CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
The appellate court sustained the dismissal made by trial court on the
RULE 2
1. GOODLAND COMPANY INC VS ASIA UNITED BANK
Facts:
Sometime in July 1999, petitioner Goodland Company, Inc. (petitioner)
mortgaged its two parcels of land situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
The Third Party Real Estate Mortgage (REM) secured the loans
extended by respondent Asia United Bank (“AUB”) to Radio Marine
Network (Smartnet), Inc. (RMNSI), doing business as Smartnet
Philippines, under the latter’s P250,000,000.00 Omnibus Credit Line
with AUB. In addition to the aforesaid collaterals, petitioner executed a
Third Party REM over its 5,801-square meter property located at
Pasong Tamo St., Makati City.
The REMs, both signed by Gilbert G. Guy, President of Goodland
Company, Inc., were duly registered by AUB with the Registry of
Deeds for Calamba, Laguna and Registry of Deeds for Makati City,
and annotated on the said titles. Subsequently, however, petitioner
repudiated the REMs by claiming that AUB and its officers unlawfully
filled up the blank mortgage forms and falsified the entries therein.
The Laguna properties were the subject of two suits filed by petitioner
to forestall their imminent foreclosure, and similar actions were likewise
instituted by petitioner involving the Makati property which is the
subject of the present case. However, the only subject of the present
petition is the Makati Property. The Laguna Properties were the subject
of separate petitions.
Petitioner instituted two suits involving the Makati Property. The first
suit filed by petitioner was an action for an annulment of the REM
covering the Makati Property on the ground of its fraudulent and
irregular execution and registration filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 56 of Makati City. On the other hand, the second suit
filed by petitioner prayed for injunctive relief and/or nullification of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale which petitioner alleged to be
procedurally and legally defective filed before the RTC, Branch 145 of
Makati City.
The RTC (Branch 145) issued an Order denying petitioner’s application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, as well as
respondents’ motion to dismiss based on forum shopping, non-
payment of correct docket fees and failure to state a cause of action.
However, the court reserved the issuance of the corresponding order
requiring petitioner to pay the appropriate docket fees after
respondents shall have submitted what they believed should have
been the correct computation thereof.
On motion of respondents, Civil Case No. 06-1032 was consolidated
with Civil Case No. 03-045. Prior to the consolidation, respondents
moved to dismiss with prejudice the two cases on the grounds of forum
shopping, and that no jurisdiction was acquired by the RTC in Civil
Case No. 03-045 for failure to pay the proper docket and other legal
fees.
In a Joint Order, the RTC (Branch 56) dismissed with prejudice the
complaints in both cases. Petitioner filed two separate motions for
reconsideration, which the RTC likewise denied. Petitioner again filed
separate appeals before the Court of Appeals (CA), which were
docketed under only one case (CA-G.R. CV No. 90418).
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
ground of forum shopping, but not on the ground of improper docket
and other legal fees.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner violated the rule against forum shopping.
Ruling:
Yes. For forum shopping can be said to exist, the following must
concur: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions, (2) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (3) the
identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
The Court ruled that these elements are present in the instant case.
There is identity of parties in the instant case notwithstanding that in
the first case (Civil Case No. 03- 045), only one bank officer (Co), the
notary public (Pelicano) and the Register of Deeds were impleaded
along with AUB as defendants, whereas in the second case (Civil Case
No. 06-1032), AUB and its two officers (Chan and Del Mundo), along
with the RTC Clerk of Court (Escasinas, Jr.), Sheriff (Magsajo) and the
Register of Deeds of Makati City (Ortile) were the named defendants.
The parties in both cases are substantially the same as they represent
the same interests and offices/positions, and who were impleaded in
their respective capacities with corresponding liabilities/duties under
the claims asserted.
The prayer for relief in the two cases was based on the same attendant
facts in the execution of REMs over petitioner’s properties in favor of
AUB. While the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, consolidation of
ownership in AUB and issuance of title in the latter’s name were set
forth only in the second case (Civil Case No. 06-1032), these were
simply the expected consequences of the REM transaction in the first
case (Civil Case No. 03-045). These eventualities are precisely what
petitioner sought to avert when it filed the first case. Undeniably then,
the injunctive relief sought against the extrajudicial foreclosure, as well
as the cancellation of the new title in the name of the creditor-
mortgagee AUB, were all premised on the alleged nullity of the REM
due to its allegedly fraudulent and irregular execution and
registration—the same facts set forth in the first case. In both cases,
petitioner asserted its right as owner of the property subject of the
REM, while AUB invoked the rights of a foreclosing creditor-
mortgagee.
With respect to identity of cause of action, a cause of action is defined
in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court as the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another. The Court made reference
to the test in determining whether or not the causes of action in the first
and second cases are identical, to wit: would the same evidence
support and establish both the present and former cause of action? If
so, the former recovery is a bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the
way of the former action.
In the first case, petitioner alleged the fraudulent and irregular
execution and registration of the REM which violated its right as owner
who did not consent thereto, while in the second case petitioner cited
further violation of its right as owner when AUB foreclosed the
property, consolidated its ownership and obtained a new TCT in its
name. Considering that the aforesaid violations of petitioner’s right as
owner in the two cases both hinge on the binding effect of the REM,
i.e., both cases will rise or fall on the issue of the validity of the REM, it
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CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
follows that the same evidence will support and establish the first and
second causes of action. The procedural infirmities or non-compliance
with legal requirements for extrajudicial foreclosure raised in the
second case were but additional grounds in support of the injunctive
relief sought against the foreclosure which was, in the first place, illegal
on account of the mortgage contract’s nullity. Evidently, petitioner
never relied solely on the alleged procedural irregularities in the
extrajudicial foreclosure when it sought the reliefs in the second case.
Lastly, Under Sec. 7, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court: The plaintiff is
required under oath to certify, among others, his undertaking to report
to the court the fact of filing of a similar case, failing which shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case, to wit: “(c) if he should thereafter
learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed. …non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.”
The Court ruled that petitioner’s act of forum shopping was deliberate
and malicious considering that it knowingly filed Civil Case No. 06-
1032 despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 03-045. This being the
case, the act of petitioner is punishable by and results in the summary
dismissal of the actions filed. Both Civil Case No. 03-045 and Civil
Case No. 06-1032 are therefore correctly dismissed with prejudice.
2. RELUCIO VS LOPEZ
G.R. No. 138497. January 16, 2002
The Case
The case is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the
decision2 of the Court of Appeals that denied a petition for certiorari
assailing the trial court’s order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss
the case against her inclusion as party defendant therein.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
“On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent Angelina Mejia
Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for “APPOINTMENT AS SOLE
ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.,” against defendant Alberto
Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio, docketed as Spec.
Proc. M3630, in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 141.
In the petition, private respondent alleged that sometime in 1968,
defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private respondent,
abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he
arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of
the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain
and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their
four children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family,
maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner
since 1976.
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
“It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio,
during their period of cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune
consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez owned or controlled
corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses,
apartments and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank
accounts and jewelry. These properties, which are in the names of
defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their
dummies and proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely
through the actual contribution of money, property and industry of
defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from
petitioner Relucio.
“In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father and
husband, he excluded the private respondent and their four children
from sharing or benefiting from the conjugal properties and the income
or fruits there from. As such, defendant Lopez either did not place
them in his name or otherwise removed, transferred, stashed away or
concealed them from the private respondent.
He placed substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the name
of petitioner Relucio.
“It was also averred that in the past twenty-five years since defendant
Lopez abandoned the private respondent, he has sold, disposed of,
alienated, transferred, assigned, canceled, removed or stashed away
properties, assets and income belonging to the conjugal partnership
with the private respondent and either spent the proceeds thereof for
his sole benefit and that of petitioner Relucio and their two illegitimate
children or permanently and fraudulently placed them beyond the
reach of the private respondent and their four children.
“On December 8, 1993, a Motion, to Dismiss the Petition was filed by
herein petitioner on the ground that private respondent has no cause of
action against her.
“An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein respondent
Judge denying petitioner Relucio’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because
some of the subject properties are registered in her name and
defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.
“Subsequently thereafter, petitioner Relucio filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the Order of the respondent Judge dated February
10, 1994 but the same was likewise denied in the Order dated May 31,
1994.”
On June 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari assailing the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss.
On May 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
denying the petition.
On June 26, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.6
However, on April 6, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal.
The Issues
1. Whether respondent’s petition for appointment as sole administratrix
of the conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto
J. Lopez established a cause of action against petitioner.
2. Whether petitioner’s inclusion as party defendant is essential in the
proceedings for a complete adjudication of the controversy.
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CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition. We resolve the issues in seriatim.
First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the
proceedings below. “A cause of action is an act or omission of one
party the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other.”
The elements of a cause of action are:
1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not
to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.
A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered
thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or proved. In order to sustain
a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must
show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim
has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain.
Hence, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged in
Special Proceedings M3630, we assay its allegations.
In Part Two on the “Nature of [the] Complaint,” respondent Angelina
Mejia Lopez summarized the causes of action alleged in the complaint
below.
The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.
Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against
petitioner. Respondent’s causes of action were all against her
husband.
The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as
administratrix of the conjugal partnership or
absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J.
Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. Article
128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit:
“If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply
with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or
for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership
property
x x x”
The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between
them, to the exclusion of all other persons.
Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband.
Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is
no right duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can
possibly support a cause of action. In fact, none of the three elements
of a cause of action exists.
The second cause of action is for an accounting “by respondent
husband.”14 The accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is
an incident of marriage.
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent
Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner
on this ground.
Respondent’s alternative cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J.
Lopez’ share in the coowned property “acquired during his illicit
relationship and cohabitation with [petitioner]”15 and for the
“dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between him [Alberto
J. Lopez] and the [respondent].”
The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez’
share in property coowned by him and petitioner. It does not involve
the issue of validity of the coownership
between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is
basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez’ share, if any there be, in
property coowned by him with petitioner.
Respondent’s asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez’
share alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share,
assuming the trial court finds in respondent’s favor, results in a breach
of an obligation to
respondent and gives rise to a cause of action.16 Such cause of
action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.
The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled
from a stranger.
The action in Special Proceedings M3630 is, to use respondent
Angelina M. Lopez’ own words, one by “an aggrieved wife against her
husband.”17 References to petitioner in the common and specific
allegations of fact in the complaint are merely incidental, to set forth
facts and circumstances that prove the causes of
action alleged against Alberto J. Lopez.
Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent’s claim for moral
damages is against Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.
To sustain a cause of action for moral damages, the complaint must
have the character of an action for
interference with marital or family relations under the Civil Code.
A real party in interest is one who stands “to be benefited or injured by
the judgment of the suit.”18 In this case, petitioner would not be
affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings M3630. If petitioner is
not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An
indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final
determination of an action. Petitioner’s participation in Special
Proceedings M3630 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can
issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of
his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to
respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez’ conjugal
partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez’ share in
property coowned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be
perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez. Nor can
petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M3630.
A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to
be joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already
parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim
subject of the action.20 In the context of her petition in the lower court,
respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were
ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with
respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over his
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share in the coownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal
partnership or absolute community property with respondent.
The Judgment
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the
decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court DISMISSES Special
Proceedings M3630 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 141 as
against petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Note.— A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the
cause of action even though the allegations may be vague or
indefinite.
3. BAYANOS VS SUSANA Realty INC .
The Case:
This petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction,
the Court holds that on the basis of the allegations of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 7373, the aforesaid case could not be one of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer within the exclusive competence of the
municipal court, but an accion publiciana which is for the recovery of
the right to possess and is a plenary action within the jurisdictional
competence of respondent court.
The Facts
The Susana Realty, Inc. (plaintiff in the court a quo as the registered
owner of two (2) parcels of land situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 28350 and 28351, sought
the recovery of the possession of its properties.
The DEFENDANTS, without the knowledge, much less the consent of
herein PLAINTIFF, by means of strategy and stealth, entered the
aforesaid premises, built their respective houses thereon and occupied
the said lots for at least three (3) years prior to this date and are still
occupying the same up to the present.
The PLAINTIFF, upon learning of DEFENDANTS' unlawful and illegal
occupancy of its above-described lots, immediately, thru letters sent to
each and everyone of them demanded that they vacate the respective
portions of the lots they are occupying, and remove therefrom any and
all structures which they may have built thereon, but defendants have
ignored plaintiff's demands and have failed and refused, and still fail
and refuse to vacate the premises they are occupying, up to the
present.
The plaintiff intends to utilize these lots in the furtherance of its
corporate purposes in order that they may yield a fair income,
however, due to the presence of the defendants thereon and their
continued refusal to vacate the premises, herein plaintiff has not been
able to utilize said lots, to the great damage and prejudice of herein
plaintiff.
Consequently, plaintiff prayed for judgment ordering defendants
(petitioners) to (1) vacate the premises and remove therefrom
whatever structures they may have built thereon, and, if they refuse to
do so, ordering the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to forcibly eject them and
demolish the aforesaid structures, at the expense of petitioners; (2)
pay damages to respondent corporation, from the date of the filing of
the complaint to the date the land is completely vacated; and (3) pay
the costs of suit.
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
For filing their answer with counterclaim several years out of time,
petitioners were declared in default. Their answer with counterclaim
was stricken from the records on January 19, 1968. Respondent
corporation was ordered to present its evidence against the
defendants.
On July 9, 1968, respondent court rendered judgment ordering
defendants (petitioners) to vacate the premises and remove whatever
improvements they may have constructed thereon, and to pay back
rentals.
In the instant petition, it is alleged:
That while it is true that whenever the allegations of a complaint fail to
plead a complete case of forcible entry and detainer, the same is under
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (Tenorio vs. Gomba, 81
Phil. 54), such ruling is not controlling in this case because the
complaint at bar alleges "stealth and strategy" as the causes of
dispossession but said complaint does not contain any specific
allegation as to when was the precise date the demand to vacate was
made. * * *
and that "the allegations in the complaint to the effect that the
defendants, thru strategy, and stealth, occupied the premises for at
least three (3) years before the filing of said complaint did not convert
the case into an accion publiciana inasmuch as mere occupation is not
illegal per se for the same may be tolerated."
On the strength of the foregoing allegations, petitioners pray that this
Court render judgment declaring respondent court to be without
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 7373 and nullifying all the proceedings
taken thereunder, and in the interim to restrain the respondent court
and the Provincial Sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution issued
therein.
On June 26, 1970, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining respondent court from issuing the special order of
demolition prayed for.
The Issue
Whether Civil Case No. 7373 is a forcible entry case, within the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts, or an accion publiciana, within the
jurisdiction of respondent Court of First Instance.
The Court’s Ruling
Yes.
The general rule is that what determines the jurisdiction of a particular
court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character
of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
The complaint in the court below alleges that defendants, by means of
stealth and without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff-corporation,
took possession of the premises in question, built their houses thereon,
and occupied the same for a period of three (3) years prior to the filing
of the complaint. It appears that the allegation of stealth was what
prompted petitioners to label the action as one for forcible entry and
insist that jurisdiction over the same property pertains to the inferior
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CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
courts. There is however, no allegation of plaintiff's prior physical
possession.
We have consistently held that a complaint for forcible entry, as
distinguished from that of unlawful detainer, in order to vest jurisdiction
upon the inferior court, must allege plaintiff's prior physical possession
of the property, as well as the fact that he was deprived of such
possession by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy and
stealth, "for if the dispossession did not take place by any of these
means, the courts of first instance, not the municipal courts, have
jurisdiction."
We deem it advisable, at this point, to reiterate the essential
differences between three kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession of real property, namely: (1) the summary action for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer; (2) the accion publiciana and (3)
the accion de revindicacion.
This case, having been filed more than one (1) year after private
respondent's deprivation of possession, is, therefore, actually an
accion publiciana.
In connection with the question raised by petitioners on the property of
the writ of execution issued by respondent court, it appears that there
is a pending motion filed by petitioners for the reconsideration of the
order granting the same, and that execution had been stayed by
respondent court. Inasmuch as the motion is still unresolved, the same
cannot be reviewed in this petition for certiorari. Moreover, whether or
not petitioner shall be permitted to appeal the decision in Civil Case
No. 7373 is still under consideration by respondent court, as there is a
pending motion filed by respondent corporation to dismiss appeal for
having been riled out of time.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by this Court on June 26, 1970 is hereby
dissolved. No special pronouncement as to costs.
RULE 3-
RULE 4- VENUE
EL HOGAR FILIPINO V SEVA
Facts:
This is an appeal taken by A.P. Seva, as judicial administrator of the
estate of Leonor G. de Seva, from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated August 3, 1931, confirming the sale made by
the sheriff of said court, of a parcel of residential property with the
improvements thereon situate in the City of Manila, and mortgaged to
the plaintiff, El Hogar Filipino, the highest bidder being Victor
Buencamino for P12,550, and ordering the issuance of another writ of
execution for the rest of the sentence under execution.
Issue:
whether or not the property herein litigated was sold extra judicially by
the sheriff of Manila
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
Whether or not there is insufficiency of the price at which the property
was sold at public auction
whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila that took
cognizance of the foreclosure proceedings here mentioned, has
jurisdiction to order the public auction sale of the mortgaged property
situate in Occidental Negros.
HELD:
No.The appellant himself answers this question in his brief recital of
the facts, wherein he states that by virtue of a writ of execution dated
June 29, 1931, issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila in the
foreclosure proceedings instituted by El Hogar Filipino against A. P,
Seva, as administrator of the estate of the late Leonor G. de Seva, the
sheriff of Manila sold the property at public auction. Inasmuch as a
competent court has ordered the public auction sale of the real
property, and this order has been carried out, the sale cannot be called
extra judicial.
No. this court laid down the following doctrine in the case of Bank of
the Philippine Islands vs. Green (52 Phil., 491) :
"MORTGAGE; SALE OF REALTY UNDER EXECUTION. Inasmuch as
the opposition to the confirmation of the sale made by the sheriff
pursuant to the execution only alleged as a ground that the price for
which the mortgaged property was sold was absolutely inadequate and
unreasonable, and whereas it has heretofore been held by this court
that a smaller price, for which the same property was sold at the first
auction, notwithstanding that it was inadequate, was not sufficient by
itself alone to,annul the order confirming the sale (which was annulled
for a different reason); therefore, the fact that the opponent was not
given an opportunity to present evidence in support of the allegations
of his opposition does not constitute a prejudicial error which would
nullify the order confirming the sale made by the sheriff."
In the present case the appellant has not shown, either in the lower
court or in this court, that there was anybody who offered, or was
willing to offer, a higher price for the property in question, if the sale
made by the sheriff to Victor Buencamino would be set aside, and
another auction sale held.
Affirmed. The court laid down the following case doctrines:
In the case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, EFFECT OF
SECTION 377, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Section 377 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, providing that actions affecting real property
shall be brought in the province where the land involved in the suit, or
some part thereof, is located, does not affect the jurisdiction of Courts
of First Instance over the land itself but relates simply to the personal
rights of the parties as to the place of trial.
VENUE NOT CONNECTED WITH JURISDICTION ; WAIVER BY
PARTIES. Venue is not connected with jurisdiction over the subject
matter; and the defendants rights in respect thereto, as they are
conferred by section 377 above referred to, may be waived expressly
or by implication. Act No. 136 before referred to having conferred the
fullest and completest jurisdiction possible upon Courts of First
Instance relative to the real estate of the Islands, section 377 referred
to will not be held or construed to restrict or limit that jurisdiction, it not
containing express provisions to that end."
"PROPERTY IN SEVERAL COUNTIES. Although there is contrary
authority, where tracts of land situated in different counties are
embraced in one mortgage, the proper court of either county has
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jurisdiction to foreclose the mortgage and order the sale of all the land.
Several mortgages securing an entire debt are in effect one and may
be foreclosed in any county in which part of the land lies.
It has already been held, therefore, that when various parcels of land
or real property situate in different provinces, are included in one
mortgage contract, the Court of First Instance of the province wherein
they are situated or a part thereof is situated, has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of an action for the foreclosure of said mortgage, and the
judgment therein rendered may be executed in all the other provinces
wherever the mortgaged real property may be found.
MIJARES VS PICCIO
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition and eertiorari with preliminary injunction
seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from enforcing his order requiring
petitioners to answer the complaint and proceed with the trial in Civil
Case No. R-3822 and asking at the same time that said order be set
aside and the case be dismissed as regards said petitioners.
On December 24, 1954, Pastora Alvarez Guanzon filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu against her husband Jose M.
Guanzon containing two causes of action: one for the annulment of a
deed of sale in favor of SulpiciaGuanzon of certain, real properties
situated in the province of Negros Occidental, and the annulment of a
deed of donation inter-vivos in favor of Joven Salvador Guanzon of
another set of real properties situated in the province of Cebu; and
another for the separation of their conjugal properties, which include
both real and personal acquired during marriage (Civil Case No. R-
3823).
On October 19, 1955, plaintiff filed a motion to bring into the case
SulpiciaGuanzon and her husband Vicente Mijares as parties
defendants alleging that their presence therein is indispensable. This
motion was granted and said defendants were duly summoned in
accordance with law.
On January 17, 1956, the new defendants SulpiciaGuanzon and
Vicente Mijares, instead of filing their answer, filed a motion to dismiss
based on three grounds, to wit: (1) that venue is improperly laid, (2)
that there is a misjoinder of causes of action and of parties defendants,
and (3) that the court has no jurisdiction over the persons of said
defendants. After hearing the parties on this motion, the court denied
the same on February 7, 1956, holding that the action is in
personam as it does not affect title to real property, that there is no
misjoinder of causes of action, and that it has jurisdiction over the
persons of the movants. The movants filed a motion for
reconsideration, and when this was denied, they interposed the
present petition for prohibition and certiorari seeking to set aside the
two orders adverted to.
Issue: Whether or not there is a misjoinder of the cause of action
Held:
YES. The present case involves the rule which allows the joinder of
several causes of action, the pertinent provision of "which
is embodied in Rule 2, section 5, which provides that "Subject to. rules
regarding venue and joinder of parties, a party may in one complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party claim state, in the alternative
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
or otherwise, as many different causes of action as he may have
against an opposing party."
While this rule appears simple, however, difficulties may arise in its
application, for it does not state specifically the cases where several
causes of action, may be joined, each case apparently depending
upon the nature of the transactions involved. But one thing is clear:
That the joining of causes of action must be subject to the rules
regarding venue and joinder of parties. If these rules are violated, then
a misjoinder of causes of action may arise.
Former Chief Justice Moran gives several illustrations of how this rule
may be applied which are interesting. On this point he makes the
following comment:
"This rule, which is now expressly extended to counterclaims, cross-
claims, and third-party claims, is subject to the limitation regarding
venue, whereby several causes of action with no common venue
cannot be joined. For instance, if A, a resident of Manila, has against
E, a resident of Baguio, two causes of action, one for money, and
another for title to real property located in Zamboanga, he cannot join
them in a single complaint, for the venue of the first action, which is
either Manila or Bagnio, is different from the venue of the second,
which is Zamboanga.
The rule is likewise subject to the limitation regarding joinder of parties.
For instance, if plaintiff A has a cause of action against B, another
cause of action against C, and another cause of action against T), the
three causes of action cannot be joined, because there would be a
misjoinder of parties defendant, each of them being interested in the
cause of action alleged against him but not in the other causes of
action pleaded against the others.1 A claim on a promissory note
against three defendants may not be joined with a claim on another
promissory note against two of the defendants, for again there is a
misjoinder of parties, the third defendant in the first cause of action not
having an interest in the second cause of action."2 (Moran, Comments
on the Ilules of Court, Vol. I, 1952 Ed., p. 24).
In the light of the instances cited by former Chief Justice Moran, it may
be stated that there is a misjoinder of causes of action in the present
case not only as regards venue but also as regards the defendants.
With regard to the first, it should be noted that the first cause of action
stated in the complaint refers to the annulment of a deed of sale of
certain real properties situated in the province of Negros Occidental,
and of a deed of donation inter vivos of another set of real properties
situated in the province of Cebu. They therefore refer to two different
transactions which affect properties situated in two different provinces.
The venue has therefore been improperly laid as regards the
properties in Negros Occidental. With regard to the second, it also
appears that the deed of sale which is sought to be annulled was made
in favor of SulpiciaGuanzon whereas the deed of donation was made
in favor of Joven Salvador Guanzon, and there is nothing from which it
may be inferred that the two defendants have a common interest that
may be joined in one cause of action. On the contrary, their interest
is distinct and separate. They cannot therefore be joined in one
cause of action.
In the light of the above considerations, it may therefore be stated
that the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners in so far as the cause of
action involving the annulment of the deed of sale covering the
properties in Negros Occidental is well taken and should have been
sustained by the lower court.
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CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND
HEALTH MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES, INC. VS UNION BANK OF
THE PHIL. ET. AL
Facts:
Union Bank filed this motion for reconsideration saying that
restructuring agreement is null and void because the borrower has not
complied with the condition precedent of the bank. It is also
unenforceable because it was only between Health and Union bank.
Paglaum was a party only to the real estate mortgages and not in the
restructuring agreement. The venue is exclusively in Cebu City, and
the assumption of the RTC's jurisdiction was without basis.
Held:
We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.
Issues raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before
this Court are deemed waived, because these should have been
brought up at the first opportunity.7 Nevertheless, there is no cogent
reason to warrant a reconsideration or modification of our 18 June
2012 Decision.
Union Bank raises three new issues that require a factual
determination that is not within the province of this Court.8 These
questions can be brought to and resolved by the RTC as it is the
proper avenue in which to raise factual issues and to present evidence
in support of these claims.
Anent Union Bank's last contention, there is no need for the Court to
discuss and revisit the issue, being a mere rehash of what we have
already resolved in our Decision.
NOCUM AND PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER VS TAN
FACTS:
Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt.
Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged
malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
INQUIRER and NOCUM alleged that the venue was improperly laid,
among many others. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the
residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of
the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and
first published.
RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of
improper venue. Aggrieved, Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion
seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the
amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended complaint, it is
alleged that "This article was printed and first published in the City of
Makati", and in par. 2.04.1, that "This caricature was printed and first
published in the City of Makati"
RTC admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the
previous order of dismissal stating that the mistake or deficiency in the
original complaint appears now to have been cured in the Amended
Complaint. Also, there is no substantial amendment, but only formal, in
the Amended Complaint which would affect the defendants’ defenses
and their Answers.
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. Two
petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners and the other
by defendants .The two petitions were consolidated. CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this PETREV filed by the petitioners.
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
Petitioners argue that since the original complaint only contained the
office address of respondent and not the latter’s actual residence or
the place where the allegedly offending news reports were printed and
first published, the original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in
its allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.
ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER THE CIVIL CASE UPON THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
HELD:
YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts
alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement
of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. Here,
the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed
before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent’s cause of action is
for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with
the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is the
RTC that is specifically designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. The Hon. Florenz D.
Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a)
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the
place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter
of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction
establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue,
a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and
respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be
conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or
agreement of the parties.
AHere, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the
article and the caricature were printed and first published in the City of
Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction.
These additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the
RTC nor would respondent’s failure to include the same in the original
complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case.
Respondent’s failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court
the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that venue was not properly laid. The term "jurisdiction" in
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as referring to the place where
actions for libel shall be filed or "venue." The amendment was merely
to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a well-established rule
that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal
actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the
action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional
impediment.
The dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper
considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed to allege
neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where the
libelous article was printed and first published. Nevertheless, before
the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended. In so
doing, the court acted properly and without any grave abuse of
discretion.
4. JUANA COMPLEX HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. VS FIL-
ESTATE LAND INC.
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CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
SUMMARY: Petitioners filed this class suit in representation of
commuters and motorists who regularly use the La Paz Road. They
filed an action for damages against Fil-Estate, who excavated and
rendered impassable the said public road, which the petitioners and
those similarly situated, have been using for more than 10 years
already. On the other hand, Fil-Estate questions the propriety of filing
the complaint as a class suit.
DOCTRINE: The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class
suit are:
1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons;
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all to court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or
representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all
concerned.
FACTS:
JCHA et.al. (Homeowners Association, individual residents of Juana
Complex I and neighboring subdivisions) instituted an action for
damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit, against Fil-Estate.
The complaint alleged that plaintiffs are regular commuters and
motorists who constantly travel along SLEX through a public road
known as La Paz Road for more than 10 years. However, Fil-Estate
deliberately excavated, ruined, and closed said road, which made it not
passable to motorists and pedestrians. Despite complaints, Fil-Estate
failed to make repairs on the road, causing damage and inconvenience
to motorists.
Fil-Estate filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss. CA upheld the RTC.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT(S):
While they agree with the CA that the complaint sufficiently stated a
cause of action, they disagree with the pronouncement that full-blown
trial on the merits was necessary. They claim that during the hearing
on the application of the writ of injunction, they had sufficiently proven
that La Paz Road was a public road and that commuters and motorists
of their neighboring villages had used this road as their means of
access to schools, churches, etc.
They also point out that La Paz Road has attained the status and
character of a public road or burdened by an apparent easement of
public right of way.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT(S):
JCHA, et al. failed to prove the existence of a right of way or a right to
pass over La Paz Road and that the closure of the said road
constituted an injury to such right. According to them, La Paz Road is a
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
torrens registered private road and there is neither a voluntary nor
legal easement constituted over it.
ISSUE(S): —Y/N
(1) WON the complaint states a cause of action; - Yes
(2) WON the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit; - Yes
(3) WON a writ of preliminary injunction is warranted - No
HELD: CA is affirmed.
1. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the
prayer of said complaint.
In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint
sufficient to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.s averments
in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road. These
are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their allegation that
they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2) an
easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said roads.
There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity
and it is the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang
that the commuters and motorists may use. Second, there is an
alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, et al. when they
excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists from
using the same. Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury and
that a valid judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the
relief sought therein.
2. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1)
the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest
to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the
class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and
can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and
motorists who use La Paz Road.
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation
of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or general
interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals
have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention
to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are
similarly situated with private respondents for they were also
prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La
Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by
private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable
to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the
complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various
barangays in Bian, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro,
Laguna.
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CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
3. A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be
thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites for its issuance are:
(1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. For the writ to issue, the right sought to be
protected must be a present right, a legal right which must be shown to
be clear and positive. This means that the persons applying for the writ
must show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed
for in their complaint.
In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof
of violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to
the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal
right therein.
Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the
parties can fully prove their respective positions on the issues.
RULE 5
RULE 6
1. SPS. PONCIANO VS. HON. PARENTELA, JR.
G.R NO. 133284, MAY 9, 2000
FACTS:
On June 13, 1995, private respondents Ildefonso and Leonora
Clamosa filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, Branch 23, against
petitioners Claro and Gloria Ponciano for unpaid cost of labor and
materials incurred by them in repairing petitioner's house in San
Roque, Cavite. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, but the same was denied by the trial
court in its Order dated September 21, 1995.
On October 18, 1995, petitioners filed their answer with compulsory
counterclaim, claiming that they have paid the total contract price
agreed upon; that despite this, the work of private respondents was
defective; and that private respondents abandoned the renovation
before it was completed. Petitioners asserted that they are entitled to
be paid P250,000 to complete the renovation, and damages.
On August 23, 1996, upon motion of private respondents, the trial court
ordered that petitioners counterclaim be stricken off from the record for
failure to comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which requires
an affidavit of non-forum shopping for all initiatory pleadings in all
courts. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration dated September
17, 1996, arguing, among others, that since their counterclaim is
compulsory in nature, it is not an initiatory pleading and therefore, does
not fall within the scope of Administrative Circular No. 04-94. However,
on October 17, 1996, the trial court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners questioned the trial court's orders before this Court by
means of a special civil action for certiorari. On February 10, 1997, the
Court's Second Division denied the petition for lack of merit.
Thereafter, petitioners filed an "Answer with Amended Compulsory
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
Counterclaim," wherein the amendment consisted of the addition of a
certification under oath in compliance with the Administrative Circular
No. 04-94. Initially, the trial court admitted such answer in its July 9,
1997 Order. However, after the filing of a motion for reconsideration by
private respondents, the court reconsidered its action and expunged
the amended compulsory counterclaim from the records. After its
denial, petitioners filed the present special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, assailing the trial court's orders denying admission of
their amended compulsory counterclaim. They assert that they should
be permitted to re-file their compulsory counterclaim provided that they
comply with such circular
ISSUE:
Whether or not an answer which asserts a compulsory counterclaim
must include a certificate of non-forum shopping.
RULING:
No. provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 do not apply to
compulsory counterclaims.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 was issued by this Court in order to
prevent the undesirable practice of forum-shopping, which exists when,
as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or
when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause, on the chance that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the counterclaims pleaded by
petitioners in their answers are compulsory in nature. The filing of a
separate action by petitioners would only result in the presentation of
the same evidence as in Civil Case No. TM-601. Proceeding from our
ruling in Santo Tomas University Hospital, petitioners need not file a
certification of non-forum shopping since their claims are not initiatory
in character, and therefore, are not covered by the provisions of
Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
WHEREFORE, the December 9, 1997 and March 17, 1998 Orders of
Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City in Civil
Case No. TM-601 are hereby SET ASIDE. The trial court is ORDERED
to ADMIT petitioners' answer with compulsory counterclaim.
2. EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY CORP. VS. HON. CUI
GR NO. L-54452, JULY 20, 1981
FACTS:
Transunion Corporation and Rey M. Pan doing business under the
name of Pan Phil. Trading entered into a dealership agreement for the
sale of merchandise. Pursuant thereto Pan Phil. Trading had to file a P
20,000 surety bond and it complied by presenting a surety bond of
Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation.
Transunion filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 115385, CFI, Manila)
against Rey M. Pan, Pan Phil. Trading and Eastern Assurance &
Surety Corporation for the full payment of merchandise delivered in the
amount of P 10,841.54.
After Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation had filed its Answer with
cross-claim, it filed a motion to file a third-party complaint against
Loreta B. Pan, wife of Rey M. Pan. The reason given in the motion is
that movant has a legal right against Loreta B. Pan. It appears that in
consideration of the surety bond, the Pan spouses executed an
9|Page
CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
Indemnity Agreement in favor of Eastern Assurance & Surety
Corporation.
The respondent judge granted the motion and admitted the third- party
complaint. Subsequently, Loreta B. Pan filed a motion to dismiss the
third-party complaint on the ground that venue was improperly laid.
She invoked paragraph 7 of the Indemnity Agreement.
The respondent judge in his order, peremptorily dismissed the third-
party complaint on the ground that the motion to dismiss was "well-
taken." The respondent judge, may his tribe vanish, did not elaborate.
A motion to reconsider the order of dismissal was denied in a similar
fashion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in dismissing the third-party
complaint.
RULING:
Yes. Petition is hereby granted by the Court despite the comment of
the respondent judge to the petition for review that in dismissing the
third-party complaint he had to uphold the policy of upholding the
sanctity of contracts in preference to the policy against multiplicity of
suits.
What the respondent judge and even petitioner's counsel failed to
perceive is that paragraph 7 of the Indemnity Agreement was imposed
on the Pan spouses by the petitioner surety company for its benefit
and convenience and therefore the latter could waive the provision by
filing its complaint, not in Quezon City, but in Manila. There is,
therefore, no sanctity of contract to hold.
But even if we assume that paragraph 7 of the Indemnity Agreement
created a reciprocal obligation, it does not necessarily follow that it is
applicable to the present situation.
It has to be remembered that a third-party complaint is but ancillary to
the main action and is a procedural device to avoid multiplicity of suits.
Because of its nature the prescriptions on jurisdiction and venue
applicable to ordinary suits may not apply. Thus a third-party complaint
has to yield to the jurisdiction and venue of the main action. This view
is supported by our decision in Republic vs. Central Surety &
Insurance Co., G.R. L-27802, Oct. 26, 1968.
3. FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. VS. TEMPONGKO
27 SCRA 418, March 28, 1969
FACTS:
In a collection action instituted in the City Court of Manila, defendant in
the course of the presentation of his evidence, obtained leave to file a
third-party complaint against the third-party defendant. After proper
proceedings, the City Court rendered judgment on the original
complaint in favor of plaintiff, and on the third-party complaint in favor
of defendant, as third-party plaintiff.
Only the third-party defendant appealed in due course from the
judgment rendered against him in the third-party complaint.
When the records were elevated to the CFI of Manila, plaintiff filed a
Motion to Remand Case to the lower court, for execution of its
judgment against defendant, alleging in substance that by virtue of
defendant's failure to appeal, its judgment against defendant had
become final and executory and was in no way affected by the appeal
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
filed by third party defendant from the judgment in favor of defendant in
the third-party complaint.
The CFI overruled defendant's opposition to plaintiff's motion and
issued an Order granting the motion for the remand of the case to the
City Court for execution of its decision against defendant, directing that
thereafter the records be sent back to it "for trial de novo insofar as the
third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant are concerned.
The Court a quo, therefore, correctly issued its order for execution of
the judgment on the principal complaint in favor of plaintiff on the
strength of this Court's ruling in Singh vs. Liberty Insurance
Corporation, this Court similarly disposed of an identical case:
It is true, as appellant claims that an appeal from the decision of an
inferior court (Municipal Court) operates to vacate said decision,
thereafter the case to stand trial de novo in the Court of First Instance,
but it seems obvious that this applies only to the party who had taken
the appeal. As against other parties adversely affected by the decision
who did not appeal, the decision must be deemed to have become
final and executory. A contrary view would lead to indefensible result.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff’s judgment in the MTC against defendant who
in turned obtained judgment for reimbursement against the third-party
defendant be deemed to have been final an executory.
RULING:
Yes. In this case, the court renders judgment on the principal complaint
in favor of plaintiff against defendant and renders another judgment on
the third-party complaint in favor of defendant as third-party plaintiff,
ordering the third-party defendant to reimburse the defendant whatever
amount said defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff in the case. Failure of
any of said parties in such a case to appeal the judgment as against
him makes such judgment final and executory. By the same token, an
appeal by one party from such judgment does not inure to the benefit
of the other party who has not appealed nor can it be deemed to be an
appeal of such other party from the judgment against him.
ACCORDINGLY, the Order of the Court a quo for the execution of the
decision of the City Court of Manila in favor of plaintiff-appellee as
against defendant-appellant is hereby affirmed. With costs against
defendant-appellant.
4. BEATRIZ VDA. DE DIOS VS. BALAGOT
20 SCRA 950, August 10, 1967
FACTS:
An action for recovery of possession of land was filed on January 24,
1963 by Beatriz G. Vda. de Dios against Leandro Balagot, in the CFI of
Rizal, Quezon City branch. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she is
the registered owner of 1,296 square meters of land situated in
Quezon City covered by TCT No. 52577 of the Registry of Deeds of
said city, issued in her name on September 6, 1960; that she had
purchased the same from J.M. Tuason & Co., then the registered
owner of the land under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 45235; that
"prior to September 6, 1960 up to the present" defendant has been in
possession of a portion of about 600 square meters of said parcel of
land, without the knowledge and tolerance of J. M. Tuason & Co., and
that in spite of demands on him by plaintiff and her predecessor-in-
interest, defendant has failed and refused to vacate the land and
remove his house and other construction thereon.
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CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
The defendant, on February 12, 1963, filed an answer with a
counterclaim. Alleged therein were that the portion of land occupied by
defendant, an area of 700 square meters, was part of the 50 quiñones
of land first owned by Telesforo Deudor in 1873; that from Pedro
Deudor, successor-in-interest of Telesforo, he bought the portion of
land in question for P4,900.00 on August 80, 1950; that right after the
sale, he took possession of the land, subsequently constructing
thereon a house worth P40,000.00; that pursuant to an agreement
between J. M. Tuason & Co., and the Deudor heirs dated March 16,
1953, defendant’s right to the land has preference over the sale in
favor of plaintiff; that, therefore, plaintiff should reconvey the portion of
the land involved herein to defendant or pay him P4,900.00 for the
land, P40,000.00 for his house, and P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees and
damages.
Plaintiff, on February 19, 1963, answered defendant’s counterclaim.
On March 14, 1963 the court set the case for hearing on May 17, 1963.
Prior to this scheduled date, however, on April 1, 1963, defendant filed
a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint, attaching the same to
the motion, against J. M. Tuason & Co. and Pedro Deudor, for
payment of the value of the house and lot in case of eviction. Plaintiff
opposed it, stating that a third-party complaint to enforce the warranty
of eviction should have been filed before the time for filing the answer,
citing Article 1559, Civil Code; and that the Tuason-Deudor agreement
defendant mentioned has been declared rescinded. Said defendant’s
motion was denied on June 11, 1963, "for lack of merit." From the
order denying his motion for leave to file a third- party complaint,
defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the third-party complaint is admissible or not.
2. Whether or not the order denying the admission of the third-party
complaint be appealed from at this stage of the proceedings.
RULING:
1. ADMISSION NECESSARY IF IT SEEKS ENFORCEMENT OF
WARRANTY AGAINST EVICTION. — As a rule the admission of a
third-party complaint is left to the discretion of the trial court. However,
if the third-party complaint seeks to enforce a vendor’s warranty in
case of eviction, the same is required by law to be resorted to instead
of being left to be filed as a separate action. If not raised in the action
for eviction, the same will not prosper and the vendor will be released
from his aforesaid warranty. It should, therefore, be admitted. In this
case, the third-party complaint, as against Pedro Deudor, seeks
enforcement of the warranty against eviction. Not only does the
admission of the third- party complaint against Pedro Deudor, avoid
multiplicity of suits: it is necessary for defendant to enforce said
warranty against his vendor.
2. Yes.
TIME OF FILING THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT. — A third-party
complaint filed after the answer but before trial is not late; the time limit
of Article 1559 of the Civil Code does not apply thereto. And Sec. 2 of
Rule 12 of the Old Rules of Court, then applicable, provided that after
service of his answer, defendant may, with notice to plaintiff, move for
leave as third-party plaintiff to file a complaint against a third-party
defendant. ORDER DISALLOWING THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
APPEALABLE. — An order disallowing a third-party complaint which
seeks to enforce a vendor’s warranty against eviction leaves nothing
further to be done in the court a quo as regards the defendant’s right to
enforce the warranty; hence, it is appealable.
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
xxxx
RULE 7
1. Felix Martos, et. al., vs New San Jose Builders, Inc. |G.R.
No. 192650 |October 24, 2012
The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where
there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading,
provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the
proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at
compliance with the rules.
FACTS:
New San Jose Builders, Inc. , is engaged in the construction
of road, bridges, buildings, and low cost houses. Private respondents
were hired by the the petitioner. Sometime in 2000, petitioner was
constrained to slow down and suspend most of the works on the SJPP
project due to lack of funds of the National Housing Authority. Thus,
the workers were informed that many of them [would] be laid off and
the rest would be reassigned to other projects. They refused to sign
the appointment papers as project employees and subsequently
refused to continue to work. Three Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and
for money claims were filed before the NLRC against petitioner and
Jose Acuzar, by private respondents who claimed to be the former
employees of petitioner. LA handed down a decision declaring, among
others, that petitioner Felix Martos was illegally dismissed and entitled
to separation pay, backwages and other monetary benefits; and
dismissing, without prejudice, the complaints/claims of the other
complainants (petitioners). Both parties appealed the LA decision to
the NLRC.
The NLRC resolved the appeal by dismissing the one filed by
respondent and partially granting that of the other petitioners. The CA
explained that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
reviving the complaints of petitioners despite their failure to verify the
same. Petitioners basically argue that the CA was wrong in affirming
the dismissal of their complaints due to their failure to verify their
position paper. They insist that the lack of verification of a position
paper is only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect. Hence, it was not
fatal to their cause of action considering that the CA could have
required them to submit the needed verification.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in dismissing the complaints.
RULING:
NO. The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations
where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a
pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the
proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at
compliance with the rules. Besides, fundamental is the precept that
rules of procedure are meant not to thwart but to facilitate the
attainment of justice; hence, their rigid application may, for deserving
reasons, be subordinated by the need for an apt dispensation of
substantial justice in the normal course. They ought to be relaxed
when there is subsequent or even substantial compliance, consistent
with the policy of liberality espoused by Rule 1, Section 6.14 Not being
inflexible, the rule on verification allows for such liberality. The
petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the Rules
when they filed their motion for reconsideration, but they refused to do
so. The Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the other
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CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
complaints were brought about by the own negligence and passive
attitude of the complainants themselves
2. PASCUAL and SANTOS, INC. v. THE MEMBERS OF THE
TRAMO WAKAS NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.
The Director of the Land Managment Bureau (LMB) granted the
petition of respondent, The Members of the
TramoWakas Neighborhood Association, Inc. (TRAMO WAKAS) which
prayed for the grant of ownership over 3 parcels of land situated in
Paranaque City. The same property is being claimed by petitioner
Pascual and Santos Inc. (PSI). PSI appealed the said decision to
higher adjudicatory bodies but was denied and dismissed for lack of
merit.
The Court of Appeals (CA) likewise dismissed the petition on
the ground of Infirm Verification and Certification of Non-forum
Shopping for the same does not show proof that the persons who
signed therein were duly authorized by the corporation. The Court
further ruled that the petition has not been filed on time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the persons who executed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping attached to PSI‘s petition were
authorized to do so
HELD:
Section 6 (d) of Rule 43 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court mandates that a petition for review shall contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping in which the Pascual and Santos
Inc. shall attest that he has not commenced any other action involving
the same issues in this Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is
such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same;
and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has
been filed or is pending before this Court, the Court of Appeals, or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal
or agency thereof within five days therefrom.
For failure to comply with this mandate, Section 7 of Rule 43 provides
that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and
the contents of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
The Court has ruled that the subsequent submission of proof of
authority to act on behalf of a petitioner corporation justifies the
relaxation of the Rules for the purpose of allowing its petition to be
given due course.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate
of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat
the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum shopping.
3. ELSA D. MEDADO, vs.HEIRS OF THE LATE
ANTONIOCONSING
FACTS: (Spouses Medado) and Estate of Consing executed Deeds of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the property identified as
Hacienda.
As part of the deal, Spouses Medado undertook to assume the estate's
loan with (PNB).
Subsequent to the sale, however, the Estate of Consing offered the
subject lots to the government. Estate of Consing also instituted with
the RTC, an action for rescission and damages against Spouses
Medado due to the alleged failure of the spouses to meet the
conditions in their agreement.
In the meantime while the case for rescission was pending, Land
Bank issued in favor of the Estate of Consing a certificate of deposit of
cash as compensation for the lots.
Spouses Medado feared that LBP would release the full proceeds
thereof to the Estate of Consing, they institute an action for injunction
to restrain LBP from releasing the remaining amount of the proceeds of
the lots to Estate of Consing, and restraining the Estate of Consing
from receiving these proceeds
RTC granter the injunction (Medado) and the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was issued. The writ was implemented 1 day before the
hearing for the motion for reconsideration filed by Heirs of Consing
Feeling aggrieved, the heirs of the late Antonio Consing
(Consing) questioned the RTC's order via a petition for certiorari filed
with the CA. They sought, among other reliefs, the dismissal of the
complaint for injunction for violation of the rules on litispendentia and
forum shopping. On the matter of the absence of a motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's order before resorting to a petition
for certiorari, the heirs explained that the implementation of the
questioned writs rendered their motion for the reconsideration moot
and academic. The heirs argued that their case was within the
exceptions to the general rule that a petition under Rule 65 will not lie
unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed.
CA NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE the ruling of RTC.
The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in taking
cognizance of Civil Case for injunction during the pendency of Civil
Case for rescission and damages as this violates the rule against
forum shopping.
ISSUES:
Was the requirement for verification and certification against forum
shopping complied with by the heris of consing when the same is
solely signed by Soledad- administratix?
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CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
Was the rule on forum shopping violated by (SpsMedado) when they
filed the complaint for injunction during the pendency of the action for
rescission and damages ( filed by the estate of Consing).
HELD:
The requirements for verification and certification against forum
shopping in the CA petition were substantially complied with, following
settled jurisprudence.
It was signed on behalf of her co-petitioners by virtue of a Special
Power of Attorney:
To protect, sue, prosecute, defend and adopt whatever action
necessary and proper relative and with respect to our right, interest
and participation over said properties
Purpose of Verification:
verification requirement is simply intended to secure an assurance that
the allegations in the pleading are true and correct, and not the product
of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
filed in good faith.
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be
signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of
them is insufficient. However, The rule of substantial compliance may
be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. Thus,
under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule
requiring the submission of such certification considering that although
it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
Settled doctrine:
Verification and certification agasint forum shopping Substantially
complied with because all the petitioners share a common interest and
invoke a common cause of action or defense. verification of a pleading
is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the
assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct.
There are recognized exceptions permitting resort to a special civil
action of certiorari even without first filing a motion for reconsideration.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its
purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any
error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case.
exceptions :
1. order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction;
2.urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner,
3. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would
be useless;
4. where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency of relief
As correctly held by the CA, a motion for reconsideration had
become useless---- naissuenaang writ of preliminary injunction
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
andcourt had decided to implement the writs
just a day before the scheduled hearing on said motion.
Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litispendentia concur.
PRP-C
(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions,
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts, and
(3) the identity of the two proceeding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration;
said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action
pendant or lispendens.[18] Applying the foregoing, there was clearly a
violation of the rule against forum shopping
All elements of litispendentia are present with the filing of the two
cases.
identity of parties ==== both involving the estate and heirs of the late
Consing on one hand, and Spouses Medado on the other. Primary
litigants in the two action, and their interests, are the same.
identity of rights==== reliefs being founded on the same set of
facts. In both cases, the parties claim their supposed right as owners
of the subject properties.--- with Spouses Medado as buyers and the
heirs as sellers,
identity of the two cases ====is such as would render the decision in
the rescission case res judicata in the injunction case, and vice versa.-
(pagnarescind- eh di yung heirs and owner, therefore the injunction
case of spsMedado would have no basis. On the other hand if the
injunction case prevails, it’s as if saying that SpsMedadoare the
owners, thus there is no cause of action to rescind the deed of sale. )
The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action
but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the
former and the present causes of action.
Factors to determine which case should be dismissed,
(1) thedate of filing, with preference generally given to the first action
filed to be retained;
(2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely
to preempt the latter action or to anticipate its filing and lay
the basis for its dismissal; and
(3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating
the issues between the parties
Ratio of res judicata requires that stability be accorded to
judgments. Controversies once decided on the merits shall remain in
repose for there should be an end to litigation which, without the
doctrine, would be endless.
4. ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR vs. CONSTANTINO
ANGELES, substituted by LUZ G. ANGELES
FACTS:
Respondent-appellee ANGELES is one of the registered owners of a
parcel of land located at 1287 Castanos Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 150872. The subject
parcel of land was occupied by one Jelly Galiga (GALIGA) from 1979
13 | P a g e
CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
up to 1993, as a lessee with a lease contract. Subsequently, Fe
Salvador (SALVADOR) alleged that she bought on September 7, 1993
the subject parcel of land from GALIGA who represented that he was
the owner, being one in possession. Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR
remained in possession of said subject property from November 1993
up to the present.
On November 18, 1993, the registered owner, the respondentappellee
ANGELES, sent a letter to petitioner-appellant SALVADOR demanding
that the latter vacate the subject property, which was not heeded by
petitioner-appellant SALVADOR. Respondent-appellee ANGELES,
thru one Rosauro Diaz, Jr. (DIAZ), filed a complaint for ejectment on
October 12, 1994 with the Metropolitan Trial Court [MeTC] of Manila,
Branch 16, docketed as Civil Case No. 146190-CV.
The [MeTC] rendered its decision on November 29, 1999 in favor of
herein respondent-appellee ANGELES, the dispositive portion of which
reads, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and
against the defendant ordering the latter and all persons claiming
under her to:
1) vacate the parcel of land located at 1287 Castanos Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, and surrender the same to the plaintiff;
2) pay the plaintiff the sum of Php1,000.00 monthly as reasonable
compensation for her use and occupancy of the above parcel of land
beginning November 1993 up to the time she has actually vacated the
premises;
3) pay the plaintiff the sum of Php5,000.00 as attorney's fees and the
cost of suit. SO ORDERED.
In the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR, she alleged,
among others, that DIAZ, who filed the complaint for ejectment, had no
authority whatsoever from respondent-appellee ANGELES at the time
of filing of the suit. Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR's appeal was
denied by the [Regional Trial Court] RTC in a Decision dated March
12, 2003. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by SALVADOR was
denied in an Order dated March 16, 2004.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review, but in a
Decision dated September 16, 2005, said petition was dismissed for
lack of merit. The CA affirmed the factual findings of the lower courts
that Galiga, the person who supposedly sold the subject premises to
petitioner, was a mere lessee of respondent, the registered owner of
the land in question. Such being the case, the lower court ruled that
Galiga could not have validly transferred ownership of subject property
to herein petitioner. It was ruled by the CA that there were no
significant facts or circumstances that the trial court overlooked or
misinterpreted, thus, it found no reason to overturn the factual findings
of the MeTC and the RTC. A motion for reconsideration of said
Decision was denied in a Resolution dated January 13, 2006.
ISSUE: Hence, the present petition, where one of the important issues
for resolution is the effect of Rosauro Diaz's (respondent's
representative) failure to present proof of his authority to represent
respondent (plaintiff before the MeTC) in filing the complaint. This
basic issue has been ignored by the MeTC and the RTC, while the CA
absolutely failed to address it, despite petitioner's insistence on it from
the very beginning, i.e., in her Answer filed with the MeTC. This is quite
unfortunate, because this threshold issue should have been resolved
at the outset as it is determinative of the court's jurisdiction over the
complaint and the plaintiff.
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
HELD: Note that the complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name
of respondent, but it was one Rosauro Diaz who executed the
verification and certification dated October 12, 1994, alleging therein
that he was respondent's attorney-in-fact. There was, however, no
copy of any document attached to the complaint to prove Diaz's
allegation regarding the authority supposedly granted to him. This
prompted petitioner to raise in her Answer and in her Position Paper,
the issue of Diaz's authority to file the case. On December 11, 1995,
more than a year after the complaint was filed, respondent attached to
his Reply and/or Comment to Respondent's (herein petitioner) Position
Paper,4 a document entitled Special Power of Attorney (SPA)5
supposedly executed by respondent in favor of Rosauro Diaz.
However, said SPA was executed only on November 16, 1994, or
more than a month after the complaint was filed, appearing to have
been notarized by one Robert F. McGuire of Santa Clara County.
Observe, further, that there was no certification from the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A, that said
person is indeed a notary public in Santa Clara County, California.
Verily, the court cannot give full faith and credit to the official acts of
said Robert McGuire, and hence, no evidentiary weight or value can be
attached to the document designated as an SPA dated November 16,
1994. Thus, there is nothing on record to show that Diaz had been
authorized by respondent to initiate the action against petitioner.
What then, is the effect of a complaint filed by one who has not proven
his authority to represent a plaintiff in filing an action? In Tamondong v.
Court of Appeals,6 the Court categorically stated that "[i]f a complaint
is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to
do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint
does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint
and the plaintiff." This ruling was reiterated in Cosco Philippines
Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Company,8 where the Court went
on to say that "[i]n order for the court to have authority to dispose of the
case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the
filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should
first be subjected to the court's jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid
complaint was ever filed with the [MeTC], the same did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of respondent [plaintiff before the lower
court]."
Pursuant to the foregoing rulings, therefore, the MeTC never acquired
jurisdiction over this case and all proceedings before it were null and
void. The courts could not have delved into the very merits of the case,
because legally, there was no complaint to speak of. The court's
jurisdiction cannot be deemed to have been invoked at all.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 146190,
dated November 29, 1999; the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. 00-96344, dated March 12, 2003; and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83467, are SET ASIDE AND
NULLIFIED. The complaint filed by respondent before the Metropolitan
Trial Court is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
5. Georgia Estel, petitionervsRecaredo Diego, Sr.
andRecaredoDiego,Jr.,
Facts:
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CASE DIGEST IN REMEDIAL 1 (CIV PRO)
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
RTC - Gingoog City denying the motion for reconsideration.
There was a complaint for forcible entry, damages and injunction with
application for TRO by Recaredos' with the MTCC of Gingoog. This
complaint alleges that on April 1991, they entered with a contract of
sale of a parcel of land with the Estel. Estel voluntarily delivered the
physical and material possession of the the subject matter after
receiving the down payment. Then the Recaredos have occupied the
land since then without any disturbances. 5 years after, Esthel with her
two sons and 5 other people uprooted the fence surrounding the land,
entered the premises and destroyed the trees and plants found therein.
Recaredo Sr., witnessed the incident but found himself helpless at that
time.
Respondents then prayed for the restoration of their possession,
issuance of permanent injunction against petitioner. MTCC issued a
TRO against petitioner and any person acting in her behalf.
In her defense and counterclaims, Estel denied the material allegations
in the complaint contending that respondents were never physical,
actual, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the land. Also
saying that he sale done before was abrogated when she offered to
return the amount which the respondents refused.
MTCC rendered order saying that the petitioners must vacate the
premises of the land and return the same to the respondents with
additional payments.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC of Gingoog, but RTC
affirmed the decision of MTCC. Petitioner then filed a petition for
review with the CA, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it as well.
Issue: (1) MTCC of Gingoog has jurisdiction over the subject matter?
(2) Complaint states no cause of action? (3) Conclusions are not
supported by competent material evidence?
Held:
(1) Petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction in the MTCC and
RTC, so she is estopped from raising that issue now. Estoppel sets in
when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the
jurisdiction of the lower court.
(2) Respondents sufficiently alleged in their complaint the material
facts constituting forcible entry, as they explicitly claimed that they had
prior possession of the land since its purchase from the petitioner, who
voluntarily delivered it to them.
6. BARROSO v. AMPIG
G.R. No. 138218; March 17, 200
FACTS:
Petitioner Barroso and private respondent Escobilio were candidates
for mayor of the municipality of Tampakan, Cotabato in May 11, 1998
elections. Private respondent filed with the COMELEC several cases
against petitioner which was dismissed by the COMELEC. Pending
appeal, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tampakan, on July 17,
1998, proclaimed petitioner as the winning mayoralty candidate.
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
On July 27, 1998, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial court,
Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato a petition contesting petitioner's
election. Private respondent failed to disclose to the court the
pendency of two pre-proclamation controversies - SPC 98-009 and
SPC 98-124. Thus petitioner sought for the dismissal of the petition for
non-compliance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94
and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Private
respondent claims that there was no need to mention the two cases
because they were deemed abandoned and rendered moot and
academic upon the filing of the election contest.
ISSUES:
Whether Pre-Proclamation cases pending before the COMELEC were
deemed terminated beginning the term of the office involved.
Whether or not the Rules of Civil Procedure will apply in Election
cases.
HELD:
SPC 98-124 was terminated pursuant to the provisions of Section 16 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166 and Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.
3049 on pending cases dated June 29, 1998. All pre-proclamation
cases pending before the Comelec in the May 11, 1998 elections were
deemed terminated at noon of June 30, 1998, the beginning of the
term of office involved; and the rulings of the board of canvassers
concerned were deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a
regular election protest by the aggrieved party. SPC 98-124 before the
Comelec was an appeal from the ruling of the board of
canvassers,hence, was deemed terminated by noon of June 30, 1998.
When private respondent filed the election contest on July 27, 1998,
SPC 98-124 had already been terminated.
The Rules of Civil Procedure generally do not apply to election cases.
They apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. Election contests are subject to the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Rule 35 thereof governs election
contests involving elective municipal officials before the Regional Trial
Courts. Rule 35 does not require that the petition contesting the
election of any municipal official be accompanied by a certification or
any statement against forum shopping.
7.Casupanan v Laroya
Two vehicles, one (“Laroya”)
other owned by (“Capitulo” )driven by (“Casupanan”)
Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-
delict,
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage.
FORUM SHOPPING-dismisssed civil case
Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the criminal case.
RTC>order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which
disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have
been an appeal.
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The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is
not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that
even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case,
such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
ISSUE : whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless
imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in
the criminal case.
HELD
Aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65.”
Clearly, the Capas RTC’s order dismissing the petition for certiorari,
on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is
erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Forum-shopping is
present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of
parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.
However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the
law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action
which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on
culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil
case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of
the fault or negligence of another.
paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (“2000 Rules” for brevity) expressly requires the accused to
litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
“SECTION 1.Institution of criminal and civil actions.– (a) x xx.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by
the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could
have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action.” (Emphasis supplied)
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action
in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed
instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the
criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent
civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising
from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action.
The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each
other.
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party
can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect
on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on
December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect
HELD > Petition for review is GRANTED.Civil Case No. 2089 is
REINSTATED.
8. SANTOS VS CA
Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met Julia Rosario Bedia in Iloilo
City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with
Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to their son in 1987. Their marriage,
however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julia’s parents, as
averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarreled about as to,
among other things, when should they start living independently from
Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse
despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk
and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that
year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military
training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to
no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed
a petition to nullify their marriage due to Julia’s alleged psychological
incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julia’s failure to return home or
at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes
psychological incapacity. Julia filed an opposition; she said that it is
Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no
collusion between the two. Leouel’s petition is however denied by the
lower and appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the
case at bar.
HELD:
No. Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code
did not define the term “psychological incapacity”, which is adopted
from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with
less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some
resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI
for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC
would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term
“psychological incapacity” defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts
in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality
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disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC
also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must
be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by
the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close
to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.
9. BPI V. CA; G.R. No. 127624 November 18, 2003
FACTS:
For the calendar year 1986, BPI Leasing Corporation, Inc. (BLC) paid
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a total of P1,139,041.49
representing 4% "contractor’s percentage tax" then imposed by
Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), based on
its gross rentals from equipment leasing for the said year amounting to
P27,783,725.42.
On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued RR 19-86. Section 6.2 thereof
provided that finance and leasing companies registered under
Republic Act 5980 shall be subject to gross receipt tax of 5%-3%-1%
on actual income earned. This means that companies registered under
Republic Act 5980, such as BLC, are not liable for "contractor’s
percentage tax" under Section 205 but are, instead, subject to "gross
receipts tax" under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC. Since
BLC had earlier paid the aforementioned "contractor’s percentage tax,"
it re-computed its tax liabilities under the "gross receipts tax" and
arrived at the amount of P361,924.44. BLC filed a claim for a refund
with the CIR for the amount of P777,117.05, representing the
difference between the P1,139,041.49 it had paid as "contractor’s
percentage tax" and P361,924.44 it should have paid for "gross
receipts tax."
The CTA dismissed the petition and denied BLC’s claim of refund and
held that RR 19-86, may only be applied prospectively such that it only
covers all leases written on or after January 1, 1987. The CTA ruled
that, since BLC’s rental income was all received prior to 1986, it follows
that this was derived from lease transactions prior to January 1, 1987,
and hence, not covered by the RR.
A motion for reconsideration of the CTA’s decision was filed, but was
denied. BLC then appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. BLC
submits that the Court of Appeals and the CTA erred in not ruling that
RR 19-86 may be applied retroactively so as to allow BLC’s claim for a
refund of P777,117.05.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the provision on the
date of effectivity of RR 19-86 is clear and unequivocal, leaving no
room for interpretation on its prospective application.
ISSUES:
WON RR 19-86 is legislative or interpretative in nature.
WON RR 19-86 is prospective or retroactive in nature.
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
WON BPI failed to meet the quantum of evidence required in refund
cases.
RULE:
1ST ISSUE – BLC attempts to convince the Court that RR 19-86 is
legislative rather than interpretative in character and hence, should
retroact to the date of effectivity of the law it seeks to interpret. A
legislative rule is in the matter of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. An
interpretative rule, on the other hand, is designed to provide guidelines
to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
The Court finds the questioned RR to be legislative in nature. Section 1
of RR 19-86 plainly states that it was promulgated pursuant to Section
277 of the NIRC (now Section 244), an express grant of authority to
the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful rules and
regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC.
Verily, it cannot be disputed that RR 19-86 was issued pursuant to the
rule-making power of the Secretary of Finance, thus making it
legislative, and not interpretative as alleged by BLC.
BLC further posits that, it is invalid for want of due process as no prior
notice, publication and public hearing attended the issuance thereof.
To support its view, BLC cited CIR v. Fortune Tobacco, et al., wherein
the Court nullified a revenue memorandum circular which reclassified
certain cigarettes and subjected them to a higher tax rate, holding it
invalid for lack of notice, publication and public hearing. In this case,
RR 19-86 would be beneficial to the taxpayers as they are subjected to
lesser taxes. Petitioner, in fact, is invoking RR 19-86 as the very basis
of its claim for refund. If it were invalid, then petitioner all the more has
no right to a refund.
2ND ISSUE – The Court now resolves whether its application should
be prospective or retroactive. Statutes, including administrative rules
and regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative
intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary
implication.In the present case, there is no indication that the RR may
operate retroactively. Furthermore, there is an express provision
stating that it "shall take effect on January 1, 1987," and that it "shall be
applicable to all leases written on or after the said date." Thus, BLC is
not in a position to invoke the provisions of RR 19-86 for lease rentals
it received prior to January 1, 1987.
3RD ISSUE – Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As
such, these are to be strictly construed against the person or entity
claiming the exemption. The burden of proof is upon him who claims
the exemption and he must be able to justify his claim by the clearest
grant under Constitutional or statutory law, and he cannot be permitted
to rely upon vague implications. Nothing that BLC has raised justifies a
tax refund.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED, and the
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
10. EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC vs CA
Facts:
Korean Airlines through its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim and
through their appointed counsel Atty. Aguinaldo filed a complaint
against Expertravel and tours (ETI) for a collection of sum of money. In
the course of the proceeding a special teleconference occurred and it
is alleged that the general manager and counsel attended such
meeting and it is further alleged the board of directors approved a
resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-
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forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged,
however, that the corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid
resolution. ETI now challenge the authority of the appointed counsel to
sign for the certification against non forum shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not a special teleconference would authorize Atty.
Aguinaldo to certify a certification against non forum shopping
Ruling: Petition GRANTED.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice
that business transactions may be made by individuals through
teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication
(three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic
medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring people together
under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of
miles.18 This type of group communication may be used in a number
of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing -
television-like communication augmented with sound; (2) computer
conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals, and
(3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with
optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying.19
A teleconference represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF)
meetings. It was first introduced in the 1960’s with American
Telephone and Telegraph’s Picturephone. At that time, however, no
demand existed for the new technology. Travel costs were reasonable
and consumers were unwilling to pay the monthly service charge for
using the picturephone, which was regarded as more of a novelty than
as an actual means for everyday communication.20 In time, people
found it advantageous to hold teleconferencing in the course of
business and corporate governance, because of the money saved,
among other advantages include:
1. People (including outside guest speakers) who wouldn’t normally
attend a distant FTF meeting can participate.
2. Follow-up to earlier meetings can be done with relative ease and
little expense.
3. Socializing is minimal compared to an FTF meeting; therefore,
meetings are shorter and more oriented to the primary purpose of the
meeting.
4. Some routine meetings are more effective since one can audio-
conference from any location equipped with a telephone.
5. Communication between the home office and field staffs is
maximized.
6. Severe climate and/or unreliable transportation may necessitate
teleconferencing.
7. Participants are generally better prepared than for FTF meetings.
8. It is particularly satisfactory for simple problem-solving, information
exchange, and procedural tasks.
9. Group members participate more equally in well-moderated
teleconferences than an FTF meeting.21
On the other hand, other private corporations opt not to hold
teleconferences because of the following disadvantages:
1. Technical failures with equipment, including connections that aren’t
made.
Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada
2. Unsatisfactory for complex interpersonal communication, such as
negotiation or bargaining.
3. Impersonal, less easy to create an atmosphere of group rapport.
4. Lack of participant familiarity with the equipment, the medium itself,
and meeting skills.
5. Acoustical problems within the teleconferencing rooms.
6. Difficulty in determining participant speaking order; frequently one
person monopolizes the meeting.
7. Greater participant preparation time needed.
8. Informal, one-to-one, social interaction not possible
.22
Indeed, teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it
does not alter the complexity of group communication. Although it may
be easier to communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be easier to
miscommunicate. Teleconferencing cannot satisfy the individual needs
of every type of meeting.23
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members
of board of directors of private corporations is a reality, in light of
Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission
issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001,
providing the guidelines to be complied with related to such
conferences.24 Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in
the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of persons in
South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate
governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim
participated in a teleconference along with the respondent’s Board of
Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if
there had been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board
resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to
file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum
shopping.
11. SHEKER VS ESTATE OF SHEKER
Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of
Victoria Medina. Alice left a holographic will which was admitted to
probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The trial court issued
an order for all creditors to file their claims against the estate. In
compliance therewith, Alan Joseph Sheker filed a contingent money
claim in the amount of P206,250.00 representing the amount of his
commission as an agent for selling some properties for Alice; and
another P275k as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.
Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Sheker’s claim alleging among
others that the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void because the
latter did not attach a certification of non-forum shopping thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of
non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate proceeding was initiated
NOT by Alan Sheker’s money claim but rather upon the filing of the
petition for allowance of the Alice Sheker’s will. Under Sections 1 and
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary
or of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
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administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would
be barred, subject to certain exceptions.

A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditor’s motion for

claims which is to be recognized and taken into consideration in the
proper disposition of the properties of the estate. And as a motion, its
office is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but
incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion
is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined
to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some
question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is
connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.

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Alcachupas, Arrabis Baronda , De las llagas, Francisco, Fua, Salva, Perida,Rizada