PANG SECKINGER 1972 The Mandarins of Imperial Brazil PDF

The Mandarins of Imperial Brazil
EUL-SOO PANG
California State College, Hayward
RON L. SECKINGER
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
The politicians of the Brazilian Empire (1822-89) have provided the in-
spiration for a tremendous production of historical writing. Scholars have
experienced difficulty, however, in making valid generalizations concerning
the career patterns of imperial politicians: recruitment, training, integra-
tion, and advancement within the ranks of the political elite.1 Good
biographies furnish useful details about individual politicians and their
careers, but do not identify the system adopted by the monarchy for the
purpose of developing its own political elite. Generalizations have been
based on individual cases, and no adequate treatment of collective career
patterns exists.
The purpose of this study is threefold: (1) to provide a general theory2
of the formation of the political elite; (2) to run a simple test of the theory
with statistical data generated from published sources; and (3) once a fair
degree of usefulness of the theory has been demonstrated, to explore
possible uses for such an approach in future historical studies of the Brazil-
ian Empire. This is only a preliminary attempt to construct a simple but
reliable historical theory by which the complex processes of imperial
politics and socioeconomic development can be explained in terms of the
role, function, and ideology of the elite. This is not to say that the study of
1
'Political elite' here refers to those persons who occupied national, provincial, and muni-
cipal administrative and political posts and participated in the formation and execution of
political decisions. Civil servants, or the 'administrative elite', are excluded from this category.
See T. B. Bottomore, 'The Administrative Elite', in The New Sociology, Irving Louis Horowitz,
ed. (New York: Galaxy Books, 1965), 357-69; and Raymond Aron, 'Social Structure and the
Ruling Class', British Journal of Sociology, 1:1 (March 1950), 1-16.
2
The term 'theory' is used here to mean the relationship of various facts to one standard
situation with a high degree of regularity. A certain situation can develop out of, say, x
number of variables. When at another time the same x number of variables is held constant,
the same result should happen. When the regularity of such a repetition in any situation with
the same variables is attained, the theory can be said to have a high validity. In this study the
theory of elite formation, while it does not have scientific rigor, does contain a number of
variables such as social status (birth and marriage), education, kinship relations, decision
and/or option to enter politics, choice in party affiliation, rotation in offices, geographical
circulation, and so forth. When these variables are found in the career of a Brazilian politician
of the imperial period, it is reasonable to assume that he was either a mandarin or a mandarin
aspirant, depending on particular circumstances.
215
2l6 EUL-SOO PANG AND RON L. SECKINGER
the elite is the only way to understand the imperial period of Brazilian
history.
The national political elite of the Brazilian Empire—that is, the high-
ranking elective and appointive officials of the imperial government—
approximates the ideal type of mandarin in role, function, and ideology.
The term 'mandarin' is used in this study to convey the similarities of the
Brazilian political elite with the elites of other countries. Broader com-
parative implications may be drawn, but that is not the intent of this
study. Traditionally, the term has been associated with Chinese political
and civil servants. In recent years, however, scholars have employed
'mandarin' as a conceptual cognate to describe the recruitment and training
of a centrally controlled political agent and his role in unifying the
country and in forging a national ideology to justify the continuation of
the existing social, economic, and political system. Thus, the term 'man-
darin' is not arbitrarily introduced in this study. The concept of the man-
darin as an educated political agent with specific functions and a national
or official ideology3 is used to simplify the task of constructing an historical
theory applicable to Brazil.
'Mandarin class' refers to the national political elite, the members of
which typically came from similar socioeconomic and educational back-
grounds, manifested similar political aspirations, and subscribed to con-
ventional political and social ideas. For the purpose of this study, the
mandarin class is operationally denned as all imperial ministers (including
presidents of the Council of Ministers, or prime ministers), members of the
Council of State (Conselho de Estado), justices of the Supreme Court
{Supremo Tribunal de Justica), imperial senators, and provincial presidents;
and those imperial deputies who had previously held one or more of the
3
The term 'mandarin' is not arbitrarily chosen. By the mid-nineteenth century, 'mandarin'
was often used to describe the imperial political elite. Aureliano Candido Tavares Bastos, an
Alagoan liberal reform-monger, called the Conservative politicians 'our mandarins'. Anyda
Marchant, Viscount Maud and the Empire of Brazil: A Biography of Irineu Evangelista de
Sousa {1813-1889) (Berkeley, 1965), 109.
An adequate treatment of the 'official or national ideology' of Brazil lies outside the scope
of this study. The term 'ideology' is used here in the sense of a set of ideas or beliefs that
rationalize the past, present, and future of society. The 'national or official ideology' means the
special set of ideas that were conventionally accepted, advocated, and practiced by the
imperial political elite to rationalize its exercise of power, to explain the national past in the
broadest sense of the word, to preserve the status quo of the Empire, and, finally, to guide the
future of the nation so as to provide historical continuity. The Constitution of 1824 and other
laws, plus various policies and ideas of the elite, constitute the core of the official ideology.
The role of the mandarin was to enforce the elements of the official ideology in order to ensure
political stability and the social continuity of the monarchy without causing fundamental
changes to the system. For an excellent study of this subject, see H61io Jaguaribe, Economic
and Political Development: A Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study (Cambridge,
Mass., 1968), 120-8. For useful definitions of ideology, see Mary Matossian, 'Ideologies of
Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities', in Political Change in Under-
developed Countries: Nationalism and Communism, John H. Kausky, ed. (New York, 1962),
252-3; David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: Phoenix, 1967), 314-23; and
Ben Halpern, 'Myth and Ideology in Modern Usage', History and Theory, I: 2 (1961), 129-
49.
THE MANDARINS OF IMPERIAL BRAZIL 217
above executive or judicial posts. Such terms as 'mandarin training' and
'mandarin career' have special conceptual meaning in this study and refer
to standard situations in the lives of the politicians described above.
Sociologists have used the term 'circulation of elites' to indicate (1)
the process by which the individual members of an elite are replaced over
time through elite recruitment, and (2) the emergence of, or the replace-
ment of the ruling elite by, a new or rival elite. The concern of this study
falls within the first definition of elite circulation. The study postulates a
process of 'mandarin training', whereby a person entered the elite by
virtue of his birthright as a member of the upper social strata, higher
education, recruitment into political and administrative offices, internship
as an imperial official on the provincial level, and his own ability to advance
his career within commonly accepted norms. The Brazilian elite circulated
not only in the sense of individuals entering and leaving the elite, but also
in a geographical sense, for the purpose of acquiring a broad range of
experience. The concept of'geographical circulation of elites' is introduced
to describe the internship component of mandarin training.
The theory of elite formation herein described may be used to reinterpret
various aspects of the history of nineteenth-century Brazil. Two aspects
are singled out for examination: the preservation of Brazil as a single
country following independence from Portugal, and its later disintegration
into semi-autonomous states when the Republic replaced the Empire.
Through their formal education and subsequent administrative internship,
the Brazilian mandarins gained national values and perspectives, which
enabled them to serve the interests of the monarchy rather than remain
the captives of regional economic and family interests. During the critical
early years of the Empire, the socially homogeneous and nationally oriented
elite was the midwife of Brazilian unity, ruling in the name of an ideology
that called for national unity under the monarchy. The unifying function
performed by the mandarins offers one explanation of the failure of Brazil
to fragment into several nations after the fashion of Spanish America.
But the elite's emphasis on national over regional values later contribu-
ted to the fall of the Empire. After 1850, the expanding coffee sector in the
center-south and the revitalized sugar economy of the north-east dis-
rupted the national ideology by which the mandarins justified their rule.
On the one hand, the mandarin ideology called for political and adminis-
trative centralization as a means of securing national unity under the
monarchy. On the other hand, the export economy required decentraliza-
tion as an incentive for growth. The inability of the mandarins, as a group,
to adjust to the needs of regional economic development manifested their
unsuitability for directing national affairs. Increasingly under attack after
1870, the official ideology remained inflexible to the demands of the ex-
port sector and contributed to disaffection with the monarchy itself. The
218 EUL-SOO PANG AND RON L. SECKINGER
mandarins thus influenced both the unity and the disintegration of imperial
Brazil.
I. THE BRAZILIAN MANDARINS
The concept of mandarin is based on the classic case of China. The
Chinese mandarins were not elected officials, but life-tenure servants of a
ruling dynasty or government. Their political responsibilities were closely
tied to the legitimacy of the emperor, king, or politician whom they
served. Mandarin status was theoretically open to persons from all social
strata, since membership in the select group was determined by general
examinations; but in reality the opportunity to acquire the necessary
education depended, to some extent, on the wealth of one's family.
Mandarins were oriented toward problems of internal administration.
After completing their formal training in the national capital, mandarins
were rotated through various provinces in the service of the national
government or dynasty, by which process they acquired a national outlook.
The ideal type of mandarin, therefore, is a specially educated, nationalized
political agent who oversees national interests in the name of the highest
political authority.4
The national political elite of imperial Brazil resembled the ideal type
of mandarin in various ways. The Brazilian mandarins might hold elective
posts or might be the appointive agents of the emperor. The internal
administration of the Empire was their concern. During their training
they were circulated through different provinces, and after achieving
mandarin status some of them continued to serve in different regions of
the Empire. Through recruitment, training, geographical circulation, and
career advancement, they overcame their provincial origins and acquired
nationally oriented attitudes. Recruitment into the mandarin class of
Brazil was even more restricted to the upper social strata than was the
case in China. Brazilian mandarins were not chosen by examinations given
to all qualified candidates, but by the process of university education,
which entailed substantial expense and was therefore generally limited to
4
The literature on the mandarins of China is extensive. For representative treatments in
English, see Ho Ping-ti, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China. Aspects of Social Mobility,
1368-1911 (New York, 1962); Robert M. Marsh, The Mandarins. The Circulation of Elites in
China, 1600-1900 (Glencoe, 111., 1961); Max Weber, 'The Chinese Literati", in From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York:
Galaxy Books, 1958), 416-44; and Cho-yun Hsu, "The Changing Relationship between Local
Society and the Central Political Power in Former Han: 206 B . C - 8 A.D.', Comparative Studies
in Society and History, 8:4 (July 1965), 358-70. See also Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An
Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1962), 109-25. Two recent works
have applied the concept of mandarin to non-Oriental elites: Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of
the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1969); and Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York, 1969).
Rupert Wilkinson, Gentlemanly Power (New York, 1964), compares the British public-school
system with the education of elites in imperial China without referring to 'British mandarins'.
Studies of elite training in various cultures are available in Rupert Wilkinson, ed., Governing
Elites. Studies in Training and Selection (New York, 1969).
scions of wealthy families; the only common alternative to university
education as an entrie into the elite was the military career, which also was
largely the prerogative of the upper strata, although individuals from the
middle and lower strata were admitted to the officer corps in increasing
numbers after 1850. Thus, the composition of the Brazilian mandarin class
was determined to a large degree by social considerations rather than on
the basis of talent.
The social system of nineteenth-century Brazil rested on export agricul-
ture and mining, both based, for the most part, on slave labor. The ruling
class, or social elite, was composed primarily of those groups associated
with the export economy—the landed aristocracy, merchants engaged in
the import-export trade, and foreign and domestic bankers. In addition
to these export-oriented groups, the social elite included the urban
professionals, high clergy, and military officers. This class was concen-
trated in those provinces (formerly captaincies-general or subordinate
captaincies) most intimately involved in the export economy, which were
also the most populous provinces: Bahia and Pernambuco in the north,
and SEo Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro in the center-south.
The social elite monopolized the occupations that were considered 'gentle-
men's careers'. The highest posts in government, law, diplomacy, public
administration, the military, and the Church were genteel professions;
medicine and engineering were more progressive vocations of the same
stripe.5 Since each of these occupations required an extensive period of
specialized training and, consequently, considerable expense, only the
sons of wealthy families could aspire to 'gentlemen's careers'.* An exam-
ination of the birthplaces of university graduates (bachare'is) in the early
nineteenth century provides evidence of the monopolization of high
education by the oligarchy of the export economy. Of the 180 Brazilians
who graduated from the University of Coimbra between 1800 and 1830,
149 (82.5 percent) came from the five wealthiest and most populous
provinces.7 Another indication of the link between higher education and
5
Gilberto Freyre, New World in the Tropics. The Culture of Modern Brazil (New York:
Vintage Books, 1963), 82, 89-90.
6
A memorial written in 1857 asserted that, prior to the establishment of law faculties in
Brazil, only 'some fortunate sons of rich landowners [fazendeiros] or of wealthy capitalists
who headed for the Old World and sought an education at the famous and decrepit [University
of] Coimbra' managed to obtain secular education. Carlos Hon6rio de Figueiredo, 'Memoria
sobre a fundacao das faculdades de direito no Brasu", Revista do Instituto Histdrico e Geogrifico
Brasileiro (hereafter cited as RIHGB), 22:4 (1859), 524.
7
The overall breakdown is as follows: Bahia, 67; Rio de Janeiro (including the court), 34;
Minas Gerais, 25; Pernambuco (including Alagoas), 18; Maranhao, 13; Sao Paulo (including
Parana), 5; Para (including Amazonas), 4; Rio Grande do Sul, 3; Goias, 2; Mato Grosso,
Espirito Santo, and Ceara, 1 each; Portuguese of Brazilian parentage, 4; unknown, 2. Luiza
da Fonseca, 'Bachareis brasileiros—Elementos biograficos (1635-1830)', in Quarto Congresso
de Histdria National, Amis, 13 vols. (Rio de Janeiro, 1950-2), XI, 331-68, 380-2, 392-405.
The number of graduates from Sao Paulo was small because that province had a small popu-
lation and was not yet integrated into the export economy; during the second half of the nine-
teenth century, population growth and the expanding coffee sector, coupled with the location
22O EUL-SOO PANG AND RON L. SECKINGER
the social elite based on the export economy is the fact that all four of the
faculties of law and medicine established in Brazil between 1808 and 1828
were located in four of the same five provinces. Thus, geographical
propinquity afforded the upper strata easy access to the training centers
where a gentleman's career was launched.
Before 1808 post-secondary education was not available in Brazil, for
Portugal, unlike Spain, did not establish institutions of higher learning in
her colonies. The University of Mexico was producing educated Creoles by
the early 1560s, and before the close of the colonial epoch the American
dominions of Spain claimed ten major and fifteen minor universities,
although some of these experienced brief and undistinguished careers.8 In
contrast, Brazil obtained her first institutions of higher education only
after the royal family fled to America before the armies of Napoleon in
1807. Prior to this time, the University of Coimbra, founded in 1288,
served as the center of professional training for the entire Portuguese
Empire. Portugal, again in contrast to Spain, did not systematically exclude
Creoles from high administrative posts. During the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, an increasing number of Brazilians made the
pilgrimage to Coimbra to be trained for careers in the socially acceptable
professions of law, government, and the like. The list of Coimbra-trained
leaders includes such luminaries from the galaxy of Brazilian heroes as
Jos6 Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva ('The Patriarch'), Jos6 da Silva Lisboa
(Visconde de Cairu), Honorio Hermeto Carneiro Leao (Marque's de
Parana), Manoel Alves Branco (second Visconde de Caravelas), Pedro
de Araiijo Lima (Marquds de Olinda), and Miguel Calmon du Pin e
Almeida (Marqu6s de Abrantes).9
The existence of a single university aided the Portuguese crown in mak-
ing sure that its metropolitan and colonial administrators would share a
common ideology, a goal that the Spanish kings attempted to accomplish
by limiting elite posts to European-born Spaniards. Brazilian students at
Coimbra came from similar backgrounds (that is, from families associated
with the export economy), but intercommunication within the prospective
elite did not begin until they met at Coimbra and studied the same ideas
under Portuguese tutelage. Long before the physical integration of Brazil
became a desideratum, elite integration was accomplished at the univer-
sity. By the time of their graduation, the students had presumably been
shorn of their parochial outlooks and had been imbued with imperial
perspectives. The graduates then embarked on their careers. Those who
entered the service of the crown began with administrative posts, usually
of a law academy in the provincial capital, gave a much larger share of university degrees to
young Paulistas.
* John Tate Lanning, Academic Culture in the Spanish Colonies (London, 1940), 33.
» Vieira Ferreira, 'Faculdades de direito do Brasil (Resumo histdrico at6 1900)', in Terceiro
Congresso de Histdria Nacional, Anais, 10 vols. (Rio de Janeiro, 1939-44), V, 289-93.
in the metropolis, and progressively advanced to higher positions in the
bureaucracy. 10
After independence, the process of elite training was transferred to
institutions of higher learning in Brazil. Prince JoSo had established cen-
ters of medical instruction in Bahia and Rio de Janeiro on arriving in
Brazil, and in 1832 these centers became full-fledged faculties of medicine.11
But Joilo had rejected entreaties for the founding of a university, and when
Brazilian independence was realized in 1822, the new nation had no
institutions devoted to the study of law.
In 1823 the Constituent Assembly debated the establishment of a new
university or universities, with many of the deputies arguing the merits
of their home provinces. The dissolution of the assembly delayed the
actual opening of law schools for five years, but the deputies agreed on
one thing: easy accessibility. Bahia and Pernambuco in the north, and
Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo in the center-south, were
regarded as the demographic and economic centers of the Empire. Con-
sequently, the imperial government made a deliberate choice in placing
law and medical schools in the populous provinces. Bahia and Rio de
Janeiro had already received medical schools before independence. Per-
nambuco and Sao Paulo, instead of the landlocked Minas Gerais, were
selected as the sites for two new law schools; in 1828 the law faculties
opened at Olinda (moved to Recife in 1854) and Sao Paulo.12 Such a
distribution allowed easy access to the prospective elite. Less wealthy
members of the landed aristocracy, merchant class, and other sectors
connected with the export economy, who could not normally have
afforded to make the trans-Atlantic voyage to Coimbra, were now able
to acquire a university education. Thus, the strategically located law and
medical schools extended not only advanced educational services to
Brazilians as a whole, but also enhanced opportunities for social mobility.
In order to preserve an Empire-wide standard in instruction and to train
students in one national ideology, professors were appointed, paid, and
frequently rotated between the two schools by the imperial government.
Similarly, students were allowed to transfer from one law faculty (or
medical faculty) to the other at any point in thefive-yearprogram.
The law faculties figured more prominently in recruiting and training
future administrators and politicians than did the schools of medicine.
10
The highest executive posts in Brazil, e.g. viceroys and captains-general, went to aristo-
cratic military officers. The real labors of administration, however, were assigned to judicial-
administrative positions, which were monopolized by professional bureaucrats trained in
civil or canon law at Coimbra. Concerning the colonial bureaucracy, see Stuart B. Schwartz,
'Magistracy and Society in Colonial Brazil', Hispanic American Historical Review (hereafter
cited as HAHR), 50:4 (November 1970), 715-30.
11
Alfredo Nascimento, 'Faculdades de medicina', in Terceiro Congresso de Histdria Nac-
ional, Amis, V, 256-60.
12
Joaquim Norberto de Souza Silva, 'Creacao de uma universidade no Imperio do Brasil',
RIHGB, 51:2 (1888), 4-11, 19.
The statesman charged with drafting the statutes of the law faculties wrote
that the faculties were established 'to the end that... able men be educated
to be one day wise magistrates and skillful lawyers, which are needed so
much; and others who might come to be worthy deputies and senators and
fit to occupy the diplomatic posts and other positions of the state'.13 The
S&O Paulo academy became the Mecca of young men from Rio de Janeiro,
Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and even the distant province of Mato
Grosso. 14 Similarly, Olinda-Recife attracted students from the north and
north-east, although the tradition of education at Coimbra was continued
by many young men from northern families for reasons of prestige. By
1856 the law schools at Sao Paulo and Olinda had graduated some 1,804
bachareis.15
Patterned after Coimbra and staffed by Coimbra-trained professors,
each law faculty offered a five-year course toward a bachelor's degree.
During those five years, the academy performed the first stage of elite
integration, synthesizing provincial attitudes into a national or Brazilian
perspective. The inculcation of common values in the law students would
become a unifying force later, when the graduates scattered to various
provinces in the service of the emperor. i« The law faculties also contributed
to elite integration in an informal manner. Cliques formed during student
years often remained strong foci of political association after graduation.
Through fraternizing and formal instruction, persons of varying back-
grounds and loyalties were knit together to form a relatively homo-
geneous elite, oriented toward the supraregional needs of the Brazilian
monarchy. In the 1850s the first Sao Paulo- and Olinda-trained mandarins
13
Luis Jose de Carvalho e Melo (Visconde de Cachoeira), quoted in ibid., 12-13. See also
Figueiredo, op. cit., 510-11.
M
Mato Grosso offers an example of the increased opportunities made available to Brazil-
ians by the establishment of the law faculties. Between 1750 and 1830, only two persons born
in Mato Grosso graduated from the University of Coimbra. Fonseca, op. cit., 390, 397. But
between 1834 and 1899, the Sao Paulo law academy awarded degrees to nineteen students
from Mato Grosso. Jose de Mesquita, 'Gente e cousas dantanho. Os primeiros bachareis
mattogrossenses', Revista do Institute) Histdrico de Mato Grosso, Ano VII, No. 14 (1925), 45.
15
Figueiredo, op. cit., 523.
16
Ferreira, op. cit., 290, 305-6. The 1857 memorial cited above depicted imperial magis-
trates as the vanguard of civilization in the Brazilian wilderness, guarantors of personal and
property rights. Figueiredo, op. cit., 508-10. During the Tokugawa period (1600-1868),
Japanese national unity was similarly fostered by the socialization of the elite in the principles
of Confucianism. See Yasuzo Horie, 'Confucian Concept of State in Tokugawa Japan',
The Kyoto University Economic Review, 32:2 (October 1962), 26-38. The University of
Chuquisaca in the Spanish colonies provides another example of elite socialization, with
different results. Students from different regions of Spanish South America gathered in
Chuquisaca, where they were schooled in doctrines that justified resistance to royal authority
under certain conditions. Many of these students later became leaders of the independence
movement in their home regions. Common values bound the graduates of Chuquisaca together
in opposition to Spain, but did not prevent the break-up of Spanish South America into
several sovereign republics. Elite socialization in this case was not a unifying force in a terri-
torial sense. See Charles W. Arnade, The Emergence of the Republic of Bolivia (Gainesville,
1957), 4-8. For comments on the ideological or cultural unity of the British and German elites,
see Wilkinson, op. cit., 132-3; and Ringer, op. cit., 81-2.
came into positions of power; gradually they replaced leaders who had been
educated at Coimbra.
By virtue of his university degree, any bacharel enjoyed the option of a
mandarin career. Not all law graduates, however, chose to enter the second
stage of mandarin training. Some went into private law practice, the
import-export trade, ranching, or agriculture, often following careers
connected with their families' economic interests. Any of these professions
could subsequently lead to a political career through election to a provincial
assembly or to the national Chamber of Deputies. But since they had
failed to complete mandarin training, such persons were less likely to
attain mandarin status. Those law graduates who accepted appointments
to imperial posts on the provincial level stood a better chance of reaching
the top echelons of governmental decision-making by way of a mandarin
career. The second stage of such a career was geographical circulation.
II. MANDARIN CAREER PATTERNS

Once a law graduate decided to enter politics, his first contacts were made
through the extended-family system; his father's political and economic
ties were especially important in determining the young man's opportuni-
ties." A few prospective mandarins were entrusted with important
imperial appointments soon after graduation. But usually the bacharel
bent on a mandarin career broke into politics by way of a period of intern-
ship, during which he served the emperor in lesser appointive positions
and, in the process, completed his training for mandarin status. Common
appointive posts for young graduates were those of municipal judge Quiz
municipal), district judge {juiz de direito), public prosecutor (promoter
ptiblico), district police chief (delegado de policia), and various minor
offices of central and provincial agencies. Higher offices included those of
provincial police chief (chefe depolicia), provincial president, and appellate
court judge (desembargador). After beginning his political career, each
person advanced according to a combination of personality, charisma,
talent, marriage ties, family connections, and political luck.
The geographical circulation of prospective mandarins took place on
three levels: intraprovincial, regional, and national. An official might
circulate almost exclusively within a single province, often his home
province. A recently graduated bacharel lacking the very best of family
connections would likely be appointed to a district (comarca) of the in-
terior as, say, a judge. But after he had served for a year or so, his party
chieftains might reward his loyalty and acknowledge his experience by
rotating him to a more prestigious district. In the province of Bahia, for
example, appointment to one of the counties (municipios) of the Reconcavo
17
Joaquim Nabuco, Um Estadista do Imperio. Nabuco de Araujo. Sua vida, suas opinioes,
sua epoca, 2 vols. (S3o Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, 1936), I, 14-13.
area was regarded as a significant advancement. To cite another example,
the municipio of Goiana in Pernambuco, although located in the interior,
commanded prestige equal to that of Recife, the capital. To gain the
experience necessary for national administration, however, a mandarin
needed to acquaint himself with the problems of more than one province.
A higher level of circulation was regional. Imperial appointees often
circulated within regions of similar social and economic conditions. A
judge serving in Bahia, for instance, was more likely to be transferred to
a province in the north or north-east than to one in the south or west. At
the level of the provincial presidency, a similar pattern may be observed.
Those who proved their abilities at the regional level were then tapped for
appointments in other regions, where they might complete the training
process.
The final level of geographical circulation was national. Officials were
rotated among various provinces in different regions. At this stage of
circulation, the posts of district judge, provincial police chief, appellate
judge, and provincial president were important. Serving as provincial
president was perhaps the most crucial stage of mandarin training. The
post frequently served as a stepping stone to higher offices, such as imperial
deputy or senator, justice of the Supreme Court, or imperial minister.
The term of office for provincial presidents was brief. Minas Gerais, for
example, had fifty-nine presidencies during the sixty-seven years of the
empire, for an average of slightly over a year per term. Adding another
fifty-eight periods during which vice-presidents exercised authority be-
tween the departure of one president and the arrival of the next, the ad-
ministrative periods averaged less than seven months.18 Comparable
figures for Mato Grosso were slightly less than two years per presidential
term and slightly less than one year per administrative period.19 Several
factors explain the rapid turnover. As political parties rotated in power,
party leaders placed their own men in the provincial presidencies. Many
presidents used their offices to secure election to the imperial Senate or
Chamber of Deputies, thereby leaving the presidencies vacant. Brief terms
permitted mandarin trainees to gain experience in several provinces in a
short period of time, and prevented their establishing strong ties in any
one.
Like district appointments, provincial presidencies varied in prestige.
The presidencies of wealthy provinces were coveted posts. Concentration
of population made Minas Gerais, Bahia, Pernambuco, and Rio de Janeiro
crucial in the party competition to gain majorities in the Chamber of
Deputies, and consequently the presidencies of these provinces carried
'• 'Governo de Minas-Gerais', Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro, I (1896), 17.

19
Based on a chart in Virgilio Corrda Filho, Mato Grosso, 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 1939),
following 54.
extra prestige. The direction of provinces that experienced chronic unrest
was a manifestation of the confidence of the emperor and his cabinet and
as such was an honor; Rio Grande do Sul is the outstanding example.
The process of geographical circulation served three basic functions: (1)
by removing a future mandarin from his home province and establishing
a direct relationship between him and the emperor, it weakened his ties
to his home province and made him dependent on the imperial government;
(2) by exposing each mandarin to different individuals, groups, and situa-
tions, it completed the broadening process begun in the university and
engendered a national perspective; and (3) it familiarized each mandarin
with the problems peculiar to different regions of the Empire, enabling
him later to make decisions with an awareness of Brazilian diversity.
Those persons who occupied the crucial position of provincial president
received still another benefit from their mandarin training. As the personal
agent of the emperor, the provincial president was charged with recon-
ciling the many differences within the province over which he presided
and with defending imperial claims to legitimacy. His practical experience
in unifying the diverse elements within a province and his intimate
association with the symbols of monarchical rule psychologically rein-
forced his attachment to the ideology of national unification under the
monarchy, and made the veteran of the provincial presidency an especially
able national administrator.
Geographical circulation at the national level completed mandarin
training. By this time one had presumably embraced the official ideology
of national unity under the monarchy, of engineering the socioeconomic
integration of the country, and of frustrating any centrifugal forces or
tendencies. Those persons who had reached this stage were considered
part of an elite 'pool', from which the emperor chose his counselors and
administrators. As political radicalization occurred, the mandarin 'pool'
was increasingly fragmented along party lines. During the last two decades
of the Empire, each party had many leaders. This permitted the emperor
considerable freedom in choosing a mandarin to organize a new cabinet.
Other party leaders were mollified with prestigious appointments to min-
isterial or diplomatic posts, or to the presidencies of important provinces.20
The imperial Senate occupied a special place in the mandarin-elite
system. The Senate was considered the highest office that a politician could
attain during his career, except for that of prime minister, because appoint-
ment for life freed him from the uncertainties to which lesser officials were
subjected. The emperor personally chose each senator from among the
20
For the idea of 'many leaders' in both parties, see Joao Moraes, 'Proclamacao da
Republica em Sao Paulo', Revista do Institute Histdrico e Geogrdfico de Sao Paulo, 18 (1903),
187-210; and Wanderley Pinho, 'Uma escolha senatorial no fim da monarquia. A questao
Moura-Carneiro da Rocha na correspondencia do Conselheiro Saraiva', RIHGB, 185 (October-
December 1944), 187-212.
three candidates receiving the most votes in a provincial election. No

province was allowed more than three senators at one time. During the
entire imperial period, only 235 persons held the coveted office. Only
persons who had served the nation in some official capacity could be
named to the Senate, but this requirement did not limit membership to
those persons who had completed mandarin training. Physicians, military
officers, merchants, planters, and ecclesiastical officials, as well as lawyer-
magistrates, were so honored by the emperor. Many began their political
careers in the provincial assemblies and then moved on to the Chamber of
Deputies. Almost all senators had previously served as imperial deputies;
many though not a majority, had served as provincial presidents. The
Senate sheltered a convenient reserve of mandarin talent, which the
emperor could tap to fill high administrative posts, such as heads of the
various ministries. Almost all members of the Council of State, and
almost all presidents of the Council of Ministers, were chosen from among
the senators.21 During the 1870s and 1880s many senators were named
presidents of key provinces, an indication of the importance of the pro-
vincial presidency at that time.
The capstone to a mandarin career was the responsibility of organizing
an imperial ministry. Pedro II usually chose for such an honor a person
who had been born in an important province, who had a university edu-
cation, and who had completed geographical circulation and had been
accepted into the ranks of the mandarins. The effectiveness of a prime
minister often did not depend on his ability to control party chiefs and
factions, but on his personal relationship with the emperor; he was
assumed to have attained his value during his apprenticeship period. The
prime minister was not expected to cater to the interests of his home
province—normally this duty fell to the imperial deputies and senators—
but to administer Brazil in the name of the crown. Above provincial
politics, the prime minister protected imperial prerogatives in the provinces
by a judicious choice of provincial presidents and other local officials. The
office of prime minister was the highest honor to which a mandarin could
aspire.
III. QUALIFICATIONS AND CASE STUDIES
Five qualifications to the above generalizations about mandarin career
patterns should be made. In the first place, the radicalization of partisan
politics during the Second Empire (1840-89) altered the purpose of
geographical circulation. Choosing a date to indicate this change is some-
what arbitrary, but 1868 will serve. Up until the formation of the cabinet
of July 16, 1868, and especially during the 'era of conciliation' (1853-7),
" Afonso de Escragnolle Taunay, O Senado do Impirio (Sao Paulo, [19417D, 13, 19-22,
34,83-4, 118.
ministerial cabinets generally included representatives of both major
parties, the Liberal and the Conservative. The provincial presidencies and
other imperial offices on the provincial level were considered primarily
administrative rather than political posts. But, because of increasing intra-
and interparty hostility, the prime ministers began to choose their ministers
on a partisan basis. After 1868 all the ministers of a cabinet belonged to
the same party, and each cabinet named party stalwarts to important
offices in the provinces. To the administrative duties of the provincial
presidents, police chiefs, and district judges were added the partisan duties
of securing electoral victory for their party.22
Because of the radicalization of politics after 1868, mandarins did not
hold office indefinitely. When a party came into power, that party con-
trolled all the imperial ministries, replaced incumbent provincial presidents
and police chiefs with party stalwarts, named party men to the district
judgeships of certain key comarcas, and asked the emperor to dismiss the
Chamber of Deputies in order that the party might gain a majority through
new elections. Only imperial senators and justices of the Supreme Court,
who enjoyed life tenure, were secure in their posts. Turned out of office,
the mandarins of the opposition party retired to their plantations, or went
into the import-export trade or into banking. In other words, they were
retired to the mandarin 'pool' until their party might return to power,
when they again would be summoned for administrative service.
For the party in power, double office-holding was common. Earlier, an
imperial deputy designated as provincial president or district judge gener-
ally relinquished his seat in the Chamber of Deputies before accepting
the provincial assignment. After 1868, one might hold both posts simul-
taneously, in order to assure the control of both posts for one's party. While
the Chamber met, the double office-holder would leave his provincial post
in the hands of a stand-in—a vice-president in the case of a provincial
president, or an alternate (suplente) in the case of a district judge. If
circumstances in the provinces demanded his presence while the Chamber
was in session, the double office-holder could entrust his seat to a substitute
while he tended to provincial duties.23 Imperial senators were often
pressed into service as provincial presidents after 1868 to serve partisan
interests.
A second qualification concerns the weakening of one's ties with one's
22
The use of the provincial presidency by the national parties to win elections frequently
occurred prior to 1868. In 1847, for example, various provincial presidents recently appointed
by the Liberal cabinet were elected to the Chamber of Deputies by the provinces over which
they presided, amid charges of electoral fraud. L. J. C. D . Mello e Mattos, Paginas d'Historia
Constitutional do Brasil, 1840-1848 (Rio de Janeiro, 1870), 353-4.
23
Double office-holding was possible only in provinces easily accessible from Rio de
Janeiro. Travel between Rio de Janeiro and the interior provinces o f Goias, Mato Grosso, and
Amazonas required so much time that one could not expect to exercise an office there and
another in the capital simultaneously.
home province during the process of geographical circulation. The rotation
of a young law graduate from, say, Bahia, through imperial posts in other
provinces necessarily weakened his power bases in Bahia. This is not to
say that such notable potentates as Joslo Mauricio Wanderley (Barao de
Cotegipe), Manoel Pinto de Sousa Dantas, and Jos6 Antonio Saraiva
forfeited all influence in Banian politics. On the contrary, provincial elites
frequently asked favors of Bahian-born mandarins for increased patronage
and other benefits, and in return the wishes of these mandarins in elections
and other matters were very much respected in Bahia. What is suggested
is not that the mandarins severed all ties with their home provinces, for
they remained members of the regional or provincial oligarchies and main-
tained their economic interests. But they did not hope to use their home
provinces as stepping stones for career advancement. For a mandarin,
career opportunities depended less on a provincial power base than on his
mandarin qualities; personal friendship with the emperor, one's position
within the party, and political luck were other factors.
The existence of alternative career patterns is a third qualification. Law-
school training and geographical circulation constituted the most common
route to mandarin status, but other avenues were open. A few mandarins
never received university degrees. Others were trained as physicians rather
than as lawyers. Still others were educated in military academies and used
careers in the army or navy as routes to mandarin status. Planters and
merchants also joined the ranks of the mandarins, usually by virtue of
election to the imperial Senate. But the highest positions in the imperial
administrative structure were normally reserved for those who had followed
the ideal pattern of mandarin training outlined above.
A fourth qualification concerns the transition from appointive, adminis-
trative posts to elective, political ones. At any level of geographical
circulation, an imperial official might be elected to some office. A district
judge, for example, might win a seat in the legislative assembly of the pro-
vince in which he was serving. Indeed, such occurrences were so common
that the imperial government attempted on several occasions to bar
imperial officials from involvement in local politics by promulgating laws
stating incompatibilities between certain public offices. Another route to
electoral politics was election to the Chamber of Deputies by one's home
province while serving as an agent of the emperor in some other province;
such success required strong family and political ties in the home province.
A final qualification is an admonition against taking the theory to be a
description of an inexorable process by which the scions of wealthy
families were selected, molded, trained, and led through a hierarchy of
offices to the upper realms of the imperial government. Many young men
who embarked on mandarin careers subsequently dropped out of the
process for their own reasons. Others died at an early age. Still others were
eliminated by their personal incompetence, by some unfortunate juncture
of events that ruined their opportunities for advancement, or by the enmity
of powerful rivals.
The theory may be illustrated by examining the careers of a few leading
mandarins, which demonstrate both the unity and diversity of the national
political elite. Jos6 Antonio Pimenta Bueno will serve as an example of a
politician who fits closely the ideal pattern of a mandarin. Born in Sao
Paulo in 1803, Pimenta Bueno acquired a modest secondary education and
was among the first graduating class of the SSo Paulo law faculty in 1832.
Named to crown and customs judgeships (juiz defora and juiz da alfdndega)
in Santos immediately after graduation, he was elevated to the post of
district judge of Santos the following year. During 1836 and 1837 he served
as president of Mato Grosso. Returning to S3o Paulo, he earned a doctor-
ate in law and was named district judge of Parana (then a district of S2o
Paulo). After a brief term as judge of the appellate court of MaranMo,
Pimenta Bueno was minister plenipotentiary to Paraguay, representative
of SSo Paulo in the Chamber of Deputies, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Minister of Justice, president of Rio Grande do Sul, imperial senator,
justice of the Supreme Court, member of the Council of State, and prime
minister. The emperor awarded him the title of MarquSs de Sao Vicente
and other ceremonial honors. Before he became prime minister in 1870,
Pimenta Bueno had held imperial appointments infivedifferent provinces.24
The best-known example of a mandarin who followed a military career
is that of Luis Alves de Lima e Silva (Duque de Caxias). Caxias was born
in 1803 in the province of Rio de Janeiro. His father was a field-marshal
in the Portuguese army, and later was an imperial senator. From the age
offive,Caxias was a soldier. He graduated from the royal military academy
in Rio de Janeiro in 1819. The expulsion of Portuguese troops from Brazil
was hisfirstcampaign, followed by tours in the south during the Cisplatine
Wars and the 'Guerra Farroupilha'. In 1840 the emperor named him
president of MaranhSo, then in the throes of a revolt against the monarchy.
He was sent to S3o Paulo and Minas Gerais to crush the Liberal revolutions
of 1842, and was then appointed president of Rio Grande do Sul, where
civil war still raged. Caxias was senator from Rio Grande do Sul, president
of that province a second time in 1851, president of the Council of Min-
isters on three occasions between 1856 and 1875, and led Brazilian troops
in the Paraguayan War. His military rank and the quality of his nobility
title rose in relation to his accomplishments, until he became commander-
in-chief of the armed forces and the only Brazilian duke.25
24
Augusto Victorino Alves Sacramento Blake, Dicclonario Biographico Brazileiro, 7 vols.
(Rio de Janeiro, 1883-1902), IV, 3 0 3 - 4 ; and Spencer Vampre, Memdrias para a Histdria da
Academia de SSo Paulo, 2 vols. (SSo Paulo, 1924), 1,116-21.
25
AntSnio da Rocha Almeida, Vultos da Pdtria. Os brasileiros mats ilustres de seu tempo, 4
vols. (Rio de Janeiro, 1961-6), I, 143-7.
23° EUL-SOO PANG AND RON L. SECKINGER
Jo§o Lins Vieira Cansansao de Sinimbu (Visconde de Sinimbu) offers
an example of a mandarin who did not follow the ideal pattern of rotating
among low-level appointments on the provincial level before holding im-
portant posts. Born in Alagoas in 1810, Sinimbu graduated from the law
faculty of Olinda in 1825 and then continued bis studies in France and
Germany. In 1839 he was elected to the provincial assembly of Alagoas
while still in Europe. Returning home, he was chosen vice-president of the
province the same year, and in December 1839 was named president of
Alagoas. Elevation to a post as important as that of provincial president
without prior service in lesser imperial positions was a rare occurrence.
Subsequently, Sinimbu followed the classic pattern: president of Sergipe,
Rio Grande do Sul, and Bahia, resident minister in Uruguay, district
judge and chief of police in the province of Rio de Janeiro, imperial
deputy and senator from Alagoas, imperial minister on several occasions,
prime minister, and member of the Council of State.2*
Other exceptions to the ideal career route might be cited. Francisco
de Paula Sousa e Melo failed to obtain a university education because of
severe health problems in his youth; yet he reached the apex of a mandarin
career, the presidency of the Council of Ministers.2? Likewise, Jose Pedro
Dias de Carvalho never acquired a university degree, but served as
minister in five cabinets, president of Minas Gerais, imperial deputy and
senator, and member of the Council of State.28 Joao Alfredo Correia de
Oliveira began his career in the provincial assembly of Pernambuco and
never exercised any of the judicial and police posts which usually gave
mandarin trainees their first political experience; nevertheless, he, too,
became prime minister.29 The routes to mandarin status were many. The
theory merely points out the most common.
IV. A PRELIMINARY TEST

An adequate test of the theory described above will require extensive
research on two different levels: first, the identification of elite members
and the accumulation of biographical data, and secondly, empirical
research on the roles of individual elite members in imperial decision-
making. Only the first level will be discussed here. Most of the office-
holders can be identified from published lists; but published biographical
data are sketchy and incomplete. The examination of all, or even a random
sample, of the elite has therefore proved impossible. A preliminary test
« Arnold Wildberger, Os Presidentes da Provincia da Bahia, Efetivos & Interims 1824-1889
(Salvador, 1949), 367-86, hereafter cited as Presidentes da Bahia.
11
S. A. Sisson, Galeria dos Brasileiros Ilustres (Os contemporaneos) ('Biblioteca Histdrica
Brasileira', 18, 2 vols.; Sao P a u l o , 1948), I I , 2 6 5 - 7 1 .
28
Sacramento Blake, op. dt., V, 116-17; a n d J o a o Camillo de Oliveira T6rres, O Conselho
de Estado ('ColecSo Ensaios Brasileiros', 2 ; Rio de Janeiro, 1965), 45.
29
Eugenio Egas, Galeria dos Presidentes de Sao Paulo, 3 vols. (Sao Paulo, 1926), I, 615,
hereafter cited as Presidentes de SSo Paulo.
THE MANDARINS OF IMPERIAL BRAZIL 23I
of the theory is here attempted, based on materials relating to the provincial
presidents of S3o Paulo, Bahia, and Mato Grosso, the imperial ministers,
and the presidents of the Council of Ministers. The social origins of the
mandarins are an aspect of the theory which cannot be tested here, due
to lack of information; only the birthplaces, education and career patterns
of the elite will be examined. Once adequate life-history materials are
available, the theory may be tested more satisfactorily.
Collections of biographical information on the presidents of Sao Paulo
and Bahia provide a core of data that may be examined in the light of
the theory of elite formation.^ The availability of such information for
these two provinces is fortunate, for both were important economically
and politically, and they belong to different geographical regions. Fairly
complete data on the presidents of Mato Grosso provide a convenient
contrast, for the relative unimportance of Mato Grosso in imperial
politics and in the national economy, its status as an outlying zone of
settlement, and its strategic military value make it a useful point of com-
parison.31
During the period of the Empire, 123 persons served as presidents of
S2o Paulo, Bahia, and Mato Grosso; six of these persons presided over
two of the three provinces. Table 1 shows composite figures for the presi-
dents' birthplaces and education. For simplicity, Brazil is considered to
be divided into two regions: the northern, comprising Amazonas, Para,
Maranhao, Piaui, Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco,
Alagoasj Sergipe, and Bahia; and the southern, comprising Mato Grosso,
Goias, Minas Gerais, Espfrito Santo, Rio de Janeiro (including the court),
Sao Paulo, Parana, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. The birth-
places of the presidents reveal that regional circulation was more common
than national circulation. Of the forty-seven Bahian presidents, thirty-
three (70.2 percent) were born in the north, compared with twelve (25.5
percent) born in the south. Similarly, thirty (60.0 percent) of the fifty
presidents of Sao Paulo were born in the south, while only fourteen (28.0
percent) were from the north. Since the birthplaces of one-quarter of the
thirty-two presidents of Mato Grosso are unknown, generalizations for
this province are less reliable; however, at least fifteen (46.9 percent) were
southerners, and at least six (18.8 percent) northerners. The figures also
indicate that the emperor (or prime minister) often called on politicians to
preside over their home provinces. Of the presidents of Sao Paulo, 28.0
percent were natives of that province, and 36.1 percent of the presidents of
30
Ibid.; and Presidentes da Bahia.
31
Data o n the presidents o f Mato Grosso were compiled from Sacramento Blake, Diccion-
ario Biographico Brazileiro; Joaquim Manoel de Macedo, Brazilian Biographical Annual,
3 vols. (Rio de Janeiro, 1876); Rubens de Mendonca, Diciondrio Biogrdfico Mato-Grossense
(Sao Paulo, 1953) and Histdria de Mato Grosso (Atravis dos sens governadores) (n.p., 1967);
Virgdio Correa Filho, 'Bahianos e m M a t o Grosso', RIHGB, 2 0 0 : 3 (1948), 7 8 - 8 1 ; Presidentes
de S3o Paulo, II; Presidentes da Bahia; and scattered archival sources.
S
N) i— * - Para
Maranhao
Piaul
Rio Grande do Norte 1
S> i-» t - Paraiba
Pernambuco
Alagoas
Sergipe
— -J Bahia
VI Total
OS I—
£ U)
(O Mato Grosso
.*> OS OS Minas Gerais i
OS oo Rio de Janeiro
Ss s: Sao Paulo
- - Parana
Rio Grande do Sul
o Total
Uruguay
Portugal
France
Unknown
Kl U Ul Grand Total
u> to o
"i NOH QNV ONVJ oos-ina zlz
B. Education by Institution
28 8 I * a
«
I f f | j || I I 1 | -a
3 I s I SI 31 is I I 3 g
Bahia 15 5 22 1 2 1 1 47 2
Sao Paulo 7 19 9 1 3 1 7 3 50
Mato Grosso 1 4 1 17 2 7 32
Total* 22 25 32 1 3 1 26 3 10 123
s
* Note: A few of the totals appear to be incorrect, but in fact are not; six persons presided
over more than one of the three provinces, and in computing the totals these persons have >
been counted only once.
>
N
r
Bahia were native Bahians. Only two (6.0 percent) of the presidents of
Mato Grosso were natives, because imperial posts were largely monopol-
ized by the five coastal provinces critical to the export economy, and
because Mato Grosso produced relatively few university graduates.
The patterns of higher education also point to a high rate of regional
circulation. Twenty-three (48.9 percent) of the Bahian presidents graduated
either from the Olinda law faculty or from the Bahia medical faculty; only
five (10.6 percent) graduated from the law faculty of S3o Paulo, and none
from the medical faculty of Rio de Janeiro. Likewise, the presidents of
SSLo Paulo were predominantly graduates of the southern schools, by a
margin of 44.0 percent to 20.0 percent from the northern schools. This
correlation, however, may have been a concomitant of the choice of
northerners to preside over Bahia and southerners over Sao Paulo.
Information regarding the education of the presidents of Mato Grosso is
inconclusive of a preference for the southern over the northern branch
of the national university. But available data do indicate that a high percen-
tage was drawn from the military, reflecting the status of Mato Grosso as
a frontier province. At least seventeen (53.1 percent) were educated in
military academies or followed military careers; this compares with 14.0
percent for Sao Paulo and 4.3 percent for Bahia.
Biographical data on the imperial ministers permit another preliminary
test of the theory. Table 2 offers composite figures on the birthplaces,
education, and high offices of the 219 persons who held ministerial port-
folios during the Empire.32 Southerners predominated, with 103 ministers
(47.0 percent) to eighty-six (39.3 percent) for the north. The five key
provinces of Pernambuco, Bahia, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao
Paulo accounted for 146 (66.6 percent) of all the ministers. Most of the
ministers were trained in law. Law degrees were held by 147 (67.0 percent);
forty-nine (22.4 percent) were trained in military academies or in the course
of a military career; ten held degrees in mathematics or civil engineering,
six in medicine, one was an ecclesiastic, and seven lacked university
degrees. The political and administrative experience of the ministers was
broad. One hundred and twelve (51.1 percent) served as president of one
or more provinces during the course of their careers. One hundred and
twenty-one (55.3 percent) were imperial senators. Fully 174 (79.5 percent)
occupied seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
A third set of data throws light on the careers of the presidents of the
Council of Ministers. Twenty-three persons served as prime minister
32
Information concerning birthplace, education, and the office of deputy was taken from
Augusto Tavares de Lyra, 'Os ministros de estado da independencia a republica', RIHGB,
193 (October-December 1946), 3-104. Which ministers served as provincial presidents and
imperial senators was determined by comparing lists in Ministerio da Justica e Neg6cios
Interiores, Arquivo Nacional, Organizafdes e Programas Ministeriais. Regime parlamentar no
Impirio, 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 1962), 3-257, 407-69.
TABLE 2
Imperial Ministers, 1822-89
A. Birthplace
North South Other
Para 2 Mato Grosso 1 Brazilian Territorial Waters 1

Maranhao 5 Minas Gerais 27 Uruguay 2
Piaui 2 Rio de Janeiro 39 Portugal 20
Ceara 8 Sao Paulo 16 France 3
Paraiba 3 Parana 4 Italy 1
Pemambuco 22 Santa Catarina 4 Africa 1
Alagoas 1 Rio Grande do Sul 12 Unknown 2
Sergipe 1
Bahia 42
Total 86 Total 103 Grand Total 219
B. Education by Course of Study C. Offices
Law 147 Provincial Presidents 112

Mathematics or civil engineering 10 Senators 121
Medicine 6 Deputies 174
Military academy or career 49
Ecclesiastical training 1
No university education 7
Total* 219
• Note: One minister had degrees in law and medicine; he is counted only once in
the total.
between the creation of the post in 1847 and the fall of the Empire in 1889.
Since all of them were quite famous, fairly complete biographical infor-
mation is readily available in published sources.33 Composite figures are
presented in Table 3.
The birthplaces of the prime ministers indicate several trends. Northern-
ers predominated over southerners, by 60.9 percent to 34.8 percent.
Nineteen (82.6 percent) of the twenty-three prime ministers were natives
of the provinces of Pernambuco, Bahia, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro,
and Sao Paulo, evidence that thesefiveprovinces did, indeed, monopolize
the highest posts of the imperial government. Bahia alone claimed nine
« Information regarding the prime ministers was compiled from the following sources:
Sisson, Galeria dos Brasileiros Ilustres; Sacramento Blake, Diccionario Biographico Brazileiro;
Almeida, Vultos da Pdtria; Macedo, Brazilian Biographical Annual; Presidentes de Sao Paulo,
II; and Presidentes da Bahia.
TABLE 3
Prime Ministers, 1847-89
A. Birthplace B. Education by Institution
North South Other
Piaul 2 Minas Gerais 4 Portugal 1 Coimbra 6

Pernambuco 2 Rio de Janeiro 2 Sao Paulo 4
Alagoas 1 Sao Paulo 2 Olinda-Recife 8
Bahia 9 Rio de Janeiro Medical
School 1
Total 14 Total 8 Grand Total 23 Military academy or career 2
No university education 1
Unknown 1
Total 23
C. Education by Course of Study D. Offices Held Before Becoming

Prime Minister
Law 18 Provincial President 19

Mathematics or civil engineering 3 Senator 20
Medicine 1 Deputy 22
Military academy 2 Supreme Court Justice 3
Council of State 19
Total* 23
* Note: One prime minister graduated from a military academy and subsequently
earned a law degree; he is counted only once in the total.
(39.1 percent) of the prime ministers. Likewise, eight prime ministers were
educated in the north, compared with five in the south. Eighteen (78.3
percent) received degrees in law, one in medicine, and three in mathematics
or civil engineering.
The career patterns of the prime ministers tend to support the theory.
Fourteen (60.9 percent) began their careers as judicial or police designates
of the imperial government on the provincial level. Six (26.1 percent) began
in provincial politics or as nonelective officials of provincial governments.
Two (8.7 percent) started at a higher level: one (Sinimbu) was named presi-
dent of Alagoas soon after completing his education, and another traded
his professorial position at the military academy for a ministerial portfolio.
Only one (Caxias) followed a military career, which in his case included
substantial administrative and political experience as president of Maran-
h§o, as president of Rio Grande do Sul twice, and as senator from the
latter province. In all, nineteen (82.6 percent) of the prime ministers served
as president of at least one province before heading the cabinet; eleven

(47.8 percent) presided over two or more provinces. Twenty-two occupied
seats in the Chamber of Deputies; Caxias was elected to the Chamber but
never assumed his post. Two accepted theirfirstministerial portfolios when
they were named prime minister; the rest had prior experience in the cabi-
net. Three were justices of the Supreme Court. Nineteen held seats on the
Council of State, and one of the other four was named to the Council but
declined. All twenty-three were senators; twenty entered before becoming
president of the Council of Ministers, two during their presidencies, and
one afterwards.
The preliminary tests using available data lend a measure of credence
to the broad outlines of the theory of elite formation described in the
preceding pages. The predominance of natives of thefiveprovinces linked
to the export economy would seem to substantiate conclusively the thesis
that these five provinces monopolized the highest posts of the imperial
government. The predominance of law graduates among the ministers and
prime ministers supports the common notion that the law faculties were the
prime suppliers of politicians and administrators under the Empire. More
than half of the ministers occupied provincial presidencies, indicating a
high rate of geographical circulation; the more detailed information on
the careers of the prime ministers provides even stronger evidence of
geographical circulation in a variety of posts. The idea that the Senate
and the Chamber of Deputies functioned as an elite 'pool' is supported by
the high percentage of ministers and prime ministers who were senators
and deputies. The large number of military officers who became ministers
backs up the assertion that a military career was the most common alter-
native to a law degree as a route to mandarin status. The existence of a
mandarin elite, educated primarily in the law faculties and trained through
the occupation of a series of imperial offices on the provincial level,
appears to be adequately demonstrated.
V. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
During the sixty-seven years of the Brazilian Empire, the national political
elite played two major roles: that of fostering national unity, and that of
presiding over the disintegration of the monarchical institutions around
which that unity was constructed. These points will be discussed briefly
in order to suggest ways in which the theory of elite formation may be used
in historical research.
Many historians and social scientists have attempted to reconcile
Brazilian diversity with the endurance of Brazil as a single political unit,
emphasizing variables ranging from the historical to the ethnocultural.34
34
Richard M. Morse, 'Some Themes of Brazilian History', The South Atlantic Quarterly,
61:2(Spring 1962), 159-82; Freyre, New World in the Tropics, 93-113; Karl F. P. von Martius,
Two historians have specifically touched on the role of the national

political elite. Joao Camillo de Oliveira T6rres states that 'the establish-
ment of a network of agents of the central authority . . . throughout the
country created, in fact, effective conditions for the political unity of the
country'. He goes on to state that political unity would have been impos-
sible without the nonpartisan 'moderating power' of the emperor and its
chief organ, the Council of State.35
Francisco Jos6 de Oliveira Vianna attributes Brazilian unity to the cen-
tripetal force of the monarchy, aided by 'an aristocracy of title, a univer-
sity elite [and] a bourgeois nobility' as agents of the emperor.36 Oliveira
Vianna refers, on the one hand, to local elites whose loyalty to the mon-
archy was ensured by a generous distribution of nobility titles and the
honors of ceremonial orders, and, on the other hand, to the national elite
trained in the institutions of higher learning. The conferring of titles and
other honors to status-hungry potentates was often, no doubt, an effective
hedge against separatist movements, for the status of local elites was
thereby linked directly to the monarchy. This, in itself, is a subject worthy
of extensive investigation. The present study, however, is concerned only
with the role of the mandarins in forging and preserving national unity.
The task that the emperor faced in seeking to reconcile regional interests
and to check unrest and the frequent armed revolts against the monarchy
was accomplished through the formation of a centrally controlled and
nationally oriented political elite. During the early years of independence
Pedro I strongly identified with the nativist element in Brazil and chose
Brazilian-born leaders as his advisers. Soon, however, he surrounded
himself with Portuguese ministers and adopted policies that the nationalists
'How the History of Brazil Should be Written', in Perspectives on Brazilian History, E.
Bradford Burns, ed. (New York, 1967), 21-41; Roger Bastide, Brasil, Terra de Contrastes,
trans. Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz, 2nd ed. (Sao Paulo, 1962); Carlos H. Oberacker, Jr.,
'A formacao da nacao brasileira', Revista de Histdria, Ano XVI, No. 29 (1957) 21-36; Hen-
rique Oscar Wiederspahn, 'O verdadeiro significado do "Estado do Brasil" e as bases dinasti-
cas de nossa unidade nacionaP, ibid., Ano XVII, No. 35 (1958), 131-45; Charles Wagley, An
Introduction to Brazil (New York, 1963), 1-24; Alexander Marchant, 'The Unity of Brazilian
History', in Brazil, Portrait of Half a Continent, T. Lynn Smith and Alexander Marchant, eds.
(New York, 1951), 37-51; Marcos Carneiro de Mendonca, 'O Marques de Pombal e a unidade
brasileira', RIHGB, 219 (April-June 1953), 59-78; Miguel Couto Filho, 'A formacao da
nacionalidade brasileira', ibid., 237 (October-December, 1957) 132-43; Alceu Amoroso
Lima, 'Psicologia do povo brasileiro', Revista do Instituto Geogrdfico e Histdrico da Bahia, No.
60 (1934), 219-39.
35
Joao Camillo de Oliveira Torres, 'Originalidade e adequacao das i n s t i t u t e s politicas
do Imperio do Brasil', in Universidade do Rio Grande do Sul, Faculdade de Filosofia, Uma
Experiencia Pioneira de Intercdmbio Cultural (P6rto Alegre, 1963), 135-6.
36
[Francisco Jose de] Oliveira Vianna, Instituicoes Politicas Brasileiras, 2 vols. (Rio de
Janeiro, 1949), I, 372-3. See ibid., 361-86, for a general discussion of the absence of nation-
alism in imperial Brazil and the unifying influence of the social and political elites sustained
by the emperor. Morse also hints at an elite variable, pointing to the nature of Brazilian
leadership during the nineteenth century as one of the three major factors contributing to
unity; but he is concerned with the presence of the monarchy, the restrained use of power
by the emperors, and the absence of charismatic leaders such as Washington or Bolivar, not
with a specially trained and nationally oriented elite. See Morse, 'Some Themes of Brazilian
History', 170-9.
considered detrimental to Brazilian interests; these actions contributed to
the dissatisfaction that led to his forced abdication in 1831. From 1831 to
1840 the nation was governed by a series of regents in the name of the child
emperor Pedro II. Lacking the direction of the legitimate heir to the
throne, Brazil under the Regency was in danger of breaking up into several
nations; indeed, the period was marked by numerous revolts against
imperial authority. Yet Brazil survived the various civil wars and regional
uprisings, for the imperial government could rely on the channels of social
communication provided by the mandarin elite. Reform measures, the
creation of the National Guard in 1831, the granting of greater autonomy
to the provinces by the 'Additional Act' of 1834, and the quasi-parliamen-
tarian system of government proved to be acceptable alternatives to the
fragmentation of the nation. The Regency period provided a unique test
of the viability of the national political elite, which was bitterly divided
over policy matters but united on the issue of national unity under the
monarchy. Common socioeconomic origins, university training, and
geographical circulation in the service of the emperor account for the
ideological integration of the mandarins. The success of the mandarins in
forging and preserving national unity was due to this common ideology.
If credit for national unity may be ascribed to the mandarins, so must
a share of the blame for the fall of the Empire. Historians have traditionally
explained the overthrow of Pedro II as the result of a withdrawal of sup-
port by the landed aristocracy (because of the abolition of slavery), the
Church (because of Church-state conflicts), and the officer corps (because
of the emperor's neglect of the military).37 An alternative explanation may
be found by studying the economic changes that Brazil experienced after
1850 and the behavior of the mandarin elite in the face of these changes.
At mid-century the long series of regional challenges to the monarchy
ended, and Brazil embarked on afifteen-yearperiod of peace and political
stability. This new-found stability, together with a number of moderate
reforms enacted by the imperial government, made the period a propitious
one for economic growth. The abolition of the slave trade in 1850 released
investment capital for development projects in agriculture, industry, and
transportation. While not a model of industrial stimulation, the commercial
code of 1850 facilitated the formation of corporations and encouraged
commercial activity in general. The imperial government promoted foreign
37
Standard interpretations include George C. A. Boehrer, Da Monarquia a Repiiblica.
Histdria do Partido Republicano do Brazil (1870-1889), trans. Berenice Xavier (Rio de Janeiro,
1954); Heitor Lyra, Histdria da Queda do Impirio ('Brasiliana', 320, 2 vols.; Sao Paulo, 1964)
and Histdrio de Dom Pedro II, 1825-1891 ('Brasiliana', 133, 3 vols.; Sao Paulo, 1938-40);
Raymundo MagalhSes, Deodoro. A espada contra o Impirio ('Brasiliana, Grande Formato',
12, 2 vols.; Sao Paulo, 1957); Jos6 Maria dos Santos, A Politico Geral do Brasil (Sao Paulo,
1930); Francisco Jose de Oliveira Vianna, O Ocaso do Impirio, 3rd ed. (Rio de Janeiro,
1959); Percy Alvin Martin, 'Causes of the Collapse of the Brazilian Empire', HAHR, 4
(February 1921), 4-48; and Jose Maria Bello, A History of Modern Brazil, 1889-1964, trans.
James L. Taylor (Stanford, 1966), 1-57.
immigration, banking, and the development of transportation systems,

particularly railways. The substitution of free labor for slaves gradually
won acceptance on the coffee plantations of the center-south, and even
some north-eastern sugar planters experimented with free labor. Banking,
railroad construction, and urban improvements boomed, as Brazil enjoyed
an unprecedented era of economic expansion. The emerging coffee sector
of the center-south and the revitalized sugar economy of the north were
integrated into the international trade, supplying the urban markets of
Europe and North America with agricultural commodities while Brazil
received manufactured goods in return. For a brief while, the 'effectiveness-
legitimacy' of the existing political institutions—that is, the institutions of
the centralized monarchy, acting in the interests of the slavocracy—
appeared to be capable of permitting the new prosperity to flourish.
The booming agricultural economy heightened the differences between
north and south, however, particularly following the close of the Para-
guayan War in 1870. Most of the foreign capital inflow and immigration
was directed to the south, and the development of transportation was
concentrated in that region. Changing patterns of labor underlined the
regional disparity. The sustained growth of the northern economy depended
on the institution of slavery, while in the south coffee planters increasingly
turned to free European immigrants as their primary source of labor.
Different attitudes and values also marked the gulf between north and
south; the new coffee aristocracy was relatively progressive and forward-
looking in its economic and social views, but most of the sugar planters
remained tradition-bound and unresponsive to change.38 Thus, while
prosperity produced the illusion of stability, the seeds of conflict were
sown in regional differentiation.
The post-1850 economic changes were the first major challenge to the
official ideology of the mandarins. Many political leaders no longer
embraced the idea of national unity and political centralization over the
economic interests of their home provinces. The differing needs of the
regional economies split the Liberal and Conservative parties into rival
factions, and the emergence of the Republican party in 1870 increased
the divisiveness within the elite.39 The political agents of the coffee and
sugar oligarchies frequently clashed over such issues as abolition, the
'moderating power' of the emperor, the need for political reform, and
38
Bastide, Brasil, Terra de Contrastes, 126-9. F o r economic changes in the center-south, see
Stanley J. Stein, Vassowas. A Brazilian Coffee County, 1850-1900 (Cambridge, Mass., 1957);
a n d Richard G r a h a m , Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850—1914 (Cambridge,
England, 1968). F o r t h e north-east, see Peter Eisenberg, 'Sugar Industry in Pernambuco,
1850-1889' ( P h . D . dissertation, Columbia University, 1969); a n d Braz d o A m a r a l , Historia da
Bahia do Imperio a Republica (Salvador, 1923).
39
Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, Historia e Teoria do Partido Politico no Direito Consti-
tucional Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro, 1948), 52. Melo Franco discusses the coffee interests that
were represented in the Republican party movement in Sao Paulo.
other problems that threatened the stability of monarchical rule. The
disparity between north and south was evident not only in the political
arena but also in the diiferent styles of elite training that had evolved at
the law faculties of S3o Paulo and Recife. Joaquim Nabuco de Araujo,
who began his legal studies in S3o Paulo and then transferred to Recife,
found the students of the northern school indifferent to the abolitionist
sentiment then very strong among students in Sao Paulo; the indifference
of the law students of the north reflected the attitudes of the sugar planters.
When Nabuco, a radical Liberal and abolitionist, was elected to the
Chamber of Deputies from Pernambuco in 1878, he went as the representa-
tive of urban, relatively progressive Recife, not as the representative
of the interior counties of proslavery tendencies.40
In the initial stage of development, an export economy requires a high
degree of decentralization, allowing a free choice of options for unchecked
growth at the local level. Once the government becomes dependent on the
export sectors for revenue, however, institutional control in the form of
exchange regulations, the supply of labor, and other protective measures
is needed to guarantee the sustained growth of the economy. During the
1870s Brazil was precisely in the midst of the expanding phase of the export
economy. Lacking industry and diversified export agriculture, the Empire
relied more and more on the coffee sector for national economic well-being.
Yet the monarchy, because of its traditional ideology of national unity
through centralized political control, was incapable of permitting the
flexible local autonomy that the expanding export economy sorely needed
in order to grow. Uniform commercial and banking codes and standard-
ized administrative practices, which once were effectively applied to the
nation at large, outlived their usefulness.41 The mandarin ideology that
had served for nation-building before 1850 was a trap froxn which the
monarchy and its elite could not extricate themselves.
To make matters worse, the clash between political factions provoked
the emperor's frequent intervention. Cabinets were overturned quickly in
order to accommodate particular factions of the Liberal and Conservative
parties. The emperor did not permit a sustained effort to modify the
political system. There were probably no major politicians during the
last two decades of the Empire, not even those who continued to embrace
the official ideology, who did not regard the free exercise of the 'moderat-
40
Joao Camillo de Oliveira Tdrres, Os Construtores do Impirio ('Brasiliana', 340; S a o
Paulo, 1968), 16. See also Carolina N a b u c o , The Life of Joaquim Nabuco, trans. Ronald Hilton
(Stanford, 1950).
41
After 1861, annual exports exceeded imports (in value) through the end o f the monarchy.
F. J. de Santa-Anna Nery, Le Brisil en 1889 (Paris, 1889), 441-65 and a chart o n 465 bis.
Concerning the export economy, see Celso Furtado, The Economic Growth of Brazil, trans.
Ricardo W. de Aguiar and Eric Charles Drysdale (Berkeley, 1963), 124-6. For the ineffective-
ness o f the banking codes in promoting commercial activities, see Joao Pandia Caldgeras, A
Politico Monetdria do Brasil (Sao Paulo, 1960), Part I, especially 9 1 - 6 .
H
ing power' by Pedro II as abusive and as detrimental to efforts for political

modernization.42 Moreover, laws promulgated by provincial assemblies
were subject to review by the Council of State, which abrogated those laws
conflicting with imperial legislation. The rapid rotation of provincial
presidents also hindered regional development by preventing the formula-
tion and execution of provincial economic programs over a sustained
period.43
Unlike the situation in 1822, the need now was not for integration but
for decentralization. The mandarins, some of whom had become regionally
oriented due to the economic changes, found themselves as a group trying
to preserve the values of the past rather than to introduce those of the
future. In short, the rise of the export economy made the mandarin class
an anachronism. The proliferation of reform proposals sponsored by
various factions after 1870 indicates a general awareness that the usefulness
of centralized political institutions had passed. But no consensus existed
on how the official ideology should be modified. Conservatives found
allies among the Republicans, and dissident Liberals voted down the pro-
grams of the Liberal ministries. The factionalism of the elite prevented a
rational approach to political reform that would preserve unity under the
monarchy while fostering regional economic growth. The monarchy was
left without an effective ideology to justify its continued rule in the chang-
ing times, and there appeared to be little chance that the monarchical
system could be adequately modified. For the champions of economic
regionalism, a quick and deadly blow to the monarchy seemed the only
recourse. Thus the fall of the Empire in 1889.
That the mandarins of the center-south adapted to the political values
of republican decentralization after 1889 more easily than their northern
counterparts was no accident. The newly acquired regional outlook of
the Sao Paulo law academy and close ties with the coffee-planter class had
made the southern mandarins effective agents of the regional economy
since about 1870. Meanwhile, the mandarins of the north, rooted in the
socially conservative sugar industry, refused to divorce themselves from
the ideology of integration and nation-building. An indication of the
regional cleavage of the elite may be found in a comparison of the birth-
places of the imperial prime ministers with those of the presidents of the
Old Republic, as shown in Tables 3 and 4.44 Of the prime ministers, 60.9
42
Anfriso F i a l h o , Processo da Monarchia Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, 1885), 11-12; a n d
Aureliano Leal, Historia Constitutional do Brazil (Rio d e Janeiro, 1915), 197. Jos6 Antonio
Saraiva o n one occasion advised Pedro I I t o 'return the crown t o the nation that gave it t o
him in 1831'.
43
O t o Prazeres, ' A economia brasileira e a administracao d a s provincias', Digesto Econd-
mico, 4 : 3 9 (February 1948), 124. See also Francisco Iglesias, Politico Econdmica do Govirno
Provincial Mineiro (1835-1889) (Rio d e Janeiro, 1958), 4 1 - 6 .
44
Table 4 is based o n Dunshee d e Abranches, Governos e Congressos da Republica dos
Estados Unidos do Brazil, 2 vols. (Sao Paulo, 1918); a n d Presidentes de Sao Paulo, I I I . T h e
*
TABLE 4
Presidents of the Old Republic, 1894-1930
A. Birthplace B. Education by Institution
North South
Paraiba 1 Minas Gerais 3 Sao Paulo 9

Rio de Janeiro 1 Recife 1
Sao Paulo 5 Military academy 1
Rio Grande do Sul 1
Total 1 Total 10 Total 11
Grand Total 11
percent were drawn from the north and 34.8 percent from the south. Of
the eleven presidents of the Old Republic, from the restitution of civilian
rule in 1894 until the Revolution of 1930, ten (90.9 percent) were southern-
ers and only one (9.1 percent) a northerner. Nine (39.1 percent) of the prime
minsters were Bahians, and four (17.4 percent) were from Sao Paulo. This
compares with five (45.5 percent) of the Republican presidents from Sao
Paulo, and none from Bahia. Patterns of education also show the shift of
power from north to south. The prime ministers were predominantly
educated in the north, by a margin of 34.8 percent to 17.4 percent. The
presidents of the Republic, on the other hand, were overwhelmingly
graduates of the Sao Paulo law faculty, by a margin of 81.8 percent to 9.1
percent. Southern mandarins dominated national politics after 1889, while
none of the major northern mandarins survived (politically) the fall of the
Empire. The economic supremacy of the center-south, and the orientation
of its leaders toward the problems of regional economic development,
made possible a southern monopoly of the federal presidency during the
Old Republic.
Unity and disintegration are only two of the themes that may be
approached via the study of the national political elite of imperial Brazil.
The themes of 'continuity and change' and 'conflict and continuity', lately
in vogue among Latin Americanists, may be viewed through the prism of
elite studies.45 Other subjects that might be examined in the light of the
theory of mandarin-elite formation include the process of economic
eleven presidents included Julio Prestes, whose assumption of the presidency was frustrated
by the Revolution of 1930.
*> John 3. Johnson, ed., Continuity and Change in Latin America (Stanford, 1964); and
Henry H. Keith and S. Fred Edwards, eds., Conflict and Continuity in Brazilian Society
(Columbia, S.C., 1969).
development, the rise of political regionalism, the rodts of the abolitionist
movement, and the relationship between education and social change. This
study does not claim to say the last word on the process or effects of
elite formation in imperial Brazil, but rather to suggest possibilities for
research.

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The Mandarins of Imperial Brazil

II. MANDARIN CAREER PATTERNS

'• 'Governo de Minas-Gerais', Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro, I (1896), 17.

three candidates receiving the most votes in a provincial election. No

IV. A PRELIMINARY TEST

North South Other

Para 2 Mato Grosso 1 Brazilian Territorial Waters 1

Total 86 Total 103 Grand Total 219

B. Education by Course of Study C. Offices

Law 147 Provincial Presidents 112

A. Birthplace B. Education by Institution

North South Other

Piaul 2 Minas Gerais 4 Portugal 1 Coimbra 6

C. Education by Course of Study D. Offices Held Before Becoming

Law 18 Provincial President 19

as president of at least one province before heading the cabinet; eleven

Two historians have specifically touched on the role of the national

immigration, banking, and the development of transportation systems,

ing power' by Pedro II as abusive and as detrimental to efforts for political

A. Birthplace B. Education by Institution

Paraiba 1 Minas Gerais 3 Sao Paulo 9

Total 1 Total 10 Total 11

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