CONSTRUCTIVE MEMORY AND DISTRIBUTED COGNITION: TOWARDS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK John Sutton Dept of Philosophy. Macquarie Univers, Syzy Seaton @semp. mg oda tpunee pl. eed ultafston 1. INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN THE SCIENCES OF MEMORY ‘Memory is studied at a bewildering mum ber of levels, witha vast aray of methods, and in a daumting range of disciplines and subdis- ciplines. Is there any sense in which these vitious memory theorists ~ from neurobiolo ists to narrative psychologists, from the com putational to the cross-cultural ~ are sodying {he same phenomena? In this exploratory position paper, I sketch the bate outline of postive framework for understanding current work on constructive remembering, both within the various ogni tive sciences, and across gulfs between the cognitive and the social sciences. 1 pinpoint Some tines of psychological theory and re Search which offer promising and compatible ‘ways of thinking about individual memory and shared, social, or collective memory simulta roously. These are obviously ambitious pro- jcts, and this paper seeks more to elicit help ‘with forging these connections than to present firm results. The aim isto deaw out some con sequences of empirical work on social memory ‘and in developmental psychology. 1 seek (0 integrate constructive memory ‘with some broader movements in the cognitive sciences which can be called the “distributed cognition’ framework. “Distributed cognition” labels loose coalition of ideas from develop mental. psychology, cognitive anthropology, dynamical systems theory, robotics, and new ropsychology, ideas which have been influen: tially synthesized und extended by the philoso pher Andy Clark (1997, 2001), As T acknowl- ‘edge below, various strands of work in the 290 psychology of memory have long been infu fenced, directly or indirectly, by theoretical and cmpirical ancestors of presen ideas on distrib luted cognition, so the possibilty ofthis ine tative work should not be too surprising. But turrent research on constructive remembering thas not yet boon explicily linked with this new consensis about dittibuted cognition, Con- smictive memory offers a rich domain and a vast fund of data to distributed cognition theo ists, while distrbuted cognition may prove a tueful forum through Which constructive memory thoorists can anchor their work inthe ‘broader cognitive sciences. The mind, on the distributed cognition perspective, isnot only embodied (in brain and body) and embedded (in a natural and social world), but is also extended beyond the boundaries of skull apd skin. Much of our ‘cognitive life depends on our abilities to con- struct and exploit what Clark calls “designer ‘environments’. For particular present purposes ‘we charactrstically form temporarily coupled systems, both with other agents and with non- biological resources: what's. siking. about human brains is that they “make the world smart so that we ean be dumb in peace” (Clark 1997, p 180; se section 2 below). in arguing that there are some stikingly convergent ideas in resent work on construc tive memory and on distributed cognition, I'm not of couse suggesting that every aspect of the cognitive psychology or the neuropsychol- ‘gy of memory ean be helpfully recast in these terms. But I do think that both research areas independently encourage work which bridges individual and social memory, agein both Constructive Memory and Distributed Cognition sth th subditcinines of peychoogy, and tessen psychology andthe soil sien, “he iden sn implausibly. co efoce a nied bear of cory along elas Te const tines, bat instead 10 delineate 0 integrated framework witin which dierent mmemery-relaed phenomena, canbe unde: Stood. his isan ener in deserve ater than prescriptive) philosophy of tins, In tended to sstemalin and celdae eng tocal_ “poins of contact betwee (sabisciplines, and to cnnty hey concep wsose empital and theoretical Bai ley spans lpe levels of explanation Scns working at “subpersonal” Tey is investigating neural mechani of men fy, or constuetng beter models of memory Systems, tnd to play lhe = report neutrality towards social sconce, er ative Sisdin tits pereived ant-naualism, Neato ‘cients’ rhetoric suggest thar bridges be tween humanities and sence wil ome Kosh the bor up, via" meleelar and cop Ste stady of memory” Saute and. Kandel 1999, p25), Some who study “socal level, in tun, think "of cognitive and aca. psschology at important bu elvan. er 36 iretevably mame by individualism red. tons. Others puso over the niyo te phenomena of memary:Sotan Engel notes that fn tecent years the topic of memory hese. come so popular i sess both biglou nd yet odely tvs. People gle seamen froma dcusion of ehitbood recoletions to national mess 8 they were pr ofthe fame. phenomenon" (999, vil. Recon Siossiplinary gatherings (chncter 1985, ara and Paterson 1998; Schacter and Scans 2000) tavesueceated mein helpily jon posog exon wet fom een St! Bln than in ately fig concep, et ‘ods, or results, * eens Phychologiss of memory are incteasingly fvae ‘of the need for empirical sense Synoptic overview of the ck. Clary to be ‘ought not trough dled armetaevaa Sn of experimental werk, bat in ewefl ie tered engagement with sleted areas of the Sontnbuing sconces. Endl Tuving, ron mending new steno to concep clay, ‘econ compiined that “our rca cont Muni’ a6 x whole does not pereive much vale in conepua alysis: hee sno prom ite of social enforcement for any sigh inh idol whe ‘night be attaced toe ener Prise" (2000.3). If we se nerdncline 4g and specialization nt as compos buts “mutually reinforcing stategies” for rsning fexibity and diverty in knowledge procs sion (Weingart 2000, p40: et Spertar 2003), thes the identification and anit of concepts hich aledy fl acon curse discpiny Bounds shoul provide one minor le fe ph losphersin the dvsion of esearch labour on ener ‘The subpersonal and the social More specie nes for new ways of dealing wit ubpeaoal and soda apes of Imemory a ones entifed in to pence ie the recent special se of Hfemary one ine, sons of auobiogapbica ter) In commentary Martin Conway wonder how the work deserted in that sso on the et soa, tod dizaive functions of abiogaphiel tmemory canbe integrated with oer phy Prodocive caret esearch on the relerate rognive-feaive ‘methanisns and. pes esse” which ae "ore Inernal 1 the Cre system (Conway 2003, 233) we mas sock 4 “unified acount” 10 deal sputaneoualy ih ese spent nd wh ss of the vet "ae of memuais in every ite" $0 Convay i atkng, Try, fr Foy integraon of empl eetods and Tidings Acros the relevant sbsisipines of pay ogy: and, secon, for beter Wesrteal frameworks fr inking about mixed suber sonal, persona, and tsi level of exp ton sipuarcousye The for nid scot ces me ‘cine agenda an tyson at ol Sad ‘Sigel wok ma cong yily “ela hat Conny smash en hat Seas memory mist be iter conesponfone or chee See eas 008 p22), 29John Sutton Meanie in a provocative contbuton tot petals, atone Nelon egies tha ausiographical merry Sopendh, £0 ¢ Stuient exten on history neatly spose pacces and ssmpion bos ind Troualty and the past (Nsion 2003). ‘She takes ast on the ili proces of aes ing claims about the nate and sbuctre of tmemory in developmental peyhology ait nm ioral tapes of aebopapiea fens and cer past forms of expen End vce vrs. So Nelson is asking ly, for eter nesta intepaton of Oe 5 Shology of menor with anally men ise dsciplins nd, secon, fr beter theo real frameworks for tiling about pects Ur atobiogapea! emery whieh may onl be well understood by working simulnously Br poyholoial sad uta historic levels of explanation These ae yet hut wits, ad anya only sanction hype swt he cet = tens of sh itrdscptinary dreams ean sl be reasonably met with some sett, BULL ope to ange that ‘Conway's tad Nelson's Wes atleast appropiate ones or the Senos of memory tu the qo sch inerdciplinay femeworks, however dant and tft, potty productive. My Broader projet i besaning fo ads both Ititon andre tea fe Se Cesta nrdsiplinariy, examining bmn the Fhe of memory seseuh n copie seen Sh vaole eefor example vom Eka 201, peel, and existing pilosophical tmp 1 Spey the requ Iercpendens eres Prenomena charactetized by fre dss pines (kicher 1992, p67, Saton forhcom Ing 2003) The poyctlogy and narsconce ot memory ately supe rags of erly dispute ce studies n posh spues sbout mdvto, level and smerny theos-consmeton (Stlar sn. Gi 1998; Schoen and Looren de ong 199% Bec 2001), My own sympathies ere ie wih pa Tosopers ot sence who prefer Dypass hesions of reduction in favour of postive Eker sects of the mechani td astviesstlypostlsted in he experi 292 tal neuropsychology of (for example) spatial memory (Craver and Darden 2001; Craver 2002), But this important work addresses rele tions between neural and cognitive sciences of ‘memory, and is not easily applicable to rela- tions between the cognitive and the social sc ences, So for current purposes, hoping o toxch Conway's and Nelson's concerns, I look here at issues which point to the relevance of fac tors outside the individual” Constructive remembering ‘The final preliminary work requited here is briefly t pick out, at a decidedly abstract level, some core guiding assumptions which 1 take to be characteristic of cognitive and de velopmental psychologists’ striking consensus About the constructive nature of remembering” A vasiey of conditions exist”, notes Daniel Schacter, “in which subjectively compelling ‘memories are grossly inaccurate” (1996, .22), pat ses atts peapetve sod compte ia de ange of ew abou he lea prs Stine Wh ects fre Shamil spaces opmton dee expt ae foluconst teas T apee wih oct (001) Cha Iman baweea coupled components of ompex ‘Suc can ofr sue anded by mechanic “emositon. Ard whe sme argue the rake Sn cependines of memory process as ea opi utneons owen pee Mem) 8) {Ges mma an ibe ew Sp tenis npo my sansa insomptible wit {em thang whi us be dpe ety one Sarous lp of scaimaging, neaopgcblogia and pheoonecaopel evince, ener, the di tbl cogiton trees fer fom arty 5 {han pron evel prone in epic req {op ateton tthe sewopsycblopia da of fetpeona meray proces One evn tort he enrochent of his oe ssn te ir coves of the a 1998 re colpea ara, sprace ‘foo ovr ecveed moms mi 1950, ch Seowspet any adem, pac Soe agement tnd sone clear exch prosenn=s in enutuetve remembering by the fate 195s, bv tuys spect on facet itary of te Sipne nels cat soli nd Natit So et Constructive Memory and Distributed Cognition As Schacter and his collngues have tem fehes demonstra of couse, neler asc *2cy' nor “ibility isa wansprent noes a ths context and ‘rato meme. heap nor foxeverinaceessible, is neither a single nr a sinple thing T te two genta ens foe work ofthe las ten yea which fl thee echo in ouiang he diibuedcogniten framework Among the mail causes diving even simple cases of remembering, payetcopic increasingly foeu on te context of tac, ‘on, ater than stey on encoding oon tho nate of encoded tacen, Conta % soe Sirect realists” assumptions, representing tories of memory donot ave wo seme at recall i fully dorined bythe tale of ie sored representation. On Tung noon of Synergistic eephory. memory” taeda “nerely potential eontibutors to eclosion" {he engram snot the memory, and aed the teurend cue andthe ena conse ma an tof episodic remembering (Schacter 1990 i S6-71, 108) Ar Susan Engel pu one reales the memory atthe moment one tds rater than merely pling out an ne eas image, or story. 0a specie Leaes of any context of real ay be dict cae of the content and format of the memasy ae rerieved (99.9.6), Secondly, ognive psychologists have senme 10 aecepe more lente and” dynes pices of longer rage. Tis i pty die to te inuenes of conection or hart ‘el Disrbuted Processing PDP) models but also arch aay of empiccalsudies ons, information, bis, andthe ole of schnas th Imemry. This internal plasticity 1 one of ie fst csious and chaaceistc femurs oft iman emery, and one which clearly ifee tates our cognitive nystems frm eure dg tl computers Is prety useful forthe comets of our files to remain cacy the sane roe the moment I clse th aight the te, sen! open them agin inthe morning Bot various Hinds of reorganization and reign ment oten happen othe infomation ruse in my brn ove the sae peed. And ince ‘in context, parla indvidal ae ae canly sei suggestion, ot fase Of souce memory (Mitchel sod ehaene 2000, ete in rlaton to asbiogeptiod menor yan tad Lats 1999) Been ad mistubtion, ay ehater fy eee i not wcssarly undepave (199, ne you ey os Somtines rh he issn. fom ol forms of pncalonnca ce th Bs of simi nad theme sch cy Bite nee odxotons as an inom type, et (WeCheiand 1995, p84} Engel my Oversea ee wring a td tater tan te exception i Be une toa Sngush between shat happened, what Sos fel abort wi happened and et eee ‘ay hae sid show what happens (1958 P16, Butte source montring Fumento Feast sugges that undcrtniing te ton in hic Sch confusions teen ule ation age range of tat Seal aectne and temperament omer factors wich ince te map en Buta psychology which deals with sich complex anal tbe neds expt cane Of thereon Berwecn ine i dues oats and process. The idea that cogntne ane tology sss the individu! men, Rave focal protester ob tented y the sae nes he tos adr main, Wht tn memset ee Saland gig? "7 OY were Pevora 2. DISTRIBUTED COGNITION AND THE EXTENDED MIND Although memory is an obvious example for teas of dseived cogiion and he extended mind, few of them have sought ones hi caine with muinsteam payche * This polite relent to ploophical views on tpemy's te mining ontaty f Ceo ent over ine. Whee many thes of Wey ok ou ert conn mem Wi pe spied in te pron pate may be a Mae Scechnan gus, city itr ws ou nea ‘soo over te bourts Someone nace ee IRE in ur yes = tht eee ale pe Serenity (ibs) vm 293John Sutton Inge! disusions but se Rowends 199, (Riper 6) Here [dsb cove cams of be Siotuiedcopiton famework in oder show tt conte en epi the atch Tis wl athe ge forsee te occont of eons betwee nile Sica or sell memory phremena ‘any Clank wns hate Hares ae ratyahor borg felon incaed and primed sas parcipate in copnive tnd Srmputtona arscare whose Bons ft tena those of skin and skal” 001, p38). Many copnive poses ~ wosing a 8 Semic pope, finding yay aroun # =o plex emvironmeny, proving a sxtac a Monk ae hytong ran processes, Bodily dynamics, and external eons sch ‘as notes, maps, and skeichpads*, Cognition Sepends' on malile lope stween bai, tov, and ysl and sei worl. Foes Sing on th noted skills nected for Nexible Su appropiate acon thors of dsb Santon suges hat n partir contexts it i essen to lean onthe ferholoial or 50" Eat eouces of extemal syabol sat oF sae poops uchins 1995) So in some sto things son ave a cog ie sotebooks incised sks siderae, sofware Ccvien fingers pub Tengages and oer Smoot syrteme, als anf momen 8 elas fends or family member become Cinoonents n broader cup systems, 9 Sentve tsk performed hy the tra alone Simpled and pegged int ths wider vor These dashed cognition claims have stronger and weaker readings and have both mctophysial end ‘netnotolopial sand, Most posh! dscxsion 0 far ht focuned on the metaphysical sue of Iwhuther ogntve pocetes relly a aly etal Bus for presem purpores the methodslgial chins Scene y Cast, Rot, Hai ee Saris the best way to avetnte ad expat many Enpmtive processes ey sugges wb to unérsan the extended hyd systems in abi eroded rains seid, Te Bo section oe et ‘hark 1997, bic also anys relevant wok in 10> oues whch I don"t mention Rete See aso Cat abd Chatmers 1998 28 ven this rough shee confi the rad cal contextueniiy of distouted or ok tended cognitive processes, Because we ae Sled in locang and exploiting spell ox ternal seuss for patil alow viened procesting, we donot need to old ful and Uae iniemal representations of al relevant aspect of te world mich faformation an be Tel out in he environmen, a Tong 38 eae Able to find he relevant safe o yma Systems whon requ Linkedin various farms of "continuous reciprocal auto’ bran ad word are often engegd in an ongo- ing interactive dance from which adaptive tm rests (Clark 1997, pp.163) Tim van Gelar explain. the motion for sang fennel) cognitive processing 38 extending fur ofthe shal "singe the nervous YS, Bey. and envionment ae all conway hanging and simlanously inning act other te te cognitive sytem is single tn sytem embracing al re, neato teowen the ner and he ober fa mar of coupling, sa Unt Boh et of processes eotnullyiflence cach eer dnetion of Songo" (ran Gelder 1995, 372) Furr, he Sane sx onthe plaiciy of eral epee Sontation as ‘we sew inthe Consustive me framework is elvan here. I's jst be. ouse the connections mails; sold items ae at sored dsinty and permancely inthe bran that our restvey uneable bi Iogiea! metores are supplemented by more Abie afl roe “fe ide that exteral memery is neither merely metaphorical, no aaghforvard tpn of mre fundamental mena pre Sematon, docs not fest onthe ea that some txrnalepresentation®” = information in tricbooks, for example, which mets cata Stioria of secu and relay = ae dental to internal ena representations Instead the coe ea is that guile spare ineraal a extemal elements are sma tly cooptd ito lrger neprcd sysens, Which have capacities distin! from tose of Cie ine orouer elements alone. The eX ternal media on which we rly as cognitive Sealflding ac, a lark argues, “bes Seen Constructive Memory and Distributed Cognition sion but complementary tothe brain's style of Storage and computation. The brain need not waste its time replicating such capacities, Rather, it must fearn to interface withthe ex teamal media in ways that maximally exploit their peculiar vitues" (1997, 7.220). For ex. ample, our internal working memory, with is limited capacity and unzeliailty, is not dupli- cated in the various systems of “exograms ‘hich humans have produced: "unlike the con Stantly-moving and fading contents of biologi cal working memory, the contents of this ex ternally-driven processor can be frozen in time, reviewed, refined, and reformatted” (Donald 1991, p.316), This ‘complementarity’ argument opens the way to the idea tha cognition is (at least) doubly distributed, scross internal neural net. Works and across external artefacts and social g70ups. As sciences of the interface, theories ‘of memory won't legitimately sop at the boundaries of the individual A general meta. physics of traces inside and outside the brain would not collapse the differences between intemal and extemal representation and proce essing, but would offer a framework for inves. Yigating how our interactions with different forms of external social and information sys- tems might in tum afect the format and proce essing of individual memories ‘But different external media for the stor- age, wansinission, and transformation of ine formation have their own peculiar virtues. The various kinds of memory scaffolding. which ‘humans have used, from knots, ehymes, codes, and sketches (0 artificial memory techniques, photographs, hooks, and computers each have diferent properties. The resources ofthe histo. ‘and social scientist may again be included in cognitive science (Sutton 1998). While the enduring and expandable nature of many ex ‘emal symbol systems has indeed altered the informational eavironment in which brains evelop, media theorists and cognitive anthro- pologisls remind us that not al such systems are designed to hold information permanently in context- or medium-independent fashions, and that not all those systems which are de~ signed to do so astay mised (win Rentew and Scare 1999), ‘et the commana ransissibe bodes of owl tsk do pervade haman cag fre not merely converient holding pens fr incrmaion too unity fo soe eral Unstea they ar eset tls Tor akiog wich often ater the copative proce which ris, bole, nd exer yet ye tems aa! entangled As Clark suse, th inemalcing of relatively contac fee tee, senatonal formats rings new cope fos sles and burden: “by “ceri” bn Sought inte memorhl,conotseisan sodaliy-tansending format of a seme we erede a special Kind of mental ee bjt thats amenable to sry from ul ple cognitive ange, snot doomed to aro Shange everytime we ate expel tno puts or information, and ince the es t's fig evel of absracton fom te enya details of ‘heir proximal ons Tenses input’ (Cire 197, p20), BY ths sin ing pala Knds of prope and pivots over ie come of oat dvtpmet eee ate cur own mins, posing an apoio, on of and ney on Oo mete ‘etesetions These rafly Vogts onieratons, etn, shui nt Be os sisi Yo he many Pesshotoiss of memory Ifanced bys Fch eologil and developmental work ote bast twenty yer Te shed ileal hore tage is peiaps ost appret in see, analytic "work on ‘alletne.renemberng {ideo and Edwards 1990) and int pe chology of conversaonalemeabecng (i Man, and Apetoaia 1997, Hn an Gls 1999), 38 well atin the social Ineractonst tain in the devctpmst of aubiogaphs cal memory which okain rty in Secon 4 tft I suggest hare overatcing tin Sibu cognition framework fe ie weave to chro he ae eter ee holo of india! emery” and ates Siscpinary rehash on soil and cotoctve tomo.John Sutton 3. CONSTRUCTIVE MEMORY AND ‘COLLECTIVE MEMORY In connectionist work on constructive memory, different contexts of reconstruction ‘condition the constructed internal representa- tion (McClelland and Rumelhart 1986, .193; McClelland 1995, pp.69-70). How can the ‘connectionist mechanisms of transformation Sand dirtortion on internal representations be sot into a broader picture of the operation of per- sonal memory in an intricate interpersonal and cultural worid? Experience attunes us 10 cer tain information of regularities or artefacts which we can exploit for particular present purposes (Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton 1986). This is not to deny, as car” lier Gibsonian realists about memory often did (Wilcox and Katz 1981; see Sutton 1998, 1p.282-280), the importance of our capacity ometimes (0 remember experiences which are not retained in some external medium, but t0 Suggest that we may only understand such ca- paciies fully by attending also to our habitual tes of present resources on which to anchor ‘ur versions of the past®. Cognitive scientists ‘will not always be able legitimately wo ignore the transmission and tansformation of external representations, while (conversely) some ex nations in the social sciences of memory ‘will refer t appropriately flexible internal ‘processes of schematization or reconstruction ® Auobiographical memory ists 2 Key domain fo iuisbted cognition thearsa. Ou abies to think Sout evats whieh arena caren. rte people ad ‘este of omg ago, sow ht mara Me at wally ‘deterined Hythe crn: envionment abd the Tre ‘de needs of the erganise. "Representation unary ke this give us a general moan for Po {uating meal representations with which to coaster amurrepresenatinistpropcas by rascal enbusias f dymomial and. teed cognition, But the Se treasinpy sopbnicted analyser of the cole of Feslleston im the peyetology of autbiogaphial ‘remy do hina tbe variety ah signeane fen ‘ourental end soci! famingegges with which par tal and aeion-orented intemal oer mest compiz. Fora satiate cies nays of piloophica bee foe t memory repesenaons too Suto 2008, seston? 26 (for « compas general propor! abost the role of cogiive scene in anata social ‘ince, se Sperbor 2000. “There's widespread septic about the very ies of “ollesive memory” Materials Be uneasy about the tt of Fungan ache ijpes or more resonance. And even so logis and historia who. work on whi teem tobe soil memory phenomena ty 10 ‘lcci he nton Tame Young, wortng on tremories of the Holocut, prefer oe the term olected memory" nad of ‘coletve nome" because “otis cannot remember In any iter way thn Dough tr const nts’ memories” (1993, pal compare Ged fn Elum 196; Winter and Sivan 200, pi; iin 2000), Discussing the great socologiesl thoort of collective memory, Maurice Hatbwacts, Resse and Wicthum wory tht tis concept of collective sonscovenese was “Curiously disconnected from the actal thouphe procsser of any partial person Ieving Inter sociological accounts with the danger of testing the Individuals “a st of futoniton, psively obeying the intirzed alice will” (1992, ppt), This wide Spread embarrassment it understandable ttnong silos and Rstrians seking ox planatry model which ae bth eile and nati, But tn ees. ‘Although not my sim here, is posible to finda more sabe, and mote plasbe, a: Sut ofthe reins between indivi an Callie representations in Halbwachs! own work’. Is true that he was highly critical of the individual of pychologial teay be tween the. wars but his pone, anie indidulit views dont ret or mir. For Halbwachs, ely, "thee is no point in sek ing where mesa preserved in Brain orn some nok of my mind to which lone fave acest for they re recalled te ett ‘amsber compatible project is the application smemery of promising plosophical work ip soci ‘mology, whch seks ntralae motions Ike “ute fevon” and "matal Ksouledge™ Soo for cage Cie 1989. Constructive Memory and Distributed Cognition nally” (1925/1992, 38). The people and groups around me normally "give me the means 10 reconstruct them". Collective frame~ ‘works of memary are not the simple product of isolated individual memories, consteueted after ‘he fact by combinations of separate reminis- ences, but are rather, in part, thet source, the instruments used inthe particular acts of recall ‘There’ a sharp contrast, argues Halbwachs in an iniguing chapter on dreams, between re ‘membering and the actual “state of isolation ‘of the dreamer, who isnt capable directly of reliance on the frameworks of collective mem ‘ory: “it is mot in memory but in the dream that the mind is most removed from society” (1925/1992, p.42). So in ordinary remember. ing, which’ is either sowally of potentially shared, itis the public scaffolding of various forms, in the physical, symbolic, and mne Ionic environment, which iggers the specific form and content of individual memory. The contemporary sociologist Paul Connerton puts the point strongly: "i's not because thoughts fare similar that we can evoke them itis rather because the same group is interested in those ‘memories, and is able t evoke them, that they are assembled together in our minds” (1989, 230). Blunt claims like these no doubt strike many psychologists as not simply anti= individualist, but as ant-cognitivist: how can there be a cognitive science of memory which includes or even allows Tor such a displace- ‘ment of explanatory relevance from the indi- Vidual mind/brain to the natural or cultural world? But what should be questioned in this reaction is the assumption that information. Processing commitments automatically rule ‘ut notions of external or collective memory. Some flagship work in distributed cognition explicitly requires broadly computational) epresentationalist assumptions: Edwin. Hut The view tat Halwa imply meget pychology |e unfortunately end exoneoasy supported ty this Yarslatoe, which simply omit he ule f the carly chaper of Halbwachs” werk, which cover dar, langaage. constructive memory. an the Inala of chins’ influential analyses of the distributed processes of navigation on a modern ship, for ‘example, rely on the possibility of tracing the flow “and transformation of ‘representations over a series of machines, media, and human agents (Hutchins 1995), Mainstream cognitive. Scientific investigation inco representational istorton and wransmission is here simply be ing extended outwards, CCurrertly eaguged in « detailed review of ‘pplications of notions of sacial and collective memory in history, sociology, snd anthropol ogy, find much work which is entirely com: patble with cognitive science, even if it might Sometimes be improved by analysis in terinsof ‘memory systems or constructive remembering, “Michael Schudson has classified forms of co! lective memory, arguing for distinctions be- teen thre kinds: socially mediated individ ‘memories, cultural forms and artifacts which hold and interpret the pas for social mediation, tnd individual memories which are in turn fconstracted from ho cultural forms (1995: ‘compare Zelizer 1995, and the review by Olick and Robbins 1995). The main concern for a naturalist about this social-scientfic. work should not, Tsuggest, be the danger of secing collective memory as lating fre of individu- ls, but rather the temptation to overlinguist ize the form of the internal representations which constrict and are permeated by collec- tive memories. Halbwachs sometimes wrote like this, arguing for instance that "one cannot think about the events of one’s past without sliscoursing upon them” (1925/1992, p53), and the powerful influence of Russian psychology fon Anglophone developmental theory often has the same result (Bakhurst 1990). This isto Project 100 quickly the format of external, ex pressed memories back inwards onto internal ‘memory. But this linguistic-constructivist co ception of mental representation, which is at ‘dds with the postconnectionist cognitive science T've described, is not necessary: my memories can be called forth socially, ‘moulded and formed by external influences, Without having themselves tobe, inthe inter nal aspect, lnguaform, 207John Sutton (ne way to confirm his point trou an examination of the istry ofthe concep of Shera’ in 20/-cenary psjehology of mem- ory, Th reveals cognitive anroplegss and poyshologntssivgling to find 8 vocabulary for telauons between internal and external inemories stich neither claps the distin ttn nor sexs the internal a simply the refe. ton of the socal. When Bartlet import the term into the fad from nesrophyilogy. he sored about as implications of sta. “T scongy dislike the term schema’ T's once too dette and too skaohy I suggests some persistent, but fragmentary “orm ofa Tangement, and i doesnot indicate what ix ‘ery exert fo the notion, tht the organised ins rents of pas changes» re etvely ‘doing something all the time” (1932, 201: compare chapter 8 on Halbwachs). S08 Scheme on one fended Cogn tive srctre a all, Por Bate, schema has both conservative and w reatve aspect, tend ing oth to homogenize or sonventionalize he new, an to support innovations around esta shed themes. “The concept of a schema ned not imply a sete stature inorder for itt play ite Quired explanatory roles. AS an enduring Dat tose sot of tendencies or dispositions, & sem may aly Be vole tin for example, the way a story may be normal ire in the remembering and etling, with he Schoma driving easy inferences to uncertain Gntold part of. the sory. Cognitive ychologieal accounts of the soma, were Inlementd in comecionist mals in the OHO The Ristory of past procesing. “sored” inthe (ending but modifiable) tix of connection weights ofthe neural nt wort, and thus inluonces the qrocssng of ‘ew and related input (Rumelhar, Smolnst, Mocleland, and Hinton 1986) Cognitive an thropologists have found this 9 useful way 10 most, simulanousl, bath the “cenriet {ores of ultra eprodction and the compe ing “cemifupal” processes of varaon and inconsistency. Claudia Stas” and Naomi Gunn, for example, employ the connections Seton of schema theory to show how euler 798 learning produces responses which are perme ated by tadition and yet not rigidly repetitive Remembering occurs on the spo. in a context, and yet can be guided (without being deter. ‘mined) by cultural norms: because connection- {sm emphatically rejects a linguistic model of Iinomal memory, i's easier to see that the traces culture leaves on and in individual braine and bodies are not downloaded copies of eny specific cultural instructions, bu rather flexible and particular action-oriented re sponses (Strauss and Quinn 1997, chapter 3), ‘The dynamics of intrepersonal thoughts, fee!- ings, and motives may be quite different from thote of extrapersonal messages and practices, even if we deliberately focus atention on cases in which the boundaries between the wo realms are permeable DISTRIBUTED COGNITION AND THE, DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY I address, finaly, body of research closer to the heat of the constructive memory famowork. The developmental psychology of memory, especially the_social-interactonist tcaiion on which my’ brief remarks here fo: cus, should be of great interest to theorists of distributed cognition; and in turn, the distib- tuted cognition framework may offer develop- ‘menialists some useful pluralist tools for em- bedding their research in a broader cognitive- seiemtific context Socialineractionises argue, in the ex: rome, that “early reministing. begins as an interpersonal process and only becomes in- Aespersonal over time” (Engel 1999, 27). ‘They thus set the study of interpersonal dy- namics, culture, and narative genre in the childs Tinguistic environment at the heart of the study of the origins of autobiographical ‘memory. Children develop from using generic ‘event memories implicitly, lke Scripts, to un {erstand regular routines and generate expecta= fons commanding pespestival mpl 5 Lacoste ope ore lyn Seton 202, rs which pare of thi sevton re ra, Constructive Memory and Distributed Cognition frameworks in which to locate memories of ‘idiosyncratic events. Memory sharing practices initiated by adults encourage the idea of differ. lent perspectives. on the same once-occupied ‘ume, until children can take memories as ob Jects for shared attention and negotition (MoCormack and Hoet! 1999, pp.173-4), Fol. lowing the Vygotskian inspiration forthe dis: tributed cognition framework, developmental. ‘sts look for trace let in more mature cogni- lve capscities by the iiosynerasies ofthe par- ticular trajectory across interpersonal scaffold- ing which has been gradually internalised in evelopment (Clark 1997, chapter 2). Ths is an enabling cultural seulping’ of the child's mind, which runs alongside and is inimately ‘angled withthe productive cultural shaping of their body, skills, snd behaviour In the case of| memory, childrea start to talk and then thik autobiographically in ways which are shot through with ther local narative conventions Fivush 1991; Nelson 1993; Nelson and Fivash 2000). Impressive empirical research, include ing. recent crossccultural work, shows how vatitions in narrative practices reappear in Subjective idiosyncrasies of early remember. ing, as children bogin to be abe to tel others bout their past, and to develop a life history (Engel 1999; Macdonald, Ussilians, & Hayne 2000; Wang 2001; Reese 20023), Intricate issues in interpreting this flour ishing research tradition arise in working out how to study longer-term effects of these indi- vidual and cultura! variations on later eutobio. srephical memory; and in understanding the Dresise role of fanguage in shaping internal ‘presentations. Although Fivush, for example, oeeasionally writes as ifthe format of autobio. Braphical memory is isef linguistic or lane ‘tuage-like (1994, p.138), this is not essential 'o the social-interactionist tradition. The tradi- tion might be better served by the distributed ‘cognition theorists’ idee of language as a pub- lic artifact whieh shapes and transforms quite iferent kinds of internal representations and computations (Clark 1997, chapter 10). The Potentiat uty of this perspective is apparent When we ask how language, culture, and ara tive genre interact with other relevant factors such asthe development ofa ‘self-schema’ and ‘of meta-epresemtstional capacities Some who stress these alternative perspectives sot theit work as in direct competition with the social. imerectionist framework (Howe and Courage 1997, Pemer 2000): Howe and Courage, for ‘example, argue thatthe individual difereaces in autobiographical memory studied by social imeractionists ae likely to be “related to matu- Fational, aot social of experiential, factors” (1997, p.515). although other proponents of ‘ore ‘internal’ factors have taken @ more pl ‘alist fine (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000, .279), and although some integrative models have been developed from within the social- intractionist tradition (Weleh-Ross 1995; Resse 20026), there isa need for positive an fed accounts to show. just ow social and sub personal factors might he entangled, A key idea here from the distributed cog nition fiteratare is that regular outcomes often ‘result from reciprocal interaction between dif. ferent elements of extended developmental systems. Any ‘inheritance’ of eopnitive capaci- ties would thus itself be extended (Griffiths and Stow 2000), Like the physical and social ally reliably recurrent, within certain ranges, ‘under normal conditions: the major cultural shits in norms relating to autobiographical ‘memory hinted at in Nelson's programmatic rand historical narrative (2008) are then pet fds where, unusually there have been sharper alterations in these narrative environments. So the idiosyncratic features of individual auto, biographical memory are constructed anew in cach generation, though complex interactions of many inner and external parameters, Refer, ‘nce to ‘innate’ or “maturational” processes in the study of cognitive development is then litte more than a promissory mote for the fu {ue progress of developmental siences of the interface (compare Griffiths 2001), ‘And an intiguing specific empirical ap- plication of this developmental systems lramework 10 the case of autobiographical memory is suggested by some recent longitu inal studies. Harley and Reese (1999; com pare Reese 20026) claim that their evidence 299John Sutton shows the existence of diferent pathways to siiy utblograpcal memory. Clon whe are carly selecognizes (cording tothe Ssitrecopnion tests described by Howe and Courage) ay dtr way to acbiogrph fal memory fasion that seat mo independent of the inguin environment Une sltecognier, neon, may ee 10 tor inguiie and nara esflding moe Ertenely to ahiove sir stoboprpical Inemory eases. Slfrecogaiton and pee Fen feminiscenee se then, may predict Sifereat aspects of children's tae sbow the st rey and Reese 199, p34). ‘Whatever he empire Tate of tis par- tear pluralist ea the. genera ine of thought i highly sipgesve. For some chi Snir te br ay ako past Shapes tbe paricalar vaye in which ough about the pant ae gradually stable, fo dered les dependent om context, nd opened 3p for repeated inspection and manipulation. Forte the vetbalation of hous shoot fhe past ier In family routing ore) in private inner speech, may chang thir con: tet a loaally-avalable cognitive props and fins come te anchor and utr te roe Enid sytem. Ingrave option fr in ‘estgatng sich proposals ight in fre in Clade netroimaging stds to test epcic evelopment hypotheses ont the al pathways of ucbogrephel memory seq Elon; and copnive,netopsycholgta) cate Si of pei alters beakown nthe ‘aon betwen ind rind he ht While these proposss are an yot lose and overgeneal, ey do al leat ‘ilustate fw te wo se ofthe paper mig be pot in practic. Like the ese of soll and ool Kectve memory, the example of the develo eof etobiopraphical memory, Bats fests ow constucive memory ad dstbted Cognition share rang of hort) comm trench can unflly he rendered ore explicie.Seconly i oles ins tha, even I febrobologits and naive thers ae nt Staying th same pom, he eno on- Sing postive framework in which ter wo ferent investigations into memory might be lected could one day Took 1 litle lees hope Tess" REFERENCES Bakburst, David (1990, Social memory in Soviet though, ia Midleton and Ea vats 195, 205-226 Barlet, Peden C. 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