Tactics Used During the Great War

By Lemuel Sapian
 The world was stunned at the outbreak of World War I. No war like it had

preceded, and many felt the end of the world was near. A war on such a vast scale was

unheard of before this time, and the repercussions were enormous. This war involved

military men in the millions, and affected even more at home. To grasp the whole

significance of the “Great War”, one must look into how it was fought. By the start of the

20th century, the way war was waged was greatly influenced by the weapons soldiers used

against each other. This is especially true in the case of the firearm. By this time, rifles

had been developed to fire more rounds in a lesser amount of time. The machine gun had

seen success and was facing mass deployment in the war. With such innovations in

firepower, infantry tactics required constant revision. Introduction of the aircraft in the

war revolutionized the art of warfare, and contributed to the constant change in strategic

thought. Naval strategy and warfare also shaped the outcome of the war. In all, the First

World War changed the way war would be fought since. This paper purports to show how

such innovations caused change in military tactics and doctrine.

Infantry

Major conflicts before the 20th century involved close order tactics to keep command

cohesion. This involved troops packed close together, in close communication distance

from their officers. This allowed more precise command control of the troops, and kept

formations from falling apart during assaults1. The skirmish line has been employed since

ranged combat began, but open order formation as a melee tactic was almost unheard of.

Warfare at the time was perceived to be won by concentrating mass force at the critical
point, which would be the weakest part of the enemy line. This doctrine of infantry

warfare was entrenched deeply in the army manuals of the time, many of which included

such authors like Jomini and Clausowitz. Napoleon was an offensive minded tactician,

and not only employed the frontal assault but perfected several flanking maneuvers to the

demise of his opponents. However, as technology advanced, so did tactical thought. The

American Civil War forced tacticians to again go to their drawing boards in search of a

more viable approach to handle the offensive. Firearms have become more lethal, and

ways must be found to circumvent the need to face such deadly fire when carrying out an

assault. In 1884, the German army adapted a magazine loaded rifle. France, Austria and

Britain all followed suit2. The magazine allowed the rifle to be loaded more rapidly, and

thus increasing firepower. This technological advancement in weaponry bade ill for any

attacking force. An adequately entrenched defender would now be many times more

likely able to ward of an attack than the defender of Napoleon’s era. A single soldier at

the start of the 19th century had the capacity to kill a dozen times his number in mere

seconds, whereas the soldier of a century earlier had the capability to kill at most three

times his number in a minute3.

The development of the machine gun was an all important technological and

lethal advance in weaponry. The rapid fire rate of the machine gun had the potential to

make any assault suicidal. Many commanders would learn their lesson the hard way, too

late. Effective military use of the machine gun would surface in the late 19th century. We

see the Gatling, the Gardner and Nordenfelt guns made their impact, and each became a

mere improvement over the other. Hiram Stevens Maxim introduced the Maxim gun in

1883, and thus set the stage for mass machine gun usage. In 1914, the Imperial German
army procured no less than 12,500 machine guns, indicating their knowledge of the

invaluable impact of the machine gun on the battlefield4. However lethal the machine gun

proved to be still did not deter many commanders from sending in droves of troops to

their deaths. Yet as time passed, tacticians got the better of themselves and broke with

tradition in revising tactics to counter such lethal and rapid firepower5.

In the Great War, more than any other conflict preceding it, infantry had to

contend with heavy artillery fire. As the infantry succumbed to trench warfare to avoid

horrific losses at the doing of more accurate and rapid firearms, artillery played a larger

part in assisting the infantry. When rifle or machine gun fire could not be brought to bear

on dug-in enemy soldiers, artillery fire could. In the Great War, as always, artillery would

be traditionally used to soften up enemy defenses and destroy the enemy physically or

psychologically. We shall analyze the tactical implementation of artillery later in this

paper. What is important is that infantry now had to devise their tactics according to this

harbinger of death that had never before been as deadly or intense.

The Assault Formation

After listing the obstacles that potentially faced an assault force, one can find how

difficult the offensive was in World War I. Indeed, in this war of the modern era, dense

assault formations no longer had the effect they had during the time of Napoleon; it

constantly failed to shatter defenses. During the Boer War in Africa, the Boers employed

a more open order formation designed to lessen their own casualties and in doing so were

able to inflict more casualties on the British. A good example of the Boer open order
assault tactic is the attack on Majuba Hill, during the First Boer War in 1881. Although

assaulting a potentially formidable defensive position, the Boers spread out and used the

terrain to conceal their men while ascending the hill. Employing “fire-and-movement”

tactics, the Boers inflicted heavy casualties on the British, who fled, leaving behind close

to 250 casualties, 85 of which were KIA. The Boers suffered only two killed6.

Throughout the two Boer Wars, the Boers continued these tactics, often to much success.

However, stubborn tradition continued to plague the European armies, and the hesitancy

to revise infantry tactics would prove disastrous for them in the Great War.

Lessons from the Boer Wars and Russo-Japanese War set aside, basic assault

tactics did not change much by the outbreak of World War I. After the German army

under von Moltke initiated their “Schlieffen plan” into Belgium and ultimately into

France, the French under Joffre launched a plan of their own, Plan XVII. French armies

were sent into Alsace-Lorraine in order to push into the heart of Germany. The French

infantry advanced in attack columns against entrenched German positions and were cut

down by accurate rifle and rapid machine gun fire7.

At the First Battle of Ypres, on November 11, 1914, the German Imperial Guard

under General Winckler advanced against British Expeditionary Force (BEF) positions.

The assault formation of choice was the traditional close-order skirmish line. The elite

troops of the Guard faltered in their attack, and were driven back with heavy casualties.

This incident proved that even a concentrated mass attack was no match to accurate rifle

fire. Ironically, weeks earlier, a bulletin was sent by the German High Command to the

Duke of Wurttemberg’s Reserve Corps. Issued on Oct. 21, 1914, it ordered the
employment of a more open-ordered formation. Unfortunately for Winckler’s Guard, the

bulletin arrived too late to change the tactical outcome at Ypres8.

The German Army Exerzier Regelement von 1906 (Drill Regulations of 1906)

suggested more combat responsibility should lie on the Non-Commissioned Officer

(NCO). As infantry column advanced, it split into several parts to improve

maneuverability, and in extreme cases, the whole assault group would split into squads

commanded by NCOs. Although the 1906 volume eventually required all units to form

back into line to deliver a suppressing volley and charge, it emphasized the need for a

more decentralized command to achieve success. Ultimately, small unit tactics would

prove more successful in the course of the war9.

Trench Warfare

Bullets and shells were not the only impediments to an assault formation. There

were trenches, razor wire and pillboxes. To shield from overwhelming firearm lethality,

troops began to develop trench warfare. The descent into trench warfare signified the

reversion to a war of attrition. Trenches created more of a sense of a static army rather

than the maneuverable army of the Napoleonic era. The philosophy of entrenched warfare

had existed for a considerable amount of time. The American Civil War saw frequented

use of fortified entrenchments, despite lingering notions that entrenching drained morale

and eroded the fighting spirit. The Boer Wars, Spanish-American War and Russo-

Japanese War all saw the use of trenches, which, by the time of the Great War became

almost a practice of tradition as much as it was a practice of necessity. Trench warfare

allowed battles to drag on for weeks, even months without a decisive tactical outcome.

The innovative German army saw the importance of trench warfare and approached it

methodologically. They constructed firmly founded trenches, and constructed their

defenses for virtual permanence. This was in contrast to the Entente armies’ philosophy

of mobility; trench development was a waste of time as they believed offensive mobility

was the key to victory9. German growing expertise in trench warfare earned them lesser

casualties and the ability to recover even after the most intense of artillery

bombardments. As a consequence, they were able to inflict more casualties on their

enemies. A good example would be the British offensive near Loos on Sept. 25, 1915,

where two British divisions were almost annihilated by flanking German machine gun

fire10.

The act of capturing an enemy trench can be hazardous, as often is. The assault

troops would carry just enough to assist in their trench attack (such as adequate

ammunition and wire cutters), while leaving unnecessary items which could merely bog

them down. Usually, a moderate to heavy artillery bombardment would precede the

assault in an attempt to suppress the enemy and cut through any obstacles that the

attackers could run into such as barbed wire. The artillery was also supposed to make

quick work of machine gun nests, allowing the attack to proceed with a significantly

lower casualty rate. However, in the confusion of combat the success of this tactic could

not be easily determined until the attack goes underway, as evident in combat

testimonials11.

Stormtroop Tactics
 We cannot ignore the significance of German infiltration tactics, for they

effectively spelled the end of entrenched attrition warfare. By 1918, the German army

trained units designed to infiltrate enemy territory and disrupt communications and

logistics. Once these small elite units were able to achieve success, the heavy infantry

would move in to consolidate success. The British and French were forced to confront

these tactics and did so by falling back and counter-attacking. This type of combat was a

harbinger of the fluid battlefields of World War II12.

Technology on the Battlefield

Gas

In order to empty the enemy trenches, different tactics were used, including

chemical warfare. The Germans used chlorine gas in an attempt the create holes in trench

lines, and at times were successful. The British also used gas in the Loos offensive, and

Robert Graves mentions its use in preparation for an assault on German positions13. As

successful as the effect of gas was perceived to be, it created more problems than it

solved. Poison gas had the capacity to inflict casualties to one’s own side as it did to the

enemy. Again, a recently gassed enemy section of trench would not be open to assault

because of the risk of incurring friendly casualties unless the attacking team had gas

masks which hampered visibility and mobility. Whatever weaknesses the use of gas had,

however, it remained a tool for inciting fear in the opposition, and retained much of its

physiological effect throughout the war and even beyond.

The Tank

To effectively break the stalemate of trench warfare, the tactical attacker must not

only break his way through scores of enemy defenders, but also, as pointed out earlier,

defensive barriers of wire, metal obstacles and pillboxes. A viable solution to that

problem was found in the development of the armored vehicle, namely the “tank”. As

armored, self-propelled moving gun emplacements, the tank seemed to be a grand

solution to the attrition warfare in the trenches. An opportunity had come to gain enemy

ground at the lower expense of lives. First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill saw the

tactical value of the tank, or as he put in a letter to Prime Minister Asquith in 1915,

“steam tractors” with “armored shelters” from which troops could shoot would easily be

able to cross trenches and crush barbed wire14. An armored tracked vehicle impervious to

small arms fire could easily run over defensive positions and machine gun nests, a tactic

that was in fact used by tank crews. The idea of armor in itself was compelling, and even

the traditional Marshal Haig advocated its use.

The tanks, however, were not without disadvantages. If they were not grounded

by mechanical failure, the tanks could not be properly deployed in villages, had the

tendency to bog down in woods and had low maneuverability. The crews often suffered

from carbon monoxide poisoning from being enclosed in such a tight space, and at times

temperatures inside were excruciating15. The infantry had difficulty in coordinating with

the tanks, and without proper coordination the tactical value of the tank was greatly

reduced. Thus, the tank’s tactical contribution to the battlefield remained somewhat

inconsistent. Once their weaknesses were ascertained, Germans found ways to disable
them. Nonetheless, the tank remained a viable offensive tactical tool and saw successes at

battles such as Cambrai.

Artillery

The artillery arm proved its worth in World War I more than in any other conflict

before it. Artillery had to work in concert with infantry assaults, often spelling success or

failure of any attack. By the time of the Great War, artillery had even greater accuracy

and range. Where available, an artillery bombardment preceded any infantry assault.

Napoleon used a heavy bombardment meant to soften the Duke of Wellington’s defensive

position at Waterloo; Robert E. Lee did the same in preparation for “Pickett’s charge” at

Gettysburg. While both instances failed to affect the defender’s ability to defend, both

Bonaparte and Lee followed a simple artillery tactical principle; the hope that the

bombardment would either destroy the enemy physically, or unnerve him mentally

enough to allow a successful advance by the tactical attacker. This same principle carried

through into World War I. Again, the German army, seemly before everyone else, foresaw

the importance of artillery and employed the use of powerful heavy artillery before the

Entente armies saw its significance. With artillery possessing deadly accuracy, it rained

death upon the infantry. A preparatory barrage was seen as essentially a part of the assault

process itself, and at times a barrage was issued to conceal one’s true intentions of where

an incoming assault would take place. There were different types of shell. The use of

shrapnel allowed the artillery man to inflict casualties a rifleman could not by hitting men

in shelter among their trenches. Shrapnel was ineffective, however, in breaking barbed

wire and other impeding obstacles.

 While the Germans use of heavy artillery granted them the advantage of longer

range and heavier hitting, the French lighter guns could not compensate with mobility or

higher rate of fire. As a result, the French infantry often had to attack without adequate

support from their artillery arm. The armies learned their lesson, however, and efforts

were made to ensure one’s fire superiority over the other. This often resulted in shell

shortages that had the potential to actually halt offensives. Once fire superiority was lost,

there was little in the way of defeat. In a typical World War I battle it is not uncommon to

see the use of several million artillery shell barrages. When one thinks of the potential

damage one shell could inflict, we can only ponder what the effect of a million shell

barrage could do.

The armies also developed different types of barrages, each developed from the

want of the most effective method of shelling. There was the “straight barrage” that

consisted of a barrage in straight lines over the enemy’s trench, while the “creeping

barrage” sought to lay accurate fire in front of assaulting friendly troops in an attempt to

decimate anything in front of them16. Of course these have their setbacks. It was difficult

to time such barrages and troops were often hit by friendly fire. In any event, artillery

either helped form the success of an assault or cause its demise; this is evident from the

armies’ gradual change in tactics later in the war. At Passchendaele we see the use of over

12 million shells, twelve times the amount used earlier at Verdun.

The War in the Air

 World War I is the first conflict in which we see the use of the airplane. However

revolutionary the airplane was in civil terms, it offered no great strategic advantage to any

one side during the war. This is obviously due to the fact it was a new innovation and

much of its potential was not yet been realized. There was some importance to

maintaining air superiority of a battlefield, however, and we see a few examples of how

World War I flight gave us a tiny taste of what was to come. Control of the air was useful

when scouting enemy positions. Airplanes worked with ground forces to establish a better

knowledge of the battlefield. While this gave a tactical advantage, it was hardly decisive.

It must be noted, however, that combat in the air was a story in itself.

Albert Ball became a legend over the Somme. His exploits as an ace earned him

lots of admiration and inspired a generation of pilots, including Ed “Mick” Mannock, an

ace in the making. The flying machine guns proved they owned their own genre of

combat. While Albert Ball preferred lone hunting, Mannock advocated group flight which

allowed each member to move into support of one another in the case of combat. He also

devised the tactic of keeping above an enemy at all times in order gain an advantage. He

preferred to hit his enemies from an angle rather than from behind. He later died after his

plane crashed, but not before he racked up 61 victories, become Great Britain’s all time

ace18. Mannock’s success and eventual fate is no different from the more celebrated Red

Baron, or Manfred von Richthofen who died after scoring 80 kills. Canadian ace Billy

Bishop managed to avoid the fate of the other great aces to survive the war after netting

his 72 kills.

One of the more interesting cases in the advancement of air tactics is the

development of air-to-ground attack. Not merely in the case of bombs, but as a strafing
instrument. The idea of dropping bombs was an innovation already set in motion by the

time warplanes took to the skies. Usually their tactical effect was similar to artillery, but

the more creative German military thought of strategic bombing and attempted to use the

Zeppelin to accomplish such missions. The airships proved fragile and did not cause

much damage. The airplane as a ground attack instrument during a battle was indeed a

tactical advancement. On August 23, 1918, German pilots Johann Putz and Robert Ritter

von Greim attempted the previously undone, attacking tanks from the air. In an effort to

slow the British advance during the Somme offensive in that year, von Greim and Putz

attacked two tanks. The armored vehicles fired back, but after a few passes, both became

silent and motionless. The two pilots returned to find out their efforts were successful:

both tanks were indeed knocked out of action19.

Naval Tactics

Perhaps the last great battleship fleet action of history, the battle of Jutland is the

only large scale ship conflict of the war. There is nothing similar to scale even in World

War II, with the sinking of the Bismarck not being a major fleet action. The British

blockade was hurting Germany, and in an attempt to destroy British Naval superiority,

Admiral Scheer devised a strategy to lure British ships in a given location, isolate them

and destroy them. Exiting the protective harbor of his ports, Scheer moved the German

High Seas Fleet into the North Sea. The British were alerted by this movement, and

consequently moved to intercept him. But before Admiral Jellicoe is able to close in on

Scheer, opposing battlecruiser squadron commanders Beatty and Hipper engaged each
other. Hipper got the best of Beatty and sunk a couple of his battlecruisers. Jellicoe came

in to support Beatty, while Hipper joined his force with Scheer. It is during this time that

Jellicoe turns his fleet in an attempt to catch Scheer in a line perpendicular to his own,

allowing the full fire power of his fleet to bear on the Germans. This he accomplished

briefly, inflicting damage on the German fleet, and forcing Scheer to withdraw. The

British suffered more casualties than the Germans, so on a tactical scale, it could be

called a German victory. However it was a strategic defeat, for the High Seas fleet would

never again be able to challenge the superiority of the Royal Navy20.

Conclusion

In this paper we have established World War I tactics that distinguished the war

from previous conflicts. Also, we saw the how technology is able to force the revision of

tactics on a large scale. The Great War indeed was a great war, overshadowed only by the

greatest war of all time, the Second World War. However, the tactics used in the Second

World War were a direct consequence and result of the conditions of World War I.

Bibliography:

Gudmundsson, Bruce I. Stormtroop Tactics. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989

Griffith, Paddy, ed. British Fighting Methods in the Great War. London: Frank Cass, 1996

Cook, Chris and Stevenson, John. Weapons of War. London: Crescent Books, 1980

Balck, Wilhelm. Development of Tactics-World War. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools

Press, 1922.
Reference:

1. Gudmundsson, Bruce I. Stormtroop Tactics. New York: Praeger, 1989, pg. 8

2. Cook, Chris and Stevenson, John. Weapons of War. London: Crescent Books, 1980, pg. 85.

3. Ibid., pg. 60

4. Ibid., pg. 87

5. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics. pg. 24.

6. Hawkins, Vince. “Death on the Hill of Doves”. Military Heritage Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 2, Oct.

2003, pg. 43.

7. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics. pg. 2.

8. Ibid., ppg. 11-13, 24.

9. Ibid. pg. 178.

10. “World War I:Trench Warfare”. Wikipedia Online, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I>

11. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics. pg. 93.

12. Graves, Robert. Goodbye to All That. London: Penguin Books, 1960, ppg. 158-169.

13. “World War I:German Spring Offensive of 1918”. Wikipedia Online,

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I>

14. Graves. Goodbye to All That., ppg. 146-153.

15. Griffith, Paddy, ed. British Fighting Methods in the Great War. London: Frank Cass, 1996, pg.

114.

16. Ibid., pg. 120.

17. Ibid., ppg. 29-33.

18. Joslyn, Mauriel P. "Mick" Mannock. Military Heritage Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 2, Oct. 2003, pg. 28.

19. von Greim, Robert. “Attack on a Tank”. Military Heritage Magazine, Vol. 4, No. 5, Apr. 2003,

ppg. 71, 88.

20. “Battle of Jutland”. Wikipedia Online, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_jutland>