Case Title: Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC

Case Number: G.R. No. 221697

Date: March 8, 2016
Ponente: Perez, J
Topic: Natural born citizenship & Qualifications for candidacy

Facts: Grace Poe was found abandoned in a church in Jaro Iloilo sometime 1968. Parental care
later was passed to the relatives of Edgardo Militar, the person who found the child. The
relatives then registered the child as a foundling and the child was then named Mary Grace
Militar. The child was subsequently adopted by Fernando Poe, Jr and Susan Roces. In 1988,
she was issued a Philippine passport. In 1991, Poe got married and flew to the US. In 2001, Poe
became a naturalized American Citizen and she obtained a US Passport.
Poe later decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime first quarter of
2005. Poe came home on May 24, 2005 and immediately secured a TIN. Poe then took her
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 9225. She filed a sworn
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three children. The Bureau of Immigration acted in favor of the petition. She and
her children were then considered dual citizens. Poe then registered as voter in August 2006
and secured a Philippine passport.

She was later appointed as Chairperson of the MTRCB. Before assuming such, she executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the US before a notary public. Poe also executed an
Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the US before the Vice Consul of the US
Embassy in Manila wherein later on she was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
US effective 2010. In 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator
stating that she was a resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months before
May 13, 2013. She was then proclaimed a Senator. Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the
May 2016 elections. She declared that she is a natural born and her residence in the Philippine
up to the day before election would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.

A petition was filed against Poe contending that she committed material misrepresentation in
her COC when she stated that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years 11
months up to the day before May 9, 2016 Elections, that she is not natural born considering
that Poe is a foundling. In addition, Francisco Tatad, one of the petitioners alleged that persons
of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, are not natural born Filipino citizens, that
foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens hence the intention to
exclude them.

COMELEC ruled against the petitioner resolving that she is not a natural born citizen and that
she failed to complete the 10 year residency requirement.
1.Issue: Whether as a foundling, Poe-Llamanzares can be considered a natural born
citizen?

Ruling: Yes. Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution is
silent as to foundlings, there is language as to exclude them either. In other words, there is no
intent or language that would permit discrimination against foundlings. Also domestic laws on
adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. And that Filipino children include
“foundlings’ which can be adopted as well. Also under international law, foundlings are citizens
as the Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws
ruled that a foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth and in the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness that. foundling is presumed born of citizens of
the country where he is found bind the Philippines. Hence, there is a generally accepted
principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born and a national of the
country in which it is found. Hence, as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Filipino citizen.

2. Issue: Whether Poe is considered a resident of the Philippine for 10 years for purposes of
candidacy?

Ruling: Yes. Poe alleged that her residency should be counted from May 24, 2005 when she
returned for good from the US. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile 1.
Residence or bodily presence in a new locality 2. Intention to remain and 3. Intention to
abandon the old domicile.

In the case at bar, Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their US domicile and stayed in the Philippines for good. This evidences include her
former US passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her return to the Philippines every
time she travelled abroad, email correspondences with freight company to arrange for the
shipment of household items as well as with the pet Bureau; school records of her children
showing enrolment in the Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc. Hence
there is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided to
permanently abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.
These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is
clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was for good. Poe is thus declared qualified to be a
candidate for Presidency.

Case Title: Government of Hongkong vs Olalia Jr

Case Number: G.R. No 153675
Date: April 19, 2007
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez
Topic: Bail in extradition proceedings
Facts: Private Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of “accepting an
advantage as agent”, in violation of the Prevention of Bribery ordinance of Hongkong and of 7
counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common law of Hongkong. The Hongkong
Department of Justice requested DOJ for the provisional arrest. The DOJ forwarded the
request to the NBI then to the RTC which issued an order of arrest. NBI agents then arrested
Munoz. Munoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the order of arrest. CA declared the arrest void. DOJ filed a petition for certiorari
and it ruled the validity of the arrest.

The Hongkong Administrative Region then filed with the RTC a petition for extradition and
arrest of Munoz. Munoz then filed a petition for bail, which was opposed. The RTC initially
denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in extradition cases
and that Munoz is a “flight risk”. Hence MR filed by Munoz which was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases?

Ruling: Yes. In a previous case of Gov’t of United States of America vs Hon Guillermo
Purganan, it ruled that the right to bail was not included in the extradition cases, since it is
available only in criminal proceedings. However the Supreme Court, recognized the modern
trend in International Law today wherein the primacy is placed on the sanctity of human rights
. Hence it departed from the ruling and ruled today that the exercise of the State’s police
power to deprive a person of his liberty is not to be limited to criminal proceedings and that the
Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the individual his right to liberty and due process and
should not therefor deprive him of his right to bail provided that certain standards for the grant
is satisfactorily met. In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muñoz has been
detained for 2 years without being convicted in Hongkong. However the respondent was not
able to show and clear and convincing evidence that he is to be entitled to bail. Thus the case is
remanded in the court for the determination and otherwise, should order the cancellation of
his bond and his immediate detention.

Case Title: Vivares vs St Theresa’s College

Case Number: G.R. No. 202666
Date: Sept 29, 2014
Ponente: Velasco, JR, J
Topic: Right to privacy/online privacy

Facts: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC),
uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates wearing only their
undergarments. Later said photos were reported to their teacher. The latter then showed said
pictured to the Discipline in Charge for appropriate action. The school then found the students
guilty and banned them from marching in their graduation ceremonies. RTC of Cebu later issued
a temporary restraining order which enjoined the school from barring the students in the
graduation ceremonies. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data was filed against the
school by the mother of Nenita along with the other mothers of the students who were involved
in the incident. They alleged that the Facebook account of the students have a reasonable
expectation of privacy which must be respected, that the photos accessed belong to the girls
and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. The Cebu RTC denied the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to informational privacy of the students were violated and
whether the writ of habeas data will prosper?
Ruling: NO. The writ of habeas data to be issued requires the existence of a person’s right to
informational privacy and a showing of an actual or threatened violation of the right of privacy.
It is ruled that if an online networking site like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes
use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Such privacy is
the right to informational privacy is the right of the individuals to control information about
themselves which must be respected and protected.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy
tools. Evidence would show that that their post on Facebook were published as “Public” which
everyone could see.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the
pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the involved
student who showed the pictures to their teacher and then the latter reported the matter to
the proper school authority and such is for a legal purpose which is to discipline their students
according to the standards of the school.

Case Title: Denis Funa vs Acting Secretary of Justice Alberto C. Agra

Case Number: G.R. No. 191644
Date: Feb 19, 2013
Ponente: Bersamin, J
Topic: Holding of multiple offices

Facts: On March 1, 2010, Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the
resignation of Secretary Agnes Devanadera. On March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated
Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity. On April 7, 2010, Funa filed this suit
to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming
it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Agra contends that he
was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the
Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as
the Secretary of Justice; that President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of
Justice and that he then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and
that pending the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the
Acting Solicitor General.

Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional

Ruling: Yes. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides a stricter prohibition on the
President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in
the Government or in government owned or government controlled corporations.

Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII. Hence, Agra could
not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General
because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided. It does not matter whether Agra’s
designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed
objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials.