PELAEZ VS AUDITOR
In  1964, President Ferdinand Marcos  issued executive orders
creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides
in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary… of
any…  municipality…  and may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as  a taxpayer, filed
a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from
disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities.
Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that
Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section
3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created
or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except
by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this
new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since
barrios are units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and
that only barrios were barred from being created by the
President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a
municipality can be created without creating barrios.  He
further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress
has delegated such power to create municipalities to the
President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to
create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here.  Although Congress
may delegate to another branch of the government the power
to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of
the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate   — and
(b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.  In this case, Sec.
68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the
public welfare may require” – which would mean that the
President may exercise such power as the public welfare may
require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard
needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place,
what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is
the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper
interpretation is “the President  may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as
the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government
may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that  the power to create
municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).
ARANETA VS DINGLASAN
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly  violating of
Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge
hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan
and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO
62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which
he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three  other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055
which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter,
against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is
seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury
from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was
appropriating funds to hold the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT
DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF
WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE
PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act,
is already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said
CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes.  CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the
president, became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress
met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive
Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without
authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress
instead of the first special session which preceded it as the
point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special
session, the Congress may “consider general legislation or only
such subjects as he (President) may designate.” Such acts were
to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment
of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner
amended or repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war
continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and
approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted
upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
PEOPLE VS VERA
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case
filed against him by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter
was referred to the Insular Probation Office which
recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition for
probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the
petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed the petition.
Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that
courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is
presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place
accused like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the
law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation  is only
meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers; that
the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if
construed as a province, has no designated probation officer –
hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter
alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it violates the
constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC
averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces
whether or nor to apply the probation law – if a province
chooses to apply the probation law, then it will appoint a
probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer
will be appointed – hence, that makes it violative of the equal
protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue
delegation of power because it gave the option to the
provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law
– however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to be
followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an
encroachment of the executive’s power to grant pardon. They
say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in
effect encroached upon the executive’s power to grant pardon.
(Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by
HSBC – ironic because their main stance was the non-
applicability of the probation law only in Manila while
recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the
Prosecution, representing the State as well as the People of
the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act
4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also
castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the
Probation Law in the past without question but is now
questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:  the president to commute penalties.
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly
authorized representative, from questioning the validity of a
law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had
been using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on
this note. There is violation of the equal protection
clause.  Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to
apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if
a province decides not to install a probation officer, then the
accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the
provisions of the Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221
provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the
respective provincial boards have provided for a probation
officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard
(sufficient standard test) should provincial boards follow in
determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their
province. This only creates a roving commission which will act
arbitrarily according to its whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
recognized the power of Congress to provide for probation.
Probation does not encroach upon the President’s power to
grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the
power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of
RODRIGUEZ VS GELLA
Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders
545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of
P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the
second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the
provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,
earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. They sought
to have Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined
from releasing funds pursuant to said EOs. These EO’s were
pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta
vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to
revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due
to the Korean War and his perception that war is still
subsisting as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was already
declared inoperative by the Supreme Court in the same case of
Araneta vs Dinglasan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid.
HELD: No.  As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO’s
issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The
president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities
emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been
intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president
cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be
attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the
president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must
be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend
otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate its power by a
simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by
two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress
to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right
and is not, and ought not to be the law.”  Act No. 671 may be
likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent
of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be
compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the
principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at
the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the
agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.