23.

Siochi vs. BPI

ISSUE:
WON it is within the RTC’s discretion to disregard procedural formalities.

RULING:
Petitioners claim that the Interim Rules of Procedure are construed
liberally; thus, the RTC may disregard the Rules.
The Court disagrees.
Indeed, the Rules are construed liberally. However, this does not mean
that courts may disregard the Rules.
In North Bulacan Corporation vs. Phil. Bank of Communications, the
Court held that, “These rules are to be construed liberally to obtain for the
parties a just, expeditious, and inexpensive disposition of the case. The parties
may not, however, invoke such liberality if it will result in the utter disregard
of the rules.”
24.
Mortel vs. Kerr

FACTS:
Petitioner pleads that the rules of procedure should be liberally
construed in his case, and that he should not be bound by the negligence and
errors of his previous counsels that deprived him of his property without being
afforded his day in court.

ISSUE:
WON the negligence of Mortel’s previous counsels should bind him.

RULING:
As a rule, a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and
mistake in handling a case. To allow a client to disown his counsel’s conduct
would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by
the subterfuge of replacing counsel. HOWEVER, THE RULE ADMITS OF
EXCEPTIONS.
In Suarez vs. CA, the Court set aside the judgment and mandated the trial
court to reopen the case for the reception of the evidence for the defense
after finding that the negligence of the therein petitioner’s counsel had
deprived her of the right to present and prove her defense.

DOCTRINE:
There is exception to the rule (above) when the negligence of the counsel
is SO GROSS AND PALPABLE as to deprive him of his day in court, thereby also
depriving the client of his property without due process of law.
25.
Gravides vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
This case involves an election protest. To summarize, it was contended
by the petitioners that AM 07-4-15-SC (rule promulgated by the Supreme
Court) should be construed liberally, especially so that it would not result to a
circumvention of the people’s guaranteed right of suffrage.

RATIO:
The rules should NOT be taken lightly. The Court has painstakingly
crafted AM No. 07-4-15-SC precisely to curb the pernicious practice of
prolonging election protests a sizable number of which, in the past, were
finally resolved adopted to provide an expeditious and inexpensive procedure
for the just determination of election cases before the courts. It is thus
emphasized that the preliminary conference and its governing rules are NOT
mere technicalities which the parties may blithely ignore or trifle with. They
are tools meant to EXPEDITE the disposition of election cases and must,
perforce, be obeyed.
26.
Tua vs. Mangrobang

FACTS:
Petitioner was a husband whose wife filed against him a complaint for a
violation of RA 9262, and against a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) was
issued. Petitioner contended that the issuance of the TPO is unconstitutional
for being violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner particularly directs his constitutional attack on Sec. 15 of RA
9262 contending that had there been no ex parte issuance of the TPO, he
would have been afforded due process of law and had properly presented his
side on the matter; that the questioned provision simply encourages arbitrary
enforcement repulsive to basic constitutional rights which affects his life,
liberty, and property.

RULING:
Court not impressed.

DOCTRINE:
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot be challenged as violative of the right
to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued
without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take
could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and were required
before such acts could be prevented. It is constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is the protection
of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
27.
Villa-Vicencio vs. Ombudsman

FACTS:
Petitioner claims that respondents gravely abused their discretion by
violating their own rules of procedure when they charged him with estafa.

RULING:
Petition granted, there was grave abuse of discretion.
In arguing for the disqualification, petitioner invokes Section III (N) of
AO 16, which provides that the Chairman, Vice Chairman, or any member of
the IAB shall be automatically disqualified from acting on a complaint if he
belongs to the same component unit as any of the parties to the case.
In this case, there was no dispute that Chua (one of the respondents)
reports to the Central Office, which is the same as the unit of Casimiro
(complainant of the estafa case).
28.
Imperial vs. Armes

DOCTRINE:
Our jurisprudence has leaned in favor of recognizing the jurisdiction of
quasi-judicial bodies. However, this jurisdiction must always be viewed within
the context of its grant. The law vests quasi-judicial powers to administrative
bodies over matters that require their particular competence and specialized
expertise. This grant of jurisdiction is not and should not be justification to
deprive courts of law of their jurisdiction as determined by law and the
Constitution. Courts of law are the instruments for the adjudication of legal
disputes. In a system of government where courts of law exist alongside quasi-
judicial bodies, the need to harmonize apparent conflicts in jurisdiction require
a determination of whether the matter to be resolved pertains to a general
question of law which belongs to ordinary courts or whether it refers to a
highly specialized question that can be better resolved by a quasi-judicial body
in accordance with its power vested by law.
29.
Senit vs. People

DOCTRINE:
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article
III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. It is established
that notices have been served to the counsel of the petitioner and his failure
to inform his counsel of his whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear
on the scheduled date. Thus, the arguments of the petitioner against the
validity of the proceedings and promulgation of judgment in absentia for being
in violation of the constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail.
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

30.
Cornejo vs. Provincial Board of Rizal

FACTS:
After receiving numerous complaints regarding the conduct of the
municipal president of Pasay, the Provincial governor, without hearing,
temporarily suspended the municipal president and laid the charges before
the provincial board for investigation.

RULING:
Due process not violated.

Ordinarily, a public official should not be removed from office without

notice, charges, a trial, and an opportunity for explanation. However, in
certain proceedings of an administrative character the right to a notice and
hearing are not essential to due process of law. 
 It is well settled in the United
States, that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional
guaranties of due process of law but is a public trust or agency. 


RATIO:
Notice and hearing are not prerequisites to the suspension of a public
officer under a statute (in this case, the Administrative Code) which does not
provide for such notice and hearing.
31.
Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad

FACTS:
Plaintifff instituted an ordinary action for damages for trespass on
plaintiff’s land, to which the defendant company opposed on the ground that
under statutory provisions for the condemnation of lands by virtue of which
defendant company had already instituted proceedings looking to the
condemnation of the land in question, it was the duty of the plaintiff to seek
redress in those proceedings.

RULING:
“While we agree with counsel before entering upon and taking
possession of the land in question, proceeded in accordance with the
provisions of law touching condemnation proceedings, by virtue of which it
claims to have been acting, in that event the plaintiff would not be entitled to
bring a separate action; we are of opinion that in absence of proof of a
substantial compliance with the provisions of law touching such proceedings,
the plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute ANY appropriate action to recover
the damages which she may have suffered as a result of an unauthorized and
unlawful seizure and occupation of her property.”

DOCTRINE:
Absence of proof regarding substantial compliance with the provisions
of a specific proceeding, any person who has a cause of action is entitled to
institute ANY APPROPRIATE action to recover damages.
32.
Ang Tibay vs. CIR

The Court pointed out that the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it
to “act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable.” (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity
of certain procedural requirements DOES NOT MEAN that it can, IN
JUSTICIABLE CASES COMING BEFORE IT, entirely IGNORE or DISREGARD the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.

In case ma-ask sa objective part, these are the cardinal primary rights discussed in
the case that must be respected even in CIR (and the like) proceedings:
1¶ Right to hearing (involves presenting the party’s case and submit evidence;
“rudimentary requirements of fair play”);
2¶ The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3¶ The duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, but
it imposes the necessity that its decision must be supported.
4¶ Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion,
but the evidence must be “substantial.”
5¶ The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6¶ The CIR must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
7¶ The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
33.
Benedicto vs. CA

Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by

the Constitution. It is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof. Instead, the right to a
preliminary investigation is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute,
and can be waived, either expressly or by implication. The waiver extends to
any irregularity in the preliminary investigation, where one was conducted.
Thus, the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash
the information.
34.
Aguirre vs. Secretary of Justice

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of
the crime for which he was prosecuted. The term does not mean “actual and
positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

A necessary component of the power to execute the laws is the right to

prosecute their violators, the responsibility of which is thrust upon the DOJ.
Hence, the determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant
the prosecution in court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ.
And by the nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion to
file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand
points to a different conclusion.
35.
Shu vs. Dee

Gist: The NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati charging the
respondents of the crime of forgery and falsification of public documents; the
documents report submitted by the NBI states that the signatures of the petitioner
which appear on the assailed deeds of real estate mortgage are not the same as the
standard sample signatures he submitted to the NBI.

DOCTRINE:
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What
the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute
absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the
requirements of due process exists when a party is given a chance to be heard
through his motion for reconsideration.

Note:
In this case, it is not disputed that the respondents filed with the Secretary of
Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any initial defect
in due process, if any, was cured by the remedy the respondents availed of.

The respondents also alleged that they were denied due process during NBI
investigation:
The Court stressed that the functions of the NBI are merely investigatory
and informational in nature. Since the NBI’s findings were merely
recommendatory, there was no denial of the respondents’ due process right;
the NBI’s findings were still subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of
Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause.
36.
Dazon vs. Yap

FACTS:
Petitioner instituted a case against respondent before the RTC of Lapu-
Lapu City, because respondent did not provide a refund for the payments
made by the petitioner regarding a condominium project that the respondent
failed to finish.

ISSUE:
WON a regional trial court has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising from
violation of PD 957.
Accdg to petitioner – jurisdiction is conferred by law and that there is no law
expressly vesting on the HLURB exclusive jurisdiction over criminal actions
arising from violations of PD 957. (Note: in other words, petitioner contends
that RTC has jurisdiction)

RULING:
Yes, RTC has jurisdiction.
Not having been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide
cases which are criminal in nature, as well as to impose penalties therefor, the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has no jurisdiction over
criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957.

DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the material averments in
the complaint as well as the character of the relief sought.
37.
Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman

The rights to due process in administrative cases as prescribed in Ang Tibay v.

Court of Industrial Relations are granted by the Constitution; hence, these rights
cannot be taken away by mere legislation. On the other hand, as repeatedly
reiterated by this Court, the right to a preliminary investigation is merely a statutory
right, not part of the “fundamental and essential requirements” of due process as
prescribed in Ang Tibay.
Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken away by legislation. The
constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not
apply in preliminary investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary
investigation be an infringement of his right to confront the witnesses against him.
A preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.
38.
Namil vs. Comelec

Due process in quasijudicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires

due notice and hearing. The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be
annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his
proclamation.
39.
Jalosjos vs. Comelec

Petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because

of his previous conviction, his application was denied, prompting him to file a
Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters before the MTC. Pending
resolution of the same, he filed a CoC seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga and
stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered
voter. Comelec, however, resolved (Resolution No. 9613) to cancel and deny due
course the CoC due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to
comply with the voter registration requirement.

ISSUE:
WON due process was denied for Comelec’s issuance of Resolution No. 9613
motu prorio.

RULING:
Due process not denied.

DOCTRINE:
COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in view
of a candidate’s disqualification to run for elective office based on a final
conviction is subsumed under its mandate to enforce and administer all laws
relating to the conduct of elections. Accordingly, in such a situation, it is the
COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding
the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the
resolution of the same.
40.
GMA Network vs. Comelec

FACTS:
Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9615 changing the interpretation
of the May 2013 election candidates’ and political parties’ airtime limitation
for political campaigns or advertisements from a “per station” basis, to a “total
aggregate” basis.

RULING:
The Court held that Resolution No. 9615 regarding “aggregate-based”
airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains
the ability of the candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people.
It is a basic postulate of due process, specifically in relation to its
substantive component, that any governmental rule or regulation must be
reasonable in its operations and its impositions. Any restrictions, as well as
sanctions, must be reasonably related to the purpose or objective of the
government in a manner that would not work unnecessary and unjustifiable
burdens on the citizenry.
In this case, HOWEVER, the adverted reason for imposing the
“aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not
constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate
their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is
specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a
prohibitive measure.
Also, for failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with
Resolution No. 9615, said Resolution, specifically in regard to the new rule on
aggregate airtime is declared defective and ineffectual.
41.
Corona vs. United Harbor

To invoke Sec. 1, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, two conditions must concur:
(1) That there is a deprivation, and (2) That such deprivation is done without pproper
observance of due process.
As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of
procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises
its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not
comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.