Fortune Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., vs. CA [G.R. No.

115278, May 23, 1995]

Facts: On June 29, 1987, Producer’s Bank of the Philippines’armored vehicle was robbed, in
transit, of seven hundred twenty-five thousand pesos (Php 725,000.00) that it was transferring
from its branch in Pasay to its main branch in Makati. To mitigate their loss, they claim the
amount from their insurer, namely Fortune Insurance and Surety Co..

Fortune Insurance, however, assails that the general exemption clause in the Casualty
Insurance coverage had a general exemption clause, to wit:

GENERAL EXCEPTIONS

The company shall not be liable under this policy in respect of

(b) any loss caused by any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of the insured or any officer,
employee, partner, director, trustee or authorized representative of the Insured whether acting
alone or in conjunction with others. . . .

And, since the driver (Magalong) and security guard (Atiga) of thearmored vehicle were charged
with three others as liable for the robbery, Fortune denies Producer’s Bank of its insurance
claim.

The trial court and the court appeals ruled in favor of recovery, hence, the case at bar.

Issue: Whether recovery is precluded under the general exemptionclause.

Held: Yes, recovery is precluded under the general exemptionclause.

Howsoever viewed, Producers entrusted the three with the specific duty to safely transfer the
money to its head office, with Alampay to be responsible for its custody in transit; Magalong to
drive thearmored vehicle which would carry the money; and Atiga to provide the needed
security for the money, the vehicle, and his two other companions. In short, for these particular
tasks, the three acted as agents of Producers. A "representative" is defined as one who
represents or stands in the place of another; one who represents others or another in a special
capacity, as an agent, and isinterchangeable with "agent." 23

In view of the foregoing, Fortune is exempt from liability under the general exceptions clause of
the insurance policy.
 Insurance Case Digest: Guingon V. Del Monte, 20 SCRA 1043 (1967)

FACTS:
 Julio Aguilar owner and operator of several jeepneys insured them with Capital Insurance
& Surety Co., Inc.
 February 20, 1961: Along the intersection of Juan Luna and Moro streets, City of Manila, the
jeepneys operated by Aguilar driven by Iluminado del Monte and Gervacio Guingon
bumped and Guingon died some days after
 Iluminado del Monte was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence and was
penalized 4 months imprisonment
 The heirs of Gervacio Guingon filed an action for damages praying that P82,771.80 be paid
to them jointly and severally by the driver del Monte,owner and operator Aguilar, and the
Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.
 CFI: Iluminado del Monte and Julio Aguilar jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the sum of
P8,572.95 as damages for the death of their father, plus P1,000.00 for attorney's fees plus
costs
 Capital Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. is hereby sentenced to pay P5,000 plus P500 as
attorney's fees and costs to be applied in partial satisfaction of the judgment rendered
against Iluminado del Monte and Julio Aguilar in this case
ISSUE:
1. W/N there a stipulation pour autriu to enable that will enable the heirs to sue against Capital
Insurance and Surety Co., Inc.? - YES

HELD: Affirmed in toto.

1. YES
 policy: the insurer agreed to indemnify the insured "against all sums . . . which the Insured
shall become legally liable to pay in respect of: a. death of or bodily injury to any person . . .
." - indemnity against liability
 TEST: Where the contract provides for indemnity against liability to third persons, then third
persons to whom the insured is liable, CAN sue the insurer. Where the contract is
for indemnity against actual loss or payment, then third persons CANNOT proceed against
the insurer, the contract being solely to reimburse the insured for liability actually
discharged by him thru payment to third persons, said third persons' recourse being thus
limited to the insured alone.
 Republic Glass v. Qua
Facts

 Republic Glass, Gervel and Qua were shareholders of Ladtek

 Ladtek obtained loans from Metrobank and Private Dev’t Corp of the Phils (PDCP)
 They entered into agreement that in case of default in payment of Ladtek loans, the parties will
reimburse each other the proportionate shares of any sum that any might pay to creditors
 Ladtek defaulted on its obligation to Metrobank and PDCP
 Republic Glass Corp and Gervel Corp payed Metrobank 7M (not full payment of the amount
due)
 Republic Glass and Gervel demanded to Qua reimbursement of the total amount that RGC and
GC paid to Metrobank
 Qua refused to pay
 Qua filed a complaint for injunction with damages with application for TRO
Issues

 W/N payment of the entire obligation is an essential condition for reimbursement?

 W/N there was novation of agreements as held by CA (that there was implied novation)
Ruling

On the first issue:

 Contrary to RGC and GC’s claim, payment of any amount will not automatically result in
reimbursement. If a solidary debtor pays the obligation in part, he can recover reimbursement
from the co-debtors only in so far his payment exceeded his share in the obligation. This is
precisely because if solidary debtor pays an amount equal to his proportionate share in the
obligation, then he in effects pay only what is due to him. If the debtor pays less than his share
in the obligation, he cannot demand reimbursement because his payment is less than his actual
debt.
 Since they only made partial payments, RGC and GC should clearly and convincingly show that
their payments to Metro bank and PDCP exceeded their proportionate shares in the obligations
before they can seek reimbursement from Qua. RGC and GC failed to do this, thus they cannot
seek reimbursement from Qua
On the second issue:

 There was no novation of the agreements. The parties did not constitute new obligations to
substitute the agreements. The terms and conditions of the agreement remains the same.
 Novation extinguishes obligation by 1) changing the object or principal conditions; 2)
substituting the person of the debtor and 3) subrogating a third person in the rights of the
creditor