Religion Compass 4/4 (2010): 234–244, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2009.00206.

Suicide Terrorism
Leonard Weinberg* and Ami Pedahzur
University of Nevada and University of Haifa

Abstract
Suicide bombing has become the most potent weapon in the arsenal of terrorist groups in the
Middle East, South Asia, and elsewhere. This analysis traces the weapon’s history, both ancient
and modern to the present day. It includes commentary on the benefits and costs of suicide attacks
as well as the motives of the ‘martyrs’ themselves and the organizations that send them on their
way. Finally, the analysis pays attention to countermeasures, policies at the disposal of the authori-
ties to stop or at least inhibit so-called ‘martyrdom operations.’

For more than a quarter century now a central concern of government security agencies
as well as academic observers has been the possibility that terrorists would acquire and use
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Billions of dollars and millions of pounds have
been spent on defending against the possibility that terrorists would employ chemical,
biological, and radiological weapons to inflict mass casualties on unsuspecting publics in
the western world and elsewhere. With a handful of exceptions though, the most notable
of which was the 1995 spread of Sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system, fears about
WMD have not been warranted by the terrorist reality.1
That reality has come to mean, in a growing number of places, the use by terrorists of
‘human bombs’ or suicide bombers. If the fear is of mass casualties, then human beings
detonating themselves with relatively primitive explosives has done far more damage and
killed far more people than WMD. To pick the most egregious example, the September
11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon killed more individuals
(c. 3,000) than any terrorist attack in history.

Definition
We should begin our discussion by defining our terms. This is a somewhat more difficult
task than readers might suspect. As Martha Crenshaw writes; ‘Research is plagued by the
lack of a common definition of the concept.’2 Part of the problem of meaning concerns
the fact that after years of debate the concept of ‘terrorism’ itself remains essentially con-
tested. Its definition seems to expand and contract depending on the point of view of the
observer. For example: should we or should we not consider attacks carried out against
military personnel or installations in Iraq or Pakistan as acts of terrorism? If crucial to the
definition of terrorism involves attacks on civilians or ‘non-combatants’ than perhaps not.
If we confine the definition to acts carried out by private groups, as is commonly the
case, how should we regard the 1988 explosion of a bomb on board a Pan-Am flight
over Lockerbie Scotland? The Lockerbie bombing was not an example of private
enterprise or an act of individual initiative. Rather it was the work of the Libyan intelli-
gence agency, the Libyan government in other words.

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 The Spread of Suicide Terrorism: Religious and Secular Causes 235

Perhaps we should throw up our hands and drop the concept ‘terrorism’ altogether.
Some prefer to focus on the idea of ‘suicide mission’ instead.3 If we do this, what fol-
lows? During the latter stages of World War II in the Pacific, the Japanese military
launched Kamikaze attacks against American ships located offshore around Iwo Jima,
Luzon, and Okinawa. The pilots’ missions, sinking the ships, could not be accomplished
without the pilots killing themselves in the course of their attacks. In a very different
context, during the early phases of the Vietnam War, Buddhist monks set themselves on
fire to protest the mistreatment their religion was receiving at the hands of the Christian
dominated Diem government in Saigon.4 The monks had no wish to kill anyone but
themselves. The Kamikaze, of course, wanted to kill as many American sailors as they
could. In both instances there seemed to be a strong element of theatricality. Success in
both cases required the deaths of the perpetrators. But are we still dealing with the same
phenomenon?
No effort at definition is likely to be entirely successful. If we simply refer to ‘suicide
missions,’ that seem to encompass missions undertaken during wartime from which the
chances of survival are virtually nil. ‘Suicide missions,’ like those undertaken by the kami-
kaze, seems to convey too broad a meaning for the subject we intend to pursue. Some
writers, on the other hand, use the term ‘martyrdom operations’ in identifying the subject
at hand. Those who send the ‘martyrs’ on their way prefer this locution. Among other
things it avoids the term ‘suicide’ which is prohibited to Muslims. The problem though
with this usage is that it is too narrow. Individuals from other backgrounds have engaged
in such operations in recent years; the recently defunct Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka come to mind as do the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and Leba-
nese Communists. None of these groups regarded themselves as bound by the divine
admonitions of the Koran.
So we prefer to use ‘suicide terrorism’ to cover the range of activities with which we
are concerned. The Israeli analyst Boaz Ganor comes close to capturing its meaning: ‘A
suicide attack is an operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent
upon the death of the perpetrator.’5 For many years, ‘terrorism’ was defined in American
law as ‘Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audi-
ence.’6 In other words, ‘suicide terrorism’ represents the most dramatic, attention-getting
and often the most lethal form of the phenomenon.

History
Given this definition, when and under what circumstances did suicide terrorism start?
Commonly analysts refer to developments in the ancient world. Some mention the
biblical figure of Samson who, according to the Book of Judges, killed himself in order
to kill the Philistines in the central temple in Gaza.7 Others describe the operations of
the Assassins or Ismailis, a Shiite sect that wished to purify the Islamic world during the
European Middle Ages. Assassins sought to achieve this objective by gaining the confi-
dence of prominent Sunni leaders and then, at a propitious moment, stabbing them to
death. The obligation of these ‘holy warriors’ was to remain in place and permit them-
selves to be killed by bystanders. Holy warriors engaged in similar behavior occurred in
the Philippines’ Sulu archipelago at the time of its rule by Spain. The objection in this
instance was opposition to Christian domination of the country’s predominantly southern
islands.8 The parallel with contemporary terrorism in the Middle East and Asia seems
clear-cut, except to say today’s self-sacrificers often hope to kill as many people as

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236 Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur

possible, not simply prominent individuals (the assassinations of Indian and Sri Lankan
leaders by the LTTE and of course the killing of late Pakistani leader Benazir Bhutto
would be notable exceptions).
Martha Crenshaw, David Rapoport and other terrorism analysts have made the case
that the late 19th century anarchists and Russian revolutionaries who specialized in the
assassination of kings, members of the nobility, presidents, prime ministers and captains of
industry self-consciously engaged in suicide terrorism. The weapons available to them,
guns that had to be fired at close range and bombs that had to be hurled from a short
distance from their targets, required the would-be killers to sacrifice their own lives in
order to succeed at their murders. In these instances religion, at least as conventionally
understood, did not play a significant role. For the killers there were no expectations of
reward in an after-life.9
What they did expect was to be remembered for their ‘heroic’ deeds and for the
transcendent cause on whose behalf they gave their lives. In the 1890s the French
psychologist Emanuel Regis observed, ‘‘…Proud of his mission and his role, he acts
always in daylight and public, and never uses a secret weapon like poison but one that
demands personal violence. Afterwards, he does not seek to escape but exhibits pride in
his deed and desire for glory and for death, either by suicide or ‘indirect suicide’ as an
executed martyr.’’10
Most observers agree that the recent wave of suicide terrorism began in the early
1980s and in Lebanon and was linked to the joint Franco-American military presence in
Beirut. The predecessors of Hezbollah the now powerful Lebanese Shiite party and
paramilitary force were caught up in Lebanon’s protracted civil war. The leaders of this
Shia group, aided by Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen operating in Lebanon’s Bekka
Valley, reached the conclusion that the French and American forces were in the country
to protect the interests of Lebanon’s Christian dominated government. In 1983 and in
response to this perception suicide bombers drove trucks loaded with explosives into the
French and American embassies. Shortly thereafter similar ‘martyrdom operations’ were
conducted against the Marine Corps barracks near Beirut’s international airport as well as
its French counterpart. Suicide bombers killed some hundreds of military personnel in
these attacks which were the most devastating bombings since the end of the Second
World War.
The tactic worked. Within a few face-saving months of the attacks all American and
French forces were withdrawn from Lebanon. The same might be said in regard to the
Israeli military presence in south Lebanon. Despite possessing some sense of indomitabil-
ity, in 1985 the Israeli leadership under Prime Minister Shimon Peres decided to with-
draw from the heartland of Lebanon and to realign its forces in a chain of outposts in the
Southern part of the country. The minister of defense at the time, Yitzhak Rabin,
reached this conclusion after Hezbollah employed suicide bombings against Israeli bases
and military convoys, to make a continued Israeli presence appear too costly.
Success breeds emulation. If Israelis could be driven from Lebanon by suicide bomb-
ings and other tactics then these ‘martyrdom operations’ might prove beneficial to the
Palestinian cause. Leaders of the religiously inspired Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ) organizations, of whom many were deported by the Israeli Government to Southern
Lebanon in 1992 and established close ties to Hezbollah, reached this conclusion follow-
ing the September 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles peace agreement between Israel
and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.11 Hamas and PIJ were committed to doing
what they could to undermine the peace process between the ‘Zionist Entity’ and the
newly formed Palestinian National Authority. As in Lebanon, suicide bombings proved

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 The Spread of Suicide Terrorism: Religious and Secular Causes 237

an effective means of achieving a limited goal. Based on training supplied by Hezbollah

to the Palestinian leaders exiled by Israel to Lebanon, and then permitted to return to the
‘Territories’ following the Oslo accords, Hamas and PIJ conducted campaigns of suicide
bombings against Israeli civilians from 1993 forward until the ultimate breakdown of the
Oslo based peace process in 2000.
But that was hardly the end of things. With the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada later
in 2000, these Islamist organizations, joined by such secular Palestinian groups as the
Fatah, escalated their suicide attacks both on the West Bank and inside Israel proper.
Crowded buses, popular restaurants, outdoor markets were all targeted for these attacks in
the hope they would kill large numbers of Israelis. The Israeli government reacted to the
threat by the targeted killing of Hamas and PIJ leaders, the invasion of West Bank cities
in 2002 (operation ‘defensive shield’) and the erection of a physical barrier separating
Israel and the West Bank. These measures seemed effective in that there has been a sub-
stantial reduction in suicide attacks since the period 2004–2005.
Despite their limited achievements in the Israeli case, suicide bombings have proven to
be exceptionally popular in other circumstances. Other countries have been the sites and
groups with other causes have adopted the tactic. In Sri Lanka, the recently defeated
LTTE, a Hindu ⁄ nationalist organization, launched suicide attacks that, among other
things, succeeded in killing Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian prime minister. Nor have the
attacks been confined necessarily to religiously grounded groups.
For a short time, the nominally Marxist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) used the tactic
beginning in 1998, suspended suicide killings and then resumed them after the capture of
its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Suicide bombings were employed as a lever to obtain his
release. The Lebanese Socialists also staged several suicide attacks in the context of that
country’s conflict with Israel. The terrorism analyst Mia Bloom maintains the spread of
suicide bombings to secular organizations is the outcome of a competitive process. In
Lebanon and especially in the Palestinian case, where the Marxist Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) also carried out a handful of suicide attacks on Israeli
targets during the Al-Aqsa (2000–2004) Intifada, the groups involved found themselves
in competition with the religiously inspired organizations. In order to keep-up and
retain their radical credentials the secular groups felt compelled to launch their own suicide
missions.12
The Russian region of Chechnya has also provided an important occasion for suicide
attacks. The cause here is a combination of nationalism, the goal of national indepen-
dence from Moscow, and Islamist ideas about jihad and the religious imperative to wage
it against infidels and their local Muslim collaborators. After engaging in a civil war with
Russian forces, the Chechen insurgents turned to suicide attacks, e.g., two Chechen
women, ‘Black Widows,’ detonated bombs aboard two Aeroflot passenger planes killing
all passengers.
Suicide attacks are presently playing major roles in the fighting over Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan. In the case of post-2003 Iraq Sunni groups, e.g., al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia,
have carried out indiscriminate suicide attacks on Shia targets, including Shia holy sites and
worshippers. The purpose of these terrorist operations is to break-up the new and fragile
government in Baghdad in the hope a new Salafist ⁄ Jihadist regime might be put in its
place.13 The other purpose for the suicide missions is to coerce American forces into leav-
ing the country, as maintained by Robert Pape. In this case, the bombings have been used
in conjunction with other unconventional weapons of insurgency, especially ‘improvised
explosive devices’ (IEDs). In both cases, the majority of the suicide bombers have been
foreigners, from North Africa and Saudi Arabia and other countries adjacent to Iraq.

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In neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan have suicide attacks been widely used, until
recently. To quote Assaf Moghadam: ‘Suicide attacks, a rarity in Pakistan until 2002 are
now a common tactic against the Shia community, foreigners, Pakistani government and
military targets and political figures.’14 The most widely publicized of these attacks
involved the 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto, a strong candidate to become the
country’s next president. The apparent goal of the group that sent the bombers on their
way is to replace the regime in Islamabad with one under the auspices of the Taliban.
About the same may be said about events in Afghanistan, the country that hosted al-Qae-
da for years before Taliban rule was ended in 2001 through the collaboration between
local leaders and American forces. There were virtually no suicide bombings during this
phase of the struggle. But neither the Taliban nor al-Qaeda went away. They have resur-
faced and are presently (2009) embarked on an insurgency aimed at restoring themselves
to power. Along with ambushes and IEDs, suicide bombings have become an almost
routine weapon in their arsenal.
Despite its remoteness from major centers of world power, Afghanistan ⁄ Pakistan,
thanks to al-Qaeda, have become the source for what according to Moghadam amounts
to the globalization of martyrdom. Al-Qaeda and its network of affiliated groups around
the world have carried out suicide bombings in such far-flung locales as Indonesia, India,
Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Morocco, London, and New York. According to Bruce Hoffman,
in some cases these attacks have been staged by individuals who have received training at
bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In other instances, as noted by Marc Sageman, alien-
ated members of Muslim communities in Western Europe, thanks to the Internet, have
taken the initiative themselves. In any event suicide bombings have become close to a
worldwide phenomenon, one with which security agencies in the West (and elsewhere)
have become fully engaged.

When and Under What Circumstances

When and under what circumstances does suicide terrorism appear? Mia Bloom and
other analysts maintain that these attacks are rarely carried out during the first phase of a
terrorist campaign. These attacks come into use, she reasons, after other tactics have been
tried and found to be of limited benefit to insurgent groups. The use of suicide bombings
is normally part of the ‘second iteration’ of terrorist campaigns, and likely represent a sign
that the insurgents are relatively weak.15 They were not able to accomplish their goals by
other techniques. Bloom’s observation seems to apply in national struggles, e.g., the
Palestinians and Israelis, but perhaps not to the globalized attacks of al-Qaeda where
the medium is really the message.
The same may be said about the observations of Robert Pape. Pape employed his
extensive collection of data about suicide attacks to identify the most common
circumstances in which suicide attacks occur. According to his analysis, episodes of
suicide bombings occur in situations of foreign occupation. This observation applies most
accurately when the occupier and the occupied belong to different religions. As in Lebanon,
the Israeli occupied West Bank, United States, and its allies occupied Iraq and Afghanistan,
Jews and Christian ‘Crusaders’ are identified as invaders of the House of Islam.16 The likeli-
hood of suicide bombing campaigns is raised, Pape contends, when the occupying forces
represent democracies. The latter are more sensitive to public opinion than authoritarian
regimes of one type or another. Democratic public opinion will exert pressure on their gov-
ernments to end their presence as casualties mount. The presence of Italian forces in
Afghanistan is apparently coming to an end as the result of this dynamic.

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Two problems arise in connection with Pape’s assertions. First, American forces have
been present for decades in South Korea and on the Japanese island of Okinawa without
their experiencing suicide terrorism. There have been protests, even riots from time to
time, but no suicide bombings. Despite the fact Koreans and Japanese on Okinawa do
not share the same religious traditions as most Americans. The same may be said about a
British presence in various parts of the world. Second, suicide attacks are now being used
for essentially domestic political reasons rather as part of an effort to drive out foreigners.
The sectarian suicide bombings by Sunni groups of Shiite and Kurdish populations in Iraq
may serve as illustrations.

Benefits
Suicide terrorism carries with it several benefits for those sending the bombers on their
way. Not only is it relatively cheap, but the groups that launch such attacks do not have
to worry usually about developing escape plans for those carrying out the operations.
Unlike more conventional terrorist attacks, leaving a bomb at a particular location for
example, suicide bombers may move from place to place until they reach the most
advantageous spot to detonate themselves. Further, if the suicide attack succeeds, the
groups involved do not have to worry about the terrorist turning into an informant and
providing the authorities with information about the whereabouts of its various members.
Also, we should not forget that, as opposed to other types of terrorism, suicide attacks
are an effective way to kill large numbers of people. Todd Sandler estimates a kill ratio of
12 to 1.17 In other words, for every one person murdered in ‘conventional’ terrorist
attacks, 12 people are killed as the result of suicide bombings. We are dealing then with
a powerful weapon. In addition, suicide bombings launched especially against civilian
targets have the ability to terrify large segments of the population and damage the target’s
economy. Few shoppers, travelers, tourists, restaurant diners, strollers would be willing to
put their lives in jeopardy if the threat of suicide attack appears serious.

Motivation
Some of the cases from which we have drawn the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the PKK in Kurd-
istan, Marxist groups in Lebanon, and the PFLP on the West Bank suggest the existence
of non-religious motives for suicide terrorism. Nonetheless it would be foolish to deny
that religion, often mixed with nationalist goals, e.g., Kashmir, does not play an impor-
tant role. Most of the groups currently waging suicide bombing campaigns do so in the
name of Islam. The Koran though prohibits followers of the Prophet from taking their
own lives.
We are dealing though with a particular form of Islamic belief, a form of religious
doctrine known as ‘Salafism.’ The latter instructs its adherents to model their behavior on
that of the Prophets’ companions back in the seventh century. This outlook does not
necessarily compel violence. But when it is linked to a call for Jihad it certainly does.
The Salafist ⁄ Jihad doctrine is of recent origins, one that came into existence during the
resistance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Salafist ⁄ Jihadism holds not
only that adherents attempt to live like the Prophet’s companions but also wage holy
war against Islam’s perceived enemies. Suicide is still understood to be prohibited, but
martyrdom while carrying out Jihad is not. In this context, suicide terrorists are under-
stood to be martyrs and are defined in heroic terms and accorded immediate entry to
heaven (see following remarks).18

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With this understanding as background, we analyze the motives for suicide bombing
campaigns of individuals, terrorist groups and the broader community on whose behalf
the bombers and the groups claim to speak.
Why do individuals choose to die in order to murder large numbers of others? The
term ‘choose’ requires some qualification. There have been some cases, where people
sent on ‘martyrdom operations’ were unaware they were expected to kill themselves in
the course of their attacks. During the 1980s in Lebanon Ariel Merari reports a number
of instances when individuals were in effect tricked by their Hezbollah handlers into driv-
ing bomb-laden trucks toward Israeli targets without a clear understanding of what their
fate were to be. The bombs were then detonated by remote control killing the ‘suicide
terrorist’ along with the intended targets.19
In Pakistan more recently, some children under the age of 12 have been sold to the
Taliban by their impoverished parents.20 In some cases the children have been resold to
local Taliban units who, in turn, have used them as ‘suicide bombers.’ If we assume that
young boys do not possess sufficient maturity of judgment to choose to kill themselves
on martyrdom operations, it is hard to define them as true suicides.
These conditions aside, most suicide bombers seem to be aware of what they are doing
so that individual motivation comes into play. The bombers are genuinely dying to kill.
Why?
Most observers including those who have interviewed the suicides’ families and those
would-be martyrs who failed in their attempts have concluded the individuals involved
were not insane. Rather most of those involved were aware of what they were doing
and why they were doing it. The desire to achieve revenge is often mentioned. Inter-
viewers report the suicide bombers often had members of their own families physically
harmed or humiliated by the authorities. In many cases, the sense of humiliation and the
desire for revenge are experienced vicariously by watching scenes on television or via
the appropriate websites. Revenge seems to be particularly powerful motive in the
Palestinian ⁄ Israeli conflict. But the desire for revenge seems to be an especially powerful
motivator for terrorist attacks in general.21 Revenge may be gained in a variety of ways.
In the case of suicide bombers, the organizations that propel the martyrs on their way
likely channel this motive in a particular direction.
Other analysts rely on the work of the 19th century French sociologist Emile
Durkheim to assign individual motivation. Altruism, sacrificing oneself on behalf of a
group or community, apparently plays a major role. Fatalism may be a factor as well.
Individuals may be driven to suicide by ‘…the use of excessive regulation and oppressive
discipline to strip individuals of the capacity for independent thought and so leave them
vulnerable to following directions against their self-interest.’22 In other words political
and religious organizations may subject individuals to brainwashing to such an extent they
lose their ability to think clearly and, as a result, follow the suicidal instructions of the
organization involved.
There’s a suspicion that women who carryout suicide bombings may have somewhat
different motives than their male counterparts. Personal problems, e.g., divorce in Muslim
societies, the scorn of other family members for various infractions, may be of greater
significance for women than men.23
What are the rewards for carrying out suicide bombings? In the case of Muslims the
benefits are both earthly and heavenly. As far as the former is concerned the martyrs’
families often receive material benefits, e.g., new furniture, cash prizes, for the acts of
their sons and daughters. Even more importantly, in such close-knit communities that
social standing of a martyr’s family inclines immediately. Those who sacrifice themselves

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to kill others are aware they will be treated as heroes posthumously. Their pictures will
be posted on the walls of the communities involved. Videos of their last statements will
be shown on television and appropriate websites.
The heavenly rewards require some willful suspension of incredulity. In the prophetic
tradition of Islam martyrs may expect the following rewards: ‘remission of one’s sins at
the moment the martyr’s blood is shed; immediate admission to heaven…; the privilege
of accompanying prophets, saints and righteous believers; marriage to heavenly maidens;
the right to intercede with God on behalf of seventy relatives; and protection against the
pain of death.’24
These expectations are so strongly believed that on occasion women suicide bombers
put on extra makeup because they want to look their best when they are admitted to
God’s presence. What happens literally when a martyr succeeds in blowing himself or
herself to bits? What parts of the body come off first? The answer apparently depends on
where the bomb is placed. If the device is placed in a back-back, for example, the head
will be the first to go.25
Suicide bombers rarely act alone. Almost always they are part of a group effort to
attack some perceived enemy. The group promoting suicide attacks is typically engaged
in an asymmetrical conflict with a far more powerful state’s military. Al-Qaeda and its
now worldwide network of cells and subsidiary groups cannot hope to defeat the Ameri-
can military by conventional means. The same may be said in regard to Hamas and PIJ
vis-à-vis the Israeli Defense Forces. By using suicide bombers against civilian targets these
groups cannot only create widespread fear in the general public but also inflict some
tangible harm on the enemy. In the case of 9 ⁄ 11 airline traffic suffered substantial loses.
The stock market suffered. In Israel tourism declined precipitously during the Al-Aqsa
intifada. There were fewer restaurant diners and fewer customers in shopping malls.
From an organizational perspective suicide bombing is relatively cheap. The cost of a
suicide vest is usually under $ 500. Automobiles and trucks may be stolen or secondhand
ones bought for little. Al-Qaeda’s 9 ⁄ 11 attacks in New York and Washington required
an expenditure of some thousands of dollars, not much in view their impact.
There is a division of labor within terrorist groups that become committed to waging a
suicide bombing campaign. Planning and fund-raising are usually the work of the clique
group. Tactical designing is done by the lower echelons and in many cases local
cells. The most important tasks they perform include the recruitment of the suicides
themselves. In recent years prospective martyrs tend often to be walk-ins rather than
long-standing members of the groups. The walk-ins contact the organization first rather
than the other way around. They volunteer for training. On other occasions recruiters
identify youthful prospects and subject them to serious scrutiny. If accepted, the would-
be martyrs are trained and then brought to their destinations by handlers.26
Do the groups that incorporate suicide attacks as part of their repertoire achieve their
goals as a result? In a tactical sense the answer is often yes. The French and Americans left
Beirut largely because of the suicide attacks on their personnel inflicted by radical Shia
organizations. The same applies to Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. If we take
strategic goals into consideration then the answer is no. The Saudi regime persists. The
United States has not ended its presence in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda’s long-term goal
of restoring a caliphate throughout the Muslim world seems as far-fetched as it did in past
years.
Are there particular social and cultural conditions which are linked to the rise of sui-
cide bombers? This is a difficult question to answer with any degree of precision.
Approximately the same conditions that have seemingly given rise to these attacks in one

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setting have not in others. Nevertheless, we are able to make a few observations about
the circumstances that may not ‘cause’ suicidal terrorism but facilitate its appearance.
Societies that are divided and polarized along ethnic and religious lines seem vulnerable.
Lebanon may serve as an example. Foreign occupation is another factor. Iraq has the misfor-
tune of being divided into Shia, Sunni Arab, and Kurdish communities, all with various
grievances, and since March 2003 foreign military occupation as well.27 Groups that promote
suicide terrorism seem most prevalent within countries with profoundly isolated minority
populations from which recruits can be drawn. The immigrant Arab and Pakistani communi-
ties in Western Europe have been the sources of many suicide terrorists in recent years.
Analysts also refer to a culture of martyrdom. They have in mind cultures that
celebrate the lives of individuals who sacrifice themselves for a higher cause. Shiite
communities with their rituals commemorating the life and heroic death of Husain seem
especially vulnerable. Further, in conflict ridden areas violent death is an everyday
occurrence. Individuals who live in such settings tend to accept death more naturally.
State and leaders of militant groups tend to take advantage of this fact and to use the most
advanced advertising techniques and vehicles in order to glorify the idea of martyrdom.
We ought not to forget the problem of behavior contagion or diffusion ‘copycat’
behavior in other words. As mentioned earlier, neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan had any
traditions of suicide terrorism. During the decade-long resistance to the Soviet occupation
of their country the Afghan ‘holy warriors’ seeking to compel the Red Army to
withdraw did not employ the tactic. Now of course it has become a widely used tactic
by the Taliban to eliminate the American presence. Why? The answer has to do with the
fact that suicide terrorism has gone global. Because of its successes in the Middle East and
the West World, militant groups have been quick to learn what to do and how to do it.

Countermeasures
Suicide bombing is a powerful tool in the hands of extremist political groups. But it is
not undefeatable. If a particular public (see above) provides permissive social and cultural
conditions for these attacks, then an appropriate reaction by the authorities is to undercut
this support by taking steps to encourage the public to repudiate the tactic. Support and
opposition to suicide attacks on civilians among the Palestinians for example rises and falls
with the chances of achieving a negotiated settlement with the Israelis.28 Public support
for suicide attacks also wanes when they are directed against the local population. Jorda-
nian support for the tactic declined substantially when the late Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi,
head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, directed an attack on Arab civilians celebrating a marriage at a
hotel in Amman.
Improved intelligence is a crucial response. The British, Spanish, Israeli, Indonesian,
and American intelligence agencies have been able to thwart multiple suicide attacks by
using highly sophisticated signal intelligence and in some cases human intelligence as well.
This allowed them to learn of the planning for such attacks and apprehending their likely
perpetrators.
Suicide bombers wish to die, but this is not necessarily the case with those ‘handlers’
and other terrorist figures who send them on their way. The Israelis have carried out
‘targeted killings’ of terrorist group leaders. American forces operating in Afghanistan
and Pakistan are currently employing Predator drone aircraft to fire Hellfire missiles at
Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders operating in these countries. Many have been killed as a result.
The principal objection to these ‘decapitations’ is that they so infuriate other members
of the terrorist groups they redouble their efforts to stage suicide attacks. The tactic is

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 The Spread of Suicide Terrorism: Religious and Secular Causes 243

deemed self-defeating because it serves to increase attacks rather than reducing them. But
one analyst points to a distinction between desire and capacity. The desire to launch
more suicide attacks increases, but the capacity to carry them out declines with the
‘decapitations’ of the terrorist groups’ most clever leaders.
Defensive measures such as physical barriers or enhanced security in public places have
proven to be quite effective in stopping or diverting suicide bombers. However, if the
roots of the conflict are not addressed, it is likely that the leaders of the group would
innovate and introduce alternative means to perpetrate terrorism. A good example is the
Hamas’ shift from suicide bombers to rocket launching.
None of the countermeasures outlined above have been completely successful. But
they do represent the most common ways governments have sought to respond to the
problem.

Short Biographies
Leonard Weinberg is Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of
Nevada and a senior fellow at the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of
Terrorism in Oklahoma City and at the National Security Studies Center at the
University of Haifa (Israel). Over the course of his career, he has been a Fulbright
senior research fellow for Italy, a visiting scholar at UCLA, a guest professor at the
University of Florence, and the recipient of an H. F. Guggenheim Foundation Grant
for the study of political violence. He has also served as a consultant to the United
Nations Office for the Prevention of Terrorism (Agency for Crime Control and Drug
Prevention). For his work in promoting Christian–Jewish reconciliation, Weinberg was
a recipient of the 1999 Thornton Peace Prize. His books include Democratic Responses
to Terrorism (2007, ed.), Global Terrorism (2005), Political Parties and Terrorist Groups
(2003, with Ami Pedahzur), Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century (2003,
eds. with Peter Merkl), Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism (2003, eds. with
Ami Pedahzur), The Democratic Experience and Political Violence (2001, eds. with David
Rapoport), and The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right (1998, with Jeffrey
Kaplan). His articles have appeared in journals such as The British Journal of Political
Science, Comparative Politics, and Party Politics. He is the senior editor of the journal
Democracy and Security.
Ami Pedahzur is an associate professor in the department of government at the
University of Texas, Austin. He received his PhD in political science from the University
of Haifa in 1999 and started teaching at the same university soon afterwards. Since the
early stages of his career Dr Pedahzur was interested in the Israeli extreme right and in
the State’s response to it. This resulted in three books. Two of them were published in
Hebrew and one ‘The Israeli Response to Jewish Extremism and Violence – Defending
Democracy’ was published in English (Manchester University Press, 2002). Dr Pedahzur
has also studied the causes for the violent manifestations of the conflict, especially terror-
ism. This research path was reflected in his book ‘Suicide Terrorism’ (Polity Press, 2005)
as well as in a more recent coauthored book (with Arie Perliger) ‘Jewish Terrorism in
Israel’ (Columbia University Press, 2009). Dr Pedahzur also has an interest in the effec-
tiveness of various counterterrorism policies. The results of these research efforts were
published in a coauthored volume in Hebrew ‘Coping with Terrorism in Jerusalem’ (The
Jerusalem Institute for the Study of Israel, 2005) and more recently in a book entitled
‘The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle against Terrorism’ (Columbia University
Press, 2009).

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244 Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur

Notes
* Correspondence address: Prof. Leonard Weinberg, 1664 N Virginia St, MS 0302, Reno, NV 89557-0302, USA.
E-mail: weinbrl@unr.nevada.edu.

1
On the Sarin gas attack, see John Parachini and Katsuhisa Furukawa, ‘Japan and Aum Shinrikyo’ in Robert Art
and Louise Richardson (Eds.) Democracy and Counterterrorism (Washington DC: USIP Press, 2007) pp. 531–62.
2
Martha Crenshaw, ‘Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay’ Security Studies 16:1 (2007) p. 135.
3
See or example, Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2008) pp. 9–16.
4
See for example, Peter Hill, ‘Kamikaze, 1943–5’ in Diego Gambetta Making Sense of Suicide Missions (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005) pp. 1–41.
5
Boaz Ganor ‘Suicide Attacks in Israel’ in Countering Suicide Terrorism (Herzliya: International Policy Institute for
Counter-Terrorism, 2000) p. 134.
6
Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656 f (d).
7
Moghadam, p. 10.
8
Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge UK: Polity Press, 2005) p. 9.
9
For an intriguing discussion of these secular ‘martyrs’ see Albert Camus, The Rebel (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1954) pp. 140–1.
10
Quoted in Barbara Tuchman, The Proud Tower (New York: Bantam Books, 1967) p. 78.
11
See, Mohammed Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2006) pp. 18–9.
12
Mia Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding’ Political Science
Quarterly 119:1 (2004) pp. 61–88.
13
Mohammed Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq (Washington DC: USIP Press, 2007) pp. 63–113.
14
Moghadam, p. 179.
15
Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) p. 76.
16
Robert Pape, Dying to Win (New York: Random House, 2005) pp. 77–101.
17
Sandler (2008).
18
See Moghadam, pp. 99–106.
19
Ariel Merari, ‘The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal terrorism in the Middle East’ in Walter Reich (ed.),
Origins of Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 192–207.\
20
Pakistan: Taliban kidnapping boys for ‘Jihad’ http://www.MSNBC/msn.com/id/32279950/ns/world.
21
See for example, Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want (New York: Random House, 2006) pp. 76–7.
22
Pape, pp. 175–6.
23
For a discussion see Yorum Schweitzer (ed.), Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center
for Strategic Studies, 2006).
24
Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs pp. 38–9.
25
Conversation with Dr Phillip Lisagor, Chief of Surgery, Veteran’s Administration Hospital, Reno, Nevada May
2007.
26
Pedahzur, pp. 40–2.
27
Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq pp. 89–113.
28
Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs pp. 53–65.

Works Cited
Bloom, Mia (2005). Dying to Kill. New York: Columbia University Press.
Gambetta, Diego (ed.) (2005). Making Sense of Suicide Missions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ganor, Boaz (ed.) (2000). Countering Suicide Terrorism. Herzilya: International Policy Institute for Counter-Terror-
ism.
Hafez, Mohammed (2006). Manufacturing Human Bombs. Washington DC: USIP Press.
—— (2007). Suicide Bombers in Iraq. Washington DC: USIP Press, 200.
Moghadam, Assaf (2008). The Globalization of Martyrdom. Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Pape, Robert (2005). Dying to Win. New York: Random House.
Pedahzur, Ami (2005). Suicide Terrorism. Cambridge UK: Polity Press.
Reich, Robert (ed.) (1990). Origins of Terrorism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Richardson, Louise (2006). What Terrorists Want. New York: Random House.
Schweitzer, Yoram (ed.) (2006). Female Suicide Bombers. Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

ª 2010 The Authors Religion Compass 4/4 (2010): 234–244, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2009.00206.x

Journal Compilation ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd