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The Story of Hewlett-Packard
The Story of Hewlett-Packard
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Barbara Black
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Black, Barbara, "The Story of Hewlett-Packard" (2009). Faculty Articles and Other Publications. Paper 49.
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INTRODUCTION:
THE STORY OF HEWLETT-PACKARD
BarbaraBlack*
* Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of
Cincinnati College of Law. I want to thank all the participants in the March 14, 2008 Symposium on
Dysfunctional Boards, especially Gary P. Kreider, Esq., Keating, Muething & Klekamp, LLP; Clifford
A. Roe, Jr., Esq., Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP; and John S. Stith, Esq., Porter Wright & Morris LLP, who
provided valuable insights in their roles as moderators of the sessions.
1. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW § 5.4B.1, at 76 (2d ed., 2009).
2. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 191 (Del. 1988) (according business judgment rule
presumption to GM board's purchase of its stock owned by Ross Perot). Similarly, courts do not view
"group think" as a serious danger. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050-51 (Del. 2004) (rejecting
plaintiff's "structural bias" argument).
3. AMERICAN BAR ASsoCIATION, CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S HANDBOOK 78-79 (4th ed., 2004)
(discussing impact of Regulation FD on corporate policies regarding the persons who are authorized to
communicate with the public).
4. Id. at 10- 11.
11. HP STANDARDS OF BUSINESS CONDUCT § 8.5 (2006) [hereinafter SBC 2006], available at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media-files/irol/71/71087/corpgov/sbcbrochure2006.pdf. See also HP
STANDARDS OF BUSINESS CONDUCT 7-8, 14 (2008), availableat http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitiz
enship/csr/sbcbrochure.pdf.
12. SBC 2006, supra note 11, at 22-23.
13. Other corporations have also suffered from leaky boards. In 2007, Dow Chemical announced
that it had fired two senior executives, one of whom was a director, for allegedly engaging in
unauthorized talks to sell the company. See Jeffrey Ball, Dennis K. Berman, & Joann S. Lublin, Officials
Fired at Dow Chemical for Secret Talks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2007, at AI, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB 117638449048167683.html.
14. Hearing, supra note 6, at 728 (testimony of Mark Hurd, President, Chief Executive Officer,
and Chairman of the Board, Hewlett-Packard, Co.). Describing it as a "rogue investigation" may be self-
serving, as Miriam Baer points out. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Coporate Policing and Corporate
Governance: What Can We Learn from Hewlett Packard's Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV.
523, 531, 535 (2008).
15. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Function of "Dysfunctional" Boards, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 391
(2008).
16. Id. at 398 (reviewing with skepticism the classic explanations: managing, monitoring, and
mediating).
17. Jayne W. Bamard, Narcissism, Over-Optimism, Fear, Anger and Depression: The Interior
Life of Corporate Leaders, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 405 (2008).
18. Id. at 424 & n.115.
19. Id. at 428.
20. Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is
Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 431 (2008).
21. Id. at 449-50.
22. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the
EmpiricalLiterature,77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465 (2008).
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(m)(2) (2007)).
Dunn and Perkins and that a "respect gap" existed. 3' According to
another HP director, Perkins's behavior toward Dunn was "chairman
32
abuse.,
Dunn testified that, prior to the identification of Keyworth as the
source of the 2006 leak, Perkins pressured her not to disclose the name
of the leaker to the full board and that Perkins felt betrayed when,
against his wishes, the board was told it was Keyworth.3 3 Perkins was
also upset that he was not told the identity of the leaker in advance of the
board meeting. Instead, before the board meeting, Dunn shared the
information with the audit committee, which oversees the Standards of
Business Conduct, and not with the nominating and governance
committee, which was headed by Perkins. 34 Dunn believed this was
"very sensitive" because Perkins and Keyworth were close friends and
allies on the board. Although the board requested Keyworth to resign, he
refused to do so. Perkins, however, resigned in protest over the
identification of Keyworth; Perkins's subsequent public disclosure of
the questionable investigative tactics set in motion the public outcry that
led to Dunn's downfall.
The HP board's dysfunctionality may also have stemmed, in part,
from its failure to achieve agreement on the board as to its appropriate
role. Keyworth and Perkins, as longtime HP directors deeply versed in
the technology, appeared to disparage the importance of corporate
governance and financial expertise that Dunn represented, contributing
to a board culture
35
prone to "destructive criticism, personality clashes and
infighting."
With the final two papers, the symposium turns to the board's role to
ensure the corporation's compliance with the law. Professor Baer uses
the HP pretexting scandal to explore the largely unexplored conflict
between corporate policing and corporate governance. 6 Building on
both corporate governance and law enforcement scholarship, she sets
forth the tension between corporate governance norms and the board's
responsibility to oversee its internal compliance department, a tension
that is exacerbated in the post-SOX era where government expects
corporations to be its partner in ferreting out corporate crime. Dunn's
description, when she defended the investigative techniques used to
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Hearing, supra note 6, at 64-68 (prepared statement of Patricia C. Dunn, Former Chairman
of the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.).
34. Id. See Murray, supra note 10.
35. Frankel, supra note 25, at 513.
36. Baer, supranote 14, at 535-36.
37. Hearing, supra note 6, at 62 (prepared statement of Patricia C. Dunn, Former Chairman of
the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.).
38. Baer, supranote 14, at 572.
39. Peter J. Henning, Board Dysfunction: Dealing with the Threat of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 585 (2008).
40. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).