University of Tulsa

The "Twitterlitter" of Nonsense: "Askesis" a t "Finnega ns Wa ke"

Author(s): Brett BourbonSource: Ja mes Joyce Qua rterly, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Winter,
2002), pp. 217-232 Published by: University of Tulsa Sta ble URL:
http://www.jstor.org/sta ble/25477866 .Accessed: 16/11/2014 05:34Your use of the
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JSTOR Terms a nd Conditions??Finnega nsBy a The "Twitterlitter"Askesis a t Finnega ns
Wa keBrett Bourbon Sta nford UniversityI Wa ke is not a work of a rt but a work of
theology.work of theology, I mea n tha t theWa ke dema nds to be rea d a s wha t Pierre
Ha dot ca lls, in describing a ncient Greek a nd Roma nphilosophy, a spiritua l exercise
(a skesis)} I n a ncient philosophy, a ccording toHa dot, these spiritua l exercises
"ha ve a s their goa l the tra nsforma tion of our vision of the world, a nd the
meta morphosis of our being" (127).While Socra tes rema ins the exempla r of such spiri
a s he ca lls it in the Thea etetus, PMlo of Alexa ndria forma l description of wha t
these exercises enta il:things."2a skesis develops from this philosophica l a skesis,
which, under theincrea sing a uthority of the Bible, ta kes the form of exegesis.
Rea ding oneself in rela tion to the words of God beca me the prima ry wa y inwhich the
self-a ttention (prosoche) prescribed by Philo could beexpressed through the
disciplines o? sa cra doctrina (holy or sa cred doc trine). Rea ding, a s Sa int
Augustine cla ims a t the end of his discussionof Genesis in the Confessions, becomes
a form of pra yer: "the exercise of tha t joyful cha rity which comes of a t la st
finding God a nd seeks tofind him in his works."3 Simila rly, St. John Ca ssia n, a
contempora ryof Augustine, in his Conferences, a collection of dia logues a ttributed
to fifteen Egyptia n church fa thers, ima gines tha t rea ding scripture, like
loneliness, fa sts, vigils, work, a nd na kedness, is pa rt of a mona stic comba t tha t
strives towin a purity of hea rt (purita s cordis).4 The sub sequent history of
Christia n exegesis reta ins this sense of rea ding a s a form of self-reflection.I t is
ea sy to lose the sense of "self-a ttention" expressed by prosoche, pa rtly beca use
there is a strong modern tendency to think of sucha ttention a s directed towa rd
something ca lled "the self." The tra nsla tion of prosoche a s "self-a ttention"
ismea nt to ca pture the sense of217tua l midwifery, gives a moreresea rch(zetesis),
(a kroa sis), self-a ttention (prosoche), self-ma stery (enkra teia ), a nd "indif ference
to indifferent Ha dot demonstra tes tha t Christia nof Nonsense:investiga tion
(skepsis), rea ding (a na gnosis), listening?This content downloa ded from
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Conditions??a ttention to how one lives a nd to the whole of one's life. Prosoche is
pa rt of the ethica l work one does to a nswer the funda menta l ethica lquestion for the
a ncient world: how ought I to live?5 A slightly differ ent ethica l sense is
expressed by Aristotle's use of euda imonia , comtra nsla ted a s "huma n flourishing."6
Tha t which flourishes a nd the flourishing itself constitute a good life, a nd it is
this life tha twould be the subject of prosoche? I n this essa y, I a m restricting
"self a ttention" even further. I mea n the "self" in "self-reflection" or "self
a ttention" to describe tha t towa rd which reflection or a ttention isdirected, tha t
which is picked out when I use the first person. I lea ve wha t is a ttended to in
this ca se open a nd va gue, pa rtly beca use it isour difficulty inpla cing a ny thing or
a ny non-thing in this position tha t constitutes the importa nce of prosoche forme.
The centra lity of self-a ttention in Christia n theologica l rea ding ha s been lost in
Jea n-Michel Ra ba t?'s cla im tha t "[p]erha ps more tha n a ny writer of this century,
Joyce ha s forced criticism to a cknowledge itstheologica l na ture."8 With some
tension a nd hesita tion, Ra ba t? fol lows Ja cques Derrida in defining the
"theologica l na ture" of criticisma s consisting of our rea ding a lwa ys behind the
text, rea ding bela ted ly tha t Joyce is a lwa ys a hea d of us, so tha t we rea d a lwa ys
"in memmonlyory of him" (l).9 Ra ba t? a rgues tha t this kind of theologica lrea ding
must become "a perverted theology" (185), replica ting a nd undoingthis memory through
rea ding (through a kind of submissiveness toa nd over-ma stery of the text):
"Finnega ns Wa ke proposes a n evolu tiona ry book tha t ha s to be resha ped by every
rea der who will lea rntoma ster its idiolect, to inha bit its pa ges, to live with or
within its uni verse" (189). I invoke Ra ba t? a nd Derrida , however, not in order to
begin a critique but in order toma rk the difference between a ny the ologica l
rea ding tha t rea ds under the a uthority of Finnega ns Wa ke a ndwha t I mea n by rea ding
a s a spiritua l exercise. I will require a different kind of self-reflectionpursued
by either Ra ba t? or Derrida , When one is rea ding the "na tla ngua ge" of theWa ke (FW
83.12), the self-reflexive rea ding dema nded by Christia n exegesis ta kes the form of
continua lly a sking how toRobert Polhemus(prosoche) a nd medita tion (melete) tha n
tha trea d it a nd why. I t is through these questions,how these questions ha ve a cla im
on us, tha t Finnega ns Wa ke emergesa s something for a nyone to rea d.Wha t I mea n by
spiritua l exercises, therefore, is closer to wha tworld exposed in theWa ke. The
Wa ke's night lessons a remea nt to a lterindica tes when he spea ks of the Wa ke a s a
comic gospel.10 Polhemus shows how one could find a wa y through the Wa ke a nd ground
one's life on a kind of comic sta nce towa rd theone's funda menta l sta nce towa rd
oneself, others,Wha t I mea n by "sta nce" here is a kin towha t Aristotle ca lls ethos,
the218through investiga tinga nd the world.?This content downloa ded from
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Conditions??cha ra cter tha t is the source of one's beha vior, but a lso to hexis, the
sta te or disposition we ta ke towa rd others a nd theworld. One mighta lso think of
Ma rtinHeidegger's use of "Verha ltung," which is norma lly sta nce"funda menta l others,
a nd the world" in order to point not totra nsla ted a s towa rd oneself,
"comportment."11 But I a m usingthe pa rticula rs of cha ra cter or comportment but to
the fa ct tha t we inha bit such sta nces. Describing wha t we a re in this wa y is to
point a thow wha t we a re (a n ontologica l question) ca n be expressed mea n ingfully in
our beha vior, thoughts, a nd usa ge of words such a s"ethos," "hexis" "verha ltung," or
"sta nce." Attempts to spea k a boutthe rela tion between wha t is a nd wha t ismea ningful
(especia lly a ttempts to equa te being with mea ning) I understa nd a s theology.
comprehending Finnega ns Wa ke a s ha ving something to tea chThus,(where its night
lessons concern how we should ta ke Wa kea n la ngua ge a s ours or not ours, a nd hence
ta ke itsworld a s congruent ora lien to ours) mea ns understa nding it a s a theologica l
lesson.The a ppea l to theology, however, ca nnot help but sound a na chronistic. The
melodra ma tic ca st to the phra se "tra nsforma tion of one'sbeing" ismore likely to be
understood psychologica lly tha n spiritua lly. Certa inly, the spirit in "spiritua l
exercises" ha s been under pres sure from modern philosophy a nd science, so tha t it
is not clea r wha t"spirit" ca n mea n a nymore. I n a ddition, ma ny of the rhetorica l
a ctiv ities tha t constituted a skesis forHellenic philosophers, forma ny of thechurch
fa thers, a nd, in a different wa y, for St. I gna tius of Loyola ha ve been forma lized
a nd distorted by tha t broa d set of ha bits a nd pra ctices developed a nd expressed
through litera ry criticism, a nd it is not clea r a ny more wha t rea ding a s pa rt of
such "exercises" ca n mea n.The exempla r for Christia n spiritua l exercises rema ins
Sa intAugustine. His re-rea ding of himself inhis Confessions works through a
complica ted interlea ving of rea ding, a ttention, listening, a nd telling.This
complica ted sta nce a llows Augustine to express a nd think through three na rra tive
stra nds tha t a re a lrea dy pa rticula r sta nces towa rd God a nd his own huma nness: 1) he
lives a nd ha s lived a lifea lrea dy embedded within the gra ce of God, a s do we a ll;
2) through his living, he fa lls from a nd strives towa rd a conscious commitmentto
God a nd his gra ce a nd word; a nd 3) through his Confessions, he reinterprets both of
the preceding na rra tive sta nces a s a wa y of further pla cing a nd understa nding
himself within a grea ter sta bility a nd comprehension of his a nd our enta nglement
within huma n fa llenness a nd God's gra ce a nd being. These complica ted stra nds a ll
center ontwo funda menta l premises: 1) tha t God is "deeply hidden yet most
intima tely present" (I .iv.4)?thus a ny move towa rd God is ca used bytha t a ll tha t is
is both nea r a nd fa r from God; a nd 2) tha twe spea k from out of our "dea d219God's
gra ce (see, especia lly, VI I I .xi.25)?a nd?This content downloa ded from 128.135.12.127
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condition ... a trough of corruption" (I X.i.l), so tha t the question "wha t a re you
[God] tome?" is tied to the question "Wha t a m I to you[God]?" (Lv.5).Augustine's
na rra tive sta nce, which I a m ca lling here his rea ding,a ttention, listening, a nd
telling, follows from these premises. One ca n see themovement of his na rra tive
through
these complica ted sta nces a nd in rela tion to these premises in the conversion
scene in book VI I I .His condition ofmora l a nd theologica l confusion is exposed
through self-a ttention, or, a s he sa ys, "a profound self-exa mina tion . . .dredged
up a hea p of a ll my misery a nd set it 'in the sight of my hea rt'" (VDI .xii.28). His
listening within this condition through fa ith a llows him to hea r in the voice of a
child a comma nd from God to"'pick up a nd rea d'" (VI I I .xii.29) a nd, by following
this comma nd through his own fa ith, he rea ds a ra ndomly chosen pa ssa ge from
scriptures tha t he understa nds a s specifica lly directed towa rds his own condition.
This moment of rea ding provides a n insight into his rela tion toGod, but it is a lso
a n a ct of conversion. Rea ding the scrip tures is itself a figure for the self-
a ttention a nd rea ding of his lifetowa rd a nd through God's gra ce in the Confessions.
Such a ttentiona nd rea ding is not a n a ttempt to discover a ny depth of person or mind
but is, ra ther, a ca lling upon God (I .i.l), a ca lling tha t is a n a ttempt to
understa nd a nd situa te oneself within the sta bility ofGod's gra ce in the fa ce of
huma n fa llenness (the two premises a bove).The rea ding of his life, theworld, a nd
the holy text tha t Augustinepursues in Confessions is funda menta lly a form of
Christia ntha t lies beyond the rea ding process," a s Bria n Stock notes, requiresself-
a tten tion. Rea ding, for Augustine, in order "to a scend to a type of truththe
orga nizing presence of God a s the tra nscendentwhich we see our fa llenness.12
Augustine writes in his Confessions:"Butwhile he is spea king, Lord, you turned my
a ttention ba ck to myself. You took me up from behind, my own ba ck where I ha dpla ced
myself (Ps. 20.13) a nd you setme before my fa ce (Ps. 49.2.1) so tha t I could see
how vile I wa s, how twisted a nd filthy, covered withsores a nd ulcers" (VI I Lvii.16).
Augustine's summa ry of his self-reflec tion describes a hermeneutic educa tion tha t
rema kes our huma nsta nce towa rd the world a nd God by reconstituting the linguistic
forms within which we configure both this sta nce a nd the rea lity ofourselves in
rela tion to theworldselves within our la ngua ge a nd pra ctices.a nd God. We discover
God a nd ourA funda menta lword, theWord of God, a nd huma n la ngua ge, a dista nce tha t
is pa rtly brea ched by our interpreta tive pra ctices. This dista nce, however,a lso
esta blishes a kind of indetermina cy within huma n la ngua ge tha tma rks the
incommensura bilitybetween the inner word a nd our ordi220dista nce rema ins between
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na ry la ngua ge.huma n la ngua ge is countered by a n a llegorica l simila rity, inwhich, a s
Augustine describes it, "the sound [of a word] is a body, but the sig nifica nce is,
so to spea k, the soul of the sound."13 This is the dista ncebetween huma nity a nd
divinity14An importa nt continuity exists between the Reformers,Ma rtin Luther, a nd
Augustine. Augustine pictured huma nra dica lly dependent on God, highlighting the
fa llenness a nd emptiness of huma n life tha t Luther woulddevelopjustifies huma n
beings through His gra ce a lone (a n interpreta tion ofRoma ns 1.17). Self-reflection
a s a spiritua l exercise in Philo's sense ofa skesis, however, ca nnot help but be
tra nsformed, in Luther's understa nding of God's ma king huma ns just through gra ce,
by the sense tha t we do not discover theWord of God but tha t theWord discoversus.
This tra nsforma tion ma rks a n importa nt fra cture in the history tha t lea ds to
Finnega ns Wa ke a nd its peculia r use of la ngua ge. Onceinterpreta tion is simplified
into a Christologica l expression of gra ce, God's word ca n be more fully present in
huma n la ngua ge.incommensura bilitybetween inner word a ndthe tension between God's
inner word a nd huma nConsequently,la ngua ge dissolves, a nd, a ccording to Luther, the
divinity of Christ isdisguised benea th the forms of la ngua ge, a sHe iswithin the
form of huma n flesh.15 From this, it follows tha t theology is, a s I sa ia h Berlin
describes it, "nothing but gra mma r concerned with the words of theHoly Ghost."16The
diminishment of a llegory in Protesta nt rea dings of the Biblewa s compensa ted for by
the grea ter Christologica l significa nce a ssigned to a ll la ngua ge. While this
encoura ged a n increa sed litera lism in rea ding holy writ, it a lso discoura ged the
presumption tha t Biblica l la ngua ge ha s mea ning by virtue of a llegorica l reference.
Fromsuch a theologica l shift, Joha nn Georg Ha ma nn a nd Joha nn Gottfried Herder
developed more or less secula r theories of la ngua ge suggesting tha t la ngua ge bea rs
the full possibilities of mea ning in its very form.17 For Ha ma nn, this mea ns tha t
words bea r a n emotiona l content in themselves a nd tha t neither the world nor
la ngua ge ha s a privrela tive to the other; furthermore, rea son a nd intu ition, or
perception, a re fully a nd inextrica bly confused with a ndileged positionI n other
words, we ca nnot get undernea th either or the world to view the other, nor ca n we
think exceptthrough la ngua ge.la ngua gethrough the gra mma r of our la ngua ge.18 Wha t
I ha ve ca lled Finnega nsWa ke's theologica l lesson exposes this sa me kind of
enta nglement of world, rea son, a nd la ngua ge. The Wa ke's theologica l lesson, unlike
Luther's, shows tha t it is not Christ tha t we find in our la ngua ge but ourselves
threa tened by nonsense, sleep, a nd dea th.How do or ca n we see ourselves in
Finnega ns Wa ke in this wa y? Or 221into the cla im tha t Godespecia lly beings a s?This
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subject to JSTOR Terms a nd Conditions??kind of self-reflection or Luther's tra cing
of divinity in the words of the Holy Spirit bera ther, how ca n either Augustine's
gra mma tica lena cted without God? Wha t kind of mora l self-reflectionFinnega ns Wa ke to
be a response to the predica ment prompting these questions, the predica ment tha t
would motiva te writing such a text a nd the one tha t would motiva te our rea ding
it.Wha t ha s repla ced God in theWa ke a re pa rticula r kinds of nonsense tha t, like
Luther's God, a re within la ngua ge itself: it is a ga inst this limit tha t we a re
forced to reflect a nd see ourselves.I fwe enter into theWa ke through the
indetermina cy tha t a ccompa nies the words "spiritua l" a nd "exercises," then we a re
fa ced with two questions. The first is a question a bout "exercises," a bout rea ding:
"Wha t kind of mea ningfulness is left if one no longer knows or understa nds how the
words in Finnega ns Wa ke a re a bout somethingor a nything?" This is a question
concerning the a boutness or inten tiona lity of la ngua ge. The second question is
a modem descenda nt ofthe query "wha t is the soul?" a nd follows from the previous
question:is rea ding Finnega ns Wa ke a huma n a ctivity?These two queries, however, a re
not rea lly questions a t a ll. I t is notclea rwha t would count a s a nswers to either of
them. Consequently, it would be more a ccura te to ca ll them riddles. I n order to
respond tothese riddles, we a re required to rea d outside the bounds of interpre
ta tive propriety with wha t ca n look like eclecticism but is rea lly a n a ttempt to
construct oneself a nd one's understa nding within a theo logica l sta nce or ra ther to
determine wha t will count a s this kind of sta nce. This mea ns undoing, a s the Wa ke
undoes, the historica l a ndduce or inha bit when the limits of the worldflicting set
of fra gments of science, technology, socia l a na chronistic religion, psychologica l
fa nta sy, a nd so on? I understa ndfra mes from within which we a re tra ined to think.
interpreta tiveThere a re, of course, limits, but we ha ve no wa y of determining wha t
these limits will a nd should be. This does not mea n one should rea d without limits,
by free a ssocia tion. I n fa ct, the ina bility of a ny interpreta tive fra me to control
the Wa kea n "cha osmos . . .moving a ndcha nging every pa rt of the time" (FW 118.21-23)
mea ns tha t rea ding requires thinking a bout wha t ca n a nd should count a s a limit to
ourrea ding.I I The la ngua ge of Finnega ns Wa ke where "Som's wholed, a ll's pa rt ed" is
"[b]inomea ns to be comprendered" (FW 563.32, 285.27-28). So why rea d it?Not
surprisingly, there is a long-sta nding tra dition tha t a ssumes tha t this question
ca n best be a nswered by a nswering the222a re constructedca n we pro a s a con
prejudice,?This content downloa ded from 128.135.12.127 on Sun, 16 Nov 2014 05:34:21
AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms a nd Conditions??"wha t is Finnega ns Wa ke a bout?"
Ja mes S. Atherton, in The Books a t the "Wa ke," suggests tha t this is the
funda menta l question for critics.19I n response to the dema nd to determine wha t the
book is a bout,critics often delinea te some interpreta tive doma in within which the
Wa ke ga ins a subject ma tter. Thus, it is a bout la ngua ge, a ccording to Rona ld E.
Bucka lew, a bout culture (Christine Froula ), a bout our psychology (Ma rgot Norris),
or a bout themind (Sheldon Brivic)?a nd soquestionon.20 Such a rguments, whileca nnot
help but ta ke the form of specia l plea ding or even of a n a pologetics for a wa y of
interpreting, sa nctioned by the ra dica l indetermi na cy of the text.Such
interpreta tive a nswers to the question "wha t is the Wa ke a bout?" a re encoura ged
beca use it is not clea r how the la ngua ge oftheWa ke could be a bout a nything, with
two possible exceptions. They a re exceptions only beca use their objects require
only a minimuminterpreta tive fra me. I nwriting Finnega ns Wa ke, Joyce cla imed tha t he
wa s a ttempting to describe our night life, a nd in so doing he ha d toput English to
sleep (in the double sense of this phra se). Consequently, a s John Bishop, in
Joyce's Book of theDa rk, ha s shown ra ther convincingly, the Wa ke is litera lly a re-
description of the nightlife of a missing individua l.21 Beca use, however, this
person "a slip" in the text ismissing (FW 377.26,597.12), he or she could be
everyone ora nyone. The
other object rea dily a va ila ble for interpreta tion is the Wa ke itself. There a re
numerous versions of this, usua lly embedded inother kinds of interpreta tions- A
book a bout itself, however, pressures "a bout" in such a wa y tha t not only is the
text a nima ted with a kind of intention, but it is difficult not simply to tra nsla te
"a bout" into redescription. A Wa kea n sentence ca n be seen a s a re-description of
itself a s a whole a nd in pa rts. This need not be pa ra doxica l. I ca n sa y,"This is a
story a bout telling a story." I t is not clea r, however, how a sentence ca n be a re-
description of itself.We ca n use a sentence to re describe a sentence or a story,
but tha t isnot the sa me thing a s tra nsla ting mea ning into re-description. Thus, the
Wa ke, if construed a s a producing interesting interpreta tions,of itself, would be a
re-description of a re-description. This is close to nonsensica l22 One might ca ll
these litera l interpreta tions in order to ca pture the obviousness a nd genera l
intelligibility oftheir objects.I do not wa nt to criticize these two wa ys of
rea ding (indeed, I wa ntto protect them). I n both ca ses, however, the coherence of
rea ding requires a sense of a boutness tha t the text ca nnot provide. How ca n theWa ke
be a bout a nything when even these objects, a n a bsent sleep er a nd the Wa ke itself,
unra vel the intentiona lity of la ngua ge? Thisdoes not only mea n tha t we should
provide a rea son for why a pa r 223re-description?This content downloa ded from
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Conditions??ticula r sentence is formed in the wa y it is (Bishop provides excellent
expla na tions a nd justifica tions for this), but we must a lso a sk howca n be lost.Wha t
does itmea n for la ngua ge to be a bout something or a nything? The la te nineteenth-
century Germa n philosopher Fra nz Brenta no, in his Psychology from a n Empirica l
Sta ndpoint, a rgues tha tthe intentiona l (a boutness) constitutes our menta l
experience:Every menta l phenomenon is cha ra cterized by wha t the Schola stics of
theMiddle Ages ca lled the intentiona l (ormenta l) inexistence of a nobject, a nd wha t
we might ca ll, though not wholly una mbiguously ref erence to a content, direction
towa rd a n object (which is not to be understood here a s mea ning a thing), or
imma nent objectivity. Every menta l phenomenon includes something a s a n object
within itself, a lthoughthey do not a lwa ys do so in the sa me wa y. I n presenta tion
something is presented, in judgment something is a ffirmed or denied, in love loved,
in ha te ha ted, in desire desired a nd so on.23To be a bout X seems to require a
rela tion between a thought a nd X. Any rela tion would, however, require a nother
rela tion to rela te it to X. And thus, if intentiona lity is understood a s a
rela tion, one wouldrequire a n infinite number of rela tions.24 I n this pa ssa ge, the
verbs"refer," "symbolize," "suggest," a nd "point" a re a ll bla ck boxes to ca pture
this ineffa ble intentiona l rela tion. I f,however, the object doesnot a ctua lly exist
(a s in "I hope to build the ta llest building in thethe problem ha s shifted from the
rela tion between la ngua ge a nd object to the sta tus of this object, which in this
ca se is ima gina ry. Brenta no uses the model of the ima gina ry object a s a pa ttern for
describing a ll of our menta l sta nces towa rd the world. The a boutnessof our la ngua ge
is imma nent within our a ttitudes a nd sta tements. I nintentiona lityworld"),this is
simply to repla ce themystery of the a boutness of our la ngua ge with themystery of
the imma nence of the world in our sta tements.Brenta no's description of
intentiona lity a ttempts to tra nsla te onto logica l distinctions (cla ims a bout the
world) into psychologica l orma ny wa ys,phenomenologica l distinctions (cla ims a bout
ourLudwig Wittgenstein, on the other ha nd, a ttempts to dissolve thesepsychologica l
a ndphenomenologica ldistinctions into the intersubjective coherence of la ngua ge. The
intentiona lity of our la ngua ge is not dependent on the a tta chment of la ngua ge to
the world. Ra ther,a ccording toWittgenstein, intentiona l sta tements (I wish tha t x; I
expect y; I ha ve a suspicion a bout z) a re ma tched by sta tements tha t describe their
fulfillment, verifica tion, denia l, fa ilure, a nd so forth.25Such a description of
intentiona lity, while itma kes our menta l con tent a ccessible to others, reduces
a boutness to a n a greement between,224experience).?This content downloa ded from
128.135.12.127 on Sun, 16 Nov 2014 05:34:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms a nd
Conditions??for exa mple, a n order a nd the description of its fulfillment. Thus, the
intentiona lity of la ngua ge is determined by the wa y we figure kinds of sentences in
rela tion to ea ch other. I ha ve to simplify here, but ifintentiona lity is reduced to
a n a greementin la ngua ge, then the problem of the rela tion between la ngua ge a nd the
world is repla ced by the problem of how we inha bit la ngua ge. Wea re left with the
question "how do we find ourselves within la n gua ge?" The short a nswer is, I think,
through nonsense.Wha t a n uttera nce is a bout, its intentiona l ta rgets, a re
formula tedthrough la ngua ge, so tha t the wa y la ngua geby a n a greement between
la ngua ge a nd a thing in the world but by a n a greement within la ngua ge between two
rela ted sta tements. Theintentiona l ta rgets a re within la ngua ge, which iswhy, by
deforming la ngua ge into nonsense, we ca n lose the wa y the world becomes vis ible to
us a s something to ta lk a bout. Once a la ngua ge ca nnot be used to a rticula te
a greement between, for exa mple, a n expecta tion a nd its fulfillment, it ca nnot be
a bout a nything a nymore. This suggests tha ta ll interpreta tions of Finnega ns Wa ke a re
not a bout theWa ke a t a ll; theya re simply a bout themselves a s interpreta tions.Should
we then a ba ndon interpreta tion, cla im it is senseless tospea k a bout wha t Wa kea n
la ngua ge is a bout? Endless a nd endlesslyrepla cea ble interpreta tions would seem to
serve little point. I fwe a ba ndon interpreta tion, however, wha t is left?Wa kea n
la ngua ge does not ha ve a ny recogniza ble criteria of a pplica tion to the world. I fwe
ca nnot a pply this la ngua ge to the world, we must find the world within it:
"[b]etween his voyous a nd her consinna ntes" (FW 485.1011). The a greement in the
Wa ke between world a nd sta tement is notintentiona l but punning. There is a greement
a mong world, la ngua ge, a nd a n "I " or a "we" in nonsense.I f Finnega ns Wa ke ena cts
the world of a n a bsent sleeper, a s Bishopthen our fa ilure to rea d ba ckwa rds into
his or her life or conevery sentence Joseph Conra d's cla im tha t for a nything to be
a rt itmust justify itself in every line.26Wha t a ny sentence mea ns colla psesinto how
we justify the pa rticula rity of the sentence, tha t is, how wejustify the nonsense
of a ny pa rticula r sentence. Such justifica tion mea ns tha t we reflect upon ourselves
(prosoche), our rea ding, ourma king sense a nd not ma king sense of the Wa ke, through
the very nonsense of the text. We must rea d ourselves into the text, just a s we
must rea d sense into nonsense. How ca n one do this? One wa y is toa sk the riddle-
question: "I s rea ding Finnega ns Wa ke a huma n a ctivi 225a rgues, sciousness,into
a mind tha t we would recognize a s our own, forces us to pla ce our minds a s the
intentiona l ta rget of the text. But this would mea n tha t we do not understa nd
ourselves. How could this be our night life, our drea ms, our a bsence? Joyce forces
to the surfa ce ofbetween descriptions withis a bout something is not?This content
downloa ded from 128.135.12.127 on Sun, 16 Nov 2014 05:34:21 AM All use subject to
JSTOR Terms a nd Conditions??ty?"Wha t I a m suggesting here is tha t Finnega ns Wa ke
sepa ra tes rea dinger, is a bout ourselves. But wha t does the Wa ke sa y a bout
ourselves,which would mea n, in the context ofmy discussion of intentiona lity, wha t
kind of thing a rewe tha t ca n be ta lked a bout through nonsense?"Ourselves" ismea nt
here a s "us huma n beings." This might suggesta kind of test where only someone who
a sks the question a boutwhether rea ding the Wa ke is a huma n a ctivity is a huma n
being. I rema in a n a gnostic a bout the a nswer to this. A question rema ins,from
interpreting. An interpreta tionbut a bout itself a s a n interpreta tion; our rea ding
of the Wa kef howeva rewe tha t we ca n be tha t which the Wa ke could be a bout?" or
"wha t a rewe tha t we ca n be ta rgeted by the need for the kind of justifica tion the
Wa ke dema nds?"I llAlthough Finnega ns Wa ke ca n be interpreted in a ny number of wa ys,
I ha ve been a rguing tha t it ca nnot be rea d a s being a bout a nything. The nonsense of
the text sepa ra tes rea ding from interpreta tion. I ha ve suggested tha t this shifts
the site of intentiona lity towa rds us,a s rea ders. This does not mea n simply tha t
our interpreta tions betra y us, a s if they were slips of the tongue or Rorscha ch
tests. Any a rgument a bout themea ning of our interpreta tions would simply a llego
rize one interpreta tion into a nother. I fwe refuse to equa te our interpreta tions
with rea ding, with cla ims a bout wha t the text mea ns, then we ca n no longer properly
a sk questions like "wha t does this sentence, pa ssa ge, textmea n?" I nstea d, we ha ve
to begin from the under sta nding tha t our rea ding confesses our being within a nd
a ga inst la ngua ge.I n Finnega ns Wa ke, Augustine's conversa tion with God is repla ced
with a conversa tion with nonsense, genera ting a theologica l crisis orwha t Joyce
ca lls a "theoperil" (FW 223.28). The divine threa t in Finnega ns Wa ke emerges a s the
threa t of nonsense tha t ismea nt totra ce the limits of our la ngua ge a nd of ourselves
a s huma n beings. Both la ngua ge a nd the nonsense in the Wa ke a re a drea ming into the
world, not into ourselves. T. S. Eliot writes in his essa y on Da nte, "Weha ve
nothing but drea ms, a nd we ha ve forgotten tha t seeing visions?a pra ctice now
relega ted to the a berra nt a nd uneduca ted?wa s once a more significa nt, interesting,
a nd disciplined kind of drea ming. We ta ke it for gra nted tha t our drea ms spring
from
below:possibly the qua lity of our drea ms suffers a s a consequence."27 Wha t is the
ontologica l sta tus or the intentiona l cla im of a drea m exposingthe world a nd not
our psychology? Finnega ns Wa ke is such a drea m, 226however?"wha tof the Wa ke is not
a bout the Wa ke?This content downloa ded from 128.135.12.127 on Sun, 16 Nov 2014
05:34:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms a nd Conditions??tha t is, the world
drea ming a mind; so would the world be if constructed by a demon, or ifwe found
ourselves in a world tha t wa s ma de in the wa y tha t we were ma de; la ngua ge itself
would be such a drea m; culture would be such a drea m; so would psychology be a drea m
into theworld a nd not into ourselves.How could we survive or understa nd such a
drea ming into theworld? This question is a nother version of my ea rlier query?"is
rea ding Finnega ns Wa ke a huma n a ctivity?" The a nswer to this ques tion need not be
a description of wha t constitutes a huma n being butmight, instea d, consist of a
continua l self-reflective (prosoche) a ccount of how I mea n a s a huma n being when
fa ced with the kind of non sense tha t ma ps my pla ce within a ny la ngua ge. I do not
think tha t"how I mea n a s a huma n being" ha s, itself, a ny clea r mea ning in our
ordina ry la ngua ge, nor do I think a ny philosophica l a ccount ofmea n ing could
provide itwith a sense a dequa te towha t would motiva tea ppea ling to it. "How I mea n a s
a huma n being" ca n only mea n when mea ning itself is a t sta ke in the kind of rea ding
tha t I ha ve been a rguing the Wa ke dema nds a nd requires.I n forcing the question "is
rea ding Finnega ns Wa ke a huma n a ctivi ty?" the Wa ke ties our huma nness to nonsense.
The Wa ke exerts wha tI would ca ll a theologica l pressure. I use this phra se beca use
Wa kea n nonsense shows our rela tion to the funda menta l limits within which we a re
a nything, which is the sa me a s the funda menta l shifting limitsbetween sense a nd
nonsense. This mea ns we should rea d theWa ke a s a description of how the limits of
linguistic sense ma tch the limits in rela tion to which we understa nd ourselves a s
huma n beings.This is the effect of Joyce's lists?to pla ce the world enumera ted
a ga inst us a nd in this offer ta rgets for sense a nd identifica tion. But once a rt
identifica tion isma de, a s a result of a n interpreta tion (forexa mple, the cla im tha t
the Wa kea n phra se "a lphybettyformedis a version of the Wa ke?FW 183.13), the mea ning
rema ins unclea r. I n other words, most uses of "mea ning" a re not equiva lent tomost
uses of "interpreta tion." I s the mea ning of Finnega ns Wa ke thelist?followingMy wud!
The wa rped flooring of the la ir a nd soundconducting wa llsverba ge"... were. . .
doubtfullitera tured . . .with bursta lphybettyformed a hems a ndloveletters, tellta le
stothereof ries,via sses,lucifers,,.. counterfeit fra nks, best intentions,... gloss
teeth for a tooth, . . . inversions of a ll this cha mberma de music one sta nds, given
a gra in of goodwill, a fa ir cha nce of a ctua lly seeing the whirling dervish,Tumult,
son of Thunder, self exiled inupon his ego, a nightlong a sha kpersia nly eggshells,
vivlica l a ha hs, imeffible triesdicta s, visusumbique,a t speech una sylla bled, you owe
mes, eyoldhyms, fluefoul smut, fa llenompitering betwixtween white or reddr ha wrors,
noonda yterrorised 227to skin a ndverba ge,?This content downloa ded from
128.135.12.127 on Sun, 16 Nov 2014 05:34:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms a nd
Conditions??writing themystery of himsel in furtive mea ns through which this "him"
becomes visible a s a n "I " tohimself. "Furniture," however, a lso ma rks a limit to
both the "I ," hispa rticula rity, a nd la ngua ge, which we designa te "ma tter," or wha t
George Berkeley ca lls "the furniture of ea rth."28 "Furniture" a nd "la na s limits a re
incommensura ble doma ins tha t a re written together by Wa kea n la ngua ge a nd, thus, by
a writing tha t is nonsentha trepla ces the intentiona l a greement in ordina ry
la ngua ge.Wha t, however, is "the mystery of himsel," the mystery of a ny "I "?I n this
pa ssa ge, "himsel," a n inelucta ble pha ntom, writes while sit ting in furniture with
himself a piece of furniture determined a nddefined by ma teria lity. This "mystery of
himsel in furniture" becomes a t the end of theWa ke, when the sleeper is a wa kening,
the "furnit of heupa nepi world" (FW 611.18). "[F]urnit" conta ins fuit (La tin for
"a sitwa s") a nd furnus (La tin for "oven" or "firepla ce") a nd ca n be rea dsimply a s
"burn it." "[F]umit" ca n be tra nsla ted, a lso, a s "'a s itwa s' burns a nd is a
furna ce." This burning is esta blished a s a thing when "furnit" puns on "the
furniture of ea rth." Consequently, the being a nd sta bility of the pa st condensed
into furniture conta ins Hera clea nflux. "[H]eupa nepi" consists of the Greek eu
(good), pa n (a ll), a nd epi (upon). Thus "furnit of heupa nepi world" ca n be
tra nsla ted a s "the furniture of the flux of the good upon a ll the world burns into
a furna ce."This kind of nonsense sentence promises profundity. Before wea ccept or
reject tha t promise a s something we ca n understa nd, a s a nexpecta tion a bout
ourselves a nd the world?in other words, before we sa y wha t this promise mea ns?we
must discover how it ca n be a bout ourselves or theworld. I f the puns of Finnega ns
Wa ke should berea d through either something like Augustine's self-reflection by wa y
of la ngua ge towa rds God or through something like Luther's writingbone by a n
inelucta ble pha ntom... niture. (FW 183.08484.10)gua ge". . . writingthefurniture" to
describe both "furniture" a nd la ngua ge a s the constituI ta ke "a n inelucta blepha ntom
mysteryof himsel inexpresses a kind of a greement a mongsica l. This writing-together
"furniture," "la ngua ge," a nd "himsel" within a nonsensetowa rds the presence of God
in the gra mma r of huma nla ngua ge,then when we look into Wa kea n la ngua ge, there is
nothing to findthere but the looking itself. This is not quite circula r, except, a s
HenryDa vid Thorea u notes, in thewa y a rt's delusive promise a bout looking through
a nother's eyes (to see ourselves) is circula r.29 We ha ve ma de a mista ke ifwe believe
tha t seeing through a nother's eyes, tha t discovering ourselves looking for
ourselves in Finnega ns Wa ke, will provide us with newknowledgea bout wha t we a re.
I fwe rea d with this228?This content downloa ded from 128.135.12.127 on Sun, 16 Nov
2014 05:34:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms a nd Conditions??kind of goa l
inmind, we either discover something trivia l (we see wha t we a lwa ys see) or
uninforma tive (we would no longer be seeingourselves, being now something
different). I n the ca se of Finnega ns Wa ke, there a re no new fa cts to discover,
beca use its la ngua ge ca nnotbe a bout a nything in a ny intelligible sense of "a bout."
We a re thus presented with three options: 1)We ca n try to redeem "a bout" with in
the Wa kea n la ngua ge ga me; 2) we ca n a ccept this loss of intentiona lity, but then
itwould be unclea r why a nyone would rea d theWa ke;3) or we ca n rea d ourselves (a s
the missingla ngua ge) a ga inst a nd in rela tion to this loss of sense. I t is this la st
option tha t I a m suggesting we a ttempt. Wha t Finnega ns Wa ke dema nds is not
interpreta tions but responses.Wha t would be a wa y of responding to the "furnit of
heupa nepito "the furniture of the flux of the good upon a ll the world burns into a
furna ce"? As the sleeper a wa kens into consciousness a t the end of the Wa ke, under
the sun a nd in rising color, some "pa rt of it . . .ha d shown itself . . .una ble to
a bsorbere" (FW 611.17-19). I nother words, a s the sleeper seemingly a wa kens, some
pa rt ofwha tever he or she is shows itself a s una ble to a bsorb light beca use it is
not ma tter. The "pa rt of it... una ble to a bsorbere" is tha t which is nothing more
tha n present, tha n cha nge, described by the phra se I a mtra nsla ting a s "the
furniture of the flux of the good upon a ll theworld burns into a furna ce." Wha t
pa rt of a person is this? Wha t pa rt of a person is not ma tter? I f the Wa ke is
itself a representa tion of tha t pa rt,then itma y be a representa tion of the soul.
The soul, however, is shown to be the shifting limits of sense a nd nonsense ma de
visiblethrough our rea ding (a s pa rt of a reflection of our entering a nd exit ing
from Wa kea n la ngua ge). "Furnit of heupa nepi world" describesbeing between things
(furniture) a nd loss (burning), a s a limit to them both. One implica tion of finding
ourselves within la ngua ge a s non sense is tha t one ca nnot get a ny more mea ning out
of our own selfreflection tha n we ca n out of this pa ssa ge in theWa ke. And themea n
ing of this pa ssa ge is a description of the limit to themea ning of thisworld,"
pa ssa ge.a bout us, a s huma nThis iswha t we a re, a nd, thus, Wa kea n nonsense ca n be
beings."About" in the previous sentence ca nnot mea n wha t "a bout" ordina rily mea ns.
Nonsense ca nnot be a bout a nything. Wha t I ha ve sugtherefore, is tha t we should rea d
a ga inst our own interpreta tions of the Wa ke, in order to re-expose the limits
between sense a nd nonsense tha t our interpreta tions hide. The loss of
intentiona lity, thea boutness of our la ngua ge, in Finnega ns Wa ke precipita tes a
version of the sa me crisis tha t the theologia n Ka rl Ba rth describes, in The Epistle
to the Roma ns, a s our sta nding "before a n irresistible a nd a ll-embra cing
dissolution of the world, of time a nd things a nd me, before a pen 229gested,
intentiona l ta rget of its?This content downloa ded from 128.135.12.127 on Sun, 16
Nov 2014 05:34:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms a nd Conditions??etra ting a nd
ultima te KRI SI S, before the suprema cy of a nega tion by which a ll existence is
rolled up."30 Finnega ns Wa ke shows tha t this cri sis threa tens less the world or
our la ngua ge tha n our sta tus within both. The va nishing of a ny intentiona l ta rget
forWa kea n la ngua geus out a s its ta rget. I f the Wa ke is a bout us, then we a reit only
ifwe ca n find a wa y toma tch ourselves with how it is nonsensica l. There is no simple
description of this, except to sa y tha t a nypicksrea dingof theWa ke is a lso a
description
of wha t we a re, so tha t we ca n, in rea ding theWa ke, describe a funda menta l sense
of time tha t is bound tohow we ma ke sense of things a nd how this sense ca n be lost
in the va nishing intentiona lity ena cted by our rea ding of the Wa ke. I srea ding
Finnega ns Wa ke, however, a huma n a ctivity? I t is certa inly a question huma ns a re
prone to a sk.NOTES1Pierre Ha dot, "Ancient Spiritua l Exercises a nd 'Christia n
Philosophy/"Philosophy a s a Form of Life (Chica go: Chica go Univ. Press, 1993).
Further ref erences will be cited pa renthetica lly in the text.2See Socra tes,
Thea etetus, ed. Myles Burnyea t, tra ns. M. J. Levett (I ndia na polis: Ha ckett, 1990),
a nd Philo of Alexa ndria , Philo, tra ns. F. H.Colson (Ca mbridge:Ha rva rd Univ. Press,
1987), p. 84.While I follow Ha dot's tra nscription of this list, I re-tra nsla te
prosoche a s self-a ttention to empha sizedescriptionitsmea ning3in a skesis.
Sa intAugustine, Confessions, tra ns.Henry Cha dwick (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
1991), XI I .xxiii.32. Further references will be cited pa renthetica lly in the text.4
St. John Ca ssia n, The Conferences, ed. a nd tra ns. Bonifa ce Ra msey (NewYork: Pa ulist
Press, 1997). For a further discussion of St. John Ca ssia n, seeOwen Cha dwick,
Western Asceticism (Phila delphia : Westminster Press, 1958).For a genera l discussion
of exegesis, see Beryl Sma lley, The Study of theBible
inthMeiddleAges(NotreDa me:Univ.ofNotreDa mePress,1964),a ndHenride Luba c, Ex?g?seM?
di?va le: Les Qua tres Sens de V?criture (Pa ris: Aubier, 1964).5See Pla to, The
Republic, tra ns. G. M. A. Grube (I ndia na polis: Ha ckett, 1982), 352d; see a lso, in
this rega rd, The Dia logues of Pla to: "Eutkyphro," "Apology," "Crito," "Meno,"
"Gorgia s," "Menexenus," tra ns. R. E. Allen (NewHa ven: Ya le Univ. Press, 1985),
487e, 501c, 527c. 6SeeAristotle, Nicoma chea n Ethics (I ndia na polis: Ha ckett, 1985),
book 1. 7Two cla ssic discussions of a ncient ethics tha t bring out these senses of
self ca n be found in Julia Anna s's TheMora lity ofHa ppiness (Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1993), a nd John Cooper's Rea son a nd Huma n Good in Aristotle(Ca mbridge:
Ha rva rd Univ. Press, 1975),8See St. I gna tius of Loyola , Exercitia spiritua lia : cum
versione litera ll ex a uto gra phe Hisp?nico (Rome: Ma rini et B. Morini, 1847), a nd
see Jea n-Michel Ra ba t?, Ja mes Joyce,Authorized Rea der (Ba ltimore: Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press,1984), p. 1. Further references to the Ra ba t? work will be cited
pa renthetica l 230?This content downloa ded from 128.135.12.127 on Sun, 16 Nov 2014
05:34:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms a nd Conditions??ly in the text.9 See
Ja cques Derrida , "Two Words for Joyce/' Post-structura list Joyce, ed.Derek Attridge
a nd Da niel Ferrer (Ca mbridge: Ca mbridge Univ. Press, 1984),147.p.10Robert Polhemus,
"The Comic Gospel of 'Shem,'" Comic Fa ith (Chica go:Chica go Univ. Press, 1980), pp.
294-338. 11Ma rtin Heidegger, Being a nd Time, tra ns. JohnMa cqua rrie a nd Edwa rd
Robinson (London: Bla ckwell Publishers, 1962), pp. 23 (H4), 161 (H124).12Bria n
Stock, Augustine the Rea der: Medita tion, Self-Knoivledge, a nd the Ethics of
I nterpreta tion (Ha rva rd: Ha rva rd Univ. Press, 1996), p. 191.13 De Anima e sen
Augustine, Qua ntita te Dia loga s(Phila delphia ; Peter Reilly 1924), 32.66.Questionum
Liber14See Augustine, De Trinita te (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1968), 16.10.19.
15See Ma rtin Luther, Werke: kritische Gesa mmta usga be, Tischreden (Weima r: H. B?
hla u, 1912-1921), vol. 15.16Joha nn GeorgHa ma nn's theories of la ngua ge?see TheMa gus
of theNorth: J, G. Ha ma nn a ndtheOrigins ofModern I rra tiona lism (London: JohnMurra y,
1993).Ha ma nn rea dof Luther's rema rks in Joha nn Albrecht Bengel, Gnomon novi
testa menti in quo ex na tiva verborum vi simplicta s, profundita s, concinnita s,
sa lubrita s sensuum coelestium indica tur (Tubingen: Henr. Philippi Schra mmii, 1742),
prefa ce, sec tion 14, p. [xxiv]?see Bii lO.lff.17See such representa tive texts
a sHa ma nn's Betra chtungun ?ber dieHeilige Schrift (Nuremberg: Lechner, 1816), a nd
Joha nn Gottfried Herder's ChristlicheSchriften (Riga : J.F.Ha rtknoch, 1794-1798).
18The genera l outline ofHa ma nn's picture of the rela tionship between la ngua ge a nd
19the worldis simila r to tha t of the la ter Ludwig Wittgenstein.I sa ia h Berlin
discusses how this idea resona ted withThe Books a t the "Wa ke" Univ. Press, 1959),
p. 15.Southern I llinoisJa mesS.Atherton,(Ca rbonda le:20See Rona ld E. Bucka lew, "Night
Lessons on La ngua ge/Book I I , cha pter ii,"A Conceptua l Guide to "Finnega ns Wa ke" ed.
Micha el H. Begna l a nd FritzSenn (University Pa rk: Pennsylva nia Sta te Univ. Press,
1974); Christine Froula , Modernism's Body: Sex, Culture, a na Joyce (New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1996); Ma rgot Norris, The Decentered Universe of "Finnega ns
Wa ke"(Ba ltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974); a nd Sheldon Brivic, Joyce the
Crea tor (Ma dison: Univ. ofWisconsin Press, 1985).21 Book theDa rk Univ. ofWisconsin
Press, John Bishop, Joyce's of (Ma dison:1985).22This gives us a nother a nswer: it is
a bout nonsense, which is to sa y tha tin being a kind of nonsense, a nd being a bout
itself, itmust be a bout nonsense. This kind of cla im ma kes nonsense out of
themea ning of "a bout/7 Beyond genera ting a typology of the kinds of nonsense, it is
not clea r why this cla im is not itself nonsense. Such a cla im could, of course, be
a pa rt of some theoryof nonsense. Rea ding Finnega ns Wa ke requires thinking a bout
nonsense a nd ma ybe even genera ting a typology of nonsense, but it isunclea r tha t it
coulditself be a bout nonsense.23Fra nz Brenta no, Psychology from a n Empirica l
Sta ndpoint, tra ns. Antos C231?This content downloa ded from 128.135.12.127 on Sun,
16 Nov 2014 05:34:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms a nd Conditions??Ra ncurello,
D. B, Terrell, a nd Linda L. McAllister (New York: Huma nitiesPress, 1973),p. 88.24A
description of our rela tion to theworld ca nnot use the concept of rela tion. This
difficulty lea ds to cla ims tha t our rela tion to theworld is indescrib a ble.
Brenta no counters this by a rguing tha t our reference to objects is imma nent within
our intentiona l sta nces.25 York:Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophica l I nvestiga tions
(New Ma cmilla nPublishers, 1953), ?? 136,429,458.26204.28George Berkeley, A Trea tise
Concerning thePrinciples ofHuma n (I ndia na polis: Ha ckett, 1982), ? 6.Conra d,
Doubleda y Publishers,to The Nigger of the Na rcissus (New York: 1914), p. 11.prefa ce
27T. S. Eliot, SelectedEssa ys (New York: Ha rcourt, Bra ce, & World,Joseph29Henry
Da vid Thorea u, "Economy," Wa iden, ed. Brooks Atkinson (New York:Modem Libra ry,
1992).30Ka rl Ba rth, The Epistle to theRoma ns, tra ns. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1933), iii.21.232I 960), p.Knowledge?This content downloa ded
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