EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LUIS TORIBIO,Defendant-Appellant.

Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered
or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information,
without a permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the
registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under
such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of
large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are
as follows:

SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse
except upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing the permit for the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for
branded cattle the production of the original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer
showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as
may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has
been requested.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer
unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a
permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human
consumption.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by him,
and such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age,
brands, knots of radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of
identification of the animal for the slaughter of which permit is issued and the date on which
such permit is issued. Names of owners shall be alphabetically arranged in the record, together
with date of permit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the
provincial treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the owner,
together with date of permit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or killing
for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five
hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more
than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the
prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a
municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is
urged that the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse,
neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without
a permit in that municipality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at
a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33
applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a
permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large
cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and
examined apart from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at
the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting both the word
"slaughtered" and the words "killed for food" in section 30, and the words "slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section
33; and the other whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as
limiting and restricting merely the words "killed for food" and "killing for food" as used in those
sections. But upon a reading of the whole Act, and keeping in mind the manifest and expressed
purpose and object of its enactment, it is very clear that the latter construction is that which
should be adopted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to
make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or
stolen. To this end it provides an elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding
and registry of ownership of all such cattle throughout the Islands, whereby owners are enabled
readily and easily to establish their title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers of large cattle
unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in the municipality where
the contract of sale is made; and it provides also for the disposition of thieves or persons
unlawfully in possession, so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in
order to make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his
possession or to dispose of them to others. But the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory
system of identification, resting as it does on the official registry of the brands and marks on
each separate animal throughout the Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally destroyed,
if such animals were requiring proof of ownership and the production of certificates of registry
by the person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered, and this especially if the animals
were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner outside of a municipal slaughterhouse.
Hence, as it would appear, sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human
consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit
issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of
all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial
treasurer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the
appellant, it will readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and
record of the brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in
large part abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully in possession of such cattle, and
naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of municipal
slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing themselves to
the danger of detection incident to the bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse,
where the brands and other identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of ownership
required.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should
be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat
the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore,
that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for
in section 30.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of
the "killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this
prohibition is clearly included in the general prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for
human consumption anywhere; but it is not improbable that the requirement for the issue of a
permit in such cases was expressly and specifically mentioned out of superabundance of
precaution, and to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding in the event that some of the
municipalities should be disposed to modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the
passage of local ordinances or regulations for the control of municipal
slaughterhouse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same
conclusion. One of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the
slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for
human consumption. A construction which would limit the prohibitions and penalties prescribed
in the statute to the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited
and unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat
the purpose and object of the legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language of
the statute it should be rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the language of the statute
is clearly susceptible of the construction which we have placed upon it, which tends to make
effective the provisions of this as well as all the other sections of the
Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it
was denied him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft
purposes." Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize
the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which
can not be procured in the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or draft
purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act
of Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." chanrobles virtual law library

It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of
the statute constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain without providing for the compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of the police power of the State. But whatever may be the basis of his
contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications understood, the
language of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55,
where the question involved was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the
taking or carrying away by any person, including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand, from
any of the beaches in the town of Chesea,) that the law in question "is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate
exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the
property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal
rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interest of the community." chanrobles
virtual law library
It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao
owners in these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the
statute; and that, without inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of
such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of which detracts from their right and authority, and
in some degree interferes with their exclusive possession and control of their property, so that if
the regulations in question were enacted for purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as
these regulations are concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill
relied on be appellant; but we are satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an interference with
the right and title of the owners, as is involved in the exercise by the State of the right of
eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners to compensation, and that it is no more than "a
just restrain of an injurious private use of the property, which the legislature had authority to
impose." chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in
Com. vs. Tewksbury ( supra) was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the
former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the right of eminent domain from the exercise
of the sovereign police powers of the State, said:

We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every
holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied
liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment
of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of
the community. . . . Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to
such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to
such reasonable restrain and regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the governing
and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and
expedient.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can
be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we
allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its
boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.

Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for
human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an
appropriation of property interests to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle of
the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere restriction or limitation
upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be determental to the public welfare. And
we think that an examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public
interest which it seeks to safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides, leaves no
room for doubt that the limitations and restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of
ownership by the particular provisions of the statute under consideration were imposed not for
private purposes but, strictly, in the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the public interest"
in the exercise of the sovereign police power which every State possesses for the general public
welfare and which "reaches to every species of property within the commonwealth."chanrobles
virtual law library

For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease
had threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away
seventy, eighty, and in some cases as much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of these
animals. Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the
work animal almost exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of
the disease with which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of
the country. large areas of productive land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the
staple food of the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the impoverished
people were compelled to spend many millions of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the
fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the country
could easily be made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The drain upon
the resources of the Islands was such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in
the breast of the people, and in many provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be
paralyzed by the apparently hopeless struggle for existence with which they were
confronted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving
the immediate needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress
of the United States as a relief or famine fund, public works were undertaken to furnish
employment in the provinces where the need was most pressing, and every effort made to
alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due
in large measure to the lack of animals fit for agricultural work and draft
purposes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural
community material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the
absence of the work animals upon which such a community must necessarily rely for the
cultivation of the fields and the transportation of the products of the fields to market.
Accordingly efforts were made by the Government to increase the supply of these animals by
importation, but, as appears from the official reports on this subject, hope for the future
depended largely on the conservation of those animals which had been spared from the ravages
of the diseased, and their redistribution throughout the Islands where the need for them was
greatest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery and
applications of preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have
proved in some degree successful in protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle,
and that the gradual increase and redistribution of these animals throughout the Archipelago, in
response to the operation of the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately results in practically
relieving those sections which suffered most by the loss of their work
animals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the
three to five fold or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures
now adopted prove entirely successful, the scant supply will keep the price of these animals at a
high figure until the natural increase shall have more nearly equalized the supply to the
demand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle,
the crime of cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating
the enactment of a special law penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and
other personal property by roving bands; and it must be assumed from the legislative authority
found that the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of special and
somewhat burdensome provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and
supervision and restriction of their slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the
provisions of the statute touching the branding and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting
and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle for food were enacted in the due and proper
exercise of the police power of the State; and we are of opinion that, under all the
circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for human
consumption of carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the due and proper
exercise of that power, justified by the exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right of
the State to protect itself against the overwhelming disaster incident to the further reduction of
the supply of animals fit for agricultural work or draft
purposes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports
and records of the administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not
merely the material welfare and future prosperity of this agricultural community were
threatened by the ravages of the disease which swept away the work animals during the years
prior to the enactment of the law under consideration, but that the very life and existence of the
inhabitants of these Islands as a civilized people would be more or less imperiled by the
continued destruction of large cattle by disease or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions,
there can be no doubt of the right of the Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the
preservation of work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what would,
under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights of ownership
and control of the private property of the citizen. The police power rests upon necessity and the
right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be
justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the
provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper
exercise of that power.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136):

The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of
discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to
include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the
destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public
nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house
falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such as are in
the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or
unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and
other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of
objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the
confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants,
beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame;
and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond
this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this
particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what
the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such
interests. (Barbier vs.Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in
thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and,
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting
the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is
a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision
of the court.

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute
under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a
"reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss
of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by
greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so
doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously
affected.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that
by this "general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon
acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are
concerned." chanrobles virtual law library

And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:

It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or may
be exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may
conflict with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or safety, are
infinite in number and in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the
public authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their property, and even to
destroy it, where the owners themselves have fully observed all their duties to their fellows and
to the State, but where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the
interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description is where it becomes necessary
to take, use, or destroy the private property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the
ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity. Here
the individual is in no degree in fault, but his interest must yield to that "necessity" which "knows
no law." The establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities and villages within which
buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or repaired may also, in
some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose
have been sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also be established for the
general good, even though they prevent the owners of water-fronts from building out on soil
which constitutes private property. And, whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the
protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may
establish regulations to that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of
the soil equally with other persons. Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use
of property, which the legislature have authority" to
impose.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of

circumstances, and without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and
unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or the public
safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed upon this grounds; and churchyards which prove, in
the advance of urban population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in danger of
becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery purposes.

These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United States
clearly indicate the wide scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine us in our
opinion that the provision of the statute in question being a proper exercise of that power is not
in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which provide that "no law shall be
enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," a
provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United States, and is found in
substance in the constitution of most if not all of the States of the
Union.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with
the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10255 August 6, 1915

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
SILVESTRE POMPEYA, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellant.

Lawrence, Ross and Block for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

On the 1st day of June, 1914, the acting prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo presented
the following complaint in the Court of First Instance of said province: "The undersigned fiscal
charges Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo, on the subject of
patrol duty, Executive Order No. 1, series of 1914, based on section 40 (m) of the Municipal
Code, in the following manner:

"That on or about March 20 of the current year, 1914, in the jurisdiction of the municipality of
Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, Philippine Islands, the said accused did willfully, illegally, and criminally
and without justifiable motive fail to render service on patrol duty; an act performed in violation
of the law.

"That for this violation the said accused was sentenced by the justice of the peace of Iloilo to a
fine of P2 and payment of the costs of the trial, from which judgment said accused appealed to
the Court of First Instance.".

Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arraigned .Upon arraignment he presented the
following demurrer: "The defendant, through his undersigned attorneys, demurs to the
complaint filed in this case on the ground that the acts charged therein do not constitute a
crime.".

In support of said demurrer, the defendant presented the following argument: "The municipal
ordinance alleged to be violated is unconstitutional because it is repugnant to the Organic Act of
the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens.".

Upon issues thus presented, the Honorable J. s .Powell, judge, on he 22nd day of August, 1914,
after hearing the arguments of the respective parties, sustained said demurrer and ordered the
dismissal of said complaint and the cancellation of the bond theretofore given, with costs de
oficio.

From the order sustaining the demurrer of the lower court, the prosecuting attorney appealed
to this court.

It appears from the demurrer that the defendant claims that the facts stated in the complaint
are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In his argument in support of said demurrer it
appears that the real basis of said demurrer was the fact that the ordinance upon which said
complaint was based was unconstitutional, for the reason that it was contrary to the provisions
of the Philippine Bill which guarantees liberty to the citizens of the Philippine Islands.

In this court the only question argued by the Attorney-General is whether or not the ordinance
upon which said complaint was based (paragraph "m" of section 40 of the Municipal Code) which
was adopted in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1309 is constitutional. Section 40 of
Act No. 82 (the Municipal Code) relates to the power of municipal councils. Act No. 1309 amends
said section (section 40, paragraph "m") which reads as follows: "(m)With the approval of the
provincial governor, when a province or municipality is infested with ladrones or outlaws (the
municipal council is empowered):

"1. To authorize the municipal president to require able-bodied male residents of the
municipality, between the ages of eighteen and fifty years, to assist, for a period not exceeding
five days in any one month, in apprehending ladrones, robbers, and other lawbreakers and
suspicious characters, and to act as patrols for the protection of the municipality, not exceeding
one day in each week. The failure, refusal, or neglect of any such able-bodied man to render
promptly the service thus required shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding one hundred
pesos or by imprisonment for not more than three months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall
authorize the municipal president to require such service of officers or men of the Army of Navy
of the United States, civil employees of the United States Government, officers and employees of
the Insular Government, or the officers or servants of companies or individuals engaged in the
business of common carriers on sea or land, or priests, ministers of the gospel,
physicians, practicantes, druggists or practicantes de farmacia, actually engaged in business, or
lawyers when actually engaged in court proceedings.".

Said Act No. 1309 contains some other provisions which are not important in the consideration
of the present case.

The question which we have to consider is whether or not the facts stated in the complaint are
sufficient to show (a) a cause of action under the said law; and (b) whether or not said law is in
violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights therein
guaranteed.

We deem it advisable to consider the second question first.

It becomes important to ascertain the real purpose of said Act (No. 1309) in order to know
whether it covers a subject upon which the United States Philippine Commission could legislate.
A reading of said Act discloses (1) that it is an amendment of the general law (Act No. 82) for the
organization of municipal government; (2) that it is amendment of section 40 of said Act No. 82,
by adding thereto paragraph "m;" (3) that said section 40 enumerates some of the powers
conferred upon the municipal council; (4) that said amendment confers upon the council
additional powers. The amendment empowers the municipal council, by ordinance, to authorize
the president: (a) To require able-bodied male residents of the municipality, between the ages of
18 and 55 [50], to assist, for a period not exceeding five days in any month, in apprehending
ladrones, robbers, and other lawbreakers and suspicious characters, and to act as patrols for the
protection of the municipality, not exceeding one day each week; (b) To require each
householder to report certain facts, enumerated in said amendment.

The specific purpose of said amendment is to require each able-bodied male resident of the
municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55 [50], as well as each householder when so required
by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by
apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the existence of such persons in
the locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such
service, and who refuse to render the same.

Is there anything in the law, organic or otherwise, in force in the Philippine Islands, which
prohibits the central Government, or any governmental entity connected therewith, from
adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the maintenance of peace and good government?
May not the people be called upon, when necessary, to assist, in any reasonable way, to rid the
state and each community thereof, of disturbing elements? Do not individuals whose rights are
protected by the Government, owe some duty to such, in protecting it against lawbreakers, and
the disturbers of the quiet and peace? Are the sacred rights of the individual violated when he is
called upon to render assistance for the protection of his protector, the Government, whether it
be the local or general government? Does the protection of the individual, the home, and the
family, in civilized communities, under established government, depend solely and alone upon
the individual? Does not the individual owe something to his neighbor, in return for the
protection which the law afford him against encroachment upon his rights, by those who might
be inclined so to do? To answer these questions in the negative would, we believe, admit that
the individual, in organized governments, in civilized society, where men are governed by law,
does not enjoy the protection afforded to the individual by men in their primitive relations.

If tradition may be relied upon, the primitive man, living in his tribal relations before the days of
constitutions and states, enjoyed the security and assurance of assistance from his fellows when
his quiet and peace were violated by malhechores. Even under the feudal system, a system of
land holdings by the Teutonic nations of Europe in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth
centuries, the feudal lord exercised the right to call upon all his vassals of a certain age to assist
in the protection of their individual and collective rights. (Book 2, Cooley's Blackstone's
Commentaries, 44; 3 Kent's Commentaries, 487; Hall, Middle Ages; Maine, Ancient Law; Guizot,
history of Civilization; Stubbs' Constitutional History of England; Chisholm vs. Georgia, 2 Dall .(U.
S.), 419; DePeyster vs. Michael, 6 N. Y., 467.) Each vassal was obliged to render individual
assistance in return for the protection afforded by all.

The feudal system was carried in to Britain by William the Conqueror in the year 1085 with all of
is ancient customs and usages.

we find in the days of the "hundreds," which meant a division of the state occupied by one
hundred free men, the individual was liable to render service for the protection of all. (Book 3,
Cooley's Blackstone's Commentaries, 160, 245, 293, 411.) In these "hundreds" the individual
"hundredor," in case of the commission of a crime within the county or by one of the
"hundredors," as against another "hundred," was obliged to join the "hue and cry" (hutesium et
clamor) in the pursuit of the felon. This purely customary ancient obligation was later made
obligatory by statute. (Book 4, Cooley's Blackstone's Commentaries, 294; 3 Edward I., Chapter 9;
4 Edward I., Chapter 2; 13 Edward I., Chapters 1 and 4.).

Later the statute provided and directed: "That from thenceforth every county shall be so well
kept, that, immediately upon robberies and feloniously committed, fresh suit shall be made from
town (pueblo) to town, and from county to county; and that "hue and cry" shall be raised upon
the felons, and they keep the town (pueblo) shall follow with "hue and cry," with all the town
(pueblo), and the towns (pueblos) near; and so "hue and cry" shall be made from town (pueblo)
to town, until they be taken and delivered to the sheriff.".

Said statue further provided that in case the "hundred" failed to join the "hue and cry" that it
should be liable for the damages done by the malhechores. Later, by statue (27th Elizabeth,
chapter 13) it was provided that no "hue and cry" would be sufficient unless it was made with
both horsemen and footmen. The "hue and cry" might be raised by a justice of the peace, or by
any peace officer, or by any private person who knew of the commission of the crime.

This ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of
his community is still recognized in all well-organized governments in the "posse comitatus"
(power of the county, poder del condado). (Book 1 Cooley's Blackstone's Commentaries, 343;
Book 4, 122.) Under this power, those persons in the state, county, or town who were charged
with the maintenance of peace and good order were bound, ex oficio, to pursue and to take all
persons who had violated the law. For that purpose they might command all the male
inhabitants of a certain age to assist them. This power is called "posse comitatus" (power of the
county). This was a right well recognized at common law. Act No. 1309 is a statutory recognition
of such common-law right. Said Act attempts simply to designate the cases and the method
when and by which the people of the town (pueblo) may be called upon to render assistance for
the protection of the public and the preservation of peace and order. It is an exercise of the
police power of the state. Is there anything in the organic or statutory law prohibiting the United
States Philippine Commission from adopting the provisions contained in said Act No. 1309?

While the statement has its exceptions, we believe, generally speaking, that the United States
Commission, and now the Philippine Legislature, may legislate and adopt laws upon all subjects
not expressly prohibited by the Organic Law (Act of congress of July 1, 1902) or expressly
reserved to Congress. Congress did not attempt to say to the Philippine Legislature what laws it
might adopt. Congress contended itself by expressly indicating what laws the Legislature
should not adopt, with the requirement that all laws adopted should be reported to it, and with
the implied reservation of the right to nullify such laws as might not meet with its approval.

Considering the Organic Act (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) as the real constitution of the
United States Government in the Philippine Islands, and its inhibitions upon the power of the
Legislature, we believe an analogy may be drawn relating to the difference between the
Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the different States, with reference to
what laws may be adopted by the different States. While the statement needs much
explanation, the general rule is that Congress has authority to legislate only upon the questions
expressly stated in the Constitution of the United States, while the state legislature may legislate
upon all questions, not expressly conferred upon Congress, nor prohibited in its constitution. In
other words, an examination of the Constitution of the United States discloses the subject
matter upon which Congress may legislate, while examination of the constitutions of the
different States must be made for the purpose of ascertaining upon what subjects the state
legislature can not legislate. Stating the rule in another way — the Constitution of the United
States permits Congress to legislate upon the following subjects; the constitutions of the States
prohibit the state legislature from legislating upon the following subjects. Generally, then, the
legislature of a State any adopt laws upon any question not expressly delegated to Congress by
the Constitution of the United States or prohibited by the constitution of the particular State.

We think that is the rule which should be applied to the Philippine Legislature. The Philippine
Legislature has power to legislate upon all subjects affecting the people of the Philippine Islands
which has not been delegated to Congress or expressly prohibited by said Organic Act.
(Gaspar vs. Molina, 5 Phil. Rep., 197; U.S., vs. Bull, 15 Phil. Rep., 7.)

The right or power conferred upon the municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within the police
power of the state (U.S .vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. Rep., 104.) Police power of the state has been
variously defined. It has been defined as the power of the government, inherent in every
sovereign, and cannot be limited; (License Cases, 5 How. (U.S.), 483). The power vested in the
legislature to make such laws as they shall judge to be for the good of the state and its subjects.
(Commonwealth vs. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.), 53, 85). The power to govern men and things,
extending to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the
protection of all property within the state. (Thorpe vs. Rutland, etc., Co., 27 Vt., 140, 149.) The
authority to establish such rules and regulations for the conduct of all persons as may be
conducive to the public interest. (People vs. Budd., 117 N.Y., 1, 14; U.S., vs.Ling Su Fan, supra.)
Blackstone, in his valuable commentaries on the common laws, defines police power as "the
defenses, regulations, and domestic order of the country, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like
members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behaviour to the rules
of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and
inoffensive in their respective stations." (4 Blackstone's Co., 162.)
The police power of the state may be said to embrace the whole system of internal regulation,
by which the state seeks not only to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the
state, but also to establish, for the intercourse of citizen with citizen, those rules of good
manners and good neighborhood, which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to
insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent, with a
like enjoyment of the rights of others. The police power of the state includes not only the public
health and safety, but also the public welfare, protection against impositions, and generally the
public's best best interest. It so extensive and all pervading, that the courts refuse to lay down a
general rule defining it, but decide each specific case on its merits. (Harding vs. People, 32 L.R.A.,
445.)

The police power of the state has been exercised in controlling and regulating private business,
even to the extent of the destruction of the property of private persons, when the use of such
property became a nuisance to the public health and convenience. (Slaughter House Cases, 16
Wal (U.S.), 36 Minnesota vs. Barber, 136 U.S., 313; Powell vs. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S., 678;
Walling vs. People, 166 U.S., 446; U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. Rep., 104.)

We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No.
1309 falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and
justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that,
therefore, the provisions of said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of
the rights of the persons affected thereby.

With reference to the first question presented by the appeal, relating to the sufficiency of the
complaint, it will be noted that Act No. 1309 authorized the municipal governments to establish
ordinances requiring (a) all able bodied male residents, between the the ages of 18 and 55 [50],
and (b) all householders, under certain conditions, to do certain things.

It will also be noted that the law authorizing the president of the municipality to call upon
persons, imposes certain conditions as prerequisites: (1) The person called upon to render such
services must be an able-bodied male resident of the municipality; (2) he must be between the
ages of 18 and 55 [50], and (3) certain conditions must exist requiring the services of such
persons.

It will not contended that a nonresident of the municipality would be liable for his refusal to
obey the call of the president; neither can it be logically contended that one under the age of 18
or over the age of 55 [50] would incur the penalty of the law by his refusal to obey the command
of the president. Moreover, the persons liable for the service mentioned in the law cannot be
called upon at the mere whim or caprice of the president. There must be some just and
reasonable ground, at least sufficient in the mind of a reasonable man, before the president can
call upon the the persons for the service mentioned in the law. The law does not apply to all
persons. The law does not apply to every condition. The law applies to special persons and
special conditions.
A complaint based upon such a law, in order to be free from objection under a demurrer, must
show that the person charged belongs to the class of persons to which the law is applicable. For
example, under the Opium Law, certain persons are punishable criminally for having opium in
their possession. All possessors of opium are not liable under the law. A complaint, therefore,
charging a person with the possession of opium, without alleging that he did not belong to the
class which are permitted to possess it, would be objectionable under a demurrer, because all
persons are not liable. The complaint must show that the one charged wit the possession of the
opium was not one of the persons who might legally possess opium. Suppose, for another
example, that there was a law providing that all persons who performed manual labor on Sunday
should be punished, with a provision that if such labor should be performed out of necessity, the
person performing it would not be liable. In such a case, in the complaint, in order to show a
good cause of action , it would be necessary to allege that the labor was not performed under
necessity. In other words, the complaint, in order to be free from objection raised by a
demurrer, must show that the person accused of the crime, in the absence of proof, is
punishable under the law. One who performed labor under necessity would not be liable. The
complaints, in the foregoing examples, in the absence of an allegation which showed that the
party accused did not belong to the exempted class, would not be good. In the absence of such
negations, the courts would be unable to impose the penalty of the law, because, perchance, the
defendant might belong to the exempt class. The complaint, in a criminal case, must state every
fact necessary to make out an offense. (U.S. vs. Cook, 17 Wall. (U.S.), 168.) The complaint must
show, on its face that, if the facts alleged are true, an offense has been committed. It must state
explicitly and directly every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute an offense. If the
statute exempts certain persons, or classes of persons, from liability, then the complaint should
show that the person charged does not belong to that class.

Even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in the present case, the court would be unable to
impose the punishment provided for by law, because it does not show (a) that the defendant
was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not
under 18 years of age nor over 55 [50]; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the
president of the municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned in the law.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs.
So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180,Petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ,
Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, Respondents.

Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent
Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City
Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.

LABRADOR, J.:

I. The case and issue, in general chanrobles virtual law library

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an
important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to
remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive
nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer.
Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national
aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for
national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the
national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation
may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and
circumstances justify the enactment?

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180 chanrobles virtual law library

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes
the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons,
not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital
of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly
in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged
in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their
licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in
case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of
term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical
entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail
business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor
and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business
to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their
businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities
and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of
aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six
months for purposes of liquidation.

III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action
to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization
for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of
Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was
passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired,
and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved chanrobles virtual law library

a. The police power. - chanrobles virtual law library

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but
petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional
requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the
consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind
certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the
ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and
equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and
what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly and correctly
understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and
the issue accordingly resolved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself,
it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-
protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless,
just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and
have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the
State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the
scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations
thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection
clause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

b. Limitations on police power. - chanrobles virtual law library

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of
our Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L.
ed. 220, 226.)chanrobles virtual law library

c. The, equal protection clause. - chanrobles virtual law library

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-
825.)chanrobles virtual law library

d. The due process clause. - chanrobles virtual law library

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of
the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private
interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is
applied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded
on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. - chanrobles virtual law library

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It
must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional
repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State,
is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and
wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted
to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although
zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to
interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there
has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative
prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never
inquire into the wisdom of the law.

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied chanrobles virtual law library

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue
involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would
be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further
and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes
more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself,
which from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or
citizenship.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. - chanrobles virtual law library

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they
produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live
in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of
things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big
communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced.
Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and
diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer,
because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within
the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human
body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the
communities comprising the nation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community.
He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little
gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store
with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He
has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out.
The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the
operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day
existence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

b. The alien retailer's trait. - chanrobles virtual law library

The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but
gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of
population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear,
ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale
in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a
slave.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred
and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he
forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and
extremely useful.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

c. Alleged alien control and dominance. - chanrobles virtual law library

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the
controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and
other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him.
In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent
control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles,
groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for
some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control
over principal foods and products would easily become full and
complete.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it
is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the
law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is
not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make
control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious
consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the
legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and
decide.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination
and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings,
and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official
statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of
the retail trade, as witness the following tables:

Assets Gross Sales

Year and
No.- Per cent Per cent
Retailers Pesos Pesos
Establishments Distribution Distribution
Nationality
1941:
 Filipino 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924 51.74
..........
Chinese 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239 44.21
...........
Others 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05
............
1947:
Filipino 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333 57.03
..........
Chinese 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134 41.96
...........
Others 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01
...........
1948: (Census)
Filipino 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667 60.51
..........
Chinese 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227 38.20
..........
Others 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29
..........
1949:
Filipino 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901 53.47
..........
Chinese 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875 45.36
..........
Others 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17
..........
1951:
Filipino 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052 53.07
.........
Chinese 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384 46.06
..........
Others 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 87
..........

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
 Item Gross
Year and Retailer's
Assets Sales
Nationality
(Pesos) (Pesos)

1941:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 1,633

Chinese 7,707 9,691

..............................................

Others 24,415 8,281

...............................................

1947:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 2,516

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 14,934

Others .............................................. 24,749 13,919

1948: (Census)

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,111

Chinese 7,707 24,398

.............................................

Others .............................................. 24,916 23,686

1949:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,069

Chinese 7,707 24,152

..............................................

Others .............................................. 24,807 20,737

1951:

Filipino ............................................. 1,877 3,905

Chinese 7,707 33,207

.............................................

Others 24,824 22,033

...............................................
(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners,
Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of
Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily
small..chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the
edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through
their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many
Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more
capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report,
pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that
the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by
respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically
helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. - chanrobles

virtual law library

It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is
the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been
adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance
and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it
is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail
trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67
of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either
pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law,
commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution
were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien
interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic
activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern
of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in
connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:

But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country
is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence alone is no
guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest
from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation
and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government as
the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the
leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way
that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an
organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities of armed
invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests in the economic field. (Phil.
Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)

Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien
control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution
No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a
similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of
Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien
predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to
control but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a
reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that compose the
Filipino community.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. - chanrobles virtual law library

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger
the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization,
alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters
as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available
in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or
distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of
national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers
and consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose
an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer
does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits
for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article,
eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or
importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade
is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly
suppressed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact
within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests
of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien
participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the
mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have
cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to
justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods
to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government
has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their
continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws,
especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec.
9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price
control convictions; that they have secret combinations among themselves to control prices,
cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott
honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful
restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax
laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and export
prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also
believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly
causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to
unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful
diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the
existence of many of the above practices.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population,
therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do
not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals;
what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods
and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or
loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While
the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the
alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. - chanrobles virtual law
library

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed
law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the
legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free
the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or
wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national
security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation chanrobles virtual law library

a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. - The next question that now poses solution is,
Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of
alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader.
The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay
here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or
purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that
spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living,
or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would
prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes
his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and
countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter
disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found
necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution,
but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's
economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient
and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function
of retail distribution to his hands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above,
their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the
welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which
they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of
the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification
adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State
to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and
reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found
between one and the other.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. - chanrobles virtual law
library

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which
are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To
this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that
the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and
as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty
bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not
declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the
Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative
power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities
we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911),
55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to a
law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:

. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state
the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope
of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis,
and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not
offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in
practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question,
if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state
of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification
in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis
but is essentially arbitrary."

c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. - chanrobles virtual law library

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United
States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No.
2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the
Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the
Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine
shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a
valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In
substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise
trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due
process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with
approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I,
as follows:

"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts
licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly
of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage
American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations.
Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade;
and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole
legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character,
that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment.
But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to
preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into
the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise,
that this whole system is projected."

The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise
justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would
be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for
similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens
and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am.,
Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of

hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has
declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following
reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to
have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot
question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a
statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of
liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to
discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with
"our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular
business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs.
Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration
an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard
rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it
does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to
a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it
could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the
legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for
controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a
parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the
business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and
limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right
to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota,
1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are
judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence
the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard,
card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan
State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of
aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the
exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even
the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479
(1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person
ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over
immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the
waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It
further added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese
ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated
traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257
(Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born
unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found
that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the
daily wage of an employee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

d. Authorities contra explained. - chanrobles virtual law library

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States
hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in
this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or
capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no
question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059
(1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the
keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local
dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of
business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey
to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their business
and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no
public benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would
deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in
the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said
that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which
attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was
mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens
to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no
reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was
proposed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens
do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom
they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except
in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the
land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions
and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the
language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of
the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:

. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the
intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise
known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow countrymen.
Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is
first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been
engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the
same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed toward the United States, as
those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is
unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute
confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for making the classification, and
therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .

VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. - chanrobles

virtual law library

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been
stated by the highest authority in the United States that:

. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall
not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .

xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional
restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The
courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the
legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due
process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . .
(Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)

Another authority states the principle thus:

. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of
the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of
the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights
secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any
restrictions on such rights. . . .

xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons
whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not be unduly
oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)

In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:

. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:

In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power
to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be
considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason
in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that
power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of
the public.

b. Petitioner's argument considered. - chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men;
that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to
prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect
assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by
petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and
unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to
their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also
found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the
illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of
the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the
national security in times of crisis and emergency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and
ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the
retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and
pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus
correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring
about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and
dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11
Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy
under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by
this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be
considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the
bill, which later was enacted into law:

This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not
citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the persons who
control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic,
who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in
our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even
our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from
the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to
paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it respects existing
rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is

none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject
to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country.
The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one
of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that
legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process.
The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of
legislative authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action. -
chanrobles virtual law library
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions
of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and
domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have
given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the
supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us,
they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the
legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their
Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of
retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for
Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the National
Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the
privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,
quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of
the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided
that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail
trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective
of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying
many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and
unconstitutional?chanrobles virtual law library

The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its
duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the
complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of
public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the
Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the
danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national
economy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. - chanrobles virtual law library

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable
the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of
those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and
similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or
privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the
Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been
denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would
defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not
subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the
Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily
the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is
in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the
law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.
Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable.
These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are:
that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of
employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no
need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general
breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments
are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative
prerogative; they do not import invalidity.

VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law chanrobles virtual law library

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title
thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to
nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional
provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:

No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.

What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and
the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate"
does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But
"regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always
been included within the term regulation.

Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41
of Answer.) chanrobles virtual law library

Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature
shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently
expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in
the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the subject of
regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)chanrobles
virtual law library

The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and
prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word
regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it
should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing
the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So.
718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the
title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more
general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains
other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms
"nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or
"prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which
would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the
principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be
adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the
Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of
the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have
been appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition
provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of
the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It
cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The
objection must therefore, be overruled.

IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations chanrobles virtual law library

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby
of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or
legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the
United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more
than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of
Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such
as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of
the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are
adopted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April
18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is
equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any
other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all
other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion chanrobles virtual law library

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a
real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the
retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects
its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident - as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary - and that in any case such matter falls within
the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of
the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the
title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the
population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power
may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have
been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have
been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to
close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of
legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection
guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed
to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and
jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions chanrobles virtual law library

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library

I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an the
Act passed by the Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic. But the rule
does not preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the Act offends against a
provision or provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the
due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution does not
infringe upon them, insofar as it affects associations, partnership or corporations, the capital of
which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and have
not been engaged in the retail business. I am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does
not violate said clauses insofar as the Act applies to associations and partnerships referred to in
the Act and to aliens, who are and have heretofore been engaged in said business. When they
did engage in the retail business there was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it.
They assumed and believed in good faith they were entitled to engaged in the business. The Act
allows aliens to continue in business until their death or voluntary retirement from the business
or forfeiture of their license; and corporations, associations or partnership, the capital of which is
not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines to continue in the business for a period of ten
years from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or until the expiry of term of the
existence of the association or partnership or corporation, whichever event comes first. The
prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, to engage in the retail business for a period of more than ten years from the date of
the approval of the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence, whichever event comes
first, is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the existence of such corporations is subject
to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by subsequent legislation. 1 But
the prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations and partnerships, the capital of
which is not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the
approval of the Act, even before the end of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the
associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is transmitted by the
death of an alien engaged in the business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to a
deprivation of their property without due process of law. To my mind, the ten-year period from
the date of the approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of the existence of the
association and partnership, whichever event comes first, and the six-month period granted to
alien heirs of a deceased alien, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not
cure the defect of the law, because the effect of the prohibition is to compel them to sell or
dispose of their business. The price obtainable at such forced sale of the business would be
inadequate to reimburse and compensate the associates or partners of the associations or
partnership, and the alien heirs of a deceased alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital
invested in it. The stock of merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute the
business. The goodwill that the association, partnership and the alien had built up during a long
period of effort, patience and perseverance forms part of such business. The constitutional
provisions that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law 2 and that
no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws 3 would have no meaning as applied
to associations or partnership and alien heirs of an alien engaged in the retail business if they
were to be compelled to sell or dispose of their business within ten years from the date of the
approval of the Act and before the end of the term of the existence of the associations and
partnership as agreed upon by the associations and partners and within six months after the
death of their predecessor-in-interest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the
ownership of private agricultural lands which together with the lands of the public domain
constitute the priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise and
prudent to deprive aliens and their heirs of such lands. 4 chanrobles virtual law library

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels associations
and partnership referred to therein to wind up their retail business within ten years from the
date of the approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term of their existence as agreed
upon by the associates and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it compels the aliens
engaged in the retail business in his lifetime his executor or administrator, to liquidate the
business, are invalid, for they violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws
clauses of the Constitution.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-7859. December 22, 1955.]

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Antonio
Jayme Ledesma, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as the Collector of Internal
Revenue, Defendant-Appellee.

Ernesto J. Gonzaga for Appellant.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres
and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TAXATION; POWER OF STATE TO LEVY TAX IN AND SUPPORT

OF SUGAR INDUSTRY. — As the protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a
matter of public concern the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what
is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative
must be allowed full play, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not
contended that the means provided in section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 567 bear no
relation to the objective pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective an methods
are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to
raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement.
Taxation may be made the implement of the state’s police power (Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477;
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 4 L. Ed. 579).

2. ID.; ID.; POWER OF STATE TO SELECT SUBJECT OF TAXATION. — It is inherent in the

power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been
repeatedly held that "inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class
for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation (Carmicheal v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245, citing numerous authorities, at 1251).

DECISION
 REYES, J. B. L., J.:

This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to test the
legality of the taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the
Sugar Adjustment Act.

Promulgated in 1940, the law in question opens (section 1) with a declaration of

emergency, due to the threat to our industry by the imminent imposition of export
taxes upon sugar as provided in the Tydings-McDuffie Act, and the "eventual loss of its
preferential position in the United States market" ; wherefore, the national policy was
expressed "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by
the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it
for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and
the imposition of the export taxes."cralaw virtua1aw library

In section 2, Commonwealth Act 567 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the
manufacture of sugar, on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufactures; while
section 3 levies on owners or persons in control of lands devoted to the cultivation of
sugar cane and ceded to others for a consideration, on lease or otherwise —

"a tax equivalent to the difference between the money value of the rental or
consideration collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed
value of such land."cralaw virtua1aw library

According to section 6 of the law —

SEC. 6. All collections made under this Act shall accrue to a special fund in the Philippine
Treasury, to be known as the ’Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund,’ and shall be
paid out only for any or all of the following purposes or to attain any or all of the
following objectives, as may be provided by law.

First, to place the sugar industry in a position to maintain itself despite the gradual loss
of the preferential position of the Philippine sugar in the United States market, and
ultimately to insure its continued existence notwithstanding the loss of that market and
the consequent necessity of meeting competition in the free markets of the world;

Second, to readjust the benefits derived from the sugar industry by all of the
component elements thereof — the mill, the landowner, the planter of the sugar cane,
and the laborers in the factory and in the field — so that all might continue profitably to
engage therein;
Third, to limit the production of sugar to areas more economically suited to the
production thereof; and

Fourth, to afford labor employed in the industry a living wage and to improve their living
and working conditions: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, until the
adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, make the necessary
disbursements from the fund herein created (1) for the establishment and operation of
sugar experiment station or stations and the undertaking of researchers (a)to increase
the recoveries of the centrifugal sugar factories with the view of reducing
manufacturing costs, (b) to produce and propagate higher yielding varieties of sugar
cane more adaptable to different distinct conditions in the Philippines, (c) to lower the
costs of raising sugar cane, (d) to improve the buying quality of denatured alcohol from
molasses for motor fuel, (e) to determine the possibility of utilizing the other by-
products of the industry, (f) to determine what crop or crops are suitable for rotation
and for the utilization of excess cane lands, and (g) on other problems the solution of
which would help rehabilitated and stabilize the industry, and (2) for the improvement
of living and working conditions in sugar mills and sugar plantations, authorizing him to
organize the necessary agency or agencies to take charge of the expenditure and
allocation of said funds to carry out the purpose hereinbefore enumerated, and,
likewise, authorizing the disbursement from the fund herein created of the necessary
amount of amounts needed for salaries, wages, travelling expenses, equipment, and
other sundry expenses or said agency or agencies."cralaw virtua1aw library

Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the
sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop
years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void,
being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff’s
opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action
having been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs appealed the case
directly to this Court (Judiciary Act, section 17).

The basic defect in the plaintiff’s position is his assumption that the tax provided for in
Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise of the taxing power. Analysis of the Act,
and particularly of section 6 (heretofore quoted in full), will show that the tax is levied
with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of
the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the
police power.

This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production in one of the great
industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products;
that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in fields and factories; that it is a
great source of the state’s wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange
needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a
policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement, therefore
redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to
find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized in
turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the law-making body could provide that
the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable it
to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain (Sligh v.
Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, 59 L. Ed. 835; Johnson v. State ex rel. Marey, 99 Fla. 1311, 128
So 853; Maxcy Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121).

As stated in Johnson v. State ex rel. Marey, with reference to the citrus industry in
Florida —

"The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great sources of the state’s
wealth and therefore directly or indirectly affecting the welfare of so great a portion of
the population of the State is affected to such an extent by public interests as to be
within the police power of the sovereign." (128 So. 857)

Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of the sugar industry
is a matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine within
reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion.
Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed full play, subject only to the test of
reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in section 6 of the law
(above quoted) bear no relation to the objective pursued or are oppressive in character.
If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state
may not be levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may
be made the implement of the state’s police power (Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U. S. v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477;
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 318, 4 L. Ed. 579).

That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves can hardly be a
ground of complaint; indeed, it appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from
those who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. At any
rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of
taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequalities which result from a singling
out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation" (Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245, citing
numerous authorities, at p. 1251).

From the point of view we have taken it appears of no moment that the funds raised
under the Sugar Stabilization Act, now in question, should be exclusively spent in aid of
the sugar industry, since it is that very enterprise that is being protected. It may be that
other industries are also in need of similar protection; but the legislature is not required
by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of "all or none." As ruled in Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270, 84 L. Ed. 744, "if the law presumably hits the
evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to
which it might have been applied;" and that the legislative authority, exerted within its
proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach" (N. L. R. B. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. Ed. 893).

Even from the standpoint that the Act is a pure tax measure, it cannot be said that the
devotion of tax money to experimental stations to seek increase of efficiency in sugar
production, utilization of by- products and solution of allied problems, as well as to the
improvement of living and working conditions in sugar mills or plantations, without any
part of such money being channeled directly to private persons, constitutes expenditure
of tax money for private purposes, (compare Everson v. Board of Education, 91 L. Ed.
472, 168 ALR 1392, 1400).

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and
Concepcion, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.]

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR,
INC. and GO CHIU, Petitioners-Appellees, v. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA,
respondent-appellant, VICTOR ALABANZA, Intervenor-Appellee.

Panganiban, Abad & Associates and Asst. City Fiscal L.L. Arguelles for Appellant.

Jose M . Aruego, Arsenio Tenchavez and Luis Go for Appellees.

Alfreo Concepcion for intervenor.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; VALIDITY, PRESUMPTION OF. — An

ordinance, having been enacted by councilors who must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality or city and with all the facts
and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action, must be
presumed to be valid and should not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of
personal property rights under the guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the
ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for evidence to rebut its validity is
unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factual foundation laid for overthrowing
Ord. No. 4760 of Manila as void on its face, the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail.

2. ID.; POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF. — Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila
is a manifestation of a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public
morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture
and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as
the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers extending as it does "to all
the great public needs."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INQUIRY. — On the legislative organs of the government, whether
national or local, primarily rests the exercise of the police power, which is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of certain constitutional
guaranties, the exercise of such police power, however, insofar as it may affect the life,
liberty or property of any person, is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of
police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable,
a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty
may call for correction by the courts.

4. ID.; ID.; LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO. — Municipal license fees can be classified into
those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.
Licenses for non-useful occupations are incidental to the police power, and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in taking the
amount of license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this
class of cases. Aside from applying the well known legal principle that municipal
ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the
amount of this kind of license fee. (Cu Unjieng v. Patstone [1922], 42 Phil,, 818, 828).

5. ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF. — Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in

determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that
some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a
particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power.
Persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be
affected by the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the exercise of that power.

6. ID.; DUE PROCESS; STANDARDS OF LEGAL INFIRMITY. — There is no controlling and

precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. It
would be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet
what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an
arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable
and what would amount to be an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the
face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.

7. ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN. — The provision in Ordinance

No. 4760 of the City of Manila making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn
or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as
transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty,
which cannot be absolute.

8. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC INTEREST; GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE. — The policy of laissez faire
has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE. — If the liberty invoked were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.

10. ID.; DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT; AMBIGUITY OF STATUTES AS DENIAL OF DUE

PROCESS. — What makes a statute susceptible to a charge that it is void on its face for
alleged vagueness or uncertainty is an enactment either for bidding or requiring the
doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and,
therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment
must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack
against its validity.

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members,
Hotel del Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of
the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was
sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the
interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as
legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities regularly paying
taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 persons and representing
an investment of more than P3 million." 1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13,
1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved
on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting
Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).

After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There
was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised
charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second c]ass motels; that the provision in
the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or
accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or
persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date
of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the
number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex
would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his
passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept
and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such
hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary,
unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and
likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-
incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two
classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels
such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry similarly
offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and
oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second
class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents
or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar
as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent
conviction would cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party,
in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
once again a transgression of the due process clause.

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment
declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July
6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain
from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions
of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of
action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper
purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power
and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self- incrimination, with
the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to
law, respondent Mayor prayed for its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of
facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and
Hotel del Mar, Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chiu is the president and
general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident
of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;

"2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief
executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances;

"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels
and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;

"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then
the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor,
amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of ordinances of
the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar
to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in his 4th
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);

"5. That the explanatory noted signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was
submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board,
copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;

"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from
license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in
the City of Manila."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress
was laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of
showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it,
citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners
against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum
for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with
citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for
a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and
making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners
association, and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party the
lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law,
the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to
submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any
evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on
constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right
and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila
to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No.
4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It
made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his
agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.

As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for
constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the
lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its
decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive
aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validity . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities
of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround
the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance,
has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the
people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation." 2

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity
for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its
face, which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than
in the leading case of O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 3 where the
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up
the matter thus: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the
scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the
specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the
plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally
defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle
of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to
unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, 4
extending as it does "to all the great public needs." 5 It would be, to paraphrase another
leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or
allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals,
public safety and the general welfare. 6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent
and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 7

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then
Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila
traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven
for prostitutes and thrill seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check
the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring
these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a
lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the license fees was intended to
discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal"
and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear
therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity
of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its
approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;
8 providing a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public
dance hall; 9 prohibiting gambling; 10 prohibiting jueteng; 11 and monte; 12 prohibiting
playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays; 13 prohibiting the
operation of pinball machines; 14 and prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting
or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise
used, 15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national of local, primarily rest
the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of such
police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject
to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of
any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

We are thus led considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is
raised to the question of due process. 16 There is no controlling and precise definition
of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case,
be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
government action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity; sufficient to
spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not
outrun the bounds of reasons and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile
to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified
as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. 17
It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch" in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." 18 It is not a narrow or
"technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"
19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." 20 Questions of due process are not to be
treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. 21

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to

meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an
arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be
deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern
is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be
more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial
measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case
must be found in the records, and as has been set forth, none is even attempted here,
to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to
meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive
plausibility to petitioners’ indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to
single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of
the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200%
for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-
class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922
that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating
occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprise and for revenue purposes only. 22 As was explained more in
detail in the above Cu-Unjieng case:" (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the
power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the
former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal
ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the
amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege
taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in cases of licenses for the
sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared
unreasonable." 23

Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz V. Araneta 24 this Court affirmed the
doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made
to implement the state’s police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to
affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to
cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the
only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purpose, just and uniform.25cralaw:red

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of
Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that
"much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here
the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a
police power measure. 26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with
this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the
plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance would deprive them of their
lawful occupation and means of livehood because they can not rent stalls in the public
markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage
meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted . .
. And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of
their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the
exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of
the police power embark in those occupations subject to the disadvantages which may
result from the legal exercise of that power." 27

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any
room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases
full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when
there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable
situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be
unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which as
pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs
through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: ‘Liberty’ as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is ‘liberty regulated by law.’ Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he
pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good . . . The
liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." 28

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state . . .
To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all." 29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of
undue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar, 30 no longer "retains its
virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to
the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest." 31 What cannot be stressed sufficiently is that if
the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is wider. 32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by
invoking the principle of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the
petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age
and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those
arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room with
him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso
in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in
a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso
which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day’s or merely a half-
day’s rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on
its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From
Connally v. General Construction Co. 33 to Adderley v. Florida, 34 the principle has been
consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an
enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this
the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but
there is no canon against using common sense in constructing laws as saying what they
obviously mean." 35

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the
arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of
the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this
Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith. With costs.

Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.

Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on official leave.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, Petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation
Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON.
ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public
Highways, Respondents.

Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor
Amado D. Aquino for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is
assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for
transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being
arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F.
Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo
L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino,
Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear
that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction
on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by
respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the
petition must be dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued
on December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of
fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked
motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal
approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under
P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety
signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the
interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do
hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their
motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible
reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides.
2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more
on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or
driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four
meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land
Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as
herein described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except
motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He
shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this
order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary
or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was
amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No.
229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall
require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his
vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen
by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule
and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.'" 4 There was issued
accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10,
1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month
period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a pre-registration
requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of
Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter
of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued
Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716,
dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter
of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the
following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated
December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may come from
whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications
contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle
, except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be
issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial
number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of payment of
current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda
in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It was for
immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works,
transportation, and Communications. 10chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035,
already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and
aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned
in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations
in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said
Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of
police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory,
nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society." 12 He
contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and
immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense
of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of
P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists
who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to
the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of
Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in
the meanwhile.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112
(Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) - Considering the allegations contained, the
issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory
and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file an answer
thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court
further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and
continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court. 16 chanrobles virtual law library

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on
November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual
allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating
they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a
Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including
its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as
amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission
Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional
provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power,
and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral
unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis
and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer." 18 Unlike
petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely
invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that
the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules
and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful
delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative
Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this
Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v.
Ericta. 21Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on
road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly
ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and
dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed
Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of
rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be
denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As
noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be
dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due
process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as
"nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was
stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power
with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds
of restraints and burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.'
Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept
was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted
by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the
greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the
most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed
out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the
language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be
interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes
with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 24chanrobles virtual
law library

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of
that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on
roads and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26As a matter of fact, the first law sought to
be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with
petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public
safety.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing
rules and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary
factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28The rationale was clearly set
forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in
the opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character,
the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record in overthrowing the statute. 29 chanrobles virtual law library

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption
of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the
necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and
such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning
devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly
only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved
rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable
data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt
therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *.
But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the
installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean
the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or
frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter
of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set
it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims
that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for
exaggeration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of
Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device
requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are
already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-
powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear
bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * *
because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions,
and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from
this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming
device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that
somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor
vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On
the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or
the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still
think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car?
Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase,
rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31chanrobles virtual law library

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the
Answer of the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229,
as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners
to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle
owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning
device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of
industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this
early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid
down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device
requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it
make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning
device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it *
* * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said
requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the
same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No.
229 and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against
it. 32chanrobles virtual law library

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on
lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to
say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is
distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this
Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or
expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is
primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the
observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision,
the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or
salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy
and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.
This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated
the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion
of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule
of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly
litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms
and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there
may be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33chanrobles
virtual law library

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power

is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to
acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the
temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v.
Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may
be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express
or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does
not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What
is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to
adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too
long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has
been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with
the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing
tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of
the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that
what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when
it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed." 34chanrobles virtual law library

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized
by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It
cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is
impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude,
which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international
morality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not
even elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and
categorical why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more
appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v.
Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be
considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal
protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can
rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but
that.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles

virtual law library

Aquino J., took no part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Concepcion J., is on leave.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.

chanrobles virtual law library

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining
order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all
motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device, without even hearing the
parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition
advances grave and serious grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land
Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No. 32
[which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No. 229,
as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable,
arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate
New Society," because of the following considerations, inter alia: chanrobles virtual law library

1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in
and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized
tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the
challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be
demonstrated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has
been made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of
nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that
occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the
purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the
country; chanrobles virtual law library

3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's
assertion that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country
requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would mean a consumer
outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands
unchallenged; chanrobles virtual law library

4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome
alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the
common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled
vehicles on the highways; and chanrobles virtual law library
5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The
respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in
their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main
cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest and
foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless
and irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes
that can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the
challenged order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner
for his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the
"all pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving
the wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty
and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial
inquiry.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 12834. October 10, 1917. ]

SEBASTIAN LOZANO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CARMEN MARTINEZ and JOSE DE VEGA, Defendants.

CARMEN MARTINEZ, Appellee.

Chas. E. Tenney for Appellant.

Ramon Sotelo for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. HABEAS CORPUS; PETITION FOR WRIT BY FATHER, TO OBTAIN POSSESSION OF A CHILD UNDER
TEN YEARS OF AGE, IN POSSESSION OF THE MOTHER. — Where a husband and wife are living
separate the question which one of them is entitled to the possession of their child under ten
years of age is a matter within the sound discretion of the court, in accordance with the
provisions of section 771 of Act No. 190.

DECISION

JOHNSON, J. :

This was a petition for the writ of habeas corpus presented in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila on the 2d day of February, 1917. Its purpose was to obtain the possession of a
child of six and one-half years old.

The record shows that the plaintiff Sebastian Lozano and the defendant Carmen Martinez were
husband and wife; that the child in question was their child; that they were living separate; that
sometime before the commencement of the present action the plaintiff had commenced a
criminal action against the defendant and the said Jose de Vega for the crime of adultery; that
said criminal action had been dismissed; that there was still pending an action by the defendant
Carmen Martinez against the plaintiff Sebastian Lozano for the crime of libel; that the defendant
Carmen Martinez had obtained possession of the child in question and had refused to deliver it
to its father. The mother, Carmen Martinez, alleges and attempted to prove that prior to the
time she took possession of said child, it was in the possession of its father; that its father was
not able to give it the care and attention which a child of tender years should have; that its
father was not financially able to give the child the care and attention which it requires; that she
was amply able to take care of the child, to furnish it food and clothing, and such other
necessities which a child requires.

After hearing the evidence adduced during the hearing on the petition for the writ of habeas
corpus the Hon. James A. Ostrand, judge, in his decision, made the following
statement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The respondent, Carmen Martinez, is the mother of the child, and pending divorce proceedings
is living separate from her husband. While the proceedings adopted by the respondent mother
to obtain possession of the child may be open to criticism, the court is nevertheless of the
opinion that she is in a much better position to take care of the child than is the petitioner; and
as the welfare of the child is the ruling consideration in providing for its custody, the discretion
vested in the court by section 771 of the Code of Civil Procedure will in this instance be exercised
in favor of the Respondent."cralaw virtua1aw library

Said section 771 provides, among other things, that, "When husband and wife are living separate
and apart from each other, or are divorced, and the question as to the care, custody and control
of the offspring of their marriage, is brought before a Court of First Instance, by petition or
otherwise, or rises as an incident to any other proceeding, the father and mother of such
offspring shall stand upon an equality before the court as to the care, custody and control of the
offspring so far as it relates to their being either father or mother of the children. The court,
upon hearing the testimony of either or both of said parents and such other testimony as the
court deems pertinent, shall decide which one of them shall have the care, custody and control
of such offspring, taking into account that which will be for the best interest of the children.

Said section gives the court the right to decide which of the parents, when they are living
separate, is entitled to the care and custody of their offspring when such offspring is under ten
years of age. There is nothing in the record which shows that the lower court abused the
discretion conferred upon it by said section 771. The evidence clearly shows that it is for the best
interest of the child to allow the mother for the present to have the control over it.

Therefore, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Carson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur.