Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Ruling: In deciding this case, the SC considered the wordings Can a party who lost rights of ownership in a parcel of land due
used by Lucila in her waiver. The court noted that the phrase to laches be allowed to regain such ownership when one who
used “ To put everything in order, I hereby waive all my share, benefited from the delay waives such benefit?
interest and participation…” means that the intention of Lucila
was to waive her right to the property, irreversibly divesting Held:
herself of her existing right to it. It disagreed with the lower
On the issue of the rights of the heirs of Victoriana
court’s interpretation that such wordings intends a precondition
and Telesfora Reyes being barred by the indefeasibility of
of waiver for if such was the intent, the phrase containing
petitioners Torrens Title over subject lot, we qualify. While it is
words such as “ subject to the condition that everything is put
true that the indefeasibility of petitioners title on the ground of
in order” would have been used. Therefore, the SC ruled that
laches bars the rights or interests of the heirs of Victoriana and
the affidavit of waiver executed by Lucila makes Isabelo and
Telesfora Reyes over the disputed lot, still, the indefeasible
4
rights of a holder of a Torrens Title may be waived in favor of Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.),
another whose equitable rights may have been barred by Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo
laches. Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa
Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As
However, the equitable rights barred by laches still for Jose, it is not clear from the records if he was made party to
subsist and are not otherwise extinguished. Thus, parties guilty the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.
of laches retains equitable rights albeit in an empty manner as
they cannot assert their rights judicially. However, such In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject
equitable rights may be revived or activated by the waiver of property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir,
those whose right has ripened due to laches, and can be Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo,
exercised to the extent of the right waived. Aklan Civil Case No. 52756 for partition, recovery of ownership
and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs.
In the case at bar, petitioners title over Lot No. 3880 Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he demanded the
had become indefeasible due to the laches of the heirs of partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed
Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes. However, like any rights over his demands; that the matter reached the level of the Lupon
immovable property, titleholders may convey, dispose, or Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a court
encumber their right or interest. Thus, through the waiver and action sometime in 1980; that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole
quitclaim, the rights of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora ownership of the property; that portions of the property were
Reyes were acknowledged, revived, and activated to the sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be
extent of the rights waived by titleholders Victorino, Luis, and collated and included as part of the portion to be awarded to
Jovito Reyes. Clearly, the quitclaim executed by titleholders Gregoria’s heirs
Victorino, Luis, and Jovito Reyes waived and conveyed their
rights over the said lot in favor of the heirs of Victoriana and Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo
Telesfora Reyes, whose equitable rights were barred by claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them;
laches. that they have become the sole owners of the subject property
through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by
In this light, we note that both trial and appellate sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the
courts in Civil Case No. 6238 did not categorically pronounce same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that
that the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes had no rights they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and
over the disputed lot. Their pronouncements were to the effect exclusive possession of the property with a just title; that they
that whatever equitable rights the heirs of Victoriana and have been paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardo’s
Telesfora Reyes may have had over the subject lot had been claim is barred by estoppel and laches.
barred by laches. Thus, the voluntary waiver of Victorino, Luis,
and Jovito Reyes revived and activated the equitable rights of Petitioners’ Arguments
the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes over Lot No. 3880.
But such revived and activated rights over Lot No. 3880 Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that
correspond only to the extent of the rights of Victorino, Luis, Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in 1943 and his
and Jovito Reyes waived in their favor. possession thereof amounted to a repudiation of the co-
ownership, and that Leonardo’s admission and
acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.’s possession for such length of
time operated to bestow upon petitioners – as Lucimo Sr.’s
successorsin-interest – the benefits of acquisitive prescription
which proceeded from the repudiation.
INENG vs VEGA
Respondents’ Arguments
FACTS:
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment35
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez that – For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted
(Rafaela), is the owner of a parcel of land (subject property) in that eighteen (18) legible copies has [sic] not been filed in this
Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title No. case for consideration in banc [sic] and nine (9) copies in
(24071) RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon and Rafaela died cases heard before a division in that [sic] all copies of
without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana pleadings served to the offices concern [sic] where said order
Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who [sic] was issued were not furnished two (2) copies each in
are now both deceased. violation to [sic] the adverse parties [sic] to the clerk of court,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; to
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion
the Honorable Court of Appeals so that No [sic] action shall be
Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega
taken on such pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and
(Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived
other papers as fail [sic] to comply with the requisites set out in
by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M.
this paragraph.
Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the
substituted respondents. Herein petitioners, except for Ramon ISSUE:
Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are
Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs). Whether or not Prescription sets in
CASE B: G.R. No L-28568 – appeal Jose de Borja from the Sometime before the agricultural year 1966-1967,
disapproval of compromise agreement by CFI Nueva Ecija Vicente Santiago approached the petitioners and offered
repurchase the subject properties. Petitioners, however,
CASE C: G.R. No. L-28611 – appeal by Jose de Borja from the refused the offer. Consequently, Vicente Santiago instituted a
decision of CFI Rizal that the main object of the compromise complaint for specific performance before the then Court of
agreement is a separate and exclusive property of Francisco First Instance of Quezon City.
de Borja and not a conjugal asset
The trial court dismissed the petition of respondent
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for the probate of and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, but when there was
the will of her wife Josefa Tangco upon her death (CFI Rizal). reorganization of courts and the records was been lodged
6
within the Intermediate Appellate Court it made a reversal of and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The
the decision made by the Court of Appeals which now allowed whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and
the specific performance of the repurchase underlying on the refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and
annotation on the instrument which states that: including the first semester of his last year in the college of law
or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law
“"they shall not sell to others these three lots but only from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar
to the seller Vicente Santiago or to his heirs or successors" examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed
which is an express prohibition against the sale of the lots the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University.
described in the "Compraventa" to third persons or strangers to Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed
the contract. transcripts. The defendant refused until after he had paid back
the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above
Issue: stated. As he could not take the bar examination without those
transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under
Whether or not the said clause is void or not
protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from
Held: defendant in this case.
Contracts are generally binding between the parties, Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship
their assigns and heirs; however, under Art. 1255 of the Civil grants as above stated, he was made to sign the following
Code of Spain, which is applicable in this instance, pacts, contract covenant and agreement:
clauses, and conditions which are contrary to public order are
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by
null and void, thus, without any binding effect.
the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to another
Parenthetically, the equivalent provision in the Civil school without having refunded to the University (defendant)
Code of the Philippines is that of Art. 1306, which states: "That the equivalent of my scholarship cash.
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
Issue:
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public Whether or not the waiver made by the Plaintiff was
order, or public policy. Public order signifies the public weal — valid.
public policy. Essentially, therefore, public order and public
policy mean one and the same thing. Public policy is simply the Held:
English equivalent of "order publico" in Art. 1255 of the Civil
Code of Spain. The Court is on the opinion that the stipulation in
question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void.
One such condition which is contrary to public policy
is the present prohibition to self to third parties, because the In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings
same virtually amounts to a perpetual restriction to the right of Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In
ownership, specifically the owner's right to freely dispose of his determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a
properties. This, we hold that any such prohibition, indefinite consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the
and stated as to time, so much so that it shall continue to be statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It might take
applicable even beyond the lifetime of the original parties to the more than a government bureau or office to lay down or
contract, is, without doubt, a nullity. In the light of this establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but
pronouncement, we grant the petitioners' prayer for the courts consider the practices of government officials as one of
cancellation of the annotations of this prohibition at the back of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It
their Transfer Certificates 'Title. has been consistently held in America that under the principles
relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of
Cui vs Arrellano University contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a
transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is
Facts: calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound
morality or to civic honest.
Plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up
preparatory law course in the defendant University. After 'In order to declare a contract void as against public
finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or
College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948- the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of
1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or
university up to and including the first semester of the fourth tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights.
year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying
law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother It is good customs; those generally accepted
of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law principles of morality which have received some kind of social
and legal counsel of the defendant university. and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding
scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not
Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law good customs nor has it received some kind of social and
studies in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in
fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which
severed his connection with defendant and having accepted implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with
the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children,
Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding
enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So
college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from also with the leading colleges and universities of the United
the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the States after which our educational practices or policies are
time he was studying law in defendant university was awarded patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to
scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their
tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester
7
propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants
whom society has an established interest or a first lien. shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE (2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia; regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of the
that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle
Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that name a child may use.
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an
Trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoptee may use.
adoption.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
ISSUE: Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as discussed above.
her middle name?
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child
RULING: adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should
YES. The use of surname is fixed by law: not be allowed to do so.
On its face, Art 26, par 2 of the Family Code does not appear However, we note that the records are bereft of competent
to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce
to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was and mere allegation is not evidence.
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on,
the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
residing in the U.S.A. can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita
into another marriage.
v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended
the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
remarry. considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare,
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
evidence in his favor.
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the ASIDE.
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.
VAN DORN vs ROMILLO
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its FACTS:
spirit or intent.
> Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States.
> They were married in Hongkong, that, after the marriage,
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements they established their residence in the Philippines.
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: > The parties were divorced in Nevada, United States; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Van Dorn.
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
> Private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that
celebrated between a Filipino petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop), is
citizen and a foreigner; and conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the private respondent be declared with right to manage the
alien spouse capacitating him or conjugal property.
her to remarry. > Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
9
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community left all his estate to Alicia and their children (nothing for Paula).
property". In 1983, he went to court for the will’s probate and to have
> Court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died. Later,
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
ISSUE: estate.
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to The trial court ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void
exercise control over such disputed property? because the divorce he obtained abroad is void. The trial court
ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence divorce is not
RULING: applicable to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are became an American citizen in 1943. Hence, when he
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and American citizen. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
the marriage.
Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws relating
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no to family rights, duties, or status are no longer applicable to
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must
sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to be respected. The rule is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the provided they are valid according to their national law.
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before for the latter to determine the effects of the divorce as to the
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.
property.
Anent the issue on Lorenzo’s last will and testament, it must be
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, respected. He is an alien and is not covered by our laws on
petitioner has to be considered still married to private succession. However, since the will was submitted to our
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article courts for probate, then the case was remanded to the lower
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to prove
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and the validity of the will.
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights PILAPIL vs IBAY-SOMERA
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. FACTS:
10
In the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing demonstrated.
to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. (2) No.
DECISION OF LOWER COURT: The most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
(1) Regional Trial Court: declares the marriage between Grace
J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal
1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground
of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Samson was proven, and
(2) Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1,
to marry petitioner. 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12,
RULING: 1994.
(1) No.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the 22
take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)
it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even
by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of Tenchavez vs. Escaño
the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly FACTS:
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before a Catholic
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained registrar. However, the two were unable to live together after
the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already
facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the
must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the and absolute” was issued in open court by the said
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California,
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of Citizenship.
his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of
Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against
11
husband was legal because now being an American citizen,
Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño
the law of her present nationality shall govern her status.
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged
Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC – Cebu: declared the marriage null and void on the
and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, (2) CA: affirmed RTC.
and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in ISSUE:
damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way Where the marriage between Crasus and Fely remains valid
and subsisting
influenced their daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages. RULING:
YES.
At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy,
ISSUE: give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines. same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent
Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations
RULING: where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage to every individual problem.
remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine I. The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to
Law. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –
deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which Escaño was
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party
bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of
of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were
States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful involved.
infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner
Intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
the basis of adultery. marriage. The root cause of the incapacity be identified as a
psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature must be
fully explained.
23
II. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
is not applicable to the case at bar.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, P e t i t i o n e r ,- versus-
By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot
CRASUS L. IYOY, R e s p o n d e n t
be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
FACTS:
Filipino citizen.
At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Cebu City. After
and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and
Philippine laws
extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
III. The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the
of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration
youngest then being only six years old, to the care of
of nullity of marriages.
respondent Crasus.
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for
received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in
the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is
1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by
elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American,
eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate
with whom she eventually had a child. At the time the
courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable
Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and
and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held
abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already
possibility of reconciliation between them.
exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s
protection of the interests of the State.
acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration 24
of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68,
70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines. G.R. No. 155635
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, vs THE
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE
June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen x-------------------------------------------x
Micklus. She argued that her marriage to her American G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, vs VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
12
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying
FACTS: petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence
Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the
old, to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA. On existence of a marriage.
November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca
gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on,
Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have 25
soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, EDGAR SAN LUIS, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly x ---------------------------------------------------- x
represented by counsel. G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner vs. FELICIDAD
DECISION OF COURTS: SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
FACTS:
(1) Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic -
ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving FACTS:
them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but
giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. On March During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
incapacity. On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to predeceased Felicisimo.
Dismiss on,inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action
and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
(2) RTC: denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
supportpendente lite Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20,
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
injunction. surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
(3) CA: issued the desired TRO. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children
ISSUES: with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
(1) Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican
Republic on February 22, 1996; and Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
(2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
are its consequent legal effects? On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court
RULING: On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
(1) Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
Case. When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One. From the a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not administration should have been filed in the Province of
have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior
Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic. personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
(2) The Divorce is valid. In plain language, Vicente and legally married to Merry Lee.
Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.
As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage
between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free (1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that
to remarry after completing the legal requirements." respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid.
The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on
Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided November 16, 1994. Thus, a new trial ensued.
the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the (2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of
national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo
Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It found that the decree of
divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee
said decree is, as here, sufficient. was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26
Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it
Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate
Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or children.
invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an (3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
American citizen on February 22, 1996.
ISSUES:
In determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would (1) Whether venue was properly laid, and
come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute (2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering
the time a valid divorce is obtained. that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June
20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988.
13
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of
petition for letters of administration. Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete separation of
properties between Tristan and Lily.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in
Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the the State of Virginia in the United States[7] and both lived as
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court husband and wife until October 2001.
of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
"dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
was deemed void under Philippine... law.
resides therein with continuity and consistency. While
petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the Regional Trial Court of
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of Quezon City
his death. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File
venue of the settlement of his estate. Intervention[10] claiming that she has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a Issue:
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien W/N Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, disregarding her legal interest in the annulment case...
the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine between Tristan and Lily.
law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving Ruling:
a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that
already established through judicial precedent. Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested laws relating to family rights and... duties, or to the status,
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.[19]
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of she will be governed by Philippine laws with... respect to his or
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition
and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and
the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family eventually becomes... successful in getting an absolute divorce
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated divorce.
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage
this case should be remanded to the trial court for further was governed by the provisions of the Civil Code[21] which
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v.
Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. Escano[22] we held:
(3) Yes. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
for letters of administration may arise from her status as the decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code. jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another
party... by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has added)
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of Thus, petitioner's claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit.
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife
upon which her motion for intervention is based.
ELMAR O. PEREZ v. CA, GR NO. 162580, 2006-01-27 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Facts: Principles:
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or
Catindig[5] twice on May 16, 1968. The first marriage she will be governed by Philippine laws with... respect to his or
ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition
T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila while the second took place and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether
at the Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition
abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems eventually becomes... successful in getting an absolute divorce
that they decided to separate from each other. Upon advice of decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute
a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the divorce.
Dominican Republic.
Ando vs DFA
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a
G.R. No. 195432 – Civil Law – Persons and Family Relations –
joint petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership with the
Foreign Divorce; how recognized
Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil
court in the Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual Remedial Law – Evidence – Foreign Divorce; Must be proven
consent of Tristan and Lily. as a matter of fact
14
In 2001, Edelina Tungul married a Japanese citizen ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage
named Yuichiro Kobayashi. In 2004, Kobayashi obtained a with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of
divorce decree against Edelina in Japan. Kobayashi later the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of
married someone else. Dominican Republic.
o on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted
In 2005, Edelina again married another Japanese citizen
another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
named Masatomi Ando.
o Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned
Thereafter, Edelina tried to renew her passport but this time to the Philippines and lived together as husband
she wanted to use her married name – she wanted to use and wife until 1987.
Ando’s name. However, the Department of Foreign Affairs ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named LUPSICON
(DFA) told her that same cannot be issued to her until she can where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased the 6th Floor
said husband Masatomi Ando is valid until otherwise declared. of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium
unit) at Makati City. Said condominium unit was to be used
In 2010, Edelina filed a petition for declaratory relief as she
as law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed
insists that she should be issued a passport bearing her
of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed
married name even without a judicial declaration that her
which was registered bearing the following names:
marriage with Ando is valid because, according to the law, void o "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L.
and voidable marriages enjoy the presumption of validity until
Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
proven otherwise. And also on that juncture, she prayed that
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R.
the court recognize her second marriage as valid.
PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief should (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married
prosper. to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100
HELD No. In the first place, the petition is misplaced. Edelina share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. When her request unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new
for renewal of passport under her married name was denied, CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
she should have appealed the denial to the Secretary of following names:
Foreign Affairs – pursuant to the Implementing Rules and o "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L.
Regulations of RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act). Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Second, her prayer to have her second marriage be “honored” Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ
is not proper. The proper remedy is for her to file a petition for SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x
the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first x x"
husband. LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was
partitioned by the partners but the same was still
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in registered in common.
our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the o The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY.
national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the LUNA over the condominium unit would be
divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the 25/100 share.
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the o ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed
divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on Cruzand used a portion of the office
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national condominium unit as their office. The said law
law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact. firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the
Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture
Full title: SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio
JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage.
and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents. o Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100
Reference: G.R. No. 171914 / July 23, 2014 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who
Nature: The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan established his own law firm named Renato G.
Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision, whereby the CA De la Cruz & Associates.
affirmed the decision RTC. The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
Topic: NCC 15 condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture
and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed
Facts: by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the
RTC.
o The complaint alleged that the subject properties
ATTY. LUNA, were acquired during the existence of the
o a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
the law firm Sycip Law Offices through their joint efforts that since they had no
o at that time when he was living with his first wife, children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
herein Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the
whom he married in a civil ceremony conducted extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½
by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque and share in the said properties plus her ½ share in
later solemnized in a church ceremony at the the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was
Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan. bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and
o they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina testament; and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA
Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD
L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio from her share in the subject properties.
Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and The RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the
Cesar Antonio Luna. aforementioned facts ruling that the 24/100 pro-indiviso
o After almost 2 decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA share in the condominium unit is adjudged to have been
and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
from each other and agreed to separation of that Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other
property, to which end, they entered into a written concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry with
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L.
SETTLEMENT", whereby they agreed to live Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
separately and to dissolve and liquidate their Zaballero Luna";
conjugal partnership of property.
15
Both parties appealed to the CA. daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir,
The CA promulgated decision, holding and ruling but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar was the executor of the
LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The estate. Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16,
absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied;
Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law
with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred
citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate
children not being entitled to anything under California law.
Issue: ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased
should be applied in determining the successional rights of his
Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia heirs.
Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more
marriage following the nationality rule laid down by Art 15. successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two
rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies
Held: to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for
Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be
time of his death. followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings – the determination of the successional rights
under Philippine law only.
Ratio:
Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both
Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10,
1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the FACTS:
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The
Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second
upon citizens of the Philippines, although living wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.
abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws
governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio 6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills,
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his
12, 1997 terminated their marriage. seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions
to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between the creation of two separate wills.
Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, 16 even if
either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the ISSUE:
only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have
beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been limited Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the
to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment determination of the illegitimate children’s successional rights
of the marriage.
RULING:
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that
Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that
the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding national law should govern.
conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as
an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his
the establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The non- national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes,
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union is valid.
especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only
upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the
between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the national law of the deceased.
marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction. Medina vs. Koike Case Digest
FACTS:
Adolfo Aznar vs Helen Christensen Garcia
7 SCRA 95 – Civil Law – Application of Laws – Foreign Law – Medina was married to Koike on on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City,
Nationality Principle – Internal and Conflict Rule Philippines. Their union bore two children. On June 14, 2012, Medina and
Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of
Application of the Renvoi Doctrine
Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the same was
California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike. Seeking to
came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on
his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural
file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7,
16
2013 a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the
capacity to remarry. At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said
the petition. On the other hand, Medina presented several foreign period of travel.
documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of
Divorce" and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike" etc. RTC denied Medina's Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of
petition, ruling that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien its terms on the part of Frank, he should become liable to the
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the
Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented were one-half salary paid during such period.
successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless
fell short of proving the national law of her husband, particularly the existence Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was
of the law on divorce. paid half-salary from the date until the date of his arrival in the
Philippine Islands.
Medina’s testimony was insufficient since she was not presented a qualified
expert witness nor was shown to have.
Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to
ISSUE: make a further compliance with the terms of the contract.
Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover
foreign divorce. from Frank the sum of money, which amount the Plaintiff
claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred in
RULING: traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the
period consumed in travel.
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. Considering
that the validity of the divorce decree between Medina and Michiyuki, as well It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract
as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said
factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the contract.
RTC. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts,
whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense,
binding subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that appeals alleging in his special defense that
taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its (1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended
original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered
should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the said contract, and also that
the Rules of Court.
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into
MICIANO v. BRIMO and was therefore not responsible under the law. the lower
GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927 court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of the
50 PHIL 867 Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite to
marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named go to the reception hall to give the meal allowance to the band
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage and to pay the suppliers. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte
bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the noticed the people staring at her and it was at this juncture that
appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son Soledad Carpio allegedly uttered the following words to
came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala
made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha” It turned out that after Valmonte left
Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the
remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines pieces of jewelry which she placed ins i de the comfort room in
particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma a paper bag were lost and these include diamond rings,
filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for earrings, bracelet and diamong necklace with a total value of
the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with about 1M pesos. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched,
petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the interrogated and trailed by the police officers, but the pe titioner
facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense kept on saying the words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.”
with respect to the accused, he being an alien Valmonte’s car was also searched but the search yielded
nothing.
ISSUES:
Few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his
Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she
minor child under the Philippine law?
wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’ relatives and guests
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally to redeem her smeared reputation but the petitioner did not
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support respond. Valmonte filed a suit for damages.
his minor child.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled that when
RULING: sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely
exercising her right and if damage results from a person
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added
Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to petitioner acted maliciously and in bad fai th in pointing to her
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the as the culprit.
consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son The CA ruled out differently and opined that Valmonte has
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a clearly established that she was singled out by the petitioner as
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. However, the
proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily court find no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is damages.
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is entitled to the award of
capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the
actual and moral damages
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent HELD: The Court ruled that the respondent in entitled to moral
upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the damages but not to actual damages.
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation
to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in In the sphere of our law on human relations, one of the
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take fundamental precepts is the principle known as “abuse of
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be rights” under Article 19 of the Civil Code. To find existence of
alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: 1)
applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to there is legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised in bad faith; 3)
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another. Thus, a
most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
18
exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and other personally. She has no reason to treat him wrongfully
good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. especially so that Reyes himself is a prominent person.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he
The Court said that petitioner’s verbal reproach against incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine of volenti non fit
respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself
own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and to the risk of being turned away, and thus being embarrassed.
amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even
she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes into the
party and that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even
which were not merely inquisitve but outrightly accusatory. By
present any supporting evidence to support any of his claims.
openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out Since he brought injury upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko
of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all Hotel can be held liable for damages.
the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily
Ardiente vs. Javier, et al
searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief.
[Civil Law: human relations; principle of abuse of rights; Article
Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner 19 of the Civil Code]
which is contrary to morals and good customs. Certainly,
petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Every person must, in the exercise of his right, and in the
Article 20 for which she should be held accountable. performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith. (Art. 19. New
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN VS REYES Ciivil Code of the Philippines)
452 SCRA 532 – Civil Law – Human Relations – Abuse of Joyce V. Ardiente, Petitioner, vs. Sps. Javier and Ma.
Rights – Volenti Non Fit Injuria Theresa Pastorfide, Cagayan de Oro Water District and
Gaspar Gonzales, Jr., Respondents
One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being G.R. No. 161921; July 17, 2013
held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Garden. The party was being
held for a prominent Japanese national. The person in charge Facts: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
at the party was Ruby Lim who was also the executive Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision and
secretary of the hotel. Later during the party, she noticed Resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the then
Robert Reyes (popularly known as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was decision of the RTC regarding its judgment sums of money for
not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The
invited Reyes to the party. When she ascertained that the host decision being contested sprouted from the cutting off of water
celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told supply of Pastorfide by the Cagayan de Oro Water District as
the latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food and leave the requested by Ardiente. In this case, Ardiente owned a piece of
party. Reyes however made a scene and began shouting at property, which was subsequently sold and conveyed to
Lim. Later, a policeman was called to escort Reyes out of the Pastorfide, however, the connection of water supply as well as
party. other utilities remained in the name of Ardiente which was
never questioned, until such time that Pastorfide became
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for
delinquent in paying the water bill.
damages. In his version, he said that he was invited by another
party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for Ardiente together with
was queuing to get his food, Lim approached him and ordered
Cagayan De Oro Water district to cut off the water supply of
him in a loud voice to leave the party immediately. He told Lim
Pastorfide owing to the fact that Ardiente has already
he was invited by Dr. Filart however when he was calling for
conveyed ownership of property to Pastorfide.
Dr. Filart the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted out of
the party like a common criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However, Ruling: No, it was not proper. Petitioner's acts which
the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Reyes as it ruled that Lim violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her
abused her right and that Reyes deserved to be treated unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water
humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had the right to ask supply disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at
Reyes to leave the party but she should have done it least notify respondent spouses of such intention. The principle
respectfully. of abuse of Rights in the enshrined Article 19 of the civil Code
provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights. and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. It
credible. She has been employed by the hotel for more than 20 recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all times. exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
It is very unlikely for her to make a scene in the party she was must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
managing. That would only make her look bad. recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined
Code. Art. 19 which provides: in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his responsible.
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes testified Sesbreno vs CA et. al. G.R. No. 160689 March 26,
in court that when Lim told him to leave, Lim did so very close 2014
to him – so close that they could almost kiss. This only proves
that Lim intended that only Reyes shall hear whatever is it that
she’s going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner Raul H.
hearing. Sesbreño founded on abuse of rights. Sesbreño accused the
violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by the
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as contra Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check his electric meter
bonus mores: with conducting an unreasonable search in his residential
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a premises. But RTC, Branch 13, in Cebu City rendered
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public judgment on August 19, 1994 dismissing the claim; 1 and the
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal on March 10,
2003.2
This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven by evidence
on record, did not demean Reyes. They do not know each
ISSUE:
19
HELD:
RULING: Yes, petitioners acted in bad faith and the award for
Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if the moral damages and attorney’s
respondents were not guilty of abuse of rights. To stress, the fees to respondent was proper. The Supreme Court affirmed
concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not the Court of Appeals’ decision.
use his right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be The principle of abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil
liable to another who suffers injury. The rationale for the Code is present in the case. Respondent complained when
concept is to present some basic principles to be followed for petitioners embarrassed her and insisted that she did not pay
the rightful relationship between human beings and the stability for the black jeans despite the issuance of an official receipt in
of social order.21Moreover, according to a commentator,22 "the her favor. The court cited the case of Carpio vs. Valmonte
exercise of right ends when the right disappears, and it in which the elements of abuse of rights were enumerated.
disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of
others[;] [i]t cannot be said that a person exercises a right “The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a
when he unnecessarily prejudices another." Article 19 of the legal right or duty; (2) which isexercised in bad faith; (3) for the
Civil Code23 sets the standards to be observed in the exercise sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.” The elements
of one’s rights and in the performance of one’s duties, namely: stated are complete in the present case. First, petitioners
(a) to act with justice; (b) to give everyone his due; and (c) to continued to insist that there was no payment made when
observe honesty and good faith. The law thereby recognizes respondent already presented the black jeans with the original
the primordial limitation on all rights – that in the exercise of the receipt. Second, they accused the respondent that not only did
rights, the standards under Article 19 must be observed. 24 she fail to pay for the black jeans but she intentionally stole it
and quickly left the shop. Third, the letters sent to the
respondent’s employer was not only intended to ask for
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise assistance in collection of the payment but also to ruin the
should there be an abuse of rights, like when the act is respondent’s reputation.
performed without prudence or in bad faith. In order that The exercise of rights is subject to limitations. Thus, it must be
liability may attach under the concept of abuse of rights, the in accordance with the purpose of its establishment and not
following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence of abused. Respondent was awarded P50,000.00 as moral
a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) damages and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 25 There is
no hard and fast rule that can be applied to ascertain whether
or not the principle of abuse of rights is to be invoked. The PATROCINIA RAVINA and WILFREDO RAVINA vs. MARY ANN
resolution of the issue depends on the circumstances of each VILLA-ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of
case. INGRID D’LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE,INGREMARK D’WIGHT
VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. vs. QUIÑONES G.R. No. 175822 ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE
(October 23, 2013)
G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009
FACTS:
FACTS:
Respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones, a ticketing agent of Cebu In 1982, during the marriage of respondent Mary Ann Pasaol
Pacific Air, bought a pair of Villa Abrille and Pedro, Villa Abrille, they acquired a parcel of
black jeans worth P2,098.00 from Guess USA Boutique. While land in Davao City (Lot 7)registered in their names. This lot is
she was on her way to Mercury Drug adjacent to another land (Lot 8), Pedro’s separate property.
Store, a Guess employee approached her and said that she When Pedro had a mistress in 1991 and neglected his family,
failed to pay for the black jeans. Nevertheless, she presented Mary Ann sold/mortgaged their movables to support the family
an official receipt and suggested that they should talk about the and the studies of her children. Pedro, by himself, offered to
matter in the Cebu Pacific Office located within the mall. While sell the house and the two lots to petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann
they were in the office, the Guess employees allegedly objected and notified the petitioners of such objection, but in
humiliated her in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific, repeatedly June 1991, Pedro still sold the house and lots without her
demanded payment and even searched the respondent’s consent. Later, Pedro, with armed members of the CAFGU and
wallet to check how much money she had. Another argument in connivance with the petitioners, surreptitiously transferred all
ensued and after that, respondent went home. The Guess their (Mary Ann+children) belongings from the house to an
employees submitted two letters to the Director of Cebu Pacific apartment. Mary Ann and her children were also stopped from
narrating the incident but the said letters were not received. entering the house.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioners, California Clothing, Inc., Excelsis Villagonzalo, Mary Ann and her children (respondents) filed a complaint for
Imelda Hawayon and Michelle S. Ybañez, alleging that due to Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and
the incident, she suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, Attorney’s Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched against Pedro and the Ravinas. During trial Pedro claimed that
reputation, moral shock and humiliation. She demanded the house was built with his own money. Petitioners assert that
payment for moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, as well Lot 7 was Pedro’s exclusive property, acquired by him through
as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Petitioners stated barter or exchange. They also claim that Wilfredo Ravina
that they approached the respondent to clarify whether or not examined the titles when they bought the property from Pedro.
payment was made and that they approached and talked to the TC ruled that the sale of the house and the lots 7 & 8 were
respondent in a gentle and polite manner. They sought valid as to the half of the share of Pedro and void as to the
payment for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees other half of the share of Mary Ann.
and litigation expenses as counterclaim. The Regional Trial CA modified, ruling that the sale of lot 8 is valid, while the sale
Court dismissed both the complaint and counterclaim stating of lot 7 is void. CA also ordered Pedro to return the value of the
that the petitioners acted in good faith and the respondent was consideration for lot 7 and the house to Sps Ravina.
the one who put herself in that situation by inviting the Guess Respondents were also given the option to exercise their rights
employees to the Cebu Pacific Office to discuss about the under Art. 450 NCC with respect to the improvements
issue of payment. However, the Court of Appeals reversed and introduced by Sps Ravina.
set aside the Regional Trial Court decision stating that there
was preponderance of evidence showing the petitioners acted ISSUES
in bad faith but, Hawayon and Villagonzalo were absolved from (1) Whether the Lot 7 is an exclusive property of Pedro or
liability due to good faith. Since petitioners acted in bad faith, conjugal property
respondent was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees. (2) Whether the sale of Lot 7 was valid considering the
absence of Mary Ann’s consent
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted in bad faith which (3) Whether the petitioners are buyers in good faith, hence,
resulted to the Court of Appeals awarding entitled toreimbursement of their payment
moral damages and attorney’s fees to respondent, Shirley G.
Quiñones. RULING:
20
1. Conjugal Lot 7 was acquired in 1982 during Pedro and and not a residence, the owner has the right to exclude the
Mary Ann’s marriage. public or deny them access.
No evidence was adduced to show that the property was
acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the VIVARES VS. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE (STC)
conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence
of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome FACTS:
said presumption or to prove that the subject property is In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St.
exclusively owned by Pedro. Likewise, the house built on Lot
7 is conjugal property, having been constructed through the Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several
joint efforts of the spouses, who had obtained a loan from DBP pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne
to construct the house.
Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
2.)Sale was VOID. Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to
Under Art. 124 of the FC, disposition of a conjugal property
is void if done a)without the consent of both the husband and their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her
wife, or b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed
court. Here, Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of
sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate
the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only action.
to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot
covered by Lot 8, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s
and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their
consent.
graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
3.) Buyers in bad faith; no reimbursement The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property
of another without notice that some other person has a right to, restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the
or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies,
the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice
of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. To STC still barred said students.
establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the
dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by
the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of
seller’s certificate of title. habeas data against the school. They argued, among others,
For a person dealing with land registered in the name of and
occupied by the seller whose capacity is restricted, such as that:
Arts. 166/173/124 of the FC, to establish status as a buyer in 1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts
GF, he must show that he inquired into the latter’s capacity to
sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable
faith. Here, the property is registered in Pedro and Mary Ann’s expectation of privacy which must be respected.
names.
Also, petitioners were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her 2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot
objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero,
the property without Mary Ann’swritten consent. Moreover, the
respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the
possession of the property at the time the transaction was photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials.
being made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew that
Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded
yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of upon;
sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection
accorded to purchasers in good faith. 3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the
copying of information, data, and digital images happened at
SPOUSES HING VS. CHOACHUY
STC’s Computer Laboratory;
FACTS: They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit
Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc.
(owned by Choachuy’s) filed a case for Injunction and with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the
Restraining Order against the Hing’s. The latter claimed that
the Hing’s constructed a fence without a valid permit and that it children’s right to privacy.
would destroy the walls of their building. The court denied the The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this
application for lack of evidence. So in order to get evidences
for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two appeal.
video surveillance cameras facing the Hing’s property. Their ISSUE: Whether or not the children’s right to privacy was
employees even took pictures of the said construction of the
fence. The Hing’s then filed a case against the Choachuy’s for violated.
violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC HELD: No.
issued a order granting the application of the Hing’s for TRO
and directed the Choachuy’s to remove the two video The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site
surveillance cameras they installed. The Choachuy’s appealed (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes
the case to the Court of Appeals and the RTC’s decision was
annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the case to the use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable
Supreme Court. expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is).
ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.
surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s violated the Hing’s right to
privacy. In this case, however, there is no showing that the students
concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would
HELD:
Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published
Hing’s under Article 26(1) prohibiting the “prying into the
as “Public”.
privacy of another’s residence.” Although it is a business office
21
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can alcoholic breath, was conscious and coherent; that the skull x-
view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile page): ray showed no fracture; that at around 4:30am of March 2,
(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view 1988, Logmao developed generalized seizures and was
(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends a resident physician of NKTI, who was rotating at EAMC,
and/or networks of the Facebook user; and suggested that Logmao be transferred to NKTI; and that after
arrangements were made, Logamo was transferred to NKTI at
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
10:10am. At the NKTI, the name Angelito Logmao was
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some
recorded as Angelito Lugmoso. Lugmoso was immediately
privacy, then he must choose any setting other than “Public”. If
attended to and given the necessary medical treatment. As
it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject
Lugmoso had no relatives around, Jennifer Misa, transplant
of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as
coordinator was asked to locate his family by enlisting police
they claim), then how come most of their classmates were able
and media assistance. Dr. Enrique Ona, chairman of the
to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was
Department of Surgery, observed that severity of the brain
their classmates who informed and showed their teacher,
injury of Lugmoso manifested symptoms of brain death. He
Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan
requested the laboratory section to conduct tissue typing and
et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they
tissue cross-matching examination, so that should Lugmoso
have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of
them scantily clad. expire despite the necessary care and medical management
and he would be found to be a suitable organ donor and his
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner
family would consent to organ donation, the organs thus
which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered
donated could be detached and transplanted promptly to any
illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who
compatible beneficiary. The identity of Lugmoso was verified
showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the
by Misa from EAMC and she was furnished the patient’s data
recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper
sheet. She then contacted several radio and television stations
school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to
to request for air time for the purpose of locating the family of
discipline their students according to the standards of the
Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Ave., Mandaluyong who was
school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the
confined at NKTI with severe head injury after allegedly falling
first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children
there). from the Cubao overpass, as well as police station no. 5
Eastern Police District. Lugmoso was pronounced brain dead
on March 3, 1988 7:00am. Two hours later, Dr. Ona was
informed that EEG recording exhibited a flat tracing thereby
Alano vs Magud-Logmao
confirming his brain death. He was found to be a suitable
GR No. 1755540 April 7, 2014
donor of the heart, kidneys, pancreas, and liver, and after the
extensive search, no relatives were found. Dr. Ona then
Facts: At around 9:50pm of March 1, 1988, Arnelito Logmao
requested the removal of the specific organs of Lugmoso from
then 18 y/o, was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center
the herein petitioners, Dr. Alano, the director of NKTI who
(EAMC) in Quezon City by two sidewalk vendors, who
thereafter issued a memorandum stating that only after the
allegedly saw the former fall from the overpass near the
requirements of RA 349 as amended by PD 856 was complied,
Farmer’s Market in Cubao, Quezon City. The patient’s data
they can remove the specified organs of Lugmoso. Lugmoso’s
sheet identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Ave.,
remains was brought at La Funeraria Oro. A press release
Mandaluyong. However, the clinical abstract prepared by Dr.
made by NKTI announcing a double organ transplant led to the
Paterno F. Cabrera, the surgical resident on-duty at the
findings of the relatives of Lugmoso.
emergency room of EAMC, stated the patient is Angelito
Logmao. Dr. Cabrera reported that Logmao was drowsy with
22
Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while
Issue: Whether or not the removal of Lugmoso’s organs were Pastor returned to his job in Manila.
valid.
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied
for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single,
Held: Yes. The internal organs of the deceased were removed that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu
City, and that she intended to return after two years. The
only after he had been declared brain dead; thus the emotional application was approved, and she left for the United States.
On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce
pain suffered by respondent due to the death of her son cannot against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court
be in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the
ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21
find evidence or second to show that respondent’s emotional October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was
issued in open court by the said tribunal.
suffering at the sight of the pitful state in which she found her
son’s lifeless body be categorically attributed to petitioner’s On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell
Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California,
conduct. and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on 8 August 1958.
Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioners employed But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings
at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her
reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allotted for notices to husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
reach the relatives of the deceased. decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed
a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to
If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son’s her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents
death because the notices did not properly state the name or denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's
acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner’s
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor
door. The trial and appellate courts found that it was the Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were
EAMC, who recorded the wrong information regarding the validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil
law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties
deceased’s identity to NKTI. The NKTI could not have obtained were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified;
and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a
the information about his name from the patient, because as Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
found by the lower courts, the deceased was already competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was
not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
unconscious by the time he was brought to NKTI.
ISSUE 1: W/N MARRIAGE WAS VALID DUE TO LACK OF
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the
effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino estate of Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court,[1] two
citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few
of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article months after the sale, private respondent Menandro Lapuz
17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following: filed a complaint for torts and damages against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, policy and good In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over three parcels of land (the
agreed upon in a foreign country. property) in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning 1964.
One of the provisions agreed upon was for private respondent
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a to put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased
necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would
Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay
recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease
Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It contract ended but since the construction of the commercial
follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was
and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband allegedly renewed.
constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which
the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started
Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit remitting his rent to the court-appointed administrator of her
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself
Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her as the new owner of the property, had been collecting rentals
husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the latter,
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to
under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights
Art. 333). over it.
ISSUE 3: CAN THE PARENTS BE HELD LIABLE? Via this petition for review, petitioner cites the following
reasons why the Court should rule in his favor:
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of
improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for 3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have liable for actual damages and attorneys fees, and;
acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice damages to the other contracting party. The tort recognized in
or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith that provision is known as interference with contractual
being always presumed until the contrary is proved. relations.[7] The interference is penalized because it violates
the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the benefits
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The that should result therefrom.[8]
law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest
himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of
24
The core issue here is whether the purchase by petitioner of to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in
the subject property, during the supposed existence of private purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous
respondents lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, interference was never established.
constituted tortuous interference for which petitioner should be
held liable for damages. The foregoing disquisition applies squarely to the case at bar.
In our view, petitioners purchase of the subject property was
The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals,[9] merely an advancement of his financial or economic interests,
laid down the elements of tortuous interference with absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. In
contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy,[21] the Court
knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his
the contract and (c) interference of the third person without conduct is impelled by a proper business interest. In other
legal justification or excuse. In that case, petitioner So Ping words, a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make
Bun occupied the premises which the corporation of his a person an officious interferer liable for damages as long as
grandfather was leasing from private respondent, without the there is no malice or bad faith involved.
knowledge and permission of the corporation. The corporation,
prevented from using the premises for its business, sued So In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to
Ping Bun for tortuous interference. hold petitioner liable for tortuous interference are present,
petitioner cannot be made to answer for private respondents
As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract losses.
must be duly established. To prove this, private respondent
presented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without
renewal.[10] While the contract appeared as duly notarized, injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage
the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.[22] In
execution and delivery but not the veracity of its contents. BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals,,[23] the
Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioners Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder
counsel and after the trial court declared it to be valid and whose credit card had been cancelled by petitioner corporation
subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presented after several defaults in payment. We held there that there can
in court appeared to be incontestable proof that private be damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the
respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their result of a violation of a legal duty. In that instance, the
lease contract. Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear, consequences must be borne by the injured person alone
strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document since the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an
continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise act which does not amount to legal injury or wrong.[24] Indeed,
to its execution and delivery.[11] lack of malice in the conduct complained of precludes recovery
of damages.[25]
The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be
knowledge on the part of the interferer that the contract exists.
Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essential G.R. No. L-23482 August 30, 1968
element to state a cause of action for tortuous interference.[12]
A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner, vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-
interfering with a contract he is unaware of.[13] While it is not LACSON and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be
aware of the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, The antecedent facts are not disputed.
will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations
and rights of the parties in the contract.[14] Alfonso Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner
spouse) and Carmen San Jose-Lacson (hereinafter referred to
In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the as the respondent spouse) were married on February 14,
lease contract. His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) 1953. To them were born four children, all alive.
likewise allegedly did not inform him of any existing lease
contract. On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal
home in Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, and
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of commenced to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a
petitioner meritorious. He conducted his own personal complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in the Juvenile and
investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious Domestic Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter referred to as
circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe the JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for
deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the them and herself.
property. An examination of the entire propertys title bore no
indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective
the registry of property had no record of the same.[15] attorneys, succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement
respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the property.
contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him
liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to the third The important and pertinent portions of the petition, embodying
element. According to our ruling in So Ping Bun, petitioner may their amicable settlement, read as follows:
be held liable only when there was no legal justification or
excuse for his action[16] or when his conduct was stirred by a 3. Petitioners have separated last January 9, 1963 when
wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson left their conjugal home at
the defendant must have acted with malice[17] or must have the Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, did not return, and
been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In decided to reside in Manila.
other words, his act of interference cannot be justified.[18]
4. Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of their conjugal partnership subject to judicial approval as
private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai required by Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines —
Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The word induce refers the particular terms and conditions of their mutual agreement
to situations where a person causes another to choose one being as follows:
course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.[19] The
records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai (a) There will be separation of property — petitioner Carmen
Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own San Jose-Lacson hereby waiving any and all claims for a share
volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence in property that may be held by petitioner Alfonso Lacson since
their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any they have acquired no property of any consequence.
evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that
private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease (b) Hereafter, each of them shall own, dispose of, possess,
contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable administer and enjoy such separate estate as they may
25
acquire without the consent of the other and all earnings from mandatory character. It prohibits in no uncertain: terms the
any profession, business or industry as may be derived by separation of a mother and her child below seven years,
each petitioner shall belong to that petitioner exclusively. unless such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons
as determined by a court.
(c) The custody of the two elder children named Enrique and
Maria Teresa shall be awarded to petitioner Alfonso Lacson The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so far as it
and the custody of the younger children named Gerrard and awarded custody of the two older children who were 6 and 5
Ramon shall be awarded to petitioner Carmen San Jose- years old, respectively, to the father, in effect sought to
Lacson. separate them from their mother. To that extent therefore, it
was null and void because clearly violative of article 363 of the
(d) Petitioner Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner Carmen San Civil Code.
Jose-Lacson a monthly allowance of P300.00 for the support of
the children in her custody. If the parties agreed to submit the matter of custody of the
minor children to the Court for incorporation in the final
(e) Each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation of judgment, they purposely suppressed the "compelling reasons
the children in the custody of the other at their respective for such measure" from appearing in the public records. This is
residences and, during the summer months, the two children in for the sake and for the welfare of the minor children.".
the custody of each petitioner shall be given to the other
except that, for this year's summer months, all four children Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the couple's
shall be delivered to and remain with petitioner Carmen San agreement regarding the custody of the children. 1äwphï1.ñët
Jose-Lacson until June 15, 1963 — on which date, she shall
return the two elder children Enrique and Maria Teresa to Article 356 of the new Civil Code provides:
petitioner Alfonso Lacson — this judgment of course being
subject to enforcement by execution writ and contempt. Every child:
Finding the foregoing joint petition to be "conformable to law," (1) Is entitled to parental care;
the CFI (Judge Jose F. Fernandez, presiding) issued an order
on April 27, 1963, rendering judgment (hereinafter referred to (2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
as the compromise judgment) approving and incorporating in
toto their compromise agreement. In compliance with (3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or
paragraph 4 (e) of their mutual agreement (par. 3[e] of the guardian;
compromise judgment), the petitioner spouse delivered all the
four children to the respondent spouse and remitted money for (4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his
their support. physical, moral and intellectual development.
On May 7, 1963 the respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a It is clear that the abovequoted legal provision grants to every
motion wherein she alleged that she "entered into and signed child rights which are not and should not be dependent solely
the ... Joint Petition as the only means by which she could on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his
have immediate custody of the ... minor children who are all parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-
below the age of 7," and thereafter prayed that she "be so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the
considered relieved of the ... agreement pertaining to the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in
custody and visitation of her minor children ... and that since all to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured
the children are now in her custody, the said custody in her the right granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present
favor be confirmed pendente lite evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative.
After the denial of her motion for reconsideration, the G.R. L-24259 is hereby remanded to the Court of First
respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the Court of Instance of Negros Occidental for further proceedings, in
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 32608-R) wherein she raised, among accordance with this decision. No pronouncement as to costs
others, the issue of validity or legality of the compromise
agreement in connection only with the custody of their minor G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001
children.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
We now come to the question of the custody and support of OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO,
the children. petitioner, Vs. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the CFI
erred in depriving the mother, the respondent spouse, of the On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was
custody of the two older children (both then below the age of so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago,
7). filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to
have custody of her husband in consortium.
The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence
of its article 363 that "No mother shall be separated from her Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of
child under seven years of age, unless the court finds her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally
compelling reasons for such measure." The rationale of this restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of
new provision was explained by the Code Commission thus: property rights out of pure greed.14 She claimed that her two
children were using their sick and frail father to sign away
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired
No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine
deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his
the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones
child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother's heart is controlling the corporations.15
not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery,
the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the
will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16
moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his
as yet unable to understand the situation." (Report of the Code children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to
Commission, p. 12). seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
The use of the word shall2 in article 363 of the Civil Code, Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
coupled with the observations made by the Code Commission and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position
in respect to the said legal provision, underscores its
26
that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the
to live together and care for each other. We agree. enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself
that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.20 The parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not
sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment
order" to enforce consortium.21 calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the
mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife;
Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife
since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto
husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is
Marital union is a two-way process. regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a
stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving
relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in
continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any
as a sublime social institution.22 purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916 and order for judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established their
residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint
are as follows: The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the
marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged
plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said
refused to perform any act other than legal and valid complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is
indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig,
spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical
the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City;
deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to
parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after
desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to the end of the school semester, which was in October of that
leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
parents. Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the
marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin
obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the
live with her husband is not one of them. complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change;
he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation
the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day
The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone
he changes his domicile or residence, except when he living in Bacolod City.
removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged
to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a
fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the
home. May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his time and that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant
wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his
love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987,
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is on which same day he went with her to her hometown of
equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her
a determination of the question whether the wife has a good parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention
and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and, to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their
consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or
the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion,
also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that
assumption that the power to grant support in a separate he intended to marry her during the semestral break in
action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was
one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in
of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that
support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later
express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
27
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, and then concluded:
1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he
went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was
the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and
and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's
her that he could not do so because he was already married to part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And
went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly
who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even
City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women,
tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the
still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning,
Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of
the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single. the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral
damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he
already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing And now to the legal issue.
for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even
already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is
wedding. 8 not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated
from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report
challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from
16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, which We quote:
respondent Court made the following analysis:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided
defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does not in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of
appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she promise suits in the United States and in England has shown
was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience
court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called
modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no
persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her." In This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision,
fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or
must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those punish in the statute books. 20
depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe,
therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate.
Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of
of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible
town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so
(sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission
and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
kind of special relationship between them? And this special or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are
but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to
the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988). subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
good moral character and must think so low and have so little because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however,
he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to that such injury should have been committed in a manner
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City
but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the
is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
lust on her. 11 honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and
it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part
28
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in
with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished
possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was
because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code declared in default.
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner
could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is
because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any
of age at the time of the seduction. person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
And in American Jurisprudence we find: policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was
mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery. subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for
September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The
of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the
merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for
of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers
sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662) but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28
years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned
petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before
sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard
and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. from again.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry.
woman so circumstances could not have even remotely As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a
life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned
Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages,
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged
of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code
with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a
good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
of his obligations. manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-
narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in
a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964 opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed,
hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious with costs.
endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
complete public humiliation.
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to
Velez left this note for his bride-to-be: as complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as
natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of
Dear Bet — promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and
expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am ever promised to marry the complainant.
leaving on the Convair today.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.
That would only create a scandal. The pertinent facts are:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age
and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by
moral damages may be recovered from him under the itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code. nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in
particularly the paragraphs preceding and those following the
good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in
said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein There is an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the
contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a
in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there
ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of must be no intention to injure another.
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights
years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high
principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be
— when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad
apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner another.
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to
bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of
had the benefit of clergy." Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is presumed, and he
who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad
HEIRS OF NALA vs CABANSAG
faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment
Artemio bought a 50-square meter property from spouses to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral
Eugenio and Felisa, part of a 400-square meter lot registered obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known
in the name of the Gomez spouses. duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of
the nature of fraud.
In October, 1991, he received a demand letter from Atty.
Alexander demanding payment for rentals from 1987 to 1991 Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to
until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
Purisima; failing which, civil and criminal charges will be harm.
brought against him.
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove
This demand letter was followed by another demand letter. that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith
According to Artemio, the demand letter caused him damages or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the
prompting him to file a complaint for damages against Purisima first place, there was ground for Nala’s actions since she
and Atty. Alexander. In their defense, Atty. Alexander alleged believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio
that he merely acted in behalf of his client Purisima, who Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same.
contested the ownership of the lot by Artemio. Purisima alleged She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust
30
imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that
of the property to respondent. It was only after respondent filed her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such
Trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the
sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the
adoption.
property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending
of the demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith. Absent ISSUE:
any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or malice
could not be attributed to petitioner since Nala was only trying Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by
to protect their interests over the property. her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name?
Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del
RULING:
Prado’s acts were done with the sole intention of prejudicing
and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered YES.
mental anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he
received the demand letters; however, there is a material The use of surname is fixed by law:
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the legal
invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or
which results from the injury. Thus, there can be damage proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
are often called damnum absque injuria.
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. substantive rules which regulate the use of surname of an
individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he
Del Prado to send the demand letters. She had to take all the
may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married
necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
the property occupied by respondent
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally
One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. use the surname of the father.
Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent should
be borne solely by him.” Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.
Tanjanco v. CA
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a
voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the
Facts:
father.
Apolonio Trajanco courted Araceli Santos. Since he promised Art. 370. A married woman may use:
her marriage, she consented to his pleas for carnal knowledge. (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's
As a result, she conceived a child, and due to her condition, surname, or
she had to resign from her work. Because she was unable to (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
support herself and the baby, and the Apolonio refused to (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that
marry her, she instituted an action for damages, compelling the she is his wife, such as Mrs.
defendant to recognize the unborn child, pay her monthly
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the
support, plus P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages. guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname.
If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden
Issue: name and surname. However, she may choose to continue
employing her former husband's surname, unless:
Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute seduction as (1) The court decrees otherwise, or
contemplated in Art. 21.? (2) She or the former husband is married again to another
person.
Held:
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife
No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere sexual intercourse or shall continue using her name and surname employed before
a breach of promise to marry. It connotes essentially the idea the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname
of deceit, enticement superior power or abuse of confidence on as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. In this
case, for 1 whole year, the woman maintained intimate sexual Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the
relations with the defendant, and such conduct is incompatible younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name
with the idea of seduction. Plainly here there is voluntariness or surname as will avoid confusion.
and mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived, she
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between
would not have again yielded to his embraces for a year.
ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be used
only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
shall either:
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
FACTS:
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name
Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia; As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law
that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of the
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To
31
Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us,
name a child may use. both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found
any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an
the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife,
adoptee may use.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the
discussed above. appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child
despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to
adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes
name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should
thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
not be allowed to do so.
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the
appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
GELUZ vs CA
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His
FACTS: only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from
the doctor a large money payment, was clearly exaggerated.
> Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz).
> She became pregnant by her present husband before they
were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from 68. Lauro G. Vizconde vs CA
her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had
herself aborted by the defendant. FACTS:
> After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became
pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita
Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she
Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer.
had herself aborted again by the defendant.
> Less than two years later, she again became pregnant, she Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses
again repaired to the defendant's clinic. Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas.
> It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis
in filing this action and award of damages. Estrellita purchased from his father, Rafael, a parcel
> The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of land located at Valenzuela, Bulacan and then sold such to
of damages upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Spouses Chiu, for P3,405,612.00. Using a portion of the
Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property, she bought a new
parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF
ISSUE:
Homes, Parañaque. The remaining amount of the proceeds
Whether or not the husband of a woman, who was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from bank. The following year the unfortunate "Vizconde Massacre"
physician who caused the same? came about.
SECOND ISSUES:
The probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction 1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving
when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the
the conjugal home
Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled
that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution
parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the
true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or of conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent mandatory
absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate injunction
court's jurisdiction.
THIRD
The order of the probate court presupposes that the husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was
Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to present.
Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Parañaque
property was conveyed for and in consideration of Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to
P900,000.00, 37 by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this
the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who
recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties.
inherited and is now the present owner of the Parañaque
property is not one of Rafael's heirs.Moreover, Rafael, in a Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible,
public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of
rights, ownership and participation as heir" in the Parañaque the husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile.
property.
“When people understand that they must live together…they
learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they
FIFTH know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and
wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties
Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it
was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than which it imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)
the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming
that the Valenzuela property may be collated, collation may still 2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within
not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to
long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the
determination by the probate court on the matter serves no
case of property rights, such an action may be maintained.
valid and binding purpose.
Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to
69. Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo GR No. L-17014, August compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as
11, 1921 England and Scotland have done this with much criticism.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was spouses Mario J. Mendezona and Teresita M. Mendezona as
granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees initial plaintiff and in the amended complaint filed on October 7,
33
1991, herein co-petitioner spouses Luis J. Mendezona joined prove so. It is significant that the deed of Absolute Sale dated
as co-plaintiff. In their compliant, the petitioners April 28, 1989 is a notarized document duly acknowledged
as plaintiff therein alleged that petitioner spouses Mario J. before a notary public. As such, it is in favor of presumption of
Mendezona and Teresita M. Mendezona and Luis J. regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
Mendezona and Maricar Mendezona own a parcel of land each with respect to its due execution. Moreover, A person is not
in Lahug, Cebu city with similar areas 3462, 3466 and 3468 incapacitated to contact merely because of advanced years or
square meters covered and described in TCT Nos by reason of physical infirmities. Only when such age or
116834, 116835 and 116836. The petitioners ultimately traced infirmity impair her mental faculties to such extent as to prevent
their titles of ownership over their respective properties from a her from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting
deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by Carmen her property rights is considered incapacitated.
of her friends and could no longer take care of her properties Facts:
by reason pf weak mind and absentmindedness. As guardians Respondent Braulio Katipunan Jr. is the registered
Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz filed on August owner of a lot and a five-door apartment constructed thereon,
which were occupied by lessees. Respondent assisted by his
6, 1991 with the guardianship court their Inventories and
brother petitioner Miguel entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale
Accounts including the 10,369 square meters Lahug property.
with brothers Edardo Balguma and Leopoldo Balguma, Jr. ( co-
Said Lahug property covered by deed of Absolute Sale dated
petitioners), represented by their lawyer-father involving the
April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen Ozamiz in favor of subject property for a consideration of P187,000.00. So, the
petitioners. In their Answer, respondents opposed the claim of title was registered in the names of the Balguma brothers and
ownership of the Lahug property and alleged that the titles they started collecting rentals thereon.
issued to the petitioners are defective and illegal and the Later, Braulio filed a complaint for annulment of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, contending that his brother Miguel,
ownership of said properties was acquired in bad faith and
Atty. Balguma and Inocencio Valdez ( one of the petitioners)
without value inasmuch as the consideration for the sale is
convinced him to work abroad. Through insidious words and
grossly inadequate and unconscionable. Respondents further machinations, they made him sign a document purportedly a
alleged that on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz was already contract of employment, which document turned out to be a
ailing and not in full possession of her mental faculties; and Deed of Absolute Sale. He further alleged that he did not
that her properties having been placed in administration, she receive the consideration stated in the contract. He claimed
that there was evident bad faith and conspiracy in taking
was in effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners. On
advantage of his ignorance, he being only a third grader.
September 23, 1992, the Trial court rendered decision in favor
The RTC dismissed the complaint because Braulio
of petitioners. On appeal the Court of Appeal reversed its
failed to prove his cause of action since he admitted that he
decision and ruled that the Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 obtained loans from the Balgumas, he signed the Deed of
was a simulated contract since the petitioners failed to prove Absolute Sale, and he acknowledged selling the property and
that the consideration was actually paid. stopped collecting the rentals. But when the case was
elevated, the decision of RTC was reversed and it was held
Issue: that Braulio was incompetent, has very low I.Q., illiterate and
has a slow comprehension. The CA based its decision on
Whether the court erred in ruling that the Deed of Absolute Arts.1332 and 1390 of NCC and Sec. 2, Rule 92 of the Rules
of Court, concerning the incompetence of a party in contract.
Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract.
Issue:
Held:
Whether there was a valid contract of sale between
the parties.
The Supreme Court ruled that the contact was not simulated.
35
Do the petitioners have legal standing to intervene in the returned to the home of her parents.The defendant, one month
proceedings? after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded
of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
RULING: genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands
of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than
No, they do not have standing to intervene. legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date
had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd
The Birth Certificate of Sylvia, which shows that she and John
and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always
were married, is sufficient proof that indeed they were married.
spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated
Although there were no marriage certificates given as proof, it
the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by wordand deed
is not considered as the sole source of evidence marriage.
and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of
Sylvia’s birth certificate hold prima facie weight and the
her body; and that, asthe plaintiff was unable by any means to
petitioners showed no contrary evidence. The reason of ‘face
induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
saving / customary’ holds no merit and the courts cannot take
cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the
judicial notice of a folkway.
conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
Therefore, Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo is void seeing that at parents.This is an action by the wife against her husband for
the time of the marriage, Isabel was still married to John. support outside of the conjugal domicile. It was urged in the
Thus, the descendants of Isabel have no share in the Estate of first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot
Rodolfo. becompelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house,
unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce
or separation from the defendant.
74. Salgado vs. Anson
Issue:
Sps. Salgado v. Luis Anson
GR 204494 Whether or not the husband be compelled to pay the pension
outside of the conjugal domicile?
Facts:
Luis Anson is the husband of Severina de Asis-Anson.
Ruling:
They had 1 daughter, Maria Luisa and she was wed to Gaston
Maya. Severina had an older daughter to a previous
relationship, Jo ann Diaz and she was also wed to Gerard Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the
Salgado. Luis and Severina acquired several real properties manner and with the solemnities established by General
and according to him, since there was no marriage settlement, Orders No. 68; in so far as its civil effects are concerned
the properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without requiring the consent of the parties. To this extent a marriage
his knowledge and consent, Severina executed 3 Unilateral partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is
Deeds of Sale transferring then properties in favor of Jo ann. something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the
When Severina died, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-
rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the
Judcial Settlement of Estate Deceased Severina adjudicating
herself as the sole heir. Due to these acts, Luis filed a agreement of the parties but upon the general law
complaint for the annulment of these Deeds against Sps whichdefines and prescribes those rights, duties, and
Salgado and Sps Maya. The latter countered that they were obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of
not aware of any marriage between Luis and their mother which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation
Severina but they knew they cohabited as common-law couple for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period
and that after their cohabitation, Luis went to the US and
by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights
married one Teresita. And due to Partition Agreement that
divided their properties without court intervention, both Sps arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as
claim that the properties herewith are separate and exclusive the law determines from time to time, and none other. When
properties of Severina. the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by
marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the
Issue: W/N marriage between Severina and Luis is state or government upon principlesof public policy for the
valid and the subject lands as conjugal partnership benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of
a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable
Ruling:
to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
Court finds that their marriage is void ab initio for lack
of marriage license. Luis asserted that their marriage was an
76. Navarro vs. Damagtoy (259 SCRA 129)
exceptional one but he failed to justify the lack of marriage
license. He admitted that they did not seek to apply for it. The
Partition agreement is valid. Valdez v RTC Quezon City held July 19, 1996
that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the FACTS:
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Art 147 or Art 148
as the case may be, of the Family Code. Also, attesting that his Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro of Dapa,
marriage with Severina was subsisting and valid, he knowingly Surigaodel Norte filed this case to the Supreme Court against
contracted to a subsequent marriage abroad, and the Court
respondent Judge Henando Domagtoy of MCTC of Monica-
finds such suspicious and fraudulent thereby tainting his
credibility. Burgos, Surigao del Norte, for gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency and ignorance of the law.
75. Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil 252)
First, on Sept. 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy
TRENT, J.:
solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorja
Facts: despite his knowledge that Tagadan was merely separated
The parties were legally and immediately thereafter from his wife. Second, he performed a marriage ceremony
established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in October
they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff 1994 at respondent judge’s residence in Dapa, SDN. As to the
36
first, Domagtoy contended that he merely relied on the affidavit provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
issued by the RTC Judge of Bassey, Samar, which stated that will not invalidate the marriage.
Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction
seven years. However, the certified true copy of the marriage
may officiate in marriages only within said areas and not
contract between Tagadan and Borja showed that his civil
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
status was “separated”.
court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
ISSUE: requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
(1) Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage
administrative liability.
of a husband who was merely separated from his wife for
almost seven years. Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months for
demonstrating gross ignorance of the law.copies of the
(2) Whether or not a Judge may solemnize a marriage at his
certificates not later than fifteen (15) days after the marriage, to
residence.
the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil
HELD:
registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the
(1) Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his
that a marriage contracted by any person during the file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate.
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage the
There is no justification for missing records save
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
fortuitous events. However, the records show that the loss
the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge’s part.
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in Halili v. Halili G.R. No. 165424 June 6, 2009
37
others, may allow others to make most of their important apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter
decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage
projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things
sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people,
feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It
became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had proof to show that they were legally married. He, however,
dismally failed to do so.
a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and
had a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was
been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be
governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies
psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to
when a couple living together were not incapacitated from
perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus the getting married. Uy did not present any proof to show that
Court declared the marriage null and void. Rosca did not receive any consideration for the sale. Neither
did he submit any evidence, whether documentary or
LUIS UY v. SPS. JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA
testimonial, showing the fair market value of the property at the
time of the sale to prove that the purchase price was
Facts:
unreasonably low or unconscionable. It was even mentioned
Uy filed with RTC Batangas a complaint for by the appellate court that "appellants failed to prove that on
Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against April 18, 1979, the property might have been worth millions of
Petra Rosca and Sps. Lacsamana. Uy alleged that he was the pesos." Thus, Uy's allegations lack sufficient substantiation.
lawful husband of Rosca, living together as husband and wife
Perido v.Perido, 63 SCRA 97
from 1944 and 1973 (29 years) when they separated (because
of Uy’s alleged affair.)
FACTS:
Subject of this case is a piece of residential land
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental,
Rosca Bought form Sps. Manuel. This property, together with
married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita
the house of Rosca built was then subsequently sold to Sps.
Talorong, with whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and
Lacsamana. Uy allege that the property is part of the sale of
Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat,
Rosca to Sps. Lacsamana was void for failure to obtain his
with whom he had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia
marital consent, the property being conjugal in nature. Uy then
and Gonzalo. Lucio died in 1942, while his second wife died in
filed a complaint, praying that the Deed of Sale (executed by
1943. Margarita is the only living child of the first marriage. The
Rosca in favor of Sps. Lacsamana) be declared null and void
children and grandchildren of the first marriage and second
with respect to his rights, interest, and ownership and
marriage filed a case regarding the partition of the properties of
damages. Upon Uy’s death, 2 daughters substituted. Upon
Lucio Perido. Margarita et al asserted that the children and
Rosca’s death and Sps. Lacsmana’s sale of the property to
grandchildren of the second marriage were illegitimate.
Buena, Buena substituted. RTC: no valid marriage between Uy
and Rosca, Deed of Sale by Rosca in favor of Lacsamana was ISSUE:
valid; CA – affirmed RTC;
W/N the children and grandchildren of the second
Issue: marriage of Lucio Perido were legitimate, entitling them for the
partition of lands
Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone,
without Uy’s consent in favor of Sps. Lacsamana is valid. HELD:
Vda dela rosa vs heirs of Vda de damian Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness
whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their
Facts: position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed
marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died intestate "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but
and without descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two strengthen the presumption of marriage.
years. Petitioners and respondents are their respective
relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. The petition Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the
for letters of administration stated that Josefa Delgado and baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It
Guillermo Rustia were never married. According to petitioners, was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa. contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried
Josefa and Guillermo eventually lived together as husband and ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in
wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, its preparation.
petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage
existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage
naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction,
as "Señorita" or unmarried woman. every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage
Josefa was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of
Lucio Ocampo with five other children without the benefit of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold
marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation
who is Luis Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa‘s estate. of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur
But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status
of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute. The marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Presumptions of law are either conclusive or
Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because if disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the
Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter
then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood how strong, may overturn them. On the other hand, disputable
brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage,
latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to
the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and the contrary.
illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never
married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage
from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now
within the illegitimate line. respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such
Issue: countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and
Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and
Whether or not there was a valid marriage between (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de
Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa and Ramon. Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado"
(the natural child of Felisa Delgado).
Held:
All things considered, we rule that these factors
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage.
Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Manuel Reyes vs CA
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be Facts:
contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx xxx xxx (aa)
That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband On Jan. 3, 1992. Torcuato Reyes executed his last
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; will and testament. He bequeathed all his prop to his wife
Asuncion (oning) and his brother Jose. The will consisted of
First, although a marriage contract is considered a two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence
primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof of three witnesses: Antonio Veleso, Gloria Borromeo, and
that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares. PR filed
marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support a petition for probate of the will. The recognized natural
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish children of Torcuato with Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape
the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the filed an opposition. The court declared that the will never
presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued married to the deceased ( Hence, dospo made in will is
to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport invalid). Julio Vivares filed an appeals before the CA with the
39
allegation that the oppositors failed to present ay comp. This case involves a contest between two women
evidence that Asuncion was legally married to another person. both claiming to have been validly married to the same man,
The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision but with the now deceased.
modification that dispo in favor of Oning was valid.
Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11
Issue: November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido
Whether or not the will was valid (Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the lawful wife of the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
Held:
Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was
As a general rule, Courts in probate proceedings are solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites
limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. While the a
to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due marriage certificate was recorded with the local civil registrar,
execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities the records of the LCR were destroyed during World War II.
prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the Tecla and Eustaquio begot four children, but Eustaquio left his
testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge family in 1954.
the validity or efficacy of the will’s provisions. The intrinsic
validity is not proved and allowed. There are, however, notable In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to
circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she
determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In
face and the probate of the will may become a useless support of her claim, Tecla presented eyewitnesses to the
ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a ceremony, the birth certificate of their children and certificates
will may be passed upon because “ practical consideration” to the fact that the marriage certificate/records were destroyed.
demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the
testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality. Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the
Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September
absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court 1989, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979
is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and and showed the marriage contract between her and Eustaquio.
pass upon certain provisions of the will. The Lower court was
not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Tecla’s
provsions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio.
that Asuncion “oning” Reyes was his wife did not have to be Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the
scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon over
the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devises/legatees the lack of records.
already involved inquiry on the will’s intrinsic validity and which
need not be inquired upon by the probate court.
The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in Nepomuceno The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a
vs. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 206) in the instant case. In presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio
the case aforesaid, the testator himself, acknowledged his illicit as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot
relationship with the devisee, to wit: Art. IV. That since 1952, I four children. Such presumption, supported by documentary
have been living, as man and wife, with one Sofia J. evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by
Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my the RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of
love an [sic] affection, for all the things which she has done for the fact of marriage. The CA found that its appreciation of the
me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5,
with my full knowledge and consent, did comfort and represent Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in
ISSUE:
the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy
bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife
marriage. of Eustaquio?
Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the legacy RULING:
because the testator admitted he was disposing of the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in TECLA, While a marriage certificate is considered the
concubinage. To remand the case would only be a waste of primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
time and money since the illegality or defect was already sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage
patent. This case is different from the Nepomuceno case. may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
bequeathing some of his personal and real properties to his recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
wife, Asuncion Oning Reyes. There was never an open his parents.
admission of any illicit relationship. In the case of
Nepomuceno, the testator admitted that he was already It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without
previously married and that he had an adulterous relationship the marriage certificate, no other proof can be accepted. The
with the devisee. execution of a document may be proven by the parties
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, vs. and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those
to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO
thereof.
Facts:
In this case, due execution was established by the
eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as a party to the
40
event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social
officiating priest. Since the due execution and the loss of the humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives." In
short, it was a fictitious marriage.
presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–
may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. The starting The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth
point then, is the presumption of marriage. certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982
are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
1982. Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7
is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they birth certificates.
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same
GO-BANGAYAN vs BANGAYAN (2013) time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a
marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered
FACTS: by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from
the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin
> Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly
GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and established that no marriage license was issued to them and
supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. Azucena left that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage
for the United States of America. Benjamin and Sally lived license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City
together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under
relationship. In order to appease her father, Sally brought Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio.
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-
signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which
contract would not be registered. are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void
> During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired some from the beginning." Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
real properties. sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between
> The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-
Sally left for Canada. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy existent.
and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using
their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the
turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage
the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being
asked the trial court for the partition of the properties. no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or
> Trial court ruled in favor of Benjamin. The trial court ruled irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if
that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not the second marriage was void not because of the existence of
bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license,
void not because of the existence of the first marriage but the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was
license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under
Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING: Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not
bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to
petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the
was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be
certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and
Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 Azucena.
March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
was valid and subsisting. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must
have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The
Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros further testified that the local civil supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N- registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a together and represented themselves as husband and wife
marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the without the benefit of marriage.
certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
the issuance of a marriage license. Clearly, if indeed Benjamin
and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations
void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code which states:
It was also established before the trial court that the purported
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
made only in jest" and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
41
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a
evidences of credit. flurry of cases against Zamoranos including a petition for
annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal and
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her disbarment from the civil service.
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. liable for Bigamy. Consequently, an Information for Bigamy
was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if
both parties are in bad faith. On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void
Marriage, the RTC, rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos,
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The
marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their
marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the
respective contributions Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Nollora v. People
Was the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum bigamous?
FACTS:
HELD: First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by
Atilano Nollora Jr was married to Jesus Nollora. Their marriage Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made by the
was still subsisting when he contracted a 2nd marriage with RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for
Rowena Geraldino, who is herself aware of his marriage with declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the
Jesusa but still agreed and contracted marriage with him. ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous
marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final
ISSUE: and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of
W/N the 2nd marriage is bigamous and null and void ab initio? jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts.
The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Shari'a
Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter
HELD: thereof.
Yes. Under Art 349 of the RPC, the marriage is bigamous and Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the
pursuant to Art 35 of the Family Code, it is void ab initio. case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the
Nollora’s religious affiliation is inapplicable here. Neither of his categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that
marriages were solemnized under the Muslim Law. The SC Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another
ruled that his two marriages were not conducted according to Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic
the Code of Muslim. Hence, his religious affiliation may not be law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos'
used as a defense. divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties.
MORIGO vs PEOPLE
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
FACTS:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for 2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
4 years, after which they lost contact with each other. They case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
reconnected again in 1984 and became sweethearts when yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
Lucia was in Singapore until she went to Canada in 1986. 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
They got married in Aug.1990, the following month Lucia went essential requisites for validity.
back to Canada leaving Lucio behind. Lucia filed for divorce in
Canada which was granted by the court to take effect on Feb When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are
17, 1992. On Oct. 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria present. The crime of bigamy was already consummated. It is
Jececha Lumbago. already immaterial if the second (or first marriage, see
September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial Mercado vs Tan) was subsequently declared void. The
declaration of nullity of marriage with Lucia, on the ground that outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no bearing
no marriage ceremony actually took place. Lucio was charged to the determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence in the bigamy
with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of case because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted. He who contracts a second
Lucio filed a petition for certiorari seeking a reversal of his marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
conviction. He should not be faulted for relying in good faith assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. The OSG
counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith in The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason
relying on the divorce decree is negated by his act of filing a to believe that his first marriage is void, he cannot simply
petition for a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to contract a second marriage without having such first marriage
Lucia. be judicially declared as void. The parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
ISSUE: the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
his defense of good faith is valid. declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
43
Uy were both null and void for lack of a marriage license, and determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration
that the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the bride and groom
marriage to Alocillo. On Appeal, the CA confirmed the ruling of did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were
the trial court. In the meantime, the RTC where Jarillo filed a
married.This standard was modified with the passage of the
civil case against Alocillo rendered judgement declaring
Jarillo’s marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA),
ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Jarillo, in her which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
motion for reconsideration, invoked the ruling of the trial court marriage was not ntered into for the purpose of evading the
as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. In a Resolution immigration laws of the United States.The focus, thus, shifted
by the CA, the latter denied reconsideration. from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must
ISSUE: be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for
immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule
W/N the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of bigamy is right on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
despite the supervening proof that her marriage to Alocillo had
been declared void. In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain
HELD: entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could
not be avoided erely because the marriage was entered into
No. Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be for a limited purpose.The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of her McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage
marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in
the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one.
second marriage without the previous one having been
judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it
already consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even one must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid solemnizing officer. A reely given consent requires that the
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud,
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
time the second marriage is contracted. intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is
presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil action for Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios
nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not
a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences
of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D.
ALBIOS. G.R. No. 198780; October 16, 2013. conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
FACTS: On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
and Albios were married, as evidenced by a Certificate of intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer, There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated
and never lived as husband and wife because they never really that would be created between them, since it was that precise
had any intention of entering into a married state or complying legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their
with any of their essential marital obligations. goal. GRANTED.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios ARANES VS OCCIANO A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial
brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the Gross Ignorance of Law
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing FACTS:
despite being duly notified of the schedule. Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge
with Gross Ignorance of the Law. Respondent is the Presiding
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined Judge of the MTCt of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner
that the parties married each other for convenience only. alleges that respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her
Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship and license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of territorial jurisdiction.
$2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this
because the latter never processed her petition for citizenship marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the
marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was
RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia.
was lacking. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent
ISSUE: Is a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations
acquiring American citizenship void ab initio on the which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
ground of lack of consent? embarrassment and sufferings.
ISSUE:
HELD: In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in gross ignorance
Naturalization Service, established the principal test for of the law when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner
44
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
HELD: provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge nullity of void marriage may be filed solelyby the husband or
is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between
of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross 11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a
out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined
liability for violating the law on marriage. only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for
Lara, the Court held that a marriage which preceded the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the the limitation, to wit:
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or 1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity
even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the 2) Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law. HELD:
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable
BLAZA V REPUBLIC law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
G.R. NO. 158298, AUGUST 11, 2010 celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity
Doctrine: It is clarified, however, that the absence of a of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the
provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No.
as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos
v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can
be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and
suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog, the children were
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the
interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their
interest can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a
rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be marriage license.
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved Salas vs. Aguila
or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in Facts: On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr.
an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the and Eden Villena Aguila were married. Aguila gave birth to
case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. their daughter on June 7 1986. Five months later, Salas left
their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer
FACTS: communicated with Aguila or their child.
On October 17, 2000, Petitioner filed in the RTC a petition for On October 7, 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of
the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage Nullity of Marriage citing psychological incapacity under Article
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they “have no
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner conjugal properties whatsoever”.
alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila
had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such
license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been provides the dissolution of their conjugal property, if any.
solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his
being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation and
without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties motion stating that she discovered 3 properties registered to
acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.
a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included,
could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the
due to the marriage being void ab initio. Discovered Properties in consideration of other properties
waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that
RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner is conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.
not a party to the marriage. CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the RTC directed Salas and Aguila to partition by proper
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his instruments of conveyance the discovered properties. CA
deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Code. YES if he is a real party-in-interest.
45
regime, property acquired during marriage is prima facie Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the
presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s joint ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership. The trial court grated her petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded by reason KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ
of the performance or non-performance G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
46
In the task of ascertaining the presence of vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would
with expertise in the field of psychology, must of expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that
necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely
arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young
conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and children.
incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts. The fact that the respondent brought her children
with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her
Personal examination by party not required; totality of neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to
evidence must be considered expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of
protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void her own personal and escapist desires.
ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence. The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for
her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard
There is no requirement for one to be declared violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a children.
physician, because what is important is the presence of
evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological FALLO:
incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the
be resorted to.” decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If the Family Code.
other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly
result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the
expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI
for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997
causation.
48
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be
Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orly’s allegation of fear
of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and was not concretely established. He was not able to prove that
there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for fear to
holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental
be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of against him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who
how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a
objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self- during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright
lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to
destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
attack the marriage. It took him 4 and a half years to file an
warrants the dissolution of the marriage. action which brings merit to Lilia’s contention that Orly freely
cohabited with her after the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,
where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of FACTS:
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter subsequently in church on December 8, 1990. A child was
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the born in April 1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio could no
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by longer take her constant lying, insecurities and jealousies over
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present him so he separated from her in August 1991. He attempted
case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally
left her for good in November 1991. Only after their marriage
defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a
that he learned about her child with another man.
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no Reyes declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. Code.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus
declared the marriage null and void.
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that
procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the the totality of evidence presented was insufficient to establish
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, requirements in the 1997 Molina case had not been satisfied.
sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the
decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for
of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and,
clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness generally, under the Molina guidelines.
must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must
be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as RULING:
regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a
code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant
lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and
made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife's
Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on
VILLANUEVA VS CA the SC, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of
the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that
respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects
FACTS: as to her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically
Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orly filed to annul the incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning
marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress and significance to her marriage.
forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving
phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired the The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in
threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by proving the psychological incapacity of his wife;
claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity
now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the has been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently
marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orly’s allegations and proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's
she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage decision;
and she showed 14 letters that shows Orly’s affection and care Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before
towards her. she married him prove that her psychological incapacity was
have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was
ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to
the case at bar. the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent;
HELD: The SC ruled that Orly’s allegation of fraud and Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her
intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orly is unable to commit the basic tenets of relationship between
only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
49
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled by the
Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the
judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical courts, that are
accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio
tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remains unchanged.
MARCOS VS MARCOS
ISSUES:
HELD:
50