424 CHAPTER NINE Second: This break is even more obvious in my second argument, which concerns the progressive character of the concept of participation. Despite its limitations, Regent’s re- publicanism had within it a logical dynamism which, in theory, allowed a considerable expansion of participation. If de la Court, as well as Spinoza, argue that “freedom” and the “interest” of the individual are unchangeable preconditions for the prosperity of the commonwealth, and that in a republic, contrary to absolutistic societies, this identity should be based upon free consent, the theory inevitably makes room for an ul- timately individualistic concept of a socially enlarged, far- reaching right of participation. Spinoza therefore moves from the idea of an aristocratic republic to that of a democratic one, in which participation is an inherited, individual right of all men descended from citizens (ex parentibus civibus) and of all others born within the fatherland who have served the republic well and have not lost the right to vote because they have committed a crime or lost their financial independence. This quantitative widening of participation coincided with a similar significant re-definition of the principle of qualifica- tion. It was an essential characteristic of “true freedom” that, when public offices, honorary posts, or other “high dignities” were distributed, they were handed out not on the basis of birth and family reputation, but for personal efficiency and ability as well as for individual achievements for the common good. This was theoretically all the more important, since this new modern principle of qualification by ability and achieve- ment appeared in an anti-monarchical and anti-noble context, that was basic to the Regents’ self-interpretation. Third: Even with regard to the question of the traditional relativism and modern universalism of republican concepts, the political theory of the Dutch Regents displayed early elements of modernity, though once again the texts are ambiguous. On the one hand, and especially in de la Court’s works, “republic” appears as a specific constitutional model of certain nations in countries with a special geographical and material background. In the case of Holland, fishing, commerce, and shipping required a liberal, not an absolutistic framework. This rela- tivism corresponds to an almost isolationist attitude, that is, the renunciation of any attempt to “export” the republican form of government. The Dutch republican Regents were inclined to Support hereditary monarchies in other countries instead ofDUTCH REPUBLICANISM 42 challenging them ideologically and politically, as the English ‘ommonwealth had on occasion. You will remember in this context Admiral Blake’s propagandistic statement at Cadiz in the early 1650's, announcing that republican principles would soon overthrow all the monarchies of Europe. Besides its relativism and isolationism, there was one aspect of Dutch republican writing which gave the republican concept a universal dimension. This can be illustrated by the following reference in a republican pamphlet of 1650 that appeared only a short time after the death of Prince William Il: “Want de text (i.e., of the Bible, H.Sch.) is klaer dat Republycken Godt behaechlycker syn als Monarchien.” (“The Bible has clear evi dence that God is in favor of a republican form of govern- ment”). Therefore, the Dutch should not endanger the “golden freedom” God granted them by striking against the house of Orange. If in this situation the Dutch did not honor the repub- lican form of government, “He (i.e. God) would say, they have rejected me, and in His wrath give us a king.” In line with the thought expressed in the pamphlet, Pieter de la Court and Johan de Witt earnestly argued that a republic was the only form of government under which people could be led to the “promised land.” Despite this eschatological perspective, it is no less clear in the works of de la Court and de Witt than in those of Spinoza that it is secular rationality that made a republic superior to all other forms of government. With Spinoza, its superiority con- sisted in its power to foster social integration and its ability to come to reasonable decisions by discussion. With de Witt and de la Court, it was its rationality and predictability in both domestic and foreign policy. A contextual analysis of the use of the term “freedom, which cannot be discussed in detail here, would show the same differences between traditional and modern meanings that we have demonstrated with the term “republic.” Thus, the analysis of the two most important key-words within the texts under consideration confirms our initial hypothesis: the republicanism of the de Witt era was a liberal and radical form of political theory that must be considered an important connecting link between early-modern, traditional, and modern ideas on state and society, or the between the early-modern and modern types of political theory. The most advanced position then expressed was that of Spinoza who argued that the lib-426 CHAPTER NINE eral—ultimately democratic—republic was not only the best form of government in terms of its success but actually the only one that was adequate for reasonable human beings. This was not, however, the position that the Regents accepted as their party program. Rather it was a philosophical deduction from that position developed by a small circle of intellectuals whose statements on this subject were either not published—in the case of Spinoza—or appeared in a considerably weakened form—in the case of the de la Courts. With regard to the general development of political theory in Europe and its precursors, our finding confirms that it was in the northwestern, maritime zone of Europe that political theory gained its modern dynamism in parallel with economic and Social modernization. It is well-known that this was also true of England and Scotland, especially in the late seventeenth cen- tury. If our observations and interpretations are correct, then the northern Netherlands or, more precisely, their western, maritime parts, dominated by the cities and the early modern bourgeoisie or middle-class, must be considered an additional important center for this development. That fits in with the well-known picture of Holland, already held by contempo- raries, as a society that set social, cultural, and economic trends for all of early modern Europe. Holland in its “Golden Cen- tury” also set intellectual trends in political theory with its analysis of state and society. This body of thought supplied a crucial mediating connection between the Renaissance ideal of a “civic humanism,” developed in Florence and Venice, and the modern liberalism that emerged in the last quarter of the seventeenth century in England. T hope my presentation demonstrates that historians of political theory who are not familiar with linguistic theories are not necessarily methodologically naive but can provide their own kind of contextual interpretation—in fact, offering interpreta- tions within two distinct contexts: the context of the texts themselves and the context of Political, social, and economic Structures. To provide an adequate interpretation on both the textual and the structural level, an understanding of the long- term development of the meaning of words, concepts, and theories as well as of historical reality is crucial. ConceptsMax Weber and his and of “Begriffsge hte,” elaborated by the Ger lars Brunner, Conze, and Koselleck. The most impor- a associated with the latter school of thought is the so led “Sattel-Zeit,” from roughly 1750 to 1820 which was the decisive period of change for the meanin key words in Political context, as they lost their Old European meanings and acquired modern ones. This fundamental change is documented in the volumes of the encyclopedia Geschichtliche Grundbe- griffe, which provides scholars of early modern political theory with an indispensable tool fc understanding the meaning of terms and texts. Finally, I would like to underscore the inter- Pretative and unavoidable subjective character of both the for mulation and interpretation of political theory. In my opinion, this cannot be overcome by theories of texts and knowledge, however sophisticated and well-established they might be. It is very important to keep this relativism both of understanding and of interpreting historical texts in mind, because pretensions of scientific objectivity can do even more harm to the meaning of the texts than an interpretation without any concern for the historical context