Staying on Top » 253 producing a fictive continuity: surrogate heirs (adoption), or the transfer of the name The regulations governing the division of inheritance were, of course, of cen tral importance to socio-cultural reproduction—a highly complexarea, where the gulfberwe n de jure stipulations and de acto settlements could be huge. Only a few aspects relevant to our topic will be touched upon in what follows. The division of inheritance among many heirs instead of a privileged few (in whatever form it might be: division of estates or revenues, and so on) put at risk the medium- and long-term economic foundation, particularly during times of growing popula tion, The question of how ‘property rights’ legacies should be divided up was also contentious, and could provoke feuds and blood letting. Itis therefore astonishing tonote how long—despite these drawbacks—such regulations governing the divi sion of inheritance remained commonplace, even among the high nobility. As mentioned earlier, this contributed to the social decline of the Edelfreien from the eastern region of Switzerland. As a further and almost exotic example in this rela- tion one could mention the high nobility in Wales during the central and late Mid- dle Ages: their perpetual feuds were the result of archaic methods of regulating rule and inheritance. The much-feared fighting prowess of Welsh warriors can in no small measure be attributed to these conditions.”* If we use the word ‘exotic’ to describe the Welsh, it should nevertheless not be forgotten that on the Continent even powerful territorial rulers such as the Habs- burgs had difficulties producing Hausgesetze with which to safeguard their dynas- tic line of succession. The Hohenzollerns formalized the procedure only around 1500, at a time when even the high nobility were increasingly devising their own Hausgesetze in order to regulate their lines of succession and to ensure that inter- generationally transferred assets remained as intact as possible. Behind this shift in behaviour lay a change in mentality: an increased sense of dynasty, and the increased importance of the family seat as an object of social prestige. This new development can be observed throughout Europe from the end of the fifteenth century onwards. In various countries primogeniture and forms of inalienable property ownership (not only entails) were introduced and backed up by force oflaw. The feudal laws of the Middle Ages were forerunners of this. None the less, there are notable differences: while, for example, in Spain during the early six- teenth century the drawing-up of mayorazgos received the sanction ofa royal war- rant, in England at the same time (1540) the peerage had a similar feudally based right (‘perpetual entails’, ‘entails by uses’) taken away from them. The English peerage side-stepped this by creating the ‘strict settlement’, an arrangement for inheritance within the group which helped to ensure that assets remained *" Davis (1987); Reeves (1983); Walker (1990); Williams (1985).254 - Rudolf Braun concentrated in a few hands over generations, and which also had the advantage over entails of offering more flexibility. Entails and other forms of inalienable assets (such as family trust funds) seriously reduced creditworthiness; this prob lem was greatly reduced in the case of ‘strict settlements The example of the Castilian high nobility reveals the problems which could arise when assets—however large—were inalienable and could not therefore be mortgaged. As was already mentioned, the increasing indebtedness of the Castil ian high nobility from the late sixteenth century onwards was not primarily brought about by a reduction in the return on their assets; it was, rather, a con- sequence of the enormous costs incurred by the magnates in fulfilling their presti. gious duties at court. The duke of Infantado, one of the most powerful nobles in Spain, was no isolated case: he was reduced to bankruptcy in 1661 and obliged to hand over the running of his estates to the Crown.” Other factors were also responsible for the debts of the high nobility: one needs only to think of the immense dowries for daughters who took husbands rather than the veil. In the house of Infantado, the credit of 60,000 ducats taken out for each of the four daughters’ dowries amounted to more than 4r per cent of the total capital debt of 897,731 ducats that had accumulated during the fifty years to 1637; the move of the king and government from Valladolid to Madrid (1606) cost the duke of Infantado 110,753 ducats, and the festivities for the prince of Wales (1623) 20,000 ducats.* This Castilian example is of fundamental significance: the taking-on of presti- gious court duties—often an inevitable result of promotion in rank—could restrict income and complicate socio-political reproduction, especially when the burden of owning inalienable assets was not counterbalanced by sufficient stan- dard sources of revenue or by newly acquired opportunities of obtaining money on credit. For these reasons, it was not unusual for noble houses to turn down proffered honours and elevations in status; the additional expenditure entailed in attendance at court was beyond their means. On the other hand, magnates who owned substantial estates, had large incomes at their disposal, and enjoyed high levels of creditworthiness, sank extraordinary sums into obtaining an elevation in rank and the associated privileges. A typical example is that of the house of Liech- tenstein; it is worth investigating this case in rather more detail. In 1696 Count Hannibal III von Hohenems, lord of Schellenberg, was forced by imperial decree to sell his estate because of its precarious financial position. The patrimony of the Schellenberg dominion held the right to a seat and vote in the council of princes of the Swabian Circle (Schwabischer Kreis). To the great annoyance ™ Stone and Fawtier-Stone (1986). ® Jago (1973); Kamen (1980). ™ Kamen (1980), 283. Note, however, Kamen’s observation: ‘Since a good marriage helped to secure a family’s fortune, dowries could be considered as an investment rather than expenditure’. Ibid, 245.Staying on Top » 255 of the house of Liechtenstein, during the Reichstag of Regensburg in 1654 the houses of Dietrichstein, Piccolomini, and Auersperg were raised to the status of unmediatized principalities of the Empire (that is, with their princes defined as immediate subjects of the Emperor and members of the imperial Diet), but Liechtenstein was passed over. They putall their energies into amending this situ ation. In 1697 Johann Adam Andreas von Liechtenstein made the Emperor an offer for the Schellenberg estates, on condition that an option on the dominion of Vaduz be included in the deal. The purchase price (115,000 gulden) was far above the real market value. Various unsettled questions delayed the attainment of unmediatized status in the Empire and admission to the princes’ bench of the regional diet of the Swabian Circle (Kreistag); this last hurdle was surmounted in 1707 by means of an interest-free loan of 250,000 gulden to the Swabian Circle Nevertheless, the house of Liechtenstein had not yet raised itself to the status of the mentioned houses of Dietrichstein, Piccolomini, and Auersperg; the seat and vote in the Reichstag were still lacking. These were honours which could be acquired through the purchase of the Vaduz dominion. In 1699 the prince made an offer of 290,000 gulden, but Vaduz was a Fideikommif’ and therefore could not change hands without imperial permission. The negotiations dragged on for years; but, as before, the problem was solved by Liechtenstein reaching deep— very deep—into its pockets: the house of Liechtenstein granted the Emperor a loan of half a million gulden; shortly afterwards (1712) the purchase contract was signed. It was, in truth, an expensive elevation in rank, although one that in the medium and long term came to pay for itself: the results were improved marriages, elevation within the nobility and in the court hierarchy; in addition, there were numerous new insignia of rank and an increase in political power. The house of Liechtenstein was elevated to the status of ruling Standesherren, and—as a result of particularly favourable circumstances—was able to avoid mediatiza- tion. From an economic perspective, however, this was an investment with a very long maturation: only in the present century—amongst other things, through postage stamps and brass plates—did it begin to pay off.”* ‘The acquisition of elevated status or prestigious new court duties by no means always implied material loss, however. These could also improve income potential and open up access to new sources of revenue through Church or state service—a cost-benefit ratio with an intergenerational perspective. Examples of this are plen- tiful. One only need remember how the bishopric of Lucon, from 1584 virtually an » In der Mauer (1901); Seger (1958); Press (1981). Only in the year 1918 (mediatization— that is the abolition of the status of direct imperial subject of petty princes and spiritual lords and their incorporation into the territorial state of some more powerful prince—was successfully avoided during the Congress of Vienna) did Aloys Il visit the principality of Vaduz, the very first member of the house of Liechtenstein to do so.