Grande v.
Court of Appeals, Domingo and Esteban Calalung (30 June 1962) provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the
DOCTRINE: An accretion does not automatically become registered land just
because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title.
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the Torrens system of
that ownership is another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land
adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land
is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and
Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and,
thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land
must be placed under the operation of the registration laws, wherein certain judicial
procedures have been provided.
FACTS: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032
hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay, Isabela, by
inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui. When it was surveyed for
purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the
Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, a gradual
accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the
Cagayan River that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about
105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters
(1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area.
Petitioners: instituted the present action in CFI Isabela against respondents, to quiet
title to said portion (19,964 sqm) formed by accretion, alleging that they and their
predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession
thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under
claim of ownership.
Respondents: claimed ownership and asserted that they have been in continuous,
open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to
the present.
CFI: Ruled in favor of petitioners, and ordered respondents to vacate the premises
and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as
damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
...The land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the
plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366,
Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the
defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not
require any act of possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from
the moment the deposit becomes manifest. Further, no act of appropriation on the
part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial
formation, as the law does not require the same.
….Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property,
the same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section
46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession by another person.
CA: ruled in favor of Petitioners. “..it should properly belong to the riparian owners,
specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 457, which
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
Respondents: averred that they have acquired ownership through prescription. This
contention poses the real issue in this case.
CA: resolved it in favor of the respondents. The first ground relied upon by the trial
court, is not quite correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific
provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession
thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection
does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold
otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and
the technical description of the land given therein, of their character of
conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the
Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not
protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development
Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights
conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions
of the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of
the addition area by another person through prescription.
Upon consideration of the evidence, the respondents were really in possession since
1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the petitioners
woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By
then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of the respondents.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by
us.
ISSUES:
1. WON the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot
which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial
property imprescriptible
NO. Petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the
registered owners of the land which it adjoins. However, the accretion does not
automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives it is
covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible, just
as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land
does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land.
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system
of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the
land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered
land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and
Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and
thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land
must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial
procedures have been provided.
The fact remains, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial
property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time
they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958.
The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not
entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered
property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.
2) WON the respondents has acquired the subject land through prescription -- YES.
Respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934,
openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of
the action in 1958.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not
the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when
the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the
effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive
prescription is in accordance with law.
Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque v. Ebio (G.R. No. 178411, 23 June
2010) - ARLEH
DOCTRINE/APPLICABLE LAW: Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters.
TAKEAWAY: It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that
alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public
domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for
by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same
under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject
to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
FACTS:
- Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting
of 406 square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay
Vitalez, Parañaque City and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in
the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio.
-Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original
occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose
Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then
on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In
1966, after executing an af􏰂davit declaring possession and occupancy, Pedro was
able to obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his name. Since then,
respondents have been religiously paying real property taxes for the said property.
- In 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro's daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedro's
advice, the couple established their home on the said lot. In April 1964 and in
October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal
of􏰂ce for the construction of their house within the said compound.
- On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his claim
over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax
declarations under Pedro's name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario
Ebio's name.
- On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed
Resolution No. 08, series of 1999 seeking assistance from the City Government of
Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the
said barangay. The proposed road, projected to be eight (8) meters wide and sixty
(60) meters long, will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound
traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. When the city government advised
all the affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately
registered their opposition thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily
suspended.
- Evidentiary record of this case shows that RL 8, containing an area of 291 square
meters is owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by TCT No. S- 62176. The
same RL 8 appears to have been donated by the Guaranteed Homes to the City
Government of Parañaque on 22 March 1966 and which was accepted by the then
Mayor FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April 1966. There is no evidence however, when
RL 8 has been intended as a road lot.
- On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ possessed
the accreted property since 1930 per his Affiavit dated 21 March 1966 for the
purpose of declaring the said property for taxation purposes. The property then
became the subject of Tax Declaration No. 20134 beginning the year 1967 and the
real property taxes therefor had been paid for the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969,
1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1980, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were
issued in favor of Appellant MARIO EBIO for the subject property.
-On 21 April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights in the accreted property to
MARIO EBIO and his successors-in-interest.
ISSUE:
1.W/N petioner’ s contention that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is
classified as public domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through
time should be considered as part of the public domain-NO.
2.W/N the land, being an accretion of the Cut- Cut Creek, rightfully belongs to
respondent Ebio-YES.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits
that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case,
the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of
the Civil Code.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over
alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits
along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the
alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which
it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the
owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens
system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No
matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no
prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or
municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the
land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of
sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear
provision of law.
Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such
that a final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court cannot
proceed without their presence. In contrast, a necessary party is one whose
presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy but
whose interest is separable such that a final decree can be made in their absence
without affecting them.
In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of
Parañaque from proceeding with its implementation of the road construction project.
The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where no
positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon
it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable party if none of
its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed.
We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents
over the contested land entitles them to the avails of the action.
A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail of an
injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is
actual or existing. It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one
which may never arise.
In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro
Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964,
respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local government of Parañaque for
the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an
affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his
name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed
Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land
occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of Parañaque.
From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one
conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed
Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate or private
capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are
deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription.
Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register
their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land
registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the
applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a
means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does
not confer, ownership.
Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains
pending before the DENR, estop them from filing an injunction suit?
We answer in the negative.
Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through
judicial proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant case,
respondents admitted that they opted to confirm their title over the property
administratively by filing an application for sales patent.
Respondents' application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice
or derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject property.
The sales patent application should instead be considered as a mere superfluiity
particularly since ownership over the land, which they seek to buy from the State, is
already vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State
does not have any authority to convey a property through the issuance of a grant or
a patent if the land is no longer a public land.
Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such
principle is equally applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007
Decision, as well as the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 91350 are hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
Sps. Galang v. Sps. Reyes (G.R. No. 184746, 8 August 2012) - EDU
FACTS:
On September 4, 1997, spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes (the
Reyeses) filed a case for the annulment of Original Certificate of Title against
spouses Crispin and Caridad Galang (the Galangs) with the Regional Trial Court.
In their Complaint, the Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties: (1) a
subdivision project known as Ponderosa Heights Subdivision (Ponderosa), and (2)
an adjoining property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 185252,
with an area of 1,201 sq.m.;4 that the properties were separated by the Marigman
Creek, which dried up sometime in 1980 when it changed its course and passed
through Ponderosa; that the Galangs, by employing manipulation and fraud, were
able to obtain a certificate of title over the dried up creek bed from the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its Provincial Office
(PENRO); that, specifically, the property was denominated as Lot 5735, Cad 29 Ext.,
Case-1, with an area of 1,573 sq.m. covered by OCT No. P-928; that they
discovered the existence of the certificate of title sometime in March 1997 when
their caretaker, Federico Enteroso (Enteroso), informed them that the subject
property had been fraudulently titled in the names of the Galangs; that in 1984,
prior to such discovery, Enteroso applied for the titling of the property, as he had
been occupying it since 1968 and had built his house on it; that, later, Enteroso
requested them to continue the application because of financial constraints on his
part;5 that they continued the application, but later learned that the application
papers were lost in the Assessor’s Office;6 and that as the owners of the land where
the new course of water passed, they are entitled to the ownership of the property
to compensate them for the loss of the land being occupied by the new creek.
The Galangs in their Answerdenied that the land subject of the complaint was part
of a creek and countered that OCT No. P-928 was issued to them after they had
complied with the free patent requirements of the DENR, through the PENRO; that
they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in possession, occupation,
cultivation, and ownership of the land for quite some time; that the property was
transferred in the names of the Reyeses through falsified document; that assuming
ex gratia argumenti that the creek had indeed changed its course and passed
through Ponderosa, the Reyeses had already claimed for themselves the portion of
the dried creek which adjoined and co-existed with their property; that Enteroso
was able to occupy a portion of their land by means of force, coercion,
machinations, and stealth in 1981; that such unlawful entry was then the subject of
an Accion Publiciana before the RTC of Antipolo City
RTC: Ruled in favor of Galangs. Reyeses presented no evidence of fraud despite
their allegations that the Galangs were not in possession of the property and that it
was part of a dried creek. There being no evidence, these contentions remained
allegations and could not defeat the title of the Galangs.
CA: Reversed. The CA found that the Reyeses had proven by preponderance of
evidence that the subject land was a portion of the creek bed that was abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the water, which had now traversed a
portion of Ponderosa. As owners of the land occupied by the new course of the
creek, the Reyeses had become the owners of the abandoned creek bed ipso facto.
ISSUE: whether the Reyeses can file the present action for annulment of a free
patent title and reconveyance
HELD: No.
The law in this regard is covered by Article 461 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course
of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new
course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining
the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof,
which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
If indeed a property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and
passed through the property of the claimant, then, pursuant to Article 461, the
ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course was automatically
acquired by the claimant. Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of
natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it must be proven
that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made
intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must prove three key
elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are: (1) the old course of the
creek, (2) the new course of the creek, and (3) the change of course of the creek
from the old location to the new location by natural occurrence.
In this regard, the Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old
course, its natural abandonment and the new course. In the face of a Torrens title
issued by the government, which is presumed to have been regularly issued, the
evidence of the Reyeses was clearly wanting. Uncorroborated testimonial evidence
will not suffice to convince the Court to order the reconveyance of the property to
them. This failure did not escape the observation of the Office of the Solicitor
General. Thus, it commented:
In the case at bar, it is not clear whether or not the Marigman Creek dried-up
naturally back in 1980. Neither did private respondents submit any findings or
report from the Bureau of Lands or the DENR Regional Executive Director, who has
the jurisdiction over the subject lot, regarding the nature of change in the course of
the creek’s waters. Worse, what is even uncertain in the present case is the exact
location of the subject matter of dispute. This is evident from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court which failed to specify which portion of the land is actually
being disputed by the contending parties.
The bottom line here is that, fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for
cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence, with mere preponderance of evidence
not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which must be proved.
In this case, the allegations of fraud were never proven. There was no evidence at
all specifically showing actual fraud or misrepresentation. Thus, the Court cannot
sustain the findings of the CA.
Gaboya v. Cui (G.R. No. L-19614, 27 March 1971) - FRANCES
DOCTRINE: A usufruct on the land may be separate from the building.
LAWS APPLICABLE: Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code
FACTS: Don Mariano Cui, widower owns lots 2312, 2313 and 2319 in Cebu, with an
area of 152 sq. m., 144 sq. m. and 2,362 sq. m., respectively, or a total extension
of 2,658 sq. m. On March 8, 1946, he sold said three lots to three of his children
named Rosario de Encarnacion, Mercedes de Ramas and Antonio Ma. Cui, pro
indiviso for the sum of P64,000.
Rosario was unable to pay her corresponding share of the purchase price, thus, the
sale to her was cancelled and the one-third of the property corresponding to her
was returned to the vendor.
These three lots are commercial. The improvements were destroyed during the last
Pacific War so there were no buildings or any other improvements on them in 1946.
As such, Don Mariano and his children Mercedes and Antonio became co-owners of
the whole mass in equal portions. In the deed of sale, Don Mariano retained for
himself the usufruct of the property in the following words:
'. . . do hereby sell, transfer, and convey to Messrs. Rosario de Encarnacion,
Mercedes de Ramas and Antonio Ma Cui, the above-mentioned parcel of land in
equal parts, . . . and the further consideration, that I, shall enjoy the fruits and
rents of the same, as long as my natural life shall last. Granting and conveying unto
the said buyers the full rights as owners to enjoy the constructive possession of the
same, improve, construct and erect a building in the lot, or do whatever they
believe to be proper and wise, as long as the same will not impair nor obstruct my
right to enjoy the fruits and rents of the same. . .'
Subsequently, a building was erected on a portion of the land and was occupied by
a Chinese businessman for which he paid Don Mariano P600 a month as rental.
Sometime after the sale to Mercedes and Antonio, the two applied to the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) for a loan of P130,000 with which to
construct a 12-door commercial building on their share of the land. In order to
facilitate the granting of the loan, Don Mariano executed an authority to mortgage
authorizing his two children co-owners to mortgage his share. The loan was
eventually granted and was secured by a mortgage on the three lots in question.
The 12-door commercial building was eventually constructed and the builder-owners
Mercedes and Antonio received and continued to receive the rents amounting to
P4,800 a month and paying the installments due for payment on the loan to the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.
On March 25, 1948, two other children of Don Mariano named Jesus and Jorge
brought an action in the CFI of Cebu for annulling the deed of sale of the three lots
in question on the ground that they belonged to the conjugal partnership of Don
Mariano and his deceased wife Antonia Perales. Thereafter, plaintiffs Jesus and
Jorge applied for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the lots and of the
rentals of the building. This petition was denied.
On March 19, 1949, Rosario Encarnacion filed a petition to declare her father
incompetent and to have a guardian appointed for his property. The petition was
granted and Don Mariano was declared incompetent and Victorino Reynes was
appointed guardian of his property. Victorino Reynes filed a motion in the
guardianship proceedings seeking authority to collect the rentals from the three lots
in question and asking the Court to order Antonio and Mercedes to deliver to him as
guardian all the rentals they had previously collected from the 12-door commercial
building, together with all the papers belonging to his ward. This motion was denied.
Judge Saguin rendered a decision in the civil case and found that the lots in
question were not conjugal property but belonged exclusively to Don Mariano and so
upheld the sale of two-thirds of said lots to Antonio and Mercedes. The plaintiffs
appealed to the CA.
From the CA, the case was brought to the SC, and the decision upholding the
validity of the sale in favor of Antonio and Mercedes Cui was finally affirmed.
Subsequently, Don Mariano Cui filed this case in order to recover P126,344.91 plus
legal interest from Antonio Cui and Mercedes Cui apparently as fruits due to his
ward by virtue of his usufruct. In essence, the complaint alleges that the
usufructuary right reserved in favor of Don Mariano Cui extends to and includes the
rentals of the building constructed by Antonio Cui and Mercedes Cui on the land sold
to them by their father; that the defendants retained those rentals for themselves;
that the usufructuary rights of the vendor were of the essence of the sale, and their
violation entitled him to rescind (or resolve) the sale. It prayed either for rescission
with accounting, or for delivery of the rentals of the building with interests,
attorneys' fees and costs.
ISSUE: WON Don Mariano Cui has the right to claim the fruits of the building -- NO.
HELD/RATIO: As pointed out, the terms of the 1946 deed of sale of the vacant lots
in question made by the late Don Mariano Cui in favor of his three children in
consideration of the sum of P64,000.00 and the reserved usufruct of the said lot in
favor of the vendor clearly prove that the reserved usufruct in favor of the vendor,
Mariano Cui, was limited to the rentals of the land alone. Had it been designed to
include also the rents of the buildings intended to be raised on the land, an express
provision would have been included to that effect.
Under the articles of the Civil Code on industrial accession by edification on the
principal land (Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code) such accession is limited either
to buildings erected on the land of another, or buildings constructed by the owner of
the land with materials owner by someone else.
Thus, Article 445, establishing the basic rule of industrial accession, prescribes that
—
"Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the
improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land
subject to the provisions of the following articles."
while Article 449 states:
"He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."
Articles 447 and 445, in turn, treat of accession produced by the landowner's
building, planting and sowing "with the materials of another" and when "the
materials, plants or seeds belong to a third person" other than the landowner or the
builder, planter or sower.
The Court held that:
(1) That the usufructuary rights of the late Don Mariano Cui, reserved in the deed of
sale (Exhibit "A" herein), was over the land alone and did not entitle him to the
rents of the building later constructed thereon by defendants Mercedes and Antonio
Cui at their own expense.
(2) That said usufructuary was entitled only to the reasonable rental value of the
land occupied by the building aforementioned.
(3) That such rental value not having been liquidated until the judgment under
appeal was rendered, Antonio and Mercedes Cui were not in default prior thereto,
and the deed of sale was, therefore, not subject to rescission.
(4) That, as found by the court below, the reasonable rental value of the land
occupied by the defendants' building totalled P100,088.80 up to the time the
usufructuary died and the usufruct terminated.
(5) That pursuant to Articles 2208 (No. 11), 2210 and 2213 of the Civil Code, 5 the
trial court had discretion to equitably award legal interest upon said sum of
P100,088.80, as well as P5,000.00 attorney's fees, considering that defendants Cui
have enjoyed the said rental value of the land during all those years.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision, the same
is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellant-intervenors, Jesus Ma. Cui, Jose Ma. Cui,
Serafin Ma. Cui, Jorge Ma. Cui, Rosario Cui de Encarnacion, Precilla C. Velez, and
Lourdes C. Velez.
IV. Quieting of Title (Art. 476-481)
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of
said property.
Article 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom
when the contract, instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has
terminated, or has been barred by extinctive prescription.
Article 479. The plaintiff must return to the defendant all benefits he may have
received from the latter, or reimburse him for expenses that may have redounded
to the plaintiff's benefit.
Article 480. The principles of the general law on the quieting of title are hereby
adopted insofar as they are not in conflict with this Code.
Article 481. The procedure for the quieting of title or the removal of a cloud
therefrom shall be governed by such rules of court as the Supreme Court shall
promulgated.
CASES:
Tandog v. Macapagal (G.R. No. 144208, 11 September 2007) - MARGA
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title
is not created by mere verbal or parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in
property. This rule is subject to qualification, where there is a written or factual
basis for the asserted right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription
or adverse possession has been held to constitute a removable cloud on title.
FACTS: The subject of the controversy is a land consisting of 147,991 square
meters situated at Sitio Inarawan, Barangay Inuman, San Isidro, Antipolo City.
Petitioners claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land since time
immemorial. They trace their rights to Casimiro Policarpio, unmarried, who died in
1945. He was survived by his nephews and nieces, now deceased, except Maria
Bautista Catanyag. She and Casimiro's grand nieces and grand nephews (herein
petitioners) have continued possessing and cultivating the land.
When petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the property, they
found that portions of the land have been occupied by spouses Alfonso and Marina
Calderon and Renato Macapagal, respondents. According to petitioners, spouses
Calderon used falsified documents to justify their possession of 20,116 square
meters of the land which they sold to the government. For his part, Renato
Macapagal applied for and was granted Free Patent No. 045802-1165 which led to
the issuance to him of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-665 over an area of
18,787 square meters. Because of these incidents, petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Antipolo City a complaint for quieting of title.
Respondent Marina Calderon, in her answer, specifically denied petitioners'
allegations in their complaint. She alleged that she and her husband bought their
property in 1958 and, since then, have been in possession of the same. They
planted trees and crops thereon. Also, they have been paying the corresponding
realty taxes. She does not know petitioners who are all strangers in the place.
Before the hearing of the case, or on July 20, 1993, petitioners and Macapagal
entered into a Compromise Agreement. 2 Petitioners acknowledged therein his
ownership of the portions of the land consisting of 18,787 square meters covered by
OCT No. P-665. This agreement was approved by the trial court. After petitioners
had presented their evidence, spouses Calderon filed a demurrer to evidence. Trial
Court and CA dismissed petitioner's complaint.
Hence, this present petition.
Petitioners contend that the allegations of spouses Calderon that they purchased
their property and Macapagal's claim that he applied for a Free Patent are judicial
admissions which they (petitioners) consider as cloud upon their interest in the
disputed property.
ISSUE: Whether Spouses Calderon's purchase of the subject land and Macapagal's
free patent are considered as a cloud upon petitoner's interest?
HELD: No. Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein,
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.
As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created
by mere verbal or parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in property. This
rule is subject to qualification, where there is a written or factual basis for the
asserted right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription or adverse
possession has been held to constitute a removable cloud on title.
While petitioners alleged that respondents' claim of adverse possession is a cloud on
their (petitioners') interest in the land, however, such allegation has not been
proved. The alleged falsified documents relied upon by respondents to justify their
possession were merely marked as exhibits but were never formally offered in
evidence by petitioners. We have consistently ruled that documents which may have
been marked as exhibits during the hearing, but which were not formally offered in
evidence, cannot be considered as evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary
value.
It is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. 5 Petitioners
failed to do so. Parenthetically, they did not present any evidence to prove that
Casimiro Policarpio "existed" and that he is their predecessor-in-interest. Their
testimonies can not be considered declarations about pedigree. In order that
pedigree may be proved by acts or declarations of relatives under Section 39 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence, it is necessary that (a) the actor or declarant is dead or
unable to testify; (b) the act or declaration is made by a person related to the
subject by birth or marriage; (c) the relationship between the declarant or the actor
and the subject is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration; and (d)
the act or declaration was made ante litem motam, or prior to the
controversy. Records show that petitioners failed to establish by evidence any or all
the above requisites.
INC v. Ponferrada (G.R. No. 168943, 27 October 2006) - MOPPET
PETITIONER: INC (defendant)
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Ponferrada (Pres. Judge, RTC) and Heirs of Santos (plaintiffs)
DOCTRINE/S: A cloud is said to be a semblance of a title, either legal or equitable,
or a cloud of an interest in land appearing in some legal form but which is, in fact,
unfounded, or which it would be inequitable to enforce. An action for quieting of
title is imprescriptible until the claimant is ousted of his possession.
The owner of a real property… is entitled to the relief of quieting of title
even if, at the time of the commencement of his action, he was not in
actual possession of real property. After all, under NCC 477, the owner need not
be in possession of the property.
An accion reivindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the actual
and material possession of the property is on defendant and that plaintiff
seeks the recovery of such possession from defendant.
LAW/S INVOLVED: NCC 476, 477
FACTS:The heirs of Santos represented by Enrique Santos (son) filed a complaint
for Quieting of Title and/or Accion Reinvindicatoria before the RTC.
Plaintiffs alleged that during the lifetime of their father Mr. Santos, the owner of the
parcel of land in Quezon City covered by a TCT issued by the Register of Deeds on
July 27, 1961, he had been in possession of the owner's duplicate of said title and
had been in continuous, open, adverse and peaceful possession of the property. He
died on February 9, 1970 and was survived by his wife, Alicia Santos, and other
plaintiffs, who were their children. Thereafter, plaintiffs took peaceful and adverse
possession of the property, and of the owner's duplicate of said title. Sometime in
February 1996, plaintiffs learned that defendant INC was claiming ownership over
the property based on TCT No. 321744 issued on September 18, 1984 which, on its
face, cancelled TCT No. 320898, under the name of the Philippine National Bank,
which allegedly cancelled TCT No. 252070 in the names of the spouses Marcos and
Romana dela Cruz. Plaintiffs insisted that TCT Nos. 321744, 320898 and 252070
were not among the titles issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and even
if the Register of Deeds issued said titles, it was contrary to law. Mr. Santos, during
his lifetime, and his heirs, after his death, never encumbered or disposed the
property. In 1996, plaintiffs had the property fenced but defendant deprived them
of the final use and enjoyment of their property.
RTC: rendered a judgment to quiet the title of the plaintiffs over and/or recover
possession of their said property in the name of their deceased father
Defendant INC moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint on the following grounds: (1)
plaintiffs failed to faithfully comply with the procedural requirements set forth in
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the action (either
Quieting of Title or Accion Reinvindicatoria) had prescribed, the same
having been filed only on October 24, 2001 beyond the statutory ten-year
period therefor; and (3) that the complaint is defective in many respects. Further,
defendant averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
prescription. It argued that plaintiffs anchor their claim on quieting of title and
considering that they are not in possession of the land in question, their cause of
action prescribed after ten years. On the other hand, if the supposed right of
plaintiffs is based on accion reinvindicatoria, prescription would set in after 10 years
from dispossession. In both cases, defendant asserts, the reckoning point is 1984
when defendant acquired TCT No. 321744 and possession of the land in question.
Plaintiffs argued that the prescriptive period for the actions should be reckoned
from 1996, when defendant claimed ownership over the property and barred
plaintiffs from fencing their property, not in 1984 when TCT No. 321744 was issued
by the Register of Deeds in the name of defendant as owner.
RTC: denied defendant INC’s motion to dismiss; MR was likewise denied
CA: dismissed the petition and held that RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion
ISSUE/S: WON the CA erred in holding that the action for quieting of title and/or
accion reinvindicatoria has not yet prescribed? — NO
RULING: The nature of an action is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought by plaintiff, and the law in effect
when the action was filed irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only some of
such relief. As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, the action of
respondents was one for quieting of title under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Article 476 of the New Civil Code.
“Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein,
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.”
A cloud is said to be a semblance of a title, either legal or equitable, or a
cloud of an interest in land appearing in some legal form but which is, in
fact, unfounded, or which it would be inequitable to enforce. An action for
quieting of title is imprescriptible until the claimant is ousted of his
possession.
The owner of a real property, as plaintiff, is entitled to the relief of quieting
of title even if, at the time of the commencement of his action, he was not
in actual possession of real property. After all, under Article 477 of the New
Civil Code, the owner need not be in possession of the property.
An accion reinvindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the actual
and material possession of the property is on defendant and that plaintiff
seeks the recovery of such possession from defendant. It bears stressing that an
accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the recovery of ownership and includes
jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as well. It is an action whereby a party
claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.
Thus, the owner of real property in actual and material possession thereof may file
an accion reinvindicatoria against another seeking ownership over a parcel of land
including jus vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants from the possession
thereof. In this case, respondents filed an alternative reinvindicatory action claiming
ownership over the property and the cancellation of TCT No. 321744 under the
name of petitioner. In fine, they sought to enforce their jus utendi and jus
vindicandi when petitioner claimed ownership and prevented them from fencing the
property.
Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when they
filed their complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive period
for the reinvindicatory action had not even commenced to run, even if petitioner
was able to secure TCT No. 321744 over the property in 1984.
Ragasa v. Roa (G.R. No. 141964, 30 June 2006) - JERALD
DOCTRINE:
[I]t is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this
jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to
property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as
against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while
the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be
owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues
liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing
right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such
claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a
defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a
complainant when he is in possession. One who claims property which is in the
possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within the statutory
period.
LAWS APPLICABLE:
Article 476 and 480 of the Civil Code.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 3, 2000 order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 220, Quezon City dismissing petitioners complaint is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for
further proceedings.
FACTS:
On May 10, 1989, plaintiffs entered into a contract with Oakland Development
Resources Corporation for the purchase in installments of a piece of property, with
improvements, located at No. 06, Garnet St., Prater Village II, Diliman, Q.C.
covered by TCT No. 27946 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and more
particularly described in a photocopy of TCT No. 27946.
Immediately thereafter, plaintiffs took possession of the property covered by TCT
No. 27946 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and resided thereat together
with their relatives who continued to occupy the same whenever the plaintiffs would
leave for Italy where they both worked.
In March of 1992, plaintiffs were able to fully pay for the agreed purchase price of
the property covered by TCT No. 27946 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City
and accordingly, a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 12, 1992 was executed by
and between Oakland Development Resources Corporation and the original owners
copy of TCT No. 27946 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City accordingly turned
over to them.
However, despite the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Oakland Development
Resources Corporation failed to cause the transfer of title to plaintiffs. On the part of
plaintiffs, all the while they thought that the Deed of Absolute Sale and possession
of the original of the owners copy of TCT No. 27946 of Registry of Deeds for Quezon
City was more than sufficient to protect their rights and interests over the property.
Sometime March of 1999, during one of the trips of plaintiff Consorcia Ragasa to the
Philippines from Italy, upon learning that Oakland Development Resources
Corporation was no longer functional as a corporate entity, she decided to cause the
transfer of registration of TCT No. 27946 of Registry of Deeds for Quezon City
herself since the vendor thereof was apparently in no position to undertake the
same.
She was thus surprised to learn from the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City that on
April 14, 1995, the property in question was sold by defendant Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Quezon City [a respondent here] to defendants Sps. Roa [respondents here] as the
highest bidder for the price and consideration of P511,000.00 as shown in the
Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale.
The levy on attachment and the execution sale undertaken by the Ex-Officio Sheriffs
Office of Quezon City is clearly illegal there being no notice given by said individual
to the occupants of the property in question.
Furthermore, a casual perusal of the Sheriffs Deed of Sale will reveal that the
execution price of P511,000.00 is grossly inadequate to pay for real properties listed
therein with fair market values conservatively estimated at P3,000,000.00.
The case was raffled to Branch 220 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Instead of filing an answer, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the grounds of prescription and laches.
In an order dated February 3, 2000, the RTC granted the motion. Characterizing the
suit as an action upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff which, according to
Article 1146 of the Civil Code, must be filed within four years, the RTC held that
petitioners action was barred by prescription for having been filed more than four
years after the registration of the execution sale.
Seeking a reversal of the trial courts order dismissing their complaint, petitioners
proceeded forthwith to this Court with the present petition for review on certiorari
raising only a pure question of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners action was barred by prescription for having been filed
more than four years after the registration of the execution sale.
HELD:
No.
The trial courts order of dismissal was predicated on the theory that the suit
petitioners commenced was an action upon an injury to their rights contemplated in
Article 1146 of the Civil Code. That premise was erroneous. A reading of the
allegations in petitioners complaint reveals that the action was essentially one for
quieting of title to real property under Article 476 of the Civil Code which states:
Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud being cast upon
title to real property or any interest therein.
To make out an action to quiet title under the foregoing provision, the initiatory
pleading has only to set forth allegations showing that (1) the plaintiff has title to
real property or any interest therein and (2) the defendant claims an interest
therein adverse to the plaintiffs arising from an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and
in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. Thus, the averments in
petitioners complaint that (1) they acquired ownership of a piece of land by tradition
or delivery as a consequence of sale and (2) private respondents subsequently
purchased the same piece of land at an allegedly void execution sale were sufficient
to make out an action to quiet title under Article 476.
This being the case, Article 1146 (which refers to actions upon an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff and upon a quasi-delict) did not apply. Rather, considering
petitioners allegation in their complaint that from May of 1989 up to the present
date, plaintiffs [had been] in continuous and notorious possession of the property to
the exclusion of others and in the concept of owner[s] ― an assertion private
respondents never bothered to dispute ― our ruling in Sapto v. Fabiana should
apply:
[I]t is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made
applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code)
that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the
plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to
land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim
or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors
remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners
thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee
continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse
claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on
his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait
until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of
limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a
cloud from title can only be invoked by a complainant when he is
in possession. One who claims property which is in the possession
of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within the statutory
period.
Accordingly, petitioners action was not subject to prescription.
Mamadsual v. Moson (G.R. No. 92557, 27 September 1990) - JUED
FACTS: On November 14, 1988, Sps. Mamadsual filed a complaint against private
respondents et.al. for "Quieting of Title To Property, Annulment of Original
Certificates of Title Nos. P-122 and P-138, and Damages, With Application for Writ
of Preliminary Injunction" with the Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a District at
Cotabato City. Public respondent Register of Deeds of the same city was impleaded
as a nominal party.
After joining the issues and pre-trial commenced, presiding Judge Hon. Corocoy D.
Moson issued a pre-trial order defining the issues and directing the parties to submit
statements (shudhud) of at least two (2) competent witnesses on the issues defined
at the pre-trial conference and other evidence (bayyina) setting forth the facts and
the law relied upon within ten (10) days from notice.
Sps. Mamadsual filed the required sworn statements but private respondents failed
to do so.
Case was set in trial on the merits but it was postponed at instance of the private
repsondents. Private respondents filed a “Amplification of Affirmative or Special
Defenses with Prayer for Dismissal of Complaint On the Ground of Lack of
Jurisdiction.” The pleading averts the following grounds:
 Sps. Mamadsual have no title to the propery (subject matter of the case).
Hence, their action to quiet title is not proper. (Relevant assertion to the
issue)
 Further, SPs. Mamadsual are not proper parties in this case; that, it should
be the Solicitor General since inasmuch as it is one for reversion to the
state of the property
Sps. Mamadsual, on the other hand, answered the allegation averring:
 On the issue of no title to the property which is the subject-matter of the
case, plaintiffs contended that the title referred to by them in the complaint
means the legal title or ownership or dominion over the land in dispute
acquired by them from their ancestors by operation of the law on
succession
Shariá District Court, in applying Art. 477 of the Civil Code as suppletory to its
judgment, finds that in order that an action for quieting of title shall prosper, it is
necessary that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to the property which
is the subject matter of the action. Thus, Sps. Mamadsual have no legal or equitable
title to the land in question. Legal title means registered ownership and equitable
title meant beneficial ownership. Since the plaintiffs have no legal or equitable title
to the parcels of land in question, it is obvious that there is no cloud to be removed
or to be prevented from being cast upon. SDC dismissed the action.
Sps. Mamadsual MR but to no avail. Court found the title over the land is registered
in the names of the defendants, and the annulment or cancellation thereof is legally
possible only through an action for reversion by the state. If the case would be
treated as one for reconveyance of title, the period within which the same could be
brought had
already prescribed.
Sps. raised thos to SC through petition on certiorari under Rule 65 :)
ISSUE: WON lower court erred in finding that Sps. Mamadsual has no cause of
action on the ground that they have no legal or equitable title to the land
i question.
HELD: Yes. The lower court erred to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
action had prescribed.
A reading of the complaint shows that it is an action for quieting title. Therein, it is
alleged that petitioners are in "actual, continuous, and adverse possession" of the
land in question "since time immemorial" in the concept of owners.
An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession
of the property.
The trial court held that in an action to quiet title the plaintiff "must" have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
action." It interpreted legal title to mean registered ownership and equitable title to
mean beneficial ownership.
It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the
registered owner of the property in question.
In Chacon, 10 this Court considered the action to be one for quieting of title where
the plaintiffs alleged ownership and actual possession since time immemorial of the
property in question by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest,
while defendants secured a certificate of title over said property through fraud,
misrepresentation and deceit.
Thus, "title" to property does not necessarily mean the original transfer certificate of
title. It can connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an
owner thereof. Indeed, one who has an equitable right or interest in the property
may also file an action to quiet title under the law.
Go v. Looyuko (G.R. No. 196529, 1 July 2013) - VON
GR 196529 July 01, 2013 J. Mendoza
William T. Go v. Alberto T. Looyuko, substituted by his legal heirs
(Teresita Looyuko, Alberto Looyuko, Jr., Abraham Looyuko, Stephanie
Looyuko), Alvin, Amos, Aaron, David, Solomon, Noah (all surnamed
Padecio)
FACTS
 Alberto and Jimmy (brother of petitioner) were partners in a partnership
named Noah’s Ark Group of Companies.
 Said partnership was embodied in a written agreement in 1982.
 In 1986, William was appointed Chief of Staff of Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery.
 William was also allowed by Alberto, Sr. to occupy the townhouse in
Gilmore Townhomes in Quezon City.
 In the same year, another agreement was entered into by Alberto and
Jimmy in furtherance of Noah’s Ark.
 In 1998, per letter, Alberto demanded William to vacate the townhouse.
 Jimmy filed an adverse claim over the townhouse, annotating his interest
on the title as co-owner. Jimmy claimed that the townhouse was bought
using funds from Noah’s Ark and, hence, partnership property.
 William refused to vacate the townhouse on the strength of Jimmy’s
adverse claim.
 Later on, Alberto filed an unlawful detainer case against William before
MeTC. As evidence, Alberto presented TCT No. 108763 issued in his name
as well as the 1998 demand letter.
 Alberto alleged William’s occupancy by tolerance, on the understanding
that the latter would vacate upon demand.
 William, on his part, presented the 1982 and 1986 agreements, contract to
sell of the townhouse to Noah’s Ark, and the cash voucher evidencing
payment for the said property.
 In 2000, MeTC rendered decision in favor of Alberto stating that he had the
right to the possession of the said townhouse as its registered owner.
 William then appealed to RTC. Meanwhile, Looyuko filed a motion for
execution pending appeal on the ground that the supersedeas bond of
William was insufficient.
 William filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the ejectment case
because a complaint for specific performance against Alberto had been filed
by Jimmy before RTC Pasig to establish his alleged right as a co-owner.
 In 2001, RTC ruled in favor of William and deferred the proceedings in the
ejectment case to await the outcome of the civil case before RTC Pasig.
 RTC also denied Alberto’s two motions for execution.
 CA, however, reversed the RTC orders and directed the immediate
execution of the MTC Decision.
 In 2004, RTC issued a decision in the action for unlawful detainer,
reversing the findings of the MTC and ruling in favor of William.
 RTC held that the townhouse was purchased in the name of Noah’s Ark and
that Looyuko held the title for purpose of expediency only.
 RTC also gave credence to the affidavit and authorization executed by
Jimmy. The said documents stated that William’s authority to occupy the
disputed property was part of his privilege as Chief of Staff of Noah’s Ark.
 Alberto appealed to CA.
 In 2009, CA ruled in favor of Alberto held that the issue of possession could
be resolved without ruling on the claim of ownership.
 CA further stated that the TCT presented by Alberto unequivocally showed
that he owned the townhouse and, hence, he was entitled to its
possession. CA ruled that the validity of his title could be assailed through
a direct proceeding but not in an action for ejectment. Hence, a present
case.
 William is contending that Alberto is not the actual owner of the townhouse
but Noah’s Ark, and that he was allowed to use the property as part of his
 benefits and privileges as its Chief of Staff. Further, he contends that
Alberto failed to prove that he had prior physical possession of the
townhouse before he was unlawfully deprived of it, which is fundamental in
an ejectment case.

ISSUE/RULING
WON the ejectment case (unlawful detainer) can proceed without resolving the issue
of ownership – YES in some instances
 The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties. When the defendant, however, raises the
defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
 In the present case, considering that such an issue has been raised, and it
appears that it is inextricably linked to the question of possession, its
resolution will then boil down to which of the parties’ respective evidence
deserves more weight. Even granting, however, that all the pieces of
documentary evidence presented by William are valid, they will fail to
bolster his case.
 It is an age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is
entitled to its possession. It has repeatedly been emphasized that when the
property is registered under the Torrens system, the registered owner’s
title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked,
especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. It has even been held that
it does not even matter if the party’s title to the property is questionable.
 In the present case, Alberto’s TCT is, therefore, evidence of indefeasible
title over the property and, as its holder, he is entitled to its possession as
a matter of right. Thus, the partnership agreements and other
documentary evidence presented by petitioner William are not, by
themselves, enough to offset Alberto’s right as registered owner.
 It must be underscored, however, that this adjudication on ownership is
merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice the action between
Jimmy and Alberto involving their claimed shares in the title over the
property.

WON prior physical possession of the plaintiff in an unlawful case over the property
is necessary for the case to prosper – NO
 Sec. 1, Rule 70, ROC lays down the requirements for filing a complaint for
unlawful detainer, to wit. Said rule states that nowhere in said rule does it
appear that, in an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff be in prior
physical possession of the property. Thus, it has been held that prior
physical possession by the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement in
an unlawful detainer case brought by a vendee or other person against
whom the possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of a right to hold possession.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without prejudice to the outcome of Civil Case
No. 67921 before Branch 167 of the RTC of Pasig City. SO ORDERED.