| Immigration and Integration in Europe and North Anterica 7 immigration policy was shot through with racist intent until the 19608, immigration is a fundamental part of the country’s founding myths. The | opening of U.S. immigration policy to non-Europeans in 1965 coincided | with the civil rights movement, and there are important links between the ‘two. Multiculturalism everywhere owes its existence to the postwar human rights movement was a symbol and to 6 Work, Welfare, and Wanderlust Immigration and Integration in Europe and North America icular experience of African A\ though of even more recent vintage than is now a fundamental part of is, to be sure, taken more seriously by the than Western Canadians or Queheckers, but support for is higher in Canada than in almost the partial exception of ates did not base their identity o Iways very grating to see s Randall Hansen the country’s nat ‘Torontonian el both molticuleu any other country Europe and North America have long, diverged in their immigration pol iy put, Europe was from the early 1800s until the x9505 a conti whereas the United States and to a lesser degree Cans were quintessential countries of immigration, Canada and the United Stat ‘encouraged Northern European immigration with the goal of bu “Anglo-Saxon settler societies; Europe encouraged emigration with the go wa and unemployment (Germany, Italy} andi the United Kingdom). In the postwar years, based, excl tradiction between Germany's official claim that it was “not a country of migration” and the reality of substantial migration. There was in fact no contradic he statement was about whether Germany derived its iden- tity from immigration and whether immigration was wanted. It did not, and was not. Neither Germany nor the rest of Europe pursued a policy of the contrary, all European countries pursued goal of zero immigration. America, and Africa. European nation-states “They tried to harness the economic benefits of mass uns ‘ensuring that the migration was temporary. These efforts largely. mnal order that is common to Europe and Not America meant that the immigrants were bearers, and European courts frustrated national efforts to guarantee the migrants’ return. \ : ‘The result, by the x990s, was a demographic makeup that looked broa similar on both sides of the Atlantic. European and North American soci- ceties were multi-ethnic; the bulk of migrants and ethnic minorities lived i their cities; and {with i dominated by family reunification. For institutional reasons, their immigra- ive despite public immigration and integration po + that pul Germany, and Spain have expanded oppor' migration, the United Kingdom explicitly copied the Canadian points system, | (which assigns points based on age, education, and experience, and grants | encry to those with enough pi nd France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy cers in these countries view themselves as 8 over skilled migrants. Second, ew emphasis on turalism, particularly (but not on wa Morawska, “Integrating Imm ia Joppke, ed, Toward Assia loundmills:Palgeave, 1999) Liberal States: Policies sizonsip. Dnomigrants14 Randall Hansen countries ended primary migration (consisting of migrants with no fa fal ties to the destination country) and limited new migration to family reunification. ‘Migration to the United States Immigration to the United States took place in four waves? The first wave cceurred before 1820. Some 60 peteent were English immigrants but there onc go German sectarians secking religious freedom in Pennsylvan nd Spaniards secking converts in Florida and che Southwest’ “The second wave ‘occurred from 1820 0 1860, when mn immigrants ~ 40 percent of Which were Trish - traveled to the United to settle the frontier. In Boo, the American frontier was closed, and the thisd wove of migration, pesinning, in 1880, was diverted to industrial cities in the Northeast and Midwest. From 1875, Congress passed a series of restrictive measuscs ~ designed to keep prowtcates, coolies, and Chinese migrants out = but immelsho! ve mained at high levels. As the new century approached, howeves the com- position of the migrant strcams altered. In 1882» 87 perce of migrants aoe (gom Northwestern Europe and 13 percent from Southern and eastern Europe. Economic boom reduced emigr and by 1907 the proportions bad reverse came from eastern and Southern Europe, inch sndonly 19 percent were from Northwestern Europes This development the stage fora policy change that was meant to mark the ‘end of Ameri immigration history. sa anmmigraion soared, pro-immigration business battled restrictionist vine and interest groups — notably the populist Ameri ‘League and Immigration Restriction Le by three Harvard alu duced cessati te sestitionists won the aggument. The Immigration Act of 1917 all but ae ee Asian immigration, and the National Origins Acts of 192 and 1924 oejuced a quota sytem that capped the annual ineake of Y gration through a system of country-based quotas wspired by evgenic ‘pressure from Western Europe, ighty-one percent of migrants jing large numbers of Jews. set pol 5p Marin, °U.S. Immigrat from 1y00 tothe Present bid Immigration and Integration in Europe and North America 175 ideas about raci from any country to 2 percent of that country’ ‘States under the 1890 census. Gi Northern European character of U.S. immigration in 1890, the legislation effectively prevented nonwhite (and particularly non-Northern European) i With the exception of African Americans, who were spat and it ly segregated from mainstream US. society, the National Origins Acts froze the white, European makeup of late nineteenth century America. “The legislation stayed on the books until 1965, and as emigration pres: cure in Europe eased, s0 did immigration to the United States. The 195% MeCarran-Walter Act reaffirmed the quota system, and extended it to ensure that citizens of Europe's colonies wese excluded. Scholars in the r950s and ‘carly 1960s thought immigration to the United States wa: ‘and no one would have predicted the massive non-European mig began in the 1970s and continues to this day. The change that made it posse ble occurred in 1965. Inspited by Presiden 3 Kennedy's assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnston's landslide vietory, and a post-Civil Rights ‘Act sympathy for ethnic minorities, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1965.? The legislation scrapped the national origins quota, replaced it svith-a per-country limit of 20,000 and subjected the Western Hemisphere sey Reet-ever limit of 120,000. it also established a seven-category prefer nce eystern based on family ties, labor skills, and Cold War refugee claims. erhational disparities of wealth, the spread of cheap international travel, ‘and the pull of the American economy made the United States attractive to non-European immigrants. The 1965 legislation gave them, forthe fist time in four decades, the chance to immigrate. Suecesoive acts have tinkered with the system ~ the Western Hemisphere vas placed under the per-country limits in 1976, in 1978 a worldwide quots vf ago,coo was established (allowing the admission of Indachinese refugees) tnd in 1990 Congress caised the quota to 675,000 ~ but the basic struc: ture of the 1963 act remains intact. Today, there are four major types of to the United States.?° The largest category consists of relatives jved_ yearly immigration population in ingly white, nad King, roa Policy in Buitan snd the US," “saagene Meas Political lnerests, and Policy Variances World Politics, vol. 5}200. > naraliss Now (Cambyidge: Harvard Usi ity Press, 1997). 9 B Schuck, “Lotery Program (U «© Marin, “US. Iounigeation.” Hanson, Fnnnigration and Asylum.16 Randall Hansen ‘of US. immigrants; of the 850,000 immigrants admitted in 2000, $83,000 {65 pescent) were family members sponsored by a relative in che seat The second category is comprised of migrants (and their families) “admitted for economic or employment reasons ~ 107,000 (#5 percent) 1m sooo. Almost all of these individuals are already in the United States (for Example, on high-skilled temporary-work visa) and readjust cheir stats. ‘The third group is made up of “diversity” immigrants. Most of these enter through the controversial lottery program, which randomly grants full esi ‘Many of those receiving them The lottery system has been criti- cized for being highly politicize sveen 1990 and 1994, forty thousand “and for favoring the hucky over those who have waited in line for years. Te addition to these legal flows, there is substantial, probably massive, iitegal immigration to the United States each year. Hundreds of thousands of clandestine migrants enter the country every year, the result of the com- bination of proximity to poor sending countries {above all Mexico) vatiable demand in the informal economy (for cheap laborers, na housekeepers, and so on), and a reluctance on the part of officials v0 ‘eaforce employer sanctions against those hiring illegal workers, Government cHforte te combat such illegal immigration have focused on border control = expanded patrols, and a controversial fence berween the United States and ‘Mexico ~ but arrivals remain high. Migration Policy in Europe From the early 19708 t0 the late 19905, all European countries pursued 2er0~ 1d, as noted, unsuccessfully attempted to reduce their Jh (forced and voluntary) return and through lim- the same time, all EU member states are signato- of refugees, 95t conven! the EU), but due to le ‘recognition rates” are 10-30 percent across , and moral constraints on deportat they are not returned ithet In practice, asylum has been, and is recognized 1 Matthew Gibney and Randall Hansen, Deportation a Liberal State (New York: United ‘Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2008) ‘employers could apply for a temporary work permit the work permit mits we Home Office scrutiny. In Germany, postguestworker, noneti rors 19601985 1990 1805 2000 5004 igure 6.1. Net Migration, F0-rs, in Thousands. Note: Data includes corrections ‘due to population censuses, register counts, and so on, which cannot be classified Ss births, deaths, or migration. Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2005, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities to be by traffickers and migrants, an effective channel for lengthy if not permanent migration to Europe. The result of these two channels was net migration to Europe that ebbed and flowed not in relation to policy change but rather the strength of Europe’s economy (a pull factor) and economic, political, and environmental crises abroad {push factors). Figure 6.1 provides an overview of net migration to Europe since 1970. ‘The only way in which zexo-immigration policies were effective was in which European states have an difficult for in Burope to migrate there. In the U.K., ind, after four years, \der could apply for permanent residence. Work per- however, only exceptionally granted and were subject to intrusive igrants without fa immigration was effectively nonexistent. Across Europe, due to the migration “stop” of the early 19708, only two migrant channels were open: family reunification | and asylum secking, In Germany during the 19908, 90 percent of net migra- family migrants (75,000), asylum seekers (100,000),SS —_—_—"——S——s—s——“_‘_O_S—S x78 Randall Hanser Immigration and Integration i Burope and North America “The fact that only some 10 percent of snigeancs has led some commentators 10 tration. Harvard economist George Borias in part and ethnic Germans (100,000) In France fom 19% to 19995 78 Per ent of the migrants arriving annually Were family members (37,600) OF asylum seekers (23,000)? Int ced Kingdom in the mid-19908, 68 per ser arriving migrants were family members (48.40) or asylum seekers (3,700)-4 family i sive vals from developing countries such as Mexics the appeal of a particular country for a would-be the migrant’ skills, the financial incentive structure o “Migration Policy in the United Stares Every year, seme 800,000 10 1,000,000 people migrate to the United States other 300,000 405000 (although noone ENON definitively) she country the world’ largest single receiver smmigrants- Despite this, the fact thatthe system “organized around family Sponsorship means that itis exceedingly difficult for anyone without those Stare, Thee is no equivalent to the Canadian rae aividals to migrate to Canada solely om she basis of their though one is proposed, as discussed [aver in thi re Sosest thing the United States has to a direst immigration the lotery system, and the average applicant 15 Tikelier to gain jon to Harvard than win a lottery visa, Asa restlty would-be migrants epee nited Seates or must come to the United Stes “hough some nonmigcant legal channel and ‘adjust their status later, The” srr omnmon way for skilled migrants to do this iS obtain an Hr-B visa granted to workers witha bachelor’ degres of higher evel of education. The ann et of Hr-Bs is capped at 65,000 {it was temPOH ised to vipgjo00 during the technology boom), a fgvre thatis remarkably low forthe ‘orl’s premier immigration counery. ‘The United Kingdom, a country one ‘eh ofthe size ofthe United States, grants over 150,900 work permits per jority of which go to high-skilled professionals. After six years Me cmployer of Hi-B visa holders ean apply v0 SPE) them for immigrant vee but they have to seek certification from the US, Depastment of Labor eaaere armerican worker can fil the postion. The task is time consuming, ‘ence of the saintliest employers tax regimes (su ties to migrate to the Us are in the United States points system, whi class to the unski much smaller mi ‘he reverse is true in Europe, where the rewards to sh jes to the mes: the skilled from Europe, and the unski from he developing world. ts immigration policies block encouraging the latter, Because of th fe a larger house, a driver, and serv are lower, and a unskilled migration have sion and limiting family migration. His mod tem, he argues, is a national quota system hhas much intellectual and ps in an important xy in the on) diffuse." Added to this isthe fragmented nature of the U tem, which renders Congress highly porous to intescst SF0E pressure, 1, “Eranee: Republica ‘da, P-L. Martin and J-F.H {Stanford CA: Stanford + Feom and the Limits of immigration Contcol” in. 8) Weld ede, Cntrlling Immigration: A Global +s George Boras, eso’ Door: Jmigation Fly and the American Eno o 999) Press, 2005), re given to labor lar caused a stir when Sraeributed poor economic performance among recent iB to exces: 3 He argues that i is a function of ¢ country of ori- scl the financial incentive structure of the home count ‘The highly ircentive to migrate from countries wich high, Progressive othe Scandinavian countries, France, Germany, and AuS- tia) to the United States, where their skills provide much higher returns. By contrast, they will have an incentive t0 remain developing countries, avhore the eax system and inequality make these Feturhs higher than they “They will have an incentive to emain intive to migrate States thus faces ‘red entry opportunities for skilled grants, few come, whereas the ample OPPO icgal and illegal) for on, Borjas recommends expanding skilled migra" ‘whose point sys- ‘everything but name. The rec al support, but it is exceed- ce, Gary Freeman explained. red States, he concluded, is dominated by Gr vic benefits are concentrated (on the employer migrant) and the costs (for roads, health care, pensions, and so pasty 55° ‘where organized migrant, business, and ethnic lobbies are able to exercise 1272) 5, Nasions of Imnignats (Oxior Oxford Uaivesiy180 Randall Hansen disproportionate influence. Public opinion remains hostile to immigration, but che anti-immigration interest groups through which this hostility is chan~ neled are poorly resourced relative to business groups, and they face the fects of the antipopulist norm —the postwar, post-Holocaust dele gitimization of arguments against m an ethnic homogeneity. One can also effects. The federal government is a net winner through taxes, ant which have to pay for most infrastructure and social services used by i grants, are net losers. Immigration policy is made by Congress, The result is that immigration policy in the United States has a struc: tural tendency to being modestly expansive. In passing the 1990 immigra tion reform, Congtess began with the intention of reducing family migra ‘while expanding skilled migration, but was only able co increase sil bby considerably expanding all categories of migration, parti reunification, Immigration Policy since 2000 Following September 11, 2001, there was much talk about how terrorism ‘would transform immigration policy. Conferences were organized around the issue, and liberal academics fretted about conservatives’ supposed dra~ identify a single immigration mea~ g/tt. On both continents, eco- the United States, the cap of in the heady days of the 65,000 per year on H1-B visas proved, particul technology boom, inadequate. Following press Congress raised it to 115,000, and then again to 195,000.” In 200. menting a decision taken before the terrorist attacks, the figure fel 000, prompting another round of complaints from the business comint nity. U the terrorist attacks’ most noticeable effect in this area seemed to be keeping something from happening, namely Karl Rove's dream of moving tion and guestworker schemes for Me: be moving in this direction, although Democrats rather than Congressional Repu (June 2007), a comprehensive It has three components: a legal United States before 2007; a temporary guestworker program (for between 7 Macin, “U.S. Immi ion.” p. 57. Immigration and Integration in Europe and North America x8 yundred thousand and four hundred thousand people a year) for I sd workers; and the replacement of extended enter the United States wit sent a massive shift however, whether the straints, ‘The effects of ofxr were tional. From 1940, border the Immigrs ‘ment of Justice. The organization had few frie L will survive the aforementioned institutional con- irect and secondary. The first was institu dogmatic. The INS signed its own death watrant in February 2002, when it issued student visa extensions for two of the dead 9/rr hijackers, and in 2003 the Department of Homeland Security took over all border-control and immigration functions. smal controls. Since the attacks, Congress has power over aliens in and citizens of the United first post-9/rr act was passing th Providing Appropriate Tools Req to Intercept and Obstract le elaborated to produce the acronym USA PATRIOT Act.** The legislation broadened grounds for depor- tation, expanded the government's powers to tap phone and Internet commu- jon and to access private data (including health and financial records), allowed the Justice Department to investigate criminal behavior by citizens and residents without probable cause, and tripled the number of U.S. bor der control personnel, customs personnel, and immigr the northern border. The State Department, immedi subjected male visa applicants from twenty-six Middle Eastern particular scrutiny, and referred the applic approval. Fin: 1¢ Department of Justice launched a contro- ‘ersial roundup of foreign Muslims in the United States. They were subject, to questioning and, at the Justice Department's disereti tion, The latter led to a lengthy battle between the courts and the Justice Department, and the effort proved largely ineffective. Because of the broader absence of systematic internal controls in the United States (such as identi cards and mandatory registration of addresses), it was easy for tors to avoid detection and many simply disappeared. In spring of 2002, the Aristide Zales, in Gibney and Hai fxitors,lnmigrants and U.S. Border Security after September 13,2001," Tnmignation and Asyhor.182 Randall Hansen Justice Department admitted that it could find relatively few of 5,000 young intended to question, and that not one of the 762 individuals it detained was deemed a terrorist."? In Europe, the consequences of the attacks for immigration policy have Jy unremarkable, despite the fact that three of the September 11 bombers were members of a H. particular, the attacks High Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP). Under the program, the interion nts for age, educa~ tion, 3 they are granted a renewable temporary residenc the British Parliament considered an immigration bill that would subsume all migeation programs, including the HSMP and the work permit scheme, public support for immigration, In 2002, Germany drafted a comprehensiveimmigration bill that provided for the first time channels for permanent labor migration to Germany. Under it, highly qualified personnel with a job offer in Germany can apply for a combined work and permanent residence permit. The new law, which took effect January x, 2005, extends work permits to spouses, The interior minister at the time, Otto Schilly, also called for a points system for selecting, migrants without jobs in Germany, bu Countries elsewhere in Europe have followed this expansioni early 2005, Spain adopted a legalization program (following carly programs in 1986, 1991, 1996, and 2000-1) for hundreds of thousands of clandes- ‘ine migrants resident in the country. Some seven hundred thousand people applied by the deadline. At the same time, the government created a cat- alogue of high-demand jobs ~ truck driving, catering, domestic labor, and gram is notable in that it ex Previous immigration ref skilled workers. Tn some cases, the numbers have been High Skilled Migrant Programme and (pi Ibid, p. 675. Immigration and Integration in Europe and North America 185 law have had low take-up rates, but the direction of policy change is clear and significant, After two decades of expressing opposition to immigra- ion, Europcan governments have embraced it as inevitable and, over lesirable. ‘The shift has multiple causes, but the most important concerns the posi- tion of the European economy within the global market. Starting in 1995, Ametican economic growth accelerated. It appeared for a time that the United States had managed to double its noninflationary growth cate, from nn for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) « nization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPE 4-5 percent. The source of the new growth pote ductivity increase occasioned by new applications of information technology am) ‘The competition from the United States had two effe the major European economies faced labor shortages in the IT sector; during, the 2000 IT boom, Germany reported seventy-five thousand unfilled vacan- cies. Second, policy makers saw in the labor shortage one clear source of the latter’s immigration on Europe. First, Koreans, Chinese, United States. The Amer and (even) brain-drained Europeans had worked in the .an shadow stood behind Germany's first attempt led its policy of issuing twenty thousand visas for led, high-wage jobs, earning more than Euro 51,129 (DM 00,000) ual the “green card” progeam. Importantly, Germany announced this pol icy during a time of high unemployment and continued opposition to new icy is also designed to address a demographic time bomb. In vir- replacementleves:Italy’s address Europe's constant, then Ger require a net total of six hundred thousand to seven jgrants per year to make up the difference. By most mea- sures, this figure is beyond Germany's integration capacity can have the effect of rendering the depopulation process less dif can affect the age structure in 2 manner that might cushion ~ particularly in the context of later retirement ages ~ government programs under pressure through an aging population184 Randall Hansen [As in the United States, the most important changes since 2001 have occurred in domestic policy. Here the continent has become something ‘of the mirror image of what it was, Whereas from 1973 until the 19908 Europe treated old migrants with relative generosity while shutting out new migrants, since the 1990s Europe has become relatively open to new migrants while hardening its attitude and policy toward old ones. Following the events in New York and Washington, and particularly following terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, EU member states have expanded powers of det and deportation. In Germany and the United Kingdom, high-profile cal Islamists have been arrested and deported. In the United Kingdom, the hhome secretary, shortly after 9/1, passed legislation giving the government the right to detain indefinitely terror suspects whom it could not deport. In 12004, the House of Lords ruled that indefinite detention violated the Euro- pean Conv in 2005, the government proposed to replace the provi legisl lowing terrorists to be detained for rinety days without charge, but the proposal was defeated in the House of ‘Commons. ‘The significan gration policy. Christian Joppke identifies four pillars of Europe's new inte- gration framework® inclusion (where inclusion is understood as a ewoway process through which migramts and the receiv for th ral political values of the EU (with an attendant lowering of ‘emphasis on cultural recognition and cultural diversity); work (employment isa fundamental part of the integration process); and "The fist pillar can be viewed as at least partially hyperbolic and rhetoric: [As Joppke notes, the claim thar integration, to use the words of official EU publications, *is a dynamic two-way process of mutual accommodation” requiring changes on the part of migrants and the host society has become a platitude, but one should not forget its extreme improbal iver since the transition from nomadic to sitled life during the Neolithic Revo vmorled populations expected newcomers to adapt to their ways ~ when in do as the Romans do. ‘The idea that something as complex an the receiving society should change in response tothe arival of numeri rnigrants~_who, as individuals, are ontologic: of: That settled society would change asa reat Immigration and Integration in Europe and North America 185 but elevating this to an ethnical maxim ~ a should ~ is an unprecedented stance t© take. ‘The last three principles can be thus viewed as the most important, Across Europe, a range of pol implemented that aim to increase migrants’ and migrant chi ‘ensure their loyalty to basi pillars — work and language ~ are mutually reinforcing. In a ski ‘economy, mastery of the national language is basic to securing employment, jermany, Austria, and the Netherlands, there is evidence of poor, ing language competence among even s. Declining language competence is home country who do not speak t tendency to speak the sending country’s language at home. A recent Dutch report on arranged marriages makes the claim that 70 percent of Turkish ‘youngsters, 60 percent of Moroccan women, and so percent of Moroccan ‘men marry someone from their home country.#? following the Netherlands’ lead, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, and Germany sroduced obligatory or semi-obligatory (as in Germany) language courses that migrants must ente entry (or in the case of the Netherlands, beforeentry) or denial of permanent residence as a sanction for noncompliance. “The “respect” or “loyalty” requirement has two variants. The first cerns potential citizens, who must attend integration courses and/or take tests, before naturalizing. In the United Kingdom, candidates for naturalization ‘must prove their language al and society, and take an oath of in part because local officials noted that some of those naturalizing could not repeat the sentence-by-sentence oath and evidently did not understand what they were saying. In Germany, two states ~ Baden-Wiirtremberg and Hesse ~ introduced by the Linder) cern German institutions, history, ity, and culture, but some apparently grants in mind, Baden-Wiirtteraberg’s test asks about the applicant's views on forced marriage, homosexuality, and women’s rights, and Hlesse’s test asks whether they believe in Israels right to exist and a 1B 336.186 Randall Hansen Immigration and Integration in Europe and North America 387 seed to attract skilled migrants to compete in the global economy — and, refactor unique to Europe ~ the need to increase numbers 10 st8¥e ofa demographic crisis. In this policy area, Europe and che United States appear sant rowing together rather than growing apart: Second, the effects of Sins and the events since have been concentrated on both ts in 21 jomestc sphere, but in different areas. In the United States legislators have sought to expand powers to detain, qu and deport suspected. ave rises to expand powers of surveillance; and ro increase (or Crests the seerotpsion of inreasing) thei contro! over the county's bor des In Europe, policy makers have focused their efforts on individuals who are ia many Tong, term residents. A series of measures, which cprnmentators view as punitive although they rarely offer alvernani™ have beet implemented with the goal of increasing residents’ anguaB> skills and ng theie loyalty to the host society and its v ‘combination of playing good cop ~ expanding immigration = and ‘nce of loyalty and integration ~ might appear ‘tsa further basic difference between Furope and the United States’ experience of Jimmigeation: Whereas the United State intogeates migrants into work, Europe integrates them neo welfare.” sete ex provides data on ethnic minocty/migrant unemployment rases the two countries. “The results are striking.” among immigrants are at best double that of srorst over three times the national average. I rest 1.3 percent. What's mote, the lines move in opposite ines The longer migrants are in Canada or the United States ¢ they are co claim welfare benefits, whereas in Burope the reverse 0 Thus, the relative unemployment rate for foreigners in Europe — which includes woman's ight to be allowed out of the hosne without the company of a vormajative. The tests have been suspended pending court decisions on their constitutional validity. ‘The second concerns potential migrants, and andlor write tests asa condition of thelr migration. In France, since 2003, Jo percent of new migeants sign a “contrat ‘accueil et de Vintégeatios ‘eauiting, one day of civics instruction and, when deemed necessar) ranred hours of language instruction. As most f ily migrants tO reetpom ex colonies or Algeria, only onethrd of migran’s 7% enrolled in migrants (and, interest= suction and six hundred pewaf language classes. In a typically German compretse between the Hond-nosed right and the guilt-sidden left, the civics classes emphasize the any German nature of German culture (French baguete%> Teekish pitas), and, although the courses are obligatory there is no sanction for nopattendance In the ‘Netherlands, which embraced thetfuleuatism with an enthusiasm unparalleled ip Europe and which is now rejecting it with equal en integration rests are compulsory for ves and settled immigrants. They cost 350 Euros ast one hous, and aver Language, ecogeaphy and history. New migrais 6 subject to addi- i fore even taking the full test, they have (0 pass a See of sear the-phone examinations with Dutch officials, ‘which, if passed, aren to take the fll, written test at Dutch embassies “The preparation ont 63 Euros, and include a video showing two men xi coe nan (scenes that were edited out of films for some, me" Oeers wo fail ro take te full test within five years 9° fined. family reunification now has a specific clas basis: “Those wishing vanprira a spouse must be twenty-one and earn at Ieask 129 percent of the minimum wage. res them to take courses cases no longer immigran nental Europe, unemployment rates ional average, and at “America, the gap is at over Integrating into What? 1 prodoced new data, and the “The previously identified patterns suagest «Wo conclusions. First, there has me been a convergence ~ in poli {not in numbers ~ between Europe and: the United States on 1 or expanding, immigration channels for rNiled (and sometimes unskilled) migrants. Indeed in purely formal, legal sary the United Kingdom and Germany are now counts :minigsation toa greater degree than the United States; bo provide direct channels for migrants with no family connections. These developments are driven by one factor common to both Furope and North America ~ the perceived the exp has cemained. Indeed, che has been constant in pert188 Randall Hansen ‘rape 6.x. Relative Unemployment in Percentage of the Labor Force by Origin, 1995 Orig N99 Relative ‘Unemployment Born Overseas/ Born inthe Born Born in the Country Country Overseas__—_Total Country Belgium 83 195 23 Canad? 10.1 102 xo Denmack. 67 146 2a France mt 175 16 Germany? 7-5 35.0 20 13.6 33 207 3.0 6 rs 78 63 13 7 Dara for Canada are 1 For Geimany, data are not divided by place of bith Jer by “citizen” versus Snon both recent immigrants and long-term residents (and sometimes their chil- dren) ~ ranges from 2.2 percent in Germany and the United Kingdom to 5.4 percent in the Netherlands and Sweden, ‘What explains this difference? Europeans suggest that the migrants to North American have higher skills and more education. The data do not support this interpretation. Although there is a marked difference between the educational achievements of migrants to Canada and migrants to Europe {which is unsurprising given Canada’s migrants to the United States and those to Europe is st “Thus, more immigrants to the United States have completed postsce- ondary educatio immigrants to some European countries (Franc Belgium, or Germany), but there are also more immigrants (twice as many levels are roug! ‘The political left would argue that higher levels of social ex in Europe prevent migrants from enter ing the lattermost first, racism no doubt plays a role, but why certain ethnic minorities ~ such as the Indians and the Chinese Immigration and Integration in Europe and North America 189 ‘taste 6.2. Relative Level of Education of the Labor Force, 1995 Seer eee ee Relative Level of Education Less than First Level of Completed Completed Secondary Secondary Tertiary Education Education Education Other Country 3) ) (6) 3) Belgium 365 303 - bat 267 i Canadat 346 en ~ 373 - Denmark 545 - jot - France Born in country 478 = Born overseas 30.9 - Germany? Born in country 60.4 36 Born overseas 398 38 Netherlands Born in country 60.0 o4 Born overseas 27.6 sot x0 Sweden Born in country 20.3, 495 Born overseas, 22.9 BS United Born in country 40.5 34 oe Kingdom Born overseas | 51.8 28.1 - United Born in country 23.0 459 - States" Bom overseas 4ne2 392 - * Dara for Canada are fom 199%. © ForGermany, data arenot sdby place ofhireh ‘om 1990 and calculations ate based on figures for the pope in the United Racists are unl same point appl It is doubeful that racists could differentiate Indian/Paki Muslims in theory, or that they would want to in practice. ‘A more plausible explanation concerns the incentive structure faced by ‘Although the pro-migrant lobby ~ Proasyl in in the United Kingdom — often speak as if ful and The190 Randall Hansen determined actors. Migrating is not ea financial and personal — and more often than not guile leave friends and fami it requires considerable resources — individuals have to (orillegal) entry ttle or no social support, and have to rely on In Burope, legal migrants are granted the full range of benefits housing, health care, subsistence level social support ~ available to permanent residents and citizens. Much the same is true of illegal migrants. Ifthey claim asylum, as any rational migra will do, they are entitled to extensive, if not overly generous, social support, health care, and housing ‘The res I face the choice ss-than-buoyant mar ket and (because her qualifications will likely not be recognized} accepting a poorly paid and unrewarding position and, on the other, accepting comfor able, clean social housing and sufficient monthly support to eke out a living. “The choice should be clear. In the United States, a legal migrant will face the choice between work and starvation. The choice should be equally clear, and it is borne out by the data in Table 6.2. Despite broadly similar educational es work, and migrants to Europe do not. suburbs and elsewhere, much was made of the social deprivation affecting these areas. What was not mentioned was that the standard of housing, welfare benefits, and public safety were all at 4 level far above that of American urban ghettos; what was as bad, if not worse, was unemployment, often reaching, 40 percent. ‘The obvious solution for Europe would be a bit of tough love: Reduce or remove welfare benefits for migrants, and make it clear to them that tha they are welcome, but that their welcome is contingent on their willingness to center the labor market. In practice, the matter is much more complicated, for wropeans would view with repugnance the idea enjoyed by citizens might not survive a gourt challenge.** What this likely means is thata European government intebton rolling back migrant rights t nents would have to embed this in a general rollback of welfare » Yasmin Soysal, The Limits of Citizenship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994) Immigration and Integration in Europe and North America x98 state provision. Such a reform effort would naturally face substantial social opposition. Where does this leave Europe? In a bind. Due to the previously cited demographic developments, Europe will need substantially larger numbers of immigcants. Given intense international competition for skilled migrants and the greater attractions of the United States (the English language, lower taxes, and less regulation) for many skilled migrants, a substantial portion of these migrants will have to be unskilled. reform of social provision, European mig: low levels of employment, high levels of welfare dependency, and among cthnic minority communities. Perhaps Europe’s main hope lies in the fact that other pressures are pushing in this direction anyway. In France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, which collectively constitute almost two- irds of Europe's total GDP, the pressures of international competition have provision. The United Kingdom went down this road long ago, but France and Germany have more recently followed. In Germany, welfare benefits for the long-term unemployed have been reduced, and welfare has in some cases been made conditional on work. In France, during the spring of 2006, the conservative government sought to case restrictions on the firing of workers. Icis unclear whether or not these efforts imately succeed. If they do, these countries may be better prepared to cope with the sort of immigration levels viewed as normal in the United States. The corol economic inequality, more like the United States. Eur in matters of work, welfare, and immigration may ultimate convergence.