Hegel's Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy Karl Ameriks Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Sep., 1985), 1-35. Stable URL hitp:/flinks.jstor-org/sicisici=003 1-8205%28198509%2946%3A 1% 3C1%3AHCOKTP%3E2.0,CO%3B2-N Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is currently published by International Phenomenological Society Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hup:/www,jstororglabout/terms.hml. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. 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University of Notre Dame Ivan Soll has remarked that “Hegel’s entire program and conception of philosophy depended upon refuting Kant’s limitation of reason.”* But ‘while Soll discusses Hegel's attempts in this regard, he admits he has not “attempted to corroborate or criticize Hegel’s interpretation of Kant.”* Soll is not alone here, for even with the great renewal of interest in Hegel today," there has been surprisingly little critical discussion of Hegel's treatment of Kant, especially with regard to the difficult core of that treat- ‘ment, namely, the rejection of the two central components of Kant’s theo- retical philosophy: the transcendental deduction of the categories and the doctrine of transcendental idealism. ‘There have been a few helpful discussions of this subject recently, but none has given a systematic account of the distinction between these two crucial components in Kant’s own view and of the general nature and ground of Hegel's treatment of the distinction. Inthe following sections, | first offer such an account (in section 1) and then distinguish and evaluate Hegel's three types of objections to Kant’s deduction (in sections I-IV) and his three types of objections to Kant’s idealism (in sections V-VII). 1 argue these objections all fail because of a closely related set of errors, errors which are understandable because they concern some of the most Ivan Sol, A Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics (Chicago: University of Chicago Pres, 1969), pp. 48-49. id, pv " See, Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975): Rich ard Bernstein, “Why Hegel Now?" Review of Metaphysics 1 (1977): 29-60; William Maker, “Understanding Hegel Today,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 343-75 + See especially Jobn Smith, “Hegel's Critique of Kant,” Review of Metaphysics 26 (1975): 438-60; Ingtraad Gorland, Die Kanokritik des jungen Hegel (Frankfurt: Klos termann, 1966); and Klaus Dising, Das Problem der Subjetiviat i Hegels Logik {Bonn: Bouvier, 1976), pp. 109-20 HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT’S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY 1diffcul issues in Kane's philosophy. [also contend that these errors ilus- trate certain general patterns of approaching transcendental philosophy which are still very influential, and hence an especially appropriate route “back to Kant” in our own time is via the re-examination of Hegel's eri- tique of that philosophy.’ |. Hegel's treatment of Kant’s transcendental deduction turns out to be so closely connected to his objections to transcendental idealism that before any assessment can be made of his specific attacks, itis necessary to review the essentials of the general relation of Kant’s deduction to his idealism.* The point of Kant's deduction is basically the central claim of the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, that (1) there are determinable a priori principles for spatiotemporal experience, principles involving categories such as substance and causal- ity. The point of Kane's idealism is basicaly the central claim of the Tran- scendental Dialectic of the Critique, namely, that (2) metaphysically the spatiotemporal realm has a nonultimate status, so that whatever we or other beings such as God may be in themselves, such things in themselves cannot have intrinsic material properties. If we combine these points and add that (3) our objective theoretical knowledge” cannot transcend the realm governed by the principles of Analytic, we then get the lesson of the Critique as a whole, a doctrine which has been called Kant’s “restriction thesis,” namely, that (4) although our knowledge has a priori structure, it is all only phenomenal. Understood simply in these terms, the central claims of the Analytic and the Dialectic are independent in meaning, and in fact there are many philosophers who have accepted only the one or the other. However, the claims are not completely separated in the Critique for already in the deduction of the categories (asin the transcendental exposition of space) Kant discusses both points. That is, he first establishes the content and validity of certain a priori propositions, and then he asserts the transcen- * Imaddition, I believe this evaluation isthe precondition for any thorough assessment of Hege’s even more influential objstions to Kans practical philosophy, espedally since, a3 Sol emphasizes, Hegel's conceptions of truth and freedom give unique unity to this ‘theoretical and practical philosophy Introduction, pp. 73). This topic willbe the focus ofthe sequel to this paper. "CER. C. Walker, Kant (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 11-233 Kael “Ameriks, “Recent Work on Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” American Philosophical ‘Quarterly 19 (1982): 134 * By "knowledge" Iwill mean generally (without always making it explicit hereafter, as Kant does, “objective” or determinate as opposed to merely analytic or formal knowl- ee, and “theoretical” as opposed to practical knowledge, where practical knowledges any knowledge based on some premise asserting an obligation, 2 KARL AMERIKS