G.R. No.
L-35748 December 14, 1931 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE of the accused went to lived in the barrio of Santo Niño, in the same municipality; that
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN
ATIENZA, defendants-appellants.
VILLA-REAL, J.: Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicting them upon the information
of the crime of arson as follows: The former as principal by direct participation, sentenced
to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of cadena temporal, in accordance with
paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal Code; and the latter as accomplice, sentenced to six
years and one day of presidio mayor; and both are further sentenced to the accessories
of the law, and to pay each of the persons whose houses were destroyed by the fire,
jointly and severally, the amount set forth in the information, with costs.
Counsel appointed by the court to defend the accused- appellants de oficio, after
delivering his argument, prayed for the affirmance of the judgment with reference to the
appellant Martin Atienza, and makes the following assignments of error with reference to
Romana Silvestre, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in convincing Romana Silvestre as accomplice of
the crime charged in the information.
2. Finally, the court erred in not acquitting said defendant from the
information upon the ground of insufficient evidence, or at the least, of
reasonable doubt.
The following facts were proved at the hearing beyond a reasonable doubt:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with her
codefendant Martin Atienza from the month of March, 1930, in the barrio of Masocol,
municipality of Paombong, Province of Bulacan. On May 16, 1930, the complaining
husband, Domingo Joaquin, filed with the justice of the peace for that municipality, a
sworn complaint for adultery, supported by affidavits of Gerardo Cabigao and Castor de
la Cruz (Exhibit B). On the same date, May 16, 1930, the said accused were arrested on
a warrant issued by said justice of the peace. On the 20th of the month, they were
released on bail, each giving a personal bond of P6,000. Pending the preliminary
investigation of the case, the two defendants begged the municipal president of
Paombong, Francisco Suerte Felipe, to speak to the complaint, Domingo Joaquin, urging
him to withdraw the complaint, the two accused binding themselves to discontinue
cohabitation, and promising not to live again in the barrio of Masocol; Martin Atienza
voluntarily signed the promise (Exhibit A). The municipal president transmitted the
defendants' petition to the complaining husband, lending it his support. Domingo Joaquin
acceded to it, and on May 20, 1930, filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint. In
consideration of this petition, the justice of the peace of Paombong dismissed the
adultery case commenced against the accused, and cancelled the bonds given by them,
with the costs against the complainant.
The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to live in that of Santo Niño, in the
same municipality of Paombong.
About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her son by her former
marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo Niño, and under pretext of asking him
for some nipa leaves, followed him home to the village of Masocol, and remained there.
The accused, Martin Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with said Romana Silvestre,
followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas de la Cruz. On the night of November 25,
1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered together
with the appellants herein after supper, Martin Atienza told said couple to take their
furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it. Upon being asked by
Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to the house, he answered that that was
the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had
instigated the charge of adultery against him and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre. As
Martin Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything to him, not
even Romana Silvestre, who was about a meter away from her codefendant. Alarmed at
what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once to communicate with the
barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had just heard Martin Atienza say;
but they had hardly gone a hundred arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!"
Turning back they saw their home in flames, and ran back to it; but seeing that the fire
had assumed considerable proportions, Antonia took refuge in the schoolhouse with her
1 year old babe in her arms, while Nicolas went to the home of his parents-in-law, took up
the furniture he had deposited there, and carried it to the schoolhouse. The fire destroyed
about forty-eight houses. Tomas Santiago coming from the barrio artesian well, and
Tomas Gonzalez, teacher at the barrio school of Masocol, and Felipe Clemente, an old
man 61 years of age, coming from their homes, to the house on fire, saw Martin Atienza
going away from the house where the fire started, and Romana Silvestre leaving
it.lawphil.net
As stated in the beginning, counsel appointed by this court to defend the accused-
appellant de oficio, prays for the affirmance of the judgment appealed from with reference
to defendant Martin Atienza. The facts related heretofore, proved beyond a reasonable
doubt at the hearing, justify this petition of the de oficio counsel, and establish beyond a
reasonable doubt said defendant's guilt of arson as charged, as principal by direct
participation.
With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only evidence of record
against her are: That, being married, she lived adulterously with her codefendant Martin
Atienza, a married man; that both were denounced for adultery by Domingo Joaquin,
Romana Silvestre's second husband; that in view of the petition of the accused, who
promised to discontinue their life together, and to leave the barrio of Masocol, and
through the good offices of the municipal president of Paombong, the complaining
husband asked for the dismissal of the complaint; that in pursuance of their promise, both
under pretext for some nipa leaves from her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la
Cruz, who had gone to the barrio of Santo Niño, Romana Silvestre followed him to his
house in the barrio of Masocol on November 23, 1930, and remained there; that her
codefendant, Martin Atienza followed her, and stayed with his coaccused in the same
house; that on the night of November 25, 1930, at about 8 o'clock, while all were
gathered together at home after supper, Martin Atienza expressed his intention of burning
the house as the only means of taking his revenge on the Masocol resident, who had
instigated Domingo Joaquin to file the complaint for adultery against them, which
compelled them to leave the barrio of Masocol; that Romana Silvestre listened to her
codefendant's threat without raising a protest, and did not give the alarm when the latter
set fire to the house. Upon the strength of these facts, the court below found her guilty of
arson as accomplice.
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an
accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who
does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act
by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the
execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.
Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime
of arson committed by her codefendant Martin Atienza? Is it her silence when he told the
spouses, Nicolas de la Cruz and Antonia de la Cruz, to take away their furniture because
he was going to set fire to their house as the only means of revenging himself on the
barrio residents, her passive presence when Martin Atienza set fire to the house, where
there is no evidence of conspiracy or cooperation, and her failure to give the alarm when
the house was already on fire?
The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether
moral, through advice, encouragement, or agreement, or material, through external acts.
In the case of the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or
material cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her
mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute
cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to
commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a
subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
The trial court found the accused-appellant Martin Atienza guilty of arson, defined and
penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall be imposed upon:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited house or any building in
which people are accustomed to meet together, without knowing whether or
not such building or house was occupied at the time, or any freight train in
motion, if the damage caused in such cases shall exceed six thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas.
While the defendant indeed knew that besides himself and his codefendant, Romana
Silvestre, there was nobody in De la Cruz's house at the moment of setting fire to it, he
cannot be convicted merely arson less serious than what the trial court sentenced him
for, inasmuch as that house was the means of destroying the others, and he did not know
whether these were occupied at the time or not. If the greater seriousness of setting fire
to an inhabited house, when the incendiary does not know whether there are people in it
at the time, depends upon the danger to which the inmates are exposed, not less serious
is the arson committed by setting fire to inhabited houses by means of another inhabited
house which the firebrand knew to be empty at the moment of committing the act, if he
did not know whether there were people or not in the others, inasmuch as the same
danger exists.
With the evidence produced at the trial, the accused-appellant Martin Atienza might have
been convicted of the crime of arson in the most serious degree provided for in article
549 of the Penal Code, if the information had alleged that at the time of setting fire to the
house, the defendant knew that the other houses were occupied, taking into account that
barrio residents are accustomed to retire at the tolling of the bell for the souls in
purgatory, i.e., at 8 o'clock at night.
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that: (1) Mere
passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation
required by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime
witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent; and (2) he who desiring
to burn the houses in a barrio, without knowing whether there are people in them or not,
sets fire to one known to be vacant at the time, which results in destroying the rest,
commits the crime of arson, defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, Penal
Code.
By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows: It is affirmed with
reference to the accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference to the
accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted with
one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.
 [G.R. No. 143819. January 29, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GERRY
CUENCA y MEDRANO, JACKSON CUENCA (at large),
CRISANTO AGON y MAGPANTAY, and BERNIE AGON (at
large), accused, GERRY CUENCA y MEDRANO and
CRISANTO AGON y MAGPANTAY, appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.: The testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible and
positive, is sufficient to support a conviction for murder. Truth is
established by the quality, not necessarily by the quantity, of the evidence.
The Case
Gerry Cuenca and Crisanto Agon[1] appeal the February 7, 2000
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City (Branch 12) in
Criminal Case No. 0132-98, which found them guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt.
The RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GERRY CUENCA and
CRISANTO AGON, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, both as principals by
direct participation for having conspired and confederated with one
another in the commission of the crime of [m]urder, as alleged in the
Information dated March 27, 1998, and defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659
and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, to pay the heirs of Wilfredo Castillo the sum of P50,000.00
as indemnity for his death, the sum of P38,800.00, as actual damages, the
sum of P4,800,000.00 for loss of earning capacity, the sum of P20,000.00,
as moral damages and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
The period during which both accused are under preventive imprisonment
shall be deducted from their sentence.
Finally, let also warrants of arrest be issued against the accused
Jackson Cuenca and Bernardo Bernie Agon for their immediate
apprehension.[3]
On March 17, 1998, Lipa City Assistant City Prosecutor Mario
G. Mayuga filed the Information charging appellants and their co-accused
as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of February, 1998 at about 9:30 oclock in
the evening, at Barangay Tambo, Lipa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then
armed with bladed/pointed and hard instruments, conspiring and
confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually aiding one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery and grave abuse of superior
strength and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, beat and stab with the use of
said bladed/pointed and hard instruments, suddenly and without warning,
one Wilfredo Castillo, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds, which
directly caused his death.[4]
When arraigned on April 27, 1998, appellants -- with the assistance
of their lawyers -- entered a plea of not guilty.[5] Because their co-accused
were at large, trial on the merits proceeded only as against them.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[6] the Office of the Solicitor General summarized the
prosecutions version of the facts as follows:
On February 14, 1998, around 9:30 in the evening, while lying down with
his wife and family in his house at Module
Subdivision, Barangay Tambo, Lipa City, Batangas, Marcial Morillo[7] hear
d a commotion taking place outside his house. Dogs were barking loudly,
so he decided to go out of the house to see what was happening outside.
He then saw a man being mauled and beaten by four (4) persons. Upon
seeing the incident, he hid himself behind a PLDT telephone post. From a
distance of about ten (10) meters, he recognized the four (4) assailants as
Gerry Cuenca, Jackson Cuenca, Crisanto Agon and Bernie Agon, while
the person being mauled was Wilfredo Edok Castillo. Marcial knew the
four assailants and the victim for eight (8) years since they were all
neighbors, Gerry and Jackson being brothers and Crisanto and Bernie
being father and son. He witnessed Crisanto hold Edoks left hand while
Bernie held his right hand. Gerry was at Edoks front and to the right
while Jackson was at Edoks front and to the left and both were
beating Edok continuously. Gerry and Jackson each used a piece of wood
in hitting Edok several times on the face, head, chest and other parts of
his body. Edok tried to struggle but his efforts proved futile. Edok then
gave in, stooped down and eventually lost consciousness
(Lumug[m]ok na po siya). The four (4) assailants then carried Edoks body
with one holding on to his right arm, the other one x x x his left arm and
the other two each held the right and left leg[s] of Edok towards the
direction of Calabarzon Highway.
Thereafter, Marcial returned to his house but did not tell his wife about the
incident because she was nerbiyosa. He did not want the members of his
family to get involved in the incident because he feared for their
safety. The mauling incident lasted approximately twenty (20)
minutes. The place where the incident happened was illuminated by the
light coming from the moon and the electric bulb at the electric post which
was at the top of the roof of a house near the place of the incident.
The following morning, February 15, 1998, Marcial met Feliciano
Castillo, Edoks brother, who told him that they were looking
for Edok. Marcial did not mention to Feliciano that he had witnessed the
mauling of Edok because he was afraid that he might be implicated and
involved in the incident.
On February 15, 1998, around 2:30 in the afternoon, a neighbor named
Silo passed by Marcials house and told him that they were looking
for Edoks body. Marcial joined in the search in the forest for about one
hour and then he went home.
About 4 oclock in the afternoon of February 15, 1998, Feliciano dropped
by the house of Marcial and said that Edoks body had been found and
borrowed Marcials flashlight in order to help in the recovery of Edoks body
which was found inside a well in the forest. The body was retrieved from
the well which was about fifteen (15) meters deep. There were blood
stains around the well.Coconut trees surrounded the area. The body was
recovered between Masagana Subdivision and Adelina Subdivision, which
was a forested area and about one-half (1/2) kilometer from where the
mauling incident took place.
Around 4:30 in the afternoon of February 15, 1998, Feliciano reported to
the Desk Officer, SPO2 Alberto Libao of the Lipa Police Satation, that the
body of his brother, Wilfredo Castillo, had been found in the forested area
in Barangay Tambo. Thereafter, Police Inspector Romeo Mitra,
PO2 Enrico Tapalla, SPO4 Renaldo Saludo and SPO3 Pablo de Luna
were dispatched to the crime scene to investigate the incident. Feliciano
went with them. When Edoks body was retrieved, SPO4 Saludo noticed
the presence of stab wounds, blows and hematomas on his body. The
cadaver was then taken to Funeraria San Sebastian
at Balagbag, Lipa City.
About 7:30 in the evening of February 15, 1998, Dr. Corazon Sabile,
Health Officer of Lipa City, conducted an autopsy on Edoks body. The
physical examniation yielded the following results: there were nine (9)
injuries on the head, two (2) of which were stab wounds, one stab wound
on the right frontal area of the right ear which reached the skull and the
second stab wound also at his right ear; one (1) lacerated gaping wound
on the head; there were several contusions and hematoma on both eyes
which could have been caused by mauling, and hematomas on the
middle mandibular area and the lateral mandibular area (chin) which could
have been caused by mauling or the dumping of the cadaver in to the well;
there are also linear abrasions on the right lateral neck area that could
have been caused by forcible contact; there were nine (9) wounds on the
body, that is, four (4) stab wounds and five (5) abrasions; the first stab
wound was on the third intercostal space midelavicular area, the second
on the fifth intercostal space, right midelavicular area, the third on the
8th intercostal space midelavicular area, and the fourth [was] on the right
lumbar area; the said wounds were almost of the same depth, that is
5 cms; all of the said wounds could have been caused by a sharp pointed
instrument; she also found five (5) abrasion on the body, i.e., in the
left midscapular area, left infrascapular area, on the vertebral line, on the
right midscapular area and on the vertebral line; that the abrasions are
called gasgas and could have been caused by forcible contact; she also
found in the extrem[i]ties of the cadaver two (2) stab wounds on the right
anterior thigh 4 to 5 cms. deep; she also found three (3) abrasions on the
right forearm, left posterior arm and left posterior hand which could have
been caused by forcible contact. The internal examination on the victims
body revealed that 200 ml. of blood were found in the fleural cavity which
could have come from the perforations of the right ventricle of the heart;
the liver and upper lobe of the right lung were perforated; there were
complete fractures on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th of both ribs which alone
were sufficient to cause death. The mauling was aggravated by the
dumping of the Edoks body in the well. Considering the nature and
number of injuries Edok sustained, no medical attention and assistance
could have saved his life. The cause of Edoks death
was Hypovolemia secondary to multiple stab wounds.
On February 16, 1998, Marcial Morillo told Ruben Castillo about the
mauling incident which (Morillo) had witnessed on the night of February
14, 1998.
Bothered by his conscience, on February 17, 1998, Morillo went to
the Lipa Police Station to report the incident.[8] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellants gave the following narration of the facts:[9]
The defense maintained that in the evening of February 14, 1998 accused
Jackson Cuenca and Bernie Agon together with three
[V]isayan [C]alabarzon workers identified as Obet, Nognog and Ruel were
in the house of Yolanda Cuenca in the evening of February 14, 1998
at Brgy. Tambo, Lipa City about one kilometer away from the place
of Marcial Morillo, the alleged eyewitness, in whose place according
to Marcial Morillo the crime was committed. While these persons were in
said house of Yolanda Cuenca, they heard a voice calling for Jackson who
was identified as Wilfredo Castillo. Jackson Cuenca came out [of] the
house and asked Wilfredo Castillo what was the problem[;]
however, Wilfredo Castillo immediately hacked him who was wounded at
the right side of his back. Witness Yolanda Cuenca brought him inside her
house and attended to his wound. While bringing him inside the
house, Jackson was struggling to be free, [and] the
three Visayan [C]alabarzon workers visitors went outside and thereafter a
commotion took place. During the commotion, Yolanda Cuenca heard
somebody [utter] the words sobra-
sobra na angginagawa mo sa mga tao dito. The following day, February
15, 1998, two of the three Visayan Calabarzon Workers
namely Obet and Nognog arrived at the house of Yolanda Cuenca and
told her that she [would] say that she saw and heard nothing about the
commotion.
Accused Gerry Cuenca and Crisanto Agon were not in the house of
Yolanda Cuenca where the commotion took place [o]n the evening of
February 14, 1998 and they were not also near the house
of Marcial Morillo where the crime took place allegedly [o]n the evening of
February 14, 1998. On that time and date, they were at the house of
Roger Dimaculangan at Normanz Village, Tambo, Lipa City helping in the
preparation of food for the baptismal party on February 15, 1998. Other
than accused-appellants Andy Obille,
Benjamin Anterola and Romy Anterola and other people were there.
Accused-appellants vehemently denied that they were the ones who
killed Wilfredo Castillo alias Edok in the evening of February 14, 1998.[10]
The Trial Courts Ruling
The RTC convicted appellants because the lone prosecution
witness, Marcial Morcillo, was credible. It said: the Court believes and gives
weight to the candid, vivid and detailed account of the incident and positive
identification of all the accused by Marcial Morcillo, not only because it is
clear, straight-forward and devoid of any signs of artificiality, but also
because it vibrates with truth and sincerity.[11]
The court a quo held that conspiracy attended the killing:
In this case, Crisanto and Bernie Agon were each holding the hands
of Wilfredo Castillo, while the brothers Gerry and Jackson Cuenca helped
each other in beating him with a piece of [wood] about one (1) meter long
x x x. After Castillo slumped and lost consciousness, the four (4) accused
helped each other in carrying Wilfredo Castillo towards
the Calabarzon Highway going to the direction of Batangas City. Verily, at
the precise moment of the execution of the crime, the accused acted in
concert to accomplish a common objective to take the life
of Wilfredo Castillo. The fact that Marcial Morillo did not witness the actual
stabbing and killing of Wilfredo Castillo is of no moment.[12]
It disbelieved the defenses of denial and alibi.
Hence, this appeal.[13]
Issues
In their Brief, appellants fault the trial court with the following alleged
errors:
1. The honorable trial court erred in giving weight to the
testimony of the alleged lone
eyewitness, Marcial Mor[c]illo.
2. The honorable trial court erred in not considering that the
victim died of multiple stab wounds and not due to injuries
caused by a piece of wood.
3. The honorable trial court erred in not considering the
defense of alibi of accused-appellants in the appreciation
of the whole evidence presented by the prosecution and
defense.[14]
This Courts Ruling
After reviewing the records of this case, we find no cogent basis to
reverse appellants conviction. We however modify the award of civil
liabilities.
First Issue: Credibility of Lone Prosecution Witness
Appellants assail the credibility of Marcial Morcillo, the lone
prosecution witness. They contend that the trial court erred in giving full
credence to Morcillos testimony, because it was not in accordance with
common experience and observation of mankind.[15] We disagree.
We carefully reviewed the testimonies of both the prosecution and
the defense witnesses, as well as the other pieces of evidence on
record. We are convinced that the trial court did not err in giving full faith
and credence to Morcillos testimony, which we reproduce in part as follows:
Q On February 14, 1998, around 9:30 oclock in the evening, do you
remember where you were?
A I was inside my house sir.
Q Where was your house on that date, February 14, 1998, 9:30
oclock in the evening?
A At Module Subdivision, Tambo, Lipa City sir.
Q What were you doing around that time, 9:30 oclock in the evening
of February 14, 1998 inside your house in Module
Subdivision, Tambo, Lipa City?
A We were already lying down sir.
Q You said we, who were with you in your house?
A My wife and my family sir.
Q While you were then already lying down on that date, February 14,
1998 around 9:30 oclock in the evening, do you remember
x x x any unusual incident that transpired?
A Yes sir.
Q What was that unusual incident that transpired?
A There was a commotion of people sir.
Q How did you come to know that there was a commotion of people?
A My dog and the dogs of my neighbors were barking sir.
Q What did you do when you heard this commotion of people and
barking of the dog and the dogs of your neighbors?
A I went out of the house and looked for [what] the commotion was all
about[,] sir.
Q What did you see when you looked [for] where this commotion [was]
coming [from] or what was causing this commotion?
A I saw a person being beaten by four (4) persons sir.
Q Were these four (4) persons or in what place in relation to your
house where these four (4) persons beating one person?
A In the street sir.
Q How far is that place from your own house?
A About ten (10) meters sir.
Q Where were you when you saw four (4) persons beating one (1)
person?
A I was hiding behind [a] PLDT Telephone post sir.
Q From the place where you were hiding behind a PLDT Telephone
Post, how far [away from you] were these four (4) persons who
were beating another person x x x?
A 10 meters sir.
Q Were you able to recognize these four (4) persons who were
beating another person?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who were these four (4) persons whom you saw were beating
another person.
A Crisanto Agon, Bernie Agon, Jackson Cuenca and
Gerry Cuenca sir.
Q Of these (4) persons whom you named
Gerry Cuenca and Crisanto Agon were the persons whom you
pointed [to] a while ago [among them]?
A Yes sir.
Q Were you able to recognize the person whom these four (4)
accused were beating?
A Yes, sir. I recognized him.
Q Who was that person who was being beaten by these four (4)
accused, Gerry Cuenca, Jackson Cuenca, Crisanto Agon and
Bernie Agon?
A Edok Castillo sir.
Q Do you know the complete name of this Edok Castillo?
A I quite remember, it is Alfredo Castillo, sir.
Q And how were Gerry Cuenca, Jackson Cuenca, Crisanto Agon and
Bernie Agon beating this Edok Castillo?
A The father and son were holding Edok Castillo and the brothers
were beating him sir.
Q When you said that the father and son were holding Edok Castillo
while the brothers were beating him, who are you referring to
when you said the father and son?
A Crisanto Agon and Bernie Agon sir.
Q How was Crisanto Agon holding Edok Castillo while the brothers
were beating Edok Castillo?
A The father and son were holding [both hands of] Edok Castillo.
Q What hand was Crisanto Agon holding?
A Left hand sir.
Q How about Bernie Agon, what hand of Edok Castillo was he
holding?
A The right hand sir.
Q How about Gerry Cuenca? Where was he positioned in relation
to Edok Castillo when he was beating Edok?
A Right front portion of Edok Castillo sir.
Q How about Jackson Cuenca, where was he positioned in relation
to Edok Castillo while he was beating Edok Castillo?
A He was standing towards the left front of Edok Castillo sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Aside from stooping down, what else was Edok Castillo doing while
he was being beaten by Gerry Cuenca and
Jackson Cuena and while
Bernie Agon and Crisanto Agon were holding his two hands?
A He lost consciousness sir.
Q Why do say that he lost consciousness?
A Lumugmok na po siya.
Q But before Edok Castillo actually fe[l]l or lumugmok what was he
doing while he was being beaten up?
A He could not do anything anymore sir.
Q After Wilfredo Castillo [fell] or lumugmok, what did Gerry Cuenca,
Jackson Cuenca, Crisanto Agon and Bernie Agon do to him if
they did anything more?
A [T]hey carried him towards Calabarzon, sir.
Q By the way, how many times did Gerry Cuenca and
Jackson Cuenca hit Edok Castillo?
A I could not remember, but he was hit several times, sir.
Q In what part or parts of the body of Edok Castillo was he hit
by th[o]se beating [him up], if he was ever hit?
xxxxxxxxx
Witness pointing his face, to his head, to his chest and to his
right face below the eye.
Q You said that after Gerry Cuenca and Jackson Cuenca [beat]
up Edok Castillo while he was being held [by] his two (2) hands
by Crisanto and Bernie Agon, he fell down or lumugmok[and]
he was carried to Calabarzon[;] what do you mean by
this Calabarzon?
A The highway going to Batangas sir.
Q How did the four (4) carry Edok Castillo towards the Calabarzo[n]
which is the road according to you going to Batangas City?
A They help[ed] each other in carrying him sir.
Q How did they carry actually this Edok Castillo?
A The two (2) were carrying him by [both his] hands[,] one [holding] on
each hand and the other two (2) were holding on [both his] feet
sir.[16]
On cross-examination Morcillo consistently maintained, despite
intense grilling and repeated attempts of the defense counsel to discredit
him, that appellants were the ones who had mauled the victim. True, the
defense counsel tried to impeach his credibility during the cross-
examination by leading him through an intricate and annoying maze of
questions that resulted in minor inconsistencies in his testimonial
declarations. Nevertheless, Morcillo remained steadfast in his narration of
what he had witnessed on the night of February 14, 1998.
So long as the witnesses testimonies agree on substantial matters,
inconsequential inconsistencies and contradictions dilute neither their
credibility nor the verity of their testimonies.[17] In the instant case, the
inconsistencies cited by appellants are insignificant and immaterial to the
essential fact testified to -- the killing of the victim.[18]
As a rule, this Court will not disturb the factual findings of the trial
court, because it had a better opportunity to observe the demeanor and
conduct of the witnesses while they were testifying. Indeed, its assessment
of the witnesses and their credibility is entitled to great weight and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of significance and value.[19]
This Court has ruled in a number of cases[20] that the testimony of a
single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient for conviction because
truth is established not by the quantity, but by the quality of the evidence.
Second Issue: Cause of the Victims Death
Appellants also contend that Morcillo did not see how the victim was
stabbed. All he said was that he saw them beat up the victim with a piece
of wood. Thus, they said that the trial court erred in concluding that the
deceased had succumbed, not to multiple stab wounds, but to injuries
caused by a piece of wood.[21]
In the absence of direct evidence, appellants may be convicted on
the basis of circumstantial evidence. The latter is defined as that which
indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which
the factfinder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is
essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon
free.[22]
Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict if the following requisites
concur: (1) more than one circumstance is present, (2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The totality
of the evidence must constitute an unbroken chain showing beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, to the exclusion of all others. [23]
To require direct eyewitness testimony when circumstantial evidence
is sufficiently established would, in many cases, expose society to felons
who would be unreasonably set free.[24]
In the present case, the postmortem examination shows that the
victim sustained multiple lacerations and abrasions plus eight stab
wounds.[25] The following pieces of circumstantial evidence show beyond
reasonable doubt that appellants are responsible for the killing:
 First, Morcillo positively identified appellants as members of the
group that had ganged up on the victim and mauled him near his residence
around 9:30 in the evening on February 14, 1998.
Second, the witness saw appellants acting in unison -- beating up
then carrying towards the Calabarzon Highway -- the unconscious body of
the victim.
Third, the victims corpse was recovered the next day inside a well,
which was less than a kilometer away from the place of the mauling.
Fourth, the victim suffered from multiple stab wounds, abrasions,
contusions and lacerations, all of which indicated that he had been heavily
beaten up. This was consistent with the narration of Morcillo on how he saw
appellants maul the victim less than 24 hours before the dead body was
discovered.
Fifth, appellants were the last persons seen with the victim before he
died.
Sixth, the other accused, Jackson Cuenca (brother of Appellant
Gerry Cuenca) and Bernie Agon (son of Appellant Crisanto Agon) fled from
their residence in Lipa City, and they have continuously evaded arrest up to
the present.
Finally, Morcillo had no ill motive to testify against appellants.
From the foregoing circumstances, it is undisputed that appellants
were physically present at the locus criminis and its immediate vicinity, and
that an eyewitness positively identified them to be members of the group
that had mauled and removed the victim from the crime scene prior to the
discovery of his corpse.
Third Issue: Defense of Alibi
Well-settled is the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses,
because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. For alibi to prosper, it
is not enough for the accused to prove that they were somewhere else when
the crime was committed; they must likewise demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time.[26]
In the case before us, appellants claim that at the time the crime
happened, they were at the residence of Roger Dimaculangan, which was
located also at Barangay Tambo, Lipa City. Dismissing this claim, the RTC
said:
Alibi and denial are inherently weak and easily contrived. This is why the
accused must prove with clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to have been present at the place and time
the felony was committed. This the accused failed to do. The distance
between the house of Roger Dimaculangan, where both accused claimed
to be at the time the f[e]lonywas committed and the locus criminis is just a
few kilometers away. It can be travelled in a few minutes by bicycle. Thus,
it was not impossible for Gerry Cuenca and Crisanto Agon to leave and,
after killing Wilfredo Castillo, return to the house of Dimaculangan without
anybody noticing their absence. In any event, alibi and denial cannot
overcome the categorical and credible testimony
of Marcial Morcillo identifying both accused as among those whom he saw
helping each other in holding and beating Wilfredo Castillo and thereafter
carrying him towards [C]alabarzonHighway going to the direction
of Batangas City. Basic is the rule that positive identification prevails over
denial and alibi.[27]
Thus, it was not physically impossible for appellants to have been at
the scene of the crime on the evening of February 14, 1998, notwithstanding
their friends testimonies that they were also at the Dimaculangan residence.
Conspiracy and Treachery
The trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty of murder
because treachery, which was alleged in the Information, had attended the
killing.
On this point, the trial court aptly explained:
Article 14 (16) of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods o[r] forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specifically to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. In the instant
case, Crisanto and Bernie Agon were holding both hands
of Wilfredo Castillo, while Gerry and Jackson Cuenca were beating him
with a piece of wood on the different parts of his body. Wilfredo Castillo
was unarmed and defenseless. Hence, treachery was present.[28]
Treachery is present when the following conditions are present: (1)
the means of execution employed gives the victims no opportunity to defend
themselves or to retaliate, and (2) the means of execution are deliberately
or consciously adopted. In this case, the prosecution succeeded in showing
that appellants, together with their co-accused (who are still at large), helped
each other in ensuring the execution of their nefarious intention to beat up
and kill the victim who was unarmed and with no opportunity to defend
himself.
The prosecution was likewise able to show that there was
conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement and decide on the commission of a felony.[29] It is not necessary
that there be direct proof that the co-conspirators had any prior agreement
to commit the crime; it is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective.[30]
Despite affirming appellants conviction, we nonetheless modify the
monetary awards.
The award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto for the loss of the
victims life is in accord with prevailing jurisprudence.[31] Likewise, the award
of P20,000 as moral damages is reasonable. However, the actual damages
granted is improper and should be reduced from P38,800 to P7,300
considering that only the latter amount, representing burial expenses, was
duly supported by receipts. The unsubstantiated balance of P31,500 should
be deleted.[32]
We also find the court a quos award of P4,800,000 for loss of earning
capacity to be improper. True, in People v. Verde,[33] we granted an award
for the loss of earning capacity to the heirs of the deceased despite the
absence of documentary evidence to substantiate such claim. We deemed
the testimony of the victims wife sufficient to establish the basis for the grant.
However, the new ruling in People v. Panabang[34] modifies this principle
and now precludes an award for loss of earning capacity without adequate
proof. The bare testimony of the brother of the deceased Felicisimo Castillo
that, at the time of his death, Wilfredo Castillo was earning P250.00 daily as
carpenter[35]is not sufficient proof.
In Panabang, we held that the indemnification for loss of earning
capacity must be duly proven. Justice Jose C. Vitug, expressing the current
view of the Court, wrote:
Indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual
damages which must be duly proven. A self-serving statement, being
unreliable, is not enough. The father of the victim has testified on the
latters monthly income of P12,000.00. But for lost income to be recovered,
there must likewise be an unbiased proof of the deceaseds average, not
just gross, income. An award for lost of earning capacity refers to the net
income of the deceased, i.e., his total income net of expenses.
x x x.[36] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED but the actual
damages awarded by the RTC is REDUCED from P35,850 to P7,300 while
the grant of P4,800,000 for loss of earning capacity is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29481 October 31, 1928
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PAMBAYA BAYAMBAO, defendant-appellant.
Gullas, Misa, Gullas and Tuano for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Pambaya Bayambao was charged with the crime of murder, was found
guilty thereof by the Court of First Instance of Lanao and sentenced to
twenty years' cadena temporal, the accessories of law, costs and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000.
He does not deny having caused the deceased's death. He alleges,
however, that he did it by mistake, believing the deceased malefactor who
attacked him in the dark. He thus related the occurence:
A. While my wife was cooking she called out to me saying,
"Pambaya, Pambaya, someone has thrown a stone at the
house." So I took my revolver and went down. Having gone
under the house, I looked around, but did not see anybody;
however, I did not go far because I was alone. Then, while I
was near the staircase, about to ascend, I heard a noise and
saw a black figure that rushed at me, with hands lifted up as if
to strike me, and becoming frightened, I fired at it. 1awph!l.net
Q. Why did you shoot him? — A. Because I thought he was an
outlaw and he also thought that I was another outlaw, but found
out later that it was my brother-in-law.
Q. Why did you not shout before shooting? — A. I had no time
because the man was already near, when I saw that black
figure with uplifted arms behind a pillar, and fearing he would
attack me with his kampilan or dagger, I shot him before he
would kill me.
Q. Why did you think that black figure was an outlaw? — A.
Because my wife screamed that there were evildoers below,
and in our place ther are many outlaws, and those outlaws hate
me because I help the Government to collect taxes. Some days
before, there was killing near my house, a soldier killing two
outlaws.
Q. After you had fired at that black figure, what did you do? —
A. After having fired, I waited a moment to see if he had other
outlaw companions, and I was prepared to go up and get my
gun. As I did not see anybody else, I cried out, "Brother-in-law,
come down, Imo, bring a light." At that Imo and Morid came
down with a light and we discovered that the person who was
moaning was my brother- in-law. Upon seeing him I ran
towards him, embracing and kissing him, saying: "Forgive me, I
thought you were an outlaw," and he answered: "And I also
thought you were an outlaw." (Pages 33-34, t.s.n.)
The wife of the victim gives another version of the occurrence. She
testified that when the accused's wife informed him that someone had
thrown a stone at the house, the accused suggested that the deceased go
down and see who was throwing stones at them; that the deceased went
down and told the accused that there was no one under the house; that
thereupon the accused, telling him to wait there for he was going to use
his flashlight, went down carrying an automatic revolver in his right hand
and a flashlight in the left; that, on coming downstairs the accused asked
the deceased if the hens there belonged to him, and the latter asked the
accused to focus his light there in order to gather all the hens together;
that at this the accused shot the deceased, whose wife peered out of the
door and saw her husband with the accused focusing his flashlight on him
and then firing at him again; that the deceased told Pambaya that he was
wounded; that the deceased's wife upbraided the accused telling him that
he did wrong, and asked why he had shot the deceased; that the accused
turned upon her telling her to shut up or he would shoot her also.
Morid, widow of the deceased, is the only witness testifying to these facts.
Her testimony is uncorroborated. The alleged ante-mortem declaration
contained in the document Exhibit B, is of doubtful authenticity, because,
while the justice of the peace and the witness Urunaga state that such
statement was made by the deceased, Constabulary Lieutenant Cramer,
who arrived at where the deceased was a few moments before said justice
of the peace positively states that the deceased could no longer speak.
Consequently, he could not very well have the alleged statement. Of
Course, it appears that it was not the deceased who wrote it, but Urunaga,
and upon a typewriter. It does not appear that the deceased read it or that
it was read to him, or that the deceased acknowledge it as his own
statement. This proof of identity is indispensible for the admissibility of
such an ante-mortem declaration as evidence. (People vs. Dizon, 44 Phil.,
267.) We cannot give any probatory value to document Exhibit B.
Alone and uncorroborated, therefore, stands the testimony of Morid,
which, besides being incongruous in parts, is flatly and shoutly denied by
the accused and his wife. Considering the circumstances of the case, it is
very improbable that, without a previous dispute or even an exchange of
words, the accused should suddenly and unexpectedly attack the
deceased. The disagreement that, according to the latter's widow, arose
between the accused and the deceased ten days before the incident, has
not been proven in the record, and it is inconsistent with the conduct of the
two during the subsequent days up to time of the incident, with both living
peacefully and sleeping together in the same house on the night in
question, a few moments before the occurrence, according to the
testimony of Morid herself.
On the other hand, the accused's narration seems natural. And as it is
corroborated not only by his wife's testimony, but on some points by that
of Lieutenant Cramer and Sergeant Tumindog, to the effect that
immediately after the occurrence the accused betook himself to the
commanding officer of the place in order to give an account of the incident,
and to ask for prompt medical help for his unexpected victim, it cannot but
produce in the mind a conviction that what happened to the unfortunate
Mangutara was an accident, without fault or guilt on the part of the herein
appellant.
The latter, on that occasion, acted from the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of an ill at least equal in gravity, in the belief that the deceased was a
malefactor who attacked him with a kampilan or dagger in hand, and for
this reason, he was guilty of no crime and is exempt from criminal liability
(art. 8, No. 10, Penal Code.)
Furthermore, his ignorance or error of fact was not due to negligence or
bad faith, and this rebuts the presumption of malicious, intent
accompanying the act of killing. In an case, this court acquitted the
accused (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488), and we deem the doctrine laid
down in that case applicable to this one.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellant acquitted, with
costs de officio, and the other pronouncements in his favor. So ordered.
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted
murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos
Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan,
Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house
of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya
that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between
them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he
would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at
Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the
instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's
bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said
room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her
home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the
room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One
witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We
will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will
come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The
court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was
guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of
the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article
4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal
Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room
on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the
crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime
was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt
and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was
intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not
because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but
due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and
his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art.
3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at
that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is
possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This
seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has
been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea
should have set about doing the deed, employing
appropriate means in order that his intent might
become a reality, and finally, that the result or end
contemplated shall have been physically possible. So
long as these conditions were not present, the law and
the courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised
Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something
quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would
constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article
4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense
against person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either
(a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its
nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11There must be either impossibility
of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible
crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would
not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances
where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the
consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his
hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet
and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he
thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in
said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People
vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot
where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the
latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his
intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the
attacking party imagined where he was, and where the
bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to
kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this
country that where the criminal result of an attempt is
not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in
the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these
facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the
criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his
intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he
was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court
explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not
committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason of
the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that
way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented
from committing the murder. This rule of the law has
application only where it is inherently impossible to
commit the crime. It has no application to a case where
it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed,
either by outside interference or because of
miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit
the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no
application to the case when the impossibility grows out
of extraneous acts not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted
robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court
quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves
punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one can
seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires
the punishment to be administered, equally whether in
the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was
supposed to exist was really present or not. The
community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again:
Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and
what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words,
excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be
carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt
takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of
victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the
victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of
attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by
Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder
against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve
the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the
American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided
for impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United
States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this
matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the
said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the
offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators
and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories:
legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime
is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committed had the circumstances been as the
defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in
reality the crime was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to
avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was
indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law
governing the matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and
consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter
without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed.
However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's
knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt
but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the
state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal
attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal
legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of
this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such
provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be
criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that
intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of
attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time
as such legislative changes in the law take place, this
court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of
criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is
factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal
liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime
where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act
is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime.
On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment,
the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an
impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no
such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a
defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are
recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely
a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent
impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article
4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act
an impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder
because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent
of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a
person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons
or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ."
In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the
offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is
an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED,
the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of
Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an
impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of
the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and
degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer
the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory
penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
[ GR No. 72964, Jan 07, 1988 ]
FILOMENO URBANO v. IAC +
DECISION
241 Phil. 1
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urbano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner
Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of
Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with
water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed.
Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened
and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked
them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and
Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and
demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them
ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the
handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm
of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was
then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who
hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said
bob, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict
further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from again
hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought
Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident
happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo
Solwen but not finding him there, Emilio looked for Barrio Councilman
Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with
Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As
suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The
group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian,
who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr.
Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned
to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico- legal examination. Dr.
Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28,
1981) which reads:
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
"This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20
years of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:
"1-Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser
palmar prominence, right.
"As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This
wound was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was
already treated by the other doctor, (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to
settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical
expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by
Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable
settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter
(Exhibit "A"), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
"Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/1030H/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties
appeared before this Station accompanied by Brgy Councilman Felipe
Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close
relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness
to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical
treatment, and promising to him and to this Office that this will never be
repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other." (p.
87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3,
1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the
presence of Barangay Captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the
Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to
the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo
Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a
healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital.
The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
"Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX: TETANUS
Still having frequent muscle spasm.
1:30 AM
With
#35, 421 difficulty opening his mouth.
1 1-15-80 Restless at times. Febrile
Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. 1M.
Sudden
cessation of respiration and HR after
muscular spasm. 02 inhalation
administered. Ambo bag
resuscitation and
cardiac massage done but to no
avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao
at 4:18
P.M. PMC done and cadaver brought
home by relatives." (p. 100. Original
Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with
the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan
City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court
found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision
mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier,
in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New
Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of
the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano
on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased
to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The
motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain
Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
"That in 1980. I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such position
in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
"That sometime in the first week of November. 1980, there was a typhoon
that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San
Fabian, a town of said province;
"That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued-irrigation
dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or
controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches
were regulated and reduced;
"That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to
the canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields. the water in
said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching
mudfishes;
"That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected,
with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
"That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, 1 saw the late
Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some
companions;
"That few days thereafter, or on November 15, 1980, 1 came to know that
said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus." (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended xxx." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is
criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for
all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v.
Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631)
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who
used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on
his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after
the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition
and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was
the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he
was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court
said:
"the claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened
from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which
covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True,
that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of
his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said
wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus
which ultimately caused his death.
"Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the
victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus.
And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus
except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981).
Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound
which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is
that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act.
(Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C.; People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v.
Cornel, 78 Phil. 418)
"Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was
due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being
properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation
canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a
desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found
himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive
that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled
hand." (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death
of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses
found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus
when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco
plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like
tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound.
The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing
at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got
infected with tetanus. However, as to when the wound was infected is not
clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1 181), we adopted the
following definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
"xxx A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38,
pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in
their brief. It is as follows:
"*** 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient
intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which
would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus
"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days.
However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days.
A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms
occur within 2 or 3 days of injury, the mortality rate approaches 100
percent.
"Nonspecific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and
headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and
difficulty swallowing. As the disease progresses, stiffness gives way to
rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In
fact, trismus is the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible
for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved,
rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus
sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite
variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms
develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most
muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms
encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, an
interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation
period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are
caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery,
which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive
contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful
and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli
produce more intense and longer-lasting spasms with increasing
frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic
contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation.
Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and
death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days
and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but
dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild.
Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and
onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are
present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The
criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset
time of 72 hrs,, or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent
prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal
Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Italics supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a
man's-body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident
took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980,
he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms.
The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild case of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however,
died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion
is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe
form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstances surrounding Javier's death, his wound
could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical-consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's-death
must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil.
1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled
in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 1 18):
"'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent
act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances, which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause.' (45 C.J. pp. 931 -93.2)."(at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of
criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting
slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this
respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident,
Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano
defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor
offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16)
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and
remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case.
It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability.
The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may
still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y
Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
"xxx While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence
is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559)
"The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt
him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by
the Code Commission as follows:
"'The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt
in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning
followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded.
"'This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate
and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the
other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the
offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other
that Article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: 'There
may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the
public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be
extinguished.' It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to
be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also
punishable by the criminal law?
"'For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the
reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will
close up an inexhaustible source of injustice a cause for disillusionment
on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.'"
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed
by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the 'indemnification was
based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the
homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly
examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs
of the victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the
testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and
from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings
rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or
to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt
as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which
there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts
disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27,"
Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto,
deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27"
as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in
August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the
house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of
the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side
of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height.
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure
means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but
one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door
and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had
received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the
door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard
no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed
open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth
of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant,
fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If
you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the
knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the
darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by
the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar,
though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown
back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate,
Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a
desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately
recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to
his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to
secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the
incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant
was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on
friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that
when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his
companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and
gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants
employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at
their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after
the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon
returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the
stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs
and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said
that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced
open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals
suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on
his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the
room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong
believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the
military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty
by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty
prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate,
Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do
a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal
liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the
following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be
entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his
fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a
dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under
such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such
an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's
thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he
persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in
a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite
his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available
weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without
waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron."
That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge
was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no
such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed
he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of
the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be
held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act
for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed
them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the
actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.
To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged
ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact
is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary
ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder,
malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal;
except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the
penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the
provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even
though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal
Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited;
Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596;
Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only
question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential
element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and
penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given
of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not
specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense
must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be
held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions
subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is
exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of
the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general
rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and
offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring
that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless,
the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal
intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein
defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as
are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed,
and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act
committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be
observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little
distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference
whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a
great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked
upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in
the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this
disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime,
the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is
greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm"
(Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having
proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was
of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished
by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be
voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur
criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different
from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word
"voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent,
and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong
or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies
and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition
of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870,
because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being
implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be
said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually
intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or
imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions
of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime.
(Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon
by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that
where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm,
without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if
there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there
is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for
example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following
language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the
malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to
cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that,
whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the
appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime
because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which
characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal
negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the
following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or
malice or their absence in the commission of an act defined and
punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact
submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an
essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined
becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are
as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done
with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision
correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave
crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through
simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according
to their discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article
81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty
prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the
first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next
one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words
"criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission
of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent),
negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute
to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful"
sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more
frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the
milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable
excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the
thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not
merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English
and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and
"malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful"
or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not
often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the
definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with
malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a
criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be
found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil
intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with
numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in
the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private parties
the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not
always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
 There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other
words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can
not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or
mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should
be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of
our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an
offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find
this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the
modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us
such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself
does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito
factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not
my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal
jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause
to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms
more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if
without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally
guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of
an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and
with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious
authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse,
whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on
the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is
misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to
what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him
though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for
the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and
large array of cases there cited.)

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference
to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without
any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result
of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground
of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm
judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of
excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard
around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes
the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from
his neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by
God to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he
did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever
a person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems
not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates
him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads
the want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of
wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited,
will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law,
superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the
law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless
his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to
290.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of
this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and
on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol
demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief
that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his
life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will
doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be
innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he
would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such
circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the
presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or
assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1
of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person
slain had a felonious design against him, and under that supposition
killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such
design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or
excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the
probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's
case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule
that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward
which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the
him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using
same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature
violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached
to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their
near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing
B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of
these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have
the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only,
always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of
and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable
certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
man say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had
question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158,
been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require
notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been
that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and
said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists
ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely
only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the
take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered
law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids."
that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be
supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity
therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by
with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia
Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat
facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed
analogous to those in the case at bar.
offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without other light than
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil
reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was
in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always
attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not
there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The
see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion
guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and
(Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54
took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and
Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and
Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28
afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown
Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith,
lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person
and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the
was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he
circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made,
learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of
and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected
cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who
to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he
confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his
acted.
father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great
 grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and
responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more
illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he
exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in
Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he
under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from
behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child,
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with
reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his
which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the
bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in
such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they
might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he
was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he
use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because
the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his
assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of
the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such Separate Opinions
strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether
there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear,
not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower TORRES, J., dissenting:
court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational
necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that,
4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence,
court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) . defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as
the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts
situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant
was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted
saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking
almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any
distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had justifiable motive.
before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me,"
and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned
ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am the accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month
ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and
receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both
from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.
as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense
under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code?
The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only
found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but
not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the
attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one
day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on
his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting
under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the
person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness
and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the
shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada,
Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is

awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window — at
this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted,
and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house
would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley
adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning
was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt
from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all
of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law?
The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there
existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt
him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for
the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months
of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the
supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in
firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by
threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of
his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada,
p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that
the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm
belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief,
 [G.R. No. L-17958. February 27, 1922.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-
appellee, vs. LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-
appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PIRACY; ARTICLES 153, 154 PENAL CODE; WHETHER I
FORCE. — The provisions of the Penal Code relating to piracy are not
inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in the United States.
2. ID; ID. — Those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the
crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, are
still in force in the Philippines.
3. ID; ID.; ID. — Article 153 of the Penal Code now reads as
follows: "The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States
and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation at war
with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua. If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent
subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished
with the penalty of presidio mayor."
4. ID; DEFINED. — Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on
the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi and in the spirit
and intention of universal hostility.
5. ID; JURISDICTION . — Piracy is a crime not against any
particular State but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may
be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crime has no territorial
limits.
6. ID; ID. — It does not matter that the crime was committed within
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral
to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
7. ID; INSTANT CASE. — One Moro who participated in the crime
of piracy was sentenced to death and another to life imprisonment.
8. PUBLIC LAW; CRIMINAL LAW; EFFECT OF TRANSFER OF
TERRITORY. — The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily
changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution,
the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the
government, remains in force.
9. ID.; ID; ID. — Laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed
to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a
municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they
are altered or repealed.
10. ID.; ID.; ID. — Wherever "Spain" is mentioned in the Penal
Code, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever
"Spaniards" are mentioned the word should be substituted by the expression,
"citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands."
DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when the picturesque
buccaneers Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts
gripped the imagination, when grotesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished,
seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record
before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but
stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible
case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch
possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one
individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and
children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands
of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded
by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked
for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo,
attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by
methods too horrible to described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with
the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes
were made in it, with the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of
fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were
succored. Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating them,
the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At
Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian,
Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were
charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A
demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the
grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts
did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine
Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had,
and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and
sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return
together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the
offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of coprax which had been robbed, or to
indemnify them in the amount of 942 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the
costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by
the attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain
questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the
crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the
high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit
and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in
the lower court and as is gain done in this court, that the Court of First
Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes
humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against
all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country
where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is
against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those
limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U. S. vs. Furlong
[1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this
court for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the
Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Articles 153 to
156 of the Penal Code read as follows:
"ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed
against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not
at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty
ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
"If the crime be committed against
nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty or presidio
mayor.
"ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes
referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding
article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or
death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in
the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:
"1. Whenever they have seized some vessel
by boarding or firing upon the same.
"2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by
murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries
specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four
hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of
article four hundred and sixteen.
"3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of
the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title
IX, of the book.
"4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned
any persons without means of saving themselves.
 "5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the United States, shall be punished with a penalty
the pirates. ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
"ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of "If the crime be committed against
this title as well as all others of this code, when Spain is nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of United States, it shall be punished with the penalty
the national territory. ofpresidio mayor."
"ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the We hold those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the
provisions of this code, every person, who, according to crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Philippines.
Spaniard shall be considered as such."
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the Penal Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the
United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena
to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense
sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means
consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States or the of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to
characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this
corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance
municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code,
they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Island, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
[1885], 114 U.S., 542.) circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was
deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its
These principles of the public law were given specific application
commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means
to the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19,1889,
were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must
to General Wesley Merritt, the Commanding General of the Army of
also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore,
Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
"Thought the powers of the military occupant are absolute and here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of
supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes
inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect our duty to impose capital punishment.
private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the
crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible
propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and
with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the
appellantLol-lo (the accused who raped one of the women) but is not
occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are
unanimous with regard to the defendant and appellant Saraw, since one
allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,
member of the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In
substantially as they before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the
far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion." (Official Gazette,
judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is
Preliminary Number, Jan. 71. 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt's
affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of
Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with
156 of the Penal Code of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall
Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos. pay a one-half part of the cost of both instances. So ordered.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand,
same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory
||| (People v. Lol-lo, G.R. No. L-17958, [February 27, 1922], 43 PHIL 19-27)
provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must
necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this
respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress
shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S Const. Art. I, sec.
8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary
ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the
crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought
into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim.
Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The
framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let
a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in
the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding
provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the
United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the
articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is
mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and
wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the
expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands." Somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United
States vs. Smith ([1919]); 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as
found in the penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer
comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in
the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal
Code would read as follows:
"The crime of piracy committed against
citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-27586. June 26, 1970.]
ERNESTO CUENCA Y CUEVAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Arsenio O. de Leon for petitioner.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C.
Borromeo and Trial Attorney Josefina Domingo-De Leon for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW, ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS: SECURITY GUARD
ENTRUSTED WITH FIREARM AND AMMUNITIONS, NOT GUILTY OF CRIME; CASE
AT BAR. — Appellant security guard of the Bataan Veterans Security Agency, which was
duly licensed to operate as such security agency, cannot be held guilty of the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions owing to the failure of the owner, manager
and/or operator of the said security agency to comply with his duty to obtain such license
before he got said firearm and ammunitions and delivered the same to his employee,
herein appellant.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS. — The reason is that appellant was entitled to assume that his
employer had the requisite license to possess said firearm and ammunitions and to turn
them over to him while he was on duty as one of the regular security guards of the
Bataan Veterans Security Agency, the same being a duly licensed security agency. As
such, those dealing with it, either as clients or as employees thereof, are entitled to
presume, in the absence of indicia to the contrary — and there were none in the present
case — that it has complied with pertinent laws, rules and regulations. What is more,
Jose Forbes had told appellant that the firearm and ammunitions in question were duly
licensed, and, as an employee of the agency, appellant could not be expected to demand
from his employer proof of the veracity of the latter's assertion before relying thereon.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DECISION IN THIS CASE RESTRICTED IN APPLICATION. — This
decision must be restricted in its application to duly licensed security agencies and to
regular security guards thereof.
4. ID., ID.; ID., OWNER OR MANAGER OF LICENSED SECURITY AGENCY LIABLE. —
The owner, manager and/or operator of the security agency who failed to secure the
requisite license — in the case at bar, Jose Forbes, as the owner and operator of the
Bataan Veterans Security Agency — should be prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearms and/or such other crime as may have been committed in consequence of the
breach of the laws and regulations regarding the operation of a security agency and use
and issuance of firearms and ammunitions.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, C.J p:
Appeal, by certiorari, taken by defendant Ernesto Cuenca y Cuevas, from a decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Manila, convicting him
of the crime of illegal possession of a firearms and seven rounds of ammunition and
sentencing him to imprisonment for one year also to pay the costs, as well as directing
the confiscation and forfeiture of said firearm and ammunition.
The facts, as found by the trial court, and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
"The accused was a special watchman and security guard
of the Bataan Veterans Security Agency. In that agency,
they were more than forty security guards. It was the
practice in the agency that when the security guards
reported for work, they were provided with firearms and
ammunition, which they would return after their tour of duty.
"On January 3, 1963, the accused was detailed at the
Philippine Savings Bank as security guard. He was wearing
the uniform of the agency and was armed with a pistol,
Ithaca, .45 cal., with Serial No. 1009738, which had a
magazine containing seven rounds of ammunition. The
firearm and the ammunition were provided by the agency.
The firearm was not always used by him alone, as at other
times the same firearm was used by the other security
guards. On the date and at the place mentioned, Pat. Paul
Sabate, who was stationed at Plaza Miranda as security
officer of the stage show, arrested the accused for illegal
possession of the said firearm and ammunition. When
asked to produce his license to possess the firearm and
ammunition, the accused told him that he was a special
watchman and security guard of the Bataan Veterans
Security Agency to which the firearm and ammunition
belonged, and the license to possess the same was in the
office of the agency. The accused told Pat. Sabate that the
owner of the agency was one Mr. Forbes, who had the
license for the said firearm and ammunition. According to
Pat. Sabate, the agency was under the supervision of the
Manila Police Department.
"It appears that the agency has no license to possess the
firearm and ammunition in question; hence, neither the
accused nor the agency is a licensed possessor of said
firearm and ammunition. The accused claimed that he was
made to believe in the agency that Mr. Forbes had license
to possess them."
The issue in this case is whether appellant is guilty of the offense charged, considering
that, at the time above-mentioned, he was a regular security guard of the Bataan
Veterans Security Agency, which was duly licensed to operate as such security agency;
that, in the course of its regular operation, the same provides its security guards, who are
in the discharge of their duties as such, with the usual firearms and ammunitions, which,
at the end of their respective shifts, are either kept in the proper locker or returned to the
agency and then delivered by the latter to the security guards assigned to the next shift:
that the firearm and ammunitions in question were found in appellant's possession at the
time when, and at the place where, he was actually discharging his duties, wearing the
corresponding uniform, arm band and badge; that upon being asked by Patrolman Paul
Sabate to produce the requisite license, appellant stated that the same was in the
possession of Jose Forbes, the owner and operator of the Bataan Veterans Security
Agency, of which he (appellant) is, and has been, since April, 1961, one of its
approximately forty (40) security guards; and that, soon thereafter, Jose Forbes
confirmed, in the police station, the statements made by appellant, but added that he
(Forbes) was still in the process of getting the said license.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted appellant herein, despite his protests of
good faith, upon the ground that the crime of illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition is not malum in se, but malum prohibitum, and that it, accordingly, requires
neither malice nor evil purpose or intent. It should be noted, however, that the Bataan
Veterans Security Agency is duly licensed to operate as such. Consequently, it may
legally engage the service of competent persons to discharge the duties of special
watchmen and security guards, and provide them, as such, with the corresponding
firearms and ammunitions. The agency is thus supposed to obtain the license necessary
therefor. Had it done so, there would be no question about the absence of any criminal
liability on the part of appellant herein for the possession of the firearm and ammunition in
question, even though the license were not in his name, but in that of the agency or its
owner and operator, Jose Forbes. Hence, the query boils down to whether or
not appellant is guilty of the crime charged owing to the failure of Jose Forbes to comply
with his duty to obtain such license, before he got said firearm and ammunition and
delivered the same to his aforementioned employee.
Upon mature deliberation, the Court feels and so holds that the answer must be in the
negative. The reason is that appellant was entitled to assume that his employer had the
requisite license to possess said firearm and ammunition and to turn them over to him
while he was on duty as one of the regular security guards of the Bataan Veterans
Security Agency, the same being a duly licensed security agency. As such, those dealing
with it, either as clients or as employees thereof, are entitled to presume, in the absence
of indicia to the contrary — and there were none in the present case — that it has
complied with pertinent laws, rules and regulations. What is more, Jose Forbes had told
appellant that the firearm and ammunition in question were duly licensed, and, as an
employee of the agency, appellant could not be expected to demand from his employer
proof of the veracity of the latter's assertion before relying thereon.
We are not unmindful of the danger posed by the possibility or probability of abuse or
misuse of the license of security agencies to operate as such. The danger arises,
however, when said license is granted improvidently, without taking the necessary
precautions therefor — prior to and subsequently to the issuance of said license — in
terms of adequate measures to see to it, inter alia, that the agency is a trustworthy and
responsible one; that it is properly managed by persons possessed of the moral character
necessary therefor; that only those having the requisite qualifications are engaged as
security guards; that suitable rules are adopted and enforced governing their discipline,
and the assignment, care and custody of firearms and ammunitions, as well as the
keeping of registers and the entry therein of annotations or memoranda setting forth, at
all times, the locations and/or disposition of each one of the aforementioned firearms and
ammunition that the operation of the agency is effectively supervised by the Government.
Needless to say, this decision must be deemed restricted in its application to duly
licensed security agencies and to regular security guards thereof. Moreover, the owner,
manager and/or operator of the security agency, who failed to secure the requisite license
— in the case at bar Jose Forbes, as the owner and operator of the Bataan Veterans
Security Agency — should be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and/or such
other crime as may have been committed in consequence of the breach of the laws and
regulation above referred to.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and herein appellant,
Ernesto Cuenca y Cuevas, accordingly, acquitted, with costs de oficio. Let a copy of this
decision be served upon the City Fiscal of Manila for appropriate action in accordance
with the preceding paragraph, with due advise to this Court of the action taken hereon. It
is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
||| (Cuenca y Cuevas v. People, G.R. No. L-27586, [June 26, 1970], 144 PHIL 457-461)