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    Levinas The Trace PDF

    Uploaded by

    Bornay Bornay

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    SE eee ee eee eee es eee eee eee eee Te T IIT EMMANUEL LEvINAS The Trace of the Other 1, BEING AND THE SAME ‘The Lis identification in the strong sense; itis the origin ofthe very | phenomenon of identity. The identity of che lis noe the permanence of an unalterable quality; Iam myself not because of some character trait which I first identify, and then find myself to be the same. Ie is because I | am from the firs che same—me ps, an ipseity—that I can identify every object, every character trait, and every being. ‘This identification is noc simple “restating” of the self The “A is A” that characterizes che I is an “A anxious for A," of an “A enjoying A, always an“"A bent over A.” The outideof me solicits ie in need: the outside © of me is fr me. The tautology of ipscity is an egoisen. ‘The true cognition where the I “leaves ic to him” and lets an alien being shine forth does noc interupe ths original identification, does not | ig hi os ncn ogi eccain ds tue knowledge. In becoming a theme, it does indeed retain a foreign- ness with respect to the chinker that embraces it. Buc it at once ceases to “ scsike up against thought. The alien being is as it were naturalized as soon as it commits itself with knowledge. In itself and consequently dlsewbere ehaa. ia thought, other than it—it does not have the wild barbarian characer of alterity. It hasa meaning. The being is propagated | in infinite images which emanate from it; it dates ina kind of ubiquicy | and penetrates che inwardness of mea. Ie shows itself and radiates, as | though the very plenitude of its altrity overflowed the mystery thac harbors, and pro-duces itself. Though it surprised ehe I, a being that is | inreuth does not alter the identity ofthe I. The obscurity from which i comes is promised to research. fe thus opens afocure whose night is but | the opacity produced by the density ofthe superimposed transparencies. ‘Memory brings back the past itself and puts i into this fueure in whi research and historical interpretation wander. The traces ofthe irrevers- ible past are taken a sigas that ensure the discovery and unity ofa world. Excerpted fom Emmanuel Levinas, “La Trace de L'Aucre,”eenslated by A. Lingis, Tijdcbrf wor Philaopbie ep. 1963), 605-23, \ 345 oL SARAARBABAAAABABAAAAAAARAARABAALAALABAALBRABR 346 ExaeaNven Lavina ‘The priority of the furure among the “ecstasies” of time constitutes knowledge as comprehension of being. This prioricy bears witness tothe adequateness of being with chought. The idea of being with which philosophers interpret che ireducile alienness ofthe non is thus cut to the measure of the same. Ie isthe idea that is of itself adequace. ‘The being of beings—difference in itself, and consequently alcerity— enlightens, according to Heidegger, inasmuch as iti buried and always already forgocten. Buc the poets and philosophers force, for a moment, its inexpressible essence. For it is sell in terms of light and obscutity, disclosure and veiling, truth and nontruth—thae is, in the priority of the facure—thae the being of beings is approached, ‘The intentionality caught sight of, by the phenomenological move- ment, at the core of practice and affecivity confirms the fact that self-consciousness, or the identification ofthe self, is not incompatible ‘with consciousness of . . . , that is, consciousness of being. And, conversely, the whole weight of being can be resolved into a play of inwardness and stand on the brink of illusion, so rigorous isthe adequa- ‘ion. The apparition of being is possibly but appearance. The shadow is taken for a prey; che prey is let loose forthe shadow. Descartes thought thac I could have accounted for ehe heavens and the sun out of myself despite all cheit magnificence. Every experience, however passive it be however welcoming, is at once converted into a “constitution of bein ‘which it receives, as though the given were drawn from oneself, as though the meaning it brings were ascribed to ic by me. Being bears in itself che possibility of idealism, ‘Western philosophy coincides with ehe disclosure of the other where the other, in manifesting itself as a being, loses its alterity. From its infancy philosophy has been struck with'a horroc of the other that remains other—with an insurmountable allergy. Iris for this reason that icis essentially philosophy of being, thac the compechension of being is its last word, and the fundamental structure of man. Its for this reason that it becomes philosophy of immanence and of autonomy, or atheism. ‘The God of the philosophers, from Aristotle co Leibniz, by way of the God of the scholastcs, is god adequate to reason, a comprehended god ‘who could not trouble the autonomy of consciousness, which finds itself again in all its adventures, returning home ¢o itself like Ulysses, who through all his peregrinations is only on the way to his native istand. ‘The philosophy handed down co us reduces to this return not only theoretical thought, bur every spontaneous movement of consciousness Not only the world understood by reason ceases to be other, for con- sciousness finds itself in that world, but everything chat isan attitude of consciousness, that is, valorization, feeling, action, labor, and, in gen- eral commitment, is in the last analysis self-consciousness, chat is, ‘The Trace of the Other aT identity and autonomy. Hegel's philosophy represents the logical out- come of this underlying allergy of philosophy. One ofthe most profound ‘modern interpreters of Hegelianism, Eric Weil, has expressed this admirably in his Lagigue dela philaphie, showing how every attitude of the rational being turns inco a category, that is, grasps itself in a new attitude. But, in conformity with philosophical tradition, he thinks that the outcome is a category reabsorbing all the attitudes. Even if life precedes philosophy, even if contemporary philosophy, which wishes co be anti-intellectualist, insists on this ancecedence of existence with respect to essence, of life with respect to understanding, even if Heidegger conceives the comprehension of being as graticude and obedience the complacency of modern philosophy for the multiplcicy of cultural signifcations and for the games of ar lightens being ofits altericy and represents the form in which philosophy prefers expectation toaction, remaining indifferen co the other and toothers, refusing every movement without rerurn, It mistruss every inconsiderate gesture, as if a lucidity of old age had co repair all the imprudence of youth. Action recuperated in advance in the light that should guide it—is perhaps the very definition of philosophy. 2. MovEMENT WITHOUT RETURN Yer the transcendence of being which is described by immanence is not the only transcendence the philosophers themselves speak of. The phi- losophers bring us also the enigmatic message of the beyond being. “The transcendence of the Good with respect ro being epkuina tosis isa eranscendence to the second degree, and we are not obliged to make it immediately renter into the Heideggerian interpretation of being that transcends beings. The One in Plotinus is posited beyond being, and also epekina nou Tlie One of which Plato speaks in the frst hypothesis of the Parmenides is foreign to definicion and limit, place and time, self-identity and difference with respect to oneself, resemblance and dissemblance, foreiga to being and ro knowledge—for which all ehese attributes constitute the categories of knowledge. It is something else than all that, oer absolutely and not with respect co some relative term. Itis the Unrevealed, but not unrevealed because all knowledge would be t00 limiced or too narrow to ceceve its light. Ic is unrevealed because i is ‘One, and because making oneself known implies a duality which already clashes with the unity of the One. The One is not beyond being because it is buried and hidden; ic is buried because itis beyond being, wholly other than being. Tn what sense, then, does the abeluely ether concern me? Must we with the—from the fist unchinkable—concact with transcendence and alterity renounce philosophy? Would transcendence be possible only for a8 Baowanus. Levinas & completely blind touch, of fora faith attached to non-signification? Or, on the contrary, if the Platonic hypothesis concerning the One, which is One above being and knowledge, is not the development of a sophism, is there not an experience of it, an experience different fom thar in which the other is teansmuted inco ehe sume? Ie would be an experience, for it would be a movement toward the transcendent, but also because in this movement the same does not lose itself ecstatically in the other, and resists the sirens’ song, does not dissolve into the rumble ‘ofan anonymous event, This experience would still remain a movement of the same, a movement of an I; it consequently approaches the sranscendent ina signification which ic will not have ascribed ro it. Does there exist a signifyingness of signification which would not be equiva- Jent to the transmucation of the other into the same? Can there be something as strange as an experience of the absolutely exterior, a8 con- tradictory in ts terms asa heteronomous experience? In the affirmative case, we will, to be sure, rot succumb to the temptation and the ilu- sion that would consist in finding again by philosophy the empirical data of positive religions, but we will disengage a dence that is ensured like the bridgehead of the “other shore,” without Which the simple coexistence of philosophy and religion in souls and even in civilizations is but an inadmissible weakness of the mind. We will aso put into question the thesis according to which the ultimate ‘eseence of man and of truth isthe comprehension of the beng of buings, a thesis towhich, we must agree, theory, experience, and discourse sem to lead ‘The heteronomous experience we seck would be an attitude that «cannot be converted into a category, and whose movement unto the ‘other is not recuperated in identification, does not return to its poine of departure. 1s it not furnished us by what we call quite simply goocness, and works, without which goodness is but a dream without transcen- dence, a pure wish (Alaser Wanich), as Kane put it? Buc then we must not conceive ofa work as an appirent agitation ofa round which afterwards remains identical with iself, like an energy ‘which, in all its transformations, remains equal to itself. Nor must we conceive it asa technical operation, which through its much-proclaimed negativity ceduces an alien world to a world whose alterty is converted into my idea. Both conceptions continue to aff being as identical with itself and reduce its fundamental event to thought which is (and «his is che ineffaceable lesson of idealism) thoughe of itself, thoughe of thought. A work conceived radically is movement of the same uns the other swhich never return othe same, To the myth of Ulysses returning to Iehaca, ‘we wish to oppose the story of Abraham who leaves his fatherland forever fora yee unknown land, and forbids his servant ro even bring back his son (0 the poine of departure. “The Trace of the Other 349 A work conceived in its ultimate nature requites a radical genetosicy of the same who in ehe work goes unto the other. Ie then requires an Ingratitude of the other. Gratitude would in face be the return of the movermeat cits origin. On the other hand, a work differs froma gee or pure expendicure. Itis not realized in pure loss and it is nor enough for ic to affirm che same in its idencity circumvented with nothingness. A work is neither a pure acquizing of merits nor a pure nihilism. Beneath the apparent gratuity of his action, boch he who chases after merits and the aibilise agent forthwieh cakes himself as the goal. A work is thus & relationship with the other who is reached without showing himself touched. It forms outside of the morose delectation of failure, and outside of the consolations with which Nietzsche defines religion ‘The departure wichout reeurn, which does not go fore into the void, ‘would also lose its absoluce goodness if the work soughe for its recom- pense in the immediacy of its triumph, if it impatiently awaited the triumph ofits cause. The one-way movement would be inverted into a reciprocity. The work, confronting its departure and its end, would be absorbed again in calculations of deficits and compensations, in account- able operations. Ie would be subordinated to thought. [The one-way action is possible only in patience, which, pushed tothe limit, means for the agent to renounce being the contemporary ofits outcome, to act without entering the promised land. ‘The future for which che work is undertaken must be posited from the start as indifferent to my death, A work, distinguished from games and from calculation, is being-for-beyond-my-

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