Annulment = valid, but voidable (can be
Defect or irregularity = NO EFFECT, if
made invalid); inaction or continuing
marriage makes it valid; only direct
proceedings
Nullity = void from the beginning; can be
raised at any time; can be attacked
collaterally
VOID MARRIAGES; GROUNDS FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY; FAMILY CODE
Art 4 FC. Absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (a).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render
the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect
the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable.
1. Essential requisites. Article 2: (a) Legal capacity of
the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female; and (b) Consent freely given in the presence
of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
a. Absence = void ab initio. Exception:
b. Defect or irregularity = voidable
2. Formal requisites. Article 3: (a) Authority of
solemnizing officer; (b) Valid marriage license
except in the cases provided for in chapter 2 of this
Title; and (c) A marriage ceremony which takes
place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other
husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.
a. Absence = void ab initio. Exception: Even if
no authority, but party/ies were in good
faith, valid (Article 35 Par 2)
1Art 41. UNLESS before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article
391 of CC, an absence of only 2 years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute as
summary proceeding
b.
essential requisites are present. Party
accountable, tho.
3. Example of voidable. When party gives consent,
but not knowingly and voluntarily or freely, or
misled, there is a defect. Marriage is NOT void ab
initio; just voidable annullable.
4. Example of void ab initio. No real consent; under
hypnosis; drugged; under 18; drama or play;
5. Example of no effect. Marriage license not obtained
properly (e.g. no documentary proof); marriage not
solemnized in designated place by law.
Art 35 FC. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen
years of age even with the consent of parents
or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally
authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal authority to
do so (mistake if fact);
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except
those covered by the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not
falling under Article 411;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one
contracting party as to the identity of the
other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void
under Article 532.
1. Reasons for provisions
a. (1), (2), (3) = absence of requisite
b. (4), (6) = impediment of prior subsisting
marriage
c. (5) = lack of valid consent
2. Marriage below age
a. Principle of canonical and evangelical law.
b. Under OLD MARRIAGE LAW, voidable only
3. Mistake of identity
a. Mistake on persons himself
2
Acc Art 53, if spouses fail to comply with Art 52, void. Art 52 says:
Judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the
delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimates shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect third persons.
 b. Substituted without knowledge of other
party
i. If x and y are twins, x to be married
to A, y subs for x and A did not
know, void.
c. Identity is not relevant to in case of
romantic marriages out of courtship 
impossible to mistake identity of party.
d. Only relevant when, example, family
arrangements, pen-pals.
i. Technology increases marriages
between people they did not fall on
love with virtually.
4. Mistake as to qualities or attributes
a. If person merely represents himself to be
someone else, assuming their name, and
other party marries him believing he is the
person whose name he has assumed, no
mistake of identity
i. The same individual, person, which
whom marriage was intended, is
one who actually gets married.
ii. Only a mistake as to name,
personal qualifications.
b. Other examples: academic and social
standing, job, name, not void ab initio nor
voidable for fraud (see Art 45(3) & 46 FC).
5. Authority. The parties are still supposed to
“reasonably” inquire re. authority.
a. Mistake of facts v mistake of law: ignorance
of law excuses no one.
Art 36 FC. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization (As amended by EO 227).
1. Void from the beginning
a. If husband things in-laws should support
them, or wife refuses sex because dirty and
hates children, void.
b. Psychological incapacity to comply (not
understand), does not affect consent, and
only voidable (cause for annulment)
i. Psych incapacity may be cured, but
this does not validate the legally
inexistent marriage.
2. Action for nullity (void from beginning)
a. Before, action prescribes in 10 years after
marriage. After EO 227 (before FC), not
anymore. But if marriage was after FC took
effect, action of defense nullity prescribes
in 10 years, after FC effectivity.
i. Important because void marriages
are void from beginning, NOT from
declaration of nullity.
3. Retroactivity of FC provision
a. Invalidates marriage that was valid when
solemnized under CC, by allowing it to be
declared void ab initio within 10 years after
FC.
b. For Tolentino, this is a mistake. It is like an
ex post facto law; contravenes Art 225
which allows retroactivity ONLY when not
impair or prejudice vested or acquired
rights (Marriage validated certainly
conferred vested rights.)
c. Provision of a 10-year period of prescription
betrays sub-consciousness that this
marriage should have been made only
voidable, instead of from the beginning.
Art 37 FC. Marriages between the following are
incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any
degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the
full of half-blood. (81a)
1. Incestuous marriage – contracted by persons
related by blood within degree prohibited by
law.
a. WON legitimate is IMMATERIAL. What’s
important is that rel. by consanguinity
(property of being from the same
kinship as another person) exists.
b. To prove so, paternity and maternity
investigations are OK.
c. Nullity of marriage not affected by fact
that one of the connective links bet.
parties is half-blood.
2. Reason: incest is against nature; degrades
family; offends decency and morals; absolutely
prohibited.
3. Scope: Not all marriages bet. persons related by
blood is incest legally; only those within
prohibited relationships are.
a. Thus, while the CC says marriages bet.
collateral relatives of 4th degree are
incest, not really in FC; BUT are still void
 – against public policy under Article
38(1)
b. Art 38(1): [the ff. marriages shall be
void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy: (1)] Between collateral
blood relatives, whether legit or illegit,
up to the 4th civil degree.
Art 38 FC. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning for reasons of PUBLIC POLICY.
1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether
legitimate of illegitimates, up to the 4th civil
degrees.
2. step-parents and step-children
3. parents-in-law and children-in-law
4. adopting parent and the adopted child
5. Surviving spouse of the adopting parent and
the adopted child
6. Surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter
7. Adopted children of the same adopted
8. Parties where one, with the intention to marry
the other, killed that other person’s spouse, or
his or her own spouse (82a).
1. Other relationships not impediments
2. Collateral blood relatives
a. Nephews, aunts, uncles, and nieces, first
cousins prohibited under par 1, based on
scientific and public opinion, contrary to
good morals.
b. Weakens the race. May suffer from organic
defects, idiots, weakminded, deaf,
nearsighted, etc.
3. Killing spouse
a. A kills own wife B to marry C, and other
formulations = VOID.
i. Reasons: moral perversion
disqualifies another marriage; pure
sentiments of love cannot be
justified by criminal acts.
b. Conspiracy not required for void.
c. Intention to marry required for this article.
If marriage to another is not reason for
killing, his second marriage will not suffer.
d. Criminal conviction. FC does not expressly
require a “guilty” verdict to render
subsequent marriage void ab initio.
i. Basta may intention remove an
obstacle person from contemplated
marriage.
ii. Proven in civil case via
preponderance of evidence.
Art 39 FC. The action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
However, in the case of marriages celebrated before
the effectivity of this (FC) Code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in 10
years after this Code shall have taken effect (As
amended by EO 227)
You can raise an action anytime, for as long as you
want!
Art 40 FC. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. (n)
1. ONLY FOR WHEN LICENSE IS TO BE
OBTAINED/PURPOSE OF REMARRIAGE.
2. Requirement for judicial decree
a. You can raise action for nullity at any time.
b. Can be attacked collaterally.
c. BUT for purposes of remarriage, need final
judgment or judicial decree. Otherwise,
impediment, and marriage license may be
denied.
3. If person hides previous marriage
a. If subseq marriage is valid in all other
respects, it cannot be invalidated by lack of
final judgment.
b. Previous marriage – void ab initio – not an
impediment because it is not subsis, not
exist.
c. In an action questioning 2nd marriage,
absolute nullity of first marriage can be
established, because void marriage can be
attacked collaterally.
i. In that instance, there is no
“purpose of remarriage”, since
nakuha na ang license, and naikasal
na. Just attack the previous
marriage collaterally.
Art 41 FC. A marriage contracted by any person during
the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, UNLESS before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years, and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391
of CC, an absence of only 2 years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute as summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(83a)
1. ONLY FOR PURPOSE OF REMARRIAGE.
2. Prior voidable marriage. A prior annullable or
voidable marriage which has not been set aside by
final judgment or dissolved by death is a subsisting
marriage and renders subseq marriage void.
3. Period of absence (Art 391 CC)
a. 4 years absence
b. 2 years when: (1) aboard vessel lost during
sea voyage or airplane, missing for 2 years;
(2) in armed forces, taken part in war and
missing for 2 years – military operations; (3)
danger of death under other circumstances,
and existence not known for 2 years;
c. CC, eliminated by FC: Also when the present
spouse believes so at time of contracting
marriage.
4. A prior voidable or annullable marriage (but not yet
void or annulled or dissolved by death) is called
subsisting previous marriage, which renders
subsequent marriage null and void.
5. Status of subsequent marriage. If there is a
subsisting prior marriage, subsequent marriage is
bigamous and void. Exception:
a. If the subsisting spouse if absent for 4 years,
or 2 years with special circumstances (e.g.
danger of death).
6. Good faith. Provisions of period of absence cannot
be shortened for “good faith” of present spouse
(e.g. trust, guts, that spouse will not leave her like
that, so s/he must be dead).
7. Absent v present spouse.
a. The deserted spouse if the present spouse.
S/he is not required to know the
whereabouts of the deserting spouse.
b. The deserting spouse is the absent spouse.
S/he had duty to keep deserted advised
about his/her whereabouts.
c. This article is concerned about the
remarriage of the DESERTED, not the
deserting spouse.
8. Burden of proof.
a. If may 2 successive marriages, presumption
is held in favor of the second marriage’s
validity and innocence.
b. Burden of the person OPPOSING validity of
second marriage to prove that first
marriage had not been dissolved.
9. RPC can also be used to determine guilt of bigamy.
Art 44 FC. *** If both spouses of the subsequent
marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be
VOID AB INITIO and all donations by reason of
marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one
in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.
(n)
1. Dissolution by death.
a. If a subseq marriage is dissolved by death of
either spouse, the effects of dissolution of
valid marriages shall arise.
i. Good or bad faith of either spouse
can no longer be raised.
ii. Because, as in annullable (voidable)
marriage, marriages cannot be
questioned except in a direct action
for annulment.
b. BUT if both parties acted in bad faith,
marriage is void ab initio.
i. Validity of marriage can be attacked
collaterally at any time.
ii. Art 44 can be applied even if
dissolution is by death of one of
spouses.
Art 52 FC. The Judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of
the children’s presumptive legitimates shall be
recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries
of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third
persons.
Art 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again
after compliance with the requirements of the
immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the
subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Art 390 NCC. [PRESUMPTION OF DEATH; NOT FOR
REMARRIAGE] After an absence of 7 years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.
1. This is presumed because it is difficult to
imagine how a person would leave persons and
things for a long period of time without
returning to his domicile or sending news.
2. Modified by FC to 4 years only.
 3. Death assumed to have taken place on the last
day of the period of absence required by law.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the
purpose of opening his succession till after an absence
of 10 years. If he disappeared after the age of 75 years,
an absence of 5 years shall be sufficient in order that
his succession may be opened. (n)
Art 391 NCC. [PRESUMPTION OF DEATH; NOT FOR
REMARRIAGE] The following shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea
voyage or an aeroplane which is missing, who
has not been heard of for 4 years since the loss
of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken
part in war, and has been missing for 4 years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances and his existence
has not been known for 4 years. (n)
1. Modified by FC to 2 years only for purposes of
remarriage.
2. Persons here are not mere absentees, more of
missing persons. Date on the day the tragedy
occurred.
a. If no date can be computed, Court
determines the middle of the period in
which the event could have happened.
i. Ex: If tragedy could have
happened July 10-20,
designated death will be on July
15.
3. Missing in war.
a. Includes all military operation or
undertakings in armed fighting.
b. Applies to soldiers, and those employed
to work or render service to armed
forces (e.g. nurses, doctors, warship
stokers, etc.), those who volunteered
service, and those who followed or
stayed with the armed forces (e.g.
reporters, photographers, cameraman,
etc.).
c. It HAS to be during military operations.
Not JUST “war time”.
d. We start computing date from the
declaration of peace or end of war.
i. Absentee could only have been
taken as prisoner and is alive.
By then, he could be released. It
he does not reappear, safe to
assume he is indeed dead.
4. In danger of death.
a. Includes calamities and other
catastrophes, such as earthquakes,
fires, explosions, inundations,
dangerous expeditions, cave-ins,
volcanic eruptions, landslides, etc.
b. We compute it from the last day of the
danger/calamity until 4 years.
c. If it is an exhibition, we compute from
the day it was supposed to be
completed.
ANTONE V BERONILLA (2010)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Myrna Antone alleged in her Affidavit-Complaint,filed in
March 2007, that she and Leo were married in 1978.
However, Leo contracted a second marriage
with CecileMaguillo in 1991. The prosecution filed the
Information in the Regional Trial Court(RTC) in a
criminal case of Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case
for arraignment, Leo moved to quash the Information
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense because his marriage with Myrna was
declared null and void as of April 2007 and became final
and executory on May 2007. Leo argues that since the
marriage had been declared null and void from the
beginning, there was actually no first marriageto speak
of. Thus, absent the first marriage, the facts alleged in
the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy.
The prosecution argued that the marriage of Myrna
and Leo on 1978 was not severed prior to his second
marriage on 1991, for which bigamy has already been
committed before the court declared the first
marriage null and void on 2007.
The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying
on Morigo v. People. Similarly, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether a subsequent declaration of nullity of the first
marriage only after contracting the subsequent
marriage is immaterial in the crime of bigamy.
HELD:
YES. Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the
previous ruling of People v. Mendoza(under the Civil
Code) declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a
void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is
no need fora judicial decree to establish that a void ab
initio marriage is invalid; and (b) a marriage declared
void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such that there
would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all,
which renders the elements of bigamy complete.
In fact, this was exhaustively discussed in Mercado v.
Tan. It stated that, under the Family Code a
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by
then the crime had already been consummated.
Otherwise stated, a person who contracts a subsequent
marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of
a previous marriage is guilty of bigamy.
While, Morigo v. People was promulgated
after Mercado, the facts are different. InMercado,
the first marriage was actually solemnized, although
later declared void ab initio. While in Mendoza,
no marriage ceremony was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer, because what occurred
was a mere signing of a marriage contract through a
private act. Thus, there is no need to secure
a judicialdeclaration of nullity before Morigo can
contract a subsequent marriage. The ruling of Morigo is
not applicable to this case.
Also, he should have filed contrary evidence, not
motion to quah, which indicates that he admits the
information of ex wife.
VOID MARRIAGES; GROUNDS;
INCESTUOUS MARRIAGES
DEFINE INCEST: Sexual relations between closely
related persons, that is prohibited by law.
 Reverential relation bet them is recognized as
incompatible with equality or relations
engendered by the bond of marriage.
 Barrier against early corruption among young
persons of either sex brought habitually into
close intimacy; cultivated the natural feeling of
respect for related persons.
 Belief that incest leads to hereditary disorders,
physical and mental.
Art 37 FC. Marriages between the following are
incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
(3) Between ascendants and descendants of any
degree; and
(4) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the
full of half-blood. (81a)
4. Incestuous marriage – contracted by persons
related by blood within degree prohibited by
law.
a. WON legitimate is IMMATERIAL. What’s
important is that rel. by consanguinity
(property of being from the same
kinship as another person) exists.
b. To prove so, paternity and maternity
investigations are OK.
c. Nullity of marriage not affected by fact
that one of the connective links bet.
parties is half-blood.
5. Reason: incest is against nature; degrades
family; offends decency and morals; absolutely
prohibited.
6. Scope: Not all marriages bet. persons related by
blood is incest legally; only those within
prohibited relationships are.
a. Thus, while the CC says marriages bet.
collateral relatives of 4th degree are
incest, not really in FC; BUT are still void
– against public policy under Article
38(1)
b. Art 38(1): [the ff. marriages shall be
void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy: (1)] Between collateral
blood relatives, whether legit or illegit,
up to the 4th civil degree.
7. Civil code. Bawal (1) ascendants and
descendants whatever degree; (2) bros and sis
full or half; (3) collateral blood relatives within
4th degree.
a. Family Code. Only the first 2 are incest.
b. But the third is still void for violation of
public policy (hereditary disorders)
Art 38 FC. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning for reasons of PUBLIC POLICY.
9. Between collateral blood relatives, whether
legitimate of illegitimates, up to the 4th civil
degrees. (not include 2nd cousins)
10. step-parents and step-children
 11. parents-in-law and children-in-law (public
policy; scandalous; confusion on may
grandchildren)
12. adopting parent and the adopted child
(fictional filial relationship)
13. Surviving spouse of the adopting parent and
the adopted child
14. Surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter
15. Adopted children of the same adopted
16. Parties where one, with the intention to marry
the other, killed that other person’s spouse, or
his or her own spouse (82a).
4. Other relationships not impediments
5. Collateral blood relatives
a. Nephews, aunts, uncles, and nieces, first
cousins prohibited under par 1, based on
scientific and public opinion, contrary to
good morals.
b. Weakens the race. May suffer from organic
defects, idiots, weakminded, deaf,
nearsighted, etc.
6. Killing spouse
a. A kills own wife B to marry C, and other
formulations = VOID.
i. Reasons: moral perversion
disqualifies another marriage; pure
sentiments of love cannot be
justified by criminal acts.
b. Conspiracy not required for void.
c. Intention to marry required for this article.
If marriage to another is not reason for
killing, his second marriage will not suffer.
d. Criminal conviction. FC does not expressly
require a “guilty” verdict to render
subsequent marriage void ab initio (unlike
CC).
i. Basta may intention remove an
obstacle person from contemplated
marriage.
ii. Proven in civil case via
preponderance of evidence.
7. Step sibling. Now allowed under FC; no common
parents3
MATTER OF BAUTISTA: IN VISA PETITION
PROCEEDINGS (SEPT 1987)
SUMMARY: Husband not allowed to apply for Visa on
behalf of wife because they were second cousins. Using
3
Siempo-Dy (1995).
Lex loci celebrationis, it was determined that 2nd cousins
are outside the 4th degree provision. He was given Visa.
FACTS:
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legac
y/2012/08/17/2671.pdf
ISSUES:
HELD:
RULING:
VOID MARRIAGES; GROUNDS;
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANCAPACITY (W/
SEMPIO-DY ANNOTATIONS)
Psychological incapacity v insanity
1. Insanity – vice on consent; curable; voidable
(annulment)
2. Psychological incapacity – inability to comply with
obligations; incurable; void (nullity)
a. Fr. Orsy: Psych incapacity can be of an
infinite variety.
b. Incognitive of basic marital covenants
Characteristics of psychological incapacity (Dr. Gerardo
Veloso)
This is based on jurisprudence. Code Commission did
not define psych incap for sake or resiliency. They also
want (1) scientific research; (2) canon law to have
persuasive effect.
1. Gravity – must be serious and grave; inability (not
refusal) to comply with obligs
2. Antecedence – deeply ingrained; typically since
adolescence; present at celebration of marriage,
even though manifested only after.
3. Incurability – though may treatment, counted if
inaccessible for some reason (e.g. financial),
Similar Canon Law 1095
Canon 1095: They are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. Who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. Who suffer from grave defect of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage
MOLINA DOCTRINE
4. Burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff;
5. Root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified
a. alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven
by expert, and clearly explained in the
decision;
6. Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time
of the celebration of marriage;
a. Need not be perceivable that time
7. Incapacity must be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable;
a. Must be relevant to assumption of obligs.
8. Grave enough to disable fulfillment of essential
marital obligations;
a. Mild peculiarities, mood changes,
emotional outbursts, etc. do not count.
9. Essential marital obligation must be embraced by
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards
husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the
same code as regards parents and their children;
10. interpretation made by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church are to
be given great weight; and
11. Fiscal and the Solicitor-General must appear as
counsel for the State.
a. Submit cert. of agreement of opposition to
petition 15 days
b. Otherwise, no decision.
Art 36 FC. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization (As amended by EO 227).
12. NULLITY not annulment
13. Void from the beginning
a. If husband things in-laws should support
them, or wife refuses sex because dirty and
hates children, void.
b. Psychological incapacity to comply (not
understand), does not affect consent, and
only voidable (cause for annulment)
i. Psych incapacity may be cured, but
this does not validate the legally
inexistent marriage.
14. Action for nullity (void from beginning)
a. Before, action prescribes in 10 years after
marriage. After EO 227 (before FC), not
anymore. But if marriage was after FC took
effect, action of defense nullity prescribes
in 10 years, after FC effectivity.
i. Important because void marriages
are void from beginning, NOT from
declaration of nullity.
15. Retroactivity of FC provision
a. Invalidates marriage that was valid when
solemnized under CC, by allowing it to be
declared void ab initio within 10 years after
FC.
b. For Tolentino, this is a mistake. It is like an
ex post facto law; contravenes Art 225
which allows retroactivity ONLY when not
impair or prejudice vested or acquired
rights (Marriage validated certainly
conferred vested rights.)
c. Provision of a 10-year period of prescription
betrays sub-consciousness that this
marriage should have been made only
voidable, instead of from the beginning.
16. Siempo-Dy.
a. FC adopted canon law void marriages to an
extent for three reasons:
i. Substitute for divorce
ii. Solution to problem of church-
annulled marriages
iii. Additional remedy for problematic
marriages not falling under the FC
provisions on void and voidables.
17. Lack of specific instances under Art 36, thus lack of
limitations, is remedied by canon law’s persuasive
effect.
18. Examples of psych incapacity of CL
a. Homosexuality/ lesbianism
b. Satyriasis/ nymphomania
c. Epilepsy w. permanently recurring
maladaptive manifestations
d. Extremely low IQ
e. Habitual alcoholism
f. Criminality
19. Voidable (Art 46)
a. If (10) examples are existing during
inception of marriage.
20. Ground for legal separation (Art 55)
a. If (10) examples emerge only during the
marriage, after inception.
21. Must be psych, not physical, though manifestations
can be physical.
22. NO NEED for actual clinical examination. Enough if
evidence supports existence of psych incap.
REPUBLIC V DAGDAG (2001)
NOTES: According to ma’am, the Court mistook
Annulment for Nullity. Psych incapacity is a ground for
nullity.
DOCTRINE:
Article 36, Family Code. “A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization”
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the
Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite.
Petitioner, who is five years older than private
respondent, was then in her first year of teaching
zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college
freshman, was her student for two consecutive
semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979
when she was no longer private respondents teacher.
On January 1, 1981, they were married. Out of their
marriage, three (3) children were born, namely, Maie,
Lyra, and Marian.
However, on July 10, 1992, petitioner filed a
petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to
private respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time
of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit,
private respondent failed to perform his obligation to
support the family and contribute to the management
of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in
drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed
that private respondent, after they were married,
cohabited with another woman with whom he had an
illegitimate child, while having affairs with different
women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private
respondent endangered her health by infecting her with
a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that
private respondent was irresponsible, immature and
unprepared for the duties of a married life. Lastly, she
averred that the respondent abandoned her and their
children.
RTC denied Lucita’s petition ruling that the
grounds in her petition are for legal separation and not
for psychological incapacity under Article 36.
On appeal, CA affirmed RTC and further ruled that
the grounds of Lucita for Respondent’s psychological
incapacity did not, as required under Article 36, occur at
the time of her marriage with the respondent.
ISSUES:
WON Respondent’s (Mario) habitual alcoholism,
infidelity, STD transmitting to petitioner, abandonmen,
irresponsiblity and imaturity constitute psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the New family Code?
HELD:
No. As held in Santos v. Court of Appeals, “Psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.”
Furthermore, the other forms of psychoses, if
existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.
If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving
declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that
at the time they were married, private respondent was
suffering from a psychological defect which in fact
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
In other words, there was no evidence was presented to
show that private respondent was not cognizant of the
basic marital obligations.
The court upheld the case of Molina (Republic v
CA) holding that the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article
36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
In the present case, expert testimony should have
been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
rests upon petitioner.
SANTOS V BEDIA SANTOS (1995) + Ma’am’s digest
FACTS:
1. Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine
Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in
1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived
with Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia
gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as
Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will
quarrel over a number of things aside from the
interference of Julia’s parents into their family
affairs.
2. Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite
Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after
her departure, she called her husband and
promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a
chance to visit US where he underwent a training
program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate
or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his
efforts were of no avail.
3. Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with him for more than 5 years are
circumstances that show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUES:
Whether their marriage can be considered void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
HOLDING:
No, the failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with her husband Leouel for more than
five years does not constitute psychological incapacity.
1. Pyschological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c)
INCURABILITY
2. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.
3. The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY” to the
mot serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inablity to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
4. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can
always provide all the specific answers to every
individual problem
5. Until further statutory and jurisprudential
parameters are established, circumstances of
incapacity must be carefully examined so that no
precipitate or indiscriminate nullity is exercised.
Court opinions of experts in psych might be helpful
or even desirable.
HOLDING:
Petition DENIED.
DOCTRINE: REP V CA and MOLINA (1997) + ma’am’s
digest
DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the
nullity of marriage, may beestablished by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however
that therespondent should be examined by a physician
or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such
declaration.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Roridel Molina married Reynaldo
Molina on April 14, 1985. After a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility” as a husband and a father exhibited
by his preference to spend time with friends,
squandering money, dependence on his parents
and dishonesty involving finances. Inevitably, this
 resulted in quarrels and by March 1987, Roridel quit
her job and moved in with her parents in Baguio.
Reynaldo left her and their child a few weeks
thereafter.
2. On Aug. 16, 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of
psychological incapacity of the husband.
a. Reynaldo admitted they can no longer live
together, because of Roridel’s strange
behavior, refusal to perform marital duties
(e.g. cooking, running household, handling
finances).
3. The trial court declared the marriage void, which
the CA affirmed in toto; hence, the petition for
certiorari.
ISSUES:
WON there is psychological incapacity.
HOLDING:
1. No. The case of Roridel and Reynaldo merely
constituted incompatibility among the estranged
spouses. The law intended to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders that must have
existed at the time marriage is celebrated. But
spouses were unable to prove existence of psych
incap. – just their failures.
2. It is a refusal or difficulty (but not incapacity) to
comply. Irreconcilable differences or conflicting
personalities are not incapacities that would hinder
the fulfillment of the essential marital obligations of
the parties.
3. The characteristics of gravity, judicial antecedence
and incurability are not present in the case.
4. Due to novelty of Art 36, SC sought the help of two
amici curiae (Rev. Cruz, justice Puno)
a. Burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff;
b. Root cause of psychological incapacity must
be medically or clinically identified
i. alleged in the complaint, sufficiently
proven by expert, and clearly
explained in the decision;
c. Incapacity must be proven to be existing at
the time of the celebration of marriage;
i. Need not be perceivable that time
d. Incapacity must be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable;
i. Must be relevant to assumption of
obligs.
e. Grave enough to disable fulfillment of
essential marital obligations;
i. Mild peculiarities, mood changes,
emotional outbursts, etc. do not
count.
f. Essential marital obligation must be
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code as regards husband and wife, and
Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as
regards parents and their children;
g. interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church are to be given great
weight; and
h. Fiscal and the Solicitor-General must appear
as counsel for the State.
i. Submit cert. of agreement of
opposition to petition 15 days
ii. Otherwise, no decision.
5. Decision REVERSED.
MARCOS V MARCOS (2000)
NOTES: NO MORE NEED FOR CLINICAL EXAMINATIONS,
BUT SUBMISSION THEREOF STRENGTHENS PETITION.
FACTS:
Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson
Marcos were married twice and hadfive children. After
the downfall of President Marcos, the respondent left
the military service in1987. Consequently, due to the
respondent’s failure to engage in any gainful
employment, theywould often quarrel and the
respondent would hit and beat the petitioner. As a
result, in 1992they were already living separately. Thus,
petitioner filed for annulment of marriage assailingArt.
36 of the Family Code. The court a quo found the
respondent to be psychologicallyincapacitated to
perform his marital obligations. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed thedecision of the RTC because
psychological incapacity had not been established by
the totality of the evidence presented.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Respondent Wilson Marcos’ failure to
find work to support his familyand his violent attitude
towards Petitioner Brenda Marcos and their children
constituted psychological incapacity.
HOLDING:
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the
nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality
of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however that the respondent be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non
for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects” were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior
of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had
lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period
of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and
moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his
alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot
declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to
observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and
Molina.
ANTONIO V REYES (2006)
NOTES: NO MORE NEED FOR CLINICAL EXAMINATIONS,
BUT SUBMISSION THEREOF STRENGTHENS PETITION.
THEY USED THE GUIDELINES FROM MOLINA THO.
MA’AM: Bad enough that State adopted church
doctrine into secular law. Antonio took it further by
treating church rulings as binding: “where the church
has already invalidated a marriage, ‘lingering doubts
are further dispelled’”. Trial Courts now only have to
ratify church decision.
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when
petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36
years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they
got married
Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991,
who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,[7] petitioner filed a petition to have
his marriage to respondent declared null and void.
He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the
time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up
to the present.[8]... petitioner claimed that respondent
persistently lied about herself, the people around her,
her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things, [9] to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth
to an illegitimate son,[10] and instead introduced the
boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin
David, attempted to rape and kill her
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her
obstetrician
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice
talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold)
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via
Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters
to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting
her as the "number one moneymaker" in the
commercial industry worth P2 million.[16]
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater
means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear
that she earned a higher income.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to
the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts.
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-
disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other
lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay
and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of
the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding
of... psychological incapacity on her part.
ISSUES:
WON the state of facts as presented by petitioner
sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code
HOLDING:
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the
guidelines in Molina.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts,
and clearly explained in the trial court's decision.
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was
established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated
friends and made up letters from fictitious characters
well before she married petitioner
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological
incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately
discernible that the parties had shared only a little over
a year of cohabitation before the... exasperated
petitioner left his wife.
Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend
the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its
psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage, including parenting.
Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to... remain in the marriage hardly banishes
nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations.
the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope... with her marital obligations,
kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with
the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles
68 to 71 of the Family Code.
As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed
to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of
the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church.
Respondent's psychological incapacity was considered
so grave... that a restrictive clause was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from
contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's
consent.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the
requirement in Molina that such psychological
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged,
as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
maintained her excessive... jealousy. From this fact, he
draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is
incurable.
respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure
thereof a remarkable feat.
The requirement... that psychological incapacity must
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined
without expert opinion.
From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently
convinced that the incurability of respondent's
psychological incapacity... has been established by the
petitioner.
REPUBLIC V MELGAR (2006)
NOTES: PRESENTATION OF EXPERT WITNESS
STRENGTHENS PETITION.
MAA’AM SAYS: This may have been clear to Court, but
for petitioners’ such as Norma, it’s like demanding
20/20 hindsight.
PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS:
1. March 27, 1965 – Marriage of petitioner to Eulogio
Melgar
2. Since birth of their first born, Eulogio manifested
habitual alcoholism, immaturity, unbearable
jealousy (over her male co-workers), constitutional
laziness (him not looking for a job and leaving the
petitioner to deal with all expenses), and
maltreatment of petitioner (out of jealousy).
3. December 27, 1985 – Eulogio was forcibly thrown
out of the house by petitioner’s brothers. Was not
heard of since.
4. August 19, 1996 – Petitioner filed for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the grounds of Eulogio’s
psychological incapacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations.
5. Summons to the Court were sent to the latter, but
he did not respond.
6. RTC rendered the marriage null and void
7. Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an appeal
and said that the evidence of petitioner was
insufficient to prove psychological nature, under
Art 36 of the Family Code.
8. CA upheld RTC’s decision.
9. OSG petitioned to SC for certiorari of the decision of
CA.
ISSUES:
WoN the petitioner’s evidence was enough to rule her
marriage null and void under Art. 36 of FC.
HOLDING:
1. Petitioner failed to establish that at the time of her
marriage with Eulogio, the latter was already
suffering from a mental disorder; in fact, it was
stated that her marriage woes started only after the
birth of their firstborn.
2. Petitioner also failed to establish or insufficiently
proved that Eulogio had a personality disorder that
made him unable to discharge essential marital
obligations. The Court stressed that the incapacity
has to be from a psychological disease, and that,
although considered not to be sine qua non, the
petitioner failed to render expert testimonies to
support her claim of her husband’s mental
incapacity (it weakened her case.)
3. LEGAL SEPARATION more applicable
NOTES: interpretation of Art 36 based on Molina
Relevant law: Art 48 FC.
DIMAYUGA-LAURENA V CA (2008)
NOTE: COURT DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN PSYCH
EXAMINATION V NECESSITY OF IDENTIFYING ROOT
CAUSE OF PSYCH INCAPACITY.
Make own digest later pretty short
TE V TE (2009)
NOTES: COURT FIGURES THAT IT’S PROBABLY
INAPPROPRIATE TO APPLY MILINA DOCTRINE TOO
RIGIDLY
PONENTE: Nachura, J.
FACTS:
1. For the resolution of the Court is a petition for
review assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision of the
Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the RTC
and Resolution denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision on
January 19, 2004
2. Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo met respondent
Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in college.
3. Edward courted Rowena January 1996, petitioner a
sophomore and respondent a freshman.
4. Key facts: In March 1996, or around three months
after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that
they elope, Edward refused at first but later agreed.
5. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he,
providing their travel money for 80,0000 and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.
6. April 1996, they decided to go back and live at
Rowena’s Uncle’s house and Edward back to his
parents’ home.
7. Key facts: As his family was abroad, and Rowena
kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she
would commit suicide,
8. Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s
place.
9. Key facts: On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle
brought the two to a court to get married. He was
then 25 years old, and she, 20.
10. The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place
where Edward was treated like a prisoner—he was
not allowed to go out unaccompanied.
11. Key facts: Edward was told by his father that he
would be disinherited, and insisted that he must go
home.
12. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of
Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His
family then hid him from Rowena and her family
13. Key facts: In June 1996, Edward’s parents wanted
them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and
demanded that they have a separate abode. In
June 1996, she said that it was better for them to
live separate lives and they then parted ways.
14. January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis
of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
15. As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on
July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to investigate whether
there was collusion between the parties.
16. On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an
investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the
parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.
17. Key facts: The clinical psychologist who examined
petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated.
18. Key facts: July 30, 2001, RTC rendered its Decision
declaring the marriage of the parties null and void
on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.17
19. The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed
its notice of appeal.
20. Key facts: On review, the appellate court, in the
assailed August 5, 2003 Decision n CA-G.R. CV No.
71867, reversed and set aside the trial court’s
ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent.
21. The CA later denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19,
2004 Resolution.
22. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the
instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15,
2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda
ISSUES:
WON based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the
marriage between the parties is null and void.
HOLDING:
1. key facts: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted
more or less six (6) months. They met in January
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in
May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s,
that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.
2. Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
a. Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do
with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.”
3. Petitioner being afflicted with dependent
personality disorder that hinders him from
assuming marital obligations
4. Respondent being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume
the same.
a. Disregard for others, abuse, mistreatment
and manipulation of others w/o remorse,
tendency to blame others, intolerance of
conventional behavioral limitations,
blackmail on suicide.
5. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and
incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is
thus, declared null and void.
6. ON MOLINA:
a. People had to live with sociopaths,
deviants, etc., affecting the foundation of
their families like termites
b. Molina doctrine became strait-jacket
c. Allowed sociopaths, etc. to continuously
pervert marriage
d. The court need not worry about abuse of
Art 36. There are safeguards, like State
intervention thru public prosecutor
e. There is an alarming increase of domestic
violence.
f. The court is not demolishing families, but
is actually protecting by refusing to allow
psychopaths from entering or remaining in
sacred bonds.
g. Under Art 36, there is no marriage in the
first place.
7. Petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
8. Decision of RTC reinstated.
9. SO ORDERED.
*TING V VELEZ-TING (2009) + ma’am’s digest
NOTES: CLARIFICATION THAT COURT DID NOT
ABANDON MOLINA DOCTRINE, BUT SIMPLY
SUGGESTED RELAXATION OF STRINGENT
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH THEREIN.
MA’AM: 6TH Molina guide says psych incap must be
relevant to assumption of marriage obligs… Recent
cases show that essential marital obligs that alleged
psyc incapacitated spouse is unable to comply with
must be those under Article 68 – 71 FC, and Articles
220, 221, 225 FC.
FACTS:
Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen
Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were
classmates in medical school. They fell in love, and they
were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when
respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more
than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest
child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified
petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin
suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time
of the celebration of their marriage, which, however,
only became manifest thereafter.
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their
marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used to
drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. But after
they were married, petitioner continued to drink
regularly and would go home at about midnight or
sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and
violent. He would confront and insult respondent,
physically assault her and force her to have sex with
him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his
gun and shot the gate of their house. Because of his
drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was
affected to the point that he often had to refuse to
answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the
task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even
stopped calling him for his services because they
perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried
to talk to her husband about the latter’s drinking
problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the
same.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically
incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable
person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an
active member of social and athletic clubs and would
drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure.
He also denied being a violent person, except when
provoked by circumstances.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its
Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr.
Oñate’s findings and the admissions made by Benjamin
in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the
CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling.
It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof
was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin
was psychologically incapacitated at the time he
married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based
only on theories and not on established fact, contrary to
the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals
and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.
Carmen filed a MR, it was denied then she filed a
petition for certiorari with the SC, SC directed CA to
decide on Carmen’s case. On review, CA reversed it’s
earlier ruling.
ISSUES:
WON the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it
refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the
Santos and Molina cases.
HOLDING:
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned
the Molina doctrine.
We have not. By the very nature of cases involving the
application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable
to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament
of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while
highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in
granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but
not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of
a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or
psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to
emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.
respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s “defects”
were present at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage,
she already knew that petitioner would occasionally
drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement,
by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing
psychological defect on the part of her husband.
Neither did the evidence adduced prove such “defects”
to be incurable.
*** The intendment of the law has been to confine the
application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. The psychological illness that must
have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is
about to assume
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have
been the decisive evidence in determining whether to
declare the marriage between the parties null and void.
Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions
provided by these experts strengthened respondent’s
allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts
provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner’s
behavior is a positive indication of a personality
disorder, while Dr. Obra maintained that there is
nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality. Moreover,
there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion
because, aside from analyzing the transcript of
Benjamin’s deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr.
Obra also took into consideration the psychological
evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in
South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well
as his (Dr. Obra’s) personal interview with Benjamin’s
brothers.
*TSOI V CA (1997) + ma’am’s digest
NOTES: COURT SAYS PROCREATION IS ESSENTIAL
MARITAL OBLIG. Nonfulfillment of which destroys
integrity and wholeness of marriage. HERE CASE,
SENSELESS AND PROTRACTED REFUSAL TO FULFILL IS
PSYCH NCAP.
MA’AM: Art 68-73 (Rights of Obligations between the
Spouses) did not mention such as right or duty. Court
mistakenly equates right and duty to live together
with procreation. Having sex is not same as having
children.
Here, Tsoi’s failure to procreate is considered
psychological incapacity, marriage is VOID. But if he
were impotent, only VOIDABLE.
PONENETE:
FACTS:
1. Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi married in 1988,
and separated March 15, 1989.
2. Gina filed annulment grounds of psych incap of
husband – impotent, closet homosexual, and never
had sex for 10 months (May 22, 1988 to March 15,
1989). She saw hubby using eyebrow pencil and
cleansing cream of his mother.
3. Also says hubby married her to maintain his
residency status in PH, and no appear as a normal
man.
4. RTC granted petition.
5. Chi appealed to CA, which affirmed.
6. He did not want marriage annulled for reasons:
a. Loves her very much
b. He has no defect, and is phys and psych
capable
c. Relationship is still very young, differences
can still be reconciled.
d. If either has incapability, no certainty that
this will not be cured
7. Admitted that they never had sex, but because wife
always refuses.
ISSUES:
HOLDING:
1. There is no collusion. Chi must have been telling
truth when he admitted lack of sex.
2. Like said by AJ. Gonzaga-Reyes: appellant admitted
lack of sex, and it did not appear that he has any
physical disability. Abnormal reluctance or
willingness to consummate is indicative of a
serious personality disorder, which is seen by Court
as utter insensitivity and inability to give meaning
and significance to marriage (Art 36 FC, Santos v
CA).
3. Because action to declare nullity can be done by
either party, question of who refuses sex is
immaterial.
a. Procreation is one of essential obligs, based
on universal principle. Constant
nonfulfillment will destroy
integrity…Senseless and protracted refusal
to sex is psych incap.
4. Unbelievable that wife is the one who refuses. Even
if it were true, he did not go to court.
5. Filipino women are modest, and it would be hard to
believe that one would expose her private life to
scrutiny if not to put her life in order, and put rest
to her marital status.
6. Other findings: Absence of empathy between
hubby and wife – spiritual communion. No interest
in each other’s feelings. Unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marriage.
7. Judgment affirmed.
**CHOA V CHOA (2002)
MA’AM: Bad enough that State adopted church
doctrine into secular law. Antonio took it further by
treating church rulings as binding: “where the church
has already invalidated a marriage, ‘lingering doubts
are further dispelled’”. Trial Courts now only have to
ratify church decision. Violated separation of Church
and State. There are other religious sects in PH.
FACTS:
Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa were married and out of
this union, two children were born. Alfonso Choa filed
before the RTC a complaint for annulment of his
marriage to Leni Choa based on the alleged
psychological incapacity of the latter rooted from lack
of procreative sexuality.
ISSUE:
HOLDING:
1. Evidence adduced by husband only shows that
spouses could not get along.
a. no proof of gravity or juridical antecedence,
or incurability.
2. They had children, which means wife’s lack of
procreative sexuality was inexistent during
celebration of marriage.
3. Ma’am: If husband was right, would the marriage
be declared null?
a. 7th Molina Guideline: interpretations of
Catholic Tribunal must be respected (given
persuasive effect)
b. Antonio v Reyes: Judge should interpret Art
36 guided by experience… and decisions of
CT.
c. Read “Ma’am Notes”
SUAZO V SUAZO (2010)
FACTS:
1. Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they
first met. Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and
some friends. Having been gone for three days,
their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after
finding them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna.
Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage
was arranged and they were married in a ceremony
officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
2. Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn
and Angelito lived with Angelitos parents after their
marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling.
Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos
relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other
hand, refused to work and was most of the time
drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and
violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns
efforts.
3. Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987.
Angelito thereafter found another woman with
whom he has since lived.
4. Ten years after their separation, or on October 8,
1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that
Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In
addition to the above historical narrative of their
relationship, she alleged in her complaint:
5. That their relationship had been marred with bitter
quarrels which caused unbearable physical and
emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because
defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every
time they had a troublesome encounter;
6. That the main reason for their quarrel was always
the refusal of the defendant to work or his
indolence and his excessive drinking which makes
him psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations making life unbearably bitter
and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their
separation in fact in July 1987;
7. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant
started from the time of their marriage and became
very apparent as time went and proves to be
continuous, permanent and incurable
8. Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint.
Neither did he submit himself to a psychological
examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who
was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
9. The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the
trial court found that no collusion existed between
the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano,
and the psychologist testified at the trial.
10. In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the
allegations in her petition, including the alleged
incidents of physical beating she received from
Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm
on these declarations but significantly declared that
Angelito had not treated her violently before they
were married.
11. The Office of the Solicitor General representing the
Republic of the Philippines strongly opposed the
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued
that the psychologist failed to examine and test
Angelito; thus, what she said about him was purely
hearsay.
12. RTC annulled the marriage.
13. CA reversed. There is scarce evidence to hold that
the respondent was psychologically incapable of
entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume
the essential duties of marriage due to an
underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave
first-hand testimony on the behavior of the
husband, and it is inconclusive.
14. Present petition Jocelyn contends that CA went
beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded
the legal basis of the RTC and that Article 36 of the
 Family Code did not define psychological incapacity;
this omission was intentional to give the courts a
wider discretion to interpret the term without being
shackled by statutory parameters.
ISSUES:
WON there is basis to nullify marriage under Art 36 of
Family Code
HOLDING:
Jurisprudence/ doctrinal development
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended
application, we must therefore apply the law based on
how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped
and developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. CA declared that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be confined
to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of the law in Republic v.
Court of Appeals (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties or one of them was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state.
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely
expounded on the basic requirements of Santos.
Marcos v. Marcos, clarified that there is no requirement
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce
expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated
by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules
pertinently provides:
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Te case assumes the basic premise that the law is so
designed to allow some resiliency in its application. Te
then enunciated the principle that each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its
own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals. Te did not abandon
Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements,
cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on
the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages:
Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated
be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity.
This case
1. Expert opinion
a. Both the psychologists testimony and the
psychological report did not conclusively
show the root cause, gravity and
incurability of Angelitos alleged
psychological condition.
b. Based on her declarations in open court,
the psychologist evaluated Angelitos
psychological condition only in an indirect
manner she derived all her conclusions
from information coming from Jocelyn
whose bias for her cause cannot of course
be doubted.
c. For a determination though of a partys
complete personality profile, information
coming from persons intimately related to
him (such as the partys close relatives and
friends) may be helpful. This is an approach
in the application of Article 36 that allows
flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if
not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps
spawned by supposedly expert opinion
based entirely on doubtful sources of
information.
d. From these perspectives, we conclude that
the psychologist, using meager information
coming from a directly interested party,
could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or
diagnosis of Angelitos psychological
condition. The methodology employed
simply cannot satisfy the required depth
and comprehensiveness of examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder. In
short, this is not the psychological report
that the Court can rely on as basis for the
conclusion that psychological incapacity
exists.
e. Psychologist merely generalized on the
questions of why and to what extent was
Angelitos personality disorder grave and
incurable, and on the effects of the disorder
on Angelitos awareness of and his capability
to undertake the duties and responsibilities
of marriage.
f. The psychologist therefore failed to provide
the answers to the more important
concerns or requisites of psychological
incapacity, all of which are critical to the
success of Jocelyns cause.
2. Jocelyn’s testimony
a. The inadequacy and/or lack of probative
value of the psychological report and the
psychologists testimony impel us to
proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyns
testimony, to find out whether she
provided the court with sufficient facts to
support a finding of Angelitos psychological
incapacity.
b. Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony
to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified
on Angelitos habitual drunkenness,
gambling, refusal to seek employment and
the physical beatings she received from him
all of which occurred after the marriage.
c. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal
to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by
themselves, show psychological incapacity.
All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect
or mere refusal to perform marital
obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence
holds, cannot be considered to be
constitutive of psychological incapacity in
the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in
 some debilitating psychological condition or
illness.
d. The physical violence allegedly inflicted on
Jocelyn deserves a different treatment.
While we may concede that physical
violence on women indicates abnormal
behavioral or personality patterns, such
violence, standing alone, does not
constitute psychological incapacity
.Jurisprudence holds that there must be
evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. The evidence
of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the
present case under our finding that the
opinion of the psychologist cannot be relied
upon. Even assuming, therefore, that
Jocelyns account of the physical beatings
she received from Angelito were true, this
evidence does not satisfy the requirement
of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence,
specifically the Santos requisites.
MARABLE V MARABLE (2011)
FACTS:
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent
eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal
before Mayor Esguerra. A church wedding followed on
December 30, 1970 and their marriage was blessed with
5 children.
Their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels
became common occurrences. Petitioner developed a
relationship with another woman. Respondent learned
about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it.
But despite the end of the affair, their quarrels
aggravated. Petitioner felt that he was unloved,
unwanted and unappreciated and this made him
indifferent towards respondent. Petitioner left the
family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City.
He gave up all the properties which he and respondent
had accumulated during their marriage in favor of
respondent and their children. Later, he converted to
Islam after dating several women.
On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his
marital bonds and filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of
his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
responsibilities of marital life.
Petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and
was already exposed to the hardships of farm life at an
early age. His father left their family to live with another
woman with whom he had seven other children. This
caused petitioner’s mother and siblings to suffer
immensely. He further alleged that he supported
himself through college and worked hard for the
company he joined. But despite his success at work, he
alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child lingered
as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own
family.
Petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr.
Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National
Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayag’s report stated that
petitioner is suffering from “Antisocial Personality
Disorder,” characterized by a pervasive pattern of social
deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness,
deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also
revealed that petitioner’s personality disorder is rooted
in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to
peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-
absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayag’s
conclusion that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
The RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner’s
marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioner’s
psychological incapacity. Upon appeal by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC
decision. CA denied MR.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitionr is psychologically
incapacitated.
HOLDING:
NO! CA’s decision was upheld.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides: A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for
the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage.
These are the disorders that result in the utter
insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give
meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has
contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.
In Republic v. CA, the Court laid down the guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36. The
Court held, (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of
the celebration” of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity
must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The
essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court
must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36
of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological
illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from
the inception of the marriage. The evaluation of Dr.
Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner
is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder. As
held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of
expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity
presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity. The evaluation of
Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the
Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioner’s
marriage to respondent. It is indispensable that the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history
of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the
reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during
his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he
became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction
with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder
rooted in his personal history. In Santos v. Court of
Appeals, the intention of the law is to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.
MENDOZA V REPUBLIC (2012)
[READ ATTACHED DIGEST]
*STUDENT REPORT ON PERSONALITY DISORDER*
VOID MARRIAGES; PERIOD TO FILE ACTION
Art 39 FC. The action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
[However, in the case of marriages celebrated before
the effectivity of this (FC) Code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in 10
years after this Code shall have taken effect (As
amended by EO 227)]
You can raise an action anytime, for as long as you
want!
RA 8533. AN ACT AMENDING TITLE I, CHAPTER 3,
ARTICLE 39 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, NULLIFYING THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
FOR ACTION OR DEFENSES GROUNDED ON
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Title I, Chapter 3, Article 39 of Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of
the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"TITLE I – MARRIAGE
"CHAPTER 3 – VOID AND VOIDABLE
MARRIAGES
"Art. 39. The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe."
Section 2. Effectivity clause. – This Act shall take effect 2. Since action for such is imprescriptible, no deadline,
after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the even after death of a party.
Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation. Distinguish void from voidable
Nullity; void ab initio Annulment; voidable
Approved: February 23, 1998 Can be attacked Must be direct
collaterally proceeding
No prescription; can be Parties must be alive
NINAL V BAYADOG (2000) raised anytime
For remarriage: Needs
NATURE: PERSONALITY TO FILE FOR NULLITY. THIRD final judgment
PARTIES CAN FILE SUIT FOR NULLITY; NO For other purposes: no
PRESCRIPTION. need final judgment; can
be attacked collaterally,
FACTS:
unless an issue arises in
1. Pepito Ninal married Teodulfa Bellones in 1974, had the case that requires FJ.
4 children, petitioners. April 24, 1985, Ninal shot 3. Therefore, if death of spouse makes marriage NOT
Teodulfa, who died. 1 year and 8 months later, nullable, it cannot be considered imprescriptible.
Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married 4. Therefore, it can be attacked by third persons, since
without license, on excuse that they had been law is silent on who may file suit.
cohabiting at hubby and wife for at least 5 years a. However, this ruling was modified by
(means he had a kabit while first wife was still the Rule of Declaration of Absolute
alive). Ninal died 1997. Nullity of Void Marriages and
2. Children filed a petition for declaration of nullity of Annulment of Voidable Marriages, but
marriage to Pepito and Norma. only AFTER this case happened.
3. Norma filed petition to dismiss – petitioners have
no cause of action, and they are not among the
ABLAZA V REPUBLIC OF THE PH (2010)
persons who could file an action for annulment of
marriage under Article 47. NATURE: RDANVMAVM (LOL) MODIFIES RULES ON
4. CFI: should have filed when Ninal was alive, PERSONALITY TO FILE SUIT. THAT THIS RULE IS
5. Petition for review SC. PROSPECTIVE.
ISSUES AND HOLDINGS: FACTS:
WON Ninal and Bayadog’s marriage falls under the VOID MARRIAGES; FINAL JUDGMENT
exception of Art 76, and is therefore valid. NO.
PEOPLE V MENDOZA (1954)
1. Both marriages were solemnized before FC, Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago says Article 53 CC was TOLENTINO V PARAS (1983)
applicable, which requires marriage license,
otherwise void ab initio. Exception: Art 76 CC WIEGEL V SEMPIO-DY (1986)
marriage of man and woman who lived together as TERRE V TERRE (1992)
hubby and wife for at least 5 years.
2. Only 20 months passed since he killed 1st wife. ATIENZA V BRILLANTES (1995)
3. Since he had a subsisting marriage while cohabiting APIAG V CANTERO (1997)
with Bayadog, their marriage does not fall under
the exception of Art 76.
4. Null and void.
VOID MARRIAGES; EFFECTS OF NULLITY
WON the children had personality to file a petition to
declare their parents’ marriage void. Art 43 FC.

1. There is no provision in the Code on who can file Art 44 FC.

petition to declare nullity of marriage
Art 50 FC.
Art 51 FC.
Art 52 FC.
Art 53 FC.
Art 54 FC.

VOID MARRIAGES; EFFECTS OF NULLITY;

PROPERTIES
DOMINGO V CA (1993)
NICDAO-CARINO V YEE CARINO (2001)
DINO V DINO (2011)

VOID MARRIAGES; EFFECTS OF NULLITY;

STATUS OF CHILDREN
Art 43 FC.
Art 54 FC.