1
EN BANC
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
- versus -
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent.
Promulgated: December 7, 2010
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
--- Justice Jose P. Laurel
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental
powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed
among the several departments.[2] The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other
laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.[3]
Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be
simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims
and caprices of government and the people who run it.[4]
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases[5] both of which essentially assail the
validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis
Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being
violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution[6] as it usurps
the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefor.[7]
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.
(petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections,
when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his
sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the
presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous
administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said
executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the
principle that a public office is a public trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who are
servants of the people, must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle and notorious
violation of this mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political, economic, and social life
of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized
and underprivileged sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and undermined the peoples
trust and confidence in the Government and its institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large
scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate
cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the
peoples faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last elections kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and
the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;

WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to reorganize the
Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend
the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to
ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an independent
collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will investigate;
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale
corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of
the Executive Branch, including government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents,
books, records and other papers;
c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the Senate and
the House of Representatives records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to
matters or subjects being investigated by the Commission;
d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts, including the
Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator, information or documents in respect to
corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;
e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or
affirmations as the case may be;
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f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state witness to ensure that
the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness under the Revised
Rules of Court of the Philippines be admitted for that purpose;
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial
authorities, by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of
public officers and employees and their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any,
when in the course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe
that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the Department of Justice
or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such assistance and
cooperation as it may require in the discharge of its functions and duties;
i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel determined
by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively and
efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its
investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection with the
objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x., SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x., SECTION 5. Engagement
of Experts. x x x, SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x., SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of
Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x., SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any government official or
personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who,
appearing before the Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce
documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any
private person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall provide the necessary funds
for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties
and responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x., SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x.
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish its mission on or before
December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x., SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the
Commission. x x x.

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there
is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the same
shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III. By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.. Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad
hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an
independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and
subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.[8]
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can
do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal,
civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official,
transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and context of serious violations of
human rights or of international humanitarian law in a countrys past.[9] They are usually established by
states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms
for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they
examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as
opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission
of a report containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned,
authorized or empowered by the State.[10] Commissions members are usually empowered to conduct
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research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes.
Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or
formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend
institutional reforms.[11]
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime
tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for
crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
of South Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent
future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on
judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of
perpetrators. As one writer[12] puts it:
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his
inaugural speech: To those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to simply
forget about the wrongs that they have committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no
reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their
occurring over and over again.
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the
petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators
summarized them in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 violates the consistent and general
international practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively
investigate human rights violations, which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted
principles of international law which the Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the
Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a
launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the
people that widespread poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even
addressing the other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment
because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of
an executive issuance or even a statute.[13]
In their Consolidated Comment,[14] the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order with
the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the Presidents
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations
to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), [15] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416[16] (as amended by
P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,[17] and settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-
judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and presidential
issuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and
Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative
Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and
Government Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.[18]
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be
resolved:
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1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question
Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs
to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.[19]
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to
demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not
shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not
sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.[20]
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail
Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the
cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and
rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez,[21]
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any
official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.[22]
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation
of the PTC and the budget for its operations.[23] It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation
and operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress.
Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action
but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1.
Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to
exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution.
The case of David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public
right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He
may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger,
or in the category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The
distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers
suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by
the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern.
As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public right,
howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere
and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to
maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act
with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public
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service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt,
later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has
sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest
common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases,
such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente,
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[25]
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26] the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be
relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming
the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and taxpayers
were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance[28] laid down in CREBA v. ERC and
Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court.
There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the
guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the
Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of
the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public,
but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal
controversies with overreaching significance to society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and
not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President.[31] Thus, in order that the President may
create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in
him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed[32] since there is no provision in
the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission.[33] He
adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority
to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the
aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as reorganize, transfer, consolidate, merge, and abolish.[34]

Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the
extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers
enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.[35]
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within
the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the
delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code:
1) does not permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to
the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the
restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions and
transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.[36] Such continuing
authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the
President overstepped the limits of this delegated authority.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a
fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it
argues that the authority of the President to create public offices within the Office of the President
Proper has long been recognized.[37] According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two
branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to assist it
in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its administrative
functions.[38] This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the
President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the
Constitution.[39]
It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations,
pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of his
department and in the exercise of his authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials.[40] The power of the
President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates in the
executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to discipline
subordinates,[41] his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes[42] and in order to be
informed on matters which he is entitled to know.[43]
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,[44] where it was held that the President has the
power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally
granted power of control and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize
executive offices under existing statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. For
the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported large
scale graft and corruption in the government.[45]
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the
power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31
contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring
the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
6
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the
Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency
under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision
refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a
modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned,
much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a
misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of
an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior
to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive
Secretary,[46]
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in
the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power
that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he
may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In
Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or
units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a
bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is
subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is
essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.[47]
Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is
inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his
inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to
create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds
statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.[48] The said law granted the President
the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This
decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as
Larin v. Executive Secretary.[49]

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a
public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation
to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national
government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the
purposes of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the
organization of the national government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D.
No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress,
as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor
General agrees with this view. Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416
says it was enacted to prepare the transition from presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary
form of government, the legislative and executive powers are fused, correct?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me that
P.D. 1416 should not be considered effective anymore upon the promulgation, adoption, ratification of
the 1987 Constitution.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the entire National Government is
deemed repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, correct.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.[50]
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to
aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability
and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the
President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As
explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]
7
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored
the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three
distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for
the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution
itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over
the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within
the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated
above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.[53]
One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty
is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,[54] the
authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to
look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the
anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with
the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the
past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare
such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for
the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment

or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of
the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor
General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very
source of the funds for the commission.[55] Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the
PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well
recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17
thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to
directly assume the functions of the executive department.[57]
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and
corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers
have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has
been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law.[58] In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the
exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be
clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the
Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official
inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in
the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry
or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to
find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make
an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or
otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the
parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers:
x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."
8
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and
the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence
and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law.[60] Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial
power.[61]
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode
their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of
the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a
consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation.[62] The actual
prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against
them,[63] is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, when in the course of its
investigation, under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from
that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.[64]
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared
with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65] it
was written:
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman
Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG
and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the
Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman
retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate
complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal
cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government,
the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied]

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a
preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically
out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the
Ombudsmans primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV
in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body
likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be
accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission
and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so,
the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be
aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the
Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They
contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling
out the previous administration as its sole object makes the PTC an adventure in partisan hostility.[66]
Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and
corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.[67]
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must
encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also
during prior administrations where the same magnitude of controversies and anomalies[68] were
reported to have been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by
the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first, there is no substantial
distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other
groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective
classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption.[69] In order to
attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with graft
and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with
equal force.[70]
9
Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the previous administration as the
initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of
large scale graft and corruption solely during the said administration.[71] Assuming arguendo that the
commission would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the petitioners
argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection clause for the segregation of the
transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a
valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive
Order seeks to correct.[72] To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it recited
the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
previous administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore,
an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against
those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and
confidence in the Government and in their public servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted by the
reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely bear the
immediate consequence of the policies of the previous administration.
Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in the
reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public
monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are
faithfully executed, are more easily established in the regime that immediately precede the current
administration.
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to provide
closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good
housekeeping by a nascent administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), created by the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and
the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No,
53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances
surrounding Philippine Centennial projects of his predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos.
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced
in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an

unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.[74]
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[75] It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.[76] The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the states duly constituted authorities.[77] In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.[78]
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.[79] Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken. [80]
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.[81] Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.[82]
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons
who naturally belong to the class.[83] The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of
the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not
necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the
class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as
long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact
that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him.[84]
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude those
that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of cases,[86]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but
10
on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that
are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as
in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the
equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration[87] only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.
Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend
the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to
ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class,
that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such

discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past
administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation
to the previous administration only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration
cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were
also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure
solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial differences do not make for
a valid classification.[88]
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended
investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that to include other past
administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its
effectiveness.[89] The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble
objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it breeds.[90]
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving
the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased
presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC.
Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given
the bodys limited time and resources. The law does not require the impossible (Lex non cogit ad
impossibilia).[91]
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of
investigating almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No.
1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must
not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all
past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be
struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,[92]
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court,
however, is of the considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection under the laws should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance
with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered.[93] Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.[94] While the thrust of
the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to
survive, must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier
administrations in the guise of substantial distinctions would only confirm the petitioners lament that
the subject executive order is only an adventure in partisan hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian,[95] it
11
was written: A rather limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be
arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political activity or membership in a political party,
union activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment rights.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.[96] Such a classification must not be based on
existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a
class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are
relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of
the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the
members of the class.[97]
The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the
equal protection clause.[98] Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and
does not include all the evils within its reach.[99] It has been written that a regulation challenged under
the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be
incomplete.[100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike
down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These
cases refer to the step by step process.[101] With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does
not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or
otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.[102]
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was
picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at
least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not
even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions
created in the past. The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional
discrimination.[103]
To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the
commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the
previous administration.[104] The OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there
is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope
of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past
administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded
mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would
decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the
petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and
personalities of the Arroyo administration.[105]

The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,[106]
that the PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal
protection clause. The decision, however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory
statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the
legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which
is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the
doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it
seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest
it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with
Judicial Power that includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to
declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the
constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of
conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the
other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit:
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.[107]
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal
body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the
authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards
the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical
principle: The end does not justify the means. No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the
purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
12
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.[108] The Court cannot just turn a blind eye
and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.
The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must
not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.[109]
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the
present administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past
administrations would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the
Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in
knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must,
however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for ours is
still a government of laws and not of men.[110]
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the
provisions of Executive Order No. 1.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission”
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created
under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD
No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ,
because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant
or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong
as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
13
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing
is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right”
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason
in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
14
Facts:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections,
when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his
sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the
presidency.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis
Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being
violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps
the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.
(petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question
Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Held:
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to
the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of
all.Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the President’s first
effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not
due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the
 15

Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
overreaching significance to society. agency or whatever guise is taken.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with
the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the
Court in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry
or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to
find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make
an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or
otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and
the entry of a judgment."
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the
equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration"only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.
Decision
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the
legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which
is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the
doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it
seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest
it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nation’s thrust to progress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the
provisions of Executive Order No. 1.
SO ORDERED.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be
accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission
and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so,
the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be
aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They
contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling
out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility."
Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and
corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive

EN BANC
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City,
and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH
EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent
of a total population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for
husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for
her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The
National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003,
"female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of
these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-
in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It
took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any
person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the
commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials,
law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local
government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the
equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City
for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner),
pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and
economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support.7
16
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven
years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural
child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and
Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her
husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and
demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and
deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was already
working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay
at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at
one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank,
Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private
respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about his sexual
relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the
woman because of their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally
wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her
with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent
forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter,
Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on
him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to
leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would
beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said
that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On
December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son
bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private
respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit,
nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy
almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges
against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then
packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private
respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent should just
accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with
her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her
children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she
goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the
President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros
Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the
absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary
of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses
amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through the use of
credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos
from the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade
her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are
conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said businesses. Until the filing of
the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the businesses the value
of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006
effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering
that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act
No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent
herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the
Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be
assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006
because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her when
he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and
driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where
the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner,
directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children,
mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation
rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
17
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and
ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial
Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be ordered
to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house
for them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from
all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as President
of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006.
Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller,
copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt
of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner
sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP
THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan
Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the
continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient
sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1)
comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the TPO
be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its
rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond
from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following
modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of
Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal
house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove
Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners
have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the
conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other
things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of
Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of
Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with
the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed
another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter
was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van
used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by a
group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and
Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap
him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another
occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her.26 The
incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her
father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
18
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the
conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came
about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's
belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room,
private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts
of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating
in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents,
from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers,
her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman
Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household
helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where
the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children;
Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or
indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly,
otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will be
rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to
the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for
rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from March
2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex
van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent
is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the
conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in
which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent
have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which
the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an
 19

interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. The Issues
T-186325 and T-168814;
I.
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a
copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale,
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION
corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that
her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to
defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains. II.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten
(10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should
not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he has not
received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its
Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an
Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23,
2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER
TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection
Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously
extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to
such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
"exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process
and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for
being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure of
petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is
clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial
court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE
STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE
BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262,
we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition
(CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if
not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court,
it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City,
petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution37 dated We disagree.
August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial
Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and
children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the
Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified.43 To achieve
harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined
under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of
such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
(Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a
court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that
RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being embraced in
the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."46The Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in
all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that
the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it
speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been
raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of
Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down
a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an
answer.49 Thus:
20
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he
himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a
temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and
third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot
likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by
one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either
of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be
the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from
being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of
private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is
being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause
for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner
from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one
of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-
10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may
issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day,
to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection
order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary,
Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to
expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until
final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order
as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running
afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have
proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an
injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a
petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court.
Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case
from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover,
if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more
reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant
to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared,
thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their
separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are
unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for
his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized
and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to
prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of
the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women
and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very
purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel
issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged
our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of private
respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse,
which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis
to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60
21
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals
that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had
originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of two measures,
namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships
Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time
giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was
eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions
of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have
expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart
from against women as well as other members of the household, including children or the husband, they
fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the
bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would
like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in
Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are
also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing
penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in,
common-law wives, and those related with the family.65
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and
not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would
be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong.
However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic
environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to
file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If
we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or
their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
 22

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will
men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered
the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the
family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the family
other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the intended The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some
relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to other family
members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or
less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
one are not available in said law.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong
they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I
recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the
basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife
and their immediate family members, particularly children.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not
limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about
input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and these things.
other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It
Senator Sotto. Mr. President. will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators. SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor. Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not
the children.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be
removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished
sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the
proposed amendment of Senator Legarda. Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.


The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as
amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress
in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No
proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice
and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but
even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of
separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and
expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none
was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but
on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that
are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as
in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by
favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than
men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for
23
real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the
accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and
Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the
unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence".
Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take
on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on
subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power
comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling
women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution
48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that
"violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and
women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial
social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and
developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of
R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a
family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the early
studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men.
Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In
ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men.
In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she
endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the
patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone
has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the
husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit
the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which
allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal
punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more importance than
preventing violence to women.
 24

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common law.
In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the common law
right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in
her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our
law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for
himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance
leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root
cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other
watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the
liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since
then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role and rights of
women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself
established a Commission on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's movements. No
less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of
women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They victims of violence.
succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than the United States
Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women and
children show that –
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of
severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total
husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical Association] views
cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354
these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages women
cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult circumstances
from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak
served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417
English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted.
physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out
According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence
of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than
is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."
90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by
the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted
by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence against
11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual
women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking
assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*
abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common.

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior
in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not
alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in
even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever experienced
large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous.
domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men
Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the
who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had
United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their
experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence.75Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence
male partners.
by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44
percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act. at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of
physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical
or emotional abuse.76
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In
 25

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid. prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly
pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to
to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the
pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing
prosecution and the judges."85
animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative
of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-
drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
streets.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle- violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and their
appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the
inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for
family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78
safety and security.

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women
are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United States
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the
Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has
institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to
"double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to
settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is
hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or
reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often
serious nature of domestic violence."80
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5,
1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October
6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before
the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and women.88 The
Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus,
bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated,
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are
threatened by violence and abuse.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the complainant in
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof
a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as
defines VAWC as:
an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a
"prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the
contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity. x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has
a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
discriminate against men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that
it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State
Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex
object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual
parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows
or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the
wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with
the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force,
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property,
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing
the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the
victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful
or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner
objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money
or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research
that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the
U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by
petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action
and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the
innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in
26
its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman
or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital
infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case
of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as
long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the
culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has
or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.
Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle
of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the
parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed
by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design
and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her
to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections
afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of
what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary
custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
"time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is authorized
to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the
victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the

victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to
recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The
victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses'
affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just
like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in
which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in
the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such
acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,103among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice
be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from
service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days
from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of
the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days
from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be
indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not
be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of
petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an
overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23,
2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which
to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required
comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal
of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the
27
continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so,
petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the
residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to
the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this
is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or all of
the following reliefs:
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or
permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of
ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be
permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim
any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and
counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a
mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the
Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order
for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily
reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is
problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against
whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by

law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders.111 The
pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders
(BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist
from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte
determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the
application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO
is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay
Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be
effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay
or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any
barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of
his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public
order in the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the
fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding
"whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an
imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would
necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is,
concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be
very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As
already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with
their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
28
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict
with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a
manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be
beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing
arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262,
which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the
facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against
domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law
itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but
will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order
against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence,
being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of
marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the
said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO
should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted
the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise
the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not
raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of
the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process
clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the
family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an
undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial
court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all
that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the
class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause
by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s
defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that
29
the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a
subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
[G.R. No. 179267; June 25, 2013] Constitutional Law| Equal Protection Clause
Background of the case:
In 2004, Congress enacted RA No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children”. It defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had
a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child.
FACTS:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children for a Temporary Protection
Order against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. The husband
now, assails the constitutionality of RA 9262 as being violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of equal protection clause.
HELD:
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall
hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the
culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has
or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.
R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection. The
unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to
be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
 30

differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, “the
accommodation of differences … is the essence of true equality.”

FACTS:

Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent
wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle,
she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to
hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of
income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA
9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING:

No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on
equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women
and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and
women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable
victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting
human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and
the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in
fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review
or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the
equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This case involves an overseas Filipino worker with shattered dreams. It is our duty, given the facts and
the law, to approximate justice for her.
We are asked to decide a petition for review1 on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision2 dated
June 27, 2005. This decision partially affirmed the National Labor RelationsCommission’s resolution
dated March 31, 2004,3declaring respondent’s dismissal illegal, directing petitioner to pay respondent’s
three-month salary equivalent to New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) 46,080.00, and ordering it to reimburse the
NT$3,000.00 withheld from respondent, and pay her NT$300.00 attorney’s fees.4
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency.5 Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a
quality control job in Taiwan.6
Joy’s application was accepted.7 Joy was later asked to sign a oneyear employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a
placement fee of ₱70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.9
Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.10 She alleged that in
her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year.11 In Taiwan, she was asked
to work as a cutter.12
Sameer Overseas Placement Agencyclaims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
informedJoy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should immediately report to
their office to get her salary and passport."13 She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."14
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.16
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint17 with the National Labor Relations Commission against
petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed.18 She asked for the return of her
placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well
as moral and exemplary damages.19 She identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s
foreign principal.20
31
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency,
negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with the work requirements [of] her foreign
[employer]."21 The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of ₱70,000.00.22 As
evidence, it showedOfficial Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10, 1997, bearing the amount of
₱20,360.00.23 Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred
to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.24 Thus, petitioner
asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.25
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it.26 It alleged that there was no
employer-employee relationship between them.27 Therefore, the claims against it were outside the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.28 Pacific Manpower argued that the employment contract should first
be presented so that the employer’s contractual obligations might be identified.29 It further denied that
it assumed liability for petitioner’s illegal acts.30
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint.31 Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro
C.Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on mereallegations.32 The Labor Arbiter found that there
was no excess payment of placement fees, based on the official receipt presented by petitioner.33 The
Labor Arbiter found unnecessary a discussion on petitioner’s transfer of obligations to Pacific34 and
considered the matter immaterial in view of the dismissal of respondent’s complaint.35
Joy appealed36 to the National Labor Relations Commission.
In a resolution37 dated March 31, 2004, the National Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was
illegally dismissed.38 It reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was
based on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer.39 It found that Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for termination.40 There was no sufficient proofto
show that respondent was inefficient in her work and that she failed to comply with company
requirements.41 Furthermore, procedural dueprocess was not observed in terminating respondent.42
The National Labor Relations Commission did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees
for lack of jurisdiction.43 It refused to entertain the issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to
Pacific.44 It did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed
to appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision not to rule on the matter.45
The National Labor Relations Commission awarded respondent only three (3) months worth of salaryin
the amount of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from her, and attorney’s fees of
NT$300.46
The Commission denied the agency’s motion for reconsideration47 dated May 12, 2004 through a
resolution48 dated July 2, 2004.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition49 for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals assailing the National Labor Relations Commission’s resolutions dated March
31, 2004 and July 2, 2004.
The Court of Appeals50 affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission with respect to
the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the equivalent of three months worth of salary,
reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s fees.51 The Court of Appeals remanded

the case to the National Labor Relations Commission to address the validity of petitioner's allegations
against Pacific.52 The Court of Appeals held, thus: Although the public respondent found the dismissal of
the complainant-respondent illegal, we should point out that the NLRC merely awarded her three (3)
months backwages or the amount of NT$46,080.00, which was based upon its finding that she was
dismissed without due process, a finding that we uphold, given petitioner’s lack of worthwhile discussion
upon the same in the proceedings below or before us. Likewise we sustain NLRC’s finding in regard to
the reimbursement of her fare, which is squarely based on the law; as well as the award of attorney’s
fees.
But we do find it necessary to remand the instant case to the public respondent for further proceedings,
for the purpose of addressing the validity or propriety of petitioner’s third-party complaint against the
transferee agent or the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. and Lea G. Manabat. We should
emphasize that as far as the decision of the NLRC on the claims of Joy Cabiles, is concerned, the same is
hereby affirmed with finality, and we hold petitioner liable thereon, but without prejudice to further
hearings on its third party complaint against Pacific for reimbursement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions are hereby partly AFFIRMED in accordance
with the foregoing discussion, but subject to the caveat embodied inthe last sentence. No costs.
SO ORDERED.53
Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition.54
We are asked to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost ofher repatriation, and attorney’s fees despite
the alleged existence of just causes of termination.
Petitioner reiterates that there was just cause for termination because there was a finding of Wacoal
that respondent was inefficient in her work.55
Therefore, it claims that respondent’s dismissal was valid.56
Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoal’s accreditation was validly transferred to Pacific at the time
respondent filed her complaint, it should be Pacific that should now assume responsibility for Wacoal’s
contractual obligations to the workers originally recruited by petitioner.57
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’spetition is without merit. We find for respondent.
I
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s dismissal.
The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work.58 They
may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards.59 Failure
to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal.60 Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain
32
the services of anemployee who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer.61 While
the law acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not "authorize the oppression or
self-destruction of the employer."62 Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our
jurisprudence.
This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered with the employee’s right to security of
tenure."63Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before termination. They may
not be removed from employment without a validor just cause as determined by law and without going
through the proper procedure.
Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.64
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different jurisdiction.
With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle of lex loci
contractus.Thus, in Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC,65 this court noted:
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending that since
Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host country.
Apparently, petitioner hopes tomake it appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any
certification by a competent public health authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.
Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made)
governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was
perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and
other laws affecting labor apply in this case.Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum
will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Herein the Philippines,
employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII,
Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers, to wit:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled
to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. Theyshall also participate in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
....
This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to determine
for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness
would encourage illegal or arbitrary pretermination of employment contracts.66 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)

Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights, this court emphasized in PCL Shipping Philippines,
Inc. v. NLRC,67 to wit:
Petitioners admit that they did notinform private respondent in writing of the charges against him and
that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side. However,
petitioners contend that the twin requirements ofnotice and hearing applies strictly only when the
employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in cases of
international maritime or overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford
protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or abroad.
Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs
in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of Employment entered into
by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here in the Philippines with the
approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together
with its implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.68 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or authorized cause and
after compliance with procedural due process requirements.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or
any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondentwas inefficient in her work and negligent in her duties69 may,
therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to
prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. "The employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause."70 Failure
to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was
illegal.71
33
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer
has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged; 2) the
standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated tothe employee; and 3) the
communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance assessment.
This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on probationary employees, which allow termination ofthe
employee only when there is "just cause or when [the probationary employee] fails to qualify as a
regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his [or her] engagement."72
However, we do not see why the application of that ruling should be limited to probationary
employment. That rule is basic to the idea of security of tenure and due process, which are guaranteed
to all employees, whether their employment is probationary or regular.
The pre-determined standards that the employer sets are the bases for determining the probationary
employee’s fitness, propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular employee. Due process requires
that the probationary employee be informed of such standards at the time of his or her engagement so
he or she can adjusthis or her character or workmanship accordingly. Proper adjustment to fit the
standards upon which the employee’s qualifications will be evaluated will increase one’s chances of
being positively assessed for regularization by his or her employer.
Assessing an employee’s work performance does not stop after regularization. The employer, on a
regular basis, determines if an employee is still qualified and efficient, based on work standards. Based
on that determination, and after complying with the due process requirements of notice and hearing,
the employer may exercise its management prerogative of terminating the employee found unqualified.
The regular employee must constantlyattempt to prove to his or her employer that he or she meets all
the standards for employment. This time, however, the standards to be met are set for the purpose of
retaining employment or promotion. The employee cannot be expected to meet any standard of
character or workmanship if such standards were not communicated to him or her. Courts should
remain vigilant on allegations of the employer’s failure to communicatework standards that would
govern one’s employment "if [these are] to discharge in good faith [their] duty to adjudicate."73
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign employer’s work
requirements and was inefficient in her work.74 No evidence was shown to support such allegations.
Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not met, what efficiency standards
were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against which her
work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as to the position held by respondent
showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is just cause for
termination. There is no proof that respondent was legally terminated.
Petitioner failed to comply with
the due process requirements

Respondent’s dismissal less than one year from hiring and her repatriation on the same day show not
onlyfailure on the partof petitioner to comply with the requirement of the existence of just cause for
termination. They patently show that the employersdid not comply with the due process requirement.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.75 The
employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before
termination.76 One of the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that may
cause his or her dismissal.77 The other notice must "[inform] the employee of the employer’s
decision."78 Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given "an opportunity to be
heard."79
Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements. Respondent started working
on June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and
barely a month from her first workday. She was also repatriated on the same day that she was informed
of her termination. The abruptness of the termination negated any finding that she was properly notified
and given the opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right to due process of law was violated.
II
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired
portion ofthe employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement
of amounts withheld from her salary.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of1995, states thatoverseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause "shall
be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less."
Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This provisions [sic] shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be
filed by the recruitment/placementagency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims
or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical
being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly
and solidarily liable with the corporation orpartnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall
not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of
the said contract.
34
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages
under this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the approval of the settlement by the
appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law
or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
....
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that "repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or
her] personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed
the worker overseas." The exception is when "termination of employment is due solely to the fault of
the worker,"80 which as we have established, is not the case. It reads: SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF
WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND. – The repatriation of the worker and the transport of his
personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the
worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the agency
concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal
belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or
local agency. However, in cases where the termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the
worker, the principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of
the former and/or his belongings.
....
The Labor Code81 also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as attorney’s
feeswhen the withholding is unlawful.
The Court of Appeals affirmedthe National Labor Relations Commission’s decision to award respondent
NT$46,080.00 or the threemonth equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of NT$300.00, and the
reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her repatriation.
We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to all of these awards. The award of the three-month
equivalent of respondent’s salary should, however, be increased to the amount equivalent to the
unexpired term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,82 this court ruled that the
clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"83 is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.84
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at
all."85

We are aware that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less"was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 provides:
Section 7.Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.– Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damage.
Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with the
developments in the global services industry.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to de
[sic] filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall
not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of
the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages
under this section shall be paid within thirty (30) days from approval of the settlement by the
appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law
or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker’s salary, the worker shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement if [sic] his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In case of a final and executory judgement against a foreign employer/principal, it shall be automatically
disqualified, without further proceedings, from participating in the Philippine Overseas Employment
Program and from recruiting and hiring Filipino workers until and unless it fully satisfies the judgement
award.
Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for resolutions of case providedunder this section shall
subject the responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(a) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within the
prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies therewith;
(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
35
(c) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for five
(5) years.
Provided, however,That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability which
any such official may have incured [sic] under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a
consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of the
clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent’s termination from work
in 1997.86 Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended byRepublic Act No. 10022 governs this case.
When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual case that clearly raises adversarial positions in their
proper context before considering a prayer to declare it as unconstitutional.
However, we are confronted with a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the exact clause
already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.
This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of
Appeals.At minimum, the existence of Republic Act No. 10022 may delay the execution of the judgment
in this case, further frustrating remedies to assuage the wrong done to petitioner.
Hence, there is a necessity to decide this constitutional issue.
Moreover, this court is possessed with the constitutional duty to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights."87 When cases become mootand academic, we do
not hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar in situations where the same violations are
capable of repetition but will evade review. This is analogous to cases where there are millions of
Filipinos working abroad who are bound to suffer from the lack of protection because of the restoration
of an identical clause in a provision previously declared as unconstitutional.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may
exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any
law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be
read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,the nullity
cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or
provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have
sochanged as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so changed so as
to cause us to reverse binding precedent.
Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial efficiency and economy that attend to these cases. The
new law puts our overseas workers in the same vulnerable position as they were prior to Serrano. Failure
to reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will result in the same untold economic hardships that
our reading of the Constitution intended to avoid. Obviously, we cannot countenance added expenses

for further litigation thatwill reduce their hardearned wages as well as add to the indignity of having
been deprived of the protection of our laws simply because our precedents have not been followed.
There is no constitutional doctrine that causes injustice in the face of empty procedural niceties.
Constitutional interpretation is complex, but it is never unreasonable.
Thus, in a resolution88 dated October 22, 2013, we ordered the parties and the Office of the Solicitor
General to comment on the constitutionality of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 10022.
In its comment,89 petitioner argued that the clause was constitutional.90 The legislators intended a
balance between the employers’ and the employees’ rights by not unduly burdening the local
recruitment agency.91 Petitioner is also of the view that the clause was already declared as constitutional
in Serrano.92
The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the clause was valid and constitutional.93 However,
since the parties never raised the issue of the constitutionality of the clause asreinstated in Republic Act
No. 10022, its contention is that it is beyond judicial review.94
On the other hand, respondentargued that the clause was unconstitutional because it infringed on
workers’ right to contract.95
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General
have failed to show any compelling changein the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the
precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by
anillegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the
same class are treated alike, in terms of "privileges conferred and liabilities enforced."97 It is a guarantee
against "undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of inequality."98
In creating laws, the legislature has the power "to make distinctions and classifications."99
In exercising such power, it has a wide discretion.100
The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power.101 A law is void on this basis, only
if classifications are made arbitrarily.102 There is no violation of the equal protection clause if the law
applies equally to persons within the same class and if there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing
between those falling within the class and those who do not fall within the class.103 A law that does not
violate the equal protection clause prescribesa reasonable classification.104
A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class."105
36
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification.
In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished between
fixed-period overseas workers and fixedperiod local workers.106 It also distinguished between overseas
workers with employment contracts of less than one year and overseas workers with employment
contracts of at least one year.107 Within the class of overseas workers with at least one-year employment
contracts, there was a distinction between those with at least a year left in their contracts and those
with less than a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed.108
The Congress’ classification may be subjected to judicial review. In Serrano, there is a "legislative
classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class."109
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special protection.110 Thus, this court in Serrano, "[i]mbued
with the same sense of ‘obligation to afford protection to labor,’ . . . employ[ed] the standard of strict
judicial scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs."111
We also noted in Serranothat before the passage of Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of illegally
terminated overseas and local workers with fixed-term employment werecomputed in the same
manner.112 Their money claims were computed based onthe "unexpired portions of their
contracts."113 The adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the money claims
of illegally dismissed overseas workers with an unexpired term of at least a year to a cap of three months
worth of their salary.114 There was no such limitation on the money claims of illegally terminated local
workers with fixed-term employment.115
We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a term of less
than one year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.116 Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with employment terms of at least a year
were granted a cap equivalent to three months of their salary for the unexpired portions of their
contracts.117
Observing the terminologies used inthe clause, we also found that "the subject clause creates a sub-layer
of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are
illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more
remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the reinstated clause, and their monetary benefits
limited to their salaries for three months only."118
We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these classifications do not rest on any real or substantial
distinctions that would justify different treatments in terms of the computation of money claims
resulting from illegal termination.
Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled to security of tenure, at least for the
period agreed upon in their contracts. This means that they cannot be dismissed before the end of their
contract terms without due process. If they were illegally dismissed, the workers’ right to security of
tenure is violated.

The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local worker is illegally terminated are neither greater than
norless than the rights violated when a fixed-period overseas worker is illegally terminated. It is state
policy to protect the rights of workers withoutqualification as to the place of employment.119 In both
cases, the workers are deprived of their expected salary, which they could have earned had they not
been illegally dismissed. For both workers, this deprivation translates to economic insecurity and
disparity.120 The same is true for the distinctions between overseas workers with an employment
contract of less than one year and overseas workers with at least one year of employment contract, and
between overseas workers with at least a year left in their contracts and overseas workers with less than
a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed.
For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument that "[overseas workers] are contractual
employeeswho can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers"121 because it already
justifies differentiated treatment in terms ofthe computation of money claims.122
Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues on overseas workers’ money claims do not justify a
differentiated treatment in the computation of their money claims.123 If anything, these issues justify an
equal, if not greater protection and assistance to overseas workers who generally are more prone to
exploitation given their physical distance from our government.
We also find that the classificationsare not relevant to the purpose of the law, which is to "establish a
higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and
overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes."124 Further, we find specious the argument that
reducing the liability of placement agencies "redounds to the benefit of the [overseas] workers."125
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not increase the standard of
protection afforded to them. On the other hand, foreign employers are more incentivizedby the
reinstated clause to enter into contracts of at least a year because it gives them more flexibility to violate
our overseas workers’ rights. Their liability for arbitrarily terminating overseas workers is decreased at
the expense of the workers whose rights they violated. Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are
impressed with an expectation of a stable job overseas for the longer contract period disregard other
opportunities only to be terminated earlier. They are left with claims that are less than what others in
the same situation would receive. The reinstated clause, therefore, creates a situation where the law
meant to protect them makes violation of rights easier and simply benign to the violator.
As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in Serrano:
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and measures, and in fact provides a hidden
twist affecting the principal/employer’s liability. While intended as an incentive accruing to
recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as worded, simply limits the OFWs’ recovery in
wrongfuldismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be liable, including the
principal/employer – the direct employer primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal. In this sense,
Section 10 – read as a grant of incentives to recruitment/manning agencies – oversteps what it aims to
do by effectively limiting what is otherwise the full liability of the foreign principals/employers. Section
10, in short, really operates to benefit the wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason,
to mitigate its liability for wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden twist, the limitation ofliability
under Section 10 cannot be an "appropriate" incentive, to borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses
to describe the incentive it envisions under its purpose clause.
37
What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive: instead of a grant that, to
encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts undertaken, the law simply
limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of already deployed OFWs. This is effectively a legally-
imposed partial condonation of their liability to OFWs, justified solely by the law’s intent to encourage
greater deployment efforts. Thus, the incentive,from a more practical and realistic view, is really part of
a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting the market. . . .
The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the OFWs — the benefits accruing
to the recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are takenfrom the pockets of the OFWs to
whom the full salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract rightfully belong. Thus, the
principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies even profit from their violation of the
security of tenure that an employment contract embodies. Conversely, lesser protection is afforded the
OFW, not only because of the lessened recovery afforded him or her by operation of law, but also
because this same lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal easier and less onerous to undertake;
the lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino will always bea consideration a foreign employer will take into
account in termination of employment decisions. . . .126
Further, "[t]here can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the
burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored
sector is composed of private businesses suchas placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is
composed ofOFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea thatprivate
business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious."127
Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it
deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose.128
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance
with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of respondent’s
salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on
July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To rule otherwise
would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would,in effect, send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which
an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional
provision of law."129
III
On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 of June 21, 2013, which revised the
interest rate for loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in the absence of stipulation,applies in this case.
The pertinent portions of Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, read: The Monetary Board, in its Resolution
No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the following revisions governing the rate of interest in the
absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate
allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rateof interest, shall be six
percent (6%) per annum.

Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections
4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions are
hereby amended accordingly.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.
Through the able ponencia of Justice Diosdado Peralta, we laid down the guidelines in computing legal
interest in Nacar v. Gallery Frames:130
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages,
the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6%
per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at
the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand
is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made
(at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013,
shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein.131
Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and forbearance of money, goods, or credits, and in
judgments when there is no stipulation on the applicable interest rate. Further, it is only applicable if the
judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013.132
We add that Circular No. 799 is not applicable when there is a law that states otherwise. While the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to set or limit interest rates,133 these interest rates do not
apply when the law provides that a different interest rate shall be applied. "[A] Central Bank Circular
cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law."134
38
For example, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that unlawfully terminated overseas workers
are entitled to the reimbursement of his or her placement fee with an interest of 12% per annum. Since
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars cannotrepeal Republic Act No. 8042, the issuance of Circular No. 799
does not have the effect of changing the interest on awards for reimbursement of placement fees from
12% to 6%. This is despite Section 1 of Circular No. 799, which provides that the 6% interest rate applies
even to judgments.
Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated in contracts. "The contracting parties need not repeat them.
They do not even have to be referred to. Every contract, thus, contains not only what has been explicitly
stipulated, but the statutory provisions that have any bearing on the matter."135 There is, therefore, an
implied stipulation in contracts between the placement agency and the overseasworker that in case the
overseas worker is adjudged as entitled to reimbursement of his or her placement fees, the amount shall
be subject to a 12% interest per annum. This implied stipulation has the effect of removing awards for
reimbursement of placement fees from Circular No. 799’s coverage.
The same cannot be said for awardsof salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract
under Republic Act No. 8042. These awards are covered by Circular No. 799 because the law does not
provide for a specific interest rate that should apply.
In sum, if judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013 and there was no stipulation
in the contract providing for a different interest rate, other money claims under Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 8042 shall be subject to the 6% interest per annum in accordance with Circular No. 799.
This means that respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per annum on her money claims from
the finality of this judgment.
IV
Finally, we clarify the liabilities ofWacoal as principal and petitioner as the employment agency that
facilitated respondent’s overseas employment.
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign employer
and the local employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money claims including claims
arising out of an employer-employee relationship and/or damages. This section also provides that the
performance bond filed by the local agency shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if
they were awarded to the employee.
This provision is in line with the state’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating workers’
plight.136
In overseas employment, the filing of money claims against the foreign employer is attended by practical
and legal complications.1âwphi1 The distance of the foreign employer alonemakes it difficult for an
overseas worker to reach it and make it liable for violations of the Labor Code. There are also possible
conflict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and procedural rules that may be raised to frustrate an overseas
worker’sattempt to advance his or her claims.
It may be argued, for instance, that the foreign employer must be impleaded in the complaint as an
indispensable party without which no final determination can be had of an action.137

The provision on joint and several liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
assures overseas workers that their rights will not be frustrated with these complications. The
fundamental effect of joint and several liability is that "each of the debtors is liable for the entire
obligation."138 A final determination may, therefore, be achieved even if only oneof the joint and several
debtors are impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case of overseas employment, either the local agency
or the foreign employer may be sued for all claims arising from the foreign employer’s labor law
violations. This way, the overseas workers are assured that someone — the foreign employer’s local
agent — may be made to answer for violationsthat the foreign employer may have committed.
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers have recourse in
law despite the circumstances of their employment. By providing that the liability of the foreign
employer may be "enforced to the full extent"139 against the local agent,the overseas worker is assured
of immediate and sufficientpayment of what is due them.140
Corollary to the assurance of immediate recourse in law, the provision on joint and several liability in the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 shifts the burden of going after the foreign
employer from the overseas worker to the local employment agency. However, it must be emphasized
that the local agency that is held to answer for the overseas worker’s money claims is not leftwithout
remedy. The law does not preclude it from going after the foreign employer for reimbursement of
whatever payment it has made to the employee to answer for the money claims against the foreign
employer.
A further implication of making localagencies jointly and severally liable with the foreign employer is
thatan additional layer of protection is afforded to overseas workers. Local agencies, which are
businesses by nature, are inoculated with interest in being always on the lookout against foreign
employers that tend to violate labor law. Lest they risk their reputation or finances, local agenciesmust
already have mechanisms for guarding against unscrupulous foreign employers even at the level prior to
overseas employment applications.
With the present state of the pleadings, it is not possible to determine whether there was indeed a
transfer of obligations from petitioner to Pacific. This should not be an obstacle for the respondent
overseas worker to proceed with the enforcement of this judgment. Petitioner is possessed with the
resources to determine the proper legal remedies to enforce its rights against Pacific, if any.
V
Many times, this court has spoken on what Filipinos may encounter as they travel into the farthest and
mostdifficult reaches of our planet to provide for their families. In Prieto v. NLRC:141
The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign land where
they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of contract,
maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of
debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts towhich they are subjected by their foreign employers,
who probably feel they can do as they please in their own country. Whilethese workers may indeed have
relatively little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not continue
to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no
reason why, in their very own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full
measure for the redress of their grievances.142
39
But it seems that we have not said enough.
We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their travails and their heroism can be told a million times over; each of
their stories as real as any other. Overseas Filipino workers brave alien cultures and the heartbreak of
families left behind daily. They would count the minutes, hours, days, months, and years yearning to see
their sons and daughters. We all know of the joy and sadness when they come home to see them all
grown up and, being so, they remember what their work has cost them. Twitter accounts, Facetime, and
many other gadgets and online applications will never substitute for their lost physical presence.
Unknown to them, they keep our economy afloat through the ebb and flow of political and economic
crises. They are our true diplomats, they who show the world the resilience, patience, and creativity of
our people. Indeed, we are a people who contribute much to the provision of material creations of this
world.
This government loses its soul if we fail to ensure decent treatment for all Filipinos. We default by
limiting the contractual wages that should be paid to our workers when their contracts are breached by
the foreign employers. While we sit, this court will ensure that our laws will reward our overseas workers
with what they deserve: their dignity.
Inevitably, their dignity is ours as weil.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C.
Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her employment contract at an
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse
respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at an
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.
The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in Section 7
of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a monthly
salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26,
1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In
Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without
prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get her
salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was
 40

told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us
Wacoal deductedNT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila. to revisit the precedent.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the
and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should
be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled
that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all.”

The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of
Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government
may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of
any law that supports such exercise. The Constitutioncannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must
be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,
the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or
provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022,
violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the

EN BANC
G.R. No. 189698 December 1, 2009
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of
the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises
thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune
and irrelevant to our day.1 It is in this light that we should address the instant case.
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In view of pressing contemporary events, the petition begs for
immediate resolution.
The Antecedents
This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election
system (AES).
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998
NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof reads:
SEC. 11. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall
contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative,
referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically
by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the
Board of Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be
provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120)
days before the elections: - Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for
any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and
vice president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to
the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to
41
a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for
purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the
positions of President, Vice President, Senators and candidates under the Party-List System as well as
petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the Party-List System shall be on
February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be
on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the
Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification
by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements.
Accredited political parties and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the
printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial
number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive
hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine and that identification
marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot
for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.2
Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23, 2007 by enacting R.A. No. 9369,
entitled "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998
NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO
ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER
RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 13 of the
amendatory law modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus:
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 15. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic display and/or
the size and form of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be filled and/or the
propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable, electronic
displays must be constructed to present the names of all candidates for the same position in the same
page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must be constructed to present the entire ballot to the
voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure that the voter sees all of the ballot options on all
pages before completing his or her vote and to allow the voter to review and change all ballot choices
prior to completing and casting his or her ballot. Under each position to be filled, the names of
candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using the same type
size. The maiden or married name shall be listed in the official ballot, as preferred by the female
candidate. Under each proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be uniformly indicated using the
same font and size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to
authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
 42

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and
of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of void.
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
The Petitioners' Contention
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That
any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces,
and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed
facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the
certificate of candidacy. purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing
does not automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. In fact,
the law considers him a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Petitioners then assert that
Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official candidates within thirty (30)
this being so, they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices when they
days before the start of the period for filing a certificate of candidacy.
file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be
considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are,
With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots shall be printed by the National by law, already considered as candidates.6
Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private
printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution,
contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral
contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to
ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized
arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their
citizens' arms of the Commission shall assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official
CoCs.7
ballots.

Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the
filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.8
necessary safeguards, such as, but not limited to, bar codes, holograms, color shifting ink, microprinting,
are provided on the ballot.
The Respondent's Arguments
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one ballot for
every registered voter with a provision of additional three ballots per precinct.3 On the procedural aspect of the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
respondent COMELEC, argues that petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit." Petitioners
have not yet filed their CoCs, hence, they are not yet affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
resolution. The OSG further claims that the petition is premature or unripe for judicial determination."
Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of
Petitioners have admitted that they are merely planning to file their CoCs for the coming 2010 elections.
Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Their interest in the present controversy is thus merely speculative and contingent upon the filing of the
Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
same. The OSG likewise contends that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. They are questioning an
issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of the latter's rule-making power. Certiorari under Rule
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding a public appointive office or 65 is then an improper remedy.9
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
phrasing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 for it merely copied what is in the law. The OSG, however,
agrees with petitioners that there is a conflict in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 that should be resolved.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his According to the OSG, there seems to be no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position. and to require them to vacate their positions on the same day that they file their CoCs, because they are
not yet considered as candidates at that time. Further, this - deemed resigned- provision existed in Batas
Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 881, and no longer finds a place in our present election laws with the
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on regular
innovations brought about by the automated system.10
days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until
midnight.
Our Ruling
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the I.
government and who intend to run in the coming elections,5 filed the instant petition for prohibition and

At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect. What petitioners assail in their
petition is a resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari
under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, cannot be availed of, because it is a remedy to question decisions,
resolutions and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function.11 Prohibition is also
an inappropriate remedy, because what petitioners actually seek from the Court is a determination of
the proper construction of a statute and a declaration of their rights thereunder. Obviously, their
petition is one for declaratory relief,12 over which this Court does not exercise original jurisdiction.13
However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of both the
COMELEC resolution and the law. Given this scenario, the Court may step in and resolve the instant
petition.
The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the compelling state
interest involved in their early resolution the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections has
already started and hundreds of civil servants intending to run for elective offices are to lose their
employment, thereby causing imminent and irreparable damage to their means of livelihood and, at the
same time, crippling the government's manpowerfurther dictate that the Court must, for propriety, if
only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite the adjudication of all, especially
the constitutional, issues.
In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or technicalities of procedure
and resolve the merits of a case. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the Rules
were promulgated to provide guidelines for the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the hand
that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules,
deprived of their judicial discretion.14
II.
To put things in their proper perspective, it is imperative that we trace the brief history of the assailed
provision. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, which for ready reference is quoted as follows:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition
for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That
any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces,
and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her
certificate of candidacy.15
Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the law amended by R.A. No. 9369.
The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the
Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.- Any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
43
in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
It may be recalled-in inverse chronology-that earlier, Presidential Decree No. 1296, or the 1978 Election
Code, contained a similar provision, thus'
SECTION 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. - Every person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or
position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall continue in the
offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of certificate of candidacy, subject to the pleasure
of the President of the Philippines.
Much earlier, R.A. No. 6388, or the Election Code of 1971, likewise stated in its Section 23 the following:
SECTION 23. Candidates Holding Appointive Office or Position. - Every person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and every officer or
employee in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position
on the date he files his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That the filing of a certificate of candidacy shall
not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which he may have incurred.
Going further back in history, R.A. No. 180, or the Revised Election Code approved on June 21, 1947, also
provided that
SECTION 26. Automatic cessation of appointive officers and employees who are candidates. - Every
person holding a public appointive office or position shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the
date he files his certificate of candidacy.
During the Commonwealth era, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 725, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR
THE NEXT ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS AND
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS
THEREFOR," approved on January 5, 1946, contained, in the last paragraph of its Section 2, the following:
A person occupying any civil office by appointment in the government or any of its political subdivisions
or agencies or government-owned or controlled corporations, whether such office by appointive or
elective, shall be considered to have resigned from such office from the moment of the filing of such
certificate of candidacy.
Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE FIRST ELECTION FOR
PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS, AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMENDMENTS THEREOF," enacted without
executive approval on June 22, 1941, the precursor of C.A. No. 725, only provided for automatic
resignation of elective, but not appointive, officials.
Nevertheless, C.A. No. 357, or the Election Code approved on August 22, 1938, had, in its Section 22, the
same verbatim provision as Section 26 of R.A. No. 180.

The earliest recorded Philippine law on the subject is Act No. 1582, or the Election Law enacted by the
Philippine Commission in 1907, the last paragraph of Section 29 of which reads:
Sec. 29. Penalties upon officers.- x x x.
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for election, nor shall he be eligible during the time
that he holds said public office to election, at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for
reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the Court of First Instance, justice of
the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of
Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take any part in any municipal,
provincial, or Assembly election under penalty of being deprived of his office and being disqualified to
hold any public office whatever for a term of five years: Provided, however, That the foregoing
provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any
election.
From this brief historical excursion, it may be gleaned that the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369- that any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at
the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy- traces its roots to the period of the
American occupation.
In fact, during the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 2231, the bill later to be consolidated with House Bill
No. 5352 and enacted as R.A. No. 9369, Senator Richard Gordon, the principal author of the bill,
acknowledged that the said proviso in the proposed legislative measure is an old provision which was
merely copied from earlier existing legislation, thus'
Senator Osmeña.- May I just opine here and perhaps obtain the opinion of the good Sponsor.- This reads
like, "ANY PERSON HOLDING [means currently] A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE POSITION" SHALL BE CONSIDERED
IPSO FACTO RESIGNED- [which means that the prohibition extends only to appointive officials]
"INCLUDING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES"- This is a
prohibition, Mr. President.- This means if one is chairman of SSS or PDIC, he is deemed ipso facto
resigned when he files his certificate of candidacy.- Is that the intention
Senator Gordon.- This is really an old provision, Mr. President.
Senator Osmeña.- It is in bold letters, so I think it was a Committee amendment.
Senator Gordon.- No, it has always been there.
Senator Osmeña.- I see.
Senator Gordon.- I guess the intention is not to give them undue advantage, especially certain people.
Senator Osmeña.- All right.16
44
In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago expressed her concern over the
inclusion of the said provision in the new law, given that the same would be disadvantageous and unfair
to potential candidates holding appointive positions, while it grants a consequent preferential treatment
to elective officials, thus'
Senator Santiago.- On page 15, line 31, I know that this is a losing cause, so I make this point more as a
matter of record than of any feasible hope that it can possibly be either accepted or if we come to a
division of the House, it will be upheld by the majority.
I am referring to page 15, line 21.- The proviso begins: "PROVIDED FINALLY, THAT ANY PERSON HOLDING
A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE OFFICE - SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED FROM HIS/HER OFFICE."
The point that I made during the appropriate debate in the past in this Hall is that there is, for me, no
valid reason for exempting elective officials from this inhibition or disqualification imposed by the law.- If
we are going to consider appointive officers of the government, including AFP members and officers of
government-owned and controlled corporations, or any other member of the appointive sector of the
civil service, why should it not apply to the elective sector for, after all, even senators and congressmen
are members of the civil service as well
Further, it is self-serving for the Senate, or for the Congress in general, to give an exception to itself
which is not available to other similarly situated officials of government. Of course, the answer is, the
reason why we are special is that we are elected. Since we are imposing a disqualification on all other
government officials except ourselves, I think, it is the better part of delicadeza to inhibit ourselves as
well, so that if we want to stay as senators, we wait until our term expires. But if we want to run for
some other elective office during our term, then we have to be considered resigned just like everybody
else. That is my proposed amendment. But if it is unacceptable to the distinguished Sponsor, because of
sensitivity to the convictions of the rest of our colleagues, I will understand.
Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the suggestion is well-thought of.- It is a good policy.- However,
this is something that is already in the old law which was upheld by the Supreme court in a recent case
that the rider was not upheld and that it was valid.17
The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic resignation of appointive civil
servants must have been the reason why Senator Recto proposed the inclusion of the following during
the period of amendments: "ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS
PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR
WHICH HE FILED HIS COC."18 The said proviso seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting
appointive officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of the
campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding appointive positions will only
be considered as resigned at the start of the campaign period when they are already treated by law as
candidates.
Parenthetically, it may be remembered that Section 67 of the OEC and Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436
contained a similar provision on automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs
for any office other than that which they hold in a permanent capacity or for President or Vice-President.
However, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act,19 in 2001, this provision was
repealed by Section 1420 of the said act. There was, thus, created a situation of obvious discrimination
against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of
their CoCs, while elective officials were not.

This situation was incidentally addressed by the Court in Fari᳠v. The Executive Secretary21 when it ruled
that
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the
equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification.- If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of
the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.- It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.- It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.- The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.- Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title
I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order
No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote.- Under the same
provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly
allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it
proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the
office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them.-
Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive
officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the
45
same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not
infringed.22
However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Fari᳠/i>, was intently focused on the main issue of
whether the repealing clause in the Fair Election Act was a constitutionally proscribed rider, in that it
unwittingly failed to ascertain with stricter scrutiny the impact of the retention of the provision on
automatic resignation of persons holding appointive positions (Section 66) in the OEC, vis-୶is the equal
protection clause.- Moreover, the Court's vision in Fari᳠/i> was shrouded by the fact that petitioners
therein, Fari᳠et al., never posed a direct challenge to the constitutionality of Section 66 of the OEC.
Fari᳠et al. rather merely questioned, on constitutional grounds, the repealing clause, or Section 14 of the
Fair Election Act. The Court's afore-quoted declaration in Fari᳠/i> may then very well be considered as an
obiter dictum.
III.
The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view of the constitutional challenge
advanced by petitioners, once and for all, to settle the issue of whether the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, a reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which, as shown
above, was based on provisions dating back to the American occupation, is violative of the equal
protection clause.
But before delving into the constitutional issue, we shall first address the issues on legal standing and on
the existence of an actual controversy.
Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a party has alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.23 In this case, petitioners allege that they will be directly affected by COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and they all have the qualifications, to run in the 2010 elections.
The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet
candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC
resolution.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to
raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy,
such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The
rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect
candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.24 The Court believes that
both candidates and voters may challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed measure
because of its impact on voting rights.25
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a
liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.26
We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to
the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.27 The Court, in this case, finds that
an actual case or controversy exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with

the enforcement and administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner
that they would engage in the very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provisionthey would
file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto
resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical
obstacle to petitioners' candidacy.28
IV.
Having hurdled what the OSG posed as obstacles to judicial review, the Court now delves into the
constitutional challenge.
It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two fundamental
freedoms, those of expression and of association. This premise is best explained in Mancuso v.
Taft,29 viz.:
Freedom of expression guarantees to the individual the opportunity to write a letter to the local
newspaper, speak out in a public park, distribute handbills advocating radical reform, or picket an official
building to seek redress of grievances. All of these activities are protected by the First Amendment if
done in a manner consistent with a narrowly defined concept of public order and safety. The choice of
means will likely depend on the amount of time and energy the individual wishes to expend and on his
perception as to the most effective method of projecting his message to the public. But interest and
commitment are evolving phenomena. What is an effective means for protest at one point in time may
not seem so effective at a later date. The dilettante who participates in a picket line may decide to
devote additional time and resources to his expressive activity. As his commitment increases, the means
of effective expression changes, but the expressive quality remains constant. He may decide to lead the
picket line, or to publish the newspaper. At one point in time he may decide that the most effective way
to give expression to his views and to get the attention of an appropriate audience is to become a
candidate for public office-means generally considered among the most appropriate for those desiring to
effect change in our governmental systems. He may seek to become a candidate by filing in a general
election as an independent or by seeking the nomination of a political party. And in the latter instance,
the individual's expressive activity has two dimensions: besides urging that his views be the views of the
elected public official, he is also attempting to become a spokesman for a political party whose
substantive program extends beyond the particular office in question. But Cranston has said that a
certain type of its citizenry, the public employee, may not become a candidate and may not engage in
any campaign activity that promotes himself as a candidate for public office. Thus the city has stifled
what may be the most important expression an individual can summon, namely that which he would be
willing to effectuate, by means of concrete public action, were he to be selected by the voters.
It is impossible to ignore the additional fact that the right to run for office also affects the freedom to
associate. In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the Court used strict review to invalidate an Ohio election system
that made it virtually impossible for third parties to secure a place on the ballot. The Court found that
the First Amendment protected the freedom to associate by forming and promoting a political party and
that that freedom was infringed when the state effectively denied a party access to its electoral
machinery. The Cranston charter provision before us also affects associational rights, albeit in a slightly
different way. An individual may decide to join or participate in an organization or political party that
shares his beliefs. He may even form a new group to forward his ideas. And at some juncture his
supporters and fellow party members may decide that he is the ideal person to carry the group's
standard into the electoral fray. To thus restrict the options available to political organization as the
Cranston charter provision has done is to limit the effectiveness of association; and the freedom to
associate is intimately related with the concept of making expression effective. Party access to the ballot
46
becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by party machinery to carry the party's programs to
the people are precluded from doing so because those nominees are civil servants.
Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of view of individual expression or
associational effectiveness, wide opportunities exist for the individual who seeks public office. The fact
of candidacy alone may open previously closed doors of the media. The candidate may be invited to
discuss his views on radio talk shows; he may be able to secure equal time on television to elaborate his
campaign program; the newspapers may cover his candidacy; he may be invited to debate before various
groups that had theretofore never heard of him or his views. In short, the fact of candidacy opens up a
variety of communicative possibilities that are not available to even the most diligent of picketers or the
most loyal of party followers. A view today, that running for public office is not an interest protected by
the First Amendment, seems to us an outlook stemming from an earlier era when public office was the
preserve of the professional and the wealthy. Consequently we hold that candidacy is both a protected
First Amendment right and a fundamental interest. Hence any legislative classification that significantly
burdens that interest must be subjected to strict equal protection review.30
Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article
III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the opportune
time for the Court to strike down the said proviso for being violative of the equal protection clause and
for being overbroad.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing
of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the
law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction
between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification
be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes
treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and
Highways,31 a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized
vehicles are created equal a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-
wheel vehicle.

Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement if
it is not germane to the purpose of the law. Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.), in his treatise on constitutional
law, explains,
The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the
purpose of the law. To illustrate, the accepted difference in physical stamina between men and women
will justify the prohibition of the latter from employment as miners or stevedores or in other heavy and
strenuous work. On the basis of this same classification, however, the law cannot provide for a lower
passing average for women in the bar examinations because physical strength is not the test for
admission to the legal profession. Imported cars may be taxed at a higher rate than locally assembled
automobiles for the protection of the national economy, but their difference in origin is no justification
for treating them differently when it comes to punishing violations of traffic regulations. The source of
the vehicle has no relation to the observance of these rules.32
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as
long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the
classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.33
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of
the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote one's candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public.34 The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the
classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the
Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as
the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-
Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and
local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no
valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present
state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains
his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive
office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of
candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the
position aspired for.
47
Mancuso v. Taft,35 cited above, explains that the measure on automatic resignation, which restricts the
rights of civil servants to run for officea right inextricably linked to their freedom of expression and
association, is not reasonably necessary to the satisfaction of the state interest. Thus, in striking down a
similar measure in the United States, Mancuso succinctly declares'
In proceeding to the second stage of active equal protection review, however, we do see some
contemporary relevance of the Mitchell decision. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, supra. In order for the
Cranston charter provision to withstand strict scrutiny, the city must show that the exclusion of all
government employees from candidacy is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. And, as
stated in Mitchell and other cases dealing with similar statutes, see Wisconsin State Employees, supra;
Broadrick, supra, government at all levels has a substantial interest in protecting the integrity of its civil
service. It is obviously conceivable that the impartial character of the civil service would be seriously
jeopardized if people in positions of authority used their discretion to forward their electoral ambitions
rather than the public welfare. Similarly if a public employee pressured other fellow employees to
engage in corrupt practices in return for promises of post-election reward, or if an employee invoked the
power of the office he was seeking to extract special favors from his superiors, the civil service would be
done irreparable injury. Conversely, members of the public, fellow-employees, or supervisors might
themselves request favors from the candidate or might improperly adjust their own official behavior
towards him. Even if none of these abuses actually materialize, the possibility of their occurrence might
seriously erode the public's confidence in its public employees. For the reputation of impartiality is
probably as crucial as the impartiality itself; the knowledge that a clerk in the assessor's office who is
running for the local zoning board has access to confidential files which could provide pressure points for
furthering his campaign is destructive regardless of whether the clerk actually takes advantage of his
opportunities. For all of these reasons we find that the state indeed has a compelling interest in
maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public work force.
We do not, however, consider the exclusionary measure taken by Cranston-a flat prohibition on office-
seeking of all kinds by all kinds of public employees-as even reasonably necessary to satisfaction of this
state interest. As Justice Marshall pointed out in Dunn v. Blumstein, [s]tatutes affecting constitutional
rights must be drawn with precision. For three sets of reasons we conclude that the Cranston charter
provision pursues its objective in a far too heavy-handed manner and hence must fall under the equal
protection clause. First, we think the nature of the regulation-a broad prophylactic rule-may be
unnecessary to fulfillment of the city's objective. Second, even granting some sort of prophylactic rule
may be required, the provision here prohibits candidacies for all types of public office, including many
which would pose none of the problems at which the law is aimed. Third, the provision excludes the
candidacies of all types of public employees, without any attempt to limit exclusion to those employees
whose positions make them vulnerable to corruption and conflicts of interest.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The
measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in
Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
V.
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government

will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is
absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence
in the political world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who
occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them
alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only
to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws. These qualifications are, as
we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the citizenry and to give free
rein for the pursuit of one's highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be
partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level.
Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a
sweeping scale.36
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict
guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental
power emanates from them.
Mancuso v. Taft,37 on this point, instructs
As to approaches less restrictive than a prophylactic rule, there exists the device of the leave of absence.
Some system of leaves of absence would permit the public employee to take time off to pursue his
candidacy while assuring him his old job should his candidacy be unsuccessful. Moreover, a leave of
absence policy would eliminate many of the opportunities for engaging in the questionable practices
that the statute is designed to prevent. While campaigning, the candidate would feel no conflict
between his desire for election and his publicly entrusted discretion, nor any conflict between his efforts
to persuade the public and his access to confidential documents. But instead of adopting a reasonable
leave of absence policy, Cranston has chosen a provision that makes the public employee cast off the
security of hard-won public employment should he desire to compete for elected office.
The city might also promote its interest in the integrity of the civil service by enforcing, through
dismissal, discipline, or criminal prosecution, rules or statutes that treat conflict of interests, bribery, or
other forms of official corruption. By thus attacking the problem directly, instead of using a broad
prophylactic rule, the city could pursue its objective without unduly burdening the First Amendment
rights of its employees and the voting rights of its citizens. Last term in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Supreme
Court faced an analogous question when the State of Tennessee asserted that the interest of ballot box
purity justified its imposition of one year and three month residency requirements before a citizen could
vote. Justice Marshall stated, inter alia, that Tennessee had available a number of criminal statutes that
could be used to punish voter fraud without unnecessary infringement on the newcomer's right to vote.
Similarly, it appears from the record in this case that the Cranston charter contains some provisions that
might be used against opportunistic public employees.
Even if some sort of prophylactic rule is necessary, we cannot say that Cranston has put much effort into
tailoring a narrow provision that attempts to match the prohibition with the problem. The charter
forbids a Cranston public employee from running for any office, anywhere. The prohibition is not limited
to the local offices of Cranston, but rather extends to statewide offices and even to national offices. It is
difficult for us to see that a public employee running for the United States Congress poses quite the
48
same threat to the civil service as would the same employee if he were running for a local office where
the contacts and information provided by his job related directly to the position he was seeking, and
hence where the potential for various abuses was greater. Nor does the Cranston charter except the
public employee who works in Cranston but aspires to office in another local jurisdiction, most probably
his town of residence. Here again the charter precludes candidacies which can pose only a remote threat
to the civil service. Finally, the charter does not limit its prohibition to partisan office-seeking, but
sterilizes also those public employees who would seek nonpartisan elective office. The statute reviewed
in Mitchell was limited to partisan political activity, and since that time other courts have found the
partisan-nonpartisan distinction a material one. See Kinnear, supra; Wisconsin State Employees,
supra; Gray v. Toledo, supra. While the line between nonpartisan and partisan can often be blurred by
systems whose true characters are disguised by the names given them by their architects, it seems clear
that the concerns of a truly partisan office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from
those involved in an office removed from regular party politics to warrant distinctive treatment in a
charter of this sort.
The third and last area of excessive and overinclusive coverage of the Cranston charter relates not to the
type of office sought, but to the type of employee seeking the office. As Justice Douglas pointed out in
his dissent in Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 120-126, 67 S.Ct. 556, restrictions on administrative employees who
either participate in decision-making or at least have some access to information concerning policy
matters are much more justifiable than restrictions on industrial employees, who, but for the fact that
the government owns the plant they work in, are, for purposes of access to official information,
identically situated to all other industrial workers. Thus, a worker in the Philadelphia mint could be
distinguished from a secretary in an office of the Department of Agriculture; so also could a janitor in the
public schools of Cranston be distinguished from an assistant comptroller of the same city. A second line
of distinction that focuses on the type of employee is illustrated by the cases of Kinnear and Minielly,
supra. In both of these cases a civil service deputy decided to run for the elected office of sheriff. The
courts in both cases felt that the no-candidacy laws in question were much too broad and indicated that
perhaps the only situation sensitive enough to justify a flat rule was one in which an inferior in a public
office electorally challenged his immediate superior. Given all these considerations, we think Cranston
has not given adequate attention to the problem of narrowing the terms of its charter to deal with the
specific kinds of conflict-of-interest problems it seeks to avoid.
We also do not find convincing the arguments that after-hours campaigning will drain the energy of the
public employee to the extent that he is incapable of performing his job effectively and that inevitable
on-the-job campaigning and discussion of his candidacy will disrupt the work of others. Although it is
indisputable that the city has a compelling interest in the performance of official work, the exclusion is
not well-tailored to effectuate that interest. Presumably the city could fire the individual if he clearly
shirks his employment responsibilities or disrupts the work of others. Also, the efficiency rationale
common to both arguments is significantly underinclusive. It applies equally well to a number of non-
political, extracurricular activities that are not prohibited by the Cranston charter. Finally, the connection
between after-hours campaigning and the state interest seems tenuous; in many cases a public
employee would be able to campaign aggressively and still continue to do his job well.38
Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing39 sustained as constitutional a provision on the automatic resignation of
District Clerks, County Clerks, County Judges, County Treasurers, Criminal District Attorneys, County
Surveyors, Inspectors of Hides and Animals, County Commissioners, Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs,
Assessors and Collectors of Taxes, District Attorneys, County Attorneys, Public Weighers, and Constables
if they announce their candidacy or if they become candidates in any general, special or primary election.
 49

In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating differently particular officials, as
distinguished from all others, under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law, merits
the stamp of approval from American courts. Not, however, a general and sweeping provision, and more
so one violative of the second requisite for a valid classification, which is on its face unconstitutional.

On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in
question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional. It is high-time that we,
too, should follow suit and, thus, uphold fundamental liberties over age-old, but barren, restrictions to
such freedoms.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of
Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the
government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and
certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and
void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC
resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to
both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the
filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing
of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the
law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction
between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification
be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes
treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and
Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized
vehicles are created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-
wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement—
if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as
long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the
classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
50
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of
the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the
classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the
Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as
the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-
Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and
local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no
valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present
state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains
his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive
office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of
candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the
position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The
measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in
Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question
an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section
13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, “Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA 9369 provides that
“For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition
of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That
any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed
 51

forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.
the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore
unconstitutional
Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third
and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the
differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of
the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of
the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power
of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may
justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost
respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will
of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were
elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of
the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the
public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it
wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign
will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions for
Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition;
and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3)
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
==============
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national
official or employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-
controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of
candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of
law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election

Case Summary of United States v. Windsor
 Windsor and Spyer were legally married and moved to New York, a state which recognized their
same-sex marriage.
 Spyer died, leaving her estate to Windsor. Windsor was denied a federal tax exemption due to
the fact the couple was not of the opposite sex.
 Windsor brought suit in a district court which held that the federal provision was
unconstitutional. The government then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
 The Court held that: (1) The reviewing court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal as long as the party
retains a sufficient stake in the outcome satisfying Article III justiciability requirements. (2) The
federal statute excluding same-sex couples from the definition of marriage is unconstitutional in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
United States v. Windsor Case Brief
Statement of the Facts:
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were legally married in Canada in 2007. The couple returned to New York,
a state which recognized the marriage. Thea died in 2009, leaving her estate to her wife, Windsor.
Windsor claimed the federal tax exemption surviving spouses receive, but was denied any exemption
under a section of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Under the code’s provision marriage was
defined as a “union between one man and one woman” and spouse as a member of the opposite sex.
After paying the federal tax, Windsor brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the restriction in
federal court.
The Attorney General notified Congress that the Department of Justice(DOJ) would no longer defend
DOMA, though it would continue to enforce the provision. The House then authorized BLAG to defend
DOMA.
Procedural History:
The district court held the provision was unconstitutional entitling Windsor to a tax refund. The court of
appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision and the government and BLAG appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
Issue and Holding:
1. Whether a reviewing court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal if the appellant is not seeking
redress from an adverse judgment? Yes.
2. Whether a federal statute excluding same-sex couples from the definition of marriage for
purposes of receiving federal benefits constitutional? No.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
Reviewing court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal even if the appellant is not seeking redress from
adverse judgment, so long as the party retains a sufficient stake in the outcome to satisfy Article III
requirements.
A Federal statute excluding same-sex couples from the definition of marriage to prevent them from
receiving federal benefits is unconstitutional.
Judgment:
The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment that the DOMA provision was unconstitutional.
52
Reasoning:
1. The issue at hand is justiciable. Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts may
adjudicate actual cases or controversies only. Standing requires the plaintiff to have an actual,
redressable injury caused by the defendant. Being forced to pay an unconstitutional tax is a redressable
injury sufficient to confer standing and as a result, Windsor had standing to sue.
The Court looks to INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), where it held that standing was proper even
though the executive had concluded the statute at issue was unconstitutional. There the Immigration
and Naturalization Service continued enforcement of the statute, and that alone was sufficient to satisfy
the case or controversy requirement. The Court held there may be an adequate controversy “where ‘the
Government largely agrees with the opposing party.” Here, a true controversy still existed because the
government continued to enforce the law and refused to refund Windsor’s payment. Though this case
presents an unusual dilemma, this Court has the “primary role in determining the constitutionality of a
law.” If the Court refused to hear this claim, the power would then be given to the president, which is
inconsistent with separation of powers.
2. DOMA’s provision defining marriage, which excludes same-sex couples, is a deprivation of liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Under Due Process each individual has a
right to equal protection. DOMA governs the definition of marriage in over a thousand federal statutes
and was created by Congress in 1996 in response to efforts to legalize same-sex marriage. DOMA treats
same-sex couples as “second-class” absent legitimate interests justifying discrimination.
Congress may enact laws that impact marriage, however, regulation of marriage is within the states’
exclusive power over domestic relations. Many now see this limitation on marriage as unjust and at this
time eleven states have legalized same-sex marriage. The Court held that DOMA “departs from
th[e]…tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage.” Essentially the federal government is
denying equal treatment to a group New York deems equal in status to opposite-sex married couples.
This violates both equal protection and due process. Those guarantees require that Congress not
discriminate for the purpose of harming a “politically unpopular group.” Legislative history makes it clear
that both the purpose and effect of DOMA are to disadvantage married same-sex couples. The Court
held that “DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States code” ensuring disparate treatment of
legally married couples. DOMA not only degrades same-sex couples, but harms their children and is
invalid under the Fifth Amendment.
Concurring and Dissenting opinion:
Dissenting (Scalia):
The Court has no authority to overturn DOMA. The majority paints the Court as the ultimate arbiter of
constitutionality above elected branches, however, the Framer’s intended to create co-equal branches.
Primary authority to decide the constitutionality of laws does not rest with the judiciary. Courts may only
decide cases or controversies. The power to interpret “what the law is” is incidental.
Windsor won at trial and on appeal, both parties advocated the same positions. As a result, the case
should have been dismissed. The majority cites Chadha to support its position, but that case was only
justiciable because the House and Senate were adverse parties, unlike the case presented here.
Jurisdiction requires controversy as well as standing.
Legitimate justifications for DOMA exist. DOMA settled choice of law questions and preserved federal
benefits for opposite-sex married couples. A constitutional law should not be invalidated due to
Congress’s improper motives. The majority claims that DOMA’s only purpose was to dehumanize same-
sex married couples and is false. The majority demeans Congress through this accusation based on the
preservation of what was the universal definition of marriage until recently. This question should be
answered through the democratic process.

Dissenting (Alito):
Windsor’s constitutional rights were not violated. In addition, the federal government’s position was not
adverse to Windsor’s, resulting in the majority opinion as an advisory opinion. In Chadha, Congress had
standing, because the ruling impacted its power to legislate. That is not the case here.
DOMA merely clarifies the category of people entitled to benefits under federal law. Same-sex marriage
is an issue of public policy to which the Constitution is silent. Substantive due process protects
“fundamental rights…deeply rooted in this Nation’s history.” There are no historical roots in same-sex
marriage. Windsor argues that DOMA violates equal protection, classifications based on sexual
orientation and should be subject to heightened scrutiny which DOMA cannot survive. The Court holds
the scrutiny structure for equal protection claims is not well suited for marriage- related laws. The
applicable standard is a question for the political branches. The majority correctly says this should be
decided by the states.
Significance:
United States v. Windsor as a landmark case outlined the federal definition of marriage as between
members of the opposite sex, for purposes of tax benefits, as unconstitutional. The Court held that this
definition violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and put the nation one step closer to
the national recognition of same-sex marriage.
Brief Fact Summary.
Windsor (Plaintiff) sued to recover the tax payment she paid after inheriting her same-sex spouse’s
estate and being denied the estate tax exemption for surviving spouses because the Defense of Marriage
Act defines “marriage”� and “spouse”� to exclude same-sex couples.
Synopsis of Rule of Law.
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act’s definitions of “marriage”� and “spouse”� that excludes
same-sex couples violates the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
Facts.
Plaintiff married Spyer in Canada. Their same-sex marriage was recognized by the state of New York.
Spyer died, leaving her estate to Plaintiff. Federal law provided an estate tax exemption for surviving
spouses. Plaintiff sought to avail herself of this exemption, but could not under § 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA). DOMA defined the terms “marriage”� and “spouse”� as used in federal law and
regulations to exclude same-sex couples. Plaintiff paid $363,053 in estate taxes and sought a refund,
which was denied by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Plaintiff then sued for a refund, arguing that
DOMA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. While the lawsuit was pending, the
Attorney General notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the Department of Justice
would not defend § 3’s constitutionality. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of
Representatives intervened to defend its constitutionality. The district court held § 3 unconstitutional
and ordered the IRS to refund Plaintiff’s taxes with interest. The court of appeals affirmed, but the IRS
refused to pay until ordered by the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
Issue.
53
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act defines “marriage”� and “spouse”� to exclude same-sex
couples. Does this violate the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause?
Held.
(Kennedy, J.) Yes. Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act’s definitions of “marriage”� and “spouse”�
that excludes same-sex couples violates the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Addressing
jurisdiction first, the United States has standing even though the executive branch does not defend § 3
because it was ordered to pay the tax refund. Although adversity is required to allow the two sides to
skillfully present the two sides of difficult constitutional questions, BLAG’s argument in favor of § 3
satisfies concerns presented by a case in which both sides agree. Historically, the definition and
regulation of marriage has been considered within the authority of the states. Congress has passed
certain statutes regulating the meaning of marriage in furtherance of federal policy in the past, but
DOMA has a broader reach than those previous statutes. DOMA impacts a class of persons that New
York, as well as other states, have sought to protect. Examining the validity of DOMA requires discussing
the historical authority of states over marriage. With the exception of certain constitutional guarantees,
the regulation of marriage and families has been left to the states. This practice dates back to the
founding of this country and the adoption of the Constitution. While marriage laws may vary from state
to state, they are consistent within each state. DOMA is counter to this established practice. The state’s
decision to give a class of persons the right to marry granted that class an important status. The federal
government used this state-defined class to instead impose restrictions. The issue is whether these
restrictions amount to a deprivation of a right protected by the Fifth Amendment. New York’s actions in
recognizing Plaintiff’s marriage were a proper exercise of its authority. DOMA violates due process and
equal protection rights when it seeks to injure a class New York seeks to protect. A congressional desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify unequal treatment of that group. DOMA’s unusual
deviation from the historical practice of recognizing state definitions of marriage deprives same-sex
couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with federal recognition of marriage. DOMA’s
stated purpose and practical effect are to create a separate status upon those who enter same-sex
marriages where those marriages are legal within that state. It deprives a subset of couples married
within a state of rights and responsibilities. DOMA makes the marriages between same-sex couples
second-tier. DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment as
to lawful same-sex marriages recognized under state law. Affirmed.
Dissent.
(Roberts, C.J.) The Court did not have jurisdiction to reach the merits of this case. On the merits, DOMA
is constitutional. The majority does not show that Congress acted with malice, or that the law does not
address a legitimate government interest. The Court has not answered the question of whether states
can continue to use the traditional definition of marriage. The majority’s opinion is limited to holding
that the federal government must leave this area of domestic relations to the states.
(Scalia, J.) The Court had no jurisdiction to hear this case because the President and the plaintiff agreed
that the statute was unconstitutional. The case only reached the Court because the President enforced a
statute he found unconstitutional in order to provide standing to the plaintiff. This manipulation should
not be allowed. If the President declares a statute unconstitutional but enforces it anyway, the litigation
should end in an order or consent decree enjoining enforcement. The majority’s decision on the merits is
incorrect and inconsistent. The majority opinion asserts federalism as the reason for its decision, but
does not reach the question of whether the federal intrusion on state power is unconstitutional. The
opinion does not use equal protection as its basis, but cites several equal protection cases to explain why
DOMA is unconstitutional. The opinion does not resolve the issue over the proper standard of review
 54

that was addressed in the lower courts. The majority seems to say that laws restricting marriage to a scholars disagree with Chief Justice Roberts that the majority based its decision on federalism. After this
man and a woman should be reviewed for a rational basis, but it does not apply that deferential ruling, the Obama administration and federal agencies began conforming statutes and regulations to the
standard here. The Court avoids answering this question by saying that DOMA violates substantive due Court’s decision. As predicted by the dissenters, lower courts have interpreted this decision in different
process, but does not show that same-sex marriage is historically and traditionally rooted. The opinion ways when addressing challenges to state laws prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriage.
finds DOMA invalid because its purpose is to harm same-sex couples, but the Constitution does not
forbid the government from enforcing traditional moral and sexual beliefs and it does not require society
to approve of same-sex marriage. There are valid justifications for DOMA, such as avoiding choice-of-law
issues and preserving the intended effects of legislation enacted before states began to allow same-sex
marriage. Defending traditional marriage is not the same as demeaning, condemning, or humiliating
those who are in same-sex marriages. Accusing Congress of such animus is demeaning to the Court. The
majority’s claim that this opinion applies only to same-sex marriages valid under state law is not to be
believed. The majority’s real rationale is that DOMA was motivated by a hatred of gays and that rationale
will clearly be applied to state legislatures that prohibit same-sex marriage. The Court should let the
people decide the issue in a democratic process.

(Alito, J.) The Constitution leaves it to the people to decide, through their elected representatives, how
marriage should be defined. DOMA was the people’s expression of that decision and is not
unconstitutional. It is inappropriate to consider the issue of same-sex marriage in terms of substantive
due process because it is not a fundamental right deeply rooted in this country’s history and traditions.
The Court should be careful in intruding in this area and should stick to interpreting the Constitution, not
making important changes to society’s institutions. Plaintiff claims that under equal protection law,
classifications based on sexual orientation should be examined under a heightened scrutiny, which
DOMA cannot survive. The majority does not directly adopt this argument, but its opinion seems to rest
on equal protection grounds. This approach is a poor one for evaluating the constitutionality of laws
concerning marriage. Classifications subject to strict scrutiny must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest. This level of scrutiny is reserved for classifications that are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that the law is considered to reflect
prejudice and antipathy. Classifications subject to intermediate scrutiny must be substantially related to
the achievement of an important government objective. This level of scrutiny applies to classifications
that are sometimes relevant to a government objective, but generally provide no sensible ground for
disparate treatment. The lowest standard of review is the rational basis standard which requires only
that the classification be rationally related to a government interest. These classifications are not viewed
as inherently suspect and under this standard, courts give deference to legislators in determining
whether, how, and to what extent the government interest should be pursued. Applying heightened
scrutiny in this case would effectively call all those who hold traditional beliefs about marriage bigots.
The Court should not be the ones to resolve the split between the two competing views of marriage—
the traditional view based on procreation and the “consent-based”� view based on emotional
commitment between two people. The Constitution does not endorse either view and therefore its
silence should end the matter for the judiciary. Plaintiff asks the Court to resolve a matter better left to
the people. Congress and the states can enact laws adopting either of these two views. The majority is
correct in leaving the issue of marriage to the states and in the future, if the issue arises, the Court
should leave the decision to the states. DOMA does not prevent any state from allowing same-sex
marriage. It merely defines a class of persons to whom federal law extends certain special rights and
responsibilities. Congress has the power to enact the laws affected by DOMA and therefore also has the
right to define the category to whom those laws apply.

Discussion.

This decision is seen by many as a landmark civil rights case. Many scholars have noted Justice Scalia’s
tone in his dissent. See Laurence H. Tribe, “DOMA, Prop. 8, and Justice Scalia’s intemperate dissent,”�
at http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/doma-prop-8-and-justice-scalias-intemperate-dissent. Other