Evnorean Punspscrives A Serie in Socal Philsophy and Cultural Crisvion Lawarnce D. Karr2Man AND Ricans Wou, isis Expeun Pepi seks to make sible works of itrliipinaty sm tcren by leaking Boropesn thinkers By presenting clase tox Sanding contemporary won the sves Mops to spe the major sii {wacom of our day ad thee fofclate the tsk a hr tndetanding "Theodor W. Adorno Notes to Literature Julia Kristeva Strangers t9 Ourselves EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY AN ESSAY ON HUME'S THEORY OF HUMAN NATURE GILLES DELEUZE CONSTANTIN V, BOUNDAS nd COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORKCONTENTS Preface to the English-Language Edition » ix Gilles Deleuze Translator’s Acknowledgments * xi TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION + 1 Deleuze, Empiricism, and the Struggle for Subjectivity ONE + 21 ‘The Problem of Knowledge and the Problem of Ethics TWO + 37 Cultural World and General Rules THREE - 55 ‘The Power of the Imagination in Ethics and Knowledge FouR + 73 God and the World FIVE + 85 Empiricism and Subjectivity SIX + 105 Principles of Homan Nature CONCLUSION + 123 Purposiveness NOTES + 135 INDEX + 155PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE EDITION ‘We onzaat somtimes of a history of philosophy that would list only the new concepts created by a great philosopher—his most es- sential and creative contribution. The case of Hume could begin to bbe made with the following list: He established the concept of belif and put it inthe place of knovrledge. He laicized belief, turning knowledge into a legitimate belief. He asked about the conditions which legitimate belief, and ‘onthe bass ofthis investigation sketched out atheory of probabil, The consequences are important: if the act of thinking is belief, ‘thought has fewer reasons to defend itelf against error than against ithaion, legitimate beliefs perhaps inevitably surround choughe like cloud of illusions. In this expect, Hume anticipates Kant. An ent art and all sorts of rules will be required in order to distinguish bbeewcen legitimate beliefs and the illusions which accompany them. —He gave the asciation of ideas its real meaning, making it a practice of cultural and conventional formations (conventional instead of contractual), rather than a theory of the human mind. Hence, the association of ideas exists for the sake of law, political economy, acsthetics, and s0 on. People ask, for example, whether itis enough tw shoot anarnow ata site in order to become its owner, or whether cn shold couch the spot with one’s own hand. This isa questionPREFACE TO THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE EDITION ahout the correct association beeween a person and a thing, for the person to become the owner of the thing. “He created the fist great logic of relations, showing init that all relations (not only “matters of fact” but also relations amon, fdas) are external to their terms. As a result, he constituted 2 mal- tilarious world of experience based upon the principle of the exte~ riorty of relations. We stat with atomic parts, but these atomic parts have transitions, passages, “tendencies,” which circulate from tone to another, These tendencies give rise to habits. Isn't this the answer to the question “what are we?” We are habits, nothing but habits—the habit of saying “I.” Perhaps, there is no more striking. answer to the problem of the Self. ‘We could certainly prolong ths list, which already testifies to the genius of Hume. Gilles Deleure 1989 TRANSLATOR’S ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Taeavonre co Jacqueline Code, Alison van Rooy, and Réal Fillion for their invaluable help with easier drafts ofthis translation. Susan Dyskton,as she has done so often before, gave me her sound citrial advice and her friendship, and 1am grateful for both gifts. To Marg Tully, probably the most frequenly acknowledged typist in the [Academy and certainly one among the most deserving acknowledg- ‘ment, sincere expression of thanks. The completion ofthe present ceansation was greatly facilitated by a sabbatical leave granted me by Trent University daring the academic year 1989-1990, nd I am thankfal fort. Tam also grateful to Pofesors Franois Larelle and ‘Anne-Frangoise Schmid-Larvelle for theie hospitality in Pais, and for the time che so kindly spent with me, without which my un- derstanding of the rhizome named “Deleuze” and of the atcula- tions of che sprawling philosophies of diference would have been rach poorer than they are nowt. Ahore all to Linda Carol Conway, ‘who elordlessly knows how to build with childhood blocks and how to become like everybody else, until we mect again, a heartel “thank you.”EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITYTRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION DELEUZE, EMPIRICISM, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SUBJECTIVITY I Every history of pilesphy har tr chapter tempi tinny. Betin Hare thre something very sang Snbick completly dophers empincism, ging 2 ne Freer heory atl practice af let, fhe AND. “Gils Deleue- Cire Pare, Dison Tue niory ap politics of paratactic discourse, or of the minor stuttering in one's own language to which these lines allude, are likely to evoke today [1990] the adventures of The Logic of Sense (1969), the assemblages of Kafka: Toward « Minor Lieature (1975), anid the body without organs of the A Thowand Plateaus (1980). But in fact the quotation implicates a much earlier segment of the De- leuzian diagram ofthis discourse, inscribed with the name of Hume, and this implication has yet to feceive the attention it deserves. It seems likely that a mindful consideration of this segment, in con junction perhaps with the segment-Bergson! and the segment-Leib- ? may begin to pay attractive dividends toward a mote accurate of Deleuze’s nomadic image of thought. Next to che lit- ‘rary linguistic, and psychoanalytic bodies of dle, cecently unveiled by Jean-Jacques Lecercle,*a philosophical body will chen begin to take shape, and Deleuze’s reasons for having assiduously tended to i over the last thircy-six years will emerge progressively into a stronger light. ‘One of his lst books ia circulation today to be translated into English, Empiricism and Subjectivity is Deleuze’s second in a long ist cof book-length publications, initiated in 1952 and sill being aug-“TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION ‘mented at regular intervals This small book appeared in the Col- lection “Epiméthée" of the Presses Universitaires de France in 1953. ‘One year before, in collaboration with André Cresson, Deleuze had released in the “Collection Philosophes” of the same house another book entitled David Hume: Sa Vie, som oeuore,gewe un exposé de sa ‘Philosophie. In one ofits chapters, “Complement sur Pocuvre,” t0- day's reader can easly recognize Delewze's pen at work in the con struction of a less elaborate version of the elegant discussion of Hume which was going co be deployed, within one year, in Em- pirkism and Subjesiity. In 1972, Deleuze returns to Hume in a chapecr-long contribution to the Histoire dela philosophic, them edited Frangois Chitelee on behalf of Hachette Littérature® One can ul here a much abbreviated version of the 1953 book, but with no significant departure from any of the major points ofits extended argument. “To this day, Deleuze has no revisited Hume, with the exception ‘of some reminiscing references to bis own earlier writings." made ‘often in the context of the thought from Outside” which has always fascinated him and informed his shizomatic theory and practice. Hume is curiously absent from the series of memories/tibutes of the One Thousand Plateaus’ to the point that an argumentum eslenio could be made, suggesting that a youthful enthusiasm with Hume had faded away. But such an argument, I think, would be missing the point, forthe intensity named “Fiume" has not ceased to resonate throughout Deleuze's writings. Named or not, the intensive en counter with Hume gave Deleuze a decisive and unbending pref erence for empiricism agains all forms of ranscendental philosophy. Acknowledged or not, the empiricist principle of difference, along with the theorem of the externality of all relaions* which was de= rived from it, strengthened Deleuze’s choice of minoritarian discourse” and fed into the problematic of paratactc serializations."° Finally, whether marked or unmarked, the resources of Hume con- solidated Deleuze"s apposition to the petite principit ofall theories endowing the transcendental feld with the very subjective (egolog- ‘eal and personological) coordinates the constiution of which should rather be accounted for and explained. The same resourees “moti= vated” Deleuse's relentless quest for an “activated” and mind-tran- sconding subjece whose pathways would avoid the transcendental ‘TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION, 1 “The concept exit jot ch in empscs sin oe ‘sons, bar hat comply diferente ia being-matple, instead of Seingone, beings or nga aes. Empisism i andaesally Lined to 2 ogi lpi of mule of which rls se ‘aly one se) Gils Deleae, Peis to the Bap Tingape Editon of he Diogu The deterinton of Deleuze’ plac inthe minds ofthe new French theory wl wae ei compen and dle negotatons Sha ipa ehh prominent i snot under dpute feb therefore sage to sure thathe equenty noted er Preach thereat omar cmpricam hs moto geered dicts worthy of he treatin by eo adn conto Even Brlee ston of hi contimingallegance opis tad nthe Peace othe English Languoge Editon of hs Bigs srk Clie ares hc ae ed ve lene Neves signfonting cha empticom as been more bans whimsical cho inthe posaconlie ange of options arent lacking or cramples in V. Decombess hel cempen dium of Maton nh Peboply one fs teerence to Deletes prices seh fora Tansecndenal Brim copter with the clan that fr Bese nop ther deta or om, pit, "according to wheter the filence between concape and fatin ie ob a conceal os mer concepel ier ce" Des syline elect empiric nthe dea of ply herbal! hong sore” abo wel own, Inde eh refrenc is iportnt enough jus a mre tal reproduction: mpm ral pe thought ope rece ‘Wey the dv beans iit vai a die ona Ingsnge sake” ut peap continues Deed, sone will object tar tis anguage wich sleping. Dobos, br then one soins. crtain ay become ste ce more, aad asin nd other grounds for the dre brwecn speach an ough This ‘ote gute, eth to, nde day. Tenens were en in 196 Desai epee Shem n 3979.1 have fen wondered“TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION thy the alternative rout, rested by Deez 1953, was noe kept pen or taveled mote fequently. *eTrath ro tell afew commentators did make the pint that the new Tench theoretical interest in emptcsm indicts an active strc fora ground which, alike eancendenal elds, would be espa to hizmatcsyapuc and diagrammatic dplicemens.* Bat noone matched Deleuze ably to vcize this interest and to turn i info 2 wat machine agin the verte and the evidences Consituting heer ofthe famous fonts phenomenologis fe. In asembling this war machine, Deleuze maize ll those ‘ho, along with Lucretius, Hume, Spinora, Newiche, and Bergson, Shave "a sere Bod formed by she crue ofthe nega, the ular of oy the hated of inti, he eternity of forces and telations and the denunciation of power.” In shi context, De- Teg has oe confesed is low tolerance forthe scholaie ctics of phenomennogy which ensrine commen and good see In tore argumentative monents~in The Lag of Sen, for inance— Shcounte with Hae fn ssid tae of phenome tology exposing the latter's Satton on the evidences of enscious tess fal surrender tothe doxi clement of common and good Som, and show all the Faudolent duplication ofthe emia do~ Imsinby a trancendental eld endowed with personal andegoogial dimensions According co Deleuze, these dimensions sll represent Phenomenology’ unteduced and uactiical presupposition” ‘Of coune, Delewe' war machine, mounted on empiric aes an} aimed st phenomenology (or hermenciis) is at fled with mitigated invective. Huser ino exactly teste ikea achoolboy in The Lago Sou or can one cay onetlookDeleuz's power dn elegant phenomenological descriptions inthe exay om Michel TTouries even ifthe descaption, in the Tong eon, te ade to Sand on thet heads The eluation ofthe struggle for sje tii in Deleuze’ ter work, bul ar they are around the notions “Tol and folling” ha clear and acknowledged conection with Heldeyee (Zi) and Mesea- Ponty (rl plsemen). Temping though a may be~and even ishionably ecumenical®—T would hot want to inrpet these gests inion of Delewrian progam forthe raisiaton of phenomenology The raclsaton Sf phenomenology, Deleuzesye, snouts othe tansfrmation of phenomenology fad no only af "vulgar nentomit rele “TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION oF) imo an ontlogy of intensive forces, extended forms, and of the "Ylding” or “internalization” of thee forces and forms. And acter intnaive Frees nor the “ol ate phenomena "sm," or "The transition from phenomenology to nomadic sensation and though Binds ts mature moment in Deletes elising Bergson in the caus of radical empiricism.” According to Deleuze, Bergson, having questioned the privilege of natural pereopon andthe sub ordination of movement toposes, creates the posits fran in vestigation of the “nonhuman” or “superhuman” orgiary world Ihotein images move and code in a sate of univer vation 3 undlation, This ira world with no ate, no center, no ope ot owas. In is qui for the pre peresprion (he ween), Bergson breaks with the philosophic raion which had asiged light co the mind and coceived conciousness a searchlight sommoning things up from their esenaldarknese. Unite phenomenology, which remained fthl co this tradition, Bergson’s vison solicited things in thc own umsinasity As fr consciousnes, instead oF beng the light of the old image of though, ci for Bergson, an opaque blade without which ight would goon diffsing itll forever, never reflected and never revealed. Deleuze subscribes to all these claims Su alo to Berpon’s characterization of conscows perception a the alec perceived, minus the aupect of ie which donot interest the perceiver Bergson and Deleze, therefor, join hands in thet de- tana that conseiousess be eonstituted. Begining with the Abgrnd fof an Enpedoclean world of elements, consciousness matt Be ex- posed atthe center, the obitace, and che "living image” which Eocks and refets the lighelines hitherto diffs in erry posible direction. Deleuze’ ltr texts wil reiterate this demand, and they wil designate subjectivity a the fold” which bend and envelope the forces ofthe Outsile™ This choice of empiricism over phenomenology inthe context of a new and more citi image of thought i bound to be rexel by tome, although the reiance, sgpect, wil he Bned on 3 more teaitonal acess fo empiricism, markedly diferent fom that of Delewe. We will do well to remember that for Deleure pil sophical maths ha litle odo with purported solitons or answers and everything to do with the quetion andthe problem, or the ail of the problem to coordinate srialve other questionsTRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION “within its range of tonalites°* Viewed from this perspective, the texthook definition of empiricism, which attributes to experience the origin and the source of validity of all possible knowledge, is, in fact, an answer without a question. Strictly speaking, the definition is not even plausible, because, despite what the definition implies, Knowledge does not represent the primary concera ofthe empiricist, not does experience play the kind of constitutive role that textbooks assign to it. Knowledge is not primary. Deleuze reminds us that Hume was primarily a moralist, a historian, and a politcal phitos- ‘opher who placed his epistemology in the service ofthese concerns. Knowledge is possible because our passions provide our ideas with associative links in view of our actions and ends. The practical in- terest, being primary, activates the theoretical interest, and raises sooner ot later the delicate issue of how to harmonize nature and human nature. What is often overlooked in our discussions of em- piticism is that experience is not unambiguously constitutive. For if by “experience” we mean atomic and distinct perceptions, the re~ ‘associate these petcrptions to each other, creating thereby an aura of belief and anticipation, cannot be accounted for. “This is Because, in the opinion of Deleuze, Hume views relations as the effects of the principles of human mature; he does not attempt to derive them from our experience of atomic and distinct percep tions. Or again if by “expetience” we mean the sum total of our ‘observations hitherto, general rules and principles will not be ac- counted for, precisely because they themselves constitate expetience and cannot therefore be derived ftom it. Hence, a definition of em- Piricism, which does not fis problematize the nature and status of ‘experience, is of litle value." ‘A more helpfal definition of empivicism, in Deleuze’s estimate, rust respect the irreducible dualism that exists between things and relations, atoms and structure, perceptions and their causes, and also tclaon and heir causes. Viewed frm this vantage pin, cmpi- icism will be the theory of the externality of relations, and con- versely, all theories which entail the derivation of relation from the nature of things would be resolutely nonempircist. In the last anal- ysis, Deleuze's commitment to empiricism rests on his conviction that relations are syntheses whose provenance cannot be explained ‘on the basis of the representationalist matrix idea/atom or mnind/ collection of atoms, Relations are the effect of the principles of "TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION human nature and the latter, as we shall sec, constitute the subject at the same time that they constitute relations ‘Thus, Deleuze’s essay shows empiricism to be marked by an ir reducible dualism between things and relations, and claims to caprure thereby the sense of Hume's dual strategy of atomisn (the diferent, the disparate) and associationism (mise en série, paratexis) For if a0 :mism “isthe theory of ideas insofar a relations are external to them, and ssociationism, the theory of relations insofar as they ate external {0 ideas, that is, insofar as they depend on (the principles of human nature),"® Hume, instead of pulverizing the given as is critics often allege, would have embatked upon the study of the mechanism which allows atoms to fi in structure. As long, as the mind is 2 collection of atoms in motion, and mover and motion indistinguish- able from each other, and as long as the mind can be likened to ‘moving images without a frame to restrict their movement, Hime can easily show that atomism is not a suficient condition for the constitution ofa science of humanity. This science can be constituted only after the naturalization of the mind asthe rsule ofthe operation ‘of associative principles upon it—in other words, only after the con- sticution of the subject inside the mind as the product of principles ‘of human mature transcending the mind, Now, the reasons why the doctrine of the externality of relations, rooted in atomism and introducing associationism, can contribute to the critique of phenomenology or to the quest for the elemental ‘world of Bergson are found in ewo enabling premises that Hume and Deleuze share. These are the principle of difference and the seriaization/compossiilty of different elements. Empiricism, in Deleuze's reading of Hume, revolves around principle of difference, hholding that the given is a collection of ideas separable because dif- ferent, and different because separable. This principle of difference requires that the mind be nether Subject not Mitrot of Nature. No impression is ever adventitious; all impressions are, in some sense, innate." Before the constitution of the Subject, no principle of organization rules over the mind. Only che indivisbility of impres- sions interests Hume, because it licenses his principle of difference and guarantees that the only constants of the mind will be non indivisible toms. It follows, argues Deleuze, that ism is not philosophy of the senses but a philosophy of the ion, and the statement that “all ideas are derived from impressions” is not‘TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION cant to enshrine repeesentationaism but is rather a regulative ciple meant to keep us within the straight and narrow of the atomist principle of difference. OF cours, difference alone docs not make an empiricist philos- cophy: difference and repetition are required to relate to each other chiastically.® From a host of differential perceptions, a subject is Dorn inside the given, and the imagination is transformed into a faculty. Terns ae related and serialized. When a law of reproduction of representations is formed under the impact of the principles of hhaman nature the subject comes to be, and begins to transcend the ‘minal it goes beyond the given. But reperition cannot occur without diflercnce: the principles of human nature may well be the necessary condition for relations in genera, serializaions in general, oF the advent of che structure-subject. However, particular relations and actual subjects require concrete and different circumstances as their suiicient conditions, Circumstances define passions and give direc- tion to interests because affecivity and circumstance go together ‘And given the primacy assigned to the practical interest over the theoretical, the principles of passion are indispensable for the for- ‘ation of conerete associations, and therefore indispensable for the constitution of the subject inside the mind.” Ultimately, Deleuze's choice of empiricism amounts to 2 choice caleulated to displace dialectics. The principle of difference that De- leuze locates in the heart of the Humean text prevents the closure threatened by dialectical sublation. Hypotacti subsumptions are re= placed by paratactic conjunctions and arborte constructions give way to the strategy of the AND. Repetition time and also habit as rep ctition—holds the paratactc series together, making posible their ‘convergence and compossiblity s wel as their divergence and res- ‘onance. Difference and repetition displace the dialectical labor of the concept and thwart the mobilization of negation forthe sake of allegedly superior synthesis ‘The choice of empiricism is nothing les than a choice fora critical but nontranscendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy, says Deleuze, beginning with a methodologically reduced field from which it derives essential certainty, asks how there can be a given, ‘ot how a subject can give itself the given. Bur Hume's empiricism asks how a subject can be constituted inside the given. The subject here is a task which must be fulfilled. In the process of full enerates a crtigne of res by means of rales this eask, en "TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION extensive rules are criticized and rectified through the application of corrective rules. But to the extent that both kinds of rules find their origin in habit, the idea of an empiricist critique would be impossible and unintelligible were it not for the fact that habit is not solely the product of an experienially ascertained repetition of similar cases. Habit can be formed by other kinds of repetition as ‘The task assumed by empiricism, therefore, is the constant ction of the imagination by means of the understanding. Habit extends the range of imagination but also corrects the accuracy of judgment. Critique must discipline the anticipating subject and make it focus on objects determined in accordance with the nacure of the understanding and the weight of observed repetitions; critique must, also educate the moral activity of the subject, that is the act which accords with the intensive integration of disparate sympathies. But ultimately, Deleuze-Hume cannot prevent a paradox from being in- scribed in the heart of empiticism: the same critique which disci- plines the mind and prompts it to reject che fictions of the imagi- nation is also the critique responsible for leading the mind ta the biggest of all fctionsSubject, World, and Godand for turning ‘hese fictions into “incorrigible,” constitutive ideas. In opposition to the prudential demarcation of ideas from concepts, which later on will be the pride of the Kantian critique, the Delewsian-Humean empitcist critique will assign to the intensive idea the role of gen ‘erating extensive concepts. With Hume, the boldest moment of cet theory has come: the ehay ofthe equ depends sow fon a fiction, m1 ‘Avie des eitoa por ie et doi cope Le ‘aps prec et ane mate informe pron ell oes AT e cored amit dels yan, Mae po les snadernc iy ad temps dant Ico Le ote st ‘incor fgle, our gue Mere danse comp Fagus Pater, cet ge aes gtcorpore le eng ~Ciles Delors, Par VII Semin, ‘Noveer 20,1984 ‘Many connoisseurs of the debates surrounding the lives and the deaths of the (ncostructoraist) subject have complained that the tunentetermined or even indeterminate (not €o be confused with‘TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION “andecidable") content of the notion “subjectivity” often leaves the debate without a point. The juty is still out, trying co nail down the precise moment ofthe subject's ingress in the “neostructuralst” boy, and voices are raised for the reprieve of the praxiological sub- ject or for the memorial repetition of the past-Messianie subject which is “never yet p.""” But was it ever clear that the “neostructuraliss”™ had so unceremoniously ousted the subject from. thai dicoune? ‘Strengthening the conviction thatthe ejection did ocuris the postings by fiends and foes alike, of a composite pierre of the tostrcturalis which is everyon’s and no-one. The montage wrhich makes this compose picture posible eres Bishop Berke ieys suspicion that behind every astact generality one cam aleays fin the sharp outline ofthe features of one of the many faily tnembers Bu then the problem with compote pitts ithat they ‘ier, on demand, some prety convenient abi with thei help an rempariieetmencatice brought to beat om a single Family Inember, alleging ache sme sme that any eter member of the fimily could have been an equally good choice; and while thsi sid, the art iy asued of quick exit if his Mf is called. A ompostepctare afte all must bluc~if not oblterte—indvidal Gifereness Lam not siggciting, of couse, that theres something inherently ile compose pietre; onthe contary, Lam leading toward the suggestion that we mus take them mach more seriously than we fave de, Tot fr all neo das, pe Supposed and entled by the labors of the neosrcturais we re Bu ehs doe sured and cracked ic emeope lines of Bight and plateaus of (mented) compouitis and it brings togetber cl- Tiling forces along with she unstable contests of senda diver dia. Taking this dv seriously preeppores montage which op- crates on shap-focused ar sully developed singular fames. Tenses, made t adj quickly borwee high and low aleiades, seem to be dispensable for carrying out this tk Ie wl be foolish of coutsey so deny tha the death of certain subject as really been wished fon, and that i has, perhaps, realy Happened. Rumor bi that the death as ben wished fr in the trae ofa certain deadly violence perpetrated aginst the Other Tn this ease, the resurrection of another Saf an of an other) ther had undersanay to wait forthe completion a the ert “TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION of the Cartesian, Kantian, and Husserlian subject, and for the un- ‘masking ofthe fraudulent accreditation that this subject had received in classical and modern texts. All this is well known; but what the composite picture ofthe neostruccuralists renders invisible is the fact that noe everyone who wished the death of “the” subject and the advent of a new entity in is place did share the sime motivation for the wish or the same wision for the new dawn, Deleuze undoubtedly is among those who contributed decisively to the critical unmasking of old pretensions and eo the hopefal n= vigilation for the arrival of the new. An important “theory of sub- Jectivity” runs through his entire work, beginning with the essay ‘on Hume and reaching impressive depeh and precision with his esay ‘on Leibniz. What is remarkable, fist of all, about this contribution tw a theory of subjectivity is that it combines a radial critique of interiorty with a stubborn search for “an inside ehat lies deeper than any internal world." In this sense, the search for the fold—"the inside as the operation of the outside"™'—that Deleuze s6 gallantly attributed to Foucault, ss much his own life-long search as ie was (for'a more limited time span) his friend's ‘There is no doubt that Deleuze’s theoty is marked by the tension created by a radical critique of intriorty and a simultaneous quest for an inside deeper than any internal world. But, as Manfred Frank (imuch more convincing in his seudies of modern subjectivity than in his parody of neostructuralisa) has shown, this tension is una vwidable in all cheories of subjectivity mindful ofthe bankruptey of ‘models based on the classical optical metaphor, the egological field, and more generally every relational account of the structure con sciousness/self-consciousnes." It isnot strange, therefore, that De~ leuze’s contribution to the theory of subjectivcy, mindful a itis of the opening up of a new space for a new Subject, after the bankruptcy ‘of the old, experiences the same tension. Bur whatever the advantages or the shortcomings of Deleuze’s contribution may be, this contribution cannot be asessed fairly +0 long as the wrong strategies for reading Deleuze persist and con- tribute to the clouding of the issues. Deleuze’s own thizomatic ‘growth and his strategy of writing should have warned againse hom- ‘centtic evolutionist readings. Infact, any example of his writing ‘on subjectivity taken fom his texts would have sufficed to show that ro reading ofthis kid had a chance to succeed. Consider, for ex-“TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION ample, che following three pasages: (I) “The subject is defined by the movement through which i¢ is developed.” Believing and inventing is what makes the subject to he subject (Empiriiom and Subjectivity [1953)}® (2) “There are no more subjects but dynamic individuation without subjects, which constitute collective assem- blages. ... Nothing becomes subjective but heeceites cake shape according to the compositions of non-subjective powers and effects" (Dialogues [1977) (3) "The struggle for [modern] subjectivity pre~ Sents itself, therefore, as the right to difference, variation and met- amorphosis” (Fonceult [1986).*° How are these dre statements to be shown compossible through the application of homocentric and cevolotionise reading strategies? Tt may seem, for a while, mote promising to try and tease out of Deleuze’ texts a theory of subjectivity after we adjust our interpre tive lenses to the sort of periodization that a certain (questionable) reception of the “final Foucaule” made fashionable. An arc would then ran through Deleuze's writings, leading from an early histo rico-philosophical interest in the structate-Subject and its actual zation (essay on Hume), through a middle period marked by th arrogant and suicidal pulverization of subjectivity (May 1968 Fé Tix?) to a belated, timid retrieval of the Subject as folded intcririty (Foucault, Le Pi) “The trouble with this periodization, however, is that itis too facile Ie overlooks, once again, the thizome named “Deleuze” and bypasses the complex relationships that exist between Deleuzian texts, The Logic of Sense (1969), for example, orchestrates the dis cussions on subjectivity atound essays published and composed long tefore the chronological punctum of the explosion of desires. Te cannot be read as a neostructuralist manifesto celebrating the pul- verization of the Subject; it is too sober for that. Yet, this book anticipates and prepares Capitaliom and Schizophrenia (1972, 1980), clearing up a transcendental feld inhabited by singularities, events, fo intensities and strated with lines converging for the creation of worlds, or with series of worlds diverging and resonant. A radical displacement of phenomenology is undoubtedly at work inthis text, culminating in the “greening” ofthe philosophy of difference. But ‘on the other hand, this new focus does not prevent the series of The Loge of Sense from being consistent with the theses om subjectivity, already posted in the essay on Hume's theory of human nature. The “TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION suc ofthe Subject (ei and antcption and ao the vase Svtegics for te actaliztion inside changing cvcomstances ae themes common co them both, Ke would be fir fo say that The Lagi of See pproaches the Jee let desous dein an etiely ove and Escnating way singularities and i convergng ordering line are now fledged intense, stiggling to sold thermic death in the coun of being stretched and extended. But then agai tensity does noe make ts appearance for the fine ime hee only Catlesreading of Deleozes clr text on Hare, on Niche, tnd on Berson can sidetep the chcory of iensive tine, aleady ‘Ercloped aed pital in them” “Te ony way thnk to aes comely Deletes contatons toward hry of sbjectiviy sto ea him the way he eases swe must read im according fo che series he create, oberving thelr trays of commerging and of becoming compossible, orand this Suns co the ene thing for our stttegy of readingaccording tothe sre on their way to diverging aed begining to senate ‘telentesvgiance ic neceaary in every sep of sich a reading. I wl ke a mistake, for example, ro rake each book of Deleuze for re sci, and toy to eal compositor fesonance sang the varios books, ¥ do oc doa that the ames of thane chat De leize reds and writes aboot stand for singalar points (intense), ole gener ee his oso Soul, mh ‘ation, speak of a Hume-ere, a Bergon-seies, 4 Lebniseris, Ste Bat woe of thee serien conncnive with the text or te thatbear the name ofthe thinker afer whom eres hasbeen named Books and sre do not ence This why i would be beter to tlle shout the "Home-effect” eis, the “Lebnizeffec” sere et [A any ste provided that we take adequate procatons, there so harm in trying eo spread Deleuze’ contibutons co» theory of subject slong the following sere, each one of which could be Hetied by means of the question/ problem introducing i. The Hamers (how does the mind bece 3 ject the Bes (how cana static ontological gens ofthe sje be worked out Seginning with prepersnal and preindividal singlets and even) the Labtec (how cn there be a naion of indidlity which neither a mere deduction Grom the concept “objet Thich exe it would be contadicory-nor a mee igure of 2a Tivihalty deprived of comcepe-in which cave would be aberd“TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION anneal); the Niche Foca (how can ayn gen- Gis of subjectivity be conte, in which the sujet would be the folding and lateralization of Oude Fores, witb soe Cuimbing ea philosophy of interior?) the Nice Kbsousk- ‘ens (Bew io tps to chink dhe subject in terms of inclusive fgoncions and simultaneously afirmed incompossble worl). THe seres woul hve Fo long thet own ines 0 igh, without oing the construction of ny planes of comsitency AONE Bhem, were it wot for Deleuze’ concepts "chasymas” ~ chy Comm ant “cracked I” (efi), which in dhe apa 28 por ‘Rinne words ccltethrogh the sexes and make poste the inlaie Sapncieairmaion of ll sere. com, chat tou the becoming word thax pos the consition ofthe sujet So asks and hasmor again that guarantees thatthe consiated siiject ill not emerge a6. sobwantvehypolemeno, bu ater as fo already always “cracked L” itis indeed steking to ind the germs of all hee series present iam ary wor ke Enpri nd Sujet. Empire Si Jen forthe os pty segment ofthe Hameed, without fin et pevening it fom being also eros by segment of Ove seres Te speks of the stcture—Sabjec ets of antic futon and invention ie al iatodues the acaalization of che Sub ‘erin term of concrete and always changing cumstances. I ordinate bythe question “how doc the mind become subject? Sod weates dhe sactre of subjectivity in terns of Deli antic Faron ad inentivencs The Suet hs seis, possible only ‘Behe comrelateof the ftonl ies "Word." The consti fane- tho ofthe later sels and makes poste the consatve function Of the pints of human natures Sueesatiipt and invent in they anit because they inven and they invent alway In concrete Grcammtancs. The a utry aed inventive subject wil dot Deleuse’s wings, without ‘xcopton, although later, atipaion wil be lle by other names (Crefetion” absaate memory", and vention wil acquire is Sst symonyns("asembling” "becoming online of fight" "be Cominorher" ete)" Deleuze wil never wave in his coiction thar otly empinicts hare the right acces tothe problem of sob- Jeet, Nonempirics alma endow their acetal fel Pith nisi and psa shat, with ubetve Selle "TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION and personal Otherness, replicating thereby the empitial domain atthe very moment that they allege fo bein the proces of grounding it. Empiicits, on the contary, begin with the mind asa theater without a stage; they begin with the mind as dliium, contingency, and indiference and strive to understand how a mee collection of inmages can ever become a stem. How can the mind become a subject? How can it become human nature? Deleuze-Hame' answer is thatthe mind hecomes subject, that is, an entity capable of be- living, anticipating, and inventing, as the resule ofthe combined effec upon it ofthe principles of buman nature. These pricier, ‘whether a principles of ssctation or x pincplc of pasion, parse 2 telecive and a corrective cour: they select impresione of sem tation, designate them as candidate for atsocition, and, on this bas they constitute impressions of reflection. Inthe case of cognition, the principles of asociationcomtguity, resemblance, and causal ity-designate impressions and organize the given into a system, bringing thereby constancy to the mind and natualizing ie They form habit, they eablish belie, and they constitare the subject an emity that anticipates (On the other hand, Deleuze recognizes that the constiiton of the ethical subject presents Hume witha diffrent problem: although the building blocks of morality are naturally given, they tend none theles to exclude one another. The mind experiences sympathy aurlly. But out sympathies are para, limited, and narrowly fo- cused if violence i to be avoided, the extension of out sympathies Tequites coretive integration.” Only through integration cn the chica totality be brought about a an invention and an artifice General rules, both extensive and corrective, must be invented and allowed to guide the operations ofthe principles of pasion, forthe sake ofthe integration of syrpathis and forthe constitoion of the thal subjece For Delewze-Hume, therefore, subjects affirm more than they loewan amcnd hi ply ther mor hy oe 28 this allows them to infer one (nongiven) part of nature from poled trill rn fan it erro by inventing institutions which nature does nce provide. tn both cases (knowledge and ethics), che subjec transcends the given albeit net in the same manner-—at least at tntally. Transcendence, in the ‘ase af kowledge, implies cxtending the Some othe Similar over‘TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION ts which ae external to ne another, whereas tanicendenc, in the ae of ethic, moles the intensity ofthe integrative act. The famous par of categorie, extension-intensty, around which the en- see Deleusin theory of diference and repttion wl be cher trated, ha therefore found inthe Humeanempiticim an important ily and vel inspiration: neither one will eve be abandoned. Bt, a we now haow fom Deleuze’ later woth, the relations bervecn the extension of contemplation andthe nen of practice ate ot 28 uapecblematic and unidimensional ss my ht paragraph teens to suggest. Intensity aod ettnson as word-making force are not opposite poles ina Geld ofexclisive dajunctions. An aie pain of their complex relationship in an aly ork sch a8 Em ‘ico ond Sabin i act, rk. Ie centers Delenzes Giscusson of Hamean ime and on the function that me has in the consitition of abject Time was inal intoduced by Hume 2 the structure ofthe mind but the subject, formed bythe habit inside the minds isthe yateds of ine. The mind was sucesion the abject snow dre and anticipation. The aticpating and ie venting sajec constiues the pat hich weighs onthe present, taking ik pas while posting the past ax therefor the four. ‘Time asthe constitutive force of stjectvity, responsible forthe tenting and folding ofthe given andthe formation of interior, is ndeed nea, The sime bring of intensity and extension is dcovered by Dele inthe complex elation that Hume signs tothe principles of atciation and passion: pasons ree the sociation of Hes, tun the other hand the toiton of Wes prespposespusons© The esting ef oon ad ce ps at assion ako gives disposition, an inclination, anda direction wo the Eocition, Ukimatly, though, the relations between epistemic a= ‘ocistion ad incinng pasion are weighted in favor ofthe intensity Of ponies mule mac ofse with the tendency. creating pasion. Aswocations without passions ate tind, bur then pasion without aucatons woud be empty. The ‘weight ofthis Hamean move i ot ost on Deleuze: cexpsins why to theory of subjectivity can be suceafalf teties on the cogative subject only. The problem canbe corety tas only atthe level of prc, and the hes srendingoaectiviy cannot be die "TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION, ‘Moreover, the primacy of practice in the correct articulation of the seructure-subjectivity resurfaces during Deleuze-Hlume's discus- sion of the actualization ofthis structure in concrete subjects. The Principles of association alone cannot account for the difference be- tween subjects. Only concrete circumstances can explain the facts, of differentiation, A differential psychology, as the science of the particular, must therefore reveal these circumstances. Deleuze will then reiterate Hume's position which asserts that subjectivity ac- quires its form through the principles of association while it sin dividuated through the principles of passion. Affectvity activates 3 tendency of the subject making her want to identify with the effects of her actions in all cases where these effecs are the result of the rmcans chosen. Once again, therefore, subjectivity is essentially linked with practice for only a mind endowed with ends, and te- lations corresponding to these ends, can be a subject. Assciationism isthe theory ofall that is practical, and operates only when harmony between fiction and the principles of passion has been established. Ie should be obvious, despite the Humean tenor of the discussion, thar the stakes are in fact about the practical and speculative interests ‘of human subjects. The intensive, integrative act of the practical interes and its priority over the cognitive speculative interest make possible the organization of subjectivity. But the peculiarity of the Hume-seres i that it posits the subject as an always already “cracked subject.” To disclose the cracks inthe structure, Deleuze-Hume must ditect his attention to the indispensable role that fiction plays inthe structuration of the subject and to the constitution of individuality. ‘The subject, as we have seen, is the product of the principles of Jhuman nature; but then the mind, or the given, is the product of the powers of nature. Under these terms, the combined labor of passioned intensity and ofthe extensive use of associative principles ‘would be spent in vain, 26 long as no frm relation has been estab lished between the principles of human nature and the principles of Deleuze, therefore, in one of the most ingenious and most con- troversial gestures of the entire Hume-series, turns «0 Hume's dis- ‘cussions of religion, and fastens his analysis on the retrieval of pur- posiveness (finalité), made possible by these discussions, and its reentry ito the world. Hume concedes that principles of association and passion (in both theie extensive and their corrective function),‘TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION jointly operate in the realm of religion. Deleuze then argues that, despite contrary textual appearances, Hume's corrective rules do not refute religion, On the contrary, theism is justified assoon asa certain antinomy affecting our ways of thinking about the world i resolved, (On one hand, Hume is clear chat the world is not an object; objects ate in the world. Ir follows that the world cannot function in an argument, or be made to stand for an effect in a causal narrative, which would sing the glory of God's causal authorship. Ths sricrure allows Hume to criticize teleological arguments and their God- founding pretensions. But there is something more in Hume, and Deleuze is not letting it go unnoticed. ‘The world is always, for Hume, a fiction of the imagination; “bur with che world, fetion becomes a horizon of experience, a principle of human nature which ‘must co-exist with the other principles, despite the contraictions.”™" ‘The world abides as a ftion of the imagination, ond also fiction becomes a principle of human nature; the world never tras into an object of the understanding, It remains as an ides, but the idea is ‘not constitutive; it constitutes a fiction, ‘Hume's empiricism, then, in Deleuze’s estimate, shows the subject in the procest of being constituted on a soil already eroded by 2 contradiction without possible conciliation. Inthe antinomy of the ‘world, the imagination with its fiction is opposed to the principles ‘which fix it and the operations which correct it. Under these ci ‘cumstances, extension and reflection find themselves on a collision course: an opposition reigns supreme between the principles of 35- sociation and the fiction which has become a principle of nature. [No choice is posible between the understanding and the suggestions of the imagination: for “when fiction becomes principle, reflection does not stop reflecting, nonetheless it can no longer correct." All the systematization, naturalization, and subjectivation of the mind that we witnessed so far have not helped the mind silence its delirium, ‘Yet itis the same delisium that makes posible the solution of the antinomy of the world, Hume, according to Deleuze, prohibits the mobilization of the principles of human nature for the sake of proving thar the world is God's effect; the same Hume, though, not opposed to thinking of God negatively, as the cause of these principles. This decision, concludes Deleuze, reestablishes purpo- siveness to the extent that it makes the agreement between the prin= ‘TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION ciples of human nature and the hidden powers of nature thinkahle again.” A long quotation from Deleuze’s chapter on Hume in La Philosophie forcefully makes this point: it characterizes the stages by ‘means of which the real world becomes a fiction before the oppo- sicion of realty and fection is overcome. In oppoxition to ancien scepticism which rests on the va- inblity of sensible appearance and onthe errorsof the senses, modern scepticism rests on the status of relations and on their exteriovity. The fist act of modern scepticism was the discovery of belief in the foundations of knowledge, thats, point, its second act was the denincatin of illegitimate belief, thai, of beefs which do not obey the reles which resale in effective knowledge (probabilism, calculus of prob- abilities). However, ina ase seinemene and in a third ac, the ilegimae aif i the Wold, the Self and God appear as the horizon of all posible egrimate bli, ore he lowest degre flee (The itlis ae mine.) Incipitsimadacrumone THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS Hows morosss Tut creation of a science of humanity, but what is really his fundamental project? A choice is always defined in terms of what it excludes, and a historical project isa logical substitution, Hume's project entails the subtittin of « pychology of the mind by 1 psychology of the mind's affections. The constitution of 2 psychology ‘of the mind is not at all possible, since this psychology cannot find its object the required constancy or universality; only a psychology of affections will be capable of constituting the «ue science of humanity. Im this sense, Hume is a moralist and a sociologist, before being a psychologist; the Treatise shows chat the two forms under which the mind is afectad are essentially the pasional and the socil. They imply each other, assuring thereby the unity of the object of an authentic science. On one hand, society demands and expects from ‘ach one of its members the display of constant reactions, the pres- cence of passions able to provide motives and ends, and the asailabilicy of collective or individual charactets: “A prince, who imposes a tax ‘upon his subjects, expects their compliance.” On the other hand, the passions implicate society as the oblique means for their sais: faction. In the last analysis, the coherence of the passional and the social, in history, is revealed as an internal unity, wich political‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS ‘organization and the instications giving history is objects. History studies the relations berween motive and action in most cicumstan- cs, and i also exhibits the uniformity of the human passions. In ‘wie, the option ofthe psychologist may he expressed paradoxically as follows: one must be a morale, sociologixt, or histori here bring a puychologir, inorder tobe a paychologirt. Here, the project, of the human sciences reaches the condition which would make knowlege in general posible: the mind must be affected. By itself anu in elf, the mind is noe nature; iis noe the objec of sience. Hence, the question which will preoccupy Hume is this how doe ‘the mind become hua nature? Passional end socal afection are only 2 part of buman nature: there are abo the understanding and che association of ideas. The faces hough, that chs lise isl based on convention. The real role ofthe understanding, says Hue, isto make the passions sociable and the interest social. The understnding reflects interest. On the other hand, nothing prevents us from thinking of it 36 something distinc, the way the physic fragments a movement, while ree ‘ogning al along that itis inivisibe and noncomposit.* We should not, in fat, forget that two points of view coexist in Hume: the passions and the understanding present themselves, in a way which Toust be made clear, a two distinct parts. By Wel, though, the understanding is only the process of the pasions on heir way to socialization. Sometimes we sce that che understanding and the pas sions constitute two separate problems, but at other times, we sce thatthe understanding i subordinated to the passions. This is the reason why, even when stadied separately, the understanding must shove all help us to understand better the general nse of the above {question Hume constantly affirms the identity between the mind, the imag ination, and ideas. The mind is not nature, nor does ie have a nature, I is identical with the ideas in the mind. Ideas ate given, a given: they are experience. The mind, on the other hand, is given as a collection of ideas and not asa system, It follows that our earlier {question can be expressed a follows: how does a collection become 4 syscem? The collection of ideas is called “imagination,” insofar as the collection designates not 2 faculty but rather an assemblage of things, in the most vague sense of the term: things are as they ‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS agpa-a cole without an album, play without a seg, ox of perceptions. “The comparison of the theatre mune nt lead tot nce mn ol wha se as ae reprsente, ref the mata of mete Pee alec dif fom works pce ne eps os no ake place n ject. Teh gan ee coco hw ds the mind coma abject How dae the enn ee a faculty? aaa = TEs rue He conan tr hater rn the mae ination. But the preposition here does not signify inherence ints sujet rates, he the ofthe preoston See at t Ina excide om the mind un ty which cea from he movement ofideas tment can ea themind andthe eas in the mind The epee ee ee Ae mean ne i ge erg Inman ies place mhich mut be Realized dee oe a something ecbleNacings done ke ac thing i doe tthe natinnion es a Cee on he ey ideas beste the procion of anes ine Ree tpl nse maga Can imagination ba own sei ut cven thee ee we island dlouy ie without gomtany sal wate ee is the movement of eas andthe Wali of tee nena Tat actin Beng the ple of leas the any ac alleen ee arte indi ems Deng the bond oF lee, ee the uses! engendering te dragons, winged Kona ane sows The dh emi bn deta, oe thing from anther pin of vow change od aes inelh the imaginations not natures is Pace ey Thee oe constancy or aformty inthe ies ha The Nea hen onstancy or anfrmiy inthe way i whith esse or the magnon: only cance wakes ap ik ee ee erly ofthe ies hota chance ofthese he oo ees t che imaginations tte thon King the ene cea role which every ues an pay ener the es oot pee Wht the ther pipe? How ds she imagination come human nse! Coneancy sal anibscsy ncaa the way in which ids are asoited in the Inaba Neocon‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS swith ite three principles (contiguity, resemblance, and causality transcends the imagination, and also difers from it. Association af- feces the imagination. Rather than finding its origin, association finds in the imagination it term and its object. Iris quality which unifies ideas, not a quality of ideas themselves.? ‘As-we will see through belief and causality the subject ranscends the given. Literally, the subject goes beyond what the mind gives itt believe in what I have neither seen nor touched. But che subject can go beyond the given because fit of all tis, inside the mind, the effect of principles transcending and affecting the mind. Before there can be belief, all three principles of association must organize the given into a system, imposing constancy on the imagination. The latter does not draw its own resources from constancy, but without it, it would never be a human nature. These principles atcribute to ideas the links and principles of union, which, instead of being the characteristics of ideas, ae the original qualities of human nature."” ‘The privilege that causality enjoys is tha it alone can make us affirm existence and make us believe. It confers upon the idea of the object ‘solidity and an objectivity that this idea would not have had it only bbeen associated through contiguity or resemblance to an actual impression.’ Bus the other wo principles also share with causality ‘4 common tole: they fix and natualize the mind; they prepare belief and accompany it. We can now see the special ground of empiricism: nothing in the mind transcends human nature, because it is human nature that, in is principles, transcends the mind; nothing is ever transcendental, Association, far from being a product, isa rule of the imagination and a manifestation of its free exercise. Ie guides the imagination, gives i uniformity, and also constetins it. In this sense, ideas are connected in the mindnot by the mind. The imagination is indeed human nature bue only to the extent that other principles have made it constant and setled. ‘There is a dficulty, though, even with this definition. Why is regulated imagination, rather than the rule grasped in its active power, human nature? How can we say of the imagination chat it Iecomes a nature, despite the fact that it has not within itself a reason for this becoming? The answer is simple. Essentially, principles refer to the mind which they affect, but nature zefers tothe imagination; its entire Function is to qualify the imagination. Assocation isa aw ‘of nature, and like every other law, itis defined by its effects, not ‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS by a cause. Similarly, on an enticely different plane, God may be called “cause” and presablished harmony oeleology may be fut fully invoked." The conclusion of the Dialpus, the essay on mi aces, and the essay on immortality ate in fact coherent. A cate may allways be showght, a something in itself, eanscending all the anal ‘gies which provide ie with a determined content, in the case of experience and knowledge. Bue the fact is that philosophy, being, a human seience, need not search for the cause; it should rather scrutinize eects, The cause cannot be kraion principles have neither Cause nor an origin oftheir power. What i Original is their effet ‘pon the imagination “The effect of association appear in three ways* Sometimes the idea takes on a role and becomes capable of representing all these ideas with which, ehrough resemblance, itis associated (general idea) at other times, the union of ideas brought about bythe ming acquires 2 regularity not previously had in which cae “nature in a manner point(s] out to every one thos simple ideas, which ate most proper to be united into a complex one™” (substance and mode; finally, somesimes, one idea can introduce another" (eaten). The resule ofthe association in all thee cases i the ming’ easy pasage from one ida to another, so that the essence of eelatons becomes precisely this easy transition. The mind, having become nature, has acquired sve a tendon. Bat despite the fact that nature makes reference wo ideas, to the extent that it asocates them in the mind ce ideas do not acquire 2 new quality of thet own, nor are they capable of atributing to their objects; no new ideas ever appear. Ideas ar related in uniform ‘ay, but hse elation arnt objet fa es. Hue in ft serves that general ideas must be represented, but only in the fancy, sonia ae peering ean ear and quality» On one hand, the imagination cannot become in itelf nature without being for itself the fancy. As forthe fancy, finds here an entirely new extension. The fancy can always inwoke rela tions, borrow the clothing of nature, and form general rales, going, beyond the determined fel of legitimate knowledge and carrying knowledge beyond its proper limits. ft can diply ts oun func the Irish cannot be witty, the French cannot have solidity. In order to wipe out the eect ofthese extensive rules and in order to con- soldste knowledge, we will need the application of diferent rales‘THLE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS thi ime, the aplication of conctve rls, Absit es fncflly, the imagination whenere faced with 2 tlton wil not fail to lube and reinforce iby means of otic relation, however Un imei thy may be nthe ther andthe mind canos be acta by the pencils of patie without emaining pase only sles the eects Re Inn temo doing the connecting, ba athe hey themslves a= Yor example pasion, an mpreson of fe Msemblance ect Casity f= Reina ception ofthe mint and not» conclsion of the werstanding Eye tman ot ete be content wth syn, thatthe idea of case ance aes rom eet constantly aot: Bu mst Bim that “ih the very tame with the Mea of hese objects In shor, the fecsary cation i indced nthe sje ut ony infra th sae “Snopes This isthe reason hy Hume sometimes onthe neg stv ies insists onthe pando of his thesis and at the ines, on the postive side he emphases is orthodony, soar a necessity Som the side ofthe subject, he acesaryelaon nthe case of things ony ens conjunction nes dad oni that > Bur accssity belongs tothe subject only insofar the subject con- temple and ot solar ai cts The constant conjunction i the tate necesary elton. For Tome, the determination i nt decrminng iis ater determined, White Hume speaks of a at of the mind of dspstion he does ot mean to hat the mind Serve uc cat actvted and that has Boome sujet. The “olen pacaox of Homes philesophy isthat eos a sbjectiviey Srhch wancen se witout beng ny sk pase Subjectivity dca san eft itis in face pros of leon. The think, having been affected by the principles, tras 0 into a hc ‘Nature canoe be studied sciemifcally xcept in terms of its effects upon the min, ye the only tve sence ofthe mind shoald have trusts ajc “Fioman Narre the oly scence of mans ‘Tis of couse: mca that the paychlogy of etons dallows any pychology of the mind, bu aso means that aflectons ge the mind ts ules, A corn ambigity may well be explained inthis way. In Fume’ mock, we wits the equal development {ow lines of diverse nspiain. Om oe had the ppchaogy of the mind pyehnogy of es of snp cnet, of inna or indivisible, Te oceptes seal the sca pr of ee system fection, and a ‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS ‘of the understanding—“the ideas of space and time.” This s Hume's 4atomism. On the other hand, the psychology of human nature is a psychology of dispositions, perhaps even an anthropology, a science ‘of practice, especially morality, politics, and history. Ie is finally a real critique of prychology, insofar as it locates the reality of ite ‘object in all the deverminations not given in an idea, or in all the ‘qualities transcending the mind. This second line of inspiration con- stitutes Hume's aociationiom, and to confuse associaionism with atomism is a cutious misunderstanding, Now, we are faced with the question: why does the first inspi- ration subsist in Hume's writings, especially in his theory of space? ‘We have seen that, although the psychology of affections contains in ite project the critique and even the elimination of a psychology of the mind (as a science impossible to constitute), it nevertheless contains in its object an essential reference to the mind as the ob- jective of natural qualifications. Since the mind is in itself collection ‘of atoms, a true psychology is neither immediately nor directly pos- sible: che principles do not make the mind an objece of possible science without first giving it an objective nature. Hume therefore does not create an atomistic psychology; he rather indicates, inside atomism, a state of the mind which does not permit any psychology. We cannot eeproach Hume for having, neglected the important prob= lem of the conditions of the human sciences. We might even wonder ‘whether modern authors do not repeat Hume's philosophical project when they asociate an assiduous critique of atomism with every positive moment of the human sciences. Ie would follow that they treat atomiam less as a historical localized thesis and more a8 the general schema of what psychology cannot be; they condema it, therefore, in the name of the concrete rights of ethology and so- cology, oF of the passional and the social “The intellect.” said Comte with respect to imposible psy chologies, “is almost exclusively the subject oftheir spec ‘lations, and the affections have been almost entirely ne~ glected; and, moreover, always subordinated to the Understanding... The whole of human nature is thus very ‘unfaithfully epresented by these futile systems..." Al srions writers ages the impossibility of a psychology of the itl. This is why they criticize so meticulously every single‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS identification berween consciousness and knowledge. They differ ‘only in the way they determine the Factors which give a nature to the mind, Sometimes, these factors are the body and mater, in which ‘case psychology makes room for physiology. Sometimes they are particular principles, constituting a psychic equivalent of matter, wherein psychology finds its unigue, posible object and is scientific condition. Hume, with his principles of association, has chosen the later route, which is the most dificult and the most audacious. This, is where his sympathy for materialism comes from, and at the same time his reticence toward it. ‘Until now, we have shown only chat che task that Hume's philosophy sets for itself is to answer the question “how does the mind become 4 nature.” But why ist this one? The question must be taken up on a different plane, Hume's problem would then be exclusively about 4 fact, and therefore empirical. Quid faci? What is the fact of knowl- ‘edge? It is transcendence or going beyond. afm more than T know: my judgment goes beyond the idea. In other word In the case of knowledge, where isthe face? ‘The fact is that these practices cannot be expressed in the form of an idea without the idea becoming immediately contradictory. Take, for example, the incompatibility between a general or abseract idea and the nature ofan idea,” or between areal relation beeween objects and che objects to which we apply the relaton.% The more im- mediate or immediately decided che incompatibility is, the more decisive i¢ will be. Hume does not reach this point after a long discussion, he begins with if 20 chat the point about the contradiction sasumes naturally the role of a basic challenge, This is the only relation between the philosopher and the others inside the system of the understanding.” “Show me the idea you claim to have.” ‘Whats at stake in the challenge isthe very psychology of mind. In fact, the given and experience have now two inverse meanings. The given isthe idea as itis given in the mind, without anything t scending it—not even the mind, which is therefore identical with the idea. But, the transcendence itself is also given, in an altogether different sense and mannet—it is given as practice, asan affection of the mind, and as an impression of reflection: passion, sis Thane docs not have to be defined:” by the same token, belief is a je ne sis {quoi adequately felt by everyone Empirical subjectivity is consti- tuted in the mind under the influence of principles affecting i; the rind therefore dors not have the characteristics of a preexisting subject. True psychology, that is, the psychology of afections, will bbe duplicated in each one of its moments by means of a critique of the false psychology of the mind; the latter is infact incapable of grasping without contradiction the constitutive element of human reality. But why isi nally necessary that philosophy undertake this critique, express the transcendence in an idea, produce the contra- diction, and manifest the incompatibility as the fac of knowledge? Tis because the transcendence under discussion is not given in an idea, but is rather refered to the mind; ie qualifies the mind, The ‘mind is atthe same time the object of a critigue and the term of a necessary reference. The necessity of the critique is located here. This isthe reason why, with respect to questions of the understand- ing, Hume's method is always the same: it goes from the absence cof an idea in the mind to the presence of an affection of the mind. ‘The negation of the idea of a thing afirms the identity between the character of this thing and the nature of an impression of reflection, This isthe case with existence, general ideas, necessary connection, the self, and alo vice and virtue Inall these cases, instead of negating the criterion ofthe idea, we allow the negation of the idea itself to serve asa criterion; transcendence is fist and foremost understood in ite negative relation to that which it transcends.” Conversely, in the structures of transcendence, the mind finds kind of positivity which comes to it from outside. Bot chen, how can we reconcile chs entire method with Hume's principle, according to which all ideas derive from a corresponding impression and, consequently, very given impression is reproduced in an idea which perfectly represents it? I, for example, necessity is an impression of reflection, there must necessarily be an idea of necesiy." Critique, says Hume, does not deprive the idea of nec- essary connection of its sense, it only destroys its improper appli- cations.*! There certainly is an idea of necessity. But basically, we speak of an impression of reflection, whenever che necessary relation is the mind affected and determined (in certain circumstances) by the idea of an object to form the idea of another object. The impres- sion of necessity, hecause it sa qualification of the mind, would not‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS bbe able to produce the ida as a quality of things. The proper role ‘of the impressions of reflection, being effects of the principles, i 0 {qualify in various ways the mind as subject. Affections then unveil the idea of subjectivity. The term “idea” can no longer have the same the psychology of affections becomes the stieured subject. Rationalism has lost this philosophy. Hume's philosophy is a shatp critique of representation. Ie does not elaborate a critique of relations bur rather a critique of representations, precisely because representations cannot present relations. By making representation into a criterion and by placing ideas within reason, rationalism ex- pects ideas to stand for something which cannot be constituted ‘within experience ot be given in an idea without contradiction: the generality of che idea, the existence of the object, and the content of the eerms “always,” “universal,” “necessary,” and “true.” Ra ‘ionalism has transferred mental determinations to external objects, taking away thereby from philosophy the meaning and the ineelli- sibility of practice and of the subject. The fact is, though, that the ‘mind isnot eeason; reason is an affection of the mind. In ths sense, season will be called instinct; habit, o nature "[W]e have found [reason] to be noching but a general calm determination of the pas- sons, founded on some distant view or reflexion." Reason isa kind of feeling. Consequently, just as the method of philosophy gocs from the absence of an idea to the presence of an Impression, similarly the theory of reason moves also fron a kin cof skepticism to a kind of positivism. le moves from a skepticism of reason to 2 positivism of feeling, in which case the later includes reason as 4 reflection of feeling in the qualified mind. Tn the same way that a distinction is made between atomism and associationism, a distinction must also be made beeween the to senses ofthe term “idea,” and therefore the ewo senses of the term “impression.” In one sense, we do not have the idea of necessity, bur in another, we do. Despite the texts which present simultane- ‘ously and render homogeneous as much as possible che impressions ‘of sensation and the impressions of reflection (or the ideas of sen- sation and the ideas of reflection), the difference between the ewo is realy a difference of nature. Wieness, for example, the following, quotation: ‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS For tht i necesary to pmaduce a new idea of reflection, nor can the mind, by revolving over a thousand times allies ideas of sensation, ever extract frm chem any new original idea, ules nature hes 0 fram’ ts acl, that i eels some new original impresion arse from such contemplation. * ‘The impressions of sensation ate only the origin of the mind 3s for the impressions of reflection, they ate the qualification of the tind and the effect of principles in it. The point of view of the origin, according to which every idea derives from a preexisting impression and represents it, does not have the importance that peo ple attribute to it it merely gives the mind a simple origin and frees the ideas from the obligation of having to represent thing, and also from the corresponding difficulty of having to understand the re~ semblance of ideas. The real importance is on the side of the impres- sions of reflection, because they are the ones which qualify the mind as subject. The esence and the destiny of empiricism are not tied to the atom but rather to the essence of association; therefore, em- ism dacs not raise the problem of the origin of the mind but rather the problem of the constitution of the subject. Moreover, it cnvisages this constitution in the mind as the effect of transcending principles and not as the produce of a genesis, The dificulty is in cstablishing a specific elation between the ewo meanings of “idea” or “impression,” or between origin and qualification. We have al- ready seen their difference. It is the same difference that Hume encounters under the form of an antimony of knowledge: it defines the problem of the self. The mind is not subject; itis subjected. When the subject is constituted in the mind under the effect of principles, the mind apprehends itself as a self, for it has been qual- shed. But the problem is eis: ifthe subjec is constituted only inside the collection of ideas, how can the collection of ideas be appre- hhended as a self, how can I say “I,” under the influence of those same principles? We do not really’ understand how we can move from dispositions co the self, or from the subject to the self. How can the subject and the mind, in the last analysis, be one and the same inside the self? The self must be both a collection of ideas and a disposition, mind and subject. It is a synthesis, which is incom prehensible, since i ties together in its notion, without ever recon- ciling them, origin and qualification‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS In shore there are ewo principles, which T cannot render consistent, norisitin my powers to renounce either of them, vi. that all our distinc prcapions are distin existences, and tht the ond never perceives any real connexion among dint Hume in fact adds that a solution may be possible. We will see later ‘on what sense we can give to this hope. Human nature isthe real object of science. But Hume's philosophy presents us with two modalities of this nature and with two types ‘of affection: we ae faced, on one hand, with the effets of association, and on the other with ‘the effects of passion, Each one of them determines a system: the system of understanding and the system of ‘passions and thie. But what is their relation? To begin with, be- tween the ewo, a kind of parallelism seems to be established and followed exactly. Belief and sympathy correspond, Moreover, very- thing that belongs to sympathy and goes beyond belie is, according +o the analysis, analogous to that which the passions add co the association of ideas* On another plane, just as association fixes in the mind a necessary generality chat is, rule which is indispensable to theoretical knowledge, in the same way the passions provide the ‘mind with ehe content of a constancy,” make possible a practical and moral activity, and give history its meaning. Without this double movement, there would noe even be a human nature, for the imag ion would be mete fancy. The points of correspondence do not ip there: the relation beewcen motive and action is ofa piece with causality." to the point that histary must be construed a8 a physics ‘of humanity." Finally, inthe case of the determination of nature, and in the case ofthe constitution of a world of morality, general rules, being both extensive and corrective, have the same sense. We should not identify the system of understanding with theory, and the system of morality and the passions with practice. Under the name of belief, we have a practice of the understanding, and under the form of social organization and justice, a theory of morality. Moreover, everywhere in Hume, the only possible theory isa theory of practice: with respect to the understanding, we have the cal lation of probabilities and genera rules; with espect eo morality an the passions, we have general rules and justice. ‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS Important as they may be, however, ll these correspondences are the mere presentation of philosophy and the distribution oft tests. ‘The relation of analogy between the two constituted domains should rot make us forget which one of them determines the constitution of the other as 2 philosophical matter. We actully seek the motive ‘of philosophy. Atleast, che fact is easy t decide: Hume is above all 4 moralist, a political thinker, and a historian, But why? ‘The Treatise begins with the system of understanding, and raises the problem of reason. However, the necessity of such a problem is not obvious; it must have an origin, which we can consider as a motive of this philosophy. Ie isnot because reason solves problems that i is itself a problem. On che contrary, for reason to experience 4 problem, in its own domain, there must be a domain that escapes reason, putting it initially into question, The important and principal sentence of the Tras is this: "Tis not contrary to Reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger." CContrarety i an excessive elation, Reason can be put into ques- tion and can ruse the problem of is nature, ecause it doesnot apply to all there is. The fact is that it does not determine practice: itis practically or technically insufficient. Undoubtedly, reason influences practice, co the extent that it informs us of the existence of a thing, as the proper object of a passion, or to the extent that it reveals 2 ‘connection hetween causes and effects as means of satisfaction.” But ‘we cannot sy that reason produces an action, that passion contradicts it, or even that reason thwarts a passion, Contradiction implies at least a disagreement between ideas and the objects which the ideas represent: “A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, mod= ification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders ita copy of any other existence or modification.”™* ‘Moreover, moral distinctions do not ler themselves be engendered, through reason; they arouse passions and produce or hinder action. "There is indeed contradiction in misappropriating properties and in violating promises, but only to the extent that promises and prop erties exist in nature. Reason can always be brought to bear, but i¢ is broughe to bear on a preexisting world and presupposes an an- tccedent ethics and an order of ends. Thus, itis because practice and morality are in their nature (and not in their circumstances) inulferene to reason that reason seeks its difference. Because itis negate from ehe outside, its denied fiom dhe inside and discovered“THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS as madness and skepticism, Forthermote, because this skepticism has its origin and its motive onthe outside, inthe indifference of practice, practice itself i indifferent to skepticism: we can always play back: ‘gammon.” The philosopher behaves as anyone else: the characteristic fof the skeptic is tha her ot his easoning does not allow a reply and, at the same time, does not produce conviction. We ae, therefore, brought back to the previous conclusion, and this time we find it completed: skepticism and positivism are matually implied by the same philosophical reasoning. The positivism of the passions and ethics produces a skepticism of reason. This internalized skepticism, hhaving become a skepticism of reason, causes a positivism of the understanding as the theory of a practice. This positivism of the ‘onderstanding is conceived inthe image ofthe skepticism of eason.”” According to the image, yes, but not according to the resemblance ‘We can now understand exactly che difference between the system of ethics and the system of the understanding. In the case of the affect, we must distinguish two terms: passional or moral affection, and transcendence as a dimension of knowledge. Without a doubs the principles of morality, that is, che original and natural qualities of che passions, transcend and affect the mind, just as the principles of association do, The empirical subject is emily constituted in the ‘mind by the combined effec ofall principles. But itis only under the (unequal) influence of the principles of association—not of the cothers—that this subject can transcend the given it believes. In this precise sense, transcendence is exclusively the alfir of knowledge: it erties the idea beyond itself, giving ita role, affirming its object, and consticutng its Tink. Ie follows that in the system of the un- derstanding, the most important principle which affects the mind vill first ofall be stadied in activity, chat i, in the movement of a subject chat transcends the given: the nature of the causal relation is grasped in the context of the inference Bur the case of ethics is completely different, even when it takes analogically the form of the exposition of transcendence, There is no inference to be drawn in this case. “We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleaes after such a particular manner, wwe in effec feel that i is virtuous." Ethics admits the idea as a factor oaly of the relevant circumstances and accepts the association as a constituted element of human nature. In the system of the ‘understanding, on the other hand, association isa constieutive cle~ ‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS ‘ment—in fact, the only constitutive element of human nature. As an illostration of this duality, itis enough to remember Hume's di tinction between two selves,° and the different way in which he presents and handles the corresponding problems, ‘Thus, there are two kinds of practice which arc immediately marked by very distinctive characteristics, The practice of the un derstanding determines the internal economy of nature, and proceeds bby means of extension. Nature, the abject of physic, is partes extra partes. This isis essence. If we consider objects from the point of view oftheir idea, it i possible for all objects “to become causes or effects of cach other," since the causal relation is not one of theit qualities: from 2 logical point of view, anything could be the cause ‘of anything. But if, on the other band, we observe the conjunction ‘of two objects each of che numerically different cases which presents the conjunction is independent of the other; neither has influence cover the other; “they are entirely divided by time and place.”"* They are only the component parts of a certain probability. In fact if probability presupposes causality, the certainty which is born of ‘causal reasoning is also a limi and a particular case of probability, ‘or rather the practically absolute convergence of probabilities” Na- ‘ure is indeed an extensive magnitude, and as such it lends itself to physical experiment and measurement. The essential thing is to de- {ermine the parts, and, within the realm of knowledge, this isthe fanction of general rules, Nature is not a whole; the whole can no rmiote be discovered than it can be invented. Torality is just a collec- tion“... Lanswer that the uniting of these parts into a whole, is performed merely by an arbiuary act ofthe mind, an hat no influence on the nature of things." The general rues of knowledge, insofar a their generality concerns the whole, are not different from the natural principles of our understanding.” The difficulty, says Hume, is notin inventing but rather in applying them. The case ofthe practice of morality, however, is different. Here, ‘he part are given immediately, without any inference required and without any necessary application, But, instead of being extensive these part are matually exclusive; they are not made up of pars (partielle), as in the case of nature; they are rather partial (partials). In che ethical practice, the difficulty isin diverting and slanting that par- tality. The important thing here i to invent: justice isan artificial virtue, and “man is an inventive species.” Thhe essential task is to“THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS constitute a whole of morality; for justice is 2 schema," and the schema is the very principle of society. "[A] single ace of justice, consider'd in itself, may often be contrary to the public goods and ‘tis only the concurrence of mankind, in 2 general scheme or system of action, which is advantageous.””? ‘The question is no longer about transcendence but rather about integration. Unlike reason, which always proceeds from one patt to another, feeling reacts to wholes.” This is why, in the domain of ethics, general rules have a different meaning, Two CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES We wust now explain some issues pertaining to ethics. It is the cxsence of moral conscience to approve and disapprove. The fecling which prompts us to praise or blame, the pain and pleasure which determine vice and virtue, have an original nature: they are produced swith reference to character in general, and with no reference to ou particular interest’ Bue what can make us abandon the reference to ‘our own point of view, and make us tefer, “through mere inspec- tion,” to character in general? In other words, what can make us take hold of something and live ini, because i is usefel or agreeable to the Other or to persons in general? Hume's response is simple: sympathy. There is, however, a paradox of sympathy: i opens up for usa moral space and generality, but the space has no extension, nor does the generlity have quantity. In fact, in order to be moral, sympathy must extend into the future and must not be limited to the present moment. I¢ mast be a double sympathy, that i 2 cot- respondence of impressions multiplied by the deste for the pleasure of the Other and by an aversion for her or his pin. It sa fae chat sympachy exists and chat itis extended naturally. But chs extension ‘snot afhemed withoue exclusion: i is impossible for sympathy to extend “without being aided by some circumstance in the present, which strikes upon asin a lively manner,” excluding chereby allCULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES cases which do not present these circumstances, The circumstances, from the point of view of the fancy, will be the degree of more precisely the enormity of unhappiness* but from the point of view ‘of human nature, there will be contiguity, esemblance, or causality. TThose whom we love, according to circumstances, are those close to-us, our peers and out relatives.” Briefly, our natural generosity is limited; what is natural co us is limited generosity.* Sympathy extends itself naturally into the future, but only when the circum= stances limit its extension. The other side of generality to which sympathy invites us is parsalry, thats, an “inequality of affection” that sympathy bestows upon us 36a characteristic of our nature, "so asto make us regatd any remarkable transgression of such a degree of partiality ether by too great an enlargement, or contraction. of the affecions, as vicious and immoral."” We condemn the parents who prefer stangers to their own children, ‘Thus, iis not our nature which is moral, ies rather our morality which is in our nature. One of Hume’s simplest but most important ideas is this: human beings are much less egoistc than they are partial Some believe themselves to be philosophers and good thinkers, as they maintain that egoism is the last resort of every activity, but this is too simple. Do they not see that “there are few that do not bestow the largest pare of cher fortunes on the pleasures oftheir wives, and the education of their child the smallest portion for their own proper use and entertainment)" "The truth is that an individual always belongs to 2 clan or a ‘community. Befoce being the types of community that Tonnies de~ scribed, family, friendship, and neighborlines are, in Hume's work, the natural determinants of sympathy. It is precisely because the ‘essence of passion or the essence ofthe particular interes is partiality rather than egoism that sympathy, for is part, does not transcend the particular interest or passion, “Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of our passions.” Let us follow the argument through, even if we jeopardize the advantage of our dis- tinction between egoism and sympathy: sympathy is no less opposed to society than egoism is. "....[S]o noble an affection, instead of fitsing men for large societies, is almost as contrary to them, as the most narrow selfishness.” [No ome has the same sympathies as another: gi of partaltes, we ate confronted with contr: [CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES This is mate's course; there is no reasonable human language a this level. ste [very particular man has a peculiar postion with re- tan to others; and "is imposible we cow'd ever converse together on any easonable terms, were each of ws to consider characters and persons, only as they appear fom his peculiar pine of view." Hone sympathy ike ein, wht imparts hal ne acreame’s cera te emt uly ae es Sophie The ew of the mater at cen Soak nso ht an sn in yg ne pes ‘Suomi changes slay the see te sac of ‘Sey ia depenting om wheter we conte om the poe SER gab or mph. pts mull only hae fo he Timed ta Spee aie mate fr they mu eine frac mide pst wl, Wt Home wc nents {Suncor precy ta they preset swan aac al Gh imoge of ey, et tie Shwe sey ely ia eg weve nao! imo feos ess ead Wnkanding sey spose ym of rete ene ‘Tharsis mpreantobeteminal at ter amen tpt gi ot en on of sey deeds on i Wat tet mnaurebibom exept, nies of ame Sates ey mor thn Single sxeof mare The fam inno al eg expla by the sex nines I Dyopeliy-sympaybetesn pes alma opr div ther oipengt Weal ie ideale ptm efecto i agle hess Aiea sy, pulser tna in sgn Wit» dob ely nt Eepminga elt oan tr slo of tse 2a Feonon Of couse, as esac nts: bt the har Seen of these is that ty tent aed one ether ite ny exces ater they ae patel Gt) ater Shanna pfs ili) Tepes tene yews the sunge of ate anig. Caen emit plea nue. he pblen of sey ia ise bin Fete flint, bt aber pe of teeta To(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES tcgrte sympathies sto make sympathy tanicend its contradiction Su naual pai, Such an integration implies postive mora ‘orld and is brought about by the positive inven of such world Tefllows thatthe moral wold not reduced to ator atice otto the natural determinations of sympathy. The moral world cms its realy when the contacto ic cecively disiated, when conversation is pou as an alternative to violence, whet Property sipenedes greed, when “notwithstanding hit variation of tur sympathy, we give the aime approbation to the ame moral ‘iaies kn China sn England" ox a word, when “the sympathy ‘res without avaration in our esteem" scem is the factor which integrates sympathies, andthe foon- dation of justice. This foundation o this uniformity of ete i ot the result ofan imaginary woyage, which transports usin thought woth most remote ines and lands in onder to constitute the persons ‘wom we take tobe our posible Lin, pers, and relative Cencivable ow ara! satinent or pasion can evra Kowa imaginary interest." The moral and social problem is how to go fom ral sympathies which exclude one anoter oar whole which would inclade thew sympathies, The problem i how ‘nested sympathy. ‘We sce the difference between morality and nature, of rather, the lack of adequation beeween nature and morality. The realty of the moral world requires the constitution of a whole, of a society, that is, the establishment of an invariable system. This reality is not nat- ural it isartifical.“The rules of justice, in vitue oftheir universality and absolute inflexibility, cannot be derived from nature, nor can they be the direct ereation of a natural inclination oF motive.” AIL the elements of morality (sympathies) are natraly given, but they are impotent by themselves 19 constitte a moral word. Vartalities ot particular interests cannot be naturally coalized, because chey are mutually exclusive. One can only invent a whole, since the only invention possible is that of the whole. This reveals the essence of the moral problem. Justice is not a principle of nature; itis rather a rule, a law of constuction, and its role is «0 organize, within the whole, the elements, including the principles of nature. Justice is a means, The moral problem is the problem of schematim, that is the actby means of which we refer ce natural inevests to the political (CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES category ofthe whole othe tty which sot given in matre. ‘The moral wot isthe sill tty ween palates se integrated and added to one anther. Or agin the moral world the sytem of means which allow my particulates, and slo the imere of the other tobe sashed and realized. Morality may equally wel be thought of» whol in tein to par al 2 ean in elation coende Inshore the moral comeiends rs policed Conscience: eve mort pls jus che te mali the legato. Expresed ins diferent ay, he moral comaence 2 termina of the pychalogical conscience, tthe pyclogel conscience apprchenel exclasively im the spect of ite omer: The moral problem isa problem of the whale and aio Problem of meas Legislation i» grea imention an te tues tenor ar ot the echologis bur rather te legltrs, They ac ot Asclepis and Buchs bot athe Royals a Theseus" Now sytem of dieted mean, a determined wholes alld ale ora sori Hue alls iva ener The las wo pole form and conten, convertion andor, 2 stem of etoms (meat) and saiity of possesion. To be ina wc) fs ft to sutituepstl convertion for lence thedought ofeach one represent in ielf he though ofthe exer, Bat ues what cone Aion? Under the condvon tht th parca sympathies ofeach fone ate wamcendd ina certain way and sormount the compos ing pertiaiis or contradictions which they genet among pope runder the condition tat natural sympathy canbe artifealy ex creed outs ts mtr nts The action of the le ia des termine a sable and omnmon point of view, frm and clas and independent of our pase sttion [Now in judging of characters, the only interest or pleasure, which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person himself, whose characteris examin'd; or that of per- sons, who have a connexion with him.” Undoubtedly, such an interest touches us mote feebly than our ‘own, of those of our kin, peers, and relatives; we are going to see tacit receives from elsewhere the vividness that it lacks: But atleast it has the practical advantage, even when the heart is not in it, of boeing a general and immutable criterion, a thied interest which does(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES sot depen on iterlcatoes-a vale “[Eperything, which gives Gnearncs in umn schon, upon the general supe, i eld Vice “The cligation which ith eented fer exemlly from nt axa obligations natral and partici interes, or the motive of he Som ml bianco dA the oe ropety presuppoes similar condions, “I oberve, tat wil be forty intrest lear another in he prsciion of hi goon provided te wil at inthe sme manner with oar w me. Fore the hid inert isa general nrc The convention of propery isthe artice ty means of which the actions ofeach one ate felted to those of the others Its the estblishment of scheme and he instiaton of "symbolic aggre or ofthe whole Hume thas fins propery fo bes phenomenon whichis esentialy plain fact, the polit peabnenem par excellence, Prpery sel conversion ar ined a te forming the swochaptcs os socal scence" The general seae tf the common interest ust be expesed in nde co be efiaions > Reson preety il rea the comernation of ropitrs, From these ie determinations, we can already se thatthe role oft gnnl il to cn ad orci cars Seocments in making w forget our preset sitation2® tthe sme Sig in terme of ia eenea, i “gacsbeyond the Gheumstance of i bch” Although the sense of Gan“ dered only fm one templating the ations of othe yet we fl no to exend ere to ou ow actions” Finally the role that which fnclaes the ‘ception i ales ux sympathize with the othe, evn when the ther dos ot expercne the seament which in gener core spond hesitation [A] man, who is not dejected by misfortunes, isthe more lamented on account of his patience ... and tho' there be an exception in the present case, yet the imagination is af- fected by the general rule... "Tis an aggravation ofa murder, that it was committed upon persons aleep and in perfect secutity.™ ‘We mus, of course, ask how the invention ofthe rule is posible indeed, this is the main question. How can we form systems of means, general rules, and aggrepates which ate hoth coercive and CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES extensive? But we can already answer the following question: what is ie exactly that we invent? In his theory of the attfce, Hume proposesan entire concept ofthe relation between nature and culture, tendency and institution. Without a doubt, particular interests ca~ ‘not be made identical to one another, or be naturally ttaliged. None= theless, nature demands chat they be made identical. If not, the general rule could never be constituted, property and couversation could not even be conceived of, because sympathies are faced with the following alternative: either to be extended through artifice ot to be destroyed through contradicion. As for the passions, they must cither be satisfied artificially and obliquely or be snubbed out by violence. As Bentham will explain later on, even more precisely, ced is natural, but there is no satisfaction of need, or at least no ‘constant and enduring satisfaction, which is not ‘made possible through arcfice, industry, and culture.® The identity of interests is therefore artificial, but only inthe sense that i eliminates the natural ‘obstacles in che natural identification of the interests themselves. In ‘other words, the significance of justice is exclusively topological ‘The artifice does not invent a principle other than sympathy. Prin= ciples are not invented. The artifice guarantees to sympathy and t0 natural pasions an extension within which they will be capable of being exercised, deployed naturally, and liberated feom their natural lists © Passions are ot limited by justice; they ate enlarged and extended, Justice is the extension of the passions and interest, and only the partial movement of the latter is denied and constrained, tis in this Sense that exiension is correction and refletion. ‘Thete is no pasion, therefore, capable of controlling the interested affection, but the very afection itself, by an al~ ‘eration ofits direction. Now this alteration mast necessarily take place upon the east reflection." ‘We must understand that justice isnot a reflection on interest but rather a reflection of interest, a kind of ewisting of the passion itself inthe mind affected by it Reflection is an operation of the tendency which restrains itself. “The remedy, then, is woe deriv'd from nature, but from artifice; or more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding, for what is irregular and ine commodious in the affections."®* The reflection of tendency isthe(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES ‘movement that constitutes practical reason; reason is nothing but a determined moment of the affections of ehe mind calm or rather calmed affection, “grounded in a distinct view or in reflection.” ‘The real dualism, in Hume's work, is not between affection and reason, nature and artifice, but rather between the whole of nature ‘which includes the artiice and the mind afected and determined by this whole. Thus, the face chat the meaning of justice is not reduced to an instinct orto natural obligation does not prevent che taistence of moral instinct or natural obligation; abot al, it docs bot prevent the existence of a natural obligation to justice, once the Jancis constituted. The fact that esteem does not vary with sym- pathy, and that iis unlimited, despite the face chat generosity nat tally limits itself, does ot prevent natural sympathy or limited senctosity from being the necesary condition and the only clement of esteem: iti because of sympathy that we esteem.» That justice isin che final analyse capable, par, of constraining our passions does not mean that i hasan end other than their satiation,” oF another origin other than their deermination™ it satisfies them ablguely. Jestice is nota principle of nature itis an artes. But to the extent that humanity i an inventive species, even the artifice is nature; the stability of posesion ie a natural law.” As Bergson said, habits are noe themselves natural, but what is natura i che hhabie eo take up habits. Nature docs not reach its ends except by smeons of caltare, and tendency is not satisfied except through che insiution. istry iin this sense part of human nate. Conversely, natute is encountered as the residue of history.® Nature is what history does not explain, what cannot be defined, what may even be sucess t describe, oF what is common inthe most diverse ways of satisfying a tendency. Nature and caltte form, therefore, a whole of a compose Hime repudiates the arguments which assign everything, eluding justice, eo dhe insti,” andthe arguments which assign everything, including the meaning of view, to poles and education” The former, a they forget culture, give us a fase image of nature; the late, as hey forget nature, deform culture Above all, Hume centers his ertgue on dhe theory of egos," which is not even a corcet psychology of buman nature, since it neglects the equally natal phenomenon of sympathy. If by “ego” we unlertand the fat (CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES hat al drives pursue their own satisfaction, we posit only the prin ciple of identity, A = A, that is, the formal and empty principle of a science of humanity—moreover, of an uncultivated and abstract humanity without history and without difference. More specifically, egoism can designate some means only that humanity organizes in order to satisfy drives, but not all possible means. Egoism then is pur in its place, and ths place is no longer very important. At chis point one can grasp the sense of Hume's political economy. In the same manner in which he introduces a dimension of sympathy into nature, Hume adds many other motives to interest—motives that are often contradictory (prodigalty, ignorance, heredity, custom, habit, or “spirit of greed and endeavor, of luxury and abundance”). Dis. postions are never obtraced from the means which we organize in order ‘0 satify them. Indeed, nothing. is further from the homo eaconomicus than Hume's analysis. History, the true science of human motivation, ‘must denounce che double error ofan abstract economy and a falsified In this sense, the idea that Hume forme of society is very strong, He presents us with a critigue of the social contract which not only the utiliarians but also the majority of th jurists opposed to “natural law" would have to take up again. The main idea is this: the essence of society isnot the law but rather the institution. The law, in fact, is a limitation of enterprise and action, and it focuses only on a negative aspect of society. The faule of contractual theories is that they present us with a society whose essence isthe law, that i, with a society which has no other objective than to guarantee certain preexisting natural rights and no other origin than the contract. ‘Thus, anything postive is taken away from the social, and instead ‘he socal is saddled with negativity, limitation, and alienation. The entire Humean critique of the stae of nature, natural rights, and the social contract, amounts to the suggestion that the problem raust be reversed. The law cannot, by itself, be the source of obligation, be- cause legal obligation presupposes utiicy. Society cannot guarantee preexisting rights: if people enter society, it is precisely because they donot have preexisting rights. We see clatly in the theory of prom: jae which Hume proposes how utility becomes a principle opposed to the contract Where isthe fundamental difference? Utility is on the side of the institution. The institution, unlike the law, is not a limitation but rather a model of actions, 4 veritable enterprise, an(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES invented system of postive means o a postive invention of indirect scans. This understanding ofthe institution effecvely reverses the problem: outside of the social chee lies the negative, the lack, or the nced. The social is profoundly ereative, inventive, ad positive. ‘Undoubtedly, we could say thatthe notion of convention maintane 2 great importance in Hume's wotk. But we rust not confase cone ‘vention and contact. Placing convention atthe base of the insiation Signiis only thatthe system of means tepeesented bythe insiation isa sytem indiec, oblique, and inventedin a word, cultural “In Tike manner are languages gradually eablish' by human conventions without any promise." Society is asc of conventions founded on wtiley, nota se of| obligations founded ona contract. Thus, from a socal point of view, the law is noe primary i presupposes an institution that it limits Similatly, the lepisator snot the one who legislate, but rather fest ofall the one who insite. The problem of the zelation between nature and society therefore ands on its head: there is no question any longer ofthe relation berween rights andthe law, but eather of needs andl insittions. This ea implies am entire remodeling of rights and an original vision ofthe science of humanity, that i, oF the new conception of paychosociology. Utilisy—that is, the relation tepween ination and edi thereto a ert prnepl Hume's ‘general rule is an institution. Moreover, if i i the case that the {general rule isa poitive and fanctional system finding its own prin- tiple in te, the nature of the link existing beeween i and the Principle of utility mast be understood... [F]ho" the rues of jus- tice ae establih'd merely by interes, thei connexion with interest is somewhat singular, and is diffrent from what may be obser'd "The fact that nature and society form an indisoluble complex shoold not make us forget that we cannot reduce society to nature. ‘The fact that humanity isan inventive species doesnot prevent oa inventions from being inventions. Sometimes Ueitatanism is given 4 “functionals” interpretation, on the bass of which society 8 ex- plained by utility, and ehe insitution by dives or needs. Perhaps, there have been writers holding this interpretation, although even thie isnot certaing at any rate, Hume ix ot at all dhe one wh held it Te isa face that a deive is satisfied inside an instiation. We speak (CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES here of specifically social institutions, not governmental institution. In martiage, sexuality is satisfied in property, greed. The institution, being the model of actions, is 2 designed system of possible satis. faction. ‘The problem is that this does not license us to conclude that the insticution is explained by the drive. ‘The institution isa systems of means, according to Hume, but these means are oblique a indirec; they do not satisfy the drive without also constraining it at the same time. Take, for example, one form of martiage, ot one system cof property. Why this system and this form? A thousand others, ‘hich we find in other times and places, are posible, The difference beeween instinct and institution is this! an insitation exists when the means by which a drive is satisfied are not determined by the drive itself or by specific characteristics, ‘These words, too, inheritance and contract, stand for ideas infinitely complicated; and to define them exactly a hundred volumes of laws, and a thousand volumes of commentators have not been found sufficient. Does nature, whose instincts {in men are all simple, embrace such complicated and arti. ficial objects and create a tational eeature without tasting anything to the operation of his reason? All bis ofthe same species, in every age and country, build their nes alike in this we se the force of instinct, Men, in different times and places, frame their houses differently: here we perceive the influence of reason and customs. Alike inference may be drawn from comparing the instinct of generation and the institution of property. Xe nature isthe principle of semblance and uniformity, so isthe sone of differences The dive is general it docs mt erga the partic, ven when eel finden he partclr the frm of is atslaction Tho’ the eablishment of tera, concerning the seailiy of possesion, be not only wef bur even able necessary to human society, con ever serve any purpone while irene in soch oneal era In bei, des noel he ntti. Piety does sot, since the init contin not does pubic wy fe day bec, sine i preappoes an enti isin worl tha(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES ‘eannot ereate, and to which itis only ateached.*” What could then ‘explain the instcution in is essence and in its particular character? Hume hae just told us that it is reason and customs; elsewhere he said that ie isthe imagination, “or the more frivolous properties of ‘our thought and conception." For example, i ito i i€ noe enough in order to become the owner of an abandoned city, to plant one's javelin in its gates?” We will not answer the question merely by ves and needs, but rather by examining the relations cumstance, and imagination, The javelin is the “Where the properties of two persons are united after such a manner as neither to admit of division nor sp zation, as when one builds a house on another's ground, that case, the whole must belong ... to the proprietor of the mos considerable part... The only difficulty is, what ‘ve shall be plear'd to call she most considerable pat, and most atractive to the imagination... The superficie yields tw the sol, says the civil lw: The writing to the paper: The canvas to the picture. These decisions do not well agre together, and are 2 proof of the contrariety of thore prin- ciples, fom which they are deviv'd® Without any doubt, the laws of association regulating the play ‘of the imagination are both the mort frivolous and the most sriots— the principle of reason and the advantage of the fancy. But for the moment, we need not be concerned with this problem. Ie suffices, ‘whatever the case, that we anticipate the following: the drive docs not explain the insiution; what explains itis the rflction ofthe drive in the imagination. We were quick to criticize assocationism; we forget too easily that ethnography brings us back to it, and ehat, as Bergson also says, “among the primitives, we encounter many pro- bibitions and prescriptions which are explained through a vague association of ideas." And this is not true only for the primitives. ‘Associations are vague, but only in the sense that chey are particular and varying according to the circumstances, Imagination is reweled 4 a veritable production of extremely diverse modele: when drives are reflected in an imagination submitted to the principles of as Cation, instiutions are determined by the fgates raved by te drives (CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES according to the circumstances, This does not mean that the imag nation isin its este active but only that it ring ont, and resonates ‘The institution is che figure. When Hume defines feeling, he asigns to it a double function: feeling posits ends and reacts to wholes, "These two functions, however, are one: there is feeling when the ‘ends ofthe drive are also the wholes to which sensibility reacts. But how are these wholes formed? They are formed when the drive and its ends ate reflected in the mind, Because human beings do not have instincts, because instincts do not enslave chem ta the actuality of a pute present, they have liberated the formative power of thei imag- ination, and they have placed their drives ina immediate and direct relation co it. Thus, the satisetion of human drives is related, not to the drive itself, but rather to the reflective drive. This is the ‘meaning of the institution, in its difference from the instinct. We can then conclude that nature and cultute, drive and instiation, are fone to the extent thae the one is satisfied by the other; but they are also «wo insofae asthe latter is not explained by the former, Similarly, with respeceo che problem of justice, the words “schema” and “totality” are entirely justified, since the general rule never in- dlicates particular persons; it does not name owners. Justice in her decisions, never regards the fitness or unfitness ‘of objects to parcicular persons... the general rule, chat posession mast be suble, is not apply'd by particule judg ‘ments, but by other general rales, which must extend io the ‘hole society, and be inflexible either by spite or favour" “We have seen that the rule is established by interest and utility, and cha itis determined by che imagination. In tis sense, it does not determine real people; iti determined and modified in statements reflecting situations and possible circumstances. This is how the sta- biliey of possession is divided herween diverse rights: immediate pos- session, occupation, prescription, accession, succession. But how can the lack of adeguation between real persons and possible situations bb corrected? This lack of adequation may itself be considered a cir- ccumstance or a situation. In that case, the mobility of persons will be regulated by the agreed-upon transfer, when the object of the {anser is present or particular, and by the promise, when the object(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES incl ig absent or general? We must therefore in the ese of the ene rule distinguish thre dimensions which are noethcess- ‘olaneow ts ished and rec "era fealty til present: synpaty,ehoyeh general eles, has won the constancy, distance, and tniformiy ofthe rue mor iment but ha lot in vividness oka i as gael in extension. "et consequences of very breach eq sem tie wey remote, and are notable 0 counterbalance any immediate advantage, that my be reap rom i™ “The quson isn longer how to speci ther but ater how vo pre fe with the vvudnes which ic aks, The gueston is wo Tanger haw co nibte but fw to fre ad elven justice Teves ot enough then to single ot by meas ofthe imagination the posible tations ofthe extension fasts his extension mast {lf become ow areal staan. In an artical way the nearest tmnt become che most distant, andthe most distant the nearest This ste meaning of government, Human beings “canot change theirqurre All hey can dos to change thie station and ender the oberance of joe the mm inert of some particular pons ap i vation het ore emo" “We ba here the principle fl serious political philosophy. True moat docs ot addres sce chiles inthe family but rather tol nthe sate, Te dss not nol the change of human mate bur the lnenion of atl and sbjecive conditions in oder for the bad spots of this nature ne to iamph. This imertion, for Hime, for the emieeighsensh cnery, wl Be poll and nly poll, The governors, "being said with cheirprse Shon inthe Sees" apprehend the general intrest under the Speco the immediate and understandjtce the good of thei Tks for them, the mse diane has become the nearest: Conners, che governed se the nearest become the mos tant, the extent thathey have “pu i out oftheir own power as far 8 posible, co tragic the laws of socket." Government and property ae thee- fone in almost the sme tclaton that Dele and abstraction 2 theater ae the question i about giving roles, and in the former tet abowtconleraingvivacty. Thus loyal complete te lst of ene uss At this eve, he theory of socal contract evitiz eer agai. There fh no question of fouling he generat cae the pme hon of the tet promis (CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES cea loyal, it sopport Jie and government have the same sour they ate iene to remedy sma ncomenences the one Simply inven extension the aren wines: Being subordinate o jt, che obseraton ofthe fw of promises i yee sme token Ind ona diferent level the efece ofthe inetaton of government, tori case" The support of tice therefore independent of specication, and is produced on enor plane Even soy or even more CTissupport mst be determined and rte nt for and ke the spent, mut though i corecton, make p for ck of aleuntion, The spclcatons of srreignty mil be long poe testo acenon cots, nd scsi. "Thecorecton of so Crigny wl bine and preci css eta ight rediance nda terain lyiumcy of relation, We must toc that the permite revolutions sr not pli n fc, he mai problem of the wate is mt» problem of teresentation, bu thera problem of belice The sate according 2 Flume, i no charged ith repe= scving the genta interes ut rater ith making the general i teescan ober of elie Iesuceeds inthis by giving geet nese tmealy though the mechanism of saetany the vvioes that only partial interes can hare fora nary the ler ead Of changing thir sation, and insead of seqiing an immedae Inretin the administration of atic, were to lec the amine isvoton of faleiied jnice to their own med pasion, then tnt only then would resistance be leptimate, inthe name of 3 general rules ‘pt nw, it sere of aes hs gven so interest an extension and 2 genera tha interest id oot hae on sown coogh his possesion has turned into propery, and stably of possesion ha En achieved A second serie of rls hat given the gener rule the prownce and vvides that tdi not hve by isle. Bot the chee which society had to conquer ae not ony the aniliy of gods and the abstract character of the gener interest. Society fr alo faced with seariy of good” And stably far fom si Imowotng this cbc aggravates father ar pies poseston wrth consons favorable forthe formation of large properties Fime often elaborates the idea chat by means of a nerd testi, property engenders and develope noua. A third sete fess hereforencesary to cone bth neuaity and erly “hse rules wl be the eof pita economy To the stability(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES of psteton and loyalty to government, the prosperity of commerce isadded at st The later “creer indy by comeing it edly from one member ofthe sate to mothe, na allowing tone of {pest or become esl Xiah espero Himes economic theory, ony its min theme willbe diced here. Like the ewo Kind of res preceding the Pgs of cme ale scl and cons st ‘ions, that iy monetary crcalaton, capital nest and expor Show ts elation with property. I cotettons, on the other band, show it tltion with the sat; that ian accent elton hich comms fm cute, Commerce prejpens ad inles a peer iting property: from an econo pois of view, lad renal pi sary. Fhe mang of come eel pt ed operty (politcal phenomenon) the economic yum that Sieh wm The of ro ges» ec ample. By ise "in sviizd and populated tatons,” propery fs the clas of landowners Beto face mith che peasant cay, the Former cetng a ontinnoas “demand fr borowing "and theater noc having the money nccesary “eo supply this demand.” The prog: tes of commer ovromes this contradiction between {00 ay Isa and too ew chen, informing a “copia nee, an “Bepeting) » numberof lenders and sing] the rate of wary = {As forthe ration beeen commerce andthe sate, we wl beer tcestd i prnipe fe clic thatthe prnperty of commerce cumulates 2 working capil allowing forthe ese ad bappiness Of the sates Rough these can lay caso ed demand Sd eck thi capital for ill 1 lm an nm since blige the tourer oo inode fo te fom hen tor tian wt suits Kil and aay. Pari hin th manatee and commode, and he wll do iat satan you wil ed ey ec some prt otis Lou sad employe pbc, Sithot ng him woe etn TThe state without method or rule acts brusquely and violently. Tes actions ate repeated accidents imposed upon its subjects, and con (CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES teary therefore to human matte, Inthe methodical sate, on the Contay, there appar an etice cheer of the aecden ss the aie ‘of comecie ales this ate nds in commerce the posible ae, ‘ation of ts power andthe real condition of subject prosperity in this way, they both conform to nature We have often noticed tht inthe work of Hume and the wii trian, como and politcal nspiaion cif geal. Th his Book cn wtltainism* Halvy distinguishes tee cates the natal fasion of meres (ympatis) in ethics the aia inten of interests in polticg andthe mechanical identity of inert in economics. We have in fact seen how these ‘three current relate. Esa of ally we ae oe cononed with thee currents, We should alto noice thatthe mechani of she economy sm les artifal than the artifice oflgiation. Commer no less han property i an instiotion; andi prenppscs property. But the economy me ae to, has no need of legilator of of 4 sate, Undoubeediy eis petiod, athe dawn of the development of apis, had no seen = bad only sometimes dimly frecen thar the interes of in rer capitalist and bowel works donot cof none sad thesame interest We must, however, sek the germ of sch an dea, conctte 2 it may be in ater tespcety in an ea which appears Frequently in Hume's work. Property, acoding to him, peta problem of quant: goods ae scarce, and they are unstable Beatie they ae rare Thi athe reason why propery cal fora egter anda sate. On the contary, the quan of mency ts aboedance ar seacty, does nt acto ts ovat mancy isthe cjg of 4 mes hans. We cold sy hate cent o perhaps the only theme of Hume's economic ety i to show thatthe fees which we ‘ordinal abate to te quant of money depend in fat on oes Causes, What is conte in tht economy i the dea tha conome activity involves a qualitative motivation. Dut sensitive tothe dik ference between commerce aad property, from » quantative pot of vin Hume concludes eat, nso the qantas haetemy of economic activities i mechanically eased, ule what hap pen in the ase of property In view of allthis, we an et up the table of general rules or smo category follows(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES 1, Content of the general rue: the #a- Biliy of possession; 2, Specification of the general rlessim- mediate posession, ‘ceupation, exes 3. Correction of the preceding speci- fistion by means of general rules, prom ise, transfer 1. Suppoee of the general tule: loyalty to the goweenment; 2. Specification of suppor: long posses: 3. Correction: 1. Complement of the general rule: the prosperity of com- 2. Specification of the complement: monetary circu tion, capital, etc 3. Cortection: THREE THE POWER OF THE IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE Sonsrrates Hun savs thatthe general rule i in esence the com. ination of reflection and extension. The fact is thatthe two at ‘dential. The passions ate extended because they are reflected: this in che principle ofthe institution ofa role. Buta other times Hare says that we mast distinguish between two kinds of non-identical rules, chats, beewecn determing and corrective cules, because the former are more extensive than refiective ‘Men are mightily addicted to goneral rls, and... we often catty our maxims beyond those reasons, which fst indue'd ‘9 to establish them. Where cates are similar in many cit cumstances, we are apt to put them on the same footing, without considering, that they differ in the most material ‘These rules are characterized by the fact that they are extended Iheyond the circumstances from which they arise. They do not ac- count for the exception, and they miscoasteue the accidental, con fusing it with the general or the essential: the disadvantages of cul wre are to be found here, As far as the second kind of rules is concerned, tha is, the corrective rules, they ate mote efltive thanIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE extensive, precisely because they cortect the extension of the deter- ‘mining rules. Instead of confusing the accidental with the general, they present themselves as general rules concerned with the acci= dental and with the exceptional. [Gleneral rules commonly extend beyond the principles, on ‘hich they ae founded; and... we seldom make any ex- ception to them, unless that exceprion have che qualities of general rule, and be founded on very numerous and com- Corrective rules express a status of experience that accounts for all possible cases, in the last resort, the exception is a natural thing, and by means of habie and imagination, it becomes the object of ‘experience and knowledge (savoir), that is, che object of easuistcs. ‘We ate confronted here with two ideas in need of reconciliation: ‘extension and rellection are identical, but they are also different. ‘Two kinds of rules are distinguished, co the extent that they go against each other, nonetheless they have the same origin and sh the same principle of constitution. We are thus led back to the mait, problems: how isthe rule possible? If we begin with unity, the rule is simultancously the extension and the reflection of the passions. The passions ate reflected; but where and in what? They are reflected in the imagination. The general rule i passion a reflected in the imagination. Undoubtedly, the qualities of the passions, being principles of nature, have as theit special characteristic affecting and qualifying the mind: but, ¢ versely, the mind reflects its pastions and affections, [}verything which is agreeable tothe senses, isalso in some measure agreeable tothe fancy, and conveys to the thought an image of that satisfaction, which ic gives by its real ap- plication to the bodily organs” Bing tected, the pasion are found before an enlarged rpeo- davttolthensies falc hemes berate Hea and condos ofthis own ati. They e, the iii domain opening up that he word of ele hyean prc themueles ine eheagh images ad deploy themes wit IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE. cut limit. The seflectd intrest transcends sown parity. This tens thatthe imagination, filled withthe images ache psinm tnd their objets, suites a eof pasos belonging ti In ‘elesion, the passions agin thetic, an she agiaton Be Comes paonte: thera i pose Te el definon of» general Tue thei 4 pasion Of the imagination. “The imagination ‘heres to the gee viows of hing In ths enc, we may dinguith he types of rules. The ale of tase fst We encounter the sane problem ete ns irene how dos fesing overcome i incanstancy and becomes aesthetic judgment? The pasion ofthe imagination do nov rete eiieney oftheir objector do they tei the King of atapeion which character of val objects, “These pasion ave moved by degrees of liveliness and engthy which ate nero to fli and indepen. den of the real exten of he objects Virwe fin agy tl ‘ita adeserte bt fertile eds oink aout the pps oF ts posible inhabitants “Seatiments mst touch the heat make hem contol oot pasion Dat they need ot extend eyo the Smuinaion, so mae them jnence our tate? “Tus, ue feng of he iagination, ot of he heat. Is 2 ule, and what grounds ale in generals the dsntion between ower and the ekercbe of powerOnly the imagination can tng thi abou, since eee oth the pasions and thes sje sep sztng them from decay so ecaperting them in heme of the pole, Aesthetic the scence which envioges hing nd beings ner te egy of power or posi. A undhome an in prison for lif isthe ojo of sm asthe gent not only tects the vigor ao balance of his body ae spate fom tte natural exec and thos simply imagine, bala becuse the age ination iin hice Ect by thove characeiins lume de ‘elos this thesis even more peeily inthe ease of taped The problem hee this hw is thatthe spectacle of pasos, which fein themes digrecble and ble, tan com to delight ws? The mote the poet knows how to ae, hori a mike ws in ign, "the ore fe] ae dlighed Aw as Hume oerve in caticzing a thesis proposed by Fontenelle ii not enough to ay ‘hae passions in ages ae sinplyfstous and weakened Ths is amamoun to seing only one side of he sluion, the negative sal Tse yore sk, Therein dierence of degre beeencealty and ar the dfeence in degre it the onion of diference is nate “Ie thus the Bion of tragedy sofen the pasion, by an infison of anew feeling, ot merely by weskening or disin- ishing the socom." Tes at enough forthe pasion to imagine lf the imagination ant alto become passionate atthe same ime. Tragedy, bese Sageran image of passions, provides the spectator’ magiaton with paste, Just the reflected inset anscends paral, 30 felted psions change quality the snes and esknes ofthe tepresened pustions ate eliminated inthe pleaste of the almose int play ofthe imagination The work of art has therefore own paviulr mode of existence, which i ot the mode of steal ehject noc the mole of an actual pasion the leer degree of belief ithe onion for another kind o belie. Ace has sown belie ‘As for the cod type of rle—tk re of fedom-—e fel that sn willy which ind of paston, “owes Ely every way and produces an image of ivelf even on that side, on which tdi noe wale lly, we are fed withthe rae ofits end dy. "Two objects may be consider as placid inthis relation, ax well when one isthe cause of any ofthe actions or motions of the other, as when the Former isthe cause of the existence fof the latter... A master is such-a-one as by his situation, arising either from force or agreement, has a power of dic recting in certain particulars the actions of anther, whom wwe call servant ume analyse wth prcion on more example ofthe rlton ase ondary, that isthe relation hick Hinks» wife oa hushand ‘San sett eal pasion, a wife cannot give othe on who loves perc ceresinty and seury: natomy relaes the husband an ever be sure thatthe childcare his own.” Reflected inthe image Itai, hi uncertainty becomes subimated, takes on soc ad Calor content, and appears the resuiement for spiel fe inine vues »"wom, tothe extent that she i the object of oosble pasion, rae alway ena chase, mode, and decent And when a general rule of this itd is once establish’, men ate apt eo extend it bryos principls, fem whit IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE ic first arose. Thus batchelors, however debauch’'d, cannot chuse but be shook’d with any instanceof lewdness or im- pence in women.” Iris therefore the imagination that makes the reflection of pusions posible. The general rie i che resonance of an afetion in the mind and che imagination, Rles efor processes and ideas of prac fice. We mas therefore modify out fist scheme, which was til 00 simple, Esler we sw thatthe principles of natare an the qualities of putions had to beside solely im etme of their effect on the tind. However, this effect is only the fact that the imagination is 2cced and ied itis asimple effec. But now we see that we must adds complex effec: the imagination reflects fection, and afecton Tesounds inside the mind. The min ceases tobe fancy, fixed, al becomes human nacure, However, insofar ai reflects the affections which fx it the mind i ill a fancy on another level and in anew sway. The fancy is revablished inthe principles of is own erans- formation, fora leat somthing withn the afections escapes all selection That which defines the real exercise ofthe affections, the actuality of hei limits, and the ation by means af which actions fixthe mind in specific forms i precly thar which cannot, without contradiction, allow itself o be rellecte, Imagination, as reflects on che forms of sown stability, liberates these forms and liberates itelffom them; it extends them infil. Ths means that it makes the lis an ject of the fancy, i plys withthe limit by presenting the accidental as esentily and separates power fom its actual x= excise. Ths illason, ays Hlume, an ilaion of the fang. The power of the imagination isto imagine power. In shor, the pasion to not refer therseles inthe imagination without the imagination extending the passions. The general rule ithe absolute unity ofthe ‘fletion ofthe passions in the imagination and the extension of the tatvons by the imagination. In his meth rfltion and xeon Bt ii also in this sense that they are ewo, since subsequent corrections sre necessary in onder to exis a igor inthis new domain This ime, the reflection will be arellectiono the previous tflection of if you wil onthe reflected intrest. But why isi that, in both cases, the same work “rection” is wsed Tis bec, in tur prviows dicuon, the extension wat aleady 4 conection it tramende he patialty ofthe natural passion. But, beses edIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE ‘ot transcend nature without confusing esence and accident it called for a new correction of, and within, the new, important order it instituted, Infact, tis aot enough to think the artifice oaly through fancy, frivolity, and illusion, forthe artifice is also the serious world ‘of culture. The distinction between nature and culture is precisely the distinction between simple and complex effects. Hume, through- ‘out his work, shows a constant interest in the problems of animal psychology, pethaps because che animal is nacute without culture: the principles act upon its mind, but eheir only effect is a simple effect. Not having general rules, being held by the instinct to the actual, lacking any stable fancy and reflective procedures, the animal also lacks history. This is precisely the problem: bow to expla that, in the case of humanity, culeure and history ate constituted in che ‘way thatthe fancy is reestablished, ehrough the resonance of affec- tions within the mind. How can ie explain this union of the most Fivolous and the most serious? ‘We have seen that, insofar asthe passions are reflected, chey nec- cessarily reflect themselves within the fan. But, in fact, they resonate ‘within 2 fancy which is already settled, affected, and naturalized. Evidently, the fancy is noe setled by ehe qualities of the pasions bur rather by those other principles of nature (the modes of asso- ciation) which operate on a diferent level. ‘This isthe reason why the rule determines itself. Only on this condition, the passions are able to trace effectively constant and determined figare in the imag ination. Hume exprestly indicates that “nature provides 1 remedy in the judgment and understanding, for what is ireegular and incommo- dlious in the affections." ‘Aleeady in the case of aesthetics, the passions reflect themselves through the principles of association, so that these principles provide a detailed account of the rules of composition: “every kind of com= position, is nothing but a chain of propositions and reasonings.””” Similarly, as we have seen, the rules of property, occupation, acces- son, and succession are’ determined through’ the principles of ‘A person, who has hunted a hare to che lst degrce of weat= iness, wou'd look upon it san injustice for another 1 rush in before him, and seize his prey. But the same porn, advancing to pluck an apple, that hangs within his wuclh, IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE has no reason to complain, ifanother, more alert, pases him, and takes possession. What is the reason for this difference, bur chat immobility, not being natural tothe hare, bu che effect of industry, forms in that case a strong relation wih the huner, which is wanting in the other? ‘The entire domain of the righe is ascociationist. We expect that an arbitrator ora judge would apply the association of ideas and decree to which person or entity a thing is related inside the mind of an observer in general. "Tis the general opinion of philosophers and civilians, that the seas incapable of becoming che property of any nation; and chat because 'tis impossible to take possession of it, oF form any such distinc relation wih it 2s maybe the foun dation of property. Where this reason ceases, property im= _meditely takes place Thus the most trenaous advocates for the liberty of the seas universally alls, that friths and bays naturally belong as an accession to the proprietors of the surrounding continent. These have properly no more bond. for union with the land, than ehe pucifc ocean wou'd have, bbue having an union in the fancy, and being at the same time inferior, they are of course regarded as an accession.” In other words, with respect to the determination of the rules of property and with respect to the understanding of history, che imag- {nation makes essential use of the principles of association: in fact, its norm isthe easy transition.» Thus, the imagination, in the unity thar ie forms with the simple effect of the principles of association, has really the ar ofa constitutive imagination: iis quasi-constitive. ‘But, one should not forget that, even in this case, iis the fancy which, in the end, invokes the principles of association: having been, in the case of knowledge, setled by the principles, it now uses them to determine and explain in deni the world of culture. One then sees the fundamental link beeween artifice and fancy, ot the part phyed by the most serious and the most frivolous... Tsugpect, thar these rules are principally ix'd by che imagination, or the more Ativslous property of our ehoughe and conception.” Moree, the reasons that makes up the hg I serueture of aIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE ‘work is specious and merely plausible; “however disguised by the colouring of the imagination,” it can still be recognized. Behind the determined content ofthe rules of properey and sovereignty, the fancy pokes through; even more clearly, it declares itself in favor of the weaknesses of these rules, or of their mutual oppositions.” This is why there are trials, or why juridical discussions can be endless ‘Thus, in the case of occupation, namely in ehe case ofthe city and the javelin, "I ind the dispute impossible to be decided .. . because the whole question hangs upon the fancy, which in this ease is not possessid of any precise or determinate standard, upon which it can give sentence." Inthe lst analysis, the historian is perplexed. His perplexity links up with the skepticism of the philosopher and completes i. This is the reason why the determination of the rale must be cometed; ie must Ibecome the object ofa second rellection, of a casistcs anda theory of the acidental. We must il ehe gap between the principles ofthe understanding and the new domain where the fancy applies them, ‘Acany rate che illusion ofthe fancy is the reality of culeure. The reality of culture is an illusion from the point of view of the un- derstanding, but it asserts itself within a domain where the under- standing can not, and should not, seek to disipate illusion. For ex- ample, the necessity ofan action, such 2s the understanding conceives it, is neither a quality of the action nor 2 quality of the agen; itis 2 quality of the thinking being which considers it. To the extent that we, the agents, in performing the action, can not feel any ne- cessity, we inevitably believe ourselves free.” In this sense, the ile lusion is no less real than the understanding which denounc culture is a false experience, but itis also a true experime “understanding has the right to exercise its critique only if we unduly transform the powers of culture into real entities, and only if we give real existence to general rules# Otherwise, the understanding can do nothing. It allows its principles of association to be borrowed in order for the world of eultute to be determined. In this cas, it cortects the extension that these principles assume and composes an cntire theory of the exception, although the exception itself forms a part of culture, ‘The cote ofthe problem is to be found in the relations between the passions and the imagination. The determination of these eelations IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE constitutes the true originality of che theory of passions. Indeed, ‘whats the simple relation berween the imagination and the passions which will permit the latter to develop inside the former a complex effect? The principles of the passions, like the modes of association, transcend the mind and fx it. "Unless nature had given some original 4ualites to the mind, it cou'd never have any secondary ones; because in that ease it wou'd have no foundation for action, nor cou'd ever begin to exert itself” But the qualities of the pasions do noe fix the imagination in the way the modes of association do, The modes of association give the ideas possible reciprocal relations, while the qualities of the passions give the relations a direction and a sens; they attribute them with a reality, a univocal movement, and hence with a first term. The self, for example, is ehe object of pride and humility in virewe of a natural and original property which confers a tendency or a dispo- sition upon the imagination. The idea, or rather the impression of the self, ficwes the mind.” “If a person be my brother I am his likewise: But tho’ the relations be reciprocal, they have very different cffects on the imagination.” The imagination passes easily from the farthest co the nearest, from my brother to me, but not from me to my brother. And here is another example: “men are principally concern'd about those objects, which are not much remov'd either in space or time. .. 2 Moreover, the tendency of the imagination is to move from the present to the foture: “We advance, rather than retard our exist- ence." We see how both kinds of affectons—relation and passion— situate themselves vis-i-vis each other: association links ideas in the imagination; the passions give a sense to these relations, and thus they provide the imagination with a tendency. It follows, therefore, that the passions need somehow the assaciation of ideas, and con versely, that the association presupposes the passions. Kdeas get as- sociated in virtue of a goal, an intention, or a purpose which only the passions can confer upon human activity. We associate our ideas because we have passions. There is therefore a mutual implication bbeeween the passions and the association of ideas. "Tis observable,” says Hume, “of these two kinds of association,” that is, of the as- sociation of ideas in knowledge and the association of impressions in the passions, “that they very much assist and forward each ‘other... "Ths the imagination follows the tendency which theIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE passions give it; the relation that they suggest, by becoming univocal, has been made real Ie is a simple component part, a circumstance of the passions. This is che simple effect of the passions on the imagination. Bot once again, the imagination is that in sehich the passions, cogether with their circumstances, reflect themselves through the principles of association. In this manner, they constitute general rules and valorize things which are very distant, beyond the tendency of the imagination, And this is the complex effect: of one hhand the possible becomes real, but on the other, the real is reflected ‘Are we not, then, at this point capable of solving the problem of | the self, by giving 2 sense to Hume's hope? We are indeed capable of stating what the ides of subjectivity is, The subject is not a quality but rather the qualification of a collection of ideas. To say that the ‘imagination is ated by principles amounts to saying that a given collection is qualified as 8 partial, actual subject. The idea of sub- jectiviey is from then on the reflection of the affection in the imag- ination andthe general rule itl. The idea is no longer here the object of a thoaghe of the quality of a thing; itis not representational. It isa governing principle, a schema, rule of construction. Transcend- ing the partiality of the subjece whose idea it is, the idea of subjec- tivity includes within each collection under consideration the prin- ciple and the rule of a possible agreement between subjects, Thus, the problem of the self, insoluble a the level of the understanding, finds, uniquely within culture, 2 moral and political solution. We saw that origin and affection could not be combined within the self because, at this level, there subsist a great difference between prine ciples and the fancy. That which constitutes now the self is the synthesis of the afection and its reflection, the synthesis of an af fection which fxes the imagination and of an imagination which reflects the affection. Practical reason isthe establishment of a whole of culture and mo- rality. That this whole can be presented in detail does not contradict this statement, because itis a decal of general determinations and not of parts.” How can this whole be established? The schematizing ‘nnagination makes it posible, to the extent that the schematisi man. ifestsand translates three properties of the imagination: imagination is reflective, essentially excessive, and quasi-consitutive. Bu, a¢ the ‘other end, theoretical reason is the determination of the detail of nature, that is, of parts submitted to calculation, IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE How is this determination possible? Surely itis not possible the way the establishment of the whole of cultare and morality is, for swe have seen that the system of the understanding and the system ‘of morality do not represent parallel affections of the mind, There fore schematiem must exist which is peculiar to theoretical reason, Schematism, in this case, would no longer be the principle of con- struction of a whole but rather the principle of the determination ‘of patts. The role of the principles of association isto fx the imag ation. But astociation, unlike the passions, has no need to be re- flected in order to calm itself, or in order to constituce reason. Tt is immediately calm, and “operates secretly and calmly on the mind."*” Tn this sense, reaton is imagination chat has become mature: itis the totality of the simple effects of association, general ideas, s stances, and relations. But then, since there are ewo kinds of relations, there are two kinds of reason. In the case of the relations between ideas, we must distinguish between those that “depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together” (resemblance, relations of ‘quantity, degrees of quality, contariety) and the relations of objects, Which "may be chang'd without any change in the ideas” (telations , of time and place, identity, causality). Similarly, we most distin= guish between two kinds of reason: the reason that proceeds on the Bass fein Gaston and demonstration)” and the rayon that proceeds in terms of probabilities" (experimental reason, nderstand= ing" Undoubtedly, these two kinds of reason are merely two dif- ferent uses of reason, in view of two kinds of relations, and must have a common root—comparitn. It would scem to follow that the convictions they generate (certainty and belief) are not without re= lation co reach other,* despite the fact chat they remain distinct. For cexample, once we have shown that causality is not the object of certainty or knowledge, the question remains whether or not the understanding, whose object itis, produces it, or whether or not causality is derived from probability-* The answer to this lst ques- tion would still be negative, bue the arguments which support cis new negation lead us ar the same time, to understand the difference between the two dimensions of reason “The principe from which the causal relation is derived a an effect hhas a gradual formation. Here, human nature does not by itself produce ‘esffet [Cham any one give the ultimate reason, why past experience inl observation provinces such an effect, any more than why nature Prone if?" According to Fame, human nature takes,IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE the detour of the observation of nature, or of an experience of na~ ture~and this isthe essential. “As the habit, which produces the association, arses from the frequent conjunction of object, it must arrive at is perfection by degrees, and must acquire new force from cach instance, that falls under our observation." ‘We can sce clearly 2 cis point why causality cannoe be derived from probability.” Actually, we must designate cvery determined degree of habit asa probability * without forgetting that probability presupposes habit a a principle. This presupposition is based on the face chat each degece of habie i, in relation to an object, the mere presumption of the existence of another object like the one which habiualy accompanies the first objct.® The patadox of habit is that ies formed by degrees and aso that itis a principle of human nature: “habit is nothing bat one of the principles of nature, and derives all its force from that origin." ‘The principle is the habit of contracting habits. A gradual for- mation, to be specifi, is a principle, 2s long, as we consider it in a general way. In Hume's empiricism, genesis i always understood in terms of principles, and itself a a principle. To derive causality from probability ist confuse the gradual formation of a principle upon ‘which reason depends with the progress of reasoning. In fac, &x- perimental reason is che resule of habit—and not vice versa. Habit is the oot of reason, and indeed the principle from which reason stems aan effect ‘other use, however, that is in the domain of the relations of ideas, reason is determined immediately by the corresponding principles, without a gradval formation and under the sole influence . The famous texts on mathematics have precisely ® Similarly, the definition ofthe relations of ideas, the relations depend entirely on ideas that we compare to one another,” doesnot mean that asoition is here, mare than eewhere, «quality ofthe ideas themselves, nor that mathematics isa system of analytic judgments. Whether as relations of ideas or as telations of objects, relations are always external to their terms. ‘What Hume means is ths: principles of human nature produce in the mind relations of ideas as they act “on thee own" om ideas. This is different from what happens in the case of the three relations berween objects, where the very observation of nature acts 3. pi ciple. To the logic of mathematics, which we shal discuss later on, IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE there muse therefore be justaposed a logic of physics or oF existence, and only general rules will bring about the later effectively.°* From ‘the point of view of relations only physics is the object ofa schematism.* ‘To say that a principle of nature—in this case, habit—is formed ‘gradualy isto say, in the frst place, chat experience is itself a prin- ciple of nature, Experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several conjunctions of objects forthe past. Habits another principle, which determines me to expect the same for the future; and both of them conspir(e] to operate upon the imagination... ‘We must also note that habit is principle diferent from experience, although it also presupposes it Asa matter of fac, the habit T adopt wll never by itself explain the fact chat I adope a habit a repetition will ever by itself form a progression. Experience causes us ab- serve particule conjunctions. Its essence isthe eepetition of similar cases, ts effet is causality 28 a philosophical relation. This is how imagination turns into understanding. However, this doce not yet exphin how the understanding i able to make an inference of to reason about causes and effects. The ral content of eawsaity—tege istcred by the term “always"—cannot be constituted in experienc, because, in a seme, i consieutes experience» One instance of rex soning does not render reasoning possible; nor is reasoning imme diately given inthe understanding, The understanding mst, from a principle other than experience, derive the faculty of drawing conclusions from experience, and abo of tanscending experience dnl making inference. Repetition by itself does noe constitute pro- fresion, nor does it form anything. The repetition of similar eases des nat move vs forward, since the only diference between the second case and the fist is thatthe second comes aftr the fist, ‘without displaying a new idea." Habit isnot the mechanics of quan tity. “Had ideas ‘no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have to the understanding, we cou'd never draw any inference from Cases to efets, nor repoe bli in any mater of Fat”™ "This isthe reason why habit appears 3b another principle and cowsality as 1 tural telation oF as an association of idea.” The cite of this onher principle ise tuen imagination ino beliefIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE thanks to the transition made from the impression of an object 0 the idea of another. Thus, a double implication is sketched out. On ‘one hand, habit allows the understanding to reason about experience, as it transforms belief into a possible act of the understanding. “. [Mlemory, senses, and understanding,” says Hume, “are, there- fore, all of them founded on the imagination or the vivaity of our ideas."* On the other hand, habie presupposes experience: once theit conjunction is discovered, objects are linked together in the imagi- nation. We could even say that habit is experience, insofar as it ‘produces the idea of an object by means of the imagination and not bby means of the understanding? Repetition becomes a progression, ‘or even a production, when we no longer see it in relation to the ‘objects repeated, because, if we do it changes, discovers and produces nothing. Itbecomes a production as soon 38 we see it from the point of view of the mind which contemplates it, for it produces a new impression init, “a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another" and “to teansfer the past o the fucue,"™ that js, an anticipation or a tendency. The fac is that experience and hubie are cwo different principle; they stand alternatively for the presentation of eases of constant conjunction to the inspecting mind, and for the union of these cases inside the mind which observes them, Because of this, Hume always gives causality two related def- inivions: causality is che union of similar objects and also a mental inference from one object to another.” ‘An analogy scems to be imposed between artifice (moral wotld) and habit (world of knowledge). These two instances, inside the coteesponding worlds, ate at the origin of general rules which are both extensive and corrective. But they do not function in the same sway. In the system of morality, the mules are invited 0 reflect in general the principles of nature in che imagination. Bu, inthe system ‘of knowledge, the condition of these rules is located in the very particular character of a principle, not only insofar as it presupposes ‘experience (or something equivalent to experience) but also insofar asi must be formed. Yet we would say that naturally chs formation has its own laws which define the legitimate exercise of reasoning, understanding. We have seen that the formation of principle was the principle of a formation. Belief, says Hume, ie the effect of the principles of a prudent nature. The idea we below i, by definition, the idea associated with a present impression, the idea therefore that IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE fixes the imagination, or the idea to which the impression com ‘municates its vividness, This communication is undoubtedly 1 forced through resemblance and contiguity” but i¢ finds its lw essentially in causality and habit. In the final analysis ie finds ie law in the repetition of cases of constant conjunction of two objects ‘observed through experience. However, this is precisely where the dificult lies. Hebi itself isa principle diferent fom experience the anity” of experience and habit it mot giver Dy itself, habit can feign or invoke a false experience, and bring about belief through “a repetition” which "is not deriv'd from ex- perience." This will be an illegitimate belief, a tion of the imag- ‘nation, “The custom of imagining a dependence has the same effect as the custom of observing it wou'd have.” Thus, the imagination will not allow itself to be fixed by the principle of habit, without ar the same time using habit for the purpose of passing of its own fancies, transcending its fixity and going beyond experience. --[T]hishabie not only approaches in its influence, but even om _many occasions prevails over that which arise from the constant and inseparable union of causes and effects." ‘Beliefs produced in this manner, albeit illegitimate from the point of view ofa rigorous exercise of the understanding, no matter how inevitable that may be, form the set of general, extensive, and ex- cessive rules that Hume cals nonphilosophical probability. “An Irish~ ‘man cannot be witty, a Frenchman cannot have solidity." Hence, despite firse appearances, the understanding cannot count upon na- ture for the immediate determination of the laws ofits legitimate exercise. These laws can only be the product of correction and re- Aection; the second series of general rules will stem from them. Only when the understanding, through a new operation, resumes the act of belief and holds it together with its principle within the limits cof past experience will the legitimate conditions of belief be rec- ‘ognized and applied; only then will they form the rules of phil sophical probability or the calculus of probabilities, (In this sense, the ‘extensive rules of the passions, in the moral world, must be corrected assoon as they have been determined by che principles of association. ‘They must be corrected not only because, a8 it happens, these prin- ples have been involved and aetivated by the fancy on a level which was not their owns they must be corrected because causality has sheady, by itself and on is own level, a fanciful, extensive use. TheIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE understanding is able to cortect the extensive rules of the passions and to question itself on the nature of morality, because it must first of all correct the extension of knowledge itself) Illegitimate beliefs or repetitions which are not based on expe- rience, 5 well a nonphilosophical probabilities, have two sour language and the fancy. These are ftiious causaites. Language, by itself, produces belief, as it substitutes observed repetition with spo ken repetition, and the impression ofa present object with the hear- ing of a specific word which allows us to conceive ideas vividly. “[W]e have a remarkable propensity to believe whatever is reported, even concerning apparitions, enchantment, and prodigies, however contrary to daily experience and observation.”"" The philosopher, having spoken continuously of faculties and occult qualities, ends up believing that these words “have a secret ‘meaning, which we might discover by reflection." The liar, having continuously repeated his own lies, ends up believing them.” Not only is credulity thus explained by the power of words, but also education,” eloquence, and poetry. We have been s0 much accusom’d to the names of mans, surevan,vanus, that inthe same manner as education infxes any opinion, the constant repetition of these ideas makes them enter into the mind with faeiliy, and prevail upon the fancy... The several incidents of the piece acquire a kind of relation by being united into one poem or representation; and the vivacity produc by the fancy isin many cases ‘greater than that which arses from custom and experience. In brief, words produce a “phantom of belief" or a “counter- feit,"" which renders the most severe critique of language philo- sophically necessary. Moreover, the fancy makes us confuse the es sential and the accidental In face, the counterfeit character of beliefs depends always on an accidental characteristic: depends not on the relations berween objects but on “the present cemper and disposition of the person." The fancy interptets the appearance of merely ac- cidental circumstances accompanying an object as the repetition of this object within experience. Thus, for example, in the case of ‘man suffering from vertigo, “the cizcumstances of depth an descent strike so strongly wpon him, that heir influence cate he destroy IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE by the contrary citcumstances of support and solidity, which ought to give him a perfecr security.”™* ‘Thus, in the field ofthe understanding and in the field of morality, the imagination is essentially exceeding. However, we can see the difference. When knowledge is exceeded, we no longer find the positivity of art; we find only the negativity of errors and lie. This is the reason why correction will no longer be the instication of a qualitative rigor, but rather the denunciation of error with the help of a calculus of quantities. In the world of knowledge, and in the cease of the understanding, extensive rules are no longer the obverse of reflection ofthe principles in the imagination; they only translate the imposibility ofa preventive reflection bearing on the principe. 2 [W]hen we have been accustom'd to see one object united to another, our imagination passes from the fist to the second, by a natural transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by — ‘The imagination is able to believe only by falsifying belie in the confusion of the accidental and the general. Habit is a principle ‘which cannot invoke experience without falsifying it, or without, at che same time, invoking fictitious repetitions. Hence, the necessity of am ulterior reflection which can only present ite a a correction, a subtraction, a second kind of rules, oF asa criterion for a quantified disenction beeween the general andthe accidental... [T]hese rules ate form’d on the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects." ‘The object of philosophical probability or ofthe caleulus of prob- abilities i to maintain belief within the limits ofthe understanding and to ensure conformity between abit and experience. Habit and ‘experience ate the means by which fictions and prejudices are dis- sipated. In other words, reasoning, in order to be absolutely legiti- mate, must be born of habit “no dircaly ... but in an oblique manner." Undoubtedly, che characteristic of belief, inference, and reasoning is to transcend experience and to transfer the past to the future; but itis still necessary that the object of belief be determined im accordance with a past experience. Experience is partes extra pate, ‘objects are separated in the understanding... [When we transfer the past to che future, the known to the unknown, every past ex- periment has the same weight, and ... tis only a superior number of chem, which can throw the balance on any side.™*IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE ‘We must determine the number of past experiences, and also the ‘opposition between pats and their quantitative ageecment. To be- Iteve isan act ofthe imagination, inthe sense thatthe concordant images prevented by the understanding or the concordant pats of ature ground themclves upon one and the same idea in the imag ination. This idea mas sil nd its content and also the measure of its vividness, in the greatest numberof similar pats offered separately by the understanding ‘The necesity af critique of rules by rules is therefore confirmed. “The dificlty i that both kinds of rule, extensive and corrective, onphilosophical and philosophical probability, insofar as they “are ina manner set in opposition to each other," ae the effect of one and the same principle: habit. They have the same origin. "The following of general rules ia very unpilosophical species of prob- able: and yet tis only by following them che we can correct his, and al other unphilosophical probabiitis."™ However, because habit isnot, in itself and by itself, confined to the repetition of cates observed within experience, since other rep- -ettions can frm it equally well, the adequation between habit and experience ia scientific resul that must be obtained, and the abject ofa tak that mast he accomplished. This task is ccomplished to the extent thar che act of tlie bea exclsiely pon an object being determined in accordance with the natuee of the understand ing, and in accordance with repetitions observed in experience” “This determination constzues the sense of corrective rules: the later recognize causality in the detail of nature, they allow us to know ‘when objets “become causes or effects," and they denounce, a8 consequence illegitimate belief In brief, habit has opposite effects ‘pon the imagination and onthe judgment on one hand, extension, ad othe other, the corzection ofthis extension. FOUR GOD AND THE WORLD Ir we wane to look for an example which would bring together all the significatons that we have successively attributed to general rales, ‘we would find icin religion. Four kinds of rule must be distinguished: ‘extensive and corrective rules of passions, and extensive and cottec- tive rules of knowledge. Now, rel ates equally in knovl- ‘edge and in pasion. In fact, religious feeling has two poles: po- Iytheism and theism, The bwo corresponding sources ate the qualities of the passions and the modes of association, respectively. Theism has its source inthe unity ofthe spectacle of natu, in other words, in the sort of unity which only resemblance and causality can guar- antee in phenomena. Polytheism has its source in the diversity of the passions and the irreducibility of sucessive passions. Furthermore, religion, in each of these cases, is presented as a system of extensive rules. Although the religious feeling finds its source in the passions, itis not itself a passion. Ie isnot an instinct, says Hume, nora primitive impression of nature, Unlike self-esteem or sexuality, ic is not naturally devcemined; rather itis a subject of historical sudy.? The gods of polytheism are the echo, the exten and the reflection ofthe passions, and their heaven is our imagination ‘nly To this sense, we encounter once mote the characteristic of the extensive rule: religious feeling, confuses the accidental with theGOD AND THE WORLD ‘essential. Is origin is in che events of human life, in the diversity and the contradiction we find in it, and inthe alternation of happiness and unhappiness, of hopes and fears.” The religious feling is awak- ‘ened in the strange encounters which we make inthe sensible world, and in che exceptional and fantastic circumstances or the unknown phenomena which we (mis)take for essence, precisely because they are unknown." This confusion defines superstition and idolatry. “Bar- baity,caprice;ehese qualities, however nominally disguised, we may universally observe, form the ruling character ofthe deity in popular religions."” ‘Molaters are people of “artificial lives," the ones who make an essence out of the extraordinary, the ones who look for “an im- mediate service of the Supreme Being,” They are the mystics, the fanatics, and the superstitious. Suck souls throw chemselves volun tary into criminal adventures, because theit common denominator is that moral acts are not enough for them. Morality is joyless—after all, morality is not picturesque; prestige belongs to vice: "Men are ceven afraid of passing for good-naturd; lest that should be taken for ‘want of understanding: And often boast of more debauches than they have been really engag’d in. .."" But on the other hand, at the other pole, theism is also a system of extensive rules, This time, though, the extension under consid= craton is an ffir of knowledge. Religion is, in this sense again, a kind of everstride ofthe imagination, a fiction, and a simulacrum of belief. I invokes a spoken tepetition and an oral or written tradition. ‘The priests speak and the miracles rest on human testimony? how- ver, the miracles do not immediately manifest a reality, but claim for themselves the fitness cha, generally, we are accustomed to find between testimony and reality. Or again, in the proofs for the ex= istence of God that are based on andlogy between machines and the ‘world, religion confuses the general and the accidental. Tt does not see thatthe world has but an extremely disant resemblance to ma- chines, and chat it resembles them only in terms of the mose acci= dental cicumstances.” Why take human technical activity as the base for the analogy, rather than another mode of operation—no ‘more and no less partial—such as, for example, generation of veg «tation? Finally, inthe proofs based on causality eligion transcends the limits of experience. It aspires to prove Gui by His effet, that is, the world oF nature. But then sometimes, as in the exe of GOD AND THE WORLD CCleanthes," religion blows the efect out of all proportion, totally denying disorder or the presence and intensity of evil by constituting God as an adequate cause ofa world which i arbitrarily emblishes. Ac other times, as in the case of Demea,® religion accords more with the cause and establishes a disproportionate God. In the end, it redescends to earth and remedies the lack of adequation by in- voking unknown effects, the most important of which is future life. Its evident that religion misuses the principle of causality. In fact, thee no wage of causality in eligi tht not egitite and It's only when rwo spies of objects ate found to be con- stantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from he other, and were an effec presented, which war entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known seis, 1 do not see, that we could form any conjecture o inference arall concerning its case.” nother words, there are no physical objects or abject of epetition except in the world. The world 3s such is essentially the Unigoe. Iki fiction of the imagination—never an object of che understand ing. Cosmolopes ate always fanciful. Thus, in Hume's texts, in a manner that difers from Kant’, the theory of causality hat two stories to tll: the determination ofthe conditions of legitimate exercise in relation to experience, and the critique of illegitimate cxercie outside experince Religion, then, is dual sytem of extensive rules. But how could icbe corrected? We understand easily that it situation, in knowledge and culate, is very particular. Undoubtedly, the correction exist, The miracle is subordinated tothe world of knowledge: the evidence drawn from testimony, to the extent that it claims eo belong 10 experience, becomes a probability catering calculations. It becomes one ofthe ewo terms of an abstraction, whereas the other stands for contrary evdence.*Incultate o in the moral worl, coretive rues, instead of confounding the exception, recognize t and include it, creating chereby a theory of experience wherein all possible exes finda role of intelligibility and get eo be ordered under a statute of the uwlerstanding, Ta one of his essays, Hume analyzes an example ofthis theory of the exception: sce is not a tansgression of ourGOD AND THE WORLD duties toward God, nor of our duties toward society. Suicide is within hhuman powers, and no more impious an act than “to build houses”; it is a power which should be used in exceptional circumstances."* ‘The exception therefore becomes an object of nature. “Do you imag- ine that Trepine at Providence, or cutse my creation, because I go ‘out of life, and put period to'a being which, were it to continue, would render me miserable?" But the question now is the following: as religion is corrected, ‘what is really left of it? In both cases, correction seems to be a total critique; ie does not allow anything to subsist, Nothing is left of the miracle; ie disappears in an abstraction without proportion. The fig- ures of the extension which we have previously studied—jusice, government, commerce, art, mores, even freedom—had a positivity Of their own, confirmed and reinforced as they were by the correc- tions, they formed the world of culture. On the other hand, Hume seems t0 exclude religion from culture, and all that goes with it When, in religion, words consecrate an object, while in the social and legal spheres promising words change the nature of actions rel- ative to some other objects, the sense is not the same.” Philosophy “is reaching completion herein a practical battle against superstition, Atthe other pole, the corrective rules which make true knowledge possible by giving criteria and laws for ts exercise do not at without expelling from the domain they define every fictitious usage of caus- ality; and they begin with religion. In brief it seems ehat, in the ddomain of che extension, religion Keeps only frivolity and foses al seriousness. We understand why. Religion is indeed the extension of passions and their reflection in the imagination. But in religion, the passions are not reflected in an imagination already setled by the principles of association in a way that would make seriousness possible. On the contrary, there is religion only when these prin- ciples are reflected in pure imagination and mere fancy. Why is that? Because religion by itself and init other aspects is only the fanciful usage of the principles of association, resemblance, and causality. Is nothing therefore lefe of religion? If chis were the case, how could we explain the final reversal of the esay “On the Immortality of the Soul” and “The Esay on Miracles"? To beliewe in miracles is a false belief, but itis also a true miracle ‘And whoever is moved by Fath to assent ti, i connie fof 2 continued miracle in his wn persen, ahi subverts GOD AND THE WORLD all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a de~ termination to believe whar is most contrary to custom and. experience.” “The irony of Hume and his necessary precautions may be invoked at this point, But even if i is correct to do s0, it will not explain the properly philosophical content of the Dialogues. In fact, religion is justifed, but only in its very special situation, outside culrure and coutside trie knowledge. We have seen that philosophy has nothing tosay on what causes the principles and on the origin oftheir power. There, itis the place of God. We cannot make use of the principles of asociation in order to know the world as an effect of divine activity, and even less to know God as the cause of the world; but we can always think of God negatively, as the cause ofthe principles. Tris in this sense that theism is valid, and i is in this sense that purpose is reintroduced. Purpose will be thought, albeit not known, «the original agreement bersen the principles of human nature and nature ‘eelf. “There isa kind of pre-established harmony between the course ‘of nature and the association of ous ideas." ‘Purpose gives us therfore, im postulate, the oiginary (original) unity of origin and qualification. ‘The idea of God, a osiginary agreement, isthe choughe of something in general as for knowledge, it can only find content in self-matilation, ater being identified with a certain rode of appearance that experience manifests, or afte being, deter- mined by means of an analogy which will necessarily be partial “In this tee corner ofthe world alone, there are four principles, reason, instinct, generation, vegetation,”® and each one of them can furnish tus with a coherene discourse on the origin of che world. But ifthe origin as auch is ehought but not known, if itis all these things at the same time-—matter and life as much as spirit~it is bound to be indifferent to every opposition; it is beyond good and evil" Each ‘one ofthe perspoctives we have of it has only one Function—to make tus transcend the other perspectives which are equally possible, and to remind us that we are always confronted with partial analogies. In cortain respects, purposiveness is more an lan vital, and less the projector the design of an infinite incelligence® One could object For thatall order ign; but that would be to suppose to rahice all porposiveness co an intention, Tue one mad: operand among. others say tT pa Fr he lly a ell asGOD AND THE WORLD ‘rom the brain[Z]."™ In ehis new state of affairs, what docs the Idea ‘of the World become? Is it still a simple fiction of the fancy? We have already scen two fictitious uses of the principle of causality. The first was defined by repetitions which do not proceed from sexperience; the second, by a particular abject—the world—which ‘annot be repeated, and which is not, properly speaking, an object. Now, according to Hume, there i also a third, fictitious or excessive ‘causality, Ie is manifested in the belief inthe distince and continuous existence of bodies. On one hand, we atibute a continuous existence to objects, in virtue of a type of causal reasoning which has as its round the coherence of certain impressions.®* Despite the discan- tinuity of my perceptions I admit “the continu’d existence of objects jn order to connect their past and present appearances, and give them such an union with each other, as I have found by experience to be suitable to theie particular natures and circumstances." This is then the resolution of the contradiction that would arise bbeewcen the conjunction of rwo objects in actual experience and the appearance of one of them only in my perception, without the ap- pearance ofits counterpart." But chis resolution is based on a mere Fiction of the imagination: the inference is fictitious and the causal reasoning, extensive It eanscends the principles that determine the conditions of its legitimate exercise in general and maintain it within the bounds of the understanding. In fat, I confer to the object more coherence and regularity than what | find in my perception But as all reasoning concerning matters of fact arses only from exstom, and custom can only be the effect of repeated perceptions, the extending of custom and reasoning beyond the pereeptions can never be the direct and natural eet of the constant repetition and connexion.* (On the other hand, distin existence ests on an equally false use ‘of causality, that is, on a fictitious and contradictory causality. We affirm a causal relation between the object and our perception of it, but never do we seize the object independently of che perception that we have of it. We forget that causality is legitimized only whe past experience reveals 0 us the conjunction of fH» entities” short, continuity and distinctness are outright tions an ily GOD AND THE WORLD of the imagination, since ehey revolve around, and designate that ‘which, by definition, i noe ofered to any posible experince, either through the senses or though the understanding Te scems that all of this transforms the belie in continuous and Aistnce existence ino a specific ease of the extensive rule. At frst lance, the tees which ae abou che constitution ofthis Belief and the txts which are about the formation of rules seem to parallel cach other. The imagination always makes use of the principles which Bx i, that i, of contiguity, resemblance, and catsality, in onder to transcend it limits, and to extend these principles beyond the conditions oftheir exercx.® Ths, the coherence of changes Causes the imagination to feign yet more coberence, as ie comes to adie continuous existence" This constancy and resemblance of appearances cause che imagination to atebute to similar appearances, the idenity of an invariable object. In this way, the imagination feigos once agsin continous existence in order to overcome the opposition between the identity of resembling perceptions and the discontinuity of appearances. The fact is, though, that this paral- lelsm between belie and rale is only apparent. The two problems, although they ae very diferent, complement cach othet. Contrary tocextcrsive rules, the Rcton of continuity snot corrgible, cannot and should not be corrected. It maintains, therefore, diferent rela- tions with reflection. Morcaver, at far asthe imagination i com cerned, its origin is very diferent from that of general rule. ‘We begin with the sccond point. Extnsive rules can be dstin- sshd from the belief in the existence of bodies by means of wo ‘haratrisis. First ofall the object of the extensive rules of know - ‘edge is a partiular determination eo which the imagination confers the value of a lav. It does so by borrowing, from the principles which fx it, he poster to go beyond principles: and it eceeds in thisby invoking an alleged experienc or, in other words by offering the understanding, mete item of fancy, s though it were an object which concerned i, Imagination offers the understanding asa gen- cal, claborate experience, che purely accidental content of a ex pericnce that only the senses have registred in chance encounters. (On the other hand, the imagination does not present tothe under sesning contin and distinct existence as an objec of posible ‘perience; nor dows the unlcrstanding denounce the use OF it by speticnce. Undoubsedly, the intupination as the object of a FalseGoD AND THE WORLD there is no experience of continuous existence either ehrough the senses oF through the understanding, because continous existence is not 2 particular object; ie is the characteristic of the World in general. It is not an object because itis the horizon which every ‘object presupposes. (OF cours, we have aleeady seen this in che case of religious belief. But being mote than an extensive rule, religious belief appears now as something composite, made up of rules and the belief in the existence of bodies. Ie participates in the rules to the extent that it teats the world as» particular object and invokes an experience of the senses and of the understanding.) Second, on the bass of the belief in the existence of bodies, fiction comes a principle of human nature. ‘The most important point is 0 be found here. The entite sense of the principles of human mature is to transform the muliplicty of ideas which constitute the mind into a qtem, that is, a system of knowledge and of its objects. But fora system to exist, it is not enough to have ideas associated in the ‘minal i€ is also necessary that perceptions be regarded as separate from the mind, and that impressions be in some manner torn from the senses, We must give the objec of the idea an existence which does not depend on the senses. The abjects of knowledge muse truly be objects. To that end, the principles of asociation do not suffice, tno more than the vividness of impressions or a mere belief does, The system is complete when “a seeming interruption” of an ap- pearance o the senses is surpassed “by [the] feigning [of] a continw'd being which may fill those intervals, and preserve a perfect and entire identiey to our perceptions." In other words, the system is completed in the identity between system and world, But, a8 we have seen, the system is the product of the principles of nature, whereas the world (continuity and dis- tinction) is an outright fiction of the imagination. Fiction becomes principle necessarily. Inthe cae of general rues, fiction draws its ‘origin and its force from the imagination, insofar asthe latter makes use of principles which fx i, and allow it therefore to go further. In the case ofthe belief in continuity, the force of fiction isthe force ‘of a principle. Witk the World, the imagination has tral become consi= ‘wie and creative, The World is an Mea, Undoubtedly, Hume always presents continuity as an excessive effec of causality, resemblance, and contiguity, and asthe product of their illegitimate extension." But, in fict, contiguity, resemblanes, and causality so not, properly GOD AND THE WORLD peaking, intervene a principles; they are the characteristics of cer- tain imptessions—precisely those impressions which will be lifted from the senses in order to constitute the world.” What is tated principle is the belief inthe existence of bodies, along with the ground on which this belief depends.» The belief in the existence of bodies includes several moments: fist, it includes the principle of identity, as a product of the fiction bby means of which the idea of time is applied to an invariable and continuous object; then, i includes the confusion by means of which an eater identity i attibueed to similar impressions; this confusion is duc to the eaty transition (itself an effect of resemblance) that resembles the effece created by the consideration of the identical ‘object; then one more fiction is included that of continuous exist- ‘ence—which serves to overcome the contradiction between the dis- continuity of impressions and the identity we attribute to them.” ‘And this is not all. Ie may indeed scem birarre that Hume, in the space of a few pages, frst presents as satisfictory the conciliation brought about by the fiction of a continuous existence, and then again as fale and as dragging along with it other fictions and other ‘onciliations.” The reason is that continuous existence is very exsily reconciled with the discontinuity of appearances. Ie can therefore legitimately ti together discontinuous images and the perfect iden- tity which we atebute o them. Ie is a fact that the attribution of identity is false, chat our perceptions ate really inteerupted, and that the affirmation ofa continuous existence hides an illegitimate usage ‘of the principles of human nature. To make things worse, this wsege is itself 0 principle. The opposition then is at its innermost state in the center of the imagination. The difference [berween] imagination and reason has become a contradiction. ‘The imagination ells us, that our resembling perceptions have a contins'd and uninterrupted existence, and are not anniilated by their absence. Reflection ells us, that even ur resembling perceptions are interrupted in thei existence, and diferent from each other ‘This contradiction, ays Hume, is established between extension and reflection, imagination and reason, the senses and the under seanling*" fat, this way of phrasing the issue is not the best,GOD AND THE WORLD since ie can apply to general rules as well. Ebewhere, Hume says it ore clearly: the contradiction is established between the principles of the imagination and the principles of teaon.* tn the preceding chap- fers, we have constantly shown the opposition beeween reason and imagination, or between human nature and the fancy. We have seen successively how the principles of human nature fx the imagination; how the imagination resumes is operation beyond this fixation; and lastly how reason comes to correct this sumption. But the problem ‘now is thatthe opposition has really become a contradiction: atthe last moment, the imagination is recuperated on a precise point. But this fast moment is alo the firs time. For the frst time, the imag- ination is opposed, as « prinipl, that is, a a principle of the world, to the principles which fx it and to the operations whick correct it, To the extent chat fiction, along with the World, count among the principles, the principles of association encounter fition, and are ‘opposed to it, without being able to eliminate it. The mose internal ‘opposition ie now established between constituted and constitutive ‘imagination, beeween the principles of asociation and the fiction ‘which has become a principle of nature. It is precisely beeatse fiction or extension has become a principle that it ean no longer be included, corrected, and even less eliminated through reflection. We need a new relation between extension and teflection, Thisis to longer the relation offered by the popular system which affirms continuous existence, but rather the relation offered by the philosophical system which affirms distinct and independent ‘existences: objects ae distinct from perceptions, perceptions are dis- ‘continuous and perishable, objects are “uninterrupted, and... pre= serve a continu'd existence and identity." “This hypothe pleases our reason, in allowing, thar our dependent perceptions are interrupted and diferent; and a¢ the same time is agreeable to the imagination, in atributing a continu'd existence to something else, sehich we ell objet." But this aesthetic game of the imagination and reason is not a reconciliation; itis rather the persistence of a contradiction, whose terms we alternately embrace.‘ Moreover, i ushers in its own ficulties, involving, as we have scea, a new and illegitimate us causality” The philosophical system is not initially recommended {to reason of to the imagination. Tes “the monsteous offspring, of ‘wo principles... which are both at ace embrac'l hy the nin, GoD AND THE WORLD and which are unable mutually to destroy each other." This system is a delirium. When fiction hecomes principle, reflection goes on reflecting, but ican no longer correct. Is thus thrown into delirious compromises. From the point of view of philosophy, the mind is no longer anything but delirium and madness. There is no complete system, syathess, or cosmology that is not imaginary.” With che belict in the existence of bodies, fiction itself asa principle is opposed to the principles of association: the latter are principally instead of being subsequently excessive, as itis the case with general rules. Fantasy triumphs. To oppose its own nature and to allow its fancies to be ‘deployed has become the nature ofthe mind. Here, the most insane is sill natural” The system is a mad delitium, Hume shows in the hypothesis of an independent existence the fist step toward this deliium, Subsequently, he studies the manner in which independent existence is formed in ancient and modern philosophy. Ancient phi- Tsophy forges the delirium of substances, substantial forms, acci- ddents, and occult qualities *—“specters in the dark."** Buc the new philosophy has also its ghosts. Ie chinks that it can recuperate reason by distinguishing primaey from secondary qualities, bu in the end it x no Jess mad than the other.” But ifthe mind is manifested as a delirium, ici because ic is fst of all, and essentially, madness.» As soon as extension becomes a principle, i follows its own way, and reflection follows another way: two principles which cannot destroy cach other are opposed. “... [Nor is it possible for us to reason Jjustly and regularly from causes and effects, and at the same time believe the continu'd existence of matter. How then shall we adjust those principles together? Which of them shall we prefer?” The ‘worst s that these ewo principles are mutually implicated, since belief in the existence of bodies essentially encompasses causality. But, on the other hand, the principles of association, insofar as they constivure the given as a system, generate the presentation of the given in the ‘guise ofa world, It follows that the choice i to be made not between fone or the other of the ewo principles but rather between all or nothing, between the contradiction or nothingness. “We have, therefore, tno choice lefe but betwixt a false eason and none a all." And this is the state of madnest. That is why, then, it would be vain to hope thar we could separate within the mind its reason feom its deliiam, its permanent, iresstible, and universal principles, from its variable,GOD AND THE WORLD fanciful, and irregular principles.” Modern philosophy hopes, and there lcs its ertot. We do noe have the meats of choosing the un dlersandiog over the suggestions ofthe imagination. [T]he an derstanding, when i acs alone, according to its most genera pri ciples, eniely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in ay proposition, either in philosophy or common life" ‘The function of the understanding to reflect on something is ex: clusively corctive; functioning alone, the understanding can do only one thing ad infinitum to cortect its corcctons, so that all certainty, even practical certainty, is compromised and lost We have seen three critical states of the mind. Inference and fancy ate the situations proper co the mind, independently ofthe external principles which fix ie chrough the association ofits ideas. Madness isthe contradiction in the mind between these principles which affect itand the fiction which it affirms asa principle. Delitium isthe system of fictional reconciliations between principles and fiction, The only resource and positivity offered to the mind is nature or practice— ‘moral practice and, based on the image of the latter, practice of the ‘understanding, Instead of referring nature to the mind, the mind must be referred to nature. “I may, nay T must yield to the current of nature in submitting to my senses and understanding; and in this blind submission I shew most perfectly my sceptical disposiion and principles." Madness is human nature related to the mind, jst as good sense is the mind related to human nature; each one is the reverse of the ‘other. This is the reason why we must reach the depths of madness and solitude in order to find a passage 10 good sense. I could not, ‘without reaching contradiction, refer the affections of the mind to the mind itself the mind is identical to its ideas, and the affection does not le itself be expressed through ideas without a decisive contradiction. On the other hand, ehe mind related to its affections ‘constitutes the entire domain of general rules and beliefs, This do- ‘main is the middle and temperate egion, where the contradiction beeween human nature andthe imagination already exists, and always subsists, but this contradiction is regulated by possible corrections and resolved through practice. In short, there is no scicue wr life ‘except at the level of general rules and belief FIVE EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY We miouourr ruar we had located the essence of empiricism in the specific problem of subjectivity. But, frst ofall, we should ask how subjectivity is defined. The subject is defined by the movement through which ie is developed. Subject is that which develops itself. The only content chat we can give to the idea of subjectivity is that of mediation and transcendence, But we note chat the movement of self-developmicnt and of becaming-other is double: the subject tran- sccnds itself, but it is also reflected upon. Hume recognized these ‘wo dimensions, presenting them as the fundamental characteristics cof human nature: inference and invention, belief and artifice. One should then avoid attributing too much importance to the analogy, ‘often noted, becween belief and sympathy. This is not to say that this analogy is not real. But, if itis true chat belief is the knowing act of the subject, then his moral act, on the contrary, is not sym pathy; it i rather artifice or invention, with respect to which sym- pathy, corresponding to belief, is only a necessary condition. In shor belicving and inventing i what makes the subject a subject. From what is given, I infer the existence of that which is not T believe. Caesar is dead, Rome did exist, the sun will rise, JF is nourishing, At the same time and through ehe same ‘opetation, while ermsconding the given, I judge and posit myself asEMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY subject. affirm more than I know. Therefore, the problem of truth ust be presented and stated as the critical problem of subjectivity itself. By what right does man affirm moze than ke knows? Betwee the sensible qualities and the powers of nature, we infer an unknow: (wyhen we sce like sensible qualities that they have like secret powers, (we) expect that eects, similar to those which wwe have experienced, will follow from them, Ifa body of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and foresee, with certsiny, like nourishment and support. Now this i 4 proces of the mind or thought, of which I wosld willingly know the fonction ‘We are also subjects in another respect, that i in (and by) the ‘moral, aesthetic, or social judgment. In this sense, the subject reflects and is reflected Upon, Ie extract from that which affects i in general a power independent of the actual exercise, that is, a pure function, and then transcends its own pattligy.® Consequently, artifice and invention have been made possible. The subject invents; it is the maker of artifice. Such is the dual power of subjectivity: to believe and to invent, to assume the secret powers and to presuppose abstract for distinct powers. In these two senses, the subject is normatives it creates norms or general rules. We must explain and find the foun- dation, lav, or principle of this dual power—this dual exercise of sgenecal rules. This isthe problem. For nothing escapes our knovl- edge as radically asthe powers of Nature,’ and nothing i more futile for our understanding than the distinction between powers and theit exercise How can we assume or distinguish thens? To believe isto infer one part of nature from another, which is not given. To invent is to distinguish powers and to constitute functional totalities or totaltis chat ate not given in nature. The problem is as follows: how can a subject transcending the siven be constituted in the given? Undoubredly, the subject itself is given. Undoubtedly, that which transcends the given is also in anocher way and in another sense. This subject who invents and believes is constituted inside the givew in sucks way that it makes [EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY. the given itself a synthesis and a system. This is what we must explain, In this formulation ofthe problem, we discover the absolute essence of empiricism. We could say that philosophy in general has always sought a plan of analysis in order to undertake and conduct the examination of the structures of consciousness (critique), and to justify the totality of experience. Initially, i i a difference in plan that opposes critical philosophies. We embark upon a transcendental critique when, having situated ourselves on a methodologically re- duced plan chat provides an essential certainty~a certainty of es sence—we ask: how can there be a given, how can something be given toa subject, and how can the subject give something to itself? Here, the crtial requirement is that of a constructivist logic which finds ies model in mathematics. The critique is empicical when, having situated ourselves in a purely immanent poine of view, which makes possible a description whose rule is found in determinable hypotheses and whose model is found in physics, we ask: how isthe subject constituted inthe given? The construction of the given makes room for the constitution of the subject. The given is no longer given co a subjece; rather, the subject constitutes itself in the given. Hume's merit lis in che singling out of this empirical problem in its pure state and its separation from the transcendental and the psychological Bur what isthe given? It is, says Hume, the fux of the sensible, 3 collection of impressions and images, or a set of perceptions. It is the totality of that which appears, being which equals appearance;> i is also movement and change without identity ot law. We use the ‘eems “imagination” and “mind” not to designate a faculey ora prin= ciple of organization, but ather a particular set ora particular col- lection. Empiricism begins from the experience of a collection, oF from an animated succession of distinct perceptions. Te begins wich ‘them, insofar as they are distinct and independent. In fat, its prin- ciple, that i, the constitutive principle giving a status to experience, is mot chat “every idea derives from an impression” whose sense i ‘only tegulaive; but rather that “everything separable is distinguish- ahle and everything distinguishable is different." ‘This isthe principle of difference. “For how is it possible we can hable, of distinguish what is not dif- ‘Therefore, experience is suecession, or the movement of[EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY. separable ideas, insofar as they are differen, and different, insofar as they are separable. We mast begin with this experience because itis the experience. It does not presuppose anything else and nothing else precedes it, Itt not the afection of an implicated subject, nor the ‘modification or mode of a substance. I every discernible perception isa separate exience, “it has] no nec of any ching to suppor [is] ‘The mind is identical to ideas in the mind. If we wish to retain the term “substance,” to find a use for it at all costs, we muse apply it correctly not to a substrate of which we have no idea but eo each individual perception, We would then clan that “every perception is a substance, and every distinct part of a perception a distinct subseance."* The mind is not 2 subject, nor does it require a subject whose mind it would be. Hume's entice critique, especially bis critique of the principle of suficient reason in its denunciations of sophisms and ‘contradictions; amounts to this: if the subject is indeed thae which transcends the given, we should noe intially atribute wo the given the capacity to transcend itself ‘On the other hand, the mind isnot the representation of nature either. Not only are perceptions the only substances, they are also the only objects.® The negation ofthe primary qualities corresponds ‘now eo the negation ofthe principle of suficient reason: perception, gives us no difference between two kinds of qualities. The philos- ‘ophy of experience is not only the critique of a philosophy of sub- stance but also the critique of a philosophy of nature. Therefore, ideas are not the representations of objects, but rather of impressions; as for the impressions, they are not representative, nor are they ad- ventitious; rather, they ace inmate. Undoubtedly, there isa nature, there ate ral operations, and bodies do have powers. But we must restrict “our speculations to the appearance of objects to our senses, without entering into disquistions concerning thei real nature and * operation, ...""" And this skepticism is not so much a renunciation asa requirement identical to the preceding one. The two critiques, in fact, merge to the point where they become one. Why? Hiccause the question of a determinable relation with mature has its own, conditions: itis not obvious, it snot given, and itn only he posited by a subjece questioning the valuc of the system of bis jul that is, the legitimacy of the transformation to whiel he subjects, [EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY. the given, or the legitimacy of the organization which he attributes to it. Therefore, the real problem would be to think, a the right moment, ofa hatmony between the unknown powers on which the given appearances depend and the transcendent principles which determine the constitution of a subject within the given. The real ‘problem would be to think of a harmony between the powers of nature and the subject. As for the given, in itself and as such, itis neither the representation of the fist nor the modification of the second. ‘We might say that the given is at least given to the senses and that ie presupposes organs and even a brain, This is true, but on ‘must always avoid endowing, in the beginning, che organism with an organization, an organization that will come about only when the subject itself comes to mind, cha is, an organization thae depends fon the same principles as the subject. Thus, in a central passage, Hume envisages a physiological explanation of association and sub= Jectivity: “... upon our conception of any idea, che animal spirits ‘un into all the contiguous traces, and rouze up the other ideas, that are related to it" Hume himself presents this explanation as “probable and plau- sible,” but, as he says, he neglects i willingly. When be appeals to it, itis not in order to explain asvociation, but rather, in order to account for the errors resulting from the association. For if such an organization ofthe brain provides us with a physiological model applicable to the associative process, it nonetheless presupposes the principles upon which this model depends and for which it cannot account. In shore, the organism and its senses do not immediately and in themselves have the characteristics of human nature or of a subject; they must aequire these somewhere else. The mechanism of the body cannot explain the spontaneity of the subject. By itself and in itself, an organ is metely a collection of impressions considered in the mechanism of theit appearance: “External objects are seen, and felt, and become present to the mind; that is, they acquire such 4 relation eo a connected heap of perceptions...” Ia a word, we always return to the same conclusions the given, the mind, the col- lection of perceptions cannot call upon anything other chan themaelves. ue as ie calls wo itself, what exactly is it calling upon, since the collection remsinsatbitsry, since every idea and every impres-[EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY sion can disappear or be separated from the mind without contra- diction?! How cat we diseuss the mind or the given in general? ‘What isthe consistency of the mind? Afterall its not under the category of quality that we must consider the mind as mind but rather form the viewpoint of quantity. Ie is not the representative ‘quality of the idea but rather is dvisbiliey cha interests us at this stage. The fundarsencal principle of empiricism, the principle of difeence, aad elveady stated this; such was its meaning. ‘The mind's constant is not particule idea, but eather the smallest dea. An idea may appear ‘oF disappear, I can always discover others; but sometimes smaller ideas cannot e found. "In rejecting the infinite capacity ofthe mind, wwe suppose it may arrive at an end in the division of ies idea.”* ‘What is essential in an idea is noe that i¢ represents something, but rather that ie is indivisible: When you tell me of the thowsandeh and ten thousandth part ofa grin of and, Ihave a distinct idea of thee numbers And of ther different proportion: but the images, which 1 form in my mind to represent the things themselves, are nothing different form each other, nor infrioe wo that image, by which I tepresene the grain of sand ivf... But what” cree we may imagine of the thing, the idea of a grain of sand is not distinguishable, nor separable into twenty, much Tess intoathovsand, oran infinite number of diferent ides.” We cll “moment of the mind” the tflction that relates ideas or impressions tothe criterion of division of ideas. The mind and the given are not derived form such-and-sach an idea but rather from the smallest ida, whether its used to represent the grain of sand ora faction of i. This is why, finaly, the problem of the "sears of the mind isthe seme a the problem of space. On one hand, Wwe ack whether or not extension is iniitely divisible. On the other hand, che indivisible ideas, to the extent that they are indivisible, constitateina certain way extension, Hume presents these ewo theses 4s the two intimately connected parts of the system. Let ws consider the fist part2® To say that the mind has a finite capacity ito say that “the imagination teaches 2 minimus." Hurse Calls this minisaams “anity"® “indivisible point. “impression of $oms or corpuscles," “terminating idea.” Noxhin EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY and by “nothing” we should understand not simply “no other ide,” but also “no other thing in general." The idea-limie is absolutely indivisible, I isin itself indivisible to the extent that iti indivisible for the mind and because itis an idea. Existence itself belongs to the unit.» This is why the mind posseses and manifests objectivity. Hume's entite theme reconciles the defects of che senses and che objectivity of the given a: follows: undoubtedly there are many things smaller than the smallese bodies that appear to our senses; the face is, though, thae there is nothing smaller than the impression thae we have of these bodies or the ideas chat we form of them." {As for the second part of the thesis, we can see that it is deter- mined by he fis. ‘The smallest impression is nether a mathematical nora physical point, bue rather a sensible one.® A physical point is already extended and divisble; a mathematical point is nothing. ‘Between the two there is a midpoint which is the only real one. Berween real extension and nonexistence there is real existence ‘whose extension will be precisely formed. A sensible point ot atom isvisible and rangible, colored and solid. By itself, i has no extension, and yet it exists. It exists and we have seen why. In the possibilicy ofits existence and in the eason for its distinc existence, empiricism cliscovers a principle. Ie # not extended, since no extension is itself andatom, acorpuscle, 2 minimum idea, ora simple impression. “Five notes play on a flte give us the impression and idea of time; tho" time be not a sixth impression, which presents itself to the hearing for any other of the senses” Similarly, the idea of space is merely the idea of visible or tangible points distributed in a certain order >> Space is discovered in the arrangement of visible or tangible objects, {ist as time is discovered in the perceptible succesion of changing. ‘object, "Thus the given is not in space; the space is in the given. Space and time ate in the mind. We should nonetheless note the difference between time and space, for the later can be given through two senses only, those of sight and touch, In fact, for the idea of space to exist itis necessary that the simple impressions, or the parts of ‘our impressions, be atranged in a way that is provided neither by the other senscs™ nor, in the case of movement, by the impressions of the muscles.” Extension, therefore, is only the quality of certian peteeptions This is not the case with time, which is effectively presented as the quality of any set of porceptions whatsoever.” “ForLEMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY ‘we may observe, that there is a continual succession of perceptions in our mind; so that the idea of time being forever present with ‘We must then define the given by two objective characteristics: indivisibity of an element and distribution of elements; stom and structure. As Laporte observed, it is entirely incorrect to say that the ‘whole, in Hume's atomism, is nothing but the sum of is pats, since the parts, considered together, are defined, rather, according t0 their ‘mode of temporal, and sometimes spatil, appearance. This is an objective and spontancous mode, by no means indebted to reflection ‘0 to construction. In fact, Hume makes this point about space in a text whose second sentence should not be forgotten: “The perception ‘consists of pars, These parts are so situated, as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity, of length, breadth, and thickness." We muse now raise the question: what do we mean when we speak of the subject? We mean that the imagination, having been a callection, becomes now a faculty; the distributed collection becomes now 2 system. The given is once again taken up by a movement, and ina movement that transcends it. The mind becomes human nature The subject invents and beliewes; iti «synthe ofthe mind. ‘We formulate three problems: what are the characteristics of the subject inthe case of belie and invention? Second, by means of what principles is the subjece consituced in this way? Which factors have acted in transforming the mind? Finally, what ate the various stages of the syathesis chat is brought about in the mind by the subject? “What ate the stages ofthe system? We begin with the fest problem. Since we previously studied the mind from three points of view— in relation to itself, in relation to the organs of the senses, and in relation to time—we must now ask what becomes of these three instances when the mind ise becomes a subject. Fir in relation to time, The mind, considered from the view- point of the appearance of is perceptions, was essentially succession, time. To speak of the subject now isto Speak of duration, custom, habit, and anticipation. Anticipation is habit, and habie is anticipa tion: these two determinations—the thrust of the past and the élan toward the future—are, tthe center af Hume's philosophy, the two aspects of the same fundamental dynamism. It is not wecessary to force the texts in otder to ind in the habit-anticipation most ofthe characteristics of the Bergsonian dare or mevory. Habit i theo EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY stieutive root of the subject, and the subject, at root, i the synthesis fof time—the synthesis of the present and the past in light of the future, Hume demonstrates this clearly when he studies the two ‘operations of subjectiviry, namely, belief and invention. We know ‘what is involved in invention; each subject reflects upon itself, that fs, transcends its immediate partiality and avidity, by instituting rules of property which are institutions making possible an agreement among subjects. But what is it, in the nature of the subject, that ‘grounds this mediace agreement and chese general rules? Here, Hume returns toa simple juridical theory which will so be developed by the majority of the utilcariane: each man expect to conserve what he already possesses: The principle of frustrated ntcipation will phy the role of the principle of contradiction in the logic of property, that is, the role of a principle of synthetic contradiction. We know that, for Hume, there are many states of possession which are determined through complex relations: actual possession before the establishment of society; occupation, prescrip- tion, aceession, and succession, after the establishment of sociery. Yet only the dynamism of habie and anticipation transforms these states into ctles of property. Hume's originality lies in the theory of this dynamism, Anticipation isthe synthesis of past and present brought about by habit. Anticipation, or the futute, isthe synthesis of time constituted by the subject inside the mind. Such is che effect of custom, that i not only reconciles us to anything we have long enjoy'd, but even gives ws an af fection fori, and makes us prefer ito other object, which may be more valuable, bur are less known to us Prescription i che privileged example inthis respect. In this ease, ic is not merely through a synthesis of time that the subject eeans- forms the state of possession into a ttle of property but rather the state of possesion is itself time and nothing els. Bur a ‘tis certain, that, however everything be produc'd in time, there is nothing eal, thac is produc'd by time; i fol- lows, that property being produc'd by cime, i not any thing, real inthe objets, bu isthe offspring af the sentiments, om swhick alone tie is found to have any influence.[PMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY, “This is the most effective way to say chat time and subject ae in such a relation with respect to cach other that the subject presents the synthesis of time, and that only this synthesis is productive, creative, and inventive “The same applies to belief. We know that belief is only a vivid idea connected, by means of a causal relation, co a present impres- sion. Belief is feeling ofa particular way of sensing ideas. Belief is the idea~the vivid idea—which is “felt rather than conceived.” ‘Therefore, if we wish to analyze this feeling, we must fst investigate the causal relation, since the latter communicates the vividness of the present impression to the idea. In this analysis, feeling reveals its source: once more, itis manifested as the resule of the synthesis of time, Indeed, what is the causal relation in its essence? Te is «that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant." We rediscover, therefore, this dynamic unity of habit and tendency, this synthesis of a past and a present which constitutes the furure, and this synthetic identity of 4 past experience and of an adaptation to the present” Custom, then is the great guide of human life... Without the influence of custom ... we should never know how 10 aajust means to ends, of to employ our natural powers in the production of any effet, There would he an end at once ‘of all action, as well asthe chief part of speculation.” In short, the synthesis posits the pastas a rule for che Future.* “With respece to belie as with property, we always encounter the same transformation: time was the strature of the mind, now the subject is presented as the synthesis of time. In order to understand the meaning of this transformation, we must note that the mind includes memory in Hume's sense of the term: we distinguish in the collection of perceptions sense impressions, ideas of memory, and ideas of imagination, according to their degrees of vividness. ‘Memory isthe reappearance of an impression in the form of an idea that is still vivid. Bu, in fact, memory alone does not bring about a synthesis of time; ie does not transcend the structure, its essearial tole becomes the reproduction of the different structures of the given.” Ie is rather habit which presents itll ay a synthesis, and habit belongs to the subject. Recollection i the old presett, wot the LEMPHUCISM AND SUBJECTIVITY past, We should call “pase” not only that which has been, but also that which determines, acts, prompts, and carties a certain weight. In this sense, not only is habit ro memory what the subject is to the ‘mind, but also habit easily does without cis dimension of the mind ‘which we call “memory”; habit has no need of memory, it does ‘without ie ordinarily, in one way or another, Sometimes no evocation ‘of memories accompanies it,* and sometimes, there is no specific memory that it could evoke In a word, the past as such is not sgiven Its consticuted through, and in, a synthesis which gives the Subject its real origin and its source. ‘We ate thus led to specify how we must understand this synthesis of past and present, for this is not clear. Obviously, if ue give ready made the past end the present to onrsles, the synthesis is made on its ‘own; it is already formed and, therefore, no longer a problem. Also, since the future is constituted through this synthesis ofthe past and the present, it s no longer a problem either under these condi ‘Thus, whea Hume says that the most diffcule thing is to explain how we are able to constitute the past as a rule for the Fatur, it is aot easy to see where the dilfculy lies. Hume himself feels the need to convince us that he isnot trying to create paradoxes." In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience, Their secret nature, and conse- quently all cei effcets and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens some- times, and with regatd to some objects: Why may ic not happen always, and with regard to all subjects? What logic, what process of argument secures you against this suppo- sition? My practice, you sy, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As en egent, Iam quite satifed in the point; but asa philsoper, who has some share of curiosity, Tvl no say sceptiom, Twant 1 len the foundation of this inference” In practice, there is no problem, for, once che past and the present are given, the synthesis is given at ehe same time. Bu, in fact, the problem is elsewhere, Present and past, the former understood as the starting pone of an clan and the latter as the abject of an ob- servation, ane not characteristics of time. ft would be better to say1CISM AND SUBJECTIVITY that they are the products ofthe synthesis rather than its constieutive clements. But even this would not be exact. The truth of the matter is chat past and present are constituted within time, under the in- fluence of certain principles, and that the synthesis of time itself is nothing but this constiution, organization, and double affection. ‘This chen is the problem: how are a present and a past constituted within time? Viewed from this angle the analysis ofthe casa relation in its essential duality acguits is fll meaning. On one hand, Hume presents experience as a principle which manifests a multiplicity and a repetition of similar cass; literally, this principle affects the span of the past. On the other hand, he fnds in habie another principle inciting us to move from one object to a second which follows it— a principle which organizes time asa perpetual presen co which we can, and must, adape. Now, if we consult the distinctions established by Hume in his analysis of “the inference from the impression to the idea." we could offer a number of definitions. The understanding is the mind itself which, under the influence of experience, reflects time in the form of a past entity subject eo its observation. The imagination, under the influence of the principle of habit, is also the mind which reflects time asa determined farare filled with it anticipation. Belief isthe relation herween these two constituted dimensions. Ashe gives the formula of belief, Hume writes: “{the ewo principles conspiring) tw operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas in a ‘more intense an lively manner, than others, which are not attended with the same advantages." ‘We have just seen how time is transformed when the subject is constituted in the mind. We can now move on to the second point: ‘what happens to the organism? Earlier, the organism was presented as the mechanism only of distinee perceptions. Now, to sy thatthe subject is constituted in the mind amounts to saying that, under the influence of principles, the organism takes on 1 dual spontaneity. Fins, it takes ona spontaneity of relation. [U]pon our conception of any idea che animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces and raze up the other ideas, that are related to i."*! We have already said that for the animal spieits to find, in the neighboring eaces into ‘hich ehey ill ideas which ate ed vo che one thatthe mind wanted to see, i is, ist, necessary tha the ideas themselves he associate inthe mind. teisnecesary that the mechan sno distinet perceptions EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY be divided agai, in a ceria way, within the body itself dhrough a physi spomtanciy of relations spontaneity ofthe body that de pens on the same principles as sabjociviry. Earlier, the body was trerey the min, that iy the collection of iss and impresons taviaged from the point of view ofthe mechanism of thet distint production. Now, the body i the sibjecinelf ewiaged from the "ewpoint ofthe pontine ofthe lation that, unt thenfaenee Of pcp, eases bereen ides. On the ater hand ther iss spontncy of dipason. We have seen the importance tat Hume plies on the distinction between Swe Kindo impress ah of snaton ad ths of releion. Our etre problem depends on this, snc the impressions af sensation oly form te ind, giving itmersl an origin, whereas the imprenions of seflcton cotta the sujet in he mind di versely qualifying the ind at bec. Undoabedly, Hume presents these Inipresons of reflection as being pat of the collection, bu, Fist ofl, they met be formed. In thet Formation, they depend on 2 particular proces at on principles of alec." [Nor can theming by revving overs thousand mesa sides of enaton ever ent from them any new original idea, wnlas mature hs So rane fuse, hat 1 fl some na oiinal impesion are fom ‘ch «cvteplation "= “The problem, thus, s Lnowing which new dimension the prn- ciples of subjectivity confer upon the body when thy constate impresions of reflection inthe mind. The tmpesins of sensation sree defied by aneans of mechanism, and referred othe boy 2 1 procedie ofthis mechanism, The impresons of reflection are defined by means of spontncty or & duposion and are reterred tothe body athe biologial source of this spontancity. As hess the passions, Hume atalyzes this new dimension of the body. The organi is ispoued to produce pasions It has a dsposition which i proper and specific wo the pasion in question, at an “original internal movement." Thiss the ete with hunger this and sexual deste One could abject, nnetces, that not al pasons are like thee, Thee are psiony, ch pride snd hum, fove and hace, love beeen the sexes, joy and sadness, co which no pec boly dlipositonconesponds Inthe, natere doesnot produce pasins “iy ise immediacy,” Int must be sisted by the co-opention oer canes Teese ae maura yet ma orginal Heer[EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY in other words, the role of the bodily disposition is only taken up by an external objece which will produce passions in natural and determinable citcomstances, This means that, even in this case, we ‘an understand the phenomenon of the passions only through the corporeal disposition: "As narure has given to the body certain ap- petites and inclinations... she has proceeded in the same manner ‘with the mind."* But wht isthe meaning of disposition? Through the mediation of the passions, disposition spontaneously incites the appearance of an idea, namely, an idea of the objece corresponding tw the passion" ‘We are let with the lst, and more general, point of view: without any other criterion, we must compare the subject with the mind. ‘But because this point is the most general, italeady leads to the ‘second problem, mentioned earlier: what are the principles consti- tusing the subject in the mind? Whar factors will transform che rind? We have seen that Hume's answer i simple: what transforms the mind into a subjece and constitutes the subject in the mind are the principles of human nature. These principles are of two kinds: principles of asociation and principles of the passions, which, in some respects, we could present in the general form of the principle of utility. The subject isthe entity which, under the influence of the principle of utility, pursues 2 goal or an intention; it organizes means in view of an end and, under the influence of the principles of association, establishes relations anvong ideas. Thus, the collection becomes a system. The collection of perceptions, when organized and bound, becomes a system, ‘Let us examine the problem of relations. We should not debate fatile points; we do not have to ask: on the assumption that relations do not depend upon ideas, is ito ipso certain that they depend on the subject? This is obvious. If relations do noe have as their causes the properties of the ideas between which they are established, that is, f they have other causes, then these other causes determine subject which alone establishes relations. The relation of truth to subjectivity is manifested in che afiemation that a true judgment is ‘not a tautology. Thus, the truly fundamental proposition is that relations are external to ideas. And if they are external, the problem ‘of the subject, as tis formulated in empiricism, follows. It is wec= essary, in fact, co know upon what other causes these rations EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY pend, thar, how the subject costtuted in he collection of dss. Re~ Tavons ate external to theie terms. When James calls himself a pluralist, he docs not sy, im principle, anything cic. This is also the case when Russell calls himself a realist. We sein this statement the point common to all empiricism. Ris true that Hume distinguishes between two kinds of relations: “auch as may be chang’ without any change inthe ideas” (identity, temporal and spatial relations, causality), and those that “depend enttely on the ideas which we compare together” (cesemblance, contrariety degres of quality, and propositions of quantity and num” ber)" Te sccm thatthe latter are not, inthis sens, external t eas. ‘And this is exactly what Kant believed, when he criticized Hume for taking mathematics to be a system of analytic judgments. But ie is nothing of the sore. Every relation is external to ie terms [Lets consider, chat since quality elation, it sno, strictly speaking, property inthe figures themselves, but arises mercly fom the comparion, which the mind makes betwixt them.” ‘We have scen thatthe ideas can be considered in two ways, cl- lectively and individally,discributively and singly in the deter- ‘minable collection where their own modes of appearance place ther, and in their own characteristics. This isthe origin ofthe distinction between the two kinds of relations, Bue both ate equally external to the ideas. Let us examine the fist kind. Spatial and temporal relations (distance, contiguity, antcriorty, posteriorty, etc) give ws, verse forms the relation ofa variable objece with the trality ‘within which itis integrated, or with the structure where i mode ‘of appearance situates it. One might say, though, that the mind as such aleady provided us with the notions of distance and contig ity. This i tac, bur it was mcrely giving us a matte—not acta principlesto confront. Contiguous or distant objets do notin the least explain that distance and contiguity ae relation. Inthe mind, spice and time were only 3 composition. Under which inflacnce (ex. ternal to the mind, since the mind undetgocs ia they do, and finds im its constraine a constaney which ie itself does not poses) do they a relation? inality ofthe relsion appears even mote clearly in the problema of identry. Infact, the tcation here is a fio. We apply the idea of time to an imariable object, and we compate the rep resentation ofthe immutable abject with the soquence of our per_EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY ceptions.* And even more clearly we know that in the case of caus ality the relation is tanendence” If now, the relations ofthe second kind end to be more confusing, itis because this second kind relates, only the characteristics of two or more ideas being considered in dividually. Resemblance, inthe narrow sense ofthe tem, compares ‘qualities proportions compare quantities; the degrees of quality com- pate intensities. We should not be surprised that, in this case, the relations cannot change without [there being] «change inthe ideas. In fat, what i being considered, what gives che comparison its subject matter is specific objectively discernible idea and not a particular collection, efectively determinable but always abitear. ‘These relations are no less external. The resemblance between pa ticular ideas does not explain that resemblance is a relation, that is, that an idea can evoke he appearance ofa similar idea in the mind. The indivisblity of ideas doesnot explain thatthe unities consti= tured by them can be added, subeacted, made equal, or tha they an enter into sytem of operations. Nor does it explain thatthe lengths which they compose, in virtue of their arrangement, can be measured and evaluated. Here, we recognize the ewo distinct problems ‘of arithmetic and geometry. The relation always presupposcs sym Ahesis, and neither the idea nor the mind can account fori. The relation, ina way, designates “that paticlaeczcumstance in which «we may think proper to compare [two ideas)" To think proper” is the best expression; i i, in fic, a normative expression, “The problem is to find the norms of this judgment, ofthis decision, nd the norms of subjectivity. Inthe lst analysis, we will have to speak about Hume's woluntarism, but thea the problem would be to show the priniples of this wll which are independent ofthe char- acteristic ofthe mind. “These principles ae, first of al, those of asocaton: contiguity, resemblance, and causality. Evidently dhese notions should be given 2 meaning different from the ones given earlier, when they were presented only as examples of relations. Relations ae the fet ofthe Principles of asociation. These principles nataralize and give con- Sane the mind escems that each of them is specially addressed to one aspect of the mind: contiguity, to the senses; causality, to time; resemblance, 0 imagination.” ‘Their common point is the designation of 3 quality that leads che mind naturally fom oe ides to another” Werslealy Kiow the meaning thit we mut ie eo _EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY the term “quality.” ‘That an idea naturally introduces another is not 4 quality of the idea, bat rather a quality of human nature. Only human nature is qualifieatory. A collection of ideas will never explain how the same simple ideas ae regulatly grouped into complex ideas. des, “most suited to be united in a complex idea,” mus be designated to each one of us. These ideas are not designated within che mind without the mind becoming subject~a subject to whom chese ideas ate designated, a subject who speaks, Ideas ae designated inthe mind a the same time that the mind itself becomes subject. In short, the effects of the principle of association are complex ideas relations, substances and modes, general idess. Under the influence of the principles of association, ideas are compared, grouped, and evoked. This relation, or rather this intimacy, between complex ideas and the subject, such that one isthe inverse of the others, is presented tous in language; the subject, a8 she speaks, designates in some way ‘ideas which are in torn designated to het. Relations are external to theie terms. This means that ideas do rot account for the nature of the operations thar we perform on them, and especially ofthe relations that we establish aroong them. "The principles of human nature, or the principles of association, are the necessary conditions of relations. But has the problem been re- solved? When Hume defines the relation a “this particular circum- stance for the sake of which we think proper to compare two ideas,” hie adds: “even when the later are arbitrarily linked in the imagi- nation’”—that i, even when the one does not naturally introduce the ‘other, In fact, association is insufficient 0 explain relations. Un- ddoubtedly, ic alone makes them possible. Undoubtedly, ie accounts entirely for immediate ot ditect relations, chat is, chose that are ‘tablished between two ideas without the intervention of another idea of che collection, For example, it explains the relation berween two, immediately adjacent shades of blue, or between two contiguous objects, ete. Le us say that it explains that A™B and B=C; but it ddocs not explain that A=C or that distance itself is a relation.” Later, we will se that Home calls that which the asociation explains “natural relation," and that which it does not suffice to explain a “philosophical relation.” He insists heavily on this point: the char- acteristic of nature is to he natural, easy going, and immediate. In tnctations, i hoses its Force and vividness, that i its effet. Inter= + exhaust it and, to each one, it loses something of itself_EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY ‘Where the mind reaches not its cbjects with easiness and facility, che same principles have not the same effet asin a ‘more natal conception of the ideas; nor does the imagi- ration feel a sensation, which holds any proportion with that which arises from its common judgments and ‘opinions. How can the mediations (or the relations that are established beeween the most remote objects) be justified? Resemblance, Hume claims, doesnot always produce "s connexion or association of ideas. When a quality becomes very general, and is common to « great many individuals it leads notte mind dreclytanyone of them; but by presenting at once too great a choice, does thereby prevent the imagination from fixing ‘om any singe object” Most of the objections raised against associationism amount to this the principles of association explain, a bes, the form of chink~ ing in general and not its particulae contents. Association explains nly the surface or “the crust” of our consciousness. Writers as differene as Bergson and Pread converge on this point. Bergson, in a famous passage, writes: For we should seck in vain for two ideas which have not some point of resemblance, or which do not touch each ‘other somewhere. To take similarity first: however profound are the differences which separate «wo images, we shall al- ‘ways find, if we go back high enough, a common genus 10 which they belong, and consequently a resemblance which ray serve as 2 connecting link between them. ... This is as much as to say that between aay two ideas chosen 3¢ random there is always a resemblance, and albvays, ew contiguity; so chat when we discover telation of contiguity ‘or of resemblance between two successive ideas, We have in ‘no way explained why the one evokes the other. What we really nced to discover i how a choice is affected among at infinite number of recollections which all resemble in some sway the present perception, and why only one of chem this rather than that-emerges into che light of eosscious: [EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY. ‘The least that we can say is that Hume thoughe of it fis. his work, che association of ideas accounts effectively for habit of thought, everyday notions of good sens, entrnt ideas, and compless of ideas which corespond fo the most general and most constant needs common t all minds and all languages" What i does not account for is the diflerence heeween one mind and another. The specific progress ofa mind must be studied, and chere is an entire casuistry to be worked out: why does this perception evoke a specific idea, rather than another, in a particular consciousness at 2 particular moment? ‘The association of ideas does not explain that this idea has been evoked instead of another. It follows that, from thie point of view, we must define relation as“... that particular circumstance, in which, ever upon the arbitrary union of two ideas inthe fancy, we ray think proper to com pare them.” If ic is true that association is necessary in order t0 ‘make all relations in gencral possible, each particular relation is not in the least explained by the association. Circumstance gives the e- lation its sufficient reason. The notion “ctcumstance” appears constantly in Hume's phi- losophy. te is atthe center of istry and i makes possible a science of the pricular and a dferenial psychology. When Freud and Bergson demonstrate thatthe association of ideas explains only tha, ‘which is superficial in us, thats, ony the formalism of consciousness, they mean, essay, tha only affecrivty can justify che singulat content, the profound and the particular. And they ate right. But Hume has never said anything else. He merely thought ehat the superficial and the formal shold also be explained, and tha this ask ‘was, ina sense, the most important. And for the rest, he appeals co circumstance. This notion, for him, always refers co affecivity. We must take literally the idea that affecivty is 2 matte of circum- stances, These are precisely the variables that define our passions and four interests. Understood in this way, st of czeumstances always individuates a subject since i represents a sate of i pasions and needs, an allocation of its interest, 2 distibuton of its beliefs and cilartions" Asa resale, we se that the principles of ee pasions sous be combined with the principles of astociation in order forthe subject to constitute itself within the mind. If the principles of 3s- sociation explin chat ideas are associated, only the principles of the passions can explain hat a particular ide, rather than another, sICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY Circumstances are not only requited by relations; they are also re= aquired by substances and modes, as well as by general ideas. As the individuals ate collected together, and plc'd under 4a general tom witha view to that resemblance, which they bear to each other, this relation must facilitate cheir entrance in che imagination, and make them be suggested more read ily upon occasion... Nothing i more admirable, than ehe readiness, with which the imagination suggests its ideas, and presents them at she very instant, which thy become necesary or afl We see that, in al cases, the subject is presented in the mind under the influence of two kinds of combined principles. Everything takes place as if the principles of association provided che subject with its necessary form, whereas the principles of the passions pro= vided it with its singular content, The later function a8 the principle for the individuation of the subject. This duality, however, ds not signify an opposition becween the singular and the universal. The principles of the passions are no less universal or constant than the ‘others. They define laws in which circumstances only acts variables. They do indeed involve the individual, bur only in the precise sense in which a science of the individual can be, and is, developed. We must chen ak, inthe thd and last problem that remains to be solved, what is the difference between, and unity of, these two kinds of principles~a uniry that must be followed and disengaged form every step of this combined action. Yet, we can already, at last, foresee how this unity will manifest itself within the subject. Ifthe relation cannot be separated from the circumstances, ifthe subject cannot be . separated from the singular content which is strictly essential to i, itis because subjectivity is essentially practical. Its definitive unity that is, che unity of relations and circumstances will be revealed in the relations between motive and action, means and end. These re- lations, means-end, motive-ecton, are inded relations, bur they are alo sovtething more. The fact that there is no theoretical subjectivity, and that there cannot be one, becomes the fundamental claim of em- sm. And, if we examine it closely, it is merely another way of saying eh ehe subject is constituted within the given. If the subject is constituted within the given, then, in fat, ein is only 3 practi subject. six PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN NATURE Aromist sr theory of es, insofar as cltions are external to them. Associaton i the theory of tltons, insofar a laos are external to ies, in other word, insofar as they depend on ater Causes. Nove, in both cases, we have ten how much we mus dist the objection often ase psn Hume's emprcsn, We shoulda of coune, present Hue as an exceptional victim, who more th oer as fel che unaines of constant extcame The aes tae forall rear philosopher. We ace surprised by the objections onstandy raed against Desarter, Kat, Hegel et: Let ws ay that Plilosophical objections ae of ewo kind Most are philosophical in rare oly othe extent tha they ae crticms ofthe theory with fut any consideration ofthe nature ofthe problem to which the theory issespnding, ofthe problem which provides the coy with its foundation and srocure, Thus Hume is reproached forthe “omization of the given. Cis believe that an cote system ean be adequately denounced by showing is bai in Hume’ personal views; 4 puriclr taste of his own, or the spi of his time, What 2 philosopher say i ofced ai ie were what he ds ot as what he ints We are presented with tito paycology ofthe intentions atthe th sufcicne ert of the theory. therefore teat a ify pects sc iy ab sone wl fo chem “He spe