Professional Documents
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Rule 66-67 Cases Complete
Rule 66-67 Cases Complete
Facts:
On October 2, 2003, petitioner filed the Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunctive Writ before the RTC of Palawan against public
and private respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3854. Petitioner argued that
the designation of private respondent deprived her of her right to exercise her function and
perform her duties in violation of her right to security of tenure. Considering that petitioner was
appointed in a permanent capacity, she insisted that private respondent’s designation as OIC of
the PNS is null and void there being no vacancy to the position. Petitioner thus prayed that the
RTC issue an order granting the writ of quo warranto enjoining private respondent from
assuming the position of OIC of the PNS, declaring the questioned designation null and void and
without operative effect, and declaring petitioner to be entitled to the office of the principal of
the PNS.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has a right to institute this quo warranto proceeding as to the contested
public office and oust private respondent from enjoyment thereof
Ruling:
Yes. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the
contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person
who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office. It
may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to
such office. In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is
entitled to the subject public office. In other words, the private person suing must show a
clear right to the contested position. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to
undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed. It is not even
necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of his appointment, continues in
the undisturbed possession of his office.
Doctrine:
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public
office.
Facts:
Ombudsman charged respondent Del Castillo, Chief Accountant of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Accounting
Center of the AFP, with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The
Ombudsman alleged that Del Castillo made false statements in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities from 1996 to
2004 and that he acquired properties out of proportion to his salary. GHQ reassigned Del Castillo to the Philippine Air
Force (PAF) Accounting Center. Moro, then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy, took over the position of Chief
Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.
Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension for six months and eventually ordered his dismissal
from the service. The penalty imposed on him included cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government. Del Castillo filed a MR, which is pending to this date.
After the lapse of his six-month suspension Del Castillo attempted to reassume his former post. But, he was unable to
do so since Moro declined to yield the position. Del Castillo filed a petition for quo warranto against Moro with the
RTC. Del Castillo claimed that Moro was merely detailed as GHQ Chief Accountant when the Ombudsman placed
Del Castillo under preventive suspension. Since the latter’s period of suspension already lapsed, he was entitled to
resume his former post and Moro was but a usurper.
Moro pointed out in his Answer that his appointment as GHQ Chief Accountant was a permanent appointment.
Indeed, the GHQ had already reassigned Del Castillo to the PAF Accounting Center even before the Ombudsman
placed him under preventive suspension. RTC dismissed Del Castillo’s petition. Del Castillo filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. CA reversed the RTC Decision. With the denial of his MR, Moro filed this petition via Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ
Accounting Center that he once held.
Held:
No. An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed against one who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. It may be brought by the RP or by the person claiming to be
entitled to such office. In this case, it was Del Castillo who filed the action after his preventive suspension ended. He
argues that, assuming his reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center was valid, the same could not exceed one
year.
But, as Moro points out, he had been authorized under SO 91 to serve as GHQ Chief Accountant. Del Castillo, on the
other hand, had been ordered dismissed from the service by the Ombudsman. Consequently, he cannot reassume
the contested position.
Del Castillo of course insists, citing Lapid v. Court of Appeals that only decisions of the Ombudsman that impose the
penalties of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than a month or a fine of one month salary are
final, executory, and unappealable. Consequently, when the penalty is dismissal as in his case, he can avail himself
of the remedy of appeal and the execution of the decision against him would, in the meantime, be held in abeyance.
But, the Lapid case has been superseded by In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH. The Court held that an appeal shall not stop a decision of the Ombudsman from
being executory.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public
office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo
warranto may be dismissed. Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name months after the
Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service. The dismissal order was immediately executory even pending
appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo warranto or reassume the position of Chief
Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.
Rule 66
Case number 5/6
Munder vs. Comelec and Atty. Sarip
SERENO, J.:
Doctrine: If a petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy failed to comply with
the prescriptive period, his remedy after a candidate has been proclaimed is to file a quo warranto
action with the Regional Trial Court to prove that such candidate lacks the eligibility required by law.
Facts: Munder ran as mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and filed his CoC on Nov. 26, 2009. The last
day for filig the certificate of candidacy was on Nov. 30, 2009. Under Sec. 4 (A) (1) of the Comelec
Resolution 8689, a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be filed
within 5 days from the last day of filing of the COC but not later than 25 days from filing thereof.
Respondent Atty. Sarip likewise filed a COC vied for the same position in the same municipality.
On April 13, 2010 Sarip filed a petition for disqualification with the comelec on the ground that
Munder was not a registered voted of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that the latter’s application for
candidacy was not accomplished in full.
Sarip argued that the candidate Munder was different from the registered voter Munder since they
had different birth years. Consequently, according to Sarip, Munder did not posses the Qualification
to run as elective official and should be disqualified. Sarip filed his petition for Disqualification
pursuant to Resolution No. 8696 Sec. 4 (b) (1) and argued that he had timely filed the petition.
In the May 2010 elections, Munder won overwhelmingly. The Municipal board of canvassers of
Bubong, Lanao Del Sur, thus proclaimed Munde as Mayor.
Munder filed his answer and argued that false representations, dishonesty and mockery of justice
were not grounds for disqualification of a candidate under Comelece resolution no. 8696. In effect he
argued that Sarip availed himself of the wrong remedy and that the latter’s petition should be treated
as a Petition to Deny Due Cours or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, at the time Sarip filed his
petition, the said petition had already lapsed.
Issue: whether or not the petition for Disqualification is the proper remedy.
Held: No. Sarip’s remedy is not a petition for Disqualification, but a petition to Deny Due Course or to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy which must comply with the prescriptive period. Otherwise, his
remedy, after Munder has been proclaimed is to file a quo warranto action with the RTC to prove
that Munder lacks eligibility required by law.
Rule 67
NPC vs Samar
GR No. 197329 September 8, 2014
Del Castillo, J.
Doctrine: Violation of the procedural requirements under rule 67 waived the usual procedure
prescribed, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation
Facts:
Civil Case No. IR-2243
Sometime in 1990, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) with the RTC, seeking to
expropriate respondent Samar’s 1,020-square meter lot situated in San Jose (Baras), Nabua,
Camarines Sur which NPC needed for the construction of a transmission line.
The RTC directed the issuance of a Writ of Condemnation in favor of NPC. Accordingly, NPC
entered the subject lot and constructed its transmission line, denominated as Tower No. 83.
However, on July 12, 1994, the trial court issued another Order dismissing Civil Case No. IR-
2243 without prejudice for failure to prosecute because the committee failed to appraise the
reasonable value of the land. NPC did not appeal nor did commence the expropriation
proceeding.
On December 5, 1994, respondents filed with the same trial court a Complaint, for compensation
and damages against NPC relative to the subject lot which NPC took over but for which it failed
to pay just compensation on account of the dismissal of Civil Case No. IR-2243. Respondent
prayed for moral and exemplary damages.
As agreed by the parties during pre-trial, a panel of commissioners composed of one
representative each from the parties, and a third from the court was constituted for the purpose of
determining the value of the subject lot.
After conducting their appraisal, the commissioners submitted their individual reports. Atty.
Wenifredo Pornillos, commissioner for the respondents, recommended a valuation within the
range of P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per square meter. Lorenzo C. Orense, commissioner for NPC,
did not set an amount, although he stated that the lot should be valued at the prevailing market
prices of agricultural, and not residential, lands within the area. The court representative, Esteban
D. Colarina, proposed a P1,100.00 per square meter valuation.
Issue:
Whether or not just compensation for the expropriated property must be determined either as of
the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint.
Ruling:
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the
owner and appropriated by the government. However, if the government takes possession before
the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking
of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the filing of the
complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property
involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.
The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that ‘upon the rendition of the order of
expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons
as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken.
Records show that sometime in 1990, NPC filed an expropriation case docketed as Civil Case
No. IR-2243. However, in an Order dated July 12, 1994, the expropriation case was dismissed
by the RTC for failure of NPC to prosecute. Subsequently, or on December 5, 1994, respondents
filed Civil Case No. IR-2678 which is a complaint for compensation and recovery of damages.
Considering the dismissal of the expropriation case for failure of the NPC to prosecute, it is as if
no expropriation suit was filed. Hence, pursuant to the above-quoted ruling, NPC is deemed “to
have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule
67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation.” Nevertheless,
just compensation for the property must be based on its value at the time of the taking of said
property, not at the time of the filing of the complaint. Consequently, the RTC should have fixed
the value of the property at the time NPC took possession of the same in 1990, and not at the
time of the filing of the complaint for compensation and damages in 1994 or its fair market value
in 1995.
Doctrine:
The settled rule in expropriation proceedings is that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.
Although the appointment of commissioners is mandatory, the Rules do not impose any qualifications or restrictions
on the appointment, other than that the commissioners should not number more than three and that they should be
competent and disinterested parties.
Facts:
An expropriation proceeding was commenced by Napocor against respondents Spouses Salvador and Nenita Cruz,
and other sposes who are the owners of individual lots located in Del Monte Park Subdivision, Dulong Bayan, San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. A complaint was filed primarily sought the determination of just compensation due the
respondents.
RTC directed the Bulacan Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) "to review and submit an appraisal report on the
properties to be acquired by Napocor in order ‘to guide the Court in fixing the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to the
defendants.’ RTC allowed Napocor to take possession of the lots, after Napocor deposited an amount equivalent to
their assessed value.
PAC submitted its report to the RTC which pegged the just compensation at P2,200.00 per SQ M. After considering
the PAC’s report, the RTC issued an order fixing the just compensation at P3,000.00 per SQ M. Although the RTC
found the PAC’s recommended amount of P2,200.00 reasonable, it noted that an additional P800.00 was necessary
in view of the then prevailing economic crises and the devaluation of the peso.
Napocor appealed the RTC’s order with the CA. It assailed the appointment of the PAC, claiming that its appointment
was contrary to Rule 67 of the roc. It also alleged that the determination of the amount of just compensation was
without basis. CA affirmed but removed the additional P800. The CA instead imposed legal interest at 12% per
annum on the amount of just compensation. Its MR of the CA decision having been denied, Hence, the the present
petition.
Issue:
WON the the appointment of the PAC as commissioners was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
No. The settled rule in expropriation proceedings is that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.
To assist the courts in this task, Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court requires the appointment of "not more than
three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." Although the appointment of commissioners is mandatory, the
Rules do not impose any qualifications or restrictions on the appointment, other than that the commissioners should
not number more than three and that they should be competent and disinterested parties.
Court finds that the appointment of the PAC as commissioners substantially complies with Section 5, Rule 67 of the
ROC. It is immaterial that the RTC appointed a committee instead of three persons to act as commissioners, since
the PAC is composed of three members – the Provincial Assessor, the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial
Treasurer. Considering their positions, we find each member of the PAC competent to perform the duty required of
them, i.e., to appraise the valuation of the affected lots. The mere fact that they are government officials does not
disqualify them as disinterested persons, as the provincial government has no significant interest in the case. Instead,
what we find material is that the PAC was tasked to perform precisely the same duty that the commissioners, under
Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, are required to discharge. If Napocor found the appointment of the PAC to
be objectionable, it should have filed its objections early on and not belatedly raise them in its appeal with the CA.
Instead, Napocor belatedly raised its objections only in its appeal with the CA.
AS TO THE COMPENSATION
We find untenable Napocor’s claim that the amount of just compensation was without factual and legal basis. That
the properties were valued at P427.76 per square meter in 1996, then at P2,200.00 in 1997 does not necessarily
indicate that the assessment by the PAC was manipulated. Napocor itself acknowledge an increase in the value of
the properties when it modified its offered settlement from P427.76 to P1,900.00. Also, the LBP Appraisal Report,
which Napocor itself commissioned, has pegged the fair market value of the properties at P2,200.00 per square
meter. The report considered important improvements in the vicinity, among them, the construction of a school, a
church and several public buildings. If Napocor had any objections on the amount of just compensation fixed in the
commissioners’ report, its remedy was to file its objections within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice of the report.
We note that not only did it belatedly file its objections to the appointment of the PAC and to the commissioners’
report; it also failed to submit copies of the compromise agreement with the CA despite the numerous extensions it
requested. Significantly, the execution of the compromise agreement, by itself, did not enjoin the CA from resolving
the appeal. By its terms and as found out by the CA, the compromise agreement required the approval of the CA for it
to take effect. Thus, Napocor can no longer assail the CA’s authority to resolve the appeal after it consistently failed
to furnish the CA a copy of the agreement.
The questions of Atty. Pedro Principe's representation and his entitlement to attorney's fees, insofar as the
respondents are concerned, are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15, for
resolution. The trial court is hereby ordered to resolve these matters with due haste.
Facts:
YCLA Sugar Development Corporation (YCLA) is the registered owner of three parcels of land
situated in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro.
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) in order to complete its Grid Project in Puerto
Galera, Oriental Mindoro, NPC had to construct transmission lines that would traverse several
private properties, including the said parcels of land owned by YCLA.
NPC filed a Complaint for expropriation with the RTC against YCLA and several other
individuals. The NPC sought the expropriation of a portion of the parcels of land owned by the
said defendants for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over areas that would be
affected by the construction of transmission lines. The portion of YCLA’s properties that would
be affected by the construction of NPC’s transmission lines has an aggregate area of 5,846
square meters.
YCLA filed its Answer alleging that the Complaint should be dismissed outright due to NPC’s
failure to allege the public use for the intended expropriation of its properties.
The parties moved, inter alia, for the constitution of a Board of Commissioners to be appointed
by the RTC to determine the reasonable amount of just compensation to be paid by the NPC.
Board of Commissioners submitted its Report, which fixed the amount of just compensation of
the subject properties at P500.00 per sq m. YCLA objected to the amount recommended by the
Board of Commissioners, claiming that the amount of just compensation should be fixed
at P900.00 per sq m considering the improvements in their properties.
YCLA filed a motion asking the RTC to direct the Board of Commissioners to conduct an ocular
inspection over the subject properties On September 15, 2003, the Board of Commissioners
submitted its second Report, which fixed the just compensation of the subject properties
at P1,000.00 per sq m. justified by its location on strategic place and the consequential damages
to the whole properties of the defendants because the plaintiff occupied the front portion along
the highway.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of
just compensation of the subject properties.
Ruling:
No. It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking,
which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution
of the action precedes entry into the property, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of
the time of the filing of the complaint.
The trial court, in expropriation cases, may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the
report submitted by the Board of Commissioners, which is merely advisory and recommendatory
in character. It may also recommit the report or set aside the same and appoint new
commissioners. In this case, the lower courts gave full faith and credence to the Board of
Commissioners' Report dated September 15, 2003 notwithstanding that it was not supported by
any documentary evidence.
Considering that the legal basis for the determination of just compensation for the subject
properties is insufficient, the respective Decisions of the RTC and the CA should be set aside.
Case be remanded to the trial court for proper determination of the just compensation.
Doctrine:
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character.
Facts:
Petitioner Masikip is the owner of a parcel of land located at Caniogan, Pasig City.
The Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her
property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. Respondent
wrote another letter, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program to provide land opportunities to deserving
poor sectors of our community."
Petitioner sent a reply stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area
of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."
Respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to
its poor residents." Respondent filed with the TC a complaint for expropriation. Respondent prayed that the TC, after due notice and
hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the
just compensation; Petitioner filed a MTD the complaint on the following grounds:
IPLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, CONSIDERING THAT:
(A) NO GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE PROPERTY
(B) ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY CHOSEN THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED.
(C) EVEN ASSUMING THAT DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY MAY BE EXPROPRIATED BY PLAINTIFF, THE FMV OF THE
PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED FAR EXCEEDS P78,000.00
TC issued an Order denying the MTD on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports
and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig. As to the just compensation, the TC held that the same is to be determined
in accordance with the ROC. Petitioner filed a MR but it was denied. It appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City
as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
for certiorari,
Issue:
1. WON CA erred in holding that the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged
in the complaint, specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property for public use.
(Procedural issue)
2. WON there is genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. (substantive)
Held:
1. Yes. Petitioner filed her MTD the complaint for expropriation in 1995. It was denied by the trial court in 1996. At that time, the rule
on expropriation was governed by Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. – Within the time specified in the summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single motion
to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his property for the use or purpose specified
in the complaint. All such objections and defenses not so presented are waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on the plaintiff’s attorney of
record and filed with the court with proof of service."
The MTD contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes the responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the
complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate. The CA therefore
erred in holding that the MTD filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, "specifically
that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property for public use." Pursuant to the above Rule, the motion is a
responsive pleading joining the issues. What the TC should have done was to set the case for the reception of evidence to
determine whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property.
Significantly, the above Rule allowing a defendant in an expropriation case to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer was
amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly mandates that
any objection or defense to the taking of the property of a defendant must be set forth in an answer. The fact that the CA rendered
its Decision on October 31, after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, is of no moment. It is only fair that the Rule at the
time petitioner filed her MTD should govern. The new provision cannot be applied retroactively to her prejudice.
2. Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the
compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking. In this case, petitioner
contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property.
While she does not dispute the intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine necessity for the
proposed use and purposes. According to petitioner, there is already an established sports development and recreational activity
center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being utilized by its residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan.
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public
character. Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute
but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public.
we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property.
The certification issued by the Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 authorizing the expropriation,
indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization,
not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private
playground and recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not public. The
necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community
recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
Facts:
NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc (PIATCO) was nullified.
Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through
expropriation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that a mere deposit
of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government depository is enough for the
entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court).
However, respondents avers that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued, direct
payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA No. 8974
and a related jurisprudence (2004 Resolution).
Issue:
WON expropriation can be conducted by mere deposit of the assessed value of the property.
Ruling:
No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after direct
payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of fairness. The same
principle applied in the 2004 Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest expropriation law (RA No.
8974)
SERENO, CJ.:
Doctrine:
The court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of
ownership of the land sought to be condemned
Facts:
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DPWH filed a Complaint against several defendants, including private
respondents, for the expropriation of several lands affected by the construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue
Flyover. Private respondents, Spouses Genato, are the registered owners of a piece of land.
During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter Engr. Gatan, reporting that the subject property
was "government land and that the TCT of the said claimant respondent is of fabrication as it encroached or
overlapped on a government property." As a result, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint seeking to limit the
coverage of the proceedings to an area conforming to the findings of the DPWH.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to have the subject property "declared or considered of uncertain
ownership or subject to conflicting claims. RTC admitted petitioner’s Amended Complaint, deferred the release to
respondents the amount of P18,400,000 deposited in the bank, equivalent to the current zonal value of the land, and
declared the property as the subject of conflicting claims.
While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the subject property actually belonged to the Government,
private respondents interposed objections saying that petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence, as it
constituted a collateral attack on the validity of their TCT.
TC finds that the issue of the validity of the TCT can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose
and not in this instant proceeding. Accordingly, plaintiff is barred from presenting evidence as they constitute
collateral attack. Petitioner filed a MR but the motion was denied by the RTC. Private respondents filed a Motion for
the payment of just compensation amounting to 20,700,000 and for the release of P18,400,000. This Motion remains
pending in the RTC. Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity of respondents’ title
Held:
No. Petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its ownership over the subject property, but for the sole
purpose of determining who is entitled to just compensation.
Petitioner argues that under Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, if the ownership of a property to be
expropriated is uncertain, the court in the same expropriation proceeding is also given authority to make a proper
adjudication of the matter. Section 9 of Rule 67 reads:
SECTION 9. Uncertain Ownership. Conflicting Claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part
thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the
persons adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the
defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.
This view is allegedly supported by Republic v. CFI of Pampanga, in which the TC hearing the expropriation
proceeding was also allowed to resolve the issue of ownership.
SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified,
or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
This being an in rem proceeding, "plaintiff Republic of the Philippines seeks the relief, both in the original and
amended complaints, to transfer to plaintiff the titles to said parcels of land together with their improvements free from
all liens and encumbrances. For this particular purpose, the expropriation suit is essentially a direct proceeding."
The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to
determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned, must be resolved in
the affirmative. That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned or
sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case is evident.
By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is taking title to and
possession of the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.