Review: On Reappraising Ancient Chinese Philosophy

Reviewed Work(s): The Concept of Man in Early China by Donald J. Munro

Review by: Henry Rosemont, Jr.
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr., 1971), pp. 203-217
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1397787
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On reappraising ancient Chinese philosophy

The Concept of Man in Early China, by Donald J. Munro. Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 1969. Pp. xi + 256. $7.50.

jen chih ch'u, hsing pen shana

At birth man's basic nature is good.

Thus begins San Tzu Chingb, the first McGuffey Reader for school children in
imperial China. As he memorized the lines, each young pupil was being incul-
cated with rationalist philosophical principles first elaborated systematically
during the latter half of the Chou dynasty. To anyone inculcated with the
empiricist-behaviorist principles of contemporary Western philosophy and psy-
chology, these ancient Chinese views will undoubtedly seem quaint and in-
teresting, but of little use for advancing our objective understanding of the
zoological species sapiens, genus Homo. Rationalist principles in any form,
with their emphasis on mind, human nature, and reason, have been distinctly
unfashionable in philosophical circles for several decades, with theoretical ef-
forts to eliminate the mental ghost from the physical machine being legion.1
Hence a book devoted to the treatment of these topics in early China will have
difficulty in attracting a philosophical audience and will probably be considered
the privileged property of East Asian classicists and ancient historians.
But it is not clear that the empiricist exorcisms have been successful, leaving
only the bare (Turing) machine. Rationalist heretics, drawing heavily from
researches in transformational-generative grammar, are suggesting that the
ghost is not only very much alive but also is giving strong evidence of its
existence by executing rather complex feats of linguistic behavior.2 As these
antiestablishment malcontents continue to gain converts, it is becoming increas-
ingly clear that issues revolving around man's innate characteristics and
mental faculties are returning to the forefront of philosophical concern, and,
consequently, studies of Chinese philosophical critiques of those issues might
well prove to be of topical as well as antiquarian interest.

Henry Rosemont, Jr. is a member of the Department of History and Philosophy of Ed-
ucation, University of Illinois (Urbana). AUTHOR'S NOTE: This review article was written
at the request of the late Richard H. Robinson. I would like to dedicate it with respect
and affection to the memory of that outstanding scholar and unorthodox gentleman.
1 Skinner may be taken as paradigmatic for the psychologists, from his Behavior of Or-
ganisms (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938) to Verbal Behavior (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957). A good philosophical example is Gilbert Ryle's The
Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1964).
2 The arch-heretic being Noam Chomsky, whose writings have contributed heavily to the
"movement" both in linguistics and in philosophy. In the former field, see Syntactic Struc-
tures (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1957) ; for the latter, Language and Mind (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968). Falling midway between is his Cartesian Linguistics
(New York: Harper & Row, 1966). Equally relevant philosophically are the works of
Jerrold Katz: The Philosophy of Language (New York: Harper & Row, 1966) and
Semantic Theory (forthcoming).

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 204 Rosemont

Unfortunately, the potential currency of ancient Chinese thought is not easily

discernible in The Concept of Man in Early China (hereafter cited as CMEC).
Although the general tenor of the entire work is philosophical, Munro does lit-
tle to make the Confucian and Taoist views he discusses come alive philosoph-
ically. Rather, his discussions of those views give the impression that they are
not very significant or relevant for any contemporary philosophical problems,
an impression which is exacerbated by his overall portrayal of the whole of an-
cient Chinese thought as being relatively uncritical when compared to ancient
Western philosophy. This circumstance is all the more unfortunate when it is
seen that Munro's historical approach, analyses, and conclusions offer a series
of incisive challenges to many stereotyped interpretations of Chou thought.
The reviewer's general evaluation of the book may thus be summarily stated
at the outset: CMEC displays sound scholarship and original thinking in the
treatment of many difficult historical problems, but, the competence of his re-
searches notwithstanding, Munro continues rather than reverses the trend to-
ward "museumifying"3 Chou philosophy.
With historical elements as a backdrop, this review will focus on the philo-
sophical strengths and weaknesses of CMEC with the aim of demonstrating
that philosophy in general will remain the poorer until the "museumification"
process of Chou philosophy is arrested. Part I will take up briefly the form
and structure of the book; in Part II, Munro's major historical theses and
methodological approach will be outlined, after which some selected issues of
controversial interpretation will be examined by concentrating on his treatment
of the Confucian Hsiin Tzu in Part III. In conclusion, Part IV will argue that
many of Munro's general views and attitudes are mistaken or misleading, and,
consequently, are counterproductive for furthering philosophical interest in the
field.
Because of the critical tone of much that follows, it should be reiterated here
that, in the opinion of the present reviewer, CMEC is a good book; if the opin-
ion were otherwise, it obviously would make little sense to criticize Munro for
not producing an excellent one.

CMEC is not as narrow or specialized a work as the title suggests. In it one

will find problems discussed which relate directly to, and are often directed to-
ward, workers in such diverse fields as philosophy, education, history, contem-
porary politics, and etymology (the list is not exhaustive). Thus the form and
structure of the book require comment, because any attempt to write for a mul-

The term was employed, in a very similar context, by the late Joseph Levenson in
"The Place of Confucius in Communist China," in History in Communist China, ed. A.
Feuerwerker (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969).

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205

tiplicity of audiences has dangers which must be circumvented, if interdisci-

plinary benefits are to be gained. Munro's presentations often make the cir-
cumvention (and this review) difficult.
Probably the initial reaction of each reader to the book will be that it was
written for someone else. A philosopher trained in contemporary problems will
look for the substance and development of the central Chinese ideas and be less
interested in such lengthy discussions as the breakdown of feudalism during
the ch'un-ch'iue and chan kuod periods (pp. 2-11, 37-40, 111, etc.), or the ex-
tent to which specific historical institutions were or were not an embodiment
of early Confucian principles (e.g., pp. 85-86, 94, 106). Attending carefully to
these discussions, on the other hand, the student of Chinese history will wish
they were longer and might well be perplexed by the extensive treatment ac-
corded early Greek philosophy, illustrated by the fact that Plato is cited twenty-
four times in the index, and Confucius, eighteen. The student of Chinese
philosophy will have some impatience with the discussions and treatment of
both of these topics, for they regularly interrupt Munro's development of many
original and provocative insights. For example, in arguing the important point
that model-emulation was a cardinal tenet of Chinese pedagogy because of the
Confucians' concern with the "behavioral-value" of a belief, Munro says:

In education, the Confucians felt that men chiefly needed to learn how to dis-
tinguish what should or should not be done in human society. Hence training
concentrated on either the imitation of living models of conduct or on the read-
ing of books describing how models of conduct (good and evil) had behaved
in the past; it did not concern itself with the study of natural phenomena and
laws simply for the sake of understanding more about them. (P. 51)

This idea clearly has important implications for education and ethics in Chi-
nese philosophy and for such issues as the obscure but never-forgotten "why
China didn't develop science" question in Chinese history. But rather than de-
veloping some concrete Chinese ramifications of this view, Munro begins the
next paragraph: "A comparison with Platonic thought should illuminate the
overriding behavioral concern in the early Confucian doctrine" (p. 52). The
Platonic digression proceeds for two-and-a-half pages but is more tenebrific
than illuminating, as Munro himself must suspect when he says near the end
of it: "Plato was not especially concerned with the Confucian idea of model-
emulation" (p. 54).4

4 Moreover, it is not clear that Plato was not concerned with model-emulation. Munro
notes that Plato excluded Homer, Hesiod, and other Greek culture heroes from his cur-
riculum, but he does not note that Plato did so because they were improper models:
Then we must not only compel our poets, on pain of expulsion, to make their poetry the
express image of noble character.... We would not have our guardians grow up among
representations of moral deformity.... Rather we must seek out those craftsmen whose
instinct guides them to whatsoever is lovely and gracious; so that our young men, dwelling
in a wholesome climate, may drink in good from every quarter. (Republic, trans. F.
Cornford [New York: Oxford University Press, 1959], p. 90.)

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 206 Rosemont

Pointing out that the idea(s) under discussion in CMEC are often diffused
is not intended to be merely a stylistic criticism; in attempting to serve many
disciplinary masters at once, Munro occasionally serves none well. As stated
earlier, his work constitutes a multiple challenge to much traditional scholar
ship on the Chou. These challenges all deserve to be taken seriously, but wi
not be if they are not well focused. Similarly, the manifold thrusts of the Chi-
nese views can be obscured for the philosopher if the presentation is too regu-
larly interrupted by comparative discussions of Western thought, with whic
the philosopher should already be familiar; hence the sympathetic reader
frustration whenever Munro does not solidly ground his views in the ancien
Chinese philosophical soil before transporting them to Greece or elsewhere.

II

Turning now to the contents of the book, we see Munro's most general thesis
is that the early Confucians and Taoists believed there were "common attri-
butes shared by all men at birth" (p. 1). The two schools differed on what
those common attributes were, but they both did advocate, according to Munro,
a doctrine of natural equality among men, and this doctrine had far-reaching
ramifications for the course of Chinese history and philosophy. The failure of
scholars to see this important theme in Chinese thought is not only owing to
the fact that the Confucians advocated a hierarchical social order but is also
owing to an ambiguity attending the use of the word 'equality.' "All men are
equal" can be taken, on the one hand, as a socio-political demand: being of
equal worth, all men should receive equal treatment; on the other hand, it can
be taken as a description-with details to be filled in-of the basic constitution
of human beings. Munro holds that the former interpretation was the common
one in Western thought, with the latter characterizing the Chinese view.
In developing the implications of this general view, Munro offers a number
of fresh and interrelated ideas about Confucianism and Taoism, each of which

The main point here, however, is not whether Munro is right or wrong in this interpre-
tation of Plato; rather, the point is that he does not make it clear in his work that it is
an interpretation. When discussing the Chinese views, he carefully notes the hypothetical
nature of his account but turns to pure exposition when considering the Greeks, giving
the distinct impression that the views he attributes to Plato and others have been settled
upon by all, which is not the case. For example, Karl Popper has argued that the poets
were banned in order to make the young more conscious of class discipline (The Open
Society and its Enemies, 2 vols. [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962], I, 53). On
the other hand, A. E Taylor in his Plato: The Man and His Work (Cleveland: World
Publishing Co., 1961) argues that the poets were banned so that the "taste and imagina-
tion" of the young would be refined, which lead them toward the good (pp. 278-280).
Both commentators do agree, however, that Plato banned the poets because he wanted
the young to emulate only proper models. A number of Munro's other discussions of
Greek philosophy involve similarly controversial issues and should have been noted as such.

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207

is worthy of comment. The resultant commentary, however, would be consid-

erably longer than the original work, and, thus, the scope and content of those
implications can only be sketched herein, with more detailed discussions of
some of them to follow.
Among his more significant views on the Confucians are the following: they
held a doctrine of natural equality because they believed all men to be equally
possessed of a mental faculty which discriminated ethical relationships; it fol-
lows that they held man to be perfectible, with education playing the central
role in achieving perfection; the descriptive doctrine of equality and the doc-
trine of perfection are both compatible with the Confucians' insistence on a
hierarchically-ordered society; because the ethical life had to be lived as well as
taught, they argued for and employed model-emulation as the foundation of
their pedagogy; on all of these views and their significant ramifications Men-
cius and Hsiin Tzu were in agreement; and the Confucian emphasis on these
principles remains in the People's Republic of China.
And about the Taoists, he holds that they, too, held a doctrine of natural
equality, believing all men equally possessed of (a part of) the Taoe; this
equality has no other ethical consequence than that no man can or should judge
another; although they disagreed on many crucial issues, the Taoists and Con-
fucians held very similar views of the summum bonum of human existence,
namely, the achievement of inner tranquillity (nei shengf) and a union be-
tween self and other (wai wangS) ; the agreement between the two schools on
natural equality and the ultimate goals of self-cultivation gave a unifying theme
to Chinese philosophical perspectives on human nature, which will continue to
exert an influence for some time to come.

Concurrence with many of Munro's historical interpretations is facilitated by

his method of working with the classical texts. He breaks significantly with
much traditional scholarship by trying to see the Chou philosophical writings
as they were written, rather than being forced to squint through the lenses
ground by the Sung Neo-Confucians:

The problems of grasping what was actually being said in the Chou works are
enormous, and often insurmountable; but the student should still try to under-
stand these works on their own terms, for the failure to do so has already ne-
gated much of the practical value of the scholarship done on the classical period
by preventing both adequate description of that period and adequate evaluation
of subsequent trends. (Pp. viii-ix)

This approach is not altogether new (e.g., Waley's The Way and Its Power)5
but is nevertheless uncommon. If successful, it not only enhances our knowl-
edge of the Chou but of the Sung as well: the juxtaposition of text and inter-
pretation should obviously tell us something about the interpreters.

5 (New York: Grove Press, n.d.)

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208 Rosemont

In general, Munro's careful etymological work validates his efforts to s

step the Neo-Confucians. His analysis of the central theme and variatio
found in the development of the concept of teh is based largely on West Chou
bronzes, and his conclusion is convincing. In opposition to those who hold
magical, or manalike, "power" view of te (which includes just about eve
one), Munro argues that te denoted an unwavering attitude toward traditi
ally prescribed norms, an attitude regularly exemplified by behavior which w
no less unwaveringly in accord with those norms. The shift in interpretation
subtle but significant. For by divesting te of its magical connotations, Mu
is able to use the relevant texts to strengthen his case for the centrality
model-emulation in Confucian education: "many scholars . .. regard. .. p
sages describing the reaction by some people to the te of another as reference
to the mana's magical power of attraction. In fact, the passages should be
plained in terms of the assumption that people are attracted to and seek to em
ulate virtuous models .. ." (p. 102).
Similarly persuasive is Munro's treatment of hsingI. Disputing the thes
that either the hsinJ element or the shengk was primary, he argues that
term's meaning was a function of both elements and that it "referred to
regular behavior of a given thing, especially to actions unique to the speci
(p. 81). Again his analysis has import beyond the field of etymology, for
unique behavior of jen-hsing1, he maintains, is the utilization of an "evaluatin
mind," the foundation of the Confucian view of natural equality.6
Somewhat less convincing is Munro's treatment of the "evaluating min
itself. The term he translates in this way is simply hsin. Similarly, in is trans
lated as "sense of fitting duty," and chihn as "moral knowing." With regard to
hsin, "evaluating mind" is a plausible reading, and because this reading is
timately woven into his overall analysis of the Confucian concept of man
should be accepted at least tentatively. The difficulty is that Munro's int
pretation of hsin has an air of circularity about it when i and chih are un
consideration. As indicated earlier, Munro maintains that the Confucian p
losophers were primarily concerned with the behavioral implications of a belie
and, specifically, with the ethical consequences of that behavior. On this
count, to know is to know how to behave morally. However, by translati
chih as "moral knowing" Munro cannot cite texts to prove that his interpreta-
tion is correct, for any translation must assume that it is; and a similar ar

6 One small point should be noted with regard to hsing. Munro's analysis entails t
in the earliest extension of its meaning, sheng was restricted to denoting the regular
definitive behavior of human beings, and only later was it further extended to refe
the definitive behavior or qualities of any and all things. If the development of the t
was otherwise, it would be difficult to explain why the hsin element, rather than so
other, was eventually added. This chronology is probably correct, but no textual sou
have been cited to show that it is.

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209

ment applies to i. Ultimately, then, the justification for his interpretation must
be philosophical (which would not make it any less genuine). Curiously
enough, Munro could have made a philosophical appeal to another of his theses
to strengthen his case for regarding chih as "moral knowing." He argues else-
where in the book that the early Confucians read their value (moral) concepts
into the natural order and that they believed their hierarchical and other ethical
relationships were exemplified in nature. If this thesis is true (it will be argued
later that probably it is not), it would imply that all knowledge, broadly con-
strued, was indeed moral knowledge-even knowledge ostensibly about the
physical universe. But, although this implication does follow, it is not one that
Munro makes explicit.

III

We turn now to Hsiin Tzu, who has traditionally received, to und

case, a bad press. Although acknowledged on all sides to have been
most original and systematic thinkers ancient China produced, he has
less been ignored or vilified by almost all of his Chinese peers for
centuries; and in spite of the efforts of a few Western students o
remains virtually unknown in contemporary philosophical circles
response to Hsiin Tzu and his philosophy is the following from H
"There was no lack of intellectual power; Hsun Tzu was, without
tion, one of the most brilliant philosophers the world has ever pr
he lacked faith in humanity. This flaw, like the fatal weakness of the
Greek tragedy, went far to nullify his best efforts. It not only bligh
fame but did much to impose upon later Confucianism a strait jac
demic orthodoxy."7 And coupled with his apparent misanthropy a
tarianism has been the almost unlimited opprobrium he has accum
having been the tutor of those archenemies of Confucianism, the
Fei and the book-burning Li Ssu.
Happily, CMEC is a first step toward showing that Hsiin Tzu's m
fate has been totally undeserved. In the first place, Munro argues
famous jen chih hsing o? dictum traditionally attributed to Hsiin Tzu
been a later interpolation, but that even if it was not, the view was n
significance to his philosophy: "First, there are no other referen
as evil in the remainder of the work, which would be unusual if i
an important idea in the thought of Hsun Tzu. Second, the theme
Hsun Tzu is concerned is quite evident: how to achieve a balance
which are in short supply, and human desires, which are extremely n
without demanding asceticism of anyone" (p. 78). To the careful

7Chinese Thought: From Confucius to Mao Tse-tung (New York: Mentor

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210 Rosemont

Hsiin Tzu, it is abundantly clear that Munro is correct and that Creel and
most all other interpreters of Chinese philosophy have missed the point: it wa
not that Hsiin Tzu distrusted his fellowmen as much as he distrusted the nat-
ural environment of China to provide an adequate supply of the basic neces-
sities of life for the Chinese people. Munro stresses the point: "Hsun Tzu's
entire political theory stems from his recognition of the mutual involvement of
things (in short supply) and desires (in surfeit). This-and not the popularly
quoted views on the evil nature of man-is the core of Hsun Tzu's thought"
(p. 90).
It is unfortunate that Munro did not link this preoccupation with economic
well-being to Hsiin Tzu's emphasis on lip, for the two are interconnected. As
Hsiin Tzu says: "The early kings . . . established the li . . . so that desires
would not exceed material things, and material things would be sufficient to
satisfy desires; desires and things would thus be in consonance. It was in this
way that the li arose."8 Had Munro attended to this interconnectedness, he
could have strengthened his exposition of the Confucians' rejection of material
benefit in favor of the "right" and the "proper" (pp. 91-95), for the li serve a
dual educational function in channeling men's desires: (a) by establishing
goals (norms) for each social level, it is insured that not everyone will desire
the same thing at the same time, increasing the probability that everyone will
realize a certain percentage of his goals; (b) by shifting attention away from
material goods, Hsiin Tzu again increases the probability-especially among
the literati-that goals will be reached and desires satisfied. Thus, if every
budding official desires five thousand mouq of land, many of them will be
frustrated in their desire, and many more farmers would suffer great hardship;
on the other hand, every young scholar can achieve his goal if he desires to
win fame as a moral exemplar, or write poetry, or hear good music, or con-
template the beauty of a ritual state sacrifice. These educational views might
be considered with profit by contemporary educators, for Hsiin Tzu is clearly
attempting to replace material incentives (money, land, etc.) with nonmaterial
incentives (e.g., peer and self-esteem) in providing motivation for intellectual
development and social service in his students. In some countries (e.g., the
United States), material incentives are declining in importance, and in others
(e.g., China) they are largely unavailable; Hsiin Tzu may have something to
say to all concerned.
Munro rightly points out that Hsiin Tzu held social organizations to be a
unique quality of man (pp. 77-78, 157-58), but here again the li are relevant,
for they are the basic "stuff" out of which Hsiin Tzu builds his ideal society.
The beauty of human behavior must ultimately reside in interpersonal rela-
tionships, especially as those relations are defined by a rich cultural heritage

8 Hsun Tsu chi-chieh, Ssu-pu chi-yao, ed. Li lun p'ien, 30.

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211

which has the pragmatic concomitance of stimulating cooperative efforts in the

economic sphere. One man cannot build the Great Wall or a dike to stem the
floodwaters of the Huang Ho; but together men can build for military security
and economic productivity. When the relations that form the cement of these
cooperative efforts are also seen to have strong psychological or religious
effects (either term being applicable), the scope and cohesiveness of Hsiin
Tzu's entire philosophy becomes all the more impressive.
It is necessary to emphasize these elements of Hsiin Tzu's philosophy for
their philosophical importance might otherwise be obscured. In Western
thought, for example, the fundamental political question has traditionally been
stated: given that men are basically free in a "state of nature," what constraints
can justifiably be placed on their liberty by the state? Hsiin Tzu, on the other
hand, saw that, without large-scale public works projects, the reluctant
Chinese soil would not nurture the population, and hence put the question
another way: given that men must be basically constrained in order to survive,
how much freedom can the state justifiably allow? In attending to these stark
economic realities, Hsiin Tzu faced squarely and attempted to answer a
philosophical question that has all too often been begged by his Western
counterparts.
An interesting and salutary consequence of Munro's treatment of Hsiin Tzu
is that Master Hsiin and Mencius were not as far apart on their views as
traditional accounts would lead us to believe. More important here than the
details of the argument (pp. 74-80) is their bracing impact. Standard inter-
pretations of Confucianism treat Mencius as representing the "idealistic wing,"
and Hsiin Tzu, the "realistic wing." It is further maintained in these inter-
pretations that the two philosophers often contradict each other. Hence they
are both portrayed as followers of a man whose views were shot through with
inconsistencies, which is rather a left-handed compliment to pay to any of the
three, and certainly is not conducive to stimulating philosophical interest in
any of their views. The question of what is ascribed to a thinker when he is
designated a Confucian is still a difficult one, but Munro has cleared the air a
great deal.
Less pollution-free is Munro's attempt to use Hsiin Tzu as support for the
view that the Confucians believed their hierarchical ethical relationships (the
li) to be exemplified in nature. The issue is of no philosophical significance-
except that it attributes a fairly naive monism to the Confucians-and does
not seem to be historically correct. Munro adduces only three textual quota-
tions as evidence for his claim. The first is from the Hsiao Chingr and is therein
attributed to Confucius, but the work dates from early Han and, therefore,
cannot be relied upon for giving us an account of the views of the earlier
Confucians. The second quote is taken from the Tso Chuan, which is an early
enough text, but the crucial passage was interpolated by Legge, who was guided

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212 Rosemont

by the interpretations of the Neo-Confucian Chu Hsi in his translations of the

classics. The third citation, to the effect that the li are found in nature, is fr
the writings of Hsiin Tzu, is the only one of its kind, and is flatly incompatib
with those other of Hsiin Tzu's writings in which the sage-kings are pra
for having produced the li. In these latter passages from Hsiin Tzu, the t
terms used by him to describe the relation between the sage-kings and th
are weis and so shengt,9 neither of which can be rendered as "discovere
"found," etc. (Indeed, a good case could be made for maintaining that it w
partially because they were man-made that Hsiin Tzu held the li in such h
esteem.)
In addition to his textual citations, Munro attempts to provide arguments
on behalf of his views that the Confucians read their value terms into the
natural order:

The third reason that the social norms were transformed into a cosmic principle
is the most important: the li, which were no more than the customary norms
of the Chinese in the Chou times, were believed to be universally valid. This
belief had to precede the treatment of the li or a social virtue, as a cosmic
principle, since no "cosmic principle" could find expression in just one society.
The Confucians viewed the norms of their own society as absolutes. (P. 36,
italics added)

This argument is not altogether convincing. It is almost certain that the Con-
fucians thought the li could have universal application, but it does not follow,
nor is it strongly suggested in their texts, that any of them thought their own
particular rituals must be so applied in order for a society to function well.
Hsiin Tzu regularly mentions the variant customs of non-Chinese groups, and
so does Mencius. They both knew that the use of a kuu for specific ritual
sacrifices was li, and so were the specific ways in which hsiao' was exemplified
in the regions of North China. It is abundantly clear from their writings that
they also knew reverence for rituals and love and respect for parents are not
the same as their behavioral manifestations, which vary from culture to
culture; and it was only the former (attitudes) which they seem to have taken
to be universal.10
One final point with regard to Munro's treatment of Hsuin Tzu: a perplex-
ing problem for every student of Confucian philosophy is distinguishing the
qualities which mark off a chun-tszu (gentleman) from a shihx (scholar), and
a sheng-jeny (sage) from both. Munro does not explicitly take up this problem,
but his several discussions about each of these levels of philosophical develop-
ment (pp. 98-99, 114, 157-158) can be brought together to outline a solution
to the problem. The shih knows many rituals (li) and the behavior appropriate

9 Ibid., Hsing o p'ien, 72-73.

10 Although the evidence is meager, Confucius may have made these distinctions too.
Cf., for example, Lun Yii III. 4 and XIII. 5.

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213

to his station (also li) and serves his functions competently. The chiin-tzu not
only serves competently, with grace and dignity, but derives aesthetic satisfac-
tion from the proper performance of his roles. In addition to possessing the
qualities of the chiin-tzu, the sheng-jen sees and feels the li holistically as
defining and integrating the entire society, giving it strength, durability, and
beauty-a seeing and feeling which can also be described as a union of self
with other.

This union is not merely of interest to students of ancient mysticism, for it

is not a mystical union. In Confucian philosophy there is no God, no immortal
soul, and no yet-to-be-realized paradise on earth. Hence the Confucian
philosophers never considered the philosophical question of the meaning of
life, but rather focused their energies on constructing a value system in which
everyone could find meaning in life. These energies are most strikingly at
work in the writings of the avowed atheist Hsiin Tzu. Perhaps his greatest
value lies in his attempts to demonstrate that supernatural beliefs were irrele-
vant to arguing the significance of human life; or perhaps his greatest value lies
in his attempt to humanize a collectivistic ethics that he felt compelled by his
environmental constraints to advocate. But wherever his greatest value lies,
this much is certain: he does not belong in a museum.

IV

The several approbatory remarks Munro makes about Hsiin Tzu and other
Chinese thinkers suggest that he would concur with the view that the ancient
Confucian and his colleagues do not belong in a museum, but the general tone
of CMEC toward all of early Chinese philosophy, nevertheless, strongly sug-
gests the opposite. To illustrate this point we may return to Munro's general
thesis about the doctrine of natural equality in China.
Given the importance Munro attaches to this doctrine throughout his work,
it is surprising that he believes it to be fundamentally weak: "From a philo-
sophical point of view, the Confucian and Taoist doctrines of natural equality
are unstable. Obviously, men are naturally similar in some ways and different
in others.... In arguing man's natural equality, the Confucians and Taoists
are simply foisting on their readers their own criteria of what is important.
There is an implicit value judgment in their arguments" (p. 21).
First, it can be seriously questioned whether it is possible for any nontrivial
philosophical view to be devoid of value judgments. One is tempted, for
example, to paraphrase Munro's quotation:

From a philosophical point of view, the logical positivists' doctrine of the

meaningfulness of philosophical statements is unstable. Obviously, some
philosophical problems can be solved by the application of their logical and
linguistic tools, and others cannot.... In arguing that all problems which are

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214 Rosemont

not amenable to solution by their methods are pseudo-problems, the logi

positivists are simply foisting on their readers their own criteria of wha
important. There is an implicit value judgment in their arguments.

Second, and more directly relevant to the Chinese philosophers, Munro him-
self later provides specific material for the rebuttal of his own criticism: "Th
Chinese stressed equality in a descriptive sense, focusing on the human con
tion at birth, and on shared attributes that were, in theory, empirically
otherwise verifiable" (p. 178).
Thus the question: why should we construe the Confucians and Taoists
"simply foisting" value judgments on us when their positions are acknowledge
to be "empirically or otherwise verifiable"? Following the last quotation, th
is a footnote to the effect that evaluative and descriptive uses of "equalit
sometimes overlap; but this distinction does not overcome the problem
hand, for in that same footnote Munro goes on to say: "In statements whe
descriptive reference is present, the relative emphasis is on the equally
unequally shared attributes of the human endowment, and any evaluation
secondary" (p. 179, italics added).
The solution to the problem, of course, is to ignore Munro's "unstable
criticism about the Chinese view of natural equality. Any evaluation is ind
secondary, and the extent to which it is implicit, tertiary. Of primary impor-
tance is the simple fact that the early Chinese philosophers believed it to be n
only verifiable but obvious that men are born equal in all ethically releva
respects. With this perspective in mind, we may account for some dissimil
ties between Chinese and Western philosophy: because of their empirica
naivete, Chinese philosophers have not provided us with sophisticated A
totelian arguments justifying the institution of slavery, nor have they provid
us with a Platonic conceptual framework in which selective breeding is morally
desirable and selective lying morally defensible."l
It is not difficult to see, however, why Munro did not draw these conclusion
himself. He occasionally twits Western philosophers for their otherworld
pursuits but is nevertheless generally deferential to that philosophical traditio
when comparing it to China's. For instance, he regularly says that Chin
philosophers were not greatly concerned with questions of truth:

There is a general tendency among Western readers ... to ... look first f
the "argument," or demonstration that the position being advocated in
Chinese work is true; when they find no systematic, step-by-step argume
there is often a feeling of frustration. (P. ix)

Or again:

11 Aristotle's arguments are found in Politics 12548-1256a. For the interpretation of Plato,
the reviewer is obviously following Popper. See Popper, The Open Society and its
Enemies, especially I, 140-144 for his discussion of the "Grand Lie," and pp. 149-153 for
the philosopher-king as eugenicist (who must also lie about his role).

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215

What were important to the Chinese philosophers, where questions of truth

and falsity were not, were the behavioral implications of the statement or
belief in question. (P. ix)
Or yet again:

In China, truth and falsity in the Greek sense have rarely been important
considerations in a philosopher's acceptance of a given belief or proposition;
these are Western concerns. (P. 55)
One is tempted to ask: If the intellectual standard-bearers of the cultural
tradition were not concerned with truth, who was? It is admitted on all sides
(and consistently emphasized by Munro) that the Chinese philosophers were
pragmatic, this-worldly men; they insisted on the concrete utilization of
knowledge gained and were philosophically preoccupied with questions of how
men should act. Given this behavior-oriented stance, it is very difficult to
believe that they cared little for the truth of statements about the world in
which that behavior was to take place. Purely armchair philosophers can
perhaps ignore the empirical adequacy of the views they generate without
untoward consequences, but a similar luxury could not be enjoyed by their
Confucian peers, who assumed the responsibility of managing the practical
affairs of the world's largest and most impoverished state when they were not
philosophizing.
The key to the misleading nature of Munro's discussion of this issue can be
seen in the following: "The Chinese thinker's regrettable lack of attention to
the logical validity of a philosophical tenet is balanced by his great concern
with problems important to human life" (p. ix, italics added). Questions of
logical validity do not arise with respect to tenets, which are simply true or
false; logical validity is a characteristic of arguments, being a special relation
holding between premises and conclusion. It is this latter feature which is often
missing in Chinese philosophical texts. These writings are not in the hypothet-
ico-deductive form common to Western texts; hence the student of Chinese
philosophy must acclimatize himself to a different style of narrative prose.
Perhaps the Chinese style will seem awkward and/or uncomfortable for some,
but no one should abandon the subject because of the mistaken belief that
Chinese philosophers were unconcerned about the truth of the views they
advocated.

There is a related question of consistency and contradiction in Chinese

philosophy. Salutarily, Munro faces the fact that there are inconsistencies in
Chinese texts, and thereby spares his readers another traditionalist attempt
uniformly to apologize for them (which usually involves a series of arguments
more logically horrendous than the originals). Here are Munro's views on the
subject:

A word of caution is also appropriate for Westerners who expect the archaic
Chinese texts to show the same consistency in philosophical position that

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216 Rosemont

Western writings do. Occasionally, a Chinese classic will contain passages on

some important topic that seem to contradict other passages in the same
work.... [O]ne had best concentrate on the dominant themes and try to live
with the inconsistencies. In many cases they are a product of later additions to
the archaic texts; in others they may simply represent the author's lack of
concern with consistency, which is so dear to Western thinkers. (Pp. ix-x)

Three points must be noted. First, from the mere premise that there are
inconsistencies to be found in Chinese texts, it clearly does not follow that
those inconsistencies ever reflect a lack of concern with consistency on the part
of the author. A contradiction-free philosophical work of any length has yet to
be written anywhere, but it must not be assumed that a high tolerance for
inconsistency is a character trait of any philosopher-Western or Chinese.
Second, it is difficult for any philosopher to live with inconsistencies in
another's writings, and Munro does not tell us why we should indulge the
Chinese thinkers in a manner not accorded their Western counterparts
Condescension in even a mild form is not a substantive improvement over
apologetics for promoting the study of Chinese philosophy. When a contradic
tion is found in a philosophical text, it must be carefully considered. If no con-
sistent interpretation can be given to it that is also consistent with the rest of
the work, then the offending view and all other views uniquely entailed by it
must be gathered together and rejected, not merely tolerated or put off to one
side.

Third, it is necessary to establish that a purported contradiction is indeed

a contradiction. For example, Munro accepts the standard account of a familiar
"contradiction" in Taoist thought:

In one of the best studies of the Tao-te ching to appear in some time D. C. Lau
points out the inconsistency between Lao Tzu's doctrine of "submission" and
the idea of the reversal of opposites .... However, his attempt to reconcile this
inconsistency by tampering with the theory of the reversal of opposites may
be just the kind of attempt at systematization that he decries elsewhere. It is
best to accept the inconsistency and explore its implications. (P. 121n)
The supposed contradiction is generated as follows: when faced with a
decision situation, the doctrine of submission tells us to elect the most submis-
sive (passive, quiet, weak, etc.) option. The theory of the reversal of opposites,
however, states that what is now strong will become weak, and conversely.
Hence the paradox: you choose the passive, but it reverses, becomes the active,
and there you are an activist meddling in the affairs of the world again, in-
capable of behaving in the prescribed wu-wei' manner.
The paradox is much more apparent than real. There is nothing in the Taoist
texts which suggests that once you have elected an option you become glued
to it. If or when whatever you have elected as passive becomes active, let go;
you are then faced with a new decision situation, and hence must apply the
"submissive rule" again: always choose the most submissive option.

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217

The general point here is not that Munro is mistaken whenever he discusses
inconsistencies in the Chinese texts, for many of the critical passages he takes
under consideration do appear to contain contradictions. Rather, the point is
that there is no reason to believe that the Chinese philosophers were any less
concerned with consistency than they were with truth, nor is there any reason
to believe that they were any less concerned with either of these qualities than
Western philosophers. Even the Taoists, who often rejoiced in promulgating
explicit paradoxes, did not display a lack of concern for consistency. On the
contrary, it is just because those paradoxes are genuinely or self-referentially
inconsistent that they are capable of exerting such persuasive philosophical
force-an insight which could hardly have been lost on the Taoist authors.
Attempting to emulate the Taoists, this review will end by returning to
its beginning. It is clear that the Chou philosophers believed there to be a
mortal, nonsupernatural but nevertheless truly remarkable ghost in the
machine. The Chinese landscape against which the shade is placed is usually
painted engagingly and authoritatively by Munro, and one is only sorry that
the spectral outline itself was not more distinctly and vibrantly drawn. Ulti-
mately everyone must justify a value system by appealing to his own views
of the basic nature of man, and therefore to look at the Chinese painting is
also to look into a mirror.

HENRY ROSEMONT, JR.

University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign

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