E. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE were not as condemnable as the others in the lists.
But, in fixing
G.R. No. 152642 November 13, 2012
Sto. Tomas v. Salac, 685 SCRA 245
FACTS:
These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain
provisions of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
The provisions that were assailed are Section 29 and 30 of RA 8042.
However the same was later repealed by RA 9244. Finally, cases
were also filed assailing Sections 6, 7, 9 and 10 of the same act.
Sections 29 and 30 of the Act commanded the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) to begin deregulating within one year of its
passage the business of handling the recruitment and migration of
overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years the
regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).
Section 6 defines the crime of "illegal recruitment" and enumerates
the acts constituting the same. Section 7 provides the penalties for
prohibited acts. Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal
actions arising from "illegal recruitment" before the RTC of the
province or city where the offense was committed or where the
offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense. Section 10, holds the corporate directors, officers, and
partners of recruitment and placement agencies jointly and solidarily
liable for money claims and damages that may be adjudged against
the latter agencies.
ISSUE:
WHETHER Sections 6, 7, 9, and 10 are unconstitutional
RULIING:
CONSITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 6:
The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after hearing
on the ground that its definition of "illegal recruitment" is vague as it
fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters and
for that reason gives undue advantage to the non-licensed recruiters
in violation of the right to equal protection of those that operate with
government licenses or authorities.
But "illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is clear and
unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC’s finding, actually makes a
distinction between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its
terms, persons who engage in "canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers"
without the appropriate government license or authority are
guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the
wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand,
recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of
OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or
authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit
any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 7
The Manila RTC also declared Section 7 unconstitutional on the
ground that its sweeping application of the penalties failed to make
any distinction as to the seriousness of the act committed for the
application of the penalty imposed on such violation.
Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the law can impose
such grave penalties upon what it believed were specific acts that
uniform penalties for each of the enumerated acts under Section
6, Congress was within its prerogative to determine what
individual acts are equally reprehensible, consistent with the
State policy of according full protection to labor, and deserving
of the same penalties. It is not within the power of the Court to
question the wisdom of this kind of choice. Notably, this
legislative policy has been further stressed in July 2010 with the
enactment of R.A. 10022 which increased even more the duration of
the penalties of imprisonment and the amounts of fine for the
commission of the acts listed under Section 7.
Obviously, in fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the
unsettling fact that OFWs must work outside the country’s borders
and beyond its immediate protection. The law must, therefore, make
an effort to somehow protect them from conscienceless individuals
within its jurisdiction who, fueled by greed, are willing to ship them
out without clear assurance that their contracted principals would
treat such OFWs fairly and humanely.
As the Court held in People v. Ventura, the State under its police
power "may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will
secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to
protect them against the consequence of ignorance and
incapacity as well as of deception and fraud." Police power is
"that inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society."
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 9:
The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the
ground that allowing the offended parties to file the criminal case in
their place of residence would negate the general rule on venue of
criminal cases which is the place where the crime or any of its
essential elements were committed. Venue, said the RTC, is
jurisdictional in penal laws and, allowing the filing of criminal actions
at the place of residence of the offended parties violates their right to
due process. Section 9 provides:
SEC. 9. Venue. – A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as
defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
province or city where the offense was committed or where the
offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first
filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts:
Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply
to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the
time of the effectivity of this Act.
But there is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress
fixing an alternative venue for violations of Section 6 of R.A.
8042 that differs from the venue established by the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Indeed, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the latter
Rules allows exceptions provided by laws.
Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of
criminal actions is, consistent with that law’s declared policy of
providing a criminal justice system that protects and serves the
best interests of the victims of illegal recruitment.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 10:
In G.R. 167590 (the PASEI case), the Quezon City RTC held as
unconstitutional the last sentence of the 2nd paragraph of Section 10
of R.A. 8042. It pointed out that, absent sufficient proof that the
corporate officers and directors of the erring company had
knowledge of and allowed the illegal recruitment, making them
automatically liable would violate their right to due process of law.
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this
case, that the liability of corporate directors and officers is not
automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their
company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in
directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or
tolerating the conduct of illegal activities. In the case of Becmen
and White Falcon, while there is evidence that these companies were
at fault in not investigating the cause of Jasmin’s death, there is no
mention of any evidence in the case against them that intervenors
Gumabay, et al., Becmen’s corporate officers and directors, were
personally involved in their company’s particular actions or omissions
in Jasmin’s case.
RA 8042 IS A POLICE POWER
As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to
regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to
curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by
numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is settled that
every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The
Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws
enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional, the
Court must uphold its validity.
===========================================
Argued: June 26, 1971 Decided: June 30, 1971
NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. UNITED STATES
FACTS:
The United States brought actions before the Courts to enjoin
publication in the New York Times and in the Washington Post of
certain classified material entitled “History of U.S Decision-Making
Process on Vietnam Policy that as according to the lower courts, has
not met the “heavy burden of showing justification for the
enforcement of such a prior restraint.
ISSUE: WHETHER the publication of this classified material should
be enjoined by the courts
RULING:
"Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity." The Government "thus carries a heavy burden of
showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint."
The District Court for the Southern District of New York, in the New
York Times case, and the District Court for the District of Columbia
and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in
the Washington Postcase, held that the Government had not met that
burden.
We agree.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE BLACK
xxx. I believe that every moment's continuance of the injunctions
against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and
continuing violation of the First Amendment. Xxx
In seeking injunctions against these newspapers, and in its
presentation to the Court, the Executive Branch seems to have
forgotten the essential purpose and history of the First Amendment.
In response to an overwhelming public clamor, James Madison
offered a series of amendments to satisfy citizens that these great
liberties would remain safe and beyond the power of government to
abridge. Madison proposed what later became the First Amendment
in three parts, two of which are set out below, and one of which
proclaimed:
"The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to
speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments, and the freedom
of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be
inviolable."
The amendments were offered to curtail and restrict the general
powers granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches
two years before in the original Constitution. The Bill of Rights
changed the original Constitution into a new charter under which no
branch of government could abridge the people's freedoms of press,
speech, religion, and assembly. Madison and the other Framers of
the First Amendment, able men that they were, wrote in language
they earnestly believed could never be misunderstood: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press. . . ."
Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the
view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the
source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints.
In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free press
the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our
democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors.
The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that
the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The
press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government
and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can
effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among
the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of
the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to
distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. In my
view, far from deserving condemnation for their courageous
reporting, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other
newspapers should be commended for serving the purpose that the
Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of
government that led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did
precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted they would do.
To find that the President has "inherent power" to halt the
publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the
First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and
security of the very people the Government hopes to make
"secure." No one can read the history of the adoption of the First
Amendment without being convinced beyond any doubt that it was
injunctions like those sought here that Madison and his collaborators
intended to outlaw in this Nation for all time.
The word "security" is a broad, vague generality whose
contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental
law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of military
and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed
representative government provides no real security for our
Republic.
"The greater the importance of safeguarding the community
from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force
and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve
inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and
free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free
political discussion, to the end that government may be
responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired,
may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of
the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government."
CONCURRING OPINION JUSTICE DOUGLAS
It should be noted at the outset that the First Amendment provides
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." That leaves, in my view, no room for
governmental restraint on the press.
There is, moreover, no statute barring the publication by the
press of the material which the Times and the Post seek to use.
There are eight sections in the chapter on espionage and censorship,
§§ 792-799. In three of those eight, "publish" is specifically
mentioned. Thus, it is apparent that Congress was capable of, and
did, distinguish between publishing and communication in the various
sections of the Espionage Act. The other evidence that § 793 does
not apply to the press is a rejected version of § 793. During the
debates in the Senate, the First Amendment was specifically cited,
and that provision was defeated.
So any power that the Government possesses must come from its
"inherent power."
The power to wage war is "the power to wage war
successfully." Hirabayashi v. United States. But the war power stems
from a declaration of war. The Constitution gives Congress, not the
President, power "[t]o declare War." Nowhere are presidential wars
authorized. We need not decide, therefore, what leveling effect the
war power of Congress might have.
These disclosures may have a serious impact. But that is no basis for
sanctioning a previous restraint on the press. As stated by Chief
Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota:
"While reckless assaults upon public men, and efforts to bring
obloquy upon those who are endeavoring faithfully to discharge
official duties, exert a baleful influence and deserve the severest
condemnation in public opinion, it cannot be said that this abuse is
greater, and it is believed to be less, than that which characterized
the period in which our institutions took shape. Meanwhile, the
administration of government has become more complex, the
opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime
has grown to most serious proportions, and the danger of its
protection by unfaithful officials and of the impairment of the
fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and
official neglect, emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and
courageous press, especially in great cities. The fact that the liberty
of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does
not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from
previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct."
As we stated only the other day in Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe, "[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this
Court with a "heavy presumption" against its constitutional
validity."
The Government says that it has inherent powers to go into court and
obtain an injunction to protect the national interest, which, in this
case, is alleged to be national security. Near v. Minnesota,
repudiated that expansive doctrine in no uncertain terms.
Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic,
perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of
public issues are vital to our national health. On public questions,
there should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
CONCURRING OPINION JUSTICE BRENNAN
The error that has pervaded these cases from the outset was the
granting of any injunctive relief whatsoever, interim or otherwise. The
entire thrust of the Government's claim throughout these cases
has been that publication of the material sought to be enjoined
"could," or "might," or "may" prejudice the national interest in
various ways. But the First Amendment tolerates absolutely no
prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or
conjecture that untoward consequences may result.* Our cases,
it is true, have indicated that there is a single, extremely narrow class
of cases in which the First Amendment's ban on prior judicial
restraint may be overridden. Our cases have thus far indicated
that such cases may arise only when the Nation "is at
war," Schenck v. United States.
"[T]he chief purpose of [the First Amendment's] guaranty [is] to
prevent previous restraints upon publication." Near v.
Minnesota. Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that
publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the
occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a
transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an
interim restraining order. In no event may mere conclusions be
sufficient, for if the Executive Branch seeks judicial aid in preventing
publication, it must inevitably submit the basis upon which that aid is
sought to scrutiny by the judiciary. And, therefore, every restraint
issued in this case, whatever its form, has violated the First
Amendment -- and not less so because that restraint was justified as
necessary to afford the courts an opportunity to examine the claim
more thoroughly. Unless and until the Government has clearly made
out its case, the First Amendment commands that no injunction may
issue.
* Freedman v. Maryland, and similar cases regarding temporary
restraints of allegedly obscene materials are not in point. For those
cases rest upon the proposition that "obscenity is not protected by
the freedoms of speech and press." Roth v. United States. Here
there is no question but that the material sought to be suppressed is
within the protection of the First Amendment; the only question is
whether, notwithstanding that fact, its publication may be enjoined for
a time because of the presence of an overwhelming national interest.
Similarly, copyright cases have no pertinence here: the Government
is not asserting an interest in the particular form of words chosen in
the documents, but is seeking to suppress the ideas expressed
therein. And the copyright laws, of course, protect only the form of
expression, and not the ideas expressed.
CONCURRING OPINION JUSTICE STEWART
The responsibility must be where the power is. If the Constitution
gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power in the conduct
of foreign affairs and the maintenance of our national defense, then,
under the Constitution, the Executive must have the largely
unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal
security necessary to exercise that power successfully. It is an
awesome responsibility, requiring judgment and wisdom of a high
order. I should suppose that moral, political, and practical
considerations would dictate that a very first principle of that wisdom
would be an insistence upon avoiding secrecy for its own sake. For
when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the
system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the
careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-
protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the
hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be
the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can
best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.
This is not to say that Congress and the courts have no role to play.
Undoubtedly, Congress has the power to enact specific and
appropriate criminal laws to protect government property and
preserve government secrets. Congress has passed such laws, and
several of them are of very colorable relevance to the apparent
circumstances of these cases. And if a criminal prosecution is
instituted, it will be the responsibility of the courts to decide the
applicability of the criminal law under which the charge is brought.
Moreover, if Congress should pass a specific law authorizing civil
proceedings in this field, the courts would likewise have the duty to
decide the constitutionality of such a law, as well as its applicability to
the facts proved.
But in the cases before us, we are asked neither to construe specific
regulations nor to apply specific laws. We are asked, instead, to
perform a function that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not the
Judiciary. We are asked, quite simply, to prevent the publication by
two newspapers of material that the Executive Branch insists should
not, in the national interest, be published. I am convinced that the
Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents involved.
But I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result in
direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its
people. That being so, there can under the First Amendment be but
one judicial resolution of the issues before us. I join the judgments of
the Court.
CONCURRING OPINION JUSTICE WHITE
The Government's position is simply stated: the responsibility of the
Executive for the conduct of the foreign affairs and for the security of
the Nation is so basic that the President is entitled to an injunction
against publication of a newspaper story whenever he can convince
a court that the information to be revealed threatens "grave and
irreparable" injury to the public interest; and the injunction should
issue whether or not the material to be published is classified,
whether or not publication would be lawful under relevant criminal
statutes enacted by Congress, and regardless of the circumstances
by which the newspaper came into possession of the information. At
least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its
own investigations and findings, I am quite unable to agree that
the inherent powers of the Executive and the courts reach so far
as to authorize remedies having such sweeping potential for
inhibiting publications by the press. Much of the difficulty
inheres in the "grave and irreparable danger" standard
suggested by the United States. If the United States were to
have judgment under such a standard in these cases, our
decision would be of little guidance to other courts in other
cases, for the material at issue here would not be available from
the Court's opinion or from public records, nor would it be
published by the press. Indeed, even today, where we hold that the
United States has not met its burden, the material remains sealed in
court records and it is properly not discussed in today's opinions.
Moreover, because the material poses substantial dangers to
national interests, and because of the hazards of criminal sanctions,
a responsible press may choose never to publish the more sensitive
materials. To sustain the Government in these cases would start the
courts down a long and hazardous road that I am not willing to travel,
at least without congressional guidance and direction.
The "grave and irreparable danger" standard is that asserted by the
Government in this Court. In remanding to Judge Gurfein for further
hearings in the Times litigation, five members of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit directed him to determine whether disclosure
of certain items specified with particularity by the Government would
"pose such grave and immediate danger to the security of the United
States as to warrant their publication being enjoined."
CONCURRING JUSTICE MARSHALL
It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the concept of
separation of powers for this Court to use its power of contempt
to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined to
prohibit. There would be a similar damage to the basic concept of
these co-equal branches of Government if, when the Executive
Branch has adequate authority granted by Congress to protect
"national security," it can choose, instead, to invoke the contempt
power of a court to enjoin the threatened conduct. The Constitution
provides that Congress shall make laws, the President execute laws,
and courts interpret laws. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). It did not provide for government by
injunction in which the courts and the Executive Branch can "make
law" without regard to the action of Congress. It may be more
convenient for the Executive Branch if it need only convince a judge
to prohibit conduct, rather than ask the Congress to pass a law, and
it may be more convenient to enforce a contempt order than to seek
a criminal conviction in a jury trial. Moreover, it may be considered
politically wise to get a court to share the responsibility for arresting
those who the Executive Branch has probable cause to believe are
violating the law. But convenience and political considerations of the
moment do not justify a basic departure from the principles of our
system of government.
===========================================
G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995
PPI v. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272
FACTS:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") assails the constitutional
validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by Comelec which created the
“COMELEC SPACE”. PPI contends that Resolution No. 2772 is
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its
agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. Also, that the letter directives of Comelec
requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same
time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute
impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions the
1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.
Following the petitions was a Manifestation by the COMELC which
clarified the assailed sections of the same resolution. The operative
portion of this Resolution follows:
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts No. 6646
and 7166 and other election laws, the Commission on Elections
RESOLVED to clarify Sections 2 and 8 of Res. No. 2772 as follows:
1. Section 2 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as
requiring publishers of the different mass media print publications to
provide print space under pain of prosecution, whether
administrative, civil or criminal, there being no sanction or penalty for
violation of said Section provided for either in said Resolution or in
Section 90 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, on the grant of "Comelec space."
2. Section 8 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as
constituting prior restraint on the part of publishers with respect to the
printing or publication of materials in the news, opinion, features or
other sections of their respective publications or other accounts or
comments, it being clear from the last sentence of said Section 8 that
the Commission shall, "unless the facts and circumstances clearly
indicate otherwise . . . respect the determination by the publisher
and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or
views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest."
This Resolution shall take effect upon approval.
ISSUE:
WHETHER Resolution 2772 is constitutional
RULING:
RESOLUTION NO. 2772 SECTION 2 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN
COMPULSORY DONATION OF COMELEC SPACE AMOUNTS TO
“TAKING” OF PRIVATE PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC
PURPOSES WHICH REQUIRES PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION
To compel print media companies to donate
"Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to
"taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes
. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such
compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from 6 March
1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a
week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same period?
The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this
is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint
upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the
compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates
ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or
in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
REQUISITES OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1.
Necessity for the taking; 2. Legal authority to effect the taking;
3. Payment of just compensation)
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be
appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private personal
property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful
taking of private property for public use need to be examined
here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal
authority to effect the taking.
FIRST: The element of necessity for the taking has not been
shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the
members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates
to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or
reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the
problem.
SECOND: Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of
eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative
authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec
must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not contested
by petitioner PPI. We note only that, under Section 3 of Resolution
No. 2772, the free "Comelec space" sought by the respondent
Commission would be used not only for informing the public about
the identities, qualifications and programs of government of
candidates for elective office but also for "dissemination of vital
election information" (including, presumably, circulars, regulations,
notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec). It seems to the Court a
matter of judicial notice that government offices and agencies
(including the Supreme Court) simply purchase print space, in the
ordinary course of events, when their rules and regulations, circulars,
notices and so forth need officially to be brought to the attention of
the general public.
THIRD: The taking of private property for public use is, of
course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment
of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently
the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is
precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as
petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require
newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec
purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers
to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A
attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and
magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to
Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a
constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the
kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise
of the power of eminent domain.
We would note that the ruling here laid down by the Court is entirely
in line with the theory of democratic representative government. The
economic costs of informing the general public about the
qualifications and programs of those seeking elective office are most
appropriately distributed as widely as possible throughout our society
by the utilization of public funds, especially funds raised by taxation,
rather than cast solely on one small sector of society, i.e., print media
enterprises. The benefits which flow from a heightened level of
information on and the awareness of the electoral process are
commonly thought to be community-wide; the burdens should be
allocated on the same basis.
RESOLUTION 2772 IS NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWER
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2
of Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to
"donate" "Comelec space, " may be sustained as a valid exercise of
the police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too
casually to require prolonged consideration on our part. Firstly,
there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of
Comelec) to show that the police power — essentially a power
of legislation — has been constitutionally delegated to
respondent Commission. Secondly, while private property may
indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police
power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in
the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the
police power.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy
instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a
national emergency or other imperious public necessity,
indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business
condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in
differing parts of the country, to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to
demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the
taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2
of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and
calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec.
Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police
power of the State.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 8 IS NOT RIPE FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR LACK OF AN ACTUAL JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY
We turn to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, which needs to be
quoted in full again:
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in
Newspapers. — No newspaper or publication shall allow to be
printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections
of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments which
manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly
or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or
political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly
indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by
the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that
the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of
public interest.
It is not easy to understand why Section 8 was included at all in
Resolution No. 2772. In any case, Section 8 should be viewed in the
context of our decision in National Press Club v. Commission on
Elections. There the Court sustained the constitutionality of Section
11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of
1987, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and airtime
for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Comelec. In
doing so, the Court carefully distinguished (a) paid political
advertisements which are reached by the prohibition of Section 11
(b), from (b) the reporting of news, commentaries and expressions of
belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators or
columnists which fall outside the scope of Section 11 (b) and which
are protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech
and of the press:
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope
of application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to
apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale
disguised as a donation, of print space and air time for campaign or
other political purposes. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any
way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy
events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and
programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or
broadcaster or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at
least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact
advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or
commentary or other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid
for by candidates for political office. We read Section 11 (b) as
designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular
candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) — that
it does not restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or
opinion or comment upon the qualifications and programs and
activities of any and all candidates for office — constitutes the critical
distinction which must be made between the instant case and that
of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections. . . . (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)
Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of
the Comelec to establish a guideline for implementation of the above-
quoted distinction and doctrine in National Press Club an effort not
blessed with evident success. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A
while possibly helpful, does not add substantially to the utility of
Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. The distinction between paid
political advertisements on the one hand and news reports,
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters,
broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be
given operative meaning only in actual cases or controversies, on a
case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts.
At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege
any specific affirmative action on the part of Comelec designed to
enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of
its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of
Comelec action under Section 8. Put a little differently, the Court
considers that the precise constitutional issue here sought to be
raised — whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes
a permissible exercise of the Comelec's power under Article IX,
Section 4 of the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of all franchise or permits for the operation of — media
of communication or information — [for the purpose of ensuring]
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly honest, peaceful and credible elections —
is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy
involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section
8.
===========================================
G.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208
FACTS:
On behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected, Petitioner
assails the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. A month after the promulgation of
the abovementioned decree, PD 1994 amended the NIRC
providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each
processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of
length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally
manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales
tax.
The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out in its
preambular clauses as follows:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or
any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly
prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters, and have
caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty
percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales,
contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in
substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government
revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around
P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of
videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax,
thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in
taxes each year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram
establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry,
particularly the more than 1,200 movie houses and theaters
throughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide displacement
and unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous moviehouses
and theaters;
4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is
imperative for the Government to create an environment conducive
to growth and development of all business industries, including the
movie industry which has an accumulated investment of about P3
Billion;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram
establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial condition of the
movie industry upon which more than 75,000 families and 500,000
workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an additional
source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time
rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene
videogram features constitutes a clear and present danger to the
moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impairs the mandate
of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote
their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for
remedial measures to curb these blatant malpractices which have
flaunted our censorship and copyright laws;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the
moral values of the people and betraying the national economic
recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with
dispatch; ... (Numbering of paragraphs supplied).
ISSUE:
WHETHER PD 1987 is constitutional.
RULING:
We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.
1. SECTION 10 OF PD 1987 IS NOT A RIDER
The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a
statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title
express each and every end that the statute wishes to
accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the
statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a
single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general object." The rule also is that the constitutional requirement
as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given
practical rather than technical construction.
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the
tax provision of the DECREE is a rider is without merit.
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general
object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed
in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to
that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one
of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the
DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation
of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the
heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from
Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of
the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE,
which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is
comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its
Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary
to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index
to the body of the DECREE.
2. THE TAX IMPOSED IS NOT HARSH, CONFISCATORY,
OPPRESSIVE AND/OR IN UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT OF
TRADE. (Tax is not only regulatory but also a revenue
measure. Tax is made an implement of the State’s
police power)
Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is
harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade.
However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to
be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even
definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes
is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the
courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any
restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of
the authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the
legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a
sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.
The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but
also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that
earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per
annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax,
imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for
public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or
borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the
government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the
admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the
viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all videogram
operators.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed
primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of
the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a
valid imposition.
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive
which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor
one industry over another.
TAX AS POLICE POWER:
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the
subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
"inequities which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation". Taxation has been made the implement of the
state's police power.
At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing
legislature.
3. THE DECREE DOES NOT CONTAIN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the
BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and
units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited
period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to
perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a
delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of
authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and
implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no
valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the
decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a
"fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned
being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the
grant of such authority might be the source of graft and
corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as
unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved
parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
4. THE DECREE IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE EX POST
FACTO PRINCIPLE
An ex post facto law is, among other categories, one which
"alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction
upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense."
It is petitioner's position that Section 15 of the DECREE raises
immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE
when the required proof of registration of any videogram cannot
be presented and thus partakes of the nature of an ex post
facto law. The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the
recent case of Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to
the passage of a law providing that the presumption of
innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption
founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting
what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such
presumption of innocence" (People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953]
at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature
may enact that when certain facts have been proved that they
shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the
accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a
rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate
facts presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of
the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experience".
Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is
a rational connection between the fact proved, which is non-
registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the
DECREE, besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of
violation of the DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period
counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in
character.
5. THE VIDEO-INDUSTRY IS NOT OVER-REGULATED
AND BEING EASED OUT AS IF IT WERE A NUISANCE.
Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was
apparent. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect
the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public
welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair
competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the
moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the
availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes
containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent
sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop
in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since
mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are
required to engage in business.
The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought
about the "demise" of the video industry. On the contrary, video
establishments are seen to have proliferated in many places
notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.
In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the
necessity, wisdom and expediency of the DECREE. These
considerations, however, are primarily and exclusively a matter of
legislative concern.
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of
the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.
This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers
has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if
on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the
rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be
courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their
controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of
legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the
challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be
sustained.
===========================================
G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000
Ortigas v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the CA, which nullified
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC of Pasig in Civil
Case No. 64931. It also assails the resolution of the appellate court,
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The civil case stemmed from a lease contract entered into by private
respondent Mathay and Hermoso Realty, the owner of the lot which
resulted in the erection of a commercial building on the lot sold by the
petitioner to Hermoso Realty. The petitioner prayed for the demolition
of the said commercial building and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction with TRO against Mathay, to stop the
construction of the building and to prevent him from engaging in any
commercial activity in the area.
In 1981, When the lot was already sold to Hermosa Realty the
Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority) enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also
known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital
Region. The ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of
Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills
Subdivision where the lot is located.
The trial court issued the writ of injunction but the Court of Appeals
nullified the order of the trial court on the ground that the MMC
ordinance nullified the restriction for the use of the property
ISSUE:
WHETHER the CA correctly set aside the order of the trial court
which issued the writ of preliminary injunction on the sole ground that
MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 nullified the building restriction imposing
exclusive residential use on the property in question
RULING:
Principally, we must resolve the issue of whether the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it refused to apply MMC Ordinance No.81-01 to Civil
Case No. 64931.
POLICE POWER CAN BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT AND
MAY REASONABLY IMPAIR VESTED RIGHTS OR CONTRACTS
We note that in issuing the disputed writ of preliminary injunction, the
trial court observed that the contract of sale was entered into in
August 1976, while the zoning ordinance was enacted only in March
1981. The trial court reasoned that since private respondent had
failed to show that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 had retroactive effect,
said ordinance should be given prospective application only,
citing Co vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 390 (1988).
In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having
only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally
settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a
contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the
latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later
law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the
intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the
contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without
violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of
contracts.
But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One
involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police
power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions
could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair
vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable
not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in
existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses
will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the
State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people.
Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be
read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, we already upheld MMC Ordinance
No. 81-01 as a legitimate police power measure.
The trial courts reliance on the Co vs. IAC, is misplaced. In Co, the
disputed area was agricultural and Ordinance No. 81-01 did not
specifically provide that it shall have retroactive effect so as to
discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands located within
the zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in
nature, and stated with respect to agricultural areas covered that the
zoning ordinance should be given prospective operation only. The
area in this case involves not agricultural but urban residential
land. Ordinance No. 81-01 retroactively affected the operation of the
zoning ordinance in Greenhills by reclassifying certain locations
therein as commercial.
Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust
Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual stipulations annotated
on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the
ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt
Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial zone by
the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the restrictions
in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all
construction on the disputed lot to single-family residential buildings,
were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of the zoning
ordinance and could no longer be enforced. While our legal system
upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed
law between the contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in
a contract cannot contravene law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. Otherwise such stipulations would be
deemed null and void. Respondent court correctly found that
the trial court committed in this case a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to
treat Ordinance No. 81-01 as applicable to Civil Case No.
64931. In resolving matters in litigation, judges are not only duty-
bound to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws, they are also
bound by their oath of office to apply the applicable law.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
A real party in interest is defined as the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the rule means
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy
or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
Tested by the foregoing definition, private respondent in this case is
clearly a real party in interest. It is not disputed that he is in
possession of the lot pursuant to a valid lease. He is a possessor in
the concept of a holder of the thing under Article 525 of the Civil
Code. He was impleaded as a defendant in the amended complaint
in Civil Case No. 64931. Further, what petitioner seeks to enjoin is
the building by respondent of a commercial structure on the lot.
Clearly, it is private respondents acts which are in issue, and his
interest in said issue cannot be a mere incidental interest. In its
amended complaint, petitioner prayed for, among others, judgment
ordering the demolition of all improvements illegally built on the lot in
question. These show that it is petitioner Mathay III, doing business
as Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., and not only the Hermosos, who will be
adversely affected by the courts decree.
Petitioner also cites the rule that a stranger to a contract has no
rights or obligations under it, and thus has no standing to challenge
its validity. But in seeking to enforce the stipulations in the deed of
sale, petitioner impleaded private respondent as a defendant. Thus
petitioner must recognize that where a plaintiff has impleaded a party
as a defendant, he cannot subsequently question the latters standing
in court.
===========================================
G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004
Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534
FACTS:
The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to
regulation. The maintenance of peace and order and the protection
of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State,
and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in
harmony with these constitutional duties.
Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued,
assails the constitutionality of to implementation of the Guidelines in
the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of
Residence issued by the Ebdane the Chief of the PNP.
ISSUES:
First, whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed
Guidelines;
Second, whether the citizens right to bear arms is a constitutional
right?;
Third, whether the revocation of petitioners PTCFOR pursuant to the
assailed Guidelines is a violation of his right to property?;
Fourth, whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid
exercise of police power?; and
Fifth, whether the assailed Guidelines constitute an ex post facto law
RULING:
I. PD 1866 AND RA 6975 PROVIDES THE
AUTHORITY OF THE PNP CHIEF TO ISSUE THE
GUIDELINES ASSAILED
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of
government are distributed among three coordinate and
substantially independent departments: the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of the
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
Pertinently, the power to make laws the legislative power is
vested in Congress. Congress may not escape its duties and
responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or
authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional
and void, on the principle that delegata potestas non potest
delegari delegated power may not be delegated.
The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power,
however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An
exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative
body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal
corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners,
auditors, bureaus and directors. Such licensing power includes the
power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.
The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early days
of our Republic, the legislatures tendency was always towards the
delegation of power.
By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the
PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore,
assumed the latters licensing authority. Section 24 thereof
specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the issuance of licenses for
the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with
law. This is in conjunction with the PNP Chiefs power to issue
detailed implementing policies and instructions on such matters as
may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and
duties of the PNP.
Contrary to petitioners contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the
Chief of the Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of his authority to
promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of
P.D. No. 1866. For one, R.A. No. 8294 did not repeal entirely P.D.
No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction of penalties for illegal
possession of firearms. Thus, the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting
to the Chief of the Constabulary the authority to issue rules and
regulations regarding firearms remains effective. Correspondingly,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations dated September 15, 1997
jointly issued by the Department of Justice and the DILG pursuant to
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 deal only with the automatic review, by
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections or the Warden of a
provincial or city jail, of the records of convicts for violations of P.D.
No. 1866. The Rules seek to give effect to the beneficent provisions
of R.A. No. 8294, thereby ensuring the early release and
reintegration of the convicts into the community.
Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP
Chief to issue the assailed guidelines.
Corollarily, petitioner disputes President Arroyos declaration of a
nationwide gun ban, arguing that she has no authority to alter,
modify, or amend the law on firearms through a mere speech.
First, it must be emphasized that President Arroyos speech was
just an expression of her policy and a directive to her
subordinate. It cannot, therefore, be argued that President
Arroyo enacted a law through a mere speech.
Second, at the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the
President. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution specifies his
power as Chief Executive, thus: The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As Chief Executive,
President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that controls the course of
her government. She lays down policies in the execution of her plans
and programs. Whatever policy she chooses, she has her
subordinates to implement them. In short, she has the power of
control. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or merely
direct the performance of a duty. Thus, when President Arroyo
directed respondent Ebdane to suspend the issuance of
PTCFOR, she was just directing a subordinate to perform an
assigned duty. Such act is well within the prerogative of her
office.
II. THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IS A STATUTORY
PRIVILEGE NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
The provision in the Constitution of the United States that the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed
is not designed to control legislation by the state.
With more reason, the right to bear arms cannot be classified as
fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Our
Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second
Amendment, as we aptly observed in the early case of United
States vs. Villareal:
The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate
comment is the claim that the statute penalizing the carrying of
concealed weapons and prohibiting the keeping and the use of
firearms without a license, is in violation of the provisions of section 5
of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the
United States Constitution against the infringement of the right
of the people of the United States to keep and bear arms (U. S.
Constitution, amendment 2), which is not included in the
Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing, to point out that in
no event could this constitutional guaranty have any bearing on
the case at bar, not only because it has not been expressly
extended to the Philippine Islands, but also because it has been
uniformly held that both this and similar provisions in State
constitutions apply only to arms used in civilized warfare (see
cases cited in 40 Cyc., 853, note 18); x x x.
Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the
Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms
is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a
mere statutory creation.
What then are the laws that grant such right to the
Filipinos? The first real firearm law is Act No. 1780 enacted by the
Philippine Commission on October 12, 1907. It was passed to
regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use and transfer of
firearms.
.The foregoing provision was restated in Section 887 of Act No. 2711
that integrated the firearm laws. Thereafter, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued P.D. No. 1866. It codified the laws on illegal
possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition of firearms,
ammunitions or explosives and imposed stiffer penalties for their
violation. R.A. No. 8294 amended some of the provisions of P.D. No.
1866 by reducing the imposable penalties. Being a mere statutory
creation, the right to bear arms cannot be considered an
inalienable or absolute right.
III. A LICENSE IS NOT A PROPERTY OR A
PROPERTY RIGHT NOR DOES IT CREATE A
VESTED RIGHT
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost
consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists.
The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to
enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property
right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it
and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more
emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded
by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner, in arguing that his PTCFOR is a constitutionally protected
property right, relied heavily on Bell vs. Burson wherein the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that once a license is issued, continued
possession may become essential in the pursuit of livelihood.
Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that
adjudicates important interest of the licensees.
The United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit ruled that Erdelyi
did not have a property interest in obtaining a license to carry a
firearm, ratiocinating as follows:
Property interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment do not arise whenever a person has
only an abstract need or desire for, or unilateral expectation of a
benefit.x x x Rather, they arise from legitimate claims of
entitlement defined by existing rules or understanding that stem
from an independent source, such as state law. x x x
Concealed weapons are closely regulated by the State of California.
x x x Whether the statute creates a property interest in
concealed weapons licenses depends largely upon the extent to
which the statute contains mandatory language that restricts the
discretion of the [issuing authority] to deny licenses to
applicants who claim to meet the minimum eligibility
requirements. x x x Where state law gives the issuing authority
broad discretion to grant or deny license application in a closely
regulated field, initial applicants do not have a property right in
such licenses protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Jacobson, supra, 627 F.2d at 180 (gaming license under Nevada
law);
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the
issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state
that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such conditions as he may
impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of
residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say
that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under
our Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other
regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an
absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under
existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably
imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as
the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions
of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their
pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it
does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or
privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of
Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co,
held: The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a
necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by
the State is always revocable.
The foregoing jurisprudence has been resonating in the Philippines
as early as 1908. Thus, in The Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Amechazurra we ruled:
x x x no private person is bound to keep arms. Whether he does or
not is entirely optional with himself, but if, for his own convenience or
pleasure, he desires to possess arms, he must do so upon such
terms as the Government sees fit to impose, for the right to keep and
bear arms is not secured to him by law. The Government can impose
upon him such terms as it pleases. If he is not satisfied with the
terms imposed, he should decline to accept them, but, if for the
purpose of securing possession of the arms he does agree to such
conditions, he must fulfill them.
IV. THE GUIDELINES CAN BE CONSIDERED AS AN
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the
validity of a police measure, thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police
power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the
essence of the constitutional guarantees of substantive due process,
equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its
issuance was the need for peace and order in the
society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those
committed by the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to
disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it
best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the
motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is
the interest of the public in general.
The only question that can then arise is whether the means
employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In
the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit
possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the
carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who
wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-
apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable
regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily,
crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to
hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their
homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for
criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would
be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns
have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the
police power. In State vs. Reams, it was held that the legislature
may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the
public peace. With the promotion of public peace as its objective and
the revocation of all PTCFOR as the means, we are convinced that
the issuance of the assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable
exercise of police power. The ruling in United States vs. Villareal, is
relevant, thus:
We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a
statutory regulation prohibiting the carrying of concealed
weapons as a police measure well calculated to restrict the too
frequent resort to such weapons in moments of anger and
excitement. We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a
regulation would tend to increase the security of life and limb, and to
suppress crime and lawlessness, in any community wherein the
practice of carrying concealed weapons prevails, and this without
being unduly oppressive upon the individual owners of these
weapons. It follows that its enactment by the legislature is a proper
and legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.
V. THE GUIDELINES ARE NOT EX POST FACTO LAW
In Mekin vs. Wolfe, an ex post facto law has been defined as
one (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes
such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater
than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters
the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense in order to convict the defendant.
We see no reason to devote much discussion on the matter. Ex post
facto law prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.The assailed
Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto law because it
is prospective in its application. Contrary to petitioners argument, it
would not result in the punishment of acts previously committed.
===========================================
G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. BEL-
AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION INC.
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to
solve urgent problems of the people. But even when government is
armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod
over the rule of law. Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on
the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public use a private road
in a private subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare
should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the
expense of the rule of law.
The case stems from a notice sent by the MMDA to Bel-Air Village
that it will open Neptune Street, the subdivision’s private road to
traffic and it will demolish the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue.
ISSUE:
WHETHER the MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Road
pursuant to the Police Power of the State
RULING:
THE MMDA HAS NO AUTHORITY TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET;
THERE IS NO SYLLABLE IN RA 7924 THT GRANTS THE MMDA
POLICE POWER LET ALONE LEGISLATIVE POWER (The MMDA
is not a political unit; it is a development authority; its functions
are administrative in nature)
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been
defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The
power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching
and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public
morals, and the general welfare.
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The
National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.
Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking
body.
A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state
which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs." The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local
government unit as a "body politic and corporate"-- one endowed
with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government
and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory. Local government units are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial and
political subdivisions of the state.
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government
units in the Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is
found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general
welfare clause.
Local government units exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial
government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city
government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal
government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is
the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality]
provided under the Code x x x." The same Code gives
the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may
be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by
law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants thereon."
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several
local government units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5)
municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong,
Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina,
Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, ,
Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of
Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was
declared as a "special development and administrative region"
and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting
the region placed under "a development authority" referred to
as the MMDA.
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide
impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge
expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be
provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro
Manila." There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the
scope of these services cover the following: (1) development
planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste
disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage
management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and
shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and
pollution control; and (7) public safety. The basic service of transport
and traffic management includes the following: Lexjuris
"(b) Transport and traffic management which include the
formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies,
standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of
thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement
of persons and goods; provision for the mass transport system
and the institution of a system to regulate road users;
administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system
in Metropolitan Manila;
Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of
the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic
management which includes the formulation and monitoring of
policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport
operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and
promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers
the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road
regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations,
traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including
the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic
violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to
set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the
MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system," fix,
impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the
following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation
of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No.
7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter
itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various
national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -
- x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory
authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro
Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government
units concerning purely local matters."
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v.
Intermediate Appellate Courtwhere we upheld a zoning ordinance
issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of
the MMDA, as an exercise of police power. The
first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition, while the
second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in
addition discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals.
Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater
respondent BAVA and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.
residents of the Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly the
Makati Development Corporation, as the developer of the Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public
subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive corporation" with the following powers:
easements in the deeds of sale over their respective lots in the
subdivision. These were the prohibition on the setting up of
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the
commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition that
purpose of establishing and administering programs providing
the lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged that
services common to the area. As a "central government" it had the
respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the
power to levy and collect taxes and special assessments, the power
subdivision, converted their residences into commercial
to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate money for its
establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions," and that
operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city
respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the full commercialization"
and municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power
of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated
to enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for
the commercial from the residential section of the village.
violation of such ordinances and resolutions. It also had the power to
review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts
The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities comprising
Municipal Council of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Metro Manila.
Manila Commission (MMC). Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified
Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the
the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal
Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed of the members of the
Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive
component city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by
Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region and promulgated
the MMC and sectoral representatives appointed by the President.
as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air Village was indicated therein
The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC
as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent thereto was
the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the
classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone.
MMC itself, however, that possessed legislative powers. All
ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by
We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMCs approval.
boundary between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to
Street was not for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also appropriate money, and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions
held that the perimeter wall on said street was constructed not to with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC. Sce-dp
separate the residential from the commercial blocks but simply for
security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the
did not violate the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale. Scc-alr
MMC which fully possessed legislative and police powers.
Whatever legislative powers the component cities and
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by
as a legitimate exercise of police power. The power of the MMC and the MMC.
the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the
general welfare prevailed over the "deed restrictions".
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law,
create "special metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common good the political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision
in terms of "traffic decongestion and public convenience." Jupiter was shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the cities
opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion along and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic
the public streets adjacent to the Village. The same reason was autonomy and their own local executive and legislative
given for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road assemblies. Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions
inside the same village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street of the Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the power to
was also made under the police power of the municipal government. constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz:
The gate, like the perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance
because it hindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its
"Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may
summary abatement by the mayor was proper and legal.
constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of
all local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area."
Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not
apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became
passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the
primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political
instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is
subdivisions. The MMAs jurisdiction was limited to addressing
contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to
common problems involving basic services that transcended local
respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any
boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was merely
ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati
to provide the local government units technical assistance in the
City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of
preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative
Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under
power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by
its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for
the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local
the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use
governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro
of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the
Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly."
scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the
imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or
implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a
power. Misjuris "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA
a "special development authority" whose functions were
"without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC
government units." The character of the MMDA was clearly
in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present
defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.
MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824,
R. A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/ 11116 and was
introduced by several legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and
Feliciano Belmonte. It was presented to the House of
Representatives by the Committee on Local Governments chaired by
Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee
consultations with the local government units in the National Capital
Region (NCR), with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA, and
career officials of said agencies.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The
power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila
Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly
stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to the bills
presentation to Congress.
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government
unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is
not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The
creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the
inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the
MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the
President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact,
part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be
assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units,
the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity
as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA
has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the local government units, acting through their
respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and
police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner
MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so
ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are
unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDAs noble
efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila.
Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis.
Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed
with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and
pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our
peoples productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services
in the country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the
metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers
granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify
the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision
without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not
antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
===========================================
G.R. No. 144681. June 21, 2004
Professional Regulations Commission v. De Guzman
FACTS:
The case stems from the alleged case of early access to exam
questions granted to Fatima examinees in the Physician Licensure
Examination conducted by the PRC. This petition for review seeks to
nullify the of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the judgment of the
RTC of Manila allowing the respondents to take their physicians oath
and to register as duly licensed physicians.
ISSUES:
WHETHER the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of law in
sustaining the judgment of the trial court that respondents are entitled
to a writ of mandamus
RULING:
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed
to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation
or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party
to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. Section 3
of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines two
situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1)
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2)
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which the other is entitled.
THE EXERCISE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF EVERY
CITIZEN TO SELECT A PROFESSION OR COURSE OF STUDY
MAY BE REGULATED PURSUANT TO THE POLICE POWER OF
THE STATE TO SAFEGUARD HEALTH, MORALS, PEACE,
EDUCATION, ORDER, SAFETY, AND GENERAL WELFARE OF
THE PEOPLE.
THUS PERSONS WHO DESIRE TO ENGAGE IN THE LEARNED
PROFESSIONS REQUIRING SCIENTIFIC OR TECHNICAL
KNOWLEDGE MAY BE REQUIRED TO TAKE AN EXAMINATION
AS A PREREQUISITE TO ENGAGING IN THEIR CHOSEN
CAREERS.
THE REGULATION TAKES PARTICULAR PERTINENCE IN THE
FIELD OF MEDICINE, TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM THE
POTENTIALLY DEADLY EFFECTS OF INCOMPETENCE AND
IGNORANCE AMONG THOSE WHO WOULD PRACTICE
MEDICINE
1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue
Certificates of Registration as Physicians under Rep. Act No. 2382
For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the
officer, board, or official concerned, has a clear legal duty, not
involving discretion. Moreover, there must be statutory authority
for the performance of the act, and the performance of the duty
has been refused. Thus, it must be pertinently asked now: Did
petitioners have the duty to administer the Hippocratic Oath and
register respondents as physicians under the Medical Act of 1959?
As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the basis of
the records:
It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-appellees and
intervenor-appellees have fully complied with all the statutory
requirements for admission into the licensure examinations for
physicians conducted and administered by the respondent-
appellants on February 12, 14, 20 and 21, 1993. Stress, too, must
be made of the fact that all of them successfully passed the same
examinations.
The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that petitioners should allow the respondents to take their
oaths as physicians and register them, steps which would enable
respondents to practice the medical profession pursuant to Section
20 of the Medical Act of 1959?
The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of Rep.
Act No. 2382, in concluding that the petitioners had the ministerial
obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and
register them as physicians. But it is a basic rule in statutory
construction that each part of a statute should be construed in
connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole, not
confining construction to only one section. The intent or meaning of
the statute should be ascertained from the statute taken as a whole,
not from an isolated part of the provision. Accordingly, Section 20 of
Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended should be read in conjunction with
the other provisions of the Act. Thus, to determine whether the
petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic
Oath to respondents and register them as physicians, recourse must
be had to the entirety of the Medical Act of 1959.
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959
discloses that the law uses the word “shall” with respect to the
issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners shall
sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have
satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board. In
statutory construction the term shall is a word of command. It is
given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the
requirements for the grant of his physicians license, the Board
is obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a
physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 22 of the
Medical Act of 1959.
However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious
inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board
requirements by the respondents. The unusually high scores in the
two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres,
the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised grave doubts about
the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. These doubts have to be
appropriately resolved.
Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with
the power to conduct administrative investigations and disapprove
applications for examination or registration, pursuant to the
objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section 1 thereof. In
this case, after the investigation, the Board filed before the PRC,
Adm. Case No. 1687 against the respondents to ascertain their moral
and mental fitness to practice medicine, as required by Section 9 of
Rep. Act No. 2382.
Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be
ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board has discretion to hold
in abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the
issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of mandamus does not
lie to compel performance of an act which is not duly authorized.
The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the
Board shall not issue a certificate of registration only in the following
instances: (1) to any candidate who has been convicted by a court of
competent jurisdiction of any criminal offense involving moral
turpitude; (2) or has been found guilty of immoral or dishonorable
conduct after the investigation by the Board; or (3) has been declared
to be of unsound mind. They aver that none of these circumstances
are present in their case.
Petitioners reject respondents argument. We are informed that in
Board Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, the Board resolved to
file charges against the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine
for immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in the Obstetrics-
Gynecology and Biochemistry examinations. It likewise sought to
cancel the examination results obtained by the examinees from
the Fatima College.
Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a
person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines,
must have satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board
Examination. Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may
only be administered to physicians who qualified in the
examinations. The operative word here is satisfactorily, defined
as sufficient to meet a condition or obligation or capable of
dispelling doubt or ignorance. Gleaned from Board Resolution No.
26, the licensing authority apparently did not find that the
respondents satisfactorily passed the licensure examinations. The
Board instead sought to nullify the examination results obtained by
the respondents.
2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As
Physicians
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to
enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal right
has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy,
and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right.
There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded. It is long established rule that a license to practice
medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government.
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of
every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to
a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the
police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people.
Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions
requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to
take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their
chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in
the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those
who would practice medicine. In a previous case, it may be
recalled, this Court has ordered the Board of Medical Examiners to
annul both its resolution and certificate authorizing a Spanish subject,
with the degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery from the
University of Barcelona, Spain, to practice medicine in
the Philippines, without first passing the examination required by the
Philippine Medical Act. In another case worth noting, we upheld the
power of the State to upgrade the selection of applicants into medical
schools through admission tests.
It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the
exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or
oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise
of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and
grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such
conditions may not, however, require giving up ones
constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the
license. Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an
arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or
officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests
in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on
some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without
prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said
officials in the exercise of their power.
In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for
in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which prescribes the
requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the
qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope
and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the
issuance of a physicians license, or revoking a license that has been
issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine,
the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear
that he has fully complied with all the conditions and
requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority.
Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than
satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is
distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded
if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid
requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the
courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said
privilege without thwarting the legislative will.
===========================================
G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. v. COURT OF
APPEALS
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
The limits of government regulation under the State's Police Power
are once again at the vortex of the instant controversy. Assailed is
the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers
to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition
to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas
employment. By contending that the right to overseas employment, is
a property right within the meaning of the Constitution, petitioners
vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous
requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and
constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power.
ISSUE:
WHETHER the ARB requirement is a valid exercise of the State’s
Police Power
RULING:
THE ARB REQUIREMENT AND THE DO ESTABLISHING THE
EIAC ARE CONSIDERED A VALID EXERICE OF POLICE POWER
The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the
character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at
promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's
police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which
virtually "extends to all public needs," this "least limitable" of
governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments
through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host
of its regulatory powers.
Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice
Malcolm, in the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro wrote:
"The police power of the State," one court has said...'is a power
coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the
law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent
and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.'
Carried onward by the current of legislature, the judiciary rarely
attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion,
provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great
principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not
arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual."
Thus, police power concerns government enactments which
precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare or the common good. As the
assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it
follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate
that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not
enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably.
A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the
issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the Artist
Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order
related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.
In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending
country in Asia dwarfing the labor export of countries with mammoth
populations such as India and China. According to the National
Statistics Office, this diaspora was augmented annually by over
450,000 documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented)
workers who left the country for various destinations abroad, lured by
higher salaries, better work opportunities and sometimes better living
conditions.
Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for
greener pastures in the last few years, women composed slightly
close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 1987-
1991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991, the year
former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of
performing artists to Japan and other countries as a result of the
gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson.
It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not
only of the trend, but also of the fact that most of our women, a large
number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers, worked
under exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal
abuse." Even then, we noted that "[t]he sordid tales of maltreatment
suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of
torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers" compelled
"urgent government action."
Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant
number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes
abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into
prostitution), and following the deaths of a number of these
women, the government began instituting measures aimed at
deploying only those individuals who met set standards which
would qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of
these measures, however, a number of our countrymen have
nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as
virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into
jobs other than those indicated in their employment contracts. Worse,
some of our women have been forced into prostitution.
Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation
schemes, the Secretary of Labor issued on August 16, 1993, D.O.
No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council
(EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industry
matters. Acting on the recommendations of the said body, the
Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued the assailed
orders. These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. 1, which
called for guidelines on screening, testing and accrediting performing
overseas Filipino artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted,
petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC, which gave the
recommendations on which the ARB and other requirements were
based.
Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly
the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order
No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of
performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would
only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the
very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by
requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and
limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for
the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It
cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for
exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually
accomplished by auditions, where those deemed unfit are usually
weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective and
vulnerable to bias and differences in taste. The ARB requirement
goes one step further, however, attempting to minimize the
subjectivity of the process by defining the minimum skills required
from entertainers and performing artists. As the Solicitor General
observed, this should be easily met by experienced artists
possessing merely basic skills. The tests are aimed at segregating
real artists or performers from those passing themselves off as such,
eager to accept any available job and therefore exposing themselves
to possible exploitation.
As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by
petitioners, we see nothing wrong with the requirement for document
and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O.
3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning performers. The
requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing
the place and nature of work allows the government closer
monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers
away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with
unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices. Parenthetically,
none of these issuances appear to us, by any stretch of the
imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary. They address
a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited
segment of our OCW's. They respond to the industry's demand for
clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines. Many of these
provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by, and after
consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government
organizations. On the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety
and security of entertainers and artists bound for Japan and other
destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion
and growth.
In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution
itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our
overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor,
embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987
Constitution in its first paragraph states:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of
employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice
provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full
employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the
government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the
protection of our workforce, local or overseas. As this Court
explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) v.
Drilon, in reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas
workers:
What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an
employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad
enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to
strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs
at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound
to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection,
personally and economically, while away from home.
We now go to petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot,
nevertheless, abridge the right of our performing workers to return to
work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process,
because, having previously been accredited, their accreditation
became a property right," protected by the due process clause. We
find this contention untenable.
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the
meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be
deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living
because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and
unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an
actionable wrong.
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a
profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld
as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by
the state particularly when their conduct affects either the
execution of legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public
morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of
legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every
one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to
himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly
much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation
requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the
settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of
regulating entry to the practice of various trades or
professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass
rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to
practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining
their seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission
has began to require previously licensed doctors and other
professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-
trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a
requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these
requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right
under the due process clause. So long as Professionals and other
workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation
exists.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument
that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures
because they abridge the freedom to contract. In Philippine
Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that "[t]he
non-impairment clause of the Constitution... must yield to the
loftier purposes targeted by the government." Equally important,
into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a
reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement
deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.
A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers
and performing artists under the assailed department orders
constitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. We do not agree.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against
undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is
directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not
require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated
alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for
so long as such classification is based on real and substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the
law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to
present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the
equal protection guarantee.
In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies
to all performing artists and entertainers destined for jobs
abroad. These orders, we stressed hereinbefore, further the
Constitutional mandate requiring Government to protect our
workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse and
exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government
regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but
short of absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and
entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our
government to assume a measure of control.