Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No.

L-3820, July 18, 1950

DECISION
(En Banc)

OZAETA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land,
known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate
sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one
Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his
alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed
to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject
transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the
course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the
person to whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the
Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the
custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions.
He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of his detention.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal
the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its
period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]

1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either

House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that
it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence
of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
– which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and
also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held
in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and
cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by
the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the
parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that
the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is
pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The
contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it
has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that
it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a
witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that
it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

xxx xxx xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject,
obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for
a term beyond its period of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for
contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating
the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without
impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed
during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing
investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such
committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very
purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-
preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
 But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate,
which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution
of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for
contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present
case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave
the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal
instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of
that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule,
to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of

the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate
him as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear
reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as
well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus
developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a
question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to
show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of
the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable
to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege
by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to
secure immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances
of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved
from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but
rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.