Factional competition and political development in the New World Edited by ELIZABETH M. BRUMFIEL and JOHN W. FOX CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. The Bt Be es Syndicate of the University of Cambridge BW Balding, Trumpington Steet, Cambridge Coane 40 West 20th Steet, New York, NY 100lIcfolse Goa "0 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Auslia © Cambridge University Pres 1994 Fist published 1994 Printed in Great Briain atthe Univesity Press, Cambridge catalog eer for hs bok saab fom he Bric Libary Library of Congres cataloguing in publication data erianal competition and political development in the New ‘Worldedited by Elizabeth M. Brumfel and John W ton B._gi, (New directions in archaeology) ISBN 0521 38400 1 Anan’ Folic and government 2 Poca! anthropology — America 3. Social archaeology "Ameren 4 Indians ~ Antiguitien jf, America — Antiquities. 1, Brumfel, Elizabeth M, 1M. Fox, John W., 1947- II. Sen, ES9.PP3F33 1993 306.2420. 92-39371 CIP ISBN 0 521 384001 hardback7 Ethnicity and political control in a complex society: the Tarascan state of prehispanic Mexico HELEN PERLSTEIN POLLARD ‘The imestelationship between ethnic units and a central politcal authority is known historically to have been frucial t0 the operation of complex societies. In the process of this interaction central authorities, par- ticularly ruling elites, have created new ethnic groups, have altered the attributes which define ethnic identity, and bave restructured relationships between ethnic sroups (Enloe 1980:1 4), Political authorities have two fundamental goals for the survival of their centralized power; (I) the economic exploitation of populations and. resources, and (2) the protection of the integrity of the state Srontiers. In achieving both these goals ethnic diversity can either Facilitate or hinder elite action. ‘Centralized authorities can assure maximal access to ‘populations and resources when decision making flows, from the top downward, according to principles estab- lished by dominant elites. Ethnic diversity often disrupts this flow, by interposing local or regional leaders, who acquire power not through their allegiance to central hierarchies, but through positions of ethnic status. Deci- sion making may be undertaken to reflect the needs of Tocal populations or local elites at the expense of the state. On the other hand, under conditions of rapid territorial expansion, when large populations and/or resources are being incorporated into a single political ‘unit, the existing lines of authority, legitimacy. and social cohesion present in ethnically distinct populations ‘may provide central authorities with an infrastructure ‘of politcal and economic networks that can be tapped +o the benefit of the state. In similar manner, the main- tenance of the state's territorial integrity demands populations willing to defend that territory, and not themselves act to foster rebellion against central auth- cority. That can be achieved in at least two ways: the acceptance of state ideology and legitimacy, usually through the identification of individuals and groups as a single social group, ie, common ethnicity; or the accept ance of common self-interest among ethnically diverse populations who see their imminent survival as depend ent on subordination to a central authority. The second is often found on active military frontiers or among refugee populations flesing conquest. To the state such peoples can provide valuable service as warriors, mess- engers, spies, and long-distance traders, services that ‘may ouweigh the hazard of desertion. To a great extent cur understanding of the evolution ‘of complex societies is based on sosietes known pri- marily or exclusively through archaeology. One approach to studying the archaeology of ethnicity, that of ethnoarchaeology, has primarily concentrated on acephalous societies, attempting to test the regularities in relationships between isolable “cultures” and artifact distributions (e.g. Hodder 1979). A second major approach, modeling the spatial and functional distri bution of prehistoric ethnic groups on the basis of cthnohistorie evidence, has the advantage of dealing directly with complex, ethnically plural societies. The primary disadvantage is its limitation to those societies knowable through both ethnohistoric and archaeo- logical information. These societies, while representing only & small sample of complex societies which have ever evolved, nevertheless provide a basie resource for the identification of those ethnic processes of sig~ nificance in societal evolution and their detection archaeologically. In the New World such an approach hhas been used in the Andes to evaluate the patterns of Inika expansion (Morris 1982; Rowe 1982; Wachtel 1982, among others) and to generate models of ethnic! state interaction which can be appliad to earlier periods (Schaedel 1978), "The central defining Feature of an ethnic group, self> identification, and categorization by the governing elite, is clearly beyond the resources of archacologically derived research. Nevertheless, because ethnicity is gen- erally associated with high rates of endogamy, the sharing of clusters of beliefs and values, marked by the use of a common language, and is often territorially isolable, the discernment of ethnic variation is not impossible. As with all aspects of archacological analy- sis, the introduction of ethnicity into the variables studied must be done with care. Ethnic boundaries are fluid, contracting or expanding with major political and economic shifts in the society at large. Ethnic identifica tions coexist with other social identifications, meaning 79