Color

A dispositional property is a property that can be ascribed only in the event of the truth of a
counterfactual claim. A categorical property, on the other hand, is a property that can be
ascribed irrespective of a contingency on any such claim.
The conceptual claim about color is that our experience of color is that of a categorical property,
while in reality color is only a dispositional property: not itself unless in the presence of a
normal observer under normal perceptual conditions. We do not see it that way. We think a
brown table continues to be a brown table even when such conditions are no longer available.
No such categorical property exists. Therefore, color-as-we-perceive it does not exist.

This conclusion can be avoided by re-interpreting color-as-we-perceive-it as not categorical but

dispositional. We can make room for a contingency by claiming we expect the brown table to
remain brown given the same observer (us) and the same sort of light conditions that we
observed it under will persist in the future. The contingency is implicit and outside awareness
but can reliably be made explicit and be brought within awareness on introspection. In the event
that I make the realization, color-as-I-perceive it becomes a dispositional property, and such a
conception of color does exist. Color is then dispositional for everyone, they simply do not know
it.

At the very least, this sort of reply to the error-theory, a dispositionalist reply, would have to
respond to the claim that it was at odds with the phenomenology of colour experience.

So what if it was at odds with the phenomenology of color experience. Visual illusions are at
odds with the phenomenology of visual experience.