Department of the Classics, Harvard University

Akrasia and Euripides' Medea

Author(s): GailAnn Rickert
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 91 (1987), pp. 91-117
Published by: Department of the Classics, Harvard University
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 AKRASIA AND EURIPIDES'MEDEA

GAILANN RICKERT

IN recent yearsofscholars haveMedea.

argued forcefully to rehabilitateour
Medea's former as a
understanding Euripides' ignominy
barbarianwitch has been largely replacedby a portraitthat emphasizes
her traditionalheroic stature. Furthermore,an approachthat focuses on
the Medea as a tragedyis supersedingthose which have understoodthe
Medea as Seelendrama or mined it for its contributionto Geistes-
geschichte.' Nonetheless, philosophers and critics are still rightly
interestedin Medea's psychology and in issues which are importantfor
our understandingof Greek intellectual history.2In particular,the cru-
cial lines (1078-1080) which form the climax of Medea's great
decision-speech still are and should be reckoned with by students of
Greek intellectual history and philosophy as well as by literarycritics,
includingthose who supply us with our texts.
These critics are still debating whether or not to excise a sizeable
portion of Medea's speech. Among those who athetize all of the last
twenty-five lines (1056-1080), one reason for rejecting the last three
lines (1078-1080) is that they introduce a significant theme which is

1 For discussion of Medea as a traditionalheroic charactersee E. Schlesinger, "Zu

Euripides'Medea," Hermes 94 (1966) 26-53 [English trans. by W. Moskalew in Greek
Tragedy: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. E. Segal (New York 1983) 294-310] and
B. M. W. Knox, "The Medea of Euripides," YCS 25 (1977) 193-225 Cf. A. Burnett,
"Medea and the Tragedy of Revenge," CP 68 (1973) 1-24. For recent expressions of
relief that old approachesto the dramaare finally fading, see H. Lloyd-Jones, "Euripides,
Medea 1056-80," WueJbb N.F. 6 (1980) 51-52; M. D. Reeve, "Euripides, Medea
1021-80," CQ N.S.22 (1972) 61 and n. 2; and D. Kovacs, "On Medea's Great Mono-
logue (E. Med. 1021-80)," CQ N.S.36 (1986) 352. These articles will subsequentlybe
referredto by author'sname alone.
2 For a recent discussion of the evidence for akrasia in tragedy, and in particular
whetheror not Socrates and Euripideswere engaged in a debate about akrasia,see T. H.
Irwin, "Euripidesand Socrates," CP 78 (1983) 183-197. See C. Gill, "Did Chrysippus
Understand Medea?," Phronesis 28 (1983) 136-149, for a discussion of the Stoics'
interpretationsof Medea.
92 GailAnnRickert

not found elsewhere in the drama and is inconsistent with Medea's

desire for and attitude towards her revenge, i.e., that it is right and
necessary since she must not let her enemies triumph.3There are, of
course, different versions of this intrusivetheme; for example, Mueller
found in the lines a moral conflict between good (here, her motherly
feelings) and evil (her desire for revenge);4Zwierlein has describedthe
lines as introducing a conflict between passion (Leidenschaft) and
betterjudgment (besseres Wissen).5 Although literary scholars do not
often invoke the technical vocabularyof philosophy, a conflict of the
sort described by Zwierlein is what philosophers discuss as akrasia.
Thus, the interests of textual critics and philosophers overlap in this
passage where what seems to some an intrusive theme is to others a
statementof akrasia. Scholarswho preferto retainthe lines in question
are no less concerned with the issue of intrusiveness.6 However,
althoughtheir explanationsare adequatefor rejecting some versions of
the intrusive theme, those built on anachronismsand the misunder-
standingsof moralists,their interpretationsas presentedare inadequate
to prevent the lines from being understoodas a statementof akrasia.7
But if akrasiaitself is an intrusivetheme, then the case for excision will
not have been met. Thus, whether or not the lines are a statementof

3 Advocates of excising 1056-1080 include: G. Mueller, "Interpolationen in der

Medea des Euripides,"SIFC 25 (1951) 65-82; Reeve 51-61; 0. Zwierlein, "Die Tragik
in den Medea-Dramen," LiteraturwissenschaftlichesJahrbuch 19 (1978) 27-63;
B. Manuwald, "Der Mord an den Kindern:Bemerkungenzu den Medea-Tragbdiendes
Euripidesund des Neophron," WS 17 (1983) 27-61.
4 Mueller 72-74 thought "das Moralische" could not be eliminated from the lines,
which he considered a post-Platonic interpolation. Reeve revives many of Mueller's
arguments,but is more clinical and focuses on the inconsistencies he sees in the use of
particularwords ratherthan large-scaleinterpretations.
5 Zwierlein is especially concernedthat this theme precludeswhat he sees as the tragic
conflict of the drama,the fact that takingvengeance on Jason, which requiresthe deathof
the children,is essential to Medea's self-respect,but at the same time the deaths will pain
Medea her whole life long.
6 Most recently, Lloyd-Jones 51-59; H. Erbse, "Zum Abschiedsmonologder euripi-
deischen Medeia," Archaiognosia 2 (1981) 67-82; and Kovacs 343-352. Kovacs seems
to be especially pleased that once he has rescuedthe disputedlines, they depict the tragic
conflict which Zwierleinthoughtthey ruledout.
7 Moralizing interpretationscan be tracedto B. Snell, Philologus 97 (1948) 125-134
and Scenesfrom GreekDrama (Berkeley 1964) 47-69. Cf. E. R. Dodds, The Greeksand
the Irrational (Berkeley 1951) 186; A. Lesky, "Zur Problematikdes Psychologischen in
der Trag6die des Euripides," Gymnasium67 (1960) 10 ff.; J. J. Walsh, Aristotle's Con-
ception of Moral Weakness(New York 1963) 18. Cf. G. Vlastos, trans., Plato, Prota-
goras (New York 1956) xliv.
 AkrasiaandEuripides'Medea 93

akrasiais importantnot only for philosophers,but for anyone interested

in interpretingthe drama.

This part of the discussion will focus on defining akrasia and dia-
gnosing why recent interpretations which seek to preserve lines
1078-1080 do not settle the question of whether or not Medea acts
akratically. I begin with a generaldescriptionof the akraticepisode.

Akrasia
The essential features of the akraticepisode are set out briefly but
clearly in Plato's Protagoras. At 352b1 ff. Socrates asks Protagoras
whether he agrees with what most people think about knowledge: that
it is not strong, authoritative,ready to lead, but a slave dragged about
by others;or with what Socrates thinks:that if someone knows what is
good and bad he would never be conquered by anything so as to do
something other than what knowledge orders. After Protagorasagrees
with Socrates' point of view on the matter,Socrates goes on to give a
fuller account of the situation he described more generally when
explaining the opinion of most people. He describes an akratic
episode:

oFOa oyv6zt oioihox zrovd&vOprciOv tot TEKai ooi 0E

o n~O0-
ovtat, &•x&qxno
itoXoi ayotyvxoncovzta;
oiy t& a ~ic -
(3(,Xto

wpatqotauvougta Ta iotev tot; xiotoivra;. (352d4-e2)

(You know that most people do not believe me and you, but say
that there are many people who recognize what is best but do not
consent to do it, although it is possible for them to do it, and
instead do other things. All those I asked to give an explanationof
this said that those doing these things are overcome by pleasure or
pain or one of those things I was just talking about.)

Besides i6ovA (physical pleasure) and (pain), the other factors

i.aTn1
Socrates listed earlier as ruling a person instead of knowledge are
wpo a (sexual desire),
tg•6o(thumos), and
p6o3po (fear) (352b7-8).
94 GailAnnRickert

The akraticepisode is essentially one in which there is a breakdown

in the ordinaryprocess of action. It is a breakdownwhich is not due to
the agent's being prevented by someone else from acting or simply
being unsuccessful in his attemptsto act. Ordinarily,an agent wants to
do what he thinksbest and actuallydoes do it. But sometimes an agent
recognizes one thing to be best but does another. In an akraticepisode,
some other internalfactor (e.g., thumos, pleasure, pain, sexual desire,
fear) directsthe agent and brings about some action otherthan what the
agent has recognizedas best to do.8

Akrasiaand Saving the Text:Lines 1077-1080

XopELTE Eiti
oj1CET'
XCopEEt'" TCpooPXiE1•EtV
oi'aTEtirpbg •;&;t, &XX& vtic& tat KaKco;.
iaitavOdvo gLv ola 6p&v ?XXwo Iau6,
Ougt; 8E K (t0 rO'V
'ptaawv v Ego00XrIu&TOv,
f'poroi'. (1076-1080)
icaK~v
f.tEp tyi•oTWvai'to;

Recently, both H. Lloyd-Jonesand D. Kovacs have urgedmore con-

servative ways of dealing with the many problems which, since the
nineteenth century, have been cause for deleting all of lines
1056-1080. According to Kovacs, all the serious problems can be
eliminatedby excising lines 1056-1064; Lloyd-Jonesfinds it necessary
to delete only lines 1059-1063. In this section I will be concernedonly
with the last few lines of Medea's speech, since these are the lines on
which the question of akrasiarests. In particular,I will discuss argu-
ments advancedto save 1078-1080 insofar as they are directly related
to akrasia. I will do this within the larger context of clarifying the
akraticepisode. This is importantto do because the rejection of past
approaches does not by itself refute the possibility that akrasia is
present in these lines. In picturing the akratic episode, we must be
careful to avoid three possible misunderstandingsof this sort of
conflict.

8 For modem discussions of akrasia,see, e.g., D. Wiggins, "Weakness of Will, Com-

mensurability,and the Objects of Deliberationand Desire" in Essays on Aristotle's Eth-
ics, ed. A. Rorty (Berkeley 1980) 241-265 and D. Davidson, "How is weakness of will
possible?" in Moral Concepts,ed. J. Feinberg(New York 1969) 93-113.
 AkrasiaandEuripides'Medea 95

(i) Akrasiaand "Moral" Conflict

Akrasia as understoodfrom the discussion in the Protagoras is not
an exclusively "moral" problem if this ambiguous term is used to
'
denote concern for the interests of others.9In fact, & Xrtoara in the
Protagoras concentrates on cases of self-interest:how is it that a per-
son can recognize what is best for himself and yet not do it? For
T. Irwin the very fact that Medea and Phaedra in the Hippolytus are
concerned with what is bad for them, not for others, is itself supportfor
thinking that Euripideswas engaged in polemic with Socrates: "Euri-
pides' presentation of their conflict is exactly right if he wants to
expose the centralpuzzle of incontinence."10
With this clarificationin mind, we can see that Kovacs, stressing a
point made by others, is right to emphasize that aocoitg(1077), caKda
(1078), and KaC&ov(1080) concern harmto Medea and do not importa
"moral" concern for others." However, recognizing that Medea's
concerns are self-interestedin no way prevents considering her words
to be a statement of akratic action. On the contrary, self-interested
concerns are especially suited to akraticactions. How people could act
against their betterjudgment when the interestsof others are at stake is
not surprisingor puzzling; but how people can act against their better
judgmentwhen theirown interestsare at stake is quite perplexing.
It should also be noted that it is not necessary to go quite as far as
Kovacs does and exclude all concern for others from Medea's remarks
to make the point about self-interest. Are we to think that Medea does
not notice that the death of the children is bad for them too? If we
think so for these lines, what about her remarks (1236-1250) just
before she kills the children? There it would be especially strange to
suppose that, when Medea speaks of rx 8Etv a t&vaylcaia ... ica.KK,
she is thinkingonly of her own harm,that the tears she delays are only

9 See M. Nussbaum's discussion of the ambiguity of this term in The Fragility of

Goodness (Cambridge 1986) 4-5. Also, it should be kept in mind that the projects of
Socratesand Plato are essentially concernedwith what is really good for the individual.
10Irwin (above, n. 2) 192. Irwin thinks that the Medea is only part of the evidence
from the extant plays and fragments showing that Euripidesrecognized the problem of
akrasia.
11Kovacs 350 credits E. Christmann,Bemerkungenzum Textder Medea des Euripides
(diss. Heidelberg 1962) and Lloyd-Jones with recognizing the correct interpretationof
lines 1078-1080. Reading a "moral" concern into the text throughthe uses of in
K•aQK
these lines has long condemnedthem to excision.
96 GailAnnRickert

for herself.12What is needed in our understandingof ciadc is not that

all others must be excluded, but that we must be sure emphaticallyto
include Medea.
Furthermore,a distinction must be drawn between recognizing that
some course of action is bad for oneself and/orothers, and recognizing
that overall this course of action is not the best course of action. An
agent can determinethat a certaincourse of action is the best course of
action even though it causes harm. Merely knowing that what one does
is bad for oneself and/or others is not enough to render the action
akratic. In line 1078 Medea says she understandswhat she is
about to do. This statementalone does not warrant the K•i•d
conclusion that
it
Medea thinks overall is best not to kill the children. Compare
Aeschylus' Agamemnon (Ag. 205 ff.): he too kills a family member
and is aware that his action is bad; but nonetheless he thinks it best to
kill his daughter.13

(ii) Akrasiaand Recognizing WhatIs Best

One should not read so much into "recognizes what is best" that a
candidate is eliminated from the pool of akraticson the basis that he
did not "really" know X was best when he did Y. The process
whereby the agent recognizes or perceives some course of action to be
best may or may not involve serious reflection and deliberation. But
however rigorousthe process that led up to the agent's "recognizing X
is best," the importantpoint in describingthe akraticepisode is thatthe
agent does in fact recognize X to be best.14

12 Cf. lines 1046-1047: at the very least Medea knows her action is kakon for Jason
since this is why she kills the children.
13The comparisonwith Agamemnonwill be discussed furtherin partII.
14I would not count as an akraticepisode a completely impulsive act. The akraticis
not someone who, if he had thought about it, would have recognized X is best or better
than Y because he does happento hold the values and beliefs that would ordinarilylead
to such a conclusion. (Cf. Aristotle NE 7.3.) Aristotle's concern to reconcile the
phainomena leads him to include a wider range of acts under akrasia. Cf. Wiggins
(above, n. 8) 263 n. 13. Other cases which must be distinguishedfrom akraticepisodes
are those where desires or emotions take away the agent's wits so that what is bad is seen
as good and pursued accordingly, e.g., cases of ate. On ate see Dodds, R. E. Doyle,
"ATH:Its Use and Meaning (New York 1984), and Irwin (above, n. 2) 187 ff. Irwin
thinks the difference between ate and akrasia is what distinguishes the interests of
Aeschylus and Sophocles from those of Euripides. Plato uses a variety of words for
"knows" in this passage, even "believes." Aristotle, NE 7.3, also thinks it makes no
difference whether it is knowledge or opinion against which the akraticacts. C. C. W.
Taylor, Plato: Protagoras (Oxford 1976) 172, discusses the lack of explicitness about
 AkrasiaandEuripides'Medea 97

Since Medea says she understands (gav0a6vo) what bad things

(KaKx6)she is about to do, this aspect of the akratic episode may not
appear problematic.15But it is, of course, a very importantissue for
Socrates since his explanationof this sort of episode has to do with the
agent not really knowing. The caution I have just urged about extract-
ing all regardfor others from Medea's words becomes significanthere,
if only to forestall an argumentthat Medea cannot be akraticbecause
she does not really understandall the harmshe is doing.
But besides this concern, there is a furtherissue connected with not
exaggerating "recognition of what is the best course of action" which
is being emphasized in currentdiscussions. This is the insistence that
the final lines are not about Medea's coming to a decision to kill her
children, but her recognition of the pain she brings on herself through
the vengeance she must take on Jason.16
Both Lloyd-Jones and Kovacs focus on the claim of Zwierlein that
lines 1078-1080 introduce an intrusive theme: a conflict between
Leidenschaft and besseres Wissen. Unlike earlier descriptions of the
intrusive theme supposed to be present in these lines, Zwierlein's does
not import the language of "morality." It is, however, about as
straightforwarda description of an akraticepisode as one is likely to
find in literary discussions of this passage. Both Lloyd-Jones and
Kovacs are concerned to refute the claim that this passage introduces
the akratic theme. Thus we must ask whether or not the rejection of
these lines as a decision prevents them from describing an akratic
conflict.
If Medea can no longer look upon her children at line 1077 because
she is overcome by troubles,and if lines 1078-1080 are not a decision
but an explanationor disclosure of these troubles, then it is still possi-
ble that the explanation of these troubles is that Medea is akratic.
Emphasizingthat no decision is being made or that Medea would not
be Medea if she did not take vengeance is not enough to prevent these

what sort of knowledge is in question but thinks it includes the application of general
principles to particularcases. For a view that relies on a more rigorous "overall" judg-
ment, see Irwin (above, n. 2) 186. This view may too easily excuse Homericheroes from
akraticaction.
'5 H. Diller, "OYMOXAE KPEIXI'N TON EMON BOYAEYMATON,"Hermes 94
(1966) 275, finds a connection between 1078-1080 and the Aeschylean theme of learning
throughsuffering.
16 E.g.,
Schlesinger,Lloyd-Jones,and Kovacs.
98 GailAnnRickert

lines from describingsome kind of conflict in Medea over her action.17

Medea could recognize that it would be betterto act in some otherway,
even if she knows it is inevitable that she will act as she does. One
sympathizes with Manuwald,who observes that Lloyd-Jones rejects a
conflict between Leidenschaft and besseres Wissen but nonetheless
imports such a conflict again in his view of Medea's "human
instincts" which counsel against the action.18Much the same can be
said about Kovacs. He tells us that in these lines "Medea's desire for
revenge overcomes not her sense of right and wrong but her prudent
desire to avoid pain."19This descriptiondoes not make it clear whether
Medea thinks it would be best to follow her prudentdesires but cannot
because of her thumos. These critics may, of course, believe that
Medea thinks it best to act as she does. On this view Medea's describ-
ing her thumos as superior to her bouleumata will be a statementof
ordinary action, for ordinarily, i.e., unless we have reason to think
otherwise, we suppose our actions or those of others are in accordance
with what we or others think best. But it does not follow that Medea
must think that taking vengeance is the best thing to do in this case
because it is what she must do.

(iii) Akrasiaand Overgeneralization

A central feature of the akratic episode can be overlooked if the
conflicting elements of a situation are overgeneralizedand inferences
are then drawn from this overgeneralization. For example, in general
terms, the akraticepisode can be describedas a conflict between reason
and desire. However, this description can lead to several misunder-
standings. Any action that can be described as arising from strong
desire, feeling, or emotion may automaticallybe labelled akratic. This
is misleading since situationsin which agents act out of emotions, feel-
ings, or more bare impulses or desires are not akraticunless the agent
recognizes that some other course of action is better to pursue. When
the agent in an akraticepisode recognizes some course of action to be
best, he may have no accompanyingdesire at all for this best course, or
he may have some desire for it, even a great deal of desire, but this

17 See Lloyd-Jones59 and n. 24, and Kovacs 346.

18 Manuwald(above, n. 3) 59-60.
19Kovacs 351.
 AkrasiaandEuripides'Medea 99

desire does not effect action.20On the other hand, overgeneralization

may lead to the incorrectconclusion that the presence of reasons, prin-
ciples, or values tied to the feelings or emotions which do bring about
action is sufficient to preclude the action from being akratic;or that the
presence of strong feelings on the side of the conflict that does bring
about action somehow increases the rationality of the side of the
conflict that does not effect action. These issues are particularlyimpor-
tant in this passage, where the question of akrasia rests to a large
degree on how we understandMedea's thumos and how this under-
standingleads us to view the bouleumatawith which her thumosseems
to be in conflict.

Thumos

Since thumos is at the center of the passage under discussion, it is

importantto be aware of the tendency to reduce it to less complex con-
cepts, or, more precisely, to concepts which in fact are no less complex,
but with which we are more comfortable:feelings or emotion. These
are concepts which in ordinarydiscourse are frequentlyconfused with
somethingmore akin to bare desires and impulses such as the desire for
physical pleasure or food or drink. One need only glance, however, at
the philosophical literaturewhich tries to untanglewhat an emotion is,
what ties emotion has to rationalityon the one hand, and to affective
faculties on the other, to be convinced that relegating thumos to the
class of emotion is no movement towardclarity.21
The overgeneralization and reduction of thumos to "passion"
(Leidenschaft) obscures its complexity, especially the principles with
which thumos, including Medea's thumos, are inextricablybound up,
namely, the heroic principles of harmingenemies, helping friends, not
submitting to dishonor, injustice, insults, or the mockery of one's
enemies. All of these principles have been acknowledged to play a
central role in Medea's action and tragedy. This reductionism,com-
bined with a moralizing tendency to see passion as evil and in conflict

20 For
example, a person could recognize that regularexercise is the best course to pur-
sue and desire to pursuethis course, but fail to exercise regularly. For an example from
the Medea, consider Creon's decision to allow Medea one more day in Corinth, lines
350-351.
21 See, e.g., the essays collected in Explaining Emotions, ed. A.
O. Rorty (Berkeley
1980). Cf. Erbse (above, n. 6) 76 ff. on Christmann144, who understandsthe conflict to
be between an irrationalfaculty and a rationalfaculty.
100 GailAnnRickert

with reason, which is good, is at the center of many unsatisfactory

interpretationsof this drama.
Since Plato's view of thumosis crucial to several interpretationsof
the lines underdiscussion, it will be useful to clarify his view and draw
attentionto its affinity with the heroic thumosof tragedy. It is true that
Plato shows great interest (especially in the middle dialogues) in the
need for the rationalpart of the soul to control the two other parts of
the soul, what he calls in the Republic the thumoeides and the
epithumeticpart. However, it is simply a misunderstandingof Plato to
reduce the thumoeidesto a completely non-rationalfaculty. In literary
discussions of the Medea we can find both critics who do and do not
grasp what the thumoeides is in Plato. For example, E. Schlesinger,
hailed by Lloyd-Jonesas one of the leading reformersof interpretation
of the Medea, rejects understandingMedea's monologue as a moral-
ized conflict between reason and passion involving conflicting parts of
the soul because he refuses to allow interpretationof the passage in
supposedlyPlatonic terms: "But here thymosis not unbridledemotion,
what Plato calls thymoeides, nor do the bouleumata stand in direct
opposition to it as a rationalprinciple, in the mannerof the charioteer
in the Phaedrus who keeps a tight rein on the two horses, thymosand
epithumia."22 Lloyd-Jones himself, on the other hand, compares
Medea's thumos to Plato's thumoeides in a perfectly accurate way:
"The address to one's is of course Homeric; but as often in
0gl6;
tragedy the 0xgol; is not merely one of several more or less vague
terms for the seat of the intelligence but connotes pride, spirit, anger,
something like what Plato means by xo "LgoetF, .,''23 Plato describes
the thumoeides in Republic 4 (439e3-441c3) as separate from the
epithumetikon,bare desires and impulses, and the logistikon, reason,
but allied with reason. At times it can be excessive and must be con-
trolled by reason; but it can side with reason when an epithumetic
desire leads a person to act against reason. It is influencedby beliefs
and judgments:when a person believes he has been treatedunjustly,it
is thumos which swells within and allies itself with what the person
judges to be just. But thumosendures if the person recognizes that he
is suffering ill treatmentjustly. Thus Plato's view of thumos is very

22Schlesinger29 (=
Eng. translation295).
23 Lloyd-Jones 54. Plato's understandingof thumos is deeply set in the tradition. On
archaic thumos see G. Nagy, "Patroklos, Concepts of Afterlife, and the Indic Triple
Fire," Arethusa 13 (1980) 162 ff. and notes: "Before death the realm of consciousness,
of rationaland emotional functions, is the thumos.. "
 AkrasiaandEuripides'Medea 101

similar to heroic thumos, the faculty in which the hero's passionate

attachmentto his principles resides, which reacts to dishonor, unjust
treatment, insult, and mockery by enemies, and fixes on vengeance
which is itself of heroic proportions.24
To be sure, some scholars have recognized the complexity of
thumos and its ties to heroic principles, and how this militates against
overly simplifiedviews of Medea's conflict as one between passion and
reason. However, the complexity of thumoshas not yet been exploited
in dealing with the description of Medea's conflict as an akratic
episode. Recognizing the complexity of thumos, however, is still not
enough to disqualify Medea's action as akratic,25since the range of
capacities mentionedby Plato as overcoming the agent's knowledge of
what is best extends from bare feelings or impulses (for example, the
desire for physical pleasure) to some which are not divorced from
beliefs and values, for example, thumos. Thus the fact that Medea acts
out of thumos,a complex web of feelings and principles, is by itself an
argument neither for nor against her acting akratically. Since it is
essential to an akraticact that the agent not act in accordancewith his
recognized evaluation that a certaincourse of action is best, in orderto
label Medea an akratic it must be clear which course of action she
recognizes to be best. But althoughmany have assumed Medea recog-
nizes thatnot killing the childrenis best, this is not easily determinable.

Medea's bouleumata

Some critics claim it is most naturalto take the bouleumataof line

1079 as denoting Medea's plans for revenge, but if 0u~tbg ;pEoowv
tev v is taken to mean "thumos is strongerthan my
W~tOv poXE•)X •ugit
plans for revenge," the passage shows an incoherence: thumos has

24 Knox 198-199
points out all these features of heroic thumos in his exposition of
Medea's likeness to the typical Sophoclean hero. Medea's heroic resolve in the face of
competing claims has also been comparedto Achilles in Iliad 1, Hector in 10 (Schles-
inger 30), Achilles in 9 (Lloyd-Jones53), and more generally to Ajax and Achilles (Eas-
terling [below, n. 33] 183).
25For other perspectives on thumos see Manuwald(above, n. 3) 49 and n. 50; Diller
(above, n. 15) 271 ff.; and A. Dihle, "Euripides'Medea," SB Heidelberg Phil.-hist. Kl. 5
(1977). Dihle's view that thumos refers to Medea's motherly feelings has been widely
rejected: see Zwierlein (above, n. 3) 35-37, Lloyd-Jones 58, and Kovacs 351 n. 12.
Diller's view will be discussed below. Here it should be noted that, although he makes
some good observationsaboutthumos,he ultimatelyreduces it to "passion."
102 GailAnnRickert

been the source of Medea's plans for revenge, but now it is in conflict
with them.- This apparentcontradictionhas been cited as a reason for
excising the lines altogether.26Others argue that bouleumata is used
several times in the dramawhere it clearly does not refer to Medea's
plans for revenge.27 This view suggests several candidates for the
meaningof the bouleumatain line 1079: e.g., Medea's plans to take the
children away (1045), her plans for their future together (1024-1036),
calculations which counsel Medea not to take the action her thumos
urges,28or Medea's calculationsto avoid the harmher vengeance will
bring her.29Other once popular interpretations,taking bouleumata to
mean moral insight, knowledge of right and wrong, or reason, are now
rightlyrejectedas anachronisticand reductive.
But once the bouleumataof 1079 are freed from overgeneralization
and reduction,it is easier to see that bouleumataby itself, understood
as any of the plausible suggestions above, does not automatically
import an evaluation of itself as not merely what we may think but as
what Medea recognizes as the best course of action or what urges the
best course of action. Without the commendation implicit in such
renderings as "moral insight," etc., bouleumata represents at most
competing claims on Medea. Thus, the fact that Medea's thumos is
strongerthan or superiorto her bouleumataneed not lead us to infer
that her action is akratic. Agents who act from the strongermotivation
when they are pressed with competing claims are not necessarily
akratic. For the action to be akraticthe strongermotivationmust not be

26E.g., Reeve 55 and n. 2, where he traces this

objection back to Stadtmueller,and
Manuwald(above, n. 3) 58-59.
27Lloyd-Jones 58 and Kovacs 351. Cf. Christmann(above, n. 11) 138. Besides
Medea, Creon and Jason also have PouxOjtaxa. In each case the referenceis to specific
plans. The Chorus expects Creon to tell Medea of "new plans" (270 Kaitviv V pooiu-
pgirCov),and he does tell Medea that she and her children must leave his land. Jason
refers to the plans (449 poiAtaatara) replaced by these "new plans" and to his own
planningwhen he asks Medea (567), "You don't think I have plannedbadly (PEpoXht-0-
la t KccIo;), do you?" While one can understandJason to be asking Medea to concede
that he has reasonedwell, he does not do so withoutreferenceto the specific resultsof his
reasoning,that is his plans for himself and his offspring. Later,Medea fulsomely refers
to the sound reasoningof Jason and Creon(874 toiaot E1). But here too she
po•A3•oiitv
refersto theirspecific plans concerningthe new marriage and providingroyal offspringto
the house of Jason. These specific plans are also referredto at 886: r(vSE (Ov pouAu-
Ljraytov,and at 893: "aiEtvov viv Eo1POEU4tc1rT6E.
28Lloyd-Jones58.
29Kovacs 351.
 AkrasiaandEuripides'Medea 103

the same as what the agent thinks best to do. In ordinaryactions, even
those where there are competing claims on the agent, the agent's
strongermotivationand what he thinksbest coincide.30

II

Lines 1078-1080 are problematic because they suggest Medea is

experiencing some kind of conflict arising from competing claims, but
do not state clearly whether or not Medea thinks the course of action
she actually takes is also the bettercourse to take. The lines simply do
not representthe conflict as clearly as Zwierlein's summaryof them as
a conflict between Leidenschaftand besseres Wissen. The cumulative
effect of Medea's inability to gaze upon her children because she is
overcome by her troubles (1077), of her statements that she under-
stands what icaic she is about to do, that her 0g16o;is strongerthan the
competing claims representedby poxxu4lara, and that OugL6;regu-
larly causes KcaQcrfor mortals, has led some critics to infer that Medea
acts against her betterjudgment and is thereforeakratic. But this con-
clusion relies on particularinterpretationsof these elements: the reduc-
tion of thumosto an excessive passion and/orthe overgeneralizationof
the competing claims representedby bouleumatawherebythe superior-
ity of thumos over bouleumata is taken to imply that Medea must
recognize some course of action other than what she actually pursues
as the better course. This unwarrantedinference is encouragedby the
confusion between recognizing something is kakon and thinking it is
not the best course of action: sometimes even the best course of action
is kakon.31 On the other hand, recognition of Medea's heroic

30 Anothersuggestion made by Walsh (above, n. 7) 18-19 (Walsh attributesthe idea to

Prof. MortonSmith), and more recentlyby Diller (above, n. 15) 273-274, is that kreisson
here means "in control of" or "is masterof." This view could allow bouleumatato be
read as revenge plans. However, the view has been widely rejected. See W. Steidle, Stu-
dien zum antikenDrama (Munich 1968) 165 n. 180; Reeve 59 n. 2; R. Kassel, RhM 116
(1973) 103 n. 21; Lloyd-Jones 58; Erbse 77; and Kovacs 351 n. 12. It is interestingto
observe, however, that both Walsh and Diller reduce thumos to "passion" and see a
conflict between this passion and what they presumeMedea knows is the bettercourse of
action, not to kill the children.
31In additionto those listed in n. 7, see Irwin'sdiscussion ([above, n. 2] 191-192). He
does not make use of his own discussion of "fused" concepts but reduces thumosto an
incontinentdesire and seems to conflate Medea's recognitionthather action is kakonwith
recognitionthat it would be betternot to act this way: "Medea also has 'sound mind'; she
knows what is bad about what she wants to do, but she wants to do it, and does it
nonetheless."
104 GailAnnRickert

characterizationand of how complex thumos is because of its ties to

principlesand values as well as feelings, and recognitionthat it is pos-
sible to consider a course of action better even if it is kakon, point to
another possibility: Medea may take vengeance and think it best to
take vengeance.
If more acceptable arguments were produced to show Medea is
akratic, one could hold that Medea's akrasiais consistent with recent
attemptsto preserve lines 1078-1080. It is possible that Medea cannot
act except out of her heroic thumos and its resolve to take vengeance
even while recognizing it would be better not to kill her children. In
stressing the inevitability that Medea will take vengeance, this view
does not import a theme inconsistent with Medea's overall characteri-
zation.
Ultimately, since Medea does not explicitly say what course of
action she believes is best, akrasia cannot be completely ruled out.
Emphasizingthe natureof heroic thumosis not by itself enough to pre-
clude akrasiasince thumosunderstoodin this way can still cause one to
act against better judgment; and we can grant that vengeance is a
proper and necessary response for Medea as a heroic figure without
grantingthat she actuallythoughtit best to murderher own children.
An argumentthat Medea is not akraticwould have to show both that
she acts out of heroic thumosand that she acts in accordancewith what
she recognizes as the better course of action in her circumstances.
Although I cannot provide a conclusive argumentof this sort, there is
more supportfor this view thanjust the recognitionthat heroic thumos
involves not only strong feelings but also principles and values. Since
this supportrelates directly to Medea's use of her children to take her
vengeance, it addresses what must always remain a nagging question
for anyone who is reluctantto interpretMedea's action as akratic:even
if Medea must take vengeance, does the very fact that she kills her own
children to do so not strongly suggest that hers is an act of excessive
passion and could not be what Medea recognized as best to do?
In this partI will discuss both the effectiveness and the appropriate-
ness of Medea's use of her children to take vengeance on Jason. Not
even the appropriatenessof killing the childrencan provide an irrefut-
able argumentthat Medea is not akratic;but it does go a long way to
increase the plausibility of thinkingthat Medea sees this action as the
best course to take in her circumstances. Finally, I will discuss another
kind of conflict, conflict of values, and the different attitudesan agent
may have when involved in such a conflict. If lines 1078-1080 are not
read as implying Medea is akratic, since they nonetheless strongly
 AkrasiaandEuripides'Medea 105

suggest Medea is experiencing some kind of conflict, we still need a

suggestion for what kind of conflict they may represent.

The Effectivenessof the Children'sDeaths

There is a significant amount of evidence that Medea is correct in
her belief that killing the children is the most effective way to take
vengeance on Jason. The nurse's early expressions of concern for the
children (36-37; 89-93; 98-101)32 introduce their safety as a theme
whose prominence intensifies throughoutthe course of the drama;the
male perspective on children is developed in the scenes Medea shares
with Creon,Jason,and Aegeus.33
When Medea decries the loss of her native land (328) to Creon, who
expels her out of fear for his family (282 ff.), Creon says that his native
land is what is dearest to him too, dearest, that is, except for his chil-
dren (329 ~irlv yxp tlcveov 4toye 17pikratov It is this empathy
for Medea's children that leads Creon into axroX,).
fatal error of judgment.
From Jason's discussions with Medea we learn of his perspective on
children:they are a fundamentalpart of his plan to establish his house
and his reputation in Corinth. The implication of his question to
Medea, what need has she of children (565), is that he does have need
of them for these purposes. Jason's children by Medea, with their
brothers from his new marriage, will one day be the leading men of
Corinth(915-917). The importanceof reputationto Jason is clear from
his discussion with Medea: because of him, Medea has her reputation
for being "wise" (aoqvi 539-541); without reputation (~iroaltgo),
Jason says that he would not want gold or the voice of Orpheus
(542-544). Thus, as a troubledexile Jason could not have been luckier
than to have the opportunityto marry into the royal house of Corinth
(550-554). Finally, there is Aegeus, who is also strongly interestedin
children. He encountersMedea on his way from the oracle of Phoebus
whom he has consulted about his present state of childlessness

32 T. V. Buttrey, "Accident and Design in Euripides' Medea," AJP 79 (1958) 1-17,

argues that, given the versions of the myths with which Euripides'audiencewas familiar,
worry about the children cannot be taken to foreshadow what does happen to them in a
way that makes theirdeaths a climax which progressesdirectlyfrom the foreshadowing.
33 See P. E. Easterling, "The Infanticidein Euripides'Medea," YCS25 (1977) 181 ff.
on the Medea as a "family drama," and Schlesinger42-52 (= 304-310) on the role chil-
dren play in the exile's attemptto establish himself in a new land. The following discus-
sion of the importanceof children in the scenes with Creon, Jason, and Aegeus, and in
Medea's plan to kill the childrenis indebtedto these papers. Cf. also Burnett21-22.
106 GailAnnRickert

(669 ff.). He agrees to help Medea for the sake of the gods and for the
childrenMedea has promisedhim (719-721).
One cannot help but notice that in her discussion with Aegeus,
Medea makes no mention of her own children. She explains her plight
as though it affected only herself, and she makes no provision for her
children in her pact with Aegeus. In fact, just after Aegeus leaves,
Medea tells the chorus why she can dare to murderher children: "for
this is the best way to wound my husband" (819). Since just before the
scene with Aegeus the children are not mentioned in a death list and
after the scene with Aegeus they are, we may infer that the impact of
this procession of males each in his turnexpressing his feelings, needs,
or interestin childrenhas not been lost on Medea.
The drama's conclusion shows that Medea was accurate in her
assessment that the best way to wound Jason is by destroying his
opportunityto establish his reputationthrough his children.34When
Jason comes to rescue the children but is told they are dead, he
exclaims, "Woman, you have destroyed me!" (1310 6S;g' &nlr aoa;g,
yTuvat).In the last scene of the drama,Medea even gloats over Jason's
obscurity. She prophesies (1386-1388) that Jason who is icaic6; will
die icaicog,as is fitting
(E••ic6):
o" 6',
•1re"pp Eic6;, icaTOavf, ical ;Ic;lc,
'Apyol;gK~pa obv Xt 6•V(pnEnXrXyy17vog,
T&XE1rXr•tfv igv
gv. ydigwvi• (1386-1388)
twuCpi;x
Kaicg; and icaid; are both colored by this clearly inglorious death,
being struckby a beam from his ship. Jason is not only "wretched" or
"bad" but a man withoutthe reputationhe sought.35

Oaths and the Appropriatenessof the Children'sDeaths

Besides the effectiveness of using the children as the means of de-
stroying Jason, their deaths are a particularlyappropriatepenalty for
Jason's offense. For entwined with Medea's response to being
wronged is her response to the oaths sworn but broken by Jason.36

34Those he shareswith Medea as well as those he counted on from his new bride. See
Easterling185, and Schlesinger50 (= 309).
35See Page's note on line 1387 for the scholion describingJason's death in the temple
of Hera,and his introduction(xxxiv) for Neophron'sversion.
36The seriousness of the oaths is emphasizedby Easterling 181 and n. 13, and espe-
cially by Burnett 13 ff. On the oath in ancientGreek society see W. Burkert,Griechische
Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche (Stuttgart1977, trans.J. Raffan, Cam-
bridge, Mass. 1985) 250 ff. In this section I develop a comment originally made by Seth
 Akrasia and Euripides'Medea 107

Jason has acted not only against his wife but against the gods and
society. As an oath-breaker,Jason has breacheda practicewhich is not
simply valued by Medea, but is rather a basic constituent of social
order. In the heroic and the historical world, swearing oaths is an
important way by which individuals and groups bind themselves to
their commitments. The oaths Medea and Jason shared sealed a two-
way commitment. For her part, they bound her to Jason even to the
extent of murderand betrayal of her own family. The oaths are men-
tioned several times in connection with Medea's "loss" of family and
home, and her coming to Greece (160-167; 207-212; 483 ff.). When
Medea tradedher home and family for Jason, it was the oaths she and
Jason swore which were to ensure that the trade would not be in vain.
But Jason has forswornand brokenhis commitment.
Medea thinks that by breaking his oaths Jason has treated her
unjustly and dishonored her. This view is shared by the nurse and
recognized by the chorus. The Nurse's prologue gives us our first look
at the role of the oaths. Medea, dishonored,calls on the oaths and even
calls on the gods to witness what she has received from Jasonin return:

MjPxtt 85'/1 &•oaltvo;itigxgt?LcL(v

fPoz Iv opioClv);,
&vrnaX6 &Xt8El,
ct•lytVgu4toTIv, K
6C0C o1;
gcLpTI)pElat
oit'agagot i3;
,ig 'I~covo; Klppt. (20-23)
Before she comes out to speak with the chorus, Medea calls on Themis
and Artemis (159) to witness what she suffers, she who bound her hus-
band with great oaths (161 ydlcXot; i3opKotg), and offers a wish that
Jason, his bride, and the whole house be crushed because they have
treatedher unjustly(165 68ttcEiv).Immediatelyafterwards(168-170),
the Nurse restates the central themes of Medea's outbursteven if she
does not quote Medea precisely. If the text is not emended, the nurse
draws the audience's attention to the confidence with which Medea
calls on Themis, goddess invoked by prayer, and Zeus the steward of
oaths.37Before Medea appearswe are again remindedthat she calls on
the gods, Zeus, the oaths, and Themis because she has been treated

Benardeteto MarthaNussbaum.
37 See Page's note on line 148 for various solutions to the problem created by the
Nurse's claim that Medea has called on Zeus, althoughin our text she has not yet done so.
I am inclined to accept Page's preferredsolution, that is, that the Nurse makes a legit-
imate connection between the gods Medea does call on and the fact thatZeus is the stew-
ardof oaths.
108 GailAnnRickert

unjustly:

O~ooK)XZ•6'6&i• o0oaooa
'r&vZlvbq 6opmKitv
OELtv... (208-209)

Medea can call on the gods in this way because her anger and cause
arejust. The Chorusearly on tells Medea thatZeus himself will be her
advocate in this affair (158 ZFed When Medea
ootd•i. oauv&tlai•et.).
asks the Chorus to be silent if she can find any way to avenge herself,
the Choruscomplies because Medea is in the rightto punishJason (267
Just before Jason enters, the last antis-
v8vilc(o y,&plc'KEorl rtowtv).
trophe of the Chorus's song declares, in lines reminiscentof Hesiod,38
that the debt of oaths has gone away and Aidos no longer remains in
great Hellas but has flown off to heaven (339-340). Medea soon picks
up this theme in her address to Jason: trust in oaths has gone, and she
wonders whether he believes that the gods by whom he swore no
longer rule or some new laws have been establishedfor humans, laws
that allow an oath to be forsworn (492-495). The Chorus listens to
Jason's defense, but sides with Medea: Jason has betrayed her and is
treatingher unjustly(576-578).
Medea's anger is a just anger broughton by her husband's broken
oaths. Thus, even when she has determinedto murderher childrenshe
dares to call on Zeus and Justice, his daughter,along with Helios (764).
In her final exchange with Jason, she mocks his cries to the avenging
Furies and Zeus, reminding him of how lightly he thought of these
same gods by whom he had made his vows to her: "What god or
daimon will hear you, a perjurerand deceiver of guests?" (1391-1392
0iR
t;g 6&KXIc6too•O 'l6 8il&ov, I o) WF )Kai
Medea's confidence in the supportof the -66oPKol
gods, whom StvntXTol);)
she includes as
partners in her plans (1013-1014), is borne out by her success and what
is arguablyher own apotheosis at the end of the drama. As she appears
in the chariot of her grandfather,Helios, speaks to Jason in triumph,
declares rites for the children, and prophesies Jason's death, she
becomes herself a deus ex machina.39

38 Cf. Hesiod Worksand Days 197 ff., where Aidos and Nemesis flee the earthbecause
of the evils of the fifth generation,evils which include forswornoaths.
39Knox 206 ff. argues cogently that Medea is apotheosized,but too quickly dismisses
Medea as avengerof brokenoaths.
 AkrasiaandEuripides'Medea 109

That Medea is sincere in her attitude toward the practice of oath-

taking is confirmedby the oath she demandsfrom Aegeus. Some may
prefer to view the oath-swearingin this scene as a cynical but effective
means by which Medea manipulates the king. But Medea does not
give us reason to view it in this way. We have seen her manipulate
anotherking, Creon (368 ff.), but there she confesses her fawning and
insincere behavior. The fact thatjust after Medea confrontsJason with
his forswearing she takes great pains to bind anotherman to his word
suggests that not even Jason's faithlessness has caused Medea to lose
faith in this practice.40Medea leaves no loopholes for Aegeus (741); he
too recognizes that the oath is sure and powerful enough that both of
them can rely on it: Aegeus can show it to Medea's enemies as his rea-
son for protectingher, and Medea can rely on it to provide safety from
her enemies (743-745). The commitment is sincere, and since it
appearsin a scene which has been convincingly arguedto be the struc-
tural climax of the drama,41we have more reason to regardit as partic-
ularly significant. Since both partiesrecognize that failure to live up to
the terms of the oath will rightly incur punishment,we are reminded
that Medea's reliance on the oaths as justification for her revenge is
serious and not just another complaint with which she rails at Jason.
The whole sequence can be repeatedagain with Aegeus if he too fails
in his obligations. Jason's case is not an isolated incident. There is
something universal about the oaths and Medea's role in enforcing the
retribution due to the oath-breaker,even if we hesitate to identify
Medea with an actual Erinys.42Moreover, the punishmentimplicit in
the oath is just as appropriatein Aegeus' case as it is for Jason.43This
brings us back to our earlier question about the appropriatenessof the
deaths of the childrenas the means to Medea's revenge.

40An interestingparallelto Medea's abiding trust in oaths despite the faithlessness of

others can be found in Lysias 12.9. Lysias requiresPeison to swear an oath about their
agreement despite his evaluation of Peison's character: Tv O-v Ot O-UtiE
- "iLtto•trLv
0Eo o t' &vOprnougvogttEt, 6~(Co ; 6' trcv ntapdvrov 6F8Kt pot vaywctat6tatov
v
EtvaOt it(1AtV taxp' atXo0 M•apE1v.'
41 Buttrey's
argument(above, n. 32) 5 ff.
42 See Knox 210 and n. 54; Burnett16-17 and 17 n. 37.
43 It is interestingthat Medea tells Aegeus nothing of Jason's perjuryand her plans of
revenge as she lists the wrongs done to her. Concealing this is important,of course, if
Aegeus is not to be frightened off from swearing his own oath. But the avoidance of
actually stating the usual imprecation against one's children is noteworthy. Given
Aegeus' desire to have children,it is a delicate understatement.
110 GailAnnRickert

Having agreed with Medea that an oath will provide the greatest
safety for both himself and Medea, Aegeus tells Medea to name the
gods by whom he is to swear (745) and asks what it is he must do
(748). Medea states all this clearly (746-747; 749-751), and Aegeus
swears (752-753). He speaks the names of the gods by whom he is
swearing but only summarizeswhat Medea demandsof him: "I swear
by Gaia and the shining light of Helios and all the gods to abide by
what I hear from you." Medea is satisfied with this shorthandand
says, "Enough" (754). But she then asks (754), "And what will you
suffer if you do not abide by this oath?" To this Aegeus gives what
may seem a rathervague response:"What happensto mortalswho pay
no regard to the gods" (755 & torotat t yyvErat 3por(Ov).
8ooEipoFoi
since from Homer onward
But this response is only seemingly vague,
the penalty for perjuryexplicitly includes the destructionor permanent
obscurityof one's house or the destructionof one's children.
In Iliad 3.276 ff., Agamemnon speaks the oath the Trojans and
Achaians swear in an attemptto have the outcome of a duel between
Paris and Menelaos end the war. He swears by Zeus, Helios, earth,
rivers, and the "dead" beneath the earth who punish those who
forswear (277-279) and states what is to be done (281-291). The
ceremony then proceeds with the symbols of oaths pledged (3.245).
Two lambs are slaughtered(292-294) and while wine is pouredeach of
the Trojansand Achaiansassembledrepeatsthe prayerwhich states the
penaltyfor breakingthe oath (298-301):

"Zeus, most renowned and greatest,and the other immortalgods,

whoever first does harm in violation of the sworn agreement
(6rntt6EpotrTp6tEpot iutp pcxta let their brainsflow
on the groundlike this wine, theirstgijvEtoav),
and their children's (ao'r(v KaQ
rECo)v),and let theirwives be subjectedto others."

In contrastto this rathergraphic picture, the penalty in Hesiod Works

and Days 280-285 may seem somewhatless severe:

If ever someone who recognizes what is just consents to make it

known, far-seeing Zeus gives him prosperity;but he who with full
commitmentperjureshimself in giving testimony ("Sg ; IKEgap-
Tpi(ontv i~owv I opicov 6o6oaaa; xEjaExat) and errs having
harmed Dike beyond repair, the descendants of this man are left
more obscure later (toi &8 dragaport•pl
t' YEVE1hgEt6rntOE
xE1turtat); but the descendantsof the man who keeps his oath are
 AkrasiaandEuripides'Medea 111

betteroff later (&vSp6o8' EV36pKo/yEvErl &LEjVOV).

iE26ntolrOEv

Commentingon &tagapotrpilyEve-iWest says, ".. . the house will not

enjoy the prosperity mentioned in 281, and consequently its social
status will sink: 86'&pe•ilicai 6i86og (313)." This pas-
is like rthoi•tp
the Iliad an actual6ritrE&i
but as West points
sage not, passage, oath,
out, the penalty is connected with the termsof actualoaths.44
Each of the following passages from fifth-centuryB.C.inscriptions
explicitly mentions the "total destruction" (Ei`xEta) of the perjurer's
children (rtaiEg) or progeny (y`vog) as the penalty for perjury. Some-
times there is also mention of "many good things" to come to the man
who abides by his oath:45

... oiv6vat [Tbv? A]ia Ka[i] 'Anr6XXo KQaAi~gE[pa],

7rtap6gEvo[v~xa6] tav
4[atSit iqptopK6vttK]ai rcat[o]iv~Eo6[?xtav... (IG 12 10.15).

Ka Tv 'Air6[RXoKalt'v A4lETpa,KaQEi
... [A]3•a• - iv Tait]-
Toy]-
[a] napap(a)tvoiji[I i56XE; ?i'Eviai azt6'; Ey6 KQ't
,
[V]vo; tb b6vy tv
[F;g iiravTaXp6vov,E0op•oVot &8Li'E]
got Kai [dyaO6] (Meiggs and Lewis 47.52-55).
rno[k]X0&
In several passages the oratorsrefer to oaths which contain prayers
against the perjurer and his house. Antiphon (5.11) points out the
penalty for perjuryincluded in the oath sworn by the prosecutor,defen-
dant, and their witnesses before a murdertrial, "... you should have
sworn the greatestand most lasting oath, calling down total destruction
on yourself and your progeny and your house ..." (To'To 6~ &5ovoE
Sto6oaoaaate 5pKovTv gELytoTov KaQi Xop6tatov, ;(j)Atav oaau?)
Kai 7 VEt Kai oiict Ti f of Erap6)JiEvov).In his speech against Era-
tosthenes, Lysias summarizesthe oath he demandedfrom Peison who
had agreed to save Lysias from the Thirty for a talent of silver: "after
he swore, calling down total destruction on himself and his children
." (12.10 1 6 (J4LooGEV, i4XEtav avuztpK Ka oit;q rtatoiv
in&t•St
In "On the Mysteries" Andocides has a law read con-
ElrapogLEtvo;).
taining an oath which all Athenians are to swear. The law ends with

44 West also cites parallelsand suggests that the connectionof perjurywith the destruc-
tion of the family is Babylonianand Indian.
45 Cf. IG 12 15.41-44; R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical
Inscriptionsto the End of the Fifth CenturyB.C. (Oxford 1969) 13.14-16 and 40.16-17.
112 GailAnnRickert

what the Athenians are to pray for regardingwho does and does not
keep the oath: ". . . and they are to pray thatthere be many good things
for the one who keeps the oath, but that for the one who forswears,he
himself and his progeny be totally destroyed" (1.98 Kail tElne Eoxet
EI)opKov~ttjv vtv"otat tOXiai a&yaOui9, 5' ab0tv
8Erl
Elvat Kai We may assume thatthe7rtopKovztt
"many good things" which
y7vo;).
come to the man who keeps his oath include a long line of descendants.
A passage from Plato's Republic (363d3-4) states this directly. Adi-
mantus describes the rewardswhich poets say belong to the just man.
Some poets, outdoingthe eternalbanquetfor the just man describedby
Musaeus and his son, say "the children's children and the race
thereafterof the pious and oath-keeping man remain alive" (irai'8a;
yxp 0air6v pxoaiKat yEvo;gKaT6rtoeEv TOi 60o'oU Ki
Xi?EaeG•t
E66proC).
These passages make it clear that, horribleas it is, Medea's destruc-
tion of the children as the means to punishingJason for his perjuryis
appropriate.Some points, however, need more clarification. It may be
thought that the Hesiod passage provides an alternativeto killing the
progeny, that is, social and financialobscurity, and may even exclude
the perjurerhimself from punishment. In the other passages, however,
the perjurerhimself is named, though I have emphasized that the off-
spring of the perjurerare cursed. It can be argued that the ultimate
obscurity of a family is achieved through the utter destructionof the
line; and mention of punishmentor rewardfor the progeny of the per-
jurer need not exclude the same for the perjurerhimself: even as there
is a spillover in penalty or rewardfrom the swearer to his progeny, so
therecan be a spilloverfrom the progeny to the swearer.
A passage from Herodotus (6.86) gives us an even better under-
standingof how the perjureris punishedthroughhis progeny, and how
obscurity is ultimately achieved by death. The Spartan king Leu-
tychides tries to break through the reluctance of the Athenians to
restore some Aiginetan hostages held in Athens. He tells the story of a
Spartan named Glaucos who was renowned for his justice and had
therefore been entrustedwith a large sum of silver which was to be
returnedsome day to whoever presentedhim with the propertokens of
ownership. When the sons of the man who had entrustedthe silver
came with these tokens to collect it, Glaucos feigned ignoranceof the
event and sent them away. Meanwhile, he consideredswearingan oath
thathe had never been entrustedwith the silver so thathe could keep it.
Glaucos consulted the oracle at Delphi about his plan and was told that
he could profit in the short run by swearing this oath, and after all,
 AkrasiaandEuripides'Medea 113

death awaits the man who swears in good faith no less than the per-
jurer. But Oath has a nameless child who has neitherhands nor feet yet
moves swiftly; and this child will grasp and destroy all his progeny and
his whole house (raoaav ouGggapxVa6•al YEVEIV KQ' Oiicov
niiravra). The offspring of the man who abides by his oath is betteroff
in the future (&v6pbo8' V6picou
E yEvEi~
iEtrttoleEv G&JEivO)).Not
surprisingly, Glaucos decides to return the silver. However, the
priestess also told him that making trial of the god in this matterwas no
different from actually doing the deed. Thus, as the Spartanking con-
cludes, "the reason I have told the story is this": there is today no de-
scendantof Glaucos or any householdbearinghis name;his family was
utterlyuprootedfrom Sparta.
I have related this story in full because it highlights the issues in
Jason's case. It shows that the death of the perjureris not the only
means by which he can be destroyed, or, better, that the perjurer's
death is assured anyway so that it is not relevant to his punishment;
even the man who abides by his oath dies. Also, we can see in this
story that the opposite of the better life promised to the descendantsof
the oath-keeperis not just obscurity,but the obscurityof annihilation.
Medea succeeds in "destroying" Jason, who continues to live,
through the deaths of his children who were to be the means to his
fame. Thus Jason and his children suffer the penalty of his perjuryin
accordance with the typical oath formula. The same argumentholds
for Aegeus. Whateverhis larger view on the role of children, what we
know of him in this dramais thathe wants children,does not have any,
and is ready to pursue any available course to get them. Aegeus gives
two reasons for agreeing to help Medea (719-721): first,for the sake of
the gods,46and, secondly, for the children Medea has promised. Thus
the penalty for perjury,which at least includes the destructionof one's
children, has particularsignificance for Aegeus too: he is sure never to
be cured of his childlessness if he forswears.

46 How one should understand"For the sake

of the gods" is difficult to say. Medea
has told Aegeus how she has been treatedunjustly: she has been supplantedby another
woman and is being driven out of the city. Aegeus calls the former "a most shameful
deed" (695), and the latter an "evil" (705). Since Medea makes no mention of the
forsworn oaths or her plans for vengeance to Aegeus, we cannot think he is somehow
concurringwith the appropriatenessof the gods' (throughMedea) punishingJason for his
perjury. More probably,he refers to doing what he supposes the gods have planned for
him.
114 GailAnnRickert

Conflictsof Values
Medea's heroic thumosdemandsvengeance. The death of her chil-
dren is both an effective and an appropriateway to punishJason, unjust
and foresworn, and in Medea thumos is strongerthan any competing
claims. This view may distance us far enough from the horror of
Medea's act to increasethe plausibilityof her act's being in accordance
with her betterjudgment,but it still does not account for the conflict in
lines 1078-1080. Is there a way to account for this conflict without
resorting to akrasia? Recent attempts to save these lines, though
insufficientto exclude akraticconflict, nonethelessreach what I thinkis
an essentially correct view of lines 1078-1080, that is, that Medea
recognizes the pain and cost of her action.
A kind of conflict suited to this passage and distinguishablefrom
akraticconflict is one involving a conflict of values.47In a conflict-of-
values situation,pursuingone valued course of action precludespursu-
ing anotheror even requiresan agent to breach a value. Whateverthe
agent ultimatelydoes in such a situation,he undoubtedlyacts with the
view of pursuing a good or right course. But how much better the
agent considers the course of action he pursues than those he rejects
may vary. His attitudetowardthe losing claim can range from thinking
it has no claim at all in this situationand feeling no regretfor not being
able to act in accordancewith it, to thinkingit still has a valid claim on
him even if he cannotpursueit in the presentcircumstancesand feeling
some or even much regret about this. It is also possible that, if the
competingclaims are of very similarvalue and importanceto the agent,
the course of action he pursues may seem only minimally better or
even no better at all. In this case, describing the agent as acting in
accordance with his "better" judgment might seem awkward; but
describing him as acting against his better judgment would be com-
pletely inappropriate.For if the agent is caught in a situationwhere he
can pursue at most only one of the competing claims, in pursuingone
claim he acts in accordance with an evaluation of it at least no lower
than that of the claim he chooses not to pursue. In an akraticepisode,
on the other hand, it is the course of action not pursuedby the agent
which is evaluated as the better option, and this evaluation is not

47In the following discussion I rely on the detailed account of Agamemnon's tragic
conflict in Nussbaum (above, n. 5) 32-50; I do not agree that Agamemnonis bound by a
direct command to go to Troy, but this does not affect the overall interpretationof
Agamemnon'sconflict and his attitudetowardhis act.
 AkrasiaandEuripides'Medea 115

contested by the claim of the course of action which is pursued.48

Aeschylus' Agamemnon is confronted with a serious conflict of
values.49 He must choose between the claims of his kingship and the
army to take righteous vengeance, and the life of his own daughter.
Observing how Agamemnon deals with this conflict can shed some
light on lines 1078-1080 and provide more evidence against an
interpretationthatMedea acts akratically.
Both Agamemnon and Medea recognize that something bad is
embedded in the course of action each pursues:Agamemnon: ti rtv6E
6VEIuKaKv; (211) and Medea: gavevyo giv oa
ToXo•ltioo KCaCd
(1078)50 and earlier tfi 8E•"ET e atpa t&vSE tF'roKtOtO V Ka'KoqI
kXno~oav a••lrv 86i; 6aa tXT&aea
a ataK; (1046-1047). The course
of action chosen is not the one lacking somethingbad, whetheror not it
is evaluated as the better course to pursue. (Agamemnondoes make a
clear statement that the course he pursues is the right course: it is
themis for him to desire the sacrifice [214-217]; this point remains
moot in Medea's case.) Killing one's daughteris a bad thing to do, bad
for the agent, the victim, and others too. For Agamemnon it is clear
that being a deserter (liponaus) is also a bad thing. Medea does not
call foregoing vengeance kakon, but it is clear from her entire speech
that to do so is intolerable. Doing the deed must be dared and endured
(to?4tlirov), and Medea thinks herself Kalcr•even to think these soft
words (1049-1052).
Up to a point, Medea's situationis comparableto that of Agamem-
non. Even though each option open to Agamemnonwould bring about
something of value, each would also entail evil. Medea too recognizes
that something bad inheres in each of her options. But through this
impious deed, Medea will satisfy the valued demands of her thumos

48It should be noted that an agent

caught in a conflict of values can act akratically.
This is possible if after some initial tension between the respective values of mutually
exclusive courses of action, the agent ultimatelyreaches the judgment that X is best but
does not pursueit.
49Walsh (above, n. 7) 18 contrastsOrestes, in conflict because he must kill his mother
in orderto avenge his father's death, with an akraticMedea who knows it is betternot to
kill her childrento carryout her vengeance but does so anyway.
50 See Kovacs 351-352. He prefersreadingroXjOiao with all the manuscriptsexcept
L. This is appealingsince does combine an active and a passive element. Medea
can be seen to be steeling roXo(6o
herself to do her deed in the face of a competing claim. One
may well need to steel oneself to such a deed as Medea's, whetheror not one thinks it
best to do. Thus, readingro•igaow fits with my view of these lines and does not preju-
dice the case for or againstthe problemof what Medea thinksbest to do.
116 GailAnnRickert

and inflict an appropriatepunishmenton her oath-breakinghusband;

Agamemnon,for his part, fulfills the demands of his kingship. But in
lines 1078-1080 Medea does not dwell on the positive effects of her
vengeance, what she will gain by her actions, or even on the rightness
of her action, which she has frequently addressed. Instead, she says
clearly that she understandswhat harm she is aboutto do and acknowl-
edges it is the propensity of thumos to cause the greatest harm to
humans. Her thumos is a strongermotivation than any calculation of
harm to herself or any plans born of her motherly feelings. But its
strengthdoes not diminish her awareness of the claims she must deny
in orderto accomplishits demands.
Agamemnon, in contrastto Medea, makes no furtheracknowledge-
ment of the evil he is about to do once his mind is made up; after he
makes his difficult decision, he ceases to show any regard for the
claims which once troubledhim and broughthim to tears (202-204).
The chorus gives a description of the sacrifice of Iphigenia which
emphasizes the brutality of the act and the suffering of the victim.
There is nothing said of any distress suffered by Agamemnon apart
from his fear of his daughter'scurses (231-237). Medea, on the other
hand, fully appreciates the horror of her proposed act; her decision
does not minimize or destroy the importanceof the "losing" value or
deny the harmdone. In ordinarycircumstances,Agamemnon's way of
reasoning and his attitude towards his action may be typical and
acceptableto us. When our values come into conflict, when any action
brings harm,we may decide that one course of action is betterthan the
other, or even right, and we may not be disturbedby our failure to pur-
sue the losing value or feel regretat the harmwe could not help. But in
extraordinarycircumstances,where what we cannot pursue is of great
importanceto us, or the harm we do is enormous, our attitudetoward
the losing claim can become a very prominentfeature of the action
itself. Medea's last words in this speech are remarkablefor the clarity
with which she sees her actions and her total lack of self-deception
about them. In the end, our evaluationof Medea may be more positive
than our evaluation of Agamemnon because of this clarity. We need
not go so far as to think Medea shows regret for her action; I do not
think she does. But she does recognize it for what it is, kakon.

Conclusion
Lines 1078-1080 cannot be understoodto say with any certainty
that Medea's action is akratic. Akrasia is read into these lines by nar-
rowing the meaning of Medea's thumos to exclude its valued
 Akrasia and Euripides' Medea 117

attachmentto oaths and her heroic principles,by unduly privileging the

claim competing with thumos, or by confusing the recognition that
something is kakon with the judgment that it thereforeought not to be
done. On the other hand, it must be allowed that despite the plausibil-
ity of inferringthat Medea's action is in accord with her judgment of
what is best to do in these circumstances,the passage does not say this
directly, and it cannot be denied that there is a serious conflict of some
sort embedded in lines 1078-1080. However, there is an alternativeto
viewing this conflict as akratic. What Medea says in these lines is con-
sistent with a conflict-of-values situationwhere the agent's regardfor a
losing claim is not diminishedby the fact thatthe agent does not pursue
this claim. Medea, confrontedby competing claims, can be understood
as acting in accordancewith her thumosand yet simultaneouslyrecog-
nizing the importanceof the claims she does not pursue or at least the
harm she does throughher action. The fact that Medea makes no clear
statementthat her action, however naturalit is for her, is also in accor-
dance with her betterjudgment, and her statementthat thumosis prone
to cause the greatest harm, may be explained by the spontaneity of
heroic action and the hero's indifferenceto judgmentabout what is best
to do. In fact, the hero's thumosand its principlesare so uncompromis-
ing that it may be difficultto find one who is truly akratic.51
THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

51 Some special condition might make it easier to detect akrasiain a hero: for example,
if over a period of time thumos and its orinciples no longer overridecompeting claims.
Achilles in Book 9 of the Iliad rejects even the argumentsof Ajax because of his anger,
anger which is part of the heroic ethic and which does not make his action akratic;so
Irwin (above, n. 2) 184 ff. and J. M. Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad (Chicago
1975) 103 ff. (Cf. J. Griffin, Homer on Life and Death [Oxford 1980] 74 n. 46, for the
view that Achilles does reject his values in favor of his passionate anger.) But we may
wonder whethercircumstancesever reach the point where the values of pity and friend-
ship, for example, come to outweigh the values of his angry heart. R. Scodel has sug-
gested to me that Achilles' descriptionof his anger in 18.107-110 may show clearersigns
of akrasia.
G. R. Stanton's article "The End of Medea's Monologue: Euripides, Medea
1078-1080," RhM 130 (1987) 97-106, appearedtoo late to be included in the body of
this discussion. Stanton follows Dihle and others in understandingthe "plans" of 1079
to be Medea's plans to kill her children and, more importantly,reassertsDiller's view
(see n. 30 above) that ipeoaaov rv •tv pothugdrov means "master of my plans."
The additionalparallelsStantoncites do not settle the objectionsto this view, but even if
Diller's renderingis accepted it does not compromise the substance of my criticisms of
1078-1080 as a statementof akrasiaand is in fact consonantwith the alternativeinterpre-
tation I have offered. Stanton's explanation of thumos as "drive" needs more
justificationthan is given to be viable.