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00228a Can PDF
00228a Can PDF
7- Layer OSI
Application
Presentation
Session Logical Link Control (LLC)
Transport - Acceptance filtering
- Overload notification
Network - Recovery management
Data Link Medium Access Control (MAC)
Physical - Data encapsulation/decapsulation Defined by CAN Controller
- Frame coding (stuffing/de-stuffing)
- Error detection/signaling
- Serialization/deserialization
Physical Signaling
- Bit encoding/decoding
ISO11898
- Bit timing/synchronization
Physical Medium Attachment
Transceiver
- Driver/receiver characteristics
MCP2551
Medium Dependent Interface
- Connectors/wires
MCU
CAN Controller
Transceiver
Node Node
120Ω 120Ω
CANH
3.5
2.5
1.5
CANL
V V
5.0
0.9
0.5
Recessive Recessive
0.05
Differential Differential
Output -0.5 Input
Range Range
-1.0
Sample Point
Propagation Delay
Time (t)
RECESSIVE STATE
A logic ‘1’ on the TXD input turns off the drivers to the
CANH and CANL pins and the pins “float” to a nominal
2.5V via biasing resistors.
DOMINANT STATE
A logic ‘0’ on the TXD input turns on the CANH and
CANL pin drivers. CANH drives ~1V higher than the
nominal 2.5V recessive state to ~3.5V. CANL drives
~1V less than the nominal 2.5V recessive state to
~1.5V.
VDD
TXD Thermal
Dominant Shutdown
VDD Detect
TXD Driver
Control
RXD GND
CANL
Reference Receiver
VREF
Voltage
VSS
Transmitter
Enabled
tDOM
TXD
Transmitter
Disabled
CANH
Recessive Recessive
Dominant Dominant
CANL
4.0
VPORH
POR
D
VD
3.5
VPORL
BOD
3.0
t
TXD
High High
Impedance Impedance
CANH
CANL
Common Mode
Bus Voltage
(Single Ended)
12
VO(CANH)(max) VDIFF(max)
4.5V 3V
-1.25V
CANH
6
CANL 12V
7.5V
6.25V
0
Receiving Node Ground
Common Mode
Bus Voltage
(Single-Ended)
-6.25V
12.5V -12V
-6 CANH
CANL
6.25V
VDIFF(max)
VO(CANL)(max) 3V
0.5V
Standard
120 Ω Termination
60 Ω
Split
Termination
C
60 Ω
R1 60 Ω
Biased
Split
Termination
C
R2 60 Ω
• Microchip believes that its family of products is one of the most secure families of its kind on the market today, when used in the
intended manner and under normal conditions.
• There are dishonest and possibly illegal methods used to breach the code protection feature. All of these methods, to our knowl-
edge, require using the Microchip products in a manner outside the operating specifications contained in Microchip's Data
Sheets. Most likely, the person doing so is engaged in theft of intellectual property.
• Microchip is willing to work with the customer who is concerned about the integrity of their code.
• Neither Microchip nor any other semiconductor manufacturer can guarantee the security of their code. Code protection does not
mean that we are guaranteeing the product as “unbreakable.”
Code protection is constantly evolving. We at Microchip are committed to continuously improving the code protection features of our
products.
10/18/02