Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles Fred Chemoff The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 123. (Apr., 1981), pp. 126-138. Stable URL http: flinksjstor-org/sici%sici= 131-8094 28198 104% 2931%3A 123%3C126%3ALPOTIOG3E2.0.CO%3B2-V The Philosophical Quarterly is currently published by The Philosophical Quarterly Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at bhupulwww.jstororg/about/terms.hunl. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of « journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial us. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hutpy/wwww jstor.org/jounals/philquar. html Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission, JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to ereating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @jstor.org, bupshvwwjstor.org/ Thu Oct 26 23:09:10 2006126 _LEIBNIZ’S PRINCIPLE OF THE ADENEITY, OF INDIGCRENIBEPS By Frep Curryorr ‘There have been numerous attempts to determine what Leiba’ grounds ave for his principle of the identity of indiscrn bes Maia aD) L. Isrmopvorory Leibniz’s final views on @ broad range of questions are presented in the ‘Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. In trying to excavate the ground of the principle of the identity of indisoernibles [PIT], as it appears there, it is ‘usual to restriot oneself entirely to the correspondence. Recourse to other ‘writings ia not generally regarded as instructive here. ‘The reason cited is ‘Leibniz’s alleged inconsistency on fundamental questions of metaphysies. It is held that, in the correspondence, Leibniz grants the reality of material, spatio-temporal objects in » way denied elsewhere in his writings? This paper may provide further reasons for heeding this advice. For if it ean be shown that there is more than one version of PII in the correspondence, it follows a fortiori that there is more than one version inherent in the Leibnizian corpus. ‘The question usually raised in connection with the ground of PIT is, ‘Is it presented as a necessary or as a contingent proposition?’ ® But we must roblem in these Tho original edition was edited, and Loibnin’slottors wore translated, by Clarke ‘Tho most sooant editions are edited by HG. Alexander and by Loemker: we lst of ‘ferences below. “Montgomery Furth discusses this supposed inconsistency, aa does Thomas Vinci * Among the commentators who pursue this question are G. H.R. Parkinson, Nicholas ‘Reschor, Bertrond ussoll and PF. Strawaon. “In hie Sth lottr to Clack, a2 woll as in his Meodicy and “On tho Radical Origina tion of Thingy”, Loibnix distingulahoe motaphyaieal rom phiysieal neeosity, logical from moral necozity, and absolute frm hypotbotieal noseaity.LRIBNIA's PRINCIPLE 12 (cg, Parkinson and perhaps Straws ‘Some of those who hold it to be contingent do so because the set of premises from which it is deduced includes propositions (concerning, for example, the nature of the Divine Will) which are not necessary truths. Others (e.g., Vinei) have argued. that, since Leibniz views these premises as necessary, PIT is presented as a necessary proposition. ‘Thus even when agreement: has been reached regard- ing the promises from which Leibniz deduces PII, there has been discord over its own nature, At least some of this disagreement rests upon an equivocation. Leibniz, holds that a principle like ‘God wills only what is best’ is necessary in one sense, but not in another. He believes it to be morally necessary; but its denial is not self-contradiotory, so it is not absolutely necessary. We can clude this problem by altering our nomenclature. I shall make use of the distinction between “logical” and ‘‘non-logical” propositions for the pur- ‘poses of investigating the ground of PII. “Logical” covers propositions that are true in virtue of our conceptual capabilities and limitations (that is, those whose negations are inconceivable). It is not possible to conceive of an armadillo as having four legs while also having fewer than four legs, nor is it possible to conceive of a set as having many members while also being empty. ‘Truths of logic and set theory are included under the rubrie ‘logical’, which corresponds, in the Leibnizian lexicon, to ‘absolutely necessary’. All other propositions, including those Leibniz holds to be morally — but not absolutely — necessary, are non-logical. Hence somo claims thet PII is necessary assert it to be a logical truth, while other such claims assert it to be non-logical. 1, Lams’ won Lerve ax ti Lootoat, Panscrrnz Leilnis profeses to provide “many demonstrations to confute tho fanoy of those who take space to be... an absolute being”. ‘Tho frst of these demonstrations is prsented at LTIT. 3 He offers & negative argument, guint the Newtonian conception of space at abycuto, and w poitive argu. ment, supporting his own relational theory of spaco, ‘The negative argument inthe following Tay then, thatif space was an absolute beng, there would something happen for which i would be impossible there should bow suit sc, Wh agit my ar And | prove thus, Spe tomething absolutely uniform; and, without the things placed tn it ge pat of mac dao nly der n any set whatsoever from another point of space. Now Hom hence H follows, (uppoang spnce to be something tn Hac, besides the order of bodies amon ERemselven) that "ti impossible there should be a reason, why God, preserving the same stvatons of bodies atong theses, shoud Krave placed them in space aftr one cortan particular mans, and 41 follow tho conventional refrenco notation: ‘LIIK. 8 i paragraph five of Laibnis's third letter