Criminal law; Prescription of offenses; Interruption by complaint or information filed in the proper court, not in the prosecutor's office. — Conformably to the doctrine of People v.DelRosario, the prescriptiveperiod for thecase at bar was never interrupted. n the said case We declared that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses prescribe in two months. Article 91 of the same Code provides that theperiod of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are justifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him, the complaint or information referred to in the above prescriptive period, as ruled in the case of Peoplev. Taycois that whichisfiledinthe proper court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party in the Prosecutor's Office. Same; Same: Same; Meaning of term “proper court”. — The proper court in the present litigation was the Court of First Instance. The records of this case clearly show that no formal complaint or information as contemplated by the aforementioned Article 91 of the Penal Code was everfiledtherein within thereglementary period Asa matter of fact, the said formal complaint or information was filed only after thelapse of more than one year. Considering that under the Code, the prescriptive period for grave oral defamation is six months (Article 90, Revised Penal Code) The only conclusion deducible is that the same has prescribed (People v. Coquia). Same; Filing of complaint in municipal court interrupts prescription. — The filingof a criminal complaintin the municipal court, although merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, interrupts the period for the prescription of the offense even if the said court cannot try the case on its merits. This rule modifies the ruling in People v. Coquia (People v. Olarte). Criminal Procedure; Prescription of felony; An accused who had committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged cannot beconvictedof a lesser offenseif it hasalready prescribed; Reason. — Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense Same; Same; Interpretation; Complaint or information referred to in Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, interpreted; Doctrine in People v. Olarte that filing of complaint in the municipal court, even if merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, interrupts the period of prescription of felony even if court where complaint or information is, filed cannot try the case on its merits, the true and correct doctrine. — Olarte set at rest the conflicting views, and enunciated the doctrine aforecited by the Solicitor General. In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where ‘the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information” without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, itis unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint (Francisco v. Court of Appeals).Criminal Procedure; Prescription; The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses are Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for offenses punished thereunder, and Act No. 3326, as amended, for those penalized by special laws. — The basic substantive laws on prescription of offensesare Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for offenses punished thereunder, and Act No. 3326, as amended, for those penalized by special laws. Under Article 90 of theRevisedPenal Code, the crime of grave oral defamation prescribes in six months. Since Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of months it shall be understood to be of 30 days, then grave oral defamation prescribesin 180 days (Llenes v. Dicdican). Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. — By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Big. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador, however, thatthe longer prescriptive period of 15 years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of B.P. Big. 195, which wasapprovedon 16 March 1982, because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to February 1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in orderto accord with People v. Pacificador. ll-Gotten Wealth; During the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986. — Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for ‘the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favorsillegally extendedrenderedit similarly well- nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986, Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG's exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No, 0013 against Disini Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the course of official functions. Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawfultransactionswas possible prior to 1986. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Prescription of Offenses; Actions; The filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription. — We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on 8 April 1991 for the conduct the preliminary investigation. In accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code andtheruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information jin the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. — The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of _ prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of thediscovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. —It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that ‘the complaint or information charges no offense maybe properly sustained, The fundamentaltest in determining whether amotion to quash maybe sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elementsof the offense as defined in the law. Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not considered. The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there ‘would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceedto trial (Disini v. Sandiganbayar). Same; Same; The commencement of the prescription period of offenses is governed by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. — The commencement of the prescription periodis also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. —The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reasonnot imputable to him, The offense was committed on 7 May 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period (Jadewell Parking System Corporation v. Lidua). Same; Same; Same; Same; The charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure and not Section 1 of Rule 110. — As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule andnot Section 1of Rule 10, Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that. — Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, “the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation.” Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are judicial proceedings, contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. — This interpretation is in consonance with the afore- quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended “when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereofare "judicialproceedings," contrary tothe submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. Same; Same; Same; Same; In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326. — At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of