PICOP Resources vs Base Metals
We
Facts: In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Dev’t Corporation entered into a
Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation
whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development
and eventual commercial operation of CMMCI’s 18 mining claims located in Agusan
del Sur. Pursuant to the terms of the Afreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications
for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. On
April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing
it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Since a
portion of Banahaw Mining’s mining claims was located in PICOP’s logging
concession in Agusan Del Sur, Banahaw Mining and PICOP entered into a MOA
whereby PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access to its mining claims. In 1991,
Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Miniral Production
Sharing Agreements (MPSA). While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on
December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over 37 mining
claims in favor of Base Metals. The transfer included those covered by its mining
operating agreement with CMMCI. Upon being informed of the development,
CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw
Mining in favor of Base Metals thereby recognizing Base Metals as the new
operator of its claims. On March 10, 1997, Base Metals amended Banahaw
Mining’s pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as
applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the application. Area
clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan
Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as required. On November 18, 1997,
PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), an Opposition to Base
Metals’ application because it violate the non-impairment clause and will be
prejudicial to PICOP. The Panel Arbitrator initially ruled for PICOP but upon appeal
to the Mines Adjudication Board, judgment was in favor of Base Metels, CA
affirmed stating the Presidential Warranty of Sept 25, 1968 issued by then
President Marcos merely confirmed the timber licensed granted to PICOP and
warranted the latter’s peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its
concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the Board of Investments
to establish the boundaries of PICOP’s timber license agreement. The Presidential
Warranty did not convert PICOP’s timber license agreement into a contract
because it did not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of
PICOP. Thus the non-impairment clause finds no application.
ISSUE: W/O the non-impairment clause is violated in timber license.
HELD:
NEGATIVE. Timber license agreement is not a contract, but a mere privilege.
should state at this jucture that the policy of multiple land use is enshrined in our
laws towards the end that the country’s natural resources may be rationally
explored, developed, utilized and conserved. In like manner, RA 7942, recognizing
the equiponderance between mining and timber rights, gives a mining contractor
the right to enter a timber concession and cut timber therein provided that the
surface owner or concessionaire shall be properly compensated for any damage
done to the property as a consequence of mining operations.Firsty, assuming that
the area covered by Base Metals’ MPSA is a government reservation, defined as
proclaimed reserved lands for specific purposes other than mineral reservations,
such does not necessarily preclude mining activities in the area. Sec 15(b) of
DAO96-40 provides that government reservations may be opened for mining
applications upon prior written clearance by the government agency having
jurisdiction over such reservation. Sec. 6 of RA7942 also provides that mining
operations in reserved lands other than mineral reservations maybe undertaken by
the DENR, subject to certain limitations. Secondly, RA 7942 does not disallow
mining applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed as watershed
forest reserves.There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base
Metals' MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. DENR
Memorandum
Order No. 03-98, which provides the guidelines in the issuance of area status and
clearance or
consent for mining applications pursuant to RA 7942, provides that timber or forest
lands, military and other government reservations, forest reservations, forest
reserves
other than critical watershed forest reserves, and existing DENR Project Areas
within timber
or forest lands, reservations and reserves, among others, are open to mining
applications
subject to area status and clearance.Lastly, PICOP failed to present any evidence
that the area
covered by the MPSA is a protected wilderness area designated as an initial
component of the
NIPAS pursuant to a law,presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive
order as
required by RA 7586.

YSMAEL vs DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau
of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as
well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private
respondents in 1984 by sending letters to the Office of the President and the MNR
[now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Petitioner’s
prayers were to no avail. Hence the petition in the Court, imputing grave abuse of
discretion to public respondents.
RULING:
The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters within
there scope without need of interference by the courts of law. These administrative
bodies are deemed to be in better positions to determine issues within their
specialty and resolve the same. The Court cited the doctrine of res judicata which
avers that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their
finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment. The rule of res judicata thus
forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting
within their exclusive jurisdiction
The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line with
the latter’s duty to develop and conserve the country’s natural resources in view of
the constitutional mandate of the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. It is their duty to regulate
the issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit, which the court cannot interfere with.
The Court further held that sans grave abuse of discretion which may be imputed to
public respondents, the court ruled that petitioner cannot seek affirmative relief.
SUNVILLE vs ABAD
The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the
issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary,
of the same question by a court of justice.
FACTS:
Sunville was granted a Timber License Agreement authorizing it to exploit timber in
Lison Valley, Zamboanga del Sur. Respondents filed a petition with the DENR to
annul the said TLA due to some various violations of its conditions and provisions of
forestry laws, carried out by petitioner. They likewise filed a complaint for injunction
in the RTC based on the same causes of action. Sunville filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction of the court and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The motion was denied by Judge Abad of RTC. The CA affirmed and held that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and
pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed
with. The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception
was the urgent need for judicial intervention given the petitioner’s operations have
caused heavy siltation in various rivers.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents should first exhaust administrative remedies.
HELD:
YES. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to
the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling
under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for
review. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of
powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-inference with
matters coming primarily within the competence of the other departments. As
correctly suggested by the respondent court however, there are number of
instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly
resorted to immediately. In this case, the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR
should be allowed to rule in the first instance on this controversy coming under its
express powers before the courts of justice.
DE OCAMPO vs ARLOS
Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is
reclassified and declared as such, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no
matter how long ago, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. Ruled before
MALABANAN case which is the prevailing rule.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTY vs VILLAREAL
FACTS:
The petitioner, Director of Forestry was one of the several persons who opposed
the application for registration of a parcel land classified as mangrove swamps in
the municipality of Sapian, Capiz with an area of 178,11 square meters of
mangrove swamps, to the applicant Ruperto Villareal. He alleged that he and his
predecessors-in-interests had been in possession of the said parcel of land for
more than forty years (40). Both parties agreed in one point that the disputed land
was a mangrove swamp. The respondent a rgued that mangrove swamp
are agricultural land but the petitioner contended that it is a forestall
land therefore not disposable. The Court of the First Instance of Capiz
however grants the application of the respondent. The decision of the lower
court was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence the Director of Forestry
elevated the case to the SC for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not mangrove swamps are agricultural land or forest land.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Furthermore the legislative definition embodied in section 1820 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1217 which declar es that mangrove
swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines
hence they are not alienable. The evidence presented by the
respondent in its claim were not sufficient to prove its possession and
ownership of the land, he only presented tax declaration. Wherefore the decision of
the Court of Appeals was set aside and the application for registration of title by the
respondent is dismissed by the Supreme Court.
YNGSON vs SEC. OF AGRICULTURE
The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area
of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini,
municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the
potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes, several persons
filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said
purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her
application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio Doromal who filed his on
October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area
were then still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available for
fishpond purposes.
"On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar
application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the
respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their
respective applications with the same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953.
When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said
area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only released
for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid
parties were brought to the attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who
issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the
petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3,
Rec. on Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed
the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901
and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal). "In an order dated April 5,1955, the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the
order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of the area
in question into three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the
whole area covered by their respective applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). The
petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null
and void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to
him be reinstated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Priority Rule established in FISHERY
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 is applicable to fishpond applications
HELD: The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond
purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications
were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease permits and
conversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their applications.
After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably
gave due course to Yngson’s application and rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales
and Jose M. Lopez. The reason given was Yngson’s priority of application.
We reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged with implementing
and enforcing the provision of a statute should be given controlling weight.
 All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a
preferential right over another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is
only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of the
swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given
some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether or not the
administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not
challenged in this case. The validity of paragraph "d" is not in issue because
petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not covered by the provision. His application
was filed almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond purposes.
The private respondents, who filed their applications within the one year period, do
not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant,in spite of the fact that
the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact,
the respondent Secretary’s order states that all three applications must be
considered as having been filed at the same time on the day the area was released
to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66 hectares among the
three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They pray that the
decision of the lower court be affirmed in WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against Petitioner-Appellant.
INT’L HARDWOOD AND VENNER vs UP
FACTS: International Hardwood is engaged in themanufacture, processing, and
exportation of plywood. It was granted by the Government an exclusive license for
25 years expiring on Feb 1985 to cut, collect and remove timber from a timber land
in the provinces of Quezon and Laguna.
Sometime on 1961, during the effectivity of the License Agreement, the President
issued Executive Proclamation No. 791. Under this proclamation, certain parcels of
land of the public domain in Quezon and Laguna were withdrawn from sale or
settlement and were reserved for the UP College of Agriculture as experiment
station for the college.
On 1964, still during the effectivity of the License Agreement, RA 3990 was enacted
establishing a central experiment station for UP for the colleges of agriculture,
veterinary medicine, arts and sciences. Under RA 3990 the land described in Proc.
791 was fully cede to UP, subject to any existing concessions, if any.
On the strength of RA 3990, UP demanded from Hardwood:
1.Payment of forest charges due and demandable under the License Agreement to
UP, instead of the BIR
2. That the sale of any timber felled or cut by Hardwood within the land described in
RA 3990 be performed by UP personnel
However, despite repeated demands, Hardwood refused to accede to UP’s
demands.
International Hardwood filed before the CFI a petition for declaratory relief seeking
a declaration that UP does NOT have the right to:
1. Supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest
products,
2.Scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or
3.Collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from Hardwood and/or
4.Impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession
covered by License Agreement, ceded in full ownership to UP by RA 3990
Hardwood also prayed for an injunction and P100,000 in damages.
UP filed its Answer:
1.Interposed affirmative defenses of improper venue and that the petition states no
cause of action
2.Set up counterclaim for payment of forest charges on the forest products cut and
felled within the area ceded to UP under RA 3990
CFI DECISION: CFI rendered judgment in favor of Hardwood:
1.RA 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure, and seal the timber cut by
International Hardwood within the tract of land and collect the corresponding
charges prescribed by NIRC
2. Dismissed UP’s counterclaim
CA DECISION: Elevated the case to the SC as the case involves purely legal
questions.
ISSUE: WON UP as owner had the right to scale, measure, and seal the timber cut
by Hardwood and collect forestry charges thereon.
HELD: YES, by virtue of the full cession of ownership to UP.
I.
Discussion on the effect of the laws
A.
The laws:
1.Under Proc. 791 – a parcel of land of the public domain was withdrawn from sale
or settlement and was reserved for the UP College of Agriculture as experiment
station, subject to private rights, if any
2. Under RA 3990 – the very same lot referred to in Proc. 791 was ceded fully to UP,
subject to
any existing concessions, if any
B. Effect of the laws on the concession of Hardwood:
1. When RA 3990 ceded the property to UP, the Philippines completely removed it
from the public domain and segregated the areas covered by the timber license
from the public forest
2. The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the area to UP
a. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to existing concession
3. Since there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this means that the
right of Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired, or
diminished; it must be respected
4. BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the
license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP
a. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or
from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the
authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated
b. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to
collect forestry charges and other fees thereon because of this full transfer.
II. As owner, UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other
limitations than those established by law. In this case, that exception is made for
Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the
license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to
UP until February 1985.
A. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest
charges or royalties to the new owner, UP
B. Thus, the charges should not be paid to the Government but to UP.
C.It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the area
covered by R.A. No. 3990
DISPOSITIVE: Judgment is rendered reversing the decision of the trial court. Thus:
1. Forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its
License Agreement within the area ceded and transferred to UP pursuant to R.A.
No. 3990 shall be paid to UP;
2. UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging,
felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs MUÑOZ
Piadeco claims to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the
municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan,
and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. Piadeco’s evidence of ownership
consists of Titulo de Propiedad and a deed of absolute sale.
The controversy began when the Acting Director of Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera
required Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him. Ground for this
cancellation was that Piadeco had violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting
trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly excluded
from the said certificate.
Piadeco filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against the Director of Forestry. Forest Station Warden Marquez and NAWASA,
essentially upon the averment that their acts heretofore narrated were “all
precipitate, arbitrary, whimsical and capricious.” The preliminary injunction was
granted and then he moved to declare the forestry officials in default for failure to
answer its petition on time. The forestry officials asked that court to dismiss the
petition upon the averments that said court had no jurisdiction over their persons or
the subject matter of the petition, and that administrative remedies have not yet
been exhausted by Piadeco. On the same date, too, but in a separate motion, said
forestry official asked for a reconsideration of the lower court’s order granting
preliminary injunction, bottomed upon their charge that the illegal cutting of trees by
Piadeco inside the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations - which are the
main source of water supply of the City of Manila and its surrounding towns and
cities - poses a grave danger of causing them to dry up to the prejudice and
irreparable injury of the inhabitants thereof. The forestry officials were declared in
default.
Piadeco entered into an amicable settlement with Nawasa whereby Piadeco’s case
against Nawasa was withdrawn, the right of way granted by Nawasa to Piadeco
remaining revoked and cancelled; and Nawasa’s counterclaim against Piadeco was
also withdrawn in consideration of P1, 651.59 paid by Piadeco to Nawasa,
representing the former’s liabilites to the latter. The court approved the amicable
settlement.
Piadeco applied for the renewal of its Certificate of Private Woodland Registration
but was denied by Assistant Director of Forestry J.L. Utleg but Piadeco continued
logging operations. It was about this time that illegal logging was denounced by
some members of Congress thereby attracting national attention. The Secretary of
National Defense directed the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to implement the
request. And, the Chief of Staff dispatched a task force of the army into the Angat
area, which impounded and seized all logs cut by Piadeco and other loggers which
were purportedly conducting illegal operations and they made a private quarters on
a portion of Piadeco’s land and prevented continuation of logging operations, from
cutting and gathering of timber and other forest products and enjoyment of said
property. Hence, Piadeco filed a complaint but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Piadeco’s title is registrable with the Bureau of Forestry.
HELD: No. Piadeco’s title is not registarable with the Bureau of Forestry. The
pertinent statutory provision is Section 1829 of the Revised Administravive Code,
viz:
Sec. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land.- Every private owner of land
containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to
the same with the Director of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the
boundaries of their property shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector of
Internal Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as
occasion may require.
Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any
such land lies shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a
view to its registration in the Bureau of Forestry.
Ampliatory thereof is Sec 7, Forest Administrative Order 12-1 of July1, 1941, as Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
amended by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, which took effect on January 1, complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
1963. It reads:
7. Titles that may be registered.- Only the following titles covering lands containing
timber, firewood and other minor forest products may be registered under and
pursuant to Section 1823 of the Revised Administrative Code; The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the
A. Administrative titles granted by the present government, such as homestead relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
patent, free patent and sales patent; and the Constitution.
B. Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land Registration Act
(Act 496, as amended) or under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended).
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and
The amendment of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 by Forestry Administrative
Order 12-2 consisted in the omission of one paragraph, paragraph c, which asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
particularized as one of the titles registrable pursuant to Section 1829 if the Revised respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
Administrative Code, “titles granted by the Spanish sovereignty in the island and
duly recognized as valid titles under the existing laws.”
ISSUES:
In the case at bar however, Piadeco’s title was issued during the Spanish regime.
And it is stated in Section 1829, does not prescribe with particularity titles that may
be registered with the Bureau of Forestry. Spanish titles are quite dissimilar to
administrative and judicial titles under the present system. Although evidences of (1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
ownership, these Spanish titles may be lost thru prescription. They are, therefore,
neither indefeasible nor imprescriptible. It should not have been allowed registration (2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
in the first place. Obviously, registration thereof can never be renewed.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of
contracts.

OPPOSA vs FACTORAN
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. RULING:
The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati,
Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against
defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
environmental tragedies. law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental
legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O.
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber
192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency
License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy
declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have
set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all
those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's
duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule
upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to
declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the
state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly
withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is
limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to
the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
decision is SET ASIDE.
TAN vs DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
1. On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the
license of logging operations on a public forest land in Olongapo.
2. On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Benjamin M. Gozon promulgated Order no. 46 which gives the power to the
Director of Forestry to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the
area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the
extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000
hectares.
3. On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was issued
by the acting secretary, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of
Forestry which incidentally was the same date the license for petitioner was
signed.
4. Acting on claims of irregularity, the license for the petitioner was revoked.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, hence the petitioner raised it directly to the
Court.
Issue:1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio
2) Whether or not the Director of Forestry gravely abused its discretion in revoking
the license
Held:
1. Yes.
a. The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it
was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of
Forestry was revoked.
b. While the timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was
released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the
licensee.
c. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any
authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant
had not acquired any legal right under such void license.
2. No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause;
it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this ceise.
Petition denied.
PEOPLE vs QUE
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of
Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277. He claimed that he
acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial,
he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica
Cayosa and Elpidio Sabal. The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and
dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit.He alleged that the
tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the PLTP's of Cayosa
and S a b a l a n d t h a t t h e y w e r e g i v e n t o h i m b y C a y o s a a n d
S a b a l a s p a y m e n t f o r h i s h a u l i n g services. Appellant argues that he
cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277
which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other forest
products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular
documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest
laws and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.
ISSUE: WON appellant is guilty for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as
amended by EO No. 277
RULING:Yes. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under
Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.In the first offense, one can
raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting
or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the
authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is
immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the
forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without
the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber
comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents as malum prohibitum.
MONGE vs PEOPLE
On July 20, 1994, Monge and Potencio were found by the barangay tanods in
possession of and transporting 3 pieces of mahogany lumber in Iriga City. Monge
and Potencio were not able to show any documents or the requisite permit from
DENR. The trial court found Monge guilty of violation of Section 68 of PD No 705,
as amended by E.O. No. 277 while Potencio was discharged because he was used
as a state witness.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to CA where he challenged the discharge of
Potencio as a state witness on the ground that there is no absolute necessity for his
testimony. Monge contested that it was Potencio who owned the lumbers and not
him, that he was only hired by Potencio to transport the lumbers to a sawmill. The
appellate court dismissed his petition, hence, he filed a review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monge was guilty of the offense charged?
HELD: YES. The contention of Monge is unvailing. Under Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended by EO No 277 criminalizes two distinct and separate offenses
namely:
a. Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority; and
b. The possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under the existing laws and regulations.
In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or
removing timber or other forest products may be proven by the authorization duly
issued by the DENR. The second offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not
the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of forest products are legal precisely
because mere possession of forest products without the requisite documents
consummates the crime.
 Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of
lumber fund in his possession nor his claim that he was merely hired by Potencio to
provide the latter with assistance in transporting the said lumber. PD No. 705 is a
penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. In other words, mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents,
even absent malice or criminal intent is illegal.
TAO PA vs PEOPLE
The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Virac,
Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut 113 pieces of lumber of
Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong species without any authority and/or legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the
public interest, and thereby arrested its driver Placido Cuison. The lumber was
covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cusion
pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of
the seized lumber, Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were charged for violating Sec. 68
of PD No. 705 as amended, in the RTC Virac, Catanduanes. They pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment. After trial, RTC found them guilty as charged beyond
reasonable doubt. Only Taopa and Cuison appealed to CA, Cusion was acquitted
but Taopa’s conviction was affirmed. However, a petition was filed by Taopa
seeking his acquittal from the charges against him alleging that the prosecution
failed to prove that he was the owner of the seized lumber as he was not in the
truck when the lumber was seized.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Sec. 68 of PD No 705.
HELD: The RTC and CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of
Taopa’s house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck drive
by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved
Taopa’s exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck.
Thus, the court was convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized
lumber, Sec. 68 PD No. 705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the
RPC for the penalties imposed on violators. Violation of Sec 68, PD No. 705 as
amended is punished as QUALIFIED THEFT. The law treats cutting, gathering,
collecting, and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an
offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. The actual
market value of the 113 pcs of lumber was P67,630.00. Following Article 310 in
relation to 309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium
and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day
to 20 years plus as additional period of four years for the excess of P47, 630.00.
The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposable on Taopa shall be the
penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC.
DENR vs DARAMAN
This is a case filed by the DENR represented by RED Israel Gaddi against Gregorio
Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio who were caught by one Pablo Opinion to
transport illegal pieces of lumber using the vehicle of one Baby Lucenecio, the Holy
Cross Funeral Services. Here, the respondents alleged that one Asan, owner of
furniture shop ask the two to bring also some pieces of wood to his house located
near the funeral’s location. Opinion, DENR employee, saw the vehicle and
inspected it, there he saw some lumber and issued an order of forfeiture. The Court
granted bound and released the funeral car and lumber because it was found out
that Daraman and Lucenecio were not owners of the vehicle and lumber. Hence
this complaint was filed.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents violated PD 705 section 68-A.
HELD: Yes. The court cannot deny the fact that Section 68-A PD 705 is also
applicable to those who transport lumber without proper documents. Here,
Daraman and Lucenecio had no permit to transport lumber although they were only
asked to bring the lumber to the house of one Asan. The RTC has overstepped its
jurisdiction of the case since DENR was given the power to confiscate the property
in favor of the state/government. The release of this property defeated the purpose
of Section 68-A of PD 705. Therefore, SC granted the petition of DENR, RTC’s
decision was reversed and set aside.
GONZALES vs MADAME PILLAR FARM DEVELOPMENT
FACTORAN vs CA
On August 9, 1988 two police officers of Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III,
intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was
cruising along Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private
respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel
Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of
DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID
investigated them, and discovered the discrepancies in the documentation of the
narra lumber.
What were declared in the documents were narra flitches, while the cargo of the
truck consisted of narra lumber. In the documents, the plate numbers of the truck
supposed to carry the cargo bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-267,
while the plate of the truck apprehended is NVT-881. Considering that the cargo is
lumber, the transport should have been accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber
Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin. The Log
Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as
the Seller and Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily
Francisco Lumber Hardware.
These are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10
which requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the
following documents:
1. Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the
District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester;
2. Sales Invoice;
3. Delivery Receipt; and
4. Tally Sheets.
Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles
issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the
six-wheeler truck.
On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the
narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck
Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed the said
order to the Office of the President. Consequently, the narra lumber and
six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government and were later on
advertised to be sold at a public auction on March 20, 1989.
On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the
issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated items, and to enjoin the panned
auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.
On the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to desist from
proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989.
On March 20, 1989, private respondents filed and Ex-Parte motion for Release and
Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for Issuance
of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the amount of
P180,000.00. The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same day and
directed the petitioners "to deliver the xxx [n]arra lumber, original documents and
truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their
representatives x x x".
On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners
refused to comply therewith. Sheriff David G. Brodett of Branch 80 of the RTC of
Quezon City, reported that the petitioners prevented him from removing the subject
properties from the DENR compound and transferring them to the Mobile Unit
compound of the Quezon City Police Force. He then agreed to a constructive
possession of the properties. On that same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation
stating their intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to
stay the execution of the writ of seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount of
P180,000.00. The trial court did not oblige the petitioners for they failed to serve a
copy of the Manifestation on the private respondents. Petitioners then made
immediately the required service and tendered the cash counterbond but it was
refused, petitioners' Manifestation having already been set for hearing on March 30,
1989.
On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond but
was also denied for the same reason.
On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in
contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure. The trial court gave petitioners 24 hours
to answer the motion. Hearing was scheduled on March 30, 1989.
On March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the orders of the trial court dated
March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989.
On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the
form of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of
preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of
P180,000.00.
On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and
dismissed the petition. It declared that the complaint for replevin filed by the private
respondents complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Sec. 1
and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, issuance of the writ of replevin was
mandatory.
As for the contempt charges against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed
that the same were sufficiently based on a written charge by private respondents
and the reports submitted by the Sheriff.
On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
decision but it was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
dated May 18, 1990.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC was correct in the issuance of a writ of replevin and
the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition and lifting the preliminary injunction.
RULING: Pursuant to Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, all actions and decision of the Director
are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby,
by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse
of 30 days from the receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed
to the President. The decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the
courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
It was observed by the Court that herein respondents never appealed the
confiscation order of the petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons
of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and proper authorities have
been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative forum.
It was pointed out by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals that the enforcement of
forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and
management of forest land fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the
DENR. It held that assumption of the trial court of a replevin suit constitutes an
encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The
doctrine of preliminary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence.
However, herein petitioners did not a motion to dismiss on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.
Nonetheless, the Court finds the petition impressed with merit.
First. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of course upon the applicant's
filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere
filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Section
2 Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of
replevin. Wrongful detention of the properties sought in an action for replevin must
be satisfactory established. If only mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ
should not be issued.
In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was within the administrative
authority of the Secretary as provided by Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. Thus, it is
not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by
the private respondents.
Second. By virtue of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the subject
properties of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond
the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to
be in custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997
amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under SEction
68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct and independent of the confiscation of forest
products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.
Fourth. SEction 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires the delivery of the seized forest
products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official
designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal
prosecutions provided for in Section 68 and not to administrative confiscation
provided for in Section 68-A.
Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that their right
to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to confiscation
of their properties.
Finally. The writ or seizure and the writ of replevin was issued by the trial court in
grave abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect
contempt of court which presupposes that the court order thereby violated was valid
and legal. Without a lawful order being issued, no contempt of court could be
committed.
The instant petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30,
1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 were set aside. Respondent presiding
judge of the RTC of Quezon City was permanently enjoined from enforcing the
Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989, or if said orders had already
been issued, said respondent judge was directed to render judgement of forfeiture
of replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said respondent judge is
hereby permanently enjoined from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed
by private respondents against petitioners.
DAGUDAG vs PADERANGA
Sometime in 2005, forest products were confiscated by the representatives of
PNPRMG, DENR and the Philippine Coast Guard for non-compliance of pertinent
documents, and since no one claimed ownership of the said items for a reasonable
time, it was confiscated in favor of the government. Respondent-judge, in a case for
issuance of writ of replevin, instituted by plaintiff Edma, issued and decided in favor
of the plaintiff, for the return of the undocumented forest products. DENR, CENRO
and herein petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ of replevin but was thereafter
denied by herein respondent. The DENR counsel was also lambasted in the
courtroom by herein respondent.
Issue(s):
1) Whether or not relevin is a proper remedy where the confiscated items were
undocumented forest products under the custody of the DENR.
2) Whether or not the acts of herein respondent constitutes gross ignorance of the
law and unbecoming of a judge.
Ruling:
1) No, The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws.
That since the case is for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277
is under the jurisdiction of DENR. That respondent should have dismissed the
replevin suit outright for three reasons, to wit:
 That courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies, under the doctrine of administrative exhaustion;
 That also, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction courts cannot take
cognizance of the cases pending before administrative agencies of special
competence. That since the undocumented forest products are in the
custody of the DENR, an administrative proceeding may have already
been commenced; and,
 That the forest products are already in custody of law and thus cannot be
the subject of replevin.
2) Yes, respondent, in taking cognizance of the replevin suit and thereafter issuing
the said writ constitute gross ignorance of the law. Respondent also is liable for
using inappropriate language in court, and repeated interruption of the lawyers and
refusal to consider the motion to quash are undignified and very unbecoming of a
judge. Considering also that this is his third offense.