CHAPTER I

ISLAMISATION IN PAKISTAN
FROM ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
TO ISLAMIC STATE
 Islamisation is a process, which involves a gradual transformation of state identity
and polity and to an extent society oriented towards Islam. It is the product of the
interplay between the structural (social, political and economic) conditions on the hand
and the politicised version of the Islamic history on the other. In the case of Pakistan, the
state-sponsored Islamisation processis is in a way organically linked to the basic problem
pertaining to the state ideology and its identity. This has it roots in the conflict between
the liberal and orthodox Islamic views that reside in the independence struggle for
Pakistan. For the former, the ideology of Pakistan was not Islam, but rather the belief that
Muslims and Hindus were intrinsically too different. It was Muslim nationalism, which
became the vehicle for the achievement of Pakistan. But for the latter, the basis of
Pakistan was Islam. Thus the ambiguity surrounding the role of Islam in the affairs of the
state has left the field open for the adventurist rulers to resort to its absolutist
interpretations either to legitimise their usurpation of power or to cover up their failings.
A bulk of this chapter will discuss the historical process of state formation in Pakistan in
an attempt to examine the national ideological ambiguity and explain as to how Zia ul-
Haq exploited this to consolidate his regime and set off the Islamisation process
impacting all facets of state and society.

The dream of a separate homeland for Muslims of the sub-continent led to the
birth of Pakistan in 1947. For the Muslims, the political self-determination was an escape
route from competitive Hindu compatriots. The entire movement for a separate state
gathered momentum in the 1940s when differences between the Congress and Muslim
League's approach towards Great Britain's plans to initiate responsible government and
later independence of India became glaring and even incompanble. The All India
Congress analysed the constitutional problems on economic lines and believed that the
struggle for independence would result in politico-economic emancipation of the
masses.' The 20th March 1940 Ramgarh session of the Congress, for instance, declared,
"Britain is carrying on the war (World War II) fundamentally for imperialist ends and for
the preservation and strengthening of her Empire which is based on the exploitation of

I Ziaul Haque, "Pakistan and Islamic Ideology", in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds.), Pakistan the
Roots ofDictatorship (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 373.

43
the people of India as well as of other Asiatic and African countries ....,,2 In contrast, the
approach of the Muslim League was based on the two nation theory, and articulation of
the great cultural divide between Hindus and Muslims. Muhammad Ali Jinnah in the
Lahore session of the Muslim League in 1940 March categorically stated:

Islam and Hinduism are two different religious philosophies, social customs, and
literatures. Muslim and Hindus neither intermarry nor inter-dine together and indeed
they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and
conceptions. Their outlooks on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus
and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different epics, different heroes and
different episodes ... To yoke together two such nations under a single state - one as a
numerical minority and the other as a majority must lead to growing discontent and final
destruction ... Hindus and Muslims brought together under a democratic system forced
upon the minorities can only mean Hindu raj ... 3

The build up to the communal consciousness, however, owes its roots to much
later date in history. The fall of the Mughal rule and the rise of the colonial power had a
psychological blow to the Muslims who could not come to tenns with the loss of their
historic conqueror's status. The renowned Sufi scholar Shah Waliullah was, for instance,
so disturbed by the disintegration of Muslim power that he sent a provoking letter to the
Afghan King Ahmad Shah Abdali to save Muslims from further distress. He wrote:

-the Muslim community is in a pitiable condition. All control of the machinery of

government is in the hands of the Hindus, because they are the only people who are
capable and industrious wealth and prosperity are concentrated in their hands, while the
share of Muslims is nothing but poverty and misery .... At this time you are the only
king who is powerful, far sighted and capable of defeating the enemy forces. Certainly it
is incumbent upon you to march to India, destroy Maratha domination and rescue weak
and old Muslims from the clutches of non-Muslims. If God forbid, domination by
infidels continue, Muslims will forget Islam and there will be nothing left to distinguish
them from non-Muslims.4

It may be noted that the Sufi scholar launched the campaign to rid Islam of its
Hindu "accretions" in order to preserve the exclusive character of Muslims of the sub-
continent Similar movements emerged in East Bengal around the same time (1831)
popularly known as the Faraizi movement. The Faraizis were juristically Hanaji, they

2 C.H. Philips, The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1958-1947: Select Documents (London: OUP, 1962),
pp.338-39.
3lamiluddin Ahmad., Speeches and writings of Mr. Jinnah, vol. I (Lahore: Ashraf, 1960), pp. 176-180; also
see "March 23, 1940: The Lahore Resolution", Pakistan Times, March 23,2005 at
http://pakistantimes.netl2005/03123/specailreport.htm
4 Khaliq Ahmed Nizami, ed., Shah Waliullah Ke Siyasi Maktuba (Aligarh, 1951), quoted in Khalid B.
Sayeed., Pakistan The Formative Phase, (London: OUP, 1968), p. 4.

44
had great loyalty and reverence to the Shariah and believed any kind of non-adherence to
it as sacrilegious. 5 The purpose of the 19th century movement was ''the total destruction
of a Pantheon of confused beliefs which had accumulated semi-divine deities from multi-
religious and cultural contacts, superstition, animism, demotic syncreticism, bhakti
movements, Sufi tolerance, ontological monism poetic license and several other sources,
Indian as well as foreign, but all of them alien to fundamentalist Islam". 6

The Farazi movement in Bengal espoused the cause of the poor peasantry and
preached against all outside influence (local syncretic symbols and cultural elements) to
be un-Islamic. "It was a fundamentalist movement involving poorer sections of agrarian
society, and it was its particular emphasis on economic and agrarian questions that
primarily distinguished it from the Waliullahi tradition of Delhi".7 Although the two
movements were different in their outlook and flourished in separate geographical zones,
historians do not doubt the possibility of these movements complementing each other on
issues concerning their common goals, especially during Jihadi campaigns. 8

The colonial state ruled by the non-Muslims set off two types of responses among
the Muslims. While the movements spearheaded by Shah Waliullah and the Faraizis were
essentially conservative in nature, modem or adaptive response was represented by Sir
Sayeed Ahmed Khan. The latter was part of the larger trend in the Muslim world centred
on iftihad or 'reasoning', which is antithetical to taqlid or blind imitation and passive
acceptance of the Koranic injunctions. 9 Regardless of their apparent differences in
approach and expression, at the root of these responses lay the conscious effort at coping
with the challenges posed by the British colonialism which was of both political and

5 Aziz Ahmad, An Intellectual History ofIslam in India (Edinburgh 1969), pp. 9-12.
6 Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment (London, 1964), p. 210.
7Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906 A Quest for identity, (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1981)p.40.
8 W.W. Hunter, The Indian Mussalmans (London, 1872), p. 9 quoted in Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal
Muslims, p. 42. Hunter writes ..that a network of conspiracy has spread itself over our provinces and that
the bleak mountains which rise beyond the Punjab are united by a chain of treason depots with the tropical
swamps through which Ganges merges into the sea".
9The rise of the theological conflict between the two schools in the 18th century onwards contributed to the
progressive decline of Islam. For details, see Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam
(London: Fiber & Fiber, 1982), pp. 56-61; Aziz AI-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London; Verso, 1993),
Chap. V, pp.89-103.

45
cultural nature. Sir Sayeed's western outlook and campaign for English education among
Muslims stemmed from his realisation of the futility of resisting the powerful colonial
state. The motive behind pushing Muslims towards learning English and western science
was to bring them on par with Hindus who were the first beneficiaries of English
education and to convince his folks about the rationality in Islam, in the absence of which
it was difficult to command their love and loyalty to their faith. 1O In short, Sir Sayeed
opted for a reconciliation strategy as much to avoid antagonising the colonial masters as
to prevent further marginalisation of his community in the sub-continent. The efforts of
Sir Sayeed Ahmed Khan resulted in the establishment of the first Muslim college at
Aligarh along modern educational lines. "Aligarh Muslim University became the crucible
of awareness for Muslims of India - a consciousness-raising centre that played an
indisputable part in the struggle for Muslim identity and its logical consequences,
Pakistan". I I

More than the revivalist movements, the reformist trend had a long term
implications in crystalising the distinctive identity among the Muslim elite partly because
of access to the western education and partly, its exposure to such ideas as nationalism
and protection of human rights.. While some Muslim intellectuals considered political
and territorial nationalism as antithetical to basic ideology of Islam due to the confused
political circumstances and heightened communal anxieties between the two main
communities, others, notably Sir Sayeed Ahmad Khan, Dr. Iqbal and Muhammad Ali
Jinnah, the founder of the Muslim League propounded the theories of separation based on
ethno- nationalism. Nowhere in the Muslim world has the revivalist movement had
deeper impact in stirring nationalist feelings as compared to the movement led by the
western educated elite because the latter could provide well defined, logical, coherent
ideological platform for rallying people to struggle for the long-term goal of a separate
national identity. In brief, it is arguable that Pakistan is an illustrative example of what

10 With the development of industry, commerce and education Hindus marched ahead in all fields
consequently a strong middle class aroused which was mainly Hindus. It is said that in 1878 "there were
3,155 Hindus as against 57 Muslims holding graduate and post-graduate degrees." See Mohammad Asghar
Khan (ed.), Islam, Politics and the State (New Delhi, Select Book Service, 1986), p. 36; Khalid B. Sayeed,
Pakistan The Formative Phase 1857-1948 (London, OUP 1968), pp. 14-15.
II Asghar Khan, Islam Politics and the State, n. 10, p. 36.

46
David Brown calls "situational nationalism" wherein the ideological myths of ethnic and
national identity are constructed and employed by political elites in response to
situational factors such as economic or power disparities. 12 What is important here to note
is that even though the national identity in this case is depicted in the primordialist
language of historical continuity, in reality it involves rational responses to changing
situations. I3

Emergence of Pakistan

Vague ideas and schemes were put forward by the British administrators, notably
John Bright and Wilfred Blunt regarding the transfer of power as early as 1877 and 1883
respectively.14 But it was only in the year 1919 when the Government of India Act was
passed that the intention of the imperial power regarding transfer of power by stages into
Indian hands was made clear. A group of western-educated Muslim leaders had by then
established the Muslim League in 1906 to safeguard their socio-economic and political
rights. Many of them had already approached the British viceroy Lord Minto in 1906 to
provide official positions for Muslims in all the provinces in proportion to their numerical
strength. 15

The political mobilisation by the Muslim League was born out of an insecurity of
being overwhelmed by Hindus. In presenting the vision of future Muslim state of
Pakistan in the Allahabad session of the Muslim League in 1930, Sir Muhammad Iqbal
said, "I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan
amalgamated into a single state. Self government within the British Empire or without

12 David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Etnocultural and Multicultural Politics (London:
Routledge, 2000), pp. 19-20.
13 On the primordialist approach to nationalism, see Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1981); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalsm; The Quest for Understanding (princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994). The primordialists claim that nations are "real", not imagined or created
by reviving and inventing traditions.

14 John Bright believed that Indians in different provinces would form independent states at the time of
transfer of power. And Wilfrid Blunt suggested that provinces of North India should be under Muslim
government and those of Southern India under Hindu government. See Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative
Phase, n. 10, pp. 102-103.
15 C.R Philips, Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947 (London, OUP, 1962) pp. 191-193.

47
the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-west Indian Muslim state
appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-west India".16
Likewise, Choudhry Rahmat Ali, another Muslim of South Asian origin and a student of
Cambridge coined the word Pakistan for the first time in 1933. Rahmat Ali wrote,
"Pakistan is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is composed of letters taken from the
names of all our home-lands - 'Indian' and 'Asian'. That is Punjab, Afghania (North-
West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan, Afghanistan and
Balochistan. It means the lands of the Paks - the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolises
the religious beliefs and the ethnical stocks of our people; and it stands for all the
territorial constituents of our original Fatherland. It has no other origin and no other
meaning, and it does not admit of any other interpretations". 17

At a time when the National Congress was taking up economic and political
issues against the imperialist power, the Muslim League and its reactionary leaders
supported communal issues like the partition of Bengal, demanded for a separate
electorate and highlighted the interests of their community to be different from those of
Hindus l8 The other major development during this period (1935) was the rejection of the
federal plea of the 1935 Government of India Act by the Congress. 19 The National
Congress decided to fight elections under the New Act of 1935 to show the unpopularity
of the Act, and won seven out of eleven provinces. It formed coalition ministries in two
others with the exception of Punjab and Bengal. The Muslim League too contested the
elections to the provincial assemblies as required by the Government of India Act 1935
and the results were too shocking for the League. Out of 489 Muslim seats only 104
seats were won by the Muslim League. 2o Following the humiliating defeat, the Muslim
League raised the spectre of 'Hindu raj' and the bogey of "Islam in danger."

16 Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, n. 10, pp. 103-104.

17 Ibid., p. 104.
18 Bipin Chandra, Modern India (Delhi: NCERT, 1971), pp. 254-255
19 The 1935 Government of India Act provided for the establishment of All India federation, provincial
autonomy for all provinces including the princely states and a bicameral federal legislative. The National
Congress rejected the Act on the ground that insurmountable power given to Governor General and
provincial Governors in the Act. The Muslim League too disapproved the Act as being anti-Muslim.
Ibid., p. 291.
20 Sayeed, Pakistan, The Formative Phase, n. 10, p. 83.

48
Furthermore, Congress rule was interpreted as the ascendancy of Hindu nationalism at
the cost of minority interest. 21 Reflecting its growing disillusionment, the Muslim League
in the Lucknow session of October 1937 condemned the reverence shown towards Bande
Mataram and criticised the anthem as "positively anti-Islamic and idolatrous in its
inspiration and ideas".22 The League's divisive politics set off the process of sectarian
polarisation, which was further precipitated by the historic Lahore resolution of 1940.
Calling for the creation of a separate Muslim state, the Resolution declared,
"geographically contiguous units (of British India) are to be demarcated into regions
which should be so constituted, with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary,
that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-western
and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which
the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.'.23 By highlighting the cultural
and historical differences of the two communities, Jinnah sought not simply to convince
the Muslim community of the near-impossibility of co-existence with the majority
Hindus, but also underlined the need for the creation of a separate state for the Muslims.

Role of Jinnah in the Creation of Pakistan

The entire sequence of events in the later part leading to partition of India based
on the two nation theory was dominated by Jinnah. The entire machinery of the Muslim
League backed him in his political propaganda but it was nevertheless true that Quaid-i-
Azam was a great balancing factor for the league. The ideology of the two nation theory,
however, did little to salvage the ethnic, linguistic geographic peculiarities and intra-
Muslim separateness. The weakness of the ideology was markedly evident "once exposed
to the post-independence competition of other identities and loyalties, these centripetal
forces have been often strained, although finally not broken".24 The fate of the party
(Muslim League) before the partition in the provinces of Punjab and Frontier was far

21 Andrew Rippin, Muslims, Their Religious Beliefs and Practices (London, Routledge, 1990), p. 54-56.
22 The Pioneer, Lucknow 16 Oct. 1937 quoted in Sayeed, Pakistan, The Formative Phase, n. 10, p. 88.
23The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 11 March 1941 quoted in Muhammad A. Quddus, Pakistan: A
Case Study of a Plural Society (Columbia, South Asia Books 1982), p. 24.
24 Alan Whaites, "Political Cohesion in Pakistan Jinnah and the ideological state", Contemporary South
Asia, vol. 7:2, July 1998, p. 182.

49
from assuring. Punjab, the pivot of Pakistan was, for example, not the stronghold of
Muslim League, whereas in the Frontier province it tried hard to soften the attitude of the
Pathans by resorting to the Islamic symbolism. Addressing the Pathans, Jinnah asked,
"Do you want Pakistan or not? (Shouts of Allah 0 Akbar) (God is great) well, if you want
Pakistan, vote for the League candidates. If we fail to realize our duty today you will be
reduced to the status of Sudras (low castes) and Islam will be vanquished from India. I
shall never allow Muslims to be slaves of Hindus. Allah-o-Akbar.,,25

Besides, Jinnah also sought the help of the Pir of Manki Sharif to mobilise public
opinion of the frontier people in favour of Pakistan. The Muslim saint is believed to have
extracted a promise from Jinnah that once Pakistan becomes a reality Muslim should not
be dictated by un-Islamic laws. 26 After having failed to get electoral support Muslim
League took recourse to Islamic slogans and phrases to garner support in the Muslim
majority provinces. Subscribing to the two-nation theory, Jinnah only made use of Islam
to rally support rather than making it the basis of the future state of Pakistan. In other
worlds, Islam had an instrumental function in the build of distinctive Muslim
consciousness in the sub-continent rather than being an ideological cornerstone of
Jinnah's vision of Pakistan. The two nation theory though considered a minority
province issue spread to Muslim majority areas. "It was the prospect of Congress power
at the centre that enabled the majority provinces to think of themselves in minority terms
on a national basis, a conceptual shift forced on minority province Muslims a century
before.',27 The Congress Party was accused of imitating fascist methods, and the manner
in which it belittled provincial governments by curtailing provincial autonomy.28 While
remaining true to its ideological strivings, Muslim League under Jinnah whipped up
provincial fears against the possibility of a strong central rule under the Congress Party,
which was also accused of being pro Hindu.29 Exhorting regional groups to overcome

25See Muhammed A. Quddus, Pakistan: A Case Study of a Plural Society (Columbia, South Asia Books,
1982), p. 24.
26 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 9 March 1949, Vol. V, no. 3, p. 46 quoted in Sayeed,
Pakistan, The Formative Phase, n. 10, p. 198.
27 Whaites, Political Cohesion in Pakistan, D. 25, p. 187.
28 R. Coupland, The Indian Problem, Part II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 120-125.
29 Whaites, Political Cohesion in Pakistan, n. 25, p. 187.

50
factional rivalry, Jinnah said, ''we shall have time to quarrel ourselves and we shall have
time when these differences will have to be settled, we shall have time for domestic
programme and politics, but first get the government." 30

Furthermore, Jinnah emphasised on Urdu being made the lingua franca of the
Muslim League even though he himself spoke very little Urdu and his speeches were
translated by the All India Muslim League's State President Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung. 31
Jinnah became the target of attack from more orthodox sections of Muslim population
like the Jamaat-i-Islami chief Maulana Maudoodi and others like Maulana Husain
Ahmad leader of Jamiyat al ulama 1 Hind for his western training and secular outlook on
various issues.32 Undeterred by such criticism and conscious of the dynamics of Muslim
politics, Jinnah tried to reach out to the powerful social forces of the time, notably the
ulemas, pirs and landlords. For example, he assured the zamindars of Punjab by
reiterating that "The League is not against any interests among Muslims.,,33 In 1946 a
Mashaikh Committee was constituted, which, made up of prominent ulemas and pirs,
spread the Muslim Leagues agenda far and wide. Giving religious colour to the Muslim
politics, prominent ulema, Maulana Osmani once said, "Any man who gives his vote to
the opponents of the Muslim League, must think of the ultimate consequences of his
action in terms of the interests of his nation and the answers that he would be called upon
to produce on the day of judgement".34 The ulema thus played a decisive role in the
Muslim League electoral campaign contributing to Jinnah's efforts at uniting a
heterogeneous group consisting of Muslim elites, Pirs, ulemas, the Nawabs, the feudal
lords and the masses with the common bond of Islam. The strength of the League was

30 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, ed. Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, (Lahore: Ashraf Publishers,
.1964), Vol. I, p.199.
31 The 1937 Lucknow session of the Muslim League formally recommended Urdu to be the language of the
League.
32 Maulana Maudoodi doubted Jinnah's Islamic outlook while Maulana Husain Ahmed gave a fatwa in
October 1945, asking Muslims to stay away from the League. He called Jinnah Kafir-i-Azam (the great
heathen). see Sayeed, Pakistan the formative stage, 10, p. 199.
33 Ibid., p. 210
34 Liaquat Ali Khan, a prominent League leader openly acknowledged the help rendered by Maulana
Osmani in the Central Legislative Assembly elections. Similarly, Muslim League won the referendum in
the Frontier with the active co-operation of the Pir of Manki sharif and the help given by Maulana Osmani
and Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi. Ibid., pp.203-205

51
revealed when it won the 1945-46 elections convincingly with 75% of Muslim votes.
Out of 533 Muslim seats the League won in 460 constituencies compared to the
extremely poor results in the 1937 elections when the League managed only 4.6% of
Muslim votes. 35

Actively supported by the influential sections of Ulema and the feudal elements,
Jinnah fmally realised his dream of Pakistan on August 14, 1947. In explaining the
factors that accounted for the partition of India, it is argued that the powerful and
distinctive social order of Islam demanded an Islamic environment to grow freely, and
the Hinduised Indian environment was perceived to be greatest obstacle. Critics,
however, hold that Islam was pushed to the fore to protect the entrenched economic
interests of the Muslim land-owning class and to some extent, the aspirations of the
western-educated Muslim elites. The creation of Pakistan was instead the result of the
conscious British policy of "divide and rule", which not only prevented unity and
communal fraternity but also transformed the Muslim community into a politicised
nationality. It also reflected the desperation among the Muslim political leaders, who
wary of being overwhelmed by the majority community leaders in an open competition
for power chose to carve out a place for themselves within a separate political entity. In
pursuit of such political ambitions, Islam only provided a hallowed cover to justify the
demand for a separate state for the Muslims of the subcontinent.36

There is little doubt regarding the salience of Islam in the creation of Pakistan and
in its post-independence life, but the support for Pakistan among the religious groups was
not unanimous. The two dominant schools of thought, the Aligarh and Deoband schools
differed widely on the issue. The former represented a heightened awareness and
modernity, whi~h inteIpreted Islam in the light of such Western ideas as nation and
nationalism. It was in fact the educated salaried class, who according to Harnza Alavi,
played a crucial role in the Pakistan Movement partly due to their exposure to modem
secular ideas and partly, a deepening sense of relative deprivation vis-a-vis Hindus.37 In

35 See R. Palme Dutt, India Today and Tomorrow (London: LSW, 1955), p.235.
36 See Louis D. Hayes, The StruggleJor Legitimacy in Pakistan, (London, Vanguad 1986), pp. 56-57.
37 Hamza Alavi, "Part 11: The State in Crisis Class and State", in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid,
Pakistan: The Roots oJDictatorship (Delhi: Oxford University press, 1983), p. 57.

52
contrast, the orthodox Deobandis were theologically oriented and their leader Maududi
wanted to "cast Islam in a rigid Arab mould.,,38 And this precisely explains why the
Deobandis had great reservations against the leaders of the Muslim League and suspected
their Islamic credentials.

The Jamat-i-Islami (ll) founded in 1941 in Lahore by Maududi was originally

opposed to the state of Pakistan on the grounds that a nationalist movement could not be
Islamic. 39 Soon after the creation of Pakistan, the 11, however, came to terms with the
existence of the new state and began the campaign in the early 1950s for reorganising the
polity on the basis of the practices of the pious Caliphate of Islam (AD. 632-661).
Accordingly, the 11 has opposed the adoption of Western capitalist or socialist model or
import of party-based representative government and women emancipation. "In the place
of western institutions and practices, it has preferred the adoption of a state ruled by
Sharia (Islamic law).',40

The Problems of State Building

The process of state-building involves not just the creation of institutions for the
purpose of security, revenue collection and administration, but also a qualitative
transformation among the citizens at the psychological level, namely the acceptance of
and identification with the new entity.41 The interactions ofIslam and politics in Pakistan,
for instance, brings to the fore a serious dilemma. Pakistan was carved out of the demand
for the establishment of a Muslim homeland. More than 90% of the populations of
Pakistan are followers of Islam. No doubt, there existed a consensus in Pakistan that
Islam should influence institutions and the political process, but there was no unanimity
42
as to how to transform this national consensus into stable working institutions. There
were ambiguities over the relationship of the state and Islam, and nowhere was it more

J8 Sayeed, Pakistan, The Formative Phase, n. 10, p. 105.

39 Leonard Binder, "Problems of Islamic Political Thought in the Light of Recent Developments in
Pakistan", The Journal of Politics, vol. 20, no. 4, (November 1958), pp. 655-675.
40 Craig Baxter et ai, Government and Politics in South Asia (Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p.192.
41 Mohammad Ayoob, Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict and
International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1995), Chap. 3.
42 Ibid., pp. 176-177.

53
glaring than in the framing of the constitution of Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan told the
constituent Assembly in 1949, "Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of the
subcontinent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and
traditions of Islam".43 As Abott has aptly put it, ''there was no agreement before or after
the creation of Pakistan as to what in accordance with the teachings and traditions of
Islam might mean.,,44 Pakistan was carved out as a state for Muslims, which in other
words means, a state where Muslims are in a majority. That was indeed the basis of
partition and the vision of the founders of Pakistan. Schooled in western ideas the latter
envisioned a liberal state of Muslims but certainly not a theocratic Islamic state.

Reflective of this. Quaid-a-Azam in his famous August 11, 1947 speech in the
Assembly said, "You are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques
or places of worship of any kind. Whatever may be your religion, creed or race, it has
nothing to do with the affairs of the state ... You will find that in course of time Hindus
would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious
sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as
citizens of the state".45 Ironically, however, all official versions about his life and this
speech have deleted his references to religion not having a role in running the affairs of
the state. 46 Scholars like Shahid Javed Burki wonders how the Hindus and Muslims
would cease to be what they are in the political sense when Jinnah campaigned
throughout his career regarding the great difference between the faiths? He asks, ''was
Jinnah giving up the two-nation theory, the ideological foundations of the state of
Pakistan, once the new state had come into.existence? Was the speech a clear signal to
the people of Pakistan that the new state though founded to preserve Islam in South Asia,
was to be run on secular grounds?,.47 The ideological ambivalence or confusion is traced

43 Freeland Abbott, Islam and Pakistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 110.
44 Hayes, The Strugglefor Legitimacy, n. 37, pp. 66-67.
4S Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali linnah: Speeches as Governor General, 1947-48 (Karachi Pakistan
Publications no date), pp. 8-9 as quoted in Samina Yasmeen, "'Pakistan and real Islam' in S. Akbarzadeh
and Abdullah Saeed (ed.), Islam and Political Legitimacy (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 72-73.
46 Adeel Khan, Politics of Identity Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage
Publications, 2005), pp. 81-82.
47 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making (Boulder: Westview press, 1986), p. 42.

54
to the independence struggle for Pakistan. The Muslim League leaders made use of
Islam to build a communal identity of all Muslims in British India. While the desire and
dream for a separate political entity called Pakistan emerged in Central India, the Islamic
card was utilised to mobilise Muslims support from provinces like Punjab, North Western
Frontier province, Sind Baluchistan, and East Bengal.48 Unlike Maulana Abdul Kalam
Azad, a great Islamic scholar and first education minister of independent India who did
not ratify the two-nation theory, Maududi opted for Pakistan despite having argued that
Islamic nationalism and political sovereignty were foreign concepts and contrary to the
belief in Muslim Umma. The reason why Maududi chose to live in Pakistan could be his
belief that the future state of Pakistan would be governed by Islamic laws and tenants.
"Instead of adhering to the idea of a global Umma, Maududi and other scholars including
Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Othmani of Jamiat ulama-i-Islam, came to emphasise that
Pakistan was created as an Islamic state and not merely a state for Muslims. The
emphasis on the theocratic nature of the state prompted them to demand that the primacy
of divine will be acknowledged in the construction of the new political order. The
orthodox interpretations of the Koran and prophetic traditions were to be the source of
law in the new state and not some liberal notions of humans determining the constitution
of pakistan.'.49 The utter confusion arose primarily from the diverse intetpretation of the
nature and character of the new Pakistani state. Whereas the liberals used Islam for the
pUtpose of political mobilisation, the latter decidedly settled for a state based on Islam.
In brief Islam for the former was the means to achieve political goal and hence, had
merely instrumental function, but for the latter it was the end. As a result, Pakistan did
not have a constitution for nine long years. Although the first constitution was drafted in
1956, it was abrogated two and a half years later following a military coup which made
Ayub Khan the ruler. 50

48 Samina Yasmeen, "Pakistan and real Islam" in Akbarzadeh and Saeed (ed.), Islam and Political
Legitimacy, n. 46, p. 73.
49 Ibid., p. 73.
50 For details, see Zulifikar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1995), pp. 179-180.

55
Position of Islam in the Constitution

During the formative years of the new state Pakistani society was ideologically
divided into "fundamentalist" and "modernist" who clashed over their own version of
Islam. The delay in adopting the constitution was attributed mainly to the protracted
debates over Islamic provisions in the Constitutions. 5I Critics see Jinnah's role in
deepening the ideological confusion as well as in the lack of proper understanding
regarding the nature of political system in Pakistan. The pre-1947 Jinnah is said to be
"Contentious, brilliant and divisive Indian lawyer politician who turned the two-nation
theory - the idea that India's Muslims and Hindus constituted two separate nations, each
deserving their own, separate state - into an effective political movement .... After
Independence, Jinnah spoke of a Pakistan that would be democratic, tolerant of religious
minorities, progressive socially and modern in the liberal western sense.,,52 Jinnah died
in 1948 without his dream of a stable, democratic Pakistan being realised. His speeches in
1940 emphasising on separateness and his Presidential address in 1947 stressing
secularism diffused the new nation's search for an Islamic identity. It is the lack of
clarity about Islam's role in the affairs of the state which made Jinnah's appeal to religion
"ambiguous.,,53 The objective Resolution which was passed in March 1949 had the
following reference to Islam:

The Government of Pakistan will be a state ... wherein the principle of democracy,
freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully
observed; wherein the Muslims of Pakistan shall be enabled individually and collectively
to order their lines in accordance with teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in
the Holy Koran and Sunnah, wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities
freely to profess and practice their religion and develop their culture.54

51 Members of the fundamentalist group mobilized public opinion for making Pakistan a Islamic state.
They favoured Islamic law and Islamic practices but the modernist as their name suggests took a liberal
view of Islam and were opposed to enforcement of Islamic law and practices see Barter, South Asia:
Politics and Government, n. 41, p. 172.
52 Stephen Cohen, "The Nation and the State of Pakistan", The Washington Quarterly, 25:3, Summer 2002.
pp.110-111.
53 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Lahore:
Sarg-e-MeeI Publications, 1992), p. 5.
54 K.K. Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, 1949-58 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and
Cultural Research, 1976), pp. 48-50.

56
 The Constituent Assembly faced great difficulty in the framing of the basic
principles. The report of the Basic principles committee which was tabled after three
years (1950) urged the President at the insistence of ulemas in Pakistan to constitute a
body of 5 ulemas knowledgeable and 'well-versed in Islamic law' to re-examine the acts
and provisions of the legislature. Laws found to be inconsistent with the holy Koran and
Sunnah would be referred back to the legislature for necessary amendments. However,
there was no mention of the Board of ulerna in the final Basic Principles Report or in the
fmal draft of the 1956 Constitution.55

The 1956 Constitution named the Country to be the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
and stated in Article 25 that the state would endeavour to enable Muslims to lead their
life individually and collectively in accordance with Holy Koran and Sunnah. The state
was also to "endeavour" to ''prevent prostitution gambling, the taking of injurious drugs:
and ... the consumption of alcoholic liquor other than for medicinal ... purposes." The
Constitution made provisions for the President who would be a Muslim (Article 32)
Article 197 made provisions to set up an Organisation for Islamic Research, and stated
that no law repugnant to Koran and Sunnah would be passed, but this provision was not
enforceable in the law courts. However, the President was empowered (by article 198) to
appoint a Committee that would make recommendations to bring laws into conformity
with Islam. 56

The Preamble reads "adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to
profess freely and practice their religions and develop their cultures". 57 These
constitutional guarantees were explained in details in various articles under part II of the
Fundamental rights. The Constitution guarantees non-discrimination in respect of access
to public place (Article 14). Another article which needs a special mention is. the article
27, which provided equal treatment to minorities as regards to their fair-representation in
federal and provincial services. Article 18 guaranteed against discrimination to manage

55 GOP, Report of the Basic Principles Committee Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1952 cited in Baxter,
Government and Politics, nAl, p.173.
56Constjtution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1956), articles 25, 28, 29, 197 & 198. See Kamal
Azfar, Pakistan Political and Constitutional Dilemmas (Karachi: Pakistan law House, 1987), pp. 45-57.
57 David F. Forte, "Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan", in Safdar Mahmood, ed., Constitutional
Foundations ofPakistan (Lahore: 2nd edition, 1975), p. 32.

57
religious institutions, whereas Article 21 guaranteed safeguards against taxation to
protect any particular religion.

The liberal approach towards minorities as provided by the 1956 Constitution was
also reflected in the numerous speeches of Liaqat Ali Khan both at home and abroad. He
told the United States Senate, "We have solemnly pledged that our minorities shall enjoy
full rights of citizenship". 58 He told the Canadian parliament that Pakistan did not plan to
become a stronghold of intolerance on Medievalism. Liaqat stated at New Orleans, "our
ideals do not spell out a sectarian medieval, intolerant, theocratic society. We believe in
God and his supreme sovereignty because we believe that civic life must have an ethical
content and a higher purpose, which we cannot but conceive of as a fulfillment of the
Divine will. But democracy, social justice, equality of opportunity and equality before
the law of all citizens irrespective of race or creed are also articles of faith with us ... ,,59

The 1956 Constitution failed due to the military substitution of the civilian
government. The coup d'etat led to the suspension of the Constitution and imposition of
martial law. The reason for its failure is attributed largely to the pathetic state of affairs
in the political parties.60 The weakening grip of the Muslim League stands out in sharp
contrast to the role played by the Congress which emerged as the chief policy maker for
India. The untimely death of Jinnah and Liaqut Ali Khan led to a void in both
organizational and ideological matters in the League. The Muslim League which
assumed state power soon after partition was not a political party in the strict sense of the
term. It was more of a movement under whose umbrella there was room for all sources
of ideas and opinion, provided they remained undivided in their agenda of Mission
Pakistan. 61 After the accomplishment of their mission there was no effort to transform
the movement into a party, with a programme/consensus, on nation building. The
manifold differences, kept in check under the "stress of necessity" erupted once Pakistan

58 See Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1961) p. 191.
59 Tariq Ali, Pakistan, Military Rule or Peoples Power (London: Trinity Press, 1990), p. 80.
60 Kamal Azfar, Pakistan Political and Constitutional Dilemmas, n. 57, pp. 58-59.
61 Mustaq Ahmed, Politics o/Crisis (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1987), p. 120.

58
became a reality.62 Shortcomings and criticisms of the leaders amounted to lack of loyalty
to the state. The party continued to live in the past and believed that no organization had
the legitimacy to match it. The leadership perhaps did not feel the need for effecting
changes in the organisation so as to cope with the new challenges and emerging social
realities. 63 The League came under the influence and control of the land lord class in
West Pakistan and the legislatures remained packed with their supporters and followers.
The result was that Muslim League was used by the particular class for the fulfillment of
their political and economic interests.64

While the lamaat-i-Islami wished to re-establish the days of the Orthodox

Caliphate there were political disagreements over communicating the idea of a Islamic
constitution. In the midst of unclear circumstances the objective of the religious groups
was to press for the ''positive enactment of Islamic law, on what Islam commands rather
than on what it forbids. The new strategy was to enter into the political arena directly
through attempting to elect some of their own adherents to the National Assembly, rather
than to try to work through the executive or judicial branches. The new tactics involved
operating in the mode of a political party, joining forces with those willing to co-operate,
and even openly opposing the government of the day".65 The struggle for an Islamic
constitution ended with the coup in 1958, which was imposed by a military~bureaucratic

complex with the connivance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).66 The New York
Times appreciated the reason behind the suspension of civilian government. It stated, "In
Pakistan both President Mirza and the army's head General Ayub Khan have stated
clearly that what they propose and wish to do is to establish in due course a fine, honest
and democratic government. There is no reason to doubt their sincerity.,,67

62 Ibid., p. 120.
63 Mustaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Royal Book Co .. 1959), pp. 126-27.
64 Ibid., p. 131.
65 Binder, Religion and Politics, n. 59, p.374.
66 Ali, Pakistan, n. 60, p. 88.
67 New York Times, October 12, 1958 .

59
The 1962 Constitution

The State of Pakistan was governed without the guidelines of a constitution from
1958 to 1962. The Second Constitution of Pakistan promulgated on March 1, 1962 was
the brainchild of Field marshal Ayub Khan. The Pakistan army and the Civil Services
appeared strong and relatively well organised to maintain much needed political stability
in the absence of broad based political parties. As the Muslim League failed to measure
up to the aspirations of the middle class, it began to look towards the bureaucracy, which
nurtured and favoured the capitalist interests in Pakistan. The domination of the
bureaucracy was further strengthened by the cohesiveness of the group which Humza
Alavi says had caste-like characteristic traits. 68 In addition, a highly centralized
government during Ayub's rule facilitated the ascendancy of the bureaucracy. A strong
contingent of 400 odd members of Pakistan civil services dominated all facets of
administration. 69 Ayub' s dependence on the bureaucrats stemmed from his conviction
that politicians in Pakistan were a discredited lot and responsible for the deterioration of
political and economic conditions in the country.70 Reflecting his negative attitude
towards the politicians, Ayub promulgated the Elective Bodies Disqualification
Ordinance (EBDO) , which was used to debar politicians from active political
participation for a period of eight years. 71 Paradoxically, the regime excluded all those
politicians with organisational and mass support base from the realms of politics who
could have made a difference to the administration but included those politicians who
were politically irrelevant and hence remained subservient to the bureaucracy.72

68 Hamza Alavi, "Army and Bureaucracy in Pakistan', International Socialist Journal, Vol. 3, no. 14
(March-April, 1966), pp. 14-29.
69 Charles H. Kennedy, "Prestige of services and Bhutto's Administrative Reforms", Asian Affairs, Vol. 12,
no. 3, pp. 25-42.
70 Ayub in his autobiography said, "The army could not remain unaffected by the conditions around it, nor
was it conceivable that officers and men would not react to all the political chicanery, intrigue corruption
and inefficiency manifested in every sphere of life. Being a patriot and national army, it was bound to
respond to the thinking of the people'. See Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements October 1958-June 1964,
Friends not Masters, vol. I-VI, 1964. p. 58.
7I Rounaq lahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, (New York: Columbia Press, 1972), pp.54-55.
72 Ibid., p. 56.

60
 While restricting political space for civilian leaders, Ayub regime initially
pursued policies aimed at creating a secular state in Pakistan. The regime was opposed to
the association of religion and religious leaders in politics. 73 The 1962 Constitution of
Ayub referred to Pakistan as the Republic of Pakistan. But a constitutional amendment
later changed the name of the republic to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The
constitution was indeed amended as many as eight times during the first five and half
years though Ayub while announcing the new constitution said, "I believe in every word
... And have complete faith in it".74 The Preamble, Part II, Chapter I were altered
drastically in addition to thirty-nine Articles some of which were amended two to three
times. 75 The 1962 Constitution designed the fundamental rights in the same manner as in
the 1956 document, the Chapter 2 of Part n which contained the Directive Principles of
State policy which were also similar to the 56' Constitution. The rights were "subject to
any reasonable restrictions imposed by law".76 What was new was the Basic
Democracies framework and practices borrowed from parliamentary and presidential
systems.

Basic Democracies System was a scheme aimed to mobilise the rural masses for
developmental activities. The emphasis upon local participation was aimed at creating
institutional linkage between the governments and governed. It was based on the belief
that Basic Democracies would train local leadership from below and were entrusted with
a wide variety of social environmental and local functions. Besides, they would also act
as the Electoral College for the presidential and assembly elections. Critics, however,
argue that Basic Democracies were meant to spread the Ayub regime's ideals and goals
and acted as their agents to gamer support from the masses.

Part X of the 1962 Constitution dealt with Islamic Institutions. It made provision
for an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology to make recommendations to bring the laws
in conformity with the principles and concepts of Islam and also advise which laws were

73 Ibid., p. 65.
74 Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis Pakistan 1962-1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972),
p.vi.
75 Ibid., p. 4.
76 See Hayes, The Struggle/or Legitimacy, n. 37, p.99.

61
repugnant to Koran and Smmah.. The Islamic ideology council was responsible for
"enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in all respects in
accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam".77 The Council was also was
required to facilitate Islamiyat or religious education. An Islamic Research Institute came
into existence to assist the Council and also to work independently to spread Islamic
ethos and ideas. The Council warned against transgression of Islamic tenets by the
President, the Governors and the Assemblies, and advocated government policies in any
event of Public controversies.78

Article 7 of the 1962 Constitution gave freedom to the minorities to practice their
faith in absolute freedom. The law did not discriminate on grants or tax exemption for
various communities. Critics evaluate Ayub's religious moves as a shift not exactly
towards secularism but towards a "more liberal interpretation of Islam".79 Others
explained the government's approach to Islam as "exclusionary corporatism".8o In other
words, the ruling elites were forced to acknowledge the relevance of Islam in a limited
manner, while the ''primacy of the secular state, and its right to interpret Islam, was
asserted by excluding the spokesman of Islam from the political process". 81 As the state
exercised its power to interpret as well as implement religion it created a lot of
controversy on certain issues. One such was the Muslim Family Law ordinance of 1961
and to the Family planning campaigns. The introduction of Family laws according to the
ulemas was not in conformity with the Koranic injuctions. The Muslim family law
ordinance aimed to remove any kind of abuse of Talaq (divorce provisions) in Islamic
law in case of conflict by referring it to the arbitration council. Ayub also made
arbitrating council's permission vital in case of polygamy. In this case, the functions of
the Council involved inquiring about the consent of the existing partner in a polygamous

77 Fazlur Rahman, "Islam and new Constitution of Pakistan", Journal of Asia and African Studies, vii (July
and October), 1973 p. 201.
78 Mustaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988), p. 218.
79 Rubiya Mehdi, The lslamisation ofthe Laws in Pakistan (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1994), p. 94.
80 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "State, Society and the Crisis of National Identity", in Rasul Bakhsh Rais, (ed.),
State, Society and Democratic Change in Pakistan (Karachi: OUP, 1997) p. 116.
81 Ibid., p. 116.

62
marriage. This move of Ayub affected both the Sunnis and Shias because Sunnis had
legal provisions to marry four times while the Shias had the benefits of unlimited
marriages for a fixed term only under the provision of mut 'ah marriage. 82

The religious conviction of the ulema was disturbed when the Ayub regime
insisted on the scientific sighting of the moon on EM. They refused to accept the fmdings
of the .Meteorological Department and mobilised public opinion in favour of the
traditional method of sighting the moon. 83 All such reactions were indicative of the onset
of the confrontation between the state on the one hand and the Islamist forces on the
other hand. The latter led by the Jamaat-i-Islami tried to mobilise the public through its
well organised and disciplined cadres against the state and the ruling regime's identity
based on the modem interpretation of Islam. Despite Ayub's crackdown on the Jamaat
leader, Maulana Maududi by opening the old charges against him in 1963 pertaining to
his ambiguous attitude towards the Pakistani proposal, Maududi continued to command
substantial following due to his large social welfare networks and ceremonial religious
activities. 84 The entire state machinery was geared against Jamaat accused of fomenting
student unrest in Lahore, Rawalpindi and Lyallpur. The numerous arrests of Jamaatis
and finally the ban order on the party under the criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908
made it an unlawful association. However, Jamaat revived its fortunes when Supreme
Court held that the ban could not be implemented in Pakistan. 85

In sum, Ayub Khan's strong preferences for a modernist interpretation of Islam

did not prevent him from justifying his policies by invoking Islam. He tried to explain
the necessity of a centralised leadership on the basis of his understanding of Islamic
history in medieval India. He said, "Another feature of Islamic history which had found
general acceptance was that the leader once he is chosen by the community, should have
sufficient power to co-ordinate, supervise and control the activities of government.

82 See Savita Pande, Politics ofEthnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan (Delhi: Maulana Abdul Kalam
Azad Institute of Asian Studies, 2005), p. 151.
83 Ahmad, Government and Politics, n. 79, p. 310.
84 Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, n, 75, pp. 64-65; Kalim Bahadur, The Jama'at-I-Islami of Pakistan:
Political Thought and Political Action (Lahore, 1983), p. 27.
85 Feldman., From Crisis to Crisis, n. 75, p. 65

63
Delegation of authority was permissible but central control must remain in the hands of
the chosen leader who should provide unified direction to the country and its
administration. ,,86

Despite Ayub's symbolic or selective gestures towards Islam, his ambitious

political and economic agenda achieved precious little save strong conservative reactions
posing constant challenge to regime stability. Moreover, he was accused of favouring a
strong central rule without any regards to the demands of the eastern wing. Four years
before he assumed power (1954) he viewed autonomy for East Pakistan the best policy
for national integration but in 1958 he looked upon the concept of autonomy as
"disruptive" and "secessionist".87 The regime witnessed the growing economic disparity
between the two wings and severe allocation conflicts. The economic policies led to the
concentrations of wealth in a few hands and thus the Bengali society lent whole-hearted
support to the Awami League, which enlisted the two economy thesis in its six-point
programme. 88

The Ayubian constitution which looked impressive on paper as it promised

stability, a measure of democracy and economic growth, but the system failed to deliver
under trying times and collapsed. He resigned from Presidency in the wake of a country-
wide agitation in which students and radical groups reigned supreme. The much
advertised Basic Democracy had ceased to function, spiraling prices and inflation led to
widespread protest by the workers and rural folks. 89 Faced with the increased opposition
from all quarters, the army intervened and the scene looked like an exact replay of 1958.
General Yahya Khan took over on March 25, 1969 and restored political order. Popularly
known as a ''Soldier's Soldier", Yahya Khan was reluctant to accept political

86 Mohammad Ayub Khan. Friends Not Masters: A Political Biography (London, OUP, 1967), cited in
Kavita R. Khory, "The Ideology of the Nation-State and Nationalism" in Rasul B. Rais (ed.) State Society,
n. 81, p. 138.
87 Raunaq Jaban, Failures ofNational Integration, n. 72, p. 66.
88 Ibid., pp. 88-89. The two economic theories attracted the urban salaried employees who preferred a
separate economic policy for East Pakistan. The Bengali bureaucrats supported it to be free from the
center's fiscal control. The intelligentsia supported it since they believed a socialist economy would grow
in independent Bangladesh. The urban labour and rural poor also supported the theory thinking of rise in
their standard ofliving.
89 David Loshak, Pakistan Crisis (London: Heinemann, 1971), pp. 32-33.

64
responsibility. But once in the seat of authority he worked towards cleaning the political
and economic mess in Pakistan and looked forward to a smooth and quick transfer of
power to civilian authorities. 90 Yahya, however, failed miserably in dealing with the
nationalist stirrings in East Bengal; some of his policy initiatives further radicalised the
secessionist movement leading to the outbreak of the Indo-Pak war and birth of an
independent Bangladesh in 1971.91

The event of 1971 was a huge blow to Pakistan's most powerful institution i.e. the
army. Its humiliating defeat in the hands of the Indian counterpart raised serious doubts
about its ability to hold the country together. 92 At the ideological level, the emergence of
Bangladesh as a separate national entity posed a potent challenge to Pakistan's Islamic
identity. It revealed the hollowness of religious symbolism either in providing national
cohesiveness or containing the surge of separatism emanating from factors that have little
to do with religion per se. In any case, the 1971 debacle facilitated the restoration of
democracy in Pakistan as Yahya transferred power to Bhutto, who was then the most
popular political figure in Pakistan. 93

Islam and Pakistan's 3rd Constitution

The 1962 Constitution was suspended in 1969 and abrogated in 1972. After the
1970 elections in Pakistan Bhutto emerged victorious and his official title upon assuming
office was President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. The termination of martial
law and the legalisation .of the 1973 Constitution redefined his position as the Prime-
Minister of Pakistan. Every time Pakistan witnessed a change of regime it experienced
severed ties with the past. This is due to the fact that each regime discredited the policies

90 Hayes, The Strugglefor Legitimacy, n. 37, p. 124.

91 See Jaban, Pakistan, n. 72, pp. 186-188.
92 Syed Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto (New York: St. martin's Press, 1980), p. 60.
93Ibid., p. 61. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rose to become foreign minister in Ayub's Cabinet. Following the 1965
War with India, he broke away from him and openly criticised the General's foreign policy. He was the
product of the anti-Ayub movement and thus had many supporters. Bhutto was the chief of Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) and had spearheaded democratic movement in the country.

65
and schemes of his predecessors. The 1973 Constitution called for a parliamentary
system with a higher degree of provincial autonomy.

Although framed by the elected representatives through intense debate and

discussion among the political groups reflecting the ideological diversity, the1973
Constitution of Pakistan ultimately had more Islamic clauses,than the previous ones.94
For example, Article 1 declared Pakistan to be an Islamic Republic and Article 2 defined
Islam to be the state religion of the Country, whereas Article 3 stated that elimination of
exploitation would be the responsibility of the state. It stated, "from each according to
his ability to each according to his work". This article highlighted the classic ideals of
socialism. A synthesis of article 2 and 3 produced what came to be known as "Islamic
Socialism.,,95 Bhutto indulged in Islamic rhetoric and believed that Islam could be an
important tool for carrying out his ambitious socio-economic reforms. He made use of
Islam's great ideals of egalitarianism to explain and introduce socialism.

The 1973 Constitution laid down conditions for the President to be a Muslim and
to take an oath stating his belief in Islam. Article 20 guaranteed each citizen the
fundamental right to profess, practice and propagate his religion and Article 21 protected
one against taxation to support any religion other than his own, whereas the Article 22
provided safeguards for religious institutions. Non-discrimination in access to public
places and services was promised by Articles 26 and 27 of the constitution. Likewise,
Article 46-48 called for elimination of prostitution, gambling, drug trafficking and
consumption of alcohol. Chapter II of Part II dealt with the Principles of Policy similar to
the earlier constitutions. Unlike the fundamental rights, these Principles of Policy did not
have the backing of the legal court of law. Article 31 dealing with Principles of Policy
emphasised the Islamic way of life. Article 36 guaranteed protection of minorities, while
Article 40 called for strengthening of bonds with the Muslim word and international
peace. Part IX of the constitution addressed the place of Islam in the state. Under Article
227, all existing laws would be brought in confonnity with the injections of Islam as laid
down in the Holy Koran and Sunnah. Article 228 to 231 provided for a Council of

94 Pande, Politics of Ethnic & Religious Minorities, n. 83, p. 151.

95 Kamal Azjar, Pakistan, n. 57, p. 87.

66
Islamic ideology to be appointed by the President to identify laws repugnant to Islam and
to make recommendations to bring the laws in accordance with Islam. 96

Introduction of Islamic Provisions under Bhutto

As noted above, officially the Constitution of 1973 stood for protection of

minorities and all religious communities, but Pakistan's record in this context was not
satisfactory. For example, Ahmadis were declared as non-Muslims in 1974 and subjected
to discrimination of all kinds. All the minority provisions under the fundamental rights
hav a foot note, which subject them to law and can be regulated, for reasons of Public
morality or public order. The Constitution Committee, which had been signed by Jamaat-
i-Islami, Jamaat-i-ulema-i-Pakistan and the Jamaat-i-ulema-i-Islam, the country's main
orthodox religious parties, stated "For the first time provision has been made to reflect
faithfully the Islamic ideology in the country's constitutional structure".97 Thus the 1973
Constitution was a blend of modern democratic ideals and Islam.

The framers of 1973 Constitution adhered to the principle of not-enacting un-

Islamic laws as reflected in the creation of the Council for Islamic Ideology (CII). The
members of the CII were drawn from various schools of IsI~ic thought, which had the
authority to advise the President on the proposed laws in the context of Koranic
injunctions. Apart from presenting a list of thirty-one suggestions for an Islamic oriented
society, the CII recommended for the establishment of Ministry of Religious Affairs
(MORA).98 Similarly, the oath of the President of Pakistan stating his faith in Islam was
probably to embarrass the Ahmediyas.99 Bhutto wanted to score political points when he
appeased the ulema and religious right by declaring the Ahmediya community non-
Muslims in 1974. Bhutto's political philosophy became famous as Islamic socialism and
the PPP campaigned on the principles of Islam, soCialism and democracy. Its populist
slogan was Roti, Kapra and Makan (bread, clothing and shelter). The manifesto of the

96For details on Constitutions, see, Kamal Azfar, Pakistan Political and Constitutional Dilemmas (Karachi:
Pakistan Law House, 1987).
97 Azjar, Pakistan, n. 57, p. 155.
98Mohammad Amin, Islamisation of Laws in Pakistan (Lashore: Sang e MeeI Publication, 1989), pp. 46-
50.
99 Pande, Politics of Ethnic & Religious Minorities, n. 83, p. 151.

67
PPP said "the ultimate objective of the party's policy is the attainment of a classless
society, which is only possible through socialism in our time ... ,,100

After winning elections, Bhutto undertook such measures as land reforms and
nationalization of basic industries reflecting his commitment to socialism. Bhutto
explained the intrinsic linkages of Islam and socialism in this way, "Pakistan People's
Party earnestly maintained that the high ideals of Islam in relation to society can be
attained only through a socialist system abolishing the exploitation of man by man. We
believe that the nature of justice in the world demanded by our religion is inherent in the
conception of a classless society ... Capitalist society has a class structure which is
opposed to the equality and brotherhood enjoined upon Muslims by Islam. When we call
our economic programme Islamic socialism, we are ... within the moral traditions of
Islam."lOl By interlinking socialism with Islam Bhutto perhaps aimed at neutralising the
opposition of the religious right towards his economic agenda and to increase his
popularity among the general public. All this, however, did not spare him from critics
who accused him of using Islam for political ends. Many, in fact, wonder whether there
is any co-relation between Islam, Democracy and socialism as manifested by the PPP's
electoral slogan - "Islam is our faith, Democracy is our polity. Socialism is our
economy. All power to the people."I02

Clearly, Bhutto used Islamic socialism as an instrument to carve out a stable

support base for himself. Socialist rhetoric no doubt drew the radical petite bourgeoisie
towards the new political formation, but it was difficult to transform the economic
rhetoric into reality. He faced two serious dilemmas: first related to the state apparatus
for the socialist ideals entailed the risk of landing his party on a collision course with the
powerful military and bureaucracy. The second dilemma was developing party links with
grass-root level organisations. It was assumed that this would throw up a politically
mobilised leadership from below and hence a threat to his position and leadership status.

100 The Pakistan Times, January 5,1972 quoted in Hayes, The Strugglefor legitimacy, n. 37, p. 236.
101 Kavita R. Khory, "The ideology of the Nation-state and Nationalism", in Rasul Bakhsh Rais, (ed.),
State, Society, n. 81, p. 140.
102 Ibid., p. 141. Bhuttos socialist measures were not followed by subsequent Palcistani governments and
even his daughter Benazir ignored it.

68
Thus, ideological shift to Islam in the wake of 1977 elections ''was not accidental, nor
was it a personal betrayal of the radicals on Bhutto's part.,,103 Moreover, Bhutto's
Islamic rhetoric was meant to counter pressure of the nine-party-coalition known as the
Pakistan National Alliance, which called for the establishment of "Nizam-i-Mustafa" the
order of the Prophet. 104 The PNA included both moderate political entities like the
National Democratic Party and orthodox right wing parties like the Jamaat-i-Islam,
Jamaat-i-ulema-i-Pakistan, and Jamaat-i-ulema-i-Islam. The Pakistan Muslim League
was less conservative than the above three was still willing to support the same
ideological view point and rhetoric. lOS As the PNA election campaign gained momentum
the emphasis shifted to Islam. The word socialism was dropped from Pakistan Peoples
Party literature and substituted by "Musawat-i-Mohammadi", which means Islamic
egalitarianism. "This was in sharp contrast to the concept of trinity propounded in the
last elections - Socialism, Islam and Democracy',.106

The PPP won the 1977 elections amidst allegations of election fraud and blatant
manipulations. The end of election however did not bring about an end to competitive
politics. Protests against vote tampering resulted in wide spread violence leading to
imposition of Martial Law in select cities of Pakistan. In the midst of nationwide protets
against the result of 1977 elections, Bhutto announced the introduction of sharia laws,
imposed total prohibition of alcohol and banned gambling in night clubs. He replaced
Sunday as weekly holiday with Friday and thus hoped to counter strong opposition from
right wing quarters. 107 Bhutto gave instructions to place a copy of Holy Koran in all hotel
rooms. 108 Ironically, Pakistan's western educated and forward looking Prime-Minister
made symbolic use of Islam the most. The freedom of speech and press guaranteed in

103 Akrnal Hussain, "Pakislan: The Crisis of the State", in Mohammad Asghar Khan (ed.), Islam, Politics
and the State (New Delhi: Select Book Service Syndicate, 1986), p. 221.
104 William L. Richter, "The Political Meaning of Islamization in Pakistan: Prognosis, Implications and
Queslions", in Anita Weiss (ed.), Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987), p. 131.
105 William L. Richter, "The Political Dynamics of Islam Resurgence in Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol. 19,
no. 6, (June 1979), p. 55l.
106 Ibid., p. 551.
107 Anwar Syed, Pakistan, Islam, Politics and National Solidarity (Lahore: Vangaurd Books, 1987), pp.
149-50.
108 Ibid., p. 146.

69
Article 19 was subject to a very disquieting clause, which read, ''to any reasonable
restriction imposed by law in the interest of the glory oflslam, or the integrity, security or
defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign states, public
order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court". 109 This clause
empowered the executive to interfere in the name of Islam. By dividing the believers and
non-believers, Bhutto took the spiritual divide to the legal sphere, thus ushering in the
second stage oflslamisation. IIo

Notwithstanding his flirtation with Islam, Bhutto could not endear himself to the
religious oriented parties whose appetite for more Islamic injunctions increased with
every stroke of Bhutto's public recitation of Kalina and such public statements as "Islam
... is our religion, the basis of Pakistan to religious groups." I I I Nor could he win over his
liberal political opponents averse to the use of Islam as a ploy to cover up the
government's failure to stem wide-spread corruption spawned by his socialist policies.
"Indeed virtually all of Bhutto's popular policies - whether land reform, new legislation
safeguarding the interests of labour, the nationalisation of key industries and the
extension of state control over the banking and insurance sector - provided immeasurable
opportunities for graft and corruption. Notwithstanding the lateral entry system, the main
beneficiaries of Public sector expansion were for the most part the very civil bureaucrats
whom the regime was supposed to be giving a much needed dressing down.,,112 What
added up to Bhutto's problem was the inflationary pressure due to the oil price hike in the
international market as a result of which the oil import bill soared from $85 million to
$385 million. Lastly, Bhutto's decision to sack the governments in the North Western
Frontier Province and Baluchistan on charges of anti-state activities in 1973 cost him

109 Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Some Reflections on the Democratization Process", in Rasul Bakhsh Rais (ed.),
State, Society, n. 81, p. 15.
110 Juergen Kleiner, "Pakistan: An Unsettled Nation", Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 18, no. 1 (January
2007), pp. 1-25.
III Anwar H. Syed, "Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Self Characterisation and Pakistani Political Culture", Asian
Survey, vol. 18, no. 12, December 1978, p. 98.
112 Ayesha Jala1, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia (Cambridge University press), p. 82.

70
dearly. The deployment of military to contain the civil-war-like situation in Baluchistan,
for instance, paved the way for the military to interfere in national affairs. l13

Bhutto began with all the goodwill for his party (PPP), but failed to
institutionalise it. Bhutto did precious little to put an end to the factional fights and left-
right divide inside the party. In addition, the periodic purging of activists and the absence
of internal party elections through out the 1970s weakened the party structure and
correspondingly, the shrinkage of support base of the party.1l4 Bhutto's lack of interest in
transforming the PPP from a mass movement into a strong and cohesive political party
has been attributed by his critics to his growing dependence on the civil servants who he
considered relatively efficient and bereft of ''political wrangling."ll5 Together with the
structural weakness of the PPP, the erosion of the government's credibility turned Bhutto
increasingly vulnerable, particularly when the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)
launched a virulent campaign against his government by portraying it as ''un-Islamic and
thus illegitimate.,,1l6 His vulnerability became all he more evident when he allowed the
Saudi Ambassador to mediate between him and right wing opposition during the political
deadlock in 1977.117

Bhutto like Jinnah had great political acumen and intellect, but "failed in his
efforts to modernise Pakistan for the same reasons that Jinnah could not. Bhutto's brand
of secularism like that of Jinnah's lay somewhere between the western perception of
secularism - a separation of the church from the state - and India's approach to

113 Fighting continued until Bhutto was overthrown. After assuming power Zia released 6,000 to 11,000
Baluch leaders from jails, and gave amnesty for the guerillas who had fled to Afghanistan and Iran. For
more details, see Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death ofa State (London: Penguin, 1983), pp. 115-
123.
114 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Democracy and the Crisis of GovernabiJity in Pakistan", Asian Survey, xxxii:6
(June 1992), p. 524.
115 Sayeed, "Some Reflections", n. 111, p. 12.
116 Anita M. Weiss, "The Historical Debate on Islam and the State in South Asia", in Anita Weiss (ed.),
Islamic Reassertion, n.l06, p.l0.
117 See F.S. Aijazuddin, "The Shifting Qiblah", Paper presented at the Yale University 26-27 March 2004
available at
http://www.yale.edulmacmillanlsouthasialevents/aijazuddin.pdf

71
secularism."Il8 His use oflslam first as a political ploy and then as an economic gamble
in the name of socialism aroused great deal of suspicion among the fundamentalists. As
the Preamble of his Constitution (1973) read, "Sovereignty over the entire universe
belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of
Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred truSt.,,1I9 Further, Bhutto
announced, "If any party is not to make Islam the main pillar of its ideology then that
party would not be a Pakistani Party.,,120 At the same time he declared that Islam in the
political context of Pakistan was irrelevant since both the exploited and exploiters were
Muslims. All this goes to show not the confusion in Bhutto's mind, but the tactful use of
as survival strategy in the face of the PNA-Ied protest movement of which the Jamaat-i-
Islami formed the main backbone. The centrality of Jamaat's role came to the fore when
Bhutto visited Maududi' s house on April 16, 1977 to diffuse tension. 121 What is more, he
appointed a General with strong Jamaat leanings as the Chief of Army, who subsequently
approved his death warrant.

Bhutto's policies impinged on the power and authority of the military. In an

attempt to ensure democratically elected governments against the possibility of military
usurpation he introduced provisions in the constitution which made imposition of martial
law and subversion of the constitution illegal. 122 But when the popular disenchantment
with the PPP rule was on the rise due to various reasons the military tried to cash in by
covertly supporting his political opponents mainly the religious groups. In a bloodless
coup, General Zia-ul-Haq became the Chief Martial Law Administrator on July 5, 1977.
Thus, Pakistan is a typical example of "Military in Politics", which is the product of an
interplay between the institutional strength and discipline of the military on one hand, and
the weakness of the countervailing civilian forces on the other. In other words, the

118 Ib'd
I .,p.8
.
119 Ibid., p. 9.
120 Syed, "ZuIfikar Ali Bhutto's Self Characterisation", n. 113, p. 98.
121 S. V. R. Nasr, "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 110, no. 2
(1996), p. 276.
122 The makers of 1973 Constitution wanted to bury Martial Law for ever. As the Article 6 of the 1973
Constitution notes, "Any person who abrogates or attempts to abrogate or conspires to subvert the
constitution by use of force or show of force or by other constitutional means shall be guilty of high
treason."

72
military intervention is the result of push of the military sub-system and the pull of the
regime vulnerability. 123

The eclipse of the Bhutto regime coincided with the rise of Jamaat -i-islami in
Pakistan politics owing to its vanguard role in the anti-Bhutto movement.. Islam as
advocated by Jamaat began to emerge as an ideological alternative that could be utilised
for political mobilisation. While Jamaat tried to expand its base through agitational
methods, Bhutto began to rely on Islam to counteract Jamaat under the rubric of Islamic
socialism. Islamic socialism was much more ambiguous than Jinnah's concepts of
Pakistan. Bhutto tried to promote an ideology with which the people were not familiar
and thus failed to strike with them. Thus, Jamaat worked hard to deny Bhutto's bid to
usurp the ideological position of Jamaat by flaunting its Islamic credentials in a way
politics in the pre-Zia period was centered on Islam in view of its potency for political
mobilisation.

When Zia came to power the state machinery was blatantly used to seize this
ideology for the purpose of legitimation. Therefore, the state rather than suppressing
Islam began to arrogate itself to the role of a guardian promote and protector of Islam
thereby denying the legitimate role for other political groups like Jamaat or PPP to use
Islam in opposition to the military regime. Islam in the preceding years of Bhutto's rule
already had great popular appeal and Zia seized upon this to lead Pakistan towards its
Islamic destiny.

RiseofZia

As noted, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appointed Zia-ul-Haq as the head of
the army bypassing the seniority of half a dozen army officers. The qualities which
endeared Bhutto to Zia were "his piety, patriotism and professionalism".124 Two years

123 For a discussion of the phenomenon, see W. R. Thompson, "Regime Vulnerability and Military Coups",
Comparative Politics, Vol. 10, no. 2 (1975), pp. 482-484; Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and
Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 73-84; Christopher
Clapham and George Philip, "The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes" in C. Clapham and G. Philip
(eds.), The Political Dilemmas ofMilitary Regimes (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 7-10.
124 Ian Talbott, A Modem History (New York: St. Martin's, 1998), p. 255.

73
later the same general deposed Bhutto and charged him with conspiracy to murder
Nawab Muhammad Ahmad Khan, father of PPP politician Ahmed Raza Kasuri.125
During the long trial in the court, Bhutto regretting his decision, stated, "I appointed a
chief of staff belonging to the Jamaat-i-Islami and the result is before all of us". 126 The
execution of Bhutto otherwise famous as "Bhutto's judicial murder" wiped out the
remnants of political opposition. The Supreme Court judgement referred to the doctrine
of state necessity which led to the imposition of Martial Law, and justified all actions
taken by the Chief Martial Law administrator by the above mentioned doctrine. 127 Firmly
saddled by judicial references Zia relied on the coercive machinery of the army for long
eleven years. He mobilised conservative forces that had no quarrels with him and
deflected the participatory process till his death in office.

Zia's military career remained apolitical till he was made the Chief of Staff, but
the PNA-Ied Nizam-e-MustaJa agitation changed him from an apolitical army man to a
clever usurper.128 Hasan-Askari Rizvi argues that once military commanders get
comfortable to the use of supreme political power under the cover of martial law or any
such martial law decrees, they remain extremely reluctant to give up or work out a power
sharing deal with democratic forces. 129 President Zia ul Haq was no exception. ~e ruled
Pakistan with a "messiah" and "saviour" complex while constantly deferring promised
elections on some pretext or other. Interestingly, General Zia reiterated his commitment
to "organise free and fair elections" which were to be originally held in October 1977. 130
But, sensing a PPP victory in the event of massive outpourings of public sympathy for

125 Mr. Ahmed Raza Kasuri survived an attack on his life, while his father died. A High Court inquiry
cleared Bhutto of all charges, but Kasuri refilled the case against him after the military take over. The
cause of his disenchantment seemed to be his failure to get a PPP ticket to fight elections. Eager to see his
end, Zia ensured his rearrest on the same old charge and he was executed later. See, Benazir Bhutto,
Daughter ojthe East, p. 58.
126KaIid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction oj Change (New York: Praeger,
1980), p. 162.
127 See Kamal Azfar, "Constitutional Dilemmas in Pakistan" in BurId and Baxter (eds.), Pakistan under
Military: Eleven Years oJZia-ul-Haq (Boulder; Colorado, 1991), p. 84.
128 Talbott, A Modem History, n. 126, p. 255.
129 Rizvi, "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol. 24, no.5 (May 1984), p. 536.
130 Zia ul Haq's first Press Conference, The New York Times, July 9,1977 as cited in Askari Rizvi, Ibid,. p.
538.

74
Bhutto, Zia tried to divert public opinion from democracy and elections either by re-
opening old cases of graft and conuption against Bhutto or by referring to the unstable
regional environment.

At the same time, Zia tried to legitimise his military regime through his constant
reference to Islam as the panacea for the ills that Pakistan was plagued with. According to
Zia, Pakistan created in the name of Islam ''will continue to survive only if it sticks to
Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential pre-
requisite for the country".131 Zia relentlessly pursued Islamisation and justified it on the
ground that the ideology of Pakistan was Islam and nothing but Islam, thus he
emphasised on the preservation of Pakistan's basic ideology so that the country would
not be influenced or exposed to secular ideologies. 132 Under the Zia regime, newspaper
articles and scholarly works on Qaid-e-Azam omitted the famous Constituent Assembly
speech of Md. Ali Jinnah. In addition, a resolution was moved in the Majlis-e-Shura that
imposed a prohibition on any written or verbal comment that ''would in any way directly
or indirectly detract from or derogate (Jinnah's) high status, position and
achievement". 133

Parallel to Zia's Islamisation programme, efforts were made to bring certain

amendments in the Constitution so as to consolidate his regime. The advisory council of
Islamic Ideology made the observations that the Presidential form of government was the
nearest to Islam and thus needed to be followed. 134 The President was empowered to
nominate and remove the Prime Minister. He also had the power to dissolve the National
Assembly. Provincial autonomy was severely curtailed and the parliament was given
legislative powers in matters which come under the Purview of states. ''The doctrine of
state necessity has thus become the slippery slope of legitimization of the overriding

131 Pakistan Times. July 7, 1977 cited in William L. Richter, "The Political Dynamics of Islamic
Resurgence in Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol. XIX, no. 6, June 1979, p. 555.
132 C.G.P. Rakisits, "Centre-Province Relations in Pakistan under President Zia: The Government's and the
Opposition's Approaches", Pacific Affairs, p. 79.
m Talbot, Modem History, n. 126, p. 49. Majlis-e-Shura means the parliament. This is cleared by Article 1
of the Constitution. The members of the Shura belonged to various interests groups, landowners,
businessmen, professionals and even members of various political parties
134 The CII made certain tailor made recommendations for Zia. It said the President was supposed to be a
true Muslim and knowledgeable in Islamic matters.

75
power of the military in Pakistan.,,135 Zia ul Haq kept the 1973 Constitution under
suspension, but the CII (Council of Islamic Ideology) was allowed to function. The
twenty-member-CII put forward suggestions for new Islamic institutions. The military
regime accepted the suggestions and established the Federal Sharia court (FSC) and the
Islamic University. A Shari a Appellate Bench was also established in the Supreme
Court. 136 Islamic University as the very name suggests undertook research on Islamic
issues. It was also involved in the task of imparting knowledge based on Islamic law and
Sharia.

Zia ul Haq's rule was a one man show till he placed the initial 286 member
contingent in the Majlis-e-Shura in place of the dissolved National Assembly. 137 The
unrepresentative body had the four main functions: to increase the pace of Islamisation;
to make ground-work for Islamic democracy since Zia believed that western style
democracy was not suitable for Pakistan; to manage and overcome socio-economic
difficulties; to offer 'opinion and wisdom' on international affairs. 138 Since the real
power to amend the constitution and bring about new legislative measures rested with the
head of the military regime, the Majlis-i-Shura remained an advisory body only. Bereft
of any law making or fmancial powers, the Shura for all practical purpose became a
"grand debating society whose expenses are paid by the state treasury". 139

On the whole, Zia's Islamisation measures were not simply aimed at

consolidating the military rule, but also foreclosing the possibility of the return of the
civilian actors to the political centre-stage. The hurried execution of Bhutto ignoring the
appeals made by heads of state both from the Islamic world and West revealed that Zia's
primary objective after the seizure of power was his survival. While his relation with the

135 Azfar, Pakistan, n. 57, p. 114.

136 Samina Yasmeen, Pakistan and the Struggle for Real Islam, n. 46, p. 71. The author writes that Zia
undertook steps with the intention of Islamising Pakistan being heavily influenced by Maududi. He
appointed ulema judges to the Federal sharia court which had the authority to examine laws suo moto.
137

138 J. Henry Korson and Michelle Maskiell, "Islamization and -Social Policy in Pakistan: The Constitutional
Crisis and the Status of Women'" Asian Survey, XXV, no. 6, June 1985, p. 590.
139 Askari Rizvi, The Paradox, n. 131, p. 547.

76
PPP was strained beyond repaIr, he moved closer to the NAP, a right wmg
conglomeration of nine political parties. The reason they preferred Zia was due to lack of
reliable alternatives. With state patronage, many of them helped Zia in carving out a
constituency for him. 14O He used the rhetoric of Islam to win over Islamic parties,
particularly the Jamaat-i-Islami.

Growth of Jrnaat-i-Islami

The Nizam-e-MustaJa movement against the People's Party government

catapulted Jamaat to great political heights. Its role in bringing Islam to the political
centre-stage was noticed by Ziaul-Haq and together they worked on an ideological
engineering project to bring all the right wing forces under state authority. Jamaat not
only endorsed Zia's Islamisation programme but also lent support in suppressing
remnants of people's party resistance. The goodwill created between the military regime
and religious orthodoxy created space for the Jamaat to be a part of the goveinment 141 •
The question which comes to mind is why was Jamaat co-opted? In a way it was mutual
dependence or the marriage of convenience between Zia in has search for legitimacy and
Jamaat in its desperate bid to curve out a place for itself. The ideological commonality
between Zia's Islamisation and Jamaat's ideological roots needs to be highlighted so as to
explain their mutual dependence for survival in Pakistan politics. Abul Ala Mawdudi
(1903-1979), the founder of Jamaat was the single most important personage who
ensured that Islam remained in the foreground of Pakistan's politics and foreign policy
since 1947. 142

Ironically, Maududi was opposed to Pakistan's founding father Muhammad Ali

Jinnah's Muslim League politics before partition in 1947, though he shared the Muslim
League's views about religion constituting the basis of nationality. Maududi clarified his
position regarding his apathy towards Muslim leagues when he said "our concern then

140 Rais, State, Society and Democratic Change, n. 81, p. xvm.

141 lamaat-e-Islamic enjoyed political power after thirty years of political activity in Pakistan. The PNA
received the portfolios of information and broadcasting, production and industry, petroleum, water and
power.
142 Syyedvali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat -i-Islami of Pakistan
(London: 1. B. Tauris, 1994), p. 108.

77
was Islam and the ability of those who sought to represent it.,,143 Maududi's Jamaat
worked as a political party to safeguard the interests of the Muslims and the aim at as
Islamic revolution Muslim society. To realise his project he worked towards bringing
about an intellectual change among the people, secondly to discipline and organize them
so as to make them fit to sustain a movement and thirdly to initiate refonns through
various social and humanitarian works fmally work towards Islamising the leadership.
Only when the government is inspired by Islam, Islamisation of the society could be
carried out leading to an Islamic state. Maududi believed that mere declaration of faith
was not enough instead every Muslim should strive hard to wage jihad in order to
demonstrate the efficacy of god's kingdom in this world. His ideology on jihad can be
understood for the following lines,

This is the litmus test for the truth or certitude of your faith. If your certitude is genuine,
then you will not be able to sleep peacefully being part of another din. To follow Islam
and abide by the norms of another religion would mean that every moment in life would
be like sleeping on a bed of thoms, food would be like poison and the desire to establish
god's religion would be an all-consuming desire. But if one was at peace co-existing with
another din, then one would not be a momin, no matter how many genuine prayers and
other forms of worship one might perform or Islamic philosophy one might expound. l44

Such an orthodox distinction between believers and non-believers forecloses any

space for catholicity in Maududi's brand oflslam. These views (against Ahmediyas, and
non-Muslims) found the most energetic expression in Ziaul-Haq's policy measures
focusing on Islamisation. Jamaat was steadfast in its demands to introduce an Islamic
constitution and mobilised the ulema and the masses to pressurise the state to do the
same. Maududi's ideological world-view was disseminated through education and other
state institutions during under Ziaul- Haq, thereby rising the Jamaat's stature Besides, his
talks were broadcasted on radio Pakistan and advice solicited. His views were highlighted
in the front pages of the national print media and a number of thinkers, writers and
journalists belonging to the Jamaat camp were patronised as the inner coterie of Zia's
advisers to enable him to lay the footprints for an Islamic state. 145

143Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, "Hamne Tehrik-i-pakistan ke sath nahin diya tha", Nawa'e waqt (August
15,1975), p.3 quoted in Ibid, p.19.
144 Ayesha Jalal, Partisans ofAllah Jihad in south Asia (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2008), p.254.
145 Nasr, The Vanguard, n. 144, pp.l93-194.

78
 Maududi's ultimate mission was "to establish God's kingdom on earth and
enforce the system of life received from him." 146 Without controlling sources of power
and authority, Maududi argued that the state's polity, civil society and ideology cannot be
based on Islamic principles. Thus, the new found political arrangement with the military
regime helped Jamaat to influence important institutions of the state and all facets of
lives. Mere declaration that ~akistan is an Islamic state meant nothing to Maududi who
believed that Islam should form the edifice of social, economic political, ideological
moral and cultural life. 147 After having served under Zia for nine years, Jamaat re-
evaluated the pros and cons of its association with the regime, and subsequently tried to
distance itself. Its decision to move away had little to do with its commitment to or desire
for restoration of democracy as was the case with other mainstream parties, it was on the
contrary prompted by its realisation of being used as an instrument by the regime for
legitimating and more importantly the receding hope for capturing state power with the
help of the military. Ironically, Jamaat rather than taking advantage of its rapport with the
Zia regime to occupy political centre-stage was used by Zia in his bid to secure popular
legitimacy to petpetuate his hold on power.

Consolidation of the Zia Regime

• Zia distrusted politicians and accordingly placed severe restrictions on political

activity. The disqualification tribunals followed his agenda of barring hundreds of
politicians from fighting elections. A former minister in the Bhutto government and
other office bearers were prohibited from contesting elections by bringing amendments in
the political parties Act. 148 His call for registration of all political parties (1979) just two
months before the scheduled date of national elections was not complied by major
political parties. The act of registration which involved giving a complete account of

146 S. Zainuddin, "Economic Intemationalisation and Islamic resurgence in India", The International Scope
Review, vol.2, No. 4 (winter 2000), pA.
147 "Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military", Initernational Crisis Group (ICG: Asia Report, No.49
(March 20, 2003),p.7.
148 Baxter, Government & Politics in South Asia, n. 41, p. 214.

79
sources of fmance and expenditure was perceived as harassment tactic on the part of the
military ruler.. 149

Instead of proper participatory elections, Zia announced a referendum to be held

on December 19, 1984, which required a 'yes' or 'no' vote from the electorate on the
question of Islamization, and whether they supported the Islamic ideology of Pakistan.
An 'yes' vote would be interpreted as supporting Zia for a period of five years. The
Martial law ruler claimed to have received a 98% affirmative vote. I50 Thus, ''through the
referendum verdict, he claimed the power to amend it (Constitution) to impart an Islamic
bias to its secular contents".151 The political parties under the MRD (Movement for
Restoration of Democracy) banner refused to acknowledge the referendum results, Zia in
a show of state power threatened to arrest them for criminal offence.

Emboldened by the popular mandate President Zia announced in August 1983 the
government's intention to go ahead with non-party legislative elections. The August 1983
speech of Zia triggered waves of discontent to spill into full scale rural uprising in the
province of Sind. 152 Among the factors that accounted for 'the Sindhi anger against the
state, the most important was the low representation of Sindhis in the· Central
administrative secretariat as well as the military.153 However, the Sindhis' sense of
deprivation owes its origin to the post-partition days when settlers (Mohajirs) from India
were distributed property left behind by rich land owning Hindus. 154 Adding to the
problem of the unequal land distribution system and the rising poverty as high as 65
percent, the demand for regional autonomy and preservation of their language created
conditions conducive to the Sindhi upsurge precipitated by the manner in which the
military dealt with Bhutto created lot of anguish against the Military rule. Powerful yet
•
149 Korson and Maskiell, /slamisation, n. 140, p. 596. Jamaat was the only party which escaped registration
process with the Election Commission.
150 Baxter, Government & Politics in South Asia, n. 41, p. 214.
151 Mushtaq Ahmad, The Politics o/Crisis (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1987), p. 202.
152 Charles H. Kennedy, "Policies of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol. XXIV, no. 6 (June
1984), p. 698. The author highlights the urban-rural divide in Economic matters in Sind and links it to the
rise of Provincial unrest in the state.
153 Rakisits, Centre-Province Relations, n. 134, p. 82.
154 See Adil Khan, Politics 0/ Identity: Ethnic Nationalsim and the State in Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage
India Publication Ltd., 2005), p. 136.

80
suppressed feelings of hurt, anger and pride exploded against Zia Regime, when the
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) called for public protests and
agitation against party-less elections. 155

Despite the boycott by MRD agitation, the military consolidated its position and
engaged itself in power politics the political groups in Pakistan were in disarray. 156 The
conservative groups failed to put up a challenge to Zia because of their co-option in the
state power structure. 157 Although some of the right wing parties left Zia's civilian
cabinet, they assured the military commanders of covert support outside the government.
In such a relationship both benefited in some ways. The Jamaat enjoyed relative freedom
to extend its influence over the state institutions while for the military it acted as a
legitimiser and spared it from the risk of political agitation. Zia went ahead with the
referendum clearly ignoring the political parties' opposition. Interestingly, he sued the
Jamaat's endorsement of the referendum to justify his political project in the name of
Islam. 158

After the referendum in 1985, Zia lifted the Martial Law which was the longest
Martial law in the history of Pakistan. Subsequent to the lifting, the 1973 Constitution
was restored .subject to amendments. He appointed Junejo of the Muslim League as the
Prime Minister. It is during this time that the highly controversial 8th amendment to the
constitution passed. 159 The 8th amendment protected all actions of the President during
the Martial Law regime. All the Presidents orders, ordinances, martial law regulations,
notifications, rules, Orders or bye-laws passed by the Martial Law regime since the 5th of
July 1977 cannot be challenged in the court of law under any condition. 16O The 8th
amendment was used by Zia as a tool to dampen the democratic institutions as evident in

ISS Christopher Jaffrelot (ed.), Nationalism Without a Nation (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002), pp. 23-25.
156 Muhammad Waseem, "Election politics in 1985", The Muslim Vol. 9, nos. 10,11,12,22, April, 1985.
157 N asr, Th e Vanguard, n.144, p. 196.

158 Rizvi, ''The Paradox", n. 131, pp. 543-544.

159 The Revival of 1973 Constitution order empowered the President to appoint and dismiss the Prime-
Minister secondly the President was given the power to dismiss the governors and federal ministers.
Thirdly he had the authority to dissolve national and StatelProvincial assemblies.
160For more on 8th Amendment see, Martin Lau, The Role of Islam in the Legal System of Pakistan
(Leiden: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 2006), pp. 81-83.

81
the dismissal of Muhammad Khan Junejo on the flimsy ground of "his lack of enthusiasm
for theocratisation".161

The story of Zia's consolidation of power would be incomplete without reference

to the army. The Pakistan army supported his moves and emerged as the biggest
corporation in Pakistan. The army, in tum, benefited immensely from his patronage. The
material benefits were far too many to be enumerated but some need mentioning.
Appointments of army officials to top civil jobs, facilities for loans and lands for
construction, provincial secretarial posts and other top administrative posts where the
successful candidates from civil services, Pakistan foreign service and police services
were required to join. That apart the army had a 10 percent quota of civil jobs reserved
for them and numerous diplomatic assignments abroad as ambassadors. 162 All the
provincial governors were military personnel until Muhammad Khan Junejo's became
Prime Minister. 163

The Pakistani army's control during Zia was so extensive that no Islamic
organisation was ever in a position to politically or militarily challenge its position. 164
On the other hand the army made use of Islam and Islamist organization to
counterbalance the threats from main-stream political parties. General Ayub trained in the
best traditions of British army believed that the responsibility of the army was to secure
territorial integrity and national stability.165 General Zia, however, had an altogether
different perception of the army's role. Along with defending the country's security, he
sought an additional role i.e. the maintenance of Pakistan as an ideological state. He said,

161 "Sharifs Last Refuge", Newsline, September, 1998, p. 23.

162 Rizvi, "The Paradox", n. 131, pp. 549-550. The army in Pakistan has the fauji foundation the Air force
Shaheen foundation and the navy has the Bharia foundation which expanded rapidly during Zia era.
163 R. Laporte, "Administrative Restructuring during the Zia period" in Shahid Javed Burki and Craig
Baxter (ed.), Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia UI Haq (Boulder: Co., 1999), p. 129.
164 Burki, "Zia: Eleven Years" in Burki and Baxter Ibid., p. 42.
165 Ayub was a modernist thinker, and attached more importance to economic development. He intervened
to stop the process of political decay. See, Wayne A Wilcox, "Pakistan Coup d'etat of 1958", Pacific
Affairs, 38 (Summer, 1965), pp. 142-63.

82
"Preservation of that Pakistan ideology and the Islamic character of the country were ....
as important as the security of the country's geographical boundaries".166

Zia used the anny machinery to promote his Islamic agenda. The curriculum for
young anny officers at the command and staff college included Islamic thought and code
of conduct. Zia used the services of Prof. Abdul Qayyum, who mastered Islamic theology
and undertook religious preaching among military personnel. The latter insisted that the
gift of Western education is not an end in itself and that the Pakistani must not be merely
"a professional soldier engineer or doctor but must use this to become "Muslim soldiers,
Muslim engineers, Muslim doctors, Muslim officers and Muslim men".167 In recognition
of his services, the lectures of Prof. Abdul Qayyum were published in a book with a
forward from Zia and distributed as part of the syllabus. 168 Zia ul Haq introduced many
mechanisms within the anned forces to determine the religious orientation of the army
men. One of them required the reporting officer to fill up a religious orientation form
about the subordinate officers. They were asked to disclose their religious affiliations,
learning, diligence in prayers and observation of fasting. 169

Through indoctrination and then promotions, Zia managed a large following of

Islamists in the army.170 After long years of Martial rule the army is always discredited,
just as it happened in Pakistan after Ayub's reign. But it is also the peculiar nature of
Pakistani politics that after every patch of civilian rule, there existed a general feeling of
frustration and political decay. The sensitivity of the military to chaos and civil war like
situations brings them to interfere in domestic affairs. General Zia ruled eleven long
years relying on the coercive machinery of the military, and by using orthodox Islamic
doctrines. The alternatives before him however were not attractive. The army was not
willing to hand over power to any mainstream group which harped on the issue of

166 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86 (Lahore Progressive Pub, 2000),
p.242.
167 Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Karachi, Himalayan Books, 1998), pp. 95-96.
168 Ibid., p. 95.
169 See Aijazuddin, "The Shifting Qiblah", n.l19, p. 12.
170 Stanley Wolpert, Zulji Bhutto a/Pakistan: His life and Times (New York: OUP Pakistan 1993), p. 95.

83
Bhutto's execution and secondly the army did not have a successful blueprint of radically
reorganizing Pakistani Society.171

In a country where all democratic institutions were stifled, General Zia's military
stood like a colossus on account of its organization, discipline and indoctrination. The
Pakistan army was predominantly Punjabi followed by Pathans.172 Compared to other
ethnic groups inside Pakistan the Punjabis have effectively managed to control state
power.173 This successfully explains their stakes in the preservation of state ideology and
state survival more than anyone else in Pakistan. According to Cohen, "From the
beginning these (military) officers claimed a special position in the new state of Pakistan:
they stressed that the virtues of Pakistan were their virtues, that the Islamic character of
Pakistan was reflected in the Islamic character of the military.,,174

The ideological indoctrination of the soldiers and officers was important because
they are required to go into battle with their own people. As observed by Alvi, "Their
minds and hearts must be infused with a sense of mission and national fervour. The
exploitation of Islamic ideology and the labeling of dissidents as enemies of Islam fulfil a
purpose here".175 Lacking political legitimacy the Zia regime continued to perpetuate
itself in the name of a holy mission. The mission was to islamise the country and polity.
He had the entire machinery of the army to back his political agenda. Last but" not the
least, the Pakistani middle class was neither big nor strong enough to assert its strength
and sustain democratic institutions against the Pakistani army.

I71 Cohen, The Pakistan Army, n. 169, p. 130.

172 Ibid., p. 42, p. 52. Cohen writes that in 1979 the Pakistani anny was 70% Punjabi, 14% from NWFP,
9% Sind, 3% from Baluchistan and 1.3% from Azad Kashmir. The percentages have not shown drastic
changes since then. The greater emphasis on Punjab was explained in tenns of its being a core area in
strategic terms.
173 Tariq Amin Khan, Economy, Society and the State in Pakistan", Contemporary South ASia, vol. 9, no. 2
(July 2000), p. 182.
174 Cohen, The Pakistan Army, n. 169, p. 42.
175 Hamza Alavi, "Part II: The State in Crisis Class and State", in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (ed.),
Pakistan: The Roots ofDictatorship (Delhi: OUP, 1983), p. 68.

84
External Environment

The most important external factor which helped Zia to consolidate his regime
was the Soviet occupation of neighbouring Afghanistan in December 1979. Prior to the
invasion Pakistan was somewhat isolated internationally. The issue of nuclear
nonproliferation was the chief cause for concern between Pakistan-US relations. The
United States had punished Pakistan for its secret nuclear programme which surpassed
the thresholds set by American laws.176 Apart from this, Pakistani leadership took time to
digest the American cold response during the 1971 war with India. Meanwhile, the USSR
was considered a good friend of India and China, a trusted ally of Pakistan. There were
certain limits to which China was prepared to go, especially when it had entered into a
process of normalizing border and other disputes with India. I77

The violent execution of Bhutto and the Islamic character of the military regime.
did little good to Pakistan's international image. But this state of affairs was a short lived
one. Pakistan soon transformed itself into a frontline state to counter the Communist
march. The massive influx of refugees from Afghanistan and the Pakistani gesture of
feeding and sheltering them won Zia's Pakistan the much needed sympathy.178 In return
for Islamabad's commitment to fight Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US
administration restored the much needed aid which was both economic and military in
nature. 179

With the Soviet invasion in 1979 the theatre of the Cold War shifted from Central
Europe to South West Asia which in turn enhanced the geostrategic saliency of Pakistan
in the eyes of the US. Pakistan was important in the strategic calculations for reasons

176 For more details, see Teresita C. Schaffer, "US influence on Pakistan: Can partners have Divergent
Priorities?, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 26: 1, (Winter, 2002-03), pp. 170-71.
177 Frederic Grare, Pakistan in the Face of the Afghan Conflict 1979-85 at the turn of the Cold War (Delhi:
India Research Press, 2003), p. 63.
178 The exodus of refugees took place through out the period of Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The influx
was over 3 million. The Pakistani government bore the burden of shelter and a monthly allowance of 12
dollar per person. Later international aid agencies got involved in the aid programme. For details, see
Grant M. Farr, "The effect of Afghan refugees on Pakistan", in C. Baxter (ed.), Zia's Pakistan (Lahore:
Vanguard, 1985), pp. 93-110.
179 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment: A Study of Foreign Policy (London:
Macmillan, 1993), p. 99. The US pledged $3.25 billion aid plan in addition to the sum promised by the UK
and EU for the development of Bluchistan strategically.

85
more than one. It shares the international boundary with Afghanistan. However, the
presence of Pushtuns along both sides of the Mortiiner-Durand line has remained a
sensitive issue between both the countries. I80 The Pushtun issue involved big powers at
one point of time, when the US supported Pakistan and the Soviet Union backed Afghan
claims over the Pakistan part of North West Frontier Province for its homogeneous
Pushtun people. The deadlock of the 1960s led to the total breakdown of diplomatic
relations when Pakistan closed its ports for the entry of Afghan goods in protest against
Afghan interference and encroachments on its territory. J81

The involvement of big powers had politicised the Pushtun factor and apart from
those American interests in the area was primarily due to its Sunni Muslim population.
After the 1979 Iranian revolution the US was apprehensive about similar revolution in the
Muslim world particularly in the Gulf. In response to the challenge posed by Khomeini
and his rhetoric about the "export of revolution" the US tried to build up a Sunni
counterweight by promoting Sunni fundamentalism. In this scheme of things Zia's
Pakistan fitted well and hence US had no hesitation in propping up the military junta in
Islamabad, as a counter poise to the possible spread of Shite variety of fundamentalism.

Under the full protection of United States of America General Zia played host to a
number of radical Islamist groups. "During the first Afghan war the Inter-service
Intelligence Agency's strategy was to support hard-line Islamic groups, and with
American concurrence, the lSI characterized the war against the Soviet intruders as a
religious struggle against atheistic communism".182 It is again with American
encouragement that the Muslim youths were indoctrinated and recruited to fight for Jihad
in Afghanistan, thereby creating fertile grounds for terrorist groups like AI Qaeda to
grow. 183 Zia's support to the mujahideen through arms and ammunitions and guerrillas
training camps raised his stature among the religious right while neutralising his civilan

180 The 1983 Mortimer-Durand line was rejected by the then Afghan Prime Minister in 1947. The latter
consider the Durand Line unjust since it divides the same people who enjoy social cultural, linguistic and
territorial unity. See, Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First Hand Account (London: Verso,
1988), p. 30.
181 Grare, Pakistan in the Face ofAfghan Conflict, n. 179, p. 8.
182 Stephen Philip Cohen,The Jdea of Pakistan (Washington; Brookings Institutions Press, 2004), p. 31.
183 Ibid.

86
opponents. "The Jamaat-i-Islami criticised Zia on a number of other counts but gave full
support to his Afghan policy. The Jamaat had strong support among the mujahideen
groups operating out of Peshawar".184 The Jamaat played a crucial role in generating
public opinion in favour of Islamic jihad against the Soviet occupation. What
subsequently emerged was a unique partnership between the Jamaat and Pakistani
security forces in pursuit of a common objective. This led to the involvement of the
Jamaat in the sensitive areas like the flow of funds and arms to the Mujahedins, exposing
its cadres to military training by the elite forces. I85 In the course ofthe Afghan war, the
Jamaat was in some ways successful in projecting itself as the symbol of pan-Islamism in
the Muslim world.

Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation Mesures

Both the domestic and external factors highlighted above contributed in varying
degree to the consolidation of the military regime until Zia's death in an air crash in
1988. But what helped Zia overcome the initial problem of legitimacy was the sate-led
Islamisation programme, which included judicial reforms, introduction of Islamic
economics, Islamic penal code and a new educational policy based on Islamic
injunctions.

Judiciary

When Nusrat Bhutto evoked Article 6 of the 1973 Constitution terming the
Martial Law interventions illegal, it was Chief Justice Anwarul Haq and his team which
came to the General's rescue. The judicial bench legitimized Zia's intervention, ''by the
highest consideration of state necessity',!86 Believing in Zia's 'Words or his "solemn
Pledge" to hold national elections in 90 days as irrefutable truth the Chief Justice invested
the Martial Law Chief the authority to change the constitution. Little did he realize that

184 Sbahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan Under Zia, 1977-1988", Asian Survey, vol. XXVIII, no. 10 (October
1988), p. 1097.
.
Nasr, The Vanguard, n.144, p.195.
1~

186 Pakistan, supreme Court Judgement on Begum Nusrat Bhutto's Petition Challenging Detention of Mr.
Z.A. Bbutto and others under Martial Law Order 12 of 1977 (Lahore, 10 November 1977), p. 23 as quoted
in Muhammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad, NlllCR, 1994), p. 356.

87
''this extravagance would later cost the court much of its authority and jurisdiction.,,187
Zia used the ruling to his best advantage and set upon his mission through numerous
measures of tampering with the constitution.

In an utter disregard to his pledge of holding early elections, Zia shifted his
priority towards Islamising Pakistan in order to legitimise his regime. The lack of
legitimacy was the major challenge to the regime, for politically he was not elected to the
office of the president and thus was a usurper. Legally he had no power to become the
head of the state. In religious terms he was not backed by people or their leaders
according to the Sunni jiqh nor was he a mujtahid who had the power to interpret Shia
jiqh. l88 What one witnessed was the programme of Nizam-i-Islam to convince the people
of the establishment of a sharia based society. In an address to the nation he said, "I must
say that the spirit of Islam demonstrated during the recent [anti Bhutto] movement, was
commendable. It proves that Pakistan which was created in the name of Islam will
continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of
Islamic system as an essential pre-requisite for the country".189 In other words, he tried
to harp on the raison d'etre of Pakistan, which was the establishment of an Islamic state.

In the process of Islamisation, Zia saw judicial activism as a serious road-block

which he tried to overcome through numerous constitutional amendments by the
establishment of military courts and the provisional constitution order. The crackdown
on judiciary in an attempt to undermine its autonomy was due to the increasing number
of Public petitions against the Martial law interventions. l90 This was perceived as a
direct threat to the military junta rule.

Shariat benches in the High Court as well as Supreme Court were established in
1979. The purpose of the Shariat benches was to "examine and decide the question

187 Anwar- Syed, Pakistan: Islam Politics and National Solidarity (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984), p. 162.
188 Weiss (ed.) Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p. 10.
189 Pakistan Times, July 6, 1977 quoted in A. Syed, Pakistan: Islamic Politics. n. 189, p. 165.
190 The Civil courts were full of cases of civilians trying to protect their interests against the Martial law
regulations. The cases included Nusrat Bhutto's petition to challenging the Seizure of the Printing Press by
Junta rulers, see Waseem, Politics and the State, n. 188, pp. 374-375.

88
whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam".191
The lawyers practicing in front of the Shariat bench were required to possess five or
more years of legal experience in the high Court and were supposed to be "an Alim"
which implies one having command over Islamic matters and the shariat. These Sharia
courts had a limited role to play in the sense they remained passive players till a law was
challenged as being repugnant to Islamic tenants, secondly the Shariat courts did not in
any other way limit the authority and functioning of civil or military courts. And finally
though laws were conformed to Islamic Sharia, the greater question of deriving the entire
legal system from the Sharia was not discussed at all. 192 The Shariat benches were made
subservient to the military courts which had the authority to bypass the opinion of the
Shariat COurtS. 193 The Zia regime passed a law which debarred any other court to contest
the ruling of the military court or issue any process against the Chief Martial Law
authority.194 Thus, the common man could now be arrested without being told about his
charges and could take no legal action against the military government since it was
placed above the Islamic jurisprudence. Zia later replaced the Shariat benches by a
Federal Shariat Court in Islamabad where the lawyers appearing before the court were
required to "state, expound and interpret injunctions of Islam relevant to the
proceedings. ,,195

The judges belonging to the entire legal setup were required to take an oath of
loyalty to the military regime. In the year 1981, the junta ruler issued the Provisional
Constitution Order (PCO). The new order limited the authority of the judiciary to the
extent of making them superfluous. The judges could no longer quash detention orders
of the military court, could not issue bail and stay orders on executions and floggings for
want of evidence. The PCO ignored elections, Parliament and all other democratic
moves. The fundamental rights ensured by the 1973 constitution were done away with

191 Weiss, Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p. 11.

192 Ibid. p. 12.
193 Oleg V. Pleshov, Islamism and Travails of Democracy in Pakistan (Delhi: Greenwich Millennium
Press, 2004), p. 208.
194 On May 1980 the Junta ruler amended Article 199 of the Constitution stripping the High Courts from
reviewing martial Law order.
195 Weiss,Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p.12.

89
and repression of any form of dissent became the order of the day.196 By making him and
his cronies above the law of the land General Zia departed from Islamic traditions, which
consider Sunnah to be supreme. By chocking all outlets of public opinion, he forgot the
Koranic practices which enjoins the ruler to maintain close contact and consultations with
the public. 197

Islamic Economic Programme

Pakistan's economy had developed along capitalist lines and thus islamising it
would take long years. This basic fact was even acknowledged by the government of
Pakistan when it prepared the Report of the Committee on Islamisation!98 Interestingly
the report stressed on the basic idea of Islamic economic management which was the
realization of al-adl-wal-ahsan (Justice and kindness). To achieve these goals the need
for improving the quality of life by providing universal education, by increasing the
employment opportunities and easy availability of consumer products etc were proposed.
The report was critical of the establishment of an interest free economy and introduction
of Zakat as ''undue obsessions". The reason for arguing against an interest free economy
was that it would destabilize the distribution of income and lead to economic exploitation
of the weaker sections in society.199

Although the objectives described by the committee were largely secular in their
nature the larger objective was to connect with the core Islamic philosophy of promoting
economic bettennent not by selfish measures but by bridging the economic inequality.
Islam to the committee "would not - as it cannot - use widening income differentials as a
policy instrument to promote capital formation and economic growth by virtue of its
commitment to al-adl wal-ahsan. It was the responsibility of the state to prevent the
occurrence of a situation in which the initial cost of promoting growth was borne by the

196 For details, see Waseem, Politics and the State, n. 188, pp. 374-376.
197 Zia dampened judicial activism, he maintained strict censorship of the Press, refused to hold national
elections, and made political parties irrelevant. See Weiss, Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p. 13
198 The Government of Pakistan. An Agenda for Economic Reforms: The Report oj the Committee on
Islamisation (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1980) quoted in Shahid Burki,
"Economic management within an Islamic context" in Weiss, Islamic Reassertion, D. 106, pp. 50-51.
199 Ibid., p. 51.

90
under-privileged segments of society. To prevent the poor from paying such a price: the
public sector will be called upon in an Islamic economy to assume among other things a
predominant role as producer of "wage goods". For social welfare requires not only a
transfer of fmancial resources from the rich to the poor, but a diversion of real resources
to the production of basic necessities of life ... In other words, the very composition of
the consumer goods basket in an Islamic economy will require the state to playa tangible
role in it.,,200 The Committee advocated for a greater and penetrating role of the state in
poverty alleviation programmes, in redistribution of land and meeting the educational
needs of the poor, so as to enable them to have access to basic living standards.

The government, however, did not consider these recommendations as catering to

their agenda and thus picked up only those points which it considered Islamic. That
included the levy of Zakat and Ushr. Zakat is an Islamic alms tax and ushr an
agricultural tax is one of the core principles ofIslamic faith. Until Zia's time Zakat was a
personal religious obligation in Pakistan, but in 1980 by introducing the Zakat and ushr
ordinance the military rulers made it a legal obligation. The ordinance states "the prime
objective of the collection of Zakat and Ushr and disbursements therefrom, is to assist the
needy, the indigent and the pOOr',.201 The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance empowered the
government to make deduction at source at the rate of 2.5 percent from savings account
deposits fixed deposits, Time deposit accOlmts and shares held in National Investment
Trust, Investment Corporation of Pakistan and other such companies where the majority
of shares were owned by Muslims. Zakat was levied on Provident funds and insurance
policies etc?02 Zakat deducted at source makes its way to Central Zakat Fund and
distributed to provincial Zakat fund's various nation wide network. It is from the local
Zakat committees funds were distributed to mustahaqeen. Beneficiaries of the Zakat
funds were widows, orphans, disabled students of Islamic schools (deeni madrasas) poor
patients and many such needy people.

200 Ibid.• p. 52.

201 See. Grace Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr as a Welfare System" in A. Weiss (ed.) Islamic
Reassertion. n. 106. p. 79.
202 See brochure of the Department of Information of the Government of Pakistan, 1987 quoted in Pleshov,
Islamism. n. 195. p. 130.

91
 The state intervention to make it obligatory brought to the surface the differences
of opinion among members of various sects of Islam. It evoked protest and
demonstrations from the Shia community who "claimed that it violated the right of Shias
to distribute alms as dictated by their consciences and in accordance with the guidelines
of Islamic law as interpreted in the jurisprudence of their own sect.,,203 Zakat Ordinance
introduced by Zia triggered off a vicious cycle of sectarian animosity disrupting the
fragile social mosaic. The Shias indulged in violent demonstrations and protests against
Zakat laws and finally were successful in clairiUng exemption from governmental
Zalmt.204

General Zia's claim that Zakat would usher in an egalitarian society by bridging
the gap between haves and have-nots did not convince anyone. The total collected
amount in 1980-81 was about 600 million rupees or $60 million which meant less than
one dollar worth assistance per capita per year in Pakistan where more than half the
population were needy.20S The Ushr tax traces its practice in societies at a very early
stage of economic development. The emphasis being on agriculture, the produce from
farms was therefore subject to taxes instead of other assets. Even though the Pakistani
officials did not provide any justifiable economic grounds which led to imposition of the
agricultural tax, the government went ahead with it due to its desire to revive Sharia-
based tax rules?06

The entire efforts of the state were to highlight Zalmt and Ushr tax as serving the
social security network of an Islamic state. Muslim economists worked on the concepts
of Zalmt and substantiated the state's approach that Zalmt would help in the establishment
of social and economic justice through re-distribution of wealth, while others built their

203 Elizabeth Mayer, "Islamisation and Taxation in Pakistan" in Weiss (ed.), Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p.
72. Although both Shias and Sunnis believe in Zakat, there exist differences of opinion as to who collects
Zakat, how it is put to good use and how it should be determined.
204 The Ministry of Finance issued a Notification on April 27, 1981 which exempted Shias from Zakat for
jurisprudential reasons. Although Shias still complained about official bungling, on pen and paper the
exemptions were put in place.
205 Syed, Pakistan Islam Politics, D. 109, p.178.
206 Mayer, "IslamisatioD and Taxation", n. 205, pp. 73-74.

92
arguments that it led to the wellbeing of whole society.207 The vision of a just economic
system, social security and a perfect Islamic society was propelled by the events of 1970s
and 1980s. Political leaders throughout the Islamic world encouraged this dream and
Zakat became a measure to determine the Islamic nature of a government. Zakat in
Pakistan which was based on precepts of Sharia was meant to meet the "Islamic
expectations of the people and the government.,,208

General Zia also realised that an economy free from distress was essential for his
survival in power. In a private discussion with Shahid Javed Burki, he said, "I agree that
Ayub Khan would have lasted longer had the economy not taken a beating following the
1965 war with India, and that the agitation against Bhutto would not have been expressed
with such vehemence if some of the important groups in our society had not felt
economically so insecure. My instructions to Ishaq Sahib are quite clear. I really don't
care what he does as long as the economy continues to function smoothly and the poor
and the lower middle class continues to see some hope from him.,,209

Ishaq Khan's management of the economy was impressive and the vast majority
of middle and lower class happy with the economic tranquility?IO Living up to the need
of the then times, the economic genius Gulam Ishaq Khan highlighted the spirit of
moralism and declared that Islam permits economic gains when it is done in a righteous
way. He claimed that after the great economic depression of 1931 the supporters of
capitalist system almost favoured the same conclusions which Islam had spoken of 1300
years ago. 211 Thus the sense of economic well-being created conditions for political
stability, which enabled Zia to go ahead with his plans to mould Pakistan's political
structure.

207Muslim Economists like Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi and Ahmed Khurshid worked on economic
development in an Islamic framework.
208 Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat", n. 203, p. 82.
209 S. Burki, "Pakistan under Zia, 1977-88", Asian Survey, vol. XXVll, no. 10, October 1988, p. 1092.
210 Between 1977-78 and 1985-86, the GNP increased by 76% and per capita income by 34%. The
economy benefited from large flow of remittances sent by Pakistanis from the Middle East. From 1975 to
1985, Pakistan received a total of $ 25 billion in remittances from the workers in Middle East and a large
percentage of it went to the deprived sections of society. Ibid., p. 1093.
211 Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, n. 188, p. 380.

93
Islamic Penal Code

Most significant and controversial change that the Zia regime brought about in
Pakistan was the adoption of Islamic laws famous as the Hudud laws as part of the new
panel code. The Hudud ordinance issued by the regime included punishments for certain
major types of crime. (i) Saraka i.e. theft of private property; (ii) Zina or adultery and
fornication; (iii) QazJwhich refers to bearing false witness to adultery and (iv) al -Sharab
which means consumption of intoxicants.212 Factors like circumstances under which a
particular act was perfonned; severity of the act and whether the act deserves Hudud or
Ta 'azir punishment were some issues which needed to be reviewed before Islamic
punishments were unleashed. A criminal received the harsher had punishments for theft
if the actual theft is equivalent or more than 4.467 grams of gold. Apart from one's own
admission to the crime, the act needs to be testified by two honest Salah Muslim men.
The thief is subjected to amputation of his right hand at the wrist. The Shias, however,
advocate cutting off the fmgers only. Punishment for aiding cattle theft includes
confiscation of all immovable property and jail up to a maximum of fourteen years, while
punishment for murder is execution.213

Along with Hudud laws to check theft, the government guaranteed private
property and industrial concerns from indiscriminate nationalization. The Zina crimes
which involved crimes of adultery and fornication and the strict punishments for the acts
attracted every strong criticism from allover the world. The legal definition of Zina
follows: "a (sane) adult man and a (sane) adult woman are said to commit Zina if they
willfully have sexual intercourse without being validly married to each other',.214
Another part of the ordinance refers to Zina-bil-jabr which consists of sexual relations
without consent. The military general believed that a person may be prov~ guilty of
Zina-bil jabr ''with or without the consent of the parties".215 The evidence for Zina

212 Weiss (ed.), Islamic Reassertion, n.106, p. 13.

213 Ibid., 12-15.
Anita Weiss, "Women's position in Pakistan Socio Cultural Effects of Islarnzation", Asian Survey, Vol.
214
XXV No.8, August 1985, p. 870.
215 Ibid., p. 870.

94
crimes included confession of the accused or testimonies of four morally strong Muslim
men. In the absence of the above evidence, it was the discretion of the law courts to
settle the matter. However, in the event of evidence the punishment prescribed was death
by stoning.

The most written about cases of Safia Bibi and Lal Mai showed that the laws were
put to discriminatory practices. Safia Bibi a blind maid who registered a case of rape by
multiple men was sentenced to 15 lashes in public, 3 years imprisonment and a fine, the
men guilty of the crime were acquitted for lack of evidence. The issue of rape and
adultery were not distinguishable to the law makers. "As the law stands, it protects
rapists, prevents women from testifying and confuses the issue of rape with adultery. As
a result, a women who registers a case of rape can by her own admission be prosecuted
for adultery while the rapist goes free for lack of evidence,,?16 In the midst of world
wide coverage of the issue the federal shariat court reviewed the case of Shafia Bibi and
dismissed her sentence.

However, Lal Mai was not as lucky; she earned the dubious distinction of being
publicly whipped in front of eight thousand people for adultery. The Council on Islamic
Ideology put forward the Law of Evidence (Qanoon-e-shahadat) which modified the
earlier Evidence law. It equated the evidence of two females with that of one man, in
cases other than those under the Hudud Ordinance. The final version of the interpretation
restricted the testimony of two-women being equal to that of one man only to financial
cases?l? Another proposal by the Council of Islamic Ideology which is not decreed is the
law of retaliation (Qasas) and blood money (Diyat). In case a man is murdered, the law
allows a diyat which is equivalent to 30.4 kilos of silver and when a women is murdered
the diyat is reduced to half. If a women is harmed the compensation is half of what
would be given to a man?18

The list would be incomplete without the mention of the Ansari Commission
Report, which disqualified women from occupying position of head of the state. The

216 Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed, Women in Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back (Lahore:
Zed Press, 1987), p. 101.
217 Ibid., pp. 106-111.
218 Weiss (ed.), Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, pp. 102-103.

95
report put restrictions on women leaving the country or serving abroad as diplomats
without therr male escorts. The minimum age for women to become member of the
Majlis-e-shura was 50 years. The proposals of the Islamic Ideology Council and the
Ansari Commission met with great resistance from women and human right activists
through out Pakistan.

Some analysts including Charles Kennedy consider Zia's Islamisation as very

unprofessional and not gender-biased. They also argue that the Hudud Ordinances had a
negligible impact on Pakistan's middle classes, as between 1980-85 the decisions of the
Federal Sharia Court were revised 27 times, and the judges in the FSC were mostly
foreign educated with no or little exposure to Islamic law. Topping them all, hudud
Ordinances in many of Pakistan's provinces were not even implemented?19
Notwithstanding Kennedy's observations, Zia's Islamisation measures severely
undermined the democratic institutions in Pakistan. Before Zia introduced such
retrogressive measures, women in Pakistan were not punished for adultery. By replacing
civil laws with Islamic laws the state sent a very clear message that it is the custodian of
Islam as well as its promoter.

The very presence of such laws in society led to resurgence of Orthodox

interpretation of Islam. By promUlgating Hudud laws the state interfered in the private
lives of its citizens in the name of morality. The government also issued directives to
women news readers and air-hostesses to wear a dupatta over their heads. Similarly
teachers and female students were asked to use scarves.220 Thus, ''the state moved on to
take over the lives of women, to control their bodies, their space, to decide what they
should wear, how they should conduct themselves, the jobs they could take the sports
they could play, and took it upon itself to defme and regulate women's morality. This
"attempt to impose single interpretation of Islam, has pitted Islam against Islam, sect

219 Charles Kennedy, "Islamisation and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-1989", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 63,
No.1, Spring 1990, pp. 62-77. Also see Charles Kennedy, "Islamisation in Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol.
xxviii, no. 3, March 1988, pp. 312-313.
220 See J Henry Korson and Michelle MaskieIl, "Islamisation and the Social policy in Pakistan: The
Constitutional Crisis and the Status of Women", Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No.6 (June 1985), pp. 601-602.

96
against sect".221 The Hudhud laws remained even after the demise of President Zia. Both
Benazir Butto and Nawaz Sharif could not change it in the face of stiff opposition from
the right-wing parties. It is true that both set up commission to investigate the ordinances
which recommended amendments but neither showed courage to follow it. The rape laws
were altered under Musharff wherein death penalty for extra-marital relations and
producing four witnesses to prove rape cases were abolished, thereby resorting to some
extent the dignity of the womenfolk.

Education Policy

Education was also not spared by the Zia regime in its attempt to secure consent
of the people, both for the military regime as well as for its Islamisation programme. The
political motive behind this was to create an ideological base to rally popular support for
the regime through official narratives by distorting history manipulating facts and
inventing myths. The Islamisation of Pakistani society was apparently the long term goal
but underlying this regime survival was the objective. With educational institutions Zia
sought to legitimise his regime through consent of the public rather than using the state
corrosive apparatus. So the state under Zia in theory appeared to be more consensual
even though the state continued to resort to corrosive methods, in order to suppress any
potential opposition.

In its efforts to make the state-sponsored Islamisation program acceptable among

the people, the works of Bhutto regime were ignored. Religious literature dealing with
introduction of "Islamic system" in Pakistan was seen while books on science and secular
literature disappeared from libraries.222 Zia on his many visits to universities, colleges
and schools took a very nationalist stance and declared that his government would not
tolerate any "anti-Islamic" and "anti-Pakistan" elements. He issued veiled threats that the
government would take note of those who propagate the ideas of secularism and
atheism?23 All this was in tune with the state's effort to maintain Pakistan as an

221 Nighat Said Khan, Voices Within: Dialogues with Women on Islam (Lahore: ASR Publications, 1993),
p.89.
m Pleshov, /siamism, o. 195, p. 190.
223 Ibid., p. 190.

97
ideological state. Zia spoke his mind when he said in 1982 ''the preservation of that
Pakistan Ideology and the Islamic character of the country was ... as important as the
security of the country's geographical boundaries".224

The liberal side of Quaid-i-Azam was suppressed and the entire media world in
Pakistan had a selective amnesia about the historic speech of Jinnah to the Constituent
Assembly, while bringing out news items on occasion of his birth anniversary. The state
made an attempt to put a brake on scholars and eminent personalities who questioned the
state's various actions to paint Jinnah as a Islamist. 225 A resolution was passed in the
Majlis-i-Shura which banned all verbal and written comment that "derogates Jinnah's
high status position and achievements.,,226 Textbooks highlighted the state narratives the
father of the nation was portrayed as the Chief architect of an Islamic state: "The All
India Muslim League, and even the Quaid-e-Azam himself, said in the clearest possible
terms that Pakistan would be an ideological state, the basis of whose laws would be the
Koran and sunnah, and whose ultimate destiny would be to provide a society in which
Muslims could individually and collectively live according to the laws oflslam"?27

The education programmes stressed that the military have more right to rule the
country than those elected in a democratic setup. ''Text books were full of the
descriptions of the great battles which brought victories to the warriors of Islam,
references to the heroic deeds of the Ghazis (those who fight for the faith) and Shahids
(those who died in the fight for the faith)".228 The educational policy during Zia's period
aim~ at altering the curricula and the textbooks to affmn its commitment to Islam. The
school curriculum provided fertile ground for the spread of extremist religious education

224Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86 (Lahore: Progressive Publisher,
1986), p. 242.
225Ex-Chief Justice Mohammad Munir in his monograph, From Jinnah to Zia wrote, "The Quaid-i-Az;im
never used the words 'Ideology of Pakistan' and for 15 years the ideology of Pakistan was not known to
anybody until in 1962 when the solitary member of the n used these words." Muslim League member
Shaukat Hayat also objected to the state's efforts to colour Jinnah as an Islamists.
226 Talbott, A Modern History, n. 126, p. 256.
227Azhar Hamid, et al "Mutalliyah-i-Pakistan" (Islamabad: Allana Iqbal Open University, 1983), p. 22
quoted in Pervez Amirali Hoodbhoy and Abdul Hameed Nayar, "Rewriting History of Pakistan-Islam
Politics and the State," in M.Asghar Khan (ed.), Islam Politics and State (London: Zed Books, 1985), p.
175.
228 Pleshov, Is/amism, n. 195, p. 191.

98
was made compulsory by the regime. In order to know the entire history of the Islamic
world which involved the life of the Prophet, Umayyads Abbasids, it was recommended
to follow one officially approved book - Tarikh-i-Islam by Dr. Hamid?29

In fact, Zia entrusted the right-wing Jamaat-i-Islami with the task of changing the
school curriculum, which led to a heavy infusion of Maududi's vision and ideas in the
textbook. Maududi believed that in an Islamic society all that is taught should be in the
context of religious knowledge. Every subject thus became Isalmiat.,,23o The officially
sponsored educational programme laid stress on military, jihad and violence. The post-
1979 textbooks erased the pre-Islamic heritage of Pakistan and the history of Pakistan
became synonymous with the history of Muslims in the sub-continent. Its history began
with Arab conquest of Sindh and Muslim conquerors from Central Asia. Similarly, there
were understated instructions to condemn India and Hindus, eulogise Aurangzeb.policies
and critical of Akbar's secular ethos so and so forth. 231 Urdu was made the language of
instruction, and other measures included the establishment of an Islamic university in
Islamabad, and a proposal for a women's university. The government of Zia ul Haq
extended financial help to Islamic seminaries and officially recognized the certificates
given by Madrasas as equivalent to Masters Degree in lslamiyat. Apart from
governmental support in [mance, the provincial Zakat Councils also distributed large
chunk of their collections to the seminaries?32

The story of educational refonn under Zia would be incomplete without the
mention of the role played by the Pakistan University Grants Commission. The
government directed teaching of Pakistan studies to all degree students including those in
engineering and medical courses. The objective behind the introduction of the new course
was to "induce pride for the nation's past, enthusiasm for the present and unshakeable
faith in the stability and longevity ofPakistan".233 Clear directives were issued to authors

229 Mubarak Ali, "Teaching of History in Pakistan", View Point, December 12,1985, p. 15.
230 Massoud Ansari, "Lessons in Intolerance", Newsline, May 2004, p. 5
231 Ahmed Salim, "Historical Falsehoods and Inaccuracies" in A. W. Nayyar and A. Salim (eds.), The
Subtle Subversion (Islamabad: SDPI Project, 2003), p. 83.
232 Talbott, A Modern History, n. 126, p. 279.
m Directives of the University Grants Commission in Azhar Hamid et al "Mutalliyah-i-Pakistan" p. xi.

99
''to demonstrate that the basis of Pakistan is not to be founded in racial, linguistic or
geographical factors, but, rather, in the shared experience of a common religion; to get
students to know and appreciate the Ideology of Pakistan and to popularize it with
slogans; to guide students towards the ultimate goal of Pakistan - the creation of a
completely Islamised state,,?34

For the creation of a state sponsored Islamic identity, steps like segregating the
roles for men and women, enforcement of chadar (veil) in educational institutions, and
compulsory teaching of Arabic as the seccmd language from class sixth onwards was
implemented Reading of Koran (nazara Koran) was required for getting intermediate
school certificate. 235 Congregational Prayers in the afternoon during school hours was
made mandatory, and religious knowledge was made criteria for appointment of teachers.
Even the definition of literacy included religious knowledge. 236 The state sponsored
Islamisation encouraged "Islamic Scientists". They made discoveries highlighting the
relevance of Koranic knowledge. Some of the so-called scientific breakthrough which
was presented at the Islamic science conference in 1979 revealed that the heaven was
moving away from us at a speed of only one centimeter per second less than the speed of
light. It was also discussed with reference to a Koranic verse that prayer on a particular
night is better than thousand nights of ordinary worship. This was said keeping the theory
of relativity in mind.237 The scientists argued that Islamic science was a solution to
socio-economic problems in the Muslim world.

Saudi Arabian Assistance in Education

In Zia's efforts to Islamise education the role of Saudi funds and logistics played a
major role. Deeply committed to the cause of Islam particularly the Wahabi variety
Saudi Arabia chose Pakistan as its laboratory. Before analysing the role played by Saudi
Arabia in the spread of Islamisation in Pakistan, it would be useful to examine the

234 Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.

235 Not only women teachers and students, even women broad casters and airlines staff were asked to dress
modestly see Korson and MaskieU, "Islamisation and Social Policy", n.222, p.610.
236 Hoodbhoy and Nayyar, "Rewriting History", D. 229, p. 1.
237 Pervez Amirali Hoodbhoy, "Ideological Problems for Science in Pakistan", in Ashghar Khan (ed.)
Islam, Politics and the State (London: Zed Books, 1985), pp. 187-189.

100
 founding ideology of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and to the extent it influenced Pakistan's
experiment in Islamisation.

Wahhabism

Fundamentalist programmes and the heightened religious consciousness among

the Pakistanis owe its origin to the orthodox strains of Islam such as Wahhabism, widely
popular in Pakistan. The Saudi based extremely conservative Wahhabism is highly
critical of political activism and emphasises on following a path with strict adherence to
Sharia. Wahhabism has served as a legetimiser for the monarchical Saudi regime and the
Saudi state. A number of policies supported and perpetuated by the Saudi kingdom to
heighten Wahhabi influence wide across the Muslim world included sponsorship towards
education law and governance, economy and all fields of human activity.238

A very short history of the religious movement would help in locating the source
of Zia's Islamisation measures. The movement began by Islamic revivalist Muhammad-
ibn Abd al-wahhab and a local ruler in Saudi Arabia Muhammad-ibn Saud of Diriyah in
the Najd, which became famous as Wahhabism aimed at recreating Islam's early
traditions and return to the practical of the prophet. The call was for the return to the
pristine glory of pure Islam of the first few prophets who were their righteous ancestors.
When Muhammad Ibn Abd-al Wahab joined hands with the local tribal ruler Muhammad
Ibn saud missionary zeal and passion combined WIth military supremacy gave rise to the
religion-political movement which attacked diversity of popular religious practices, cross
cultural accommodations, equal rights to non-Muslims and even Muslims of different
sects other than Sunnis. 239

Interestingly, during Zia's rule there was no other ideology which could offer an
alternative to Wahabi totalitarianism. Funding from Saudi Arabia and other rich oil-rich
Arab states were used to sponsor Wahhabism, and dissuade people from following other
liberal strains of Islam like Sufism etc. Wahhabism spread through the numerous

238 Y. Admon "Saudis criticize their school curricula again", Middle East Media Research Institute
(Inquiry and Analysis No.325) available at http://memri.org/biniartic1es
239 Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (Karachi:
_ Oxford University Publication, 2001), pp. 154-158.

101
networks of mosques and madrassas that mostly preached the ideology of hate and later
degenerated into legitimising terror. Zia ul Haq's statist Islam followed the narrow
precepts of Wahabi Islam, which was reflected in his policy-measures like curbs on
literary works, art, media, viewing non-Wahabis as takfir, segregation of the second sex,
introduction of Islamic. punishments like storing and lashing and similar regressive
measures. 240

As explained above, the state sponsored indoctrination was most clearly visible in
the field of education. The entire curriculum followed the Wahabi agenda like glorifying
the Jehadis, creating deep antagonism among different Islamic sects like Shia-sunni and
Ahmediyas.241 The spiraling effects of propagating this exclusionary world view
generated "hypocrites, blindfolded zealots, fundamentalists, intriguers, time servers and
ignoramuses with the highest degrees.,,242 The Wahabi networks across Muslim societies
developed exclusionary tactics to isolate fellow brothers from other sects with periodic
outbursts of extreme violence. The Saudis contributed lavishly to Wahabi based
institutions across Pakistan. Wahhabism as a life style doctrine often took an inflexible
stance towards pilgrimage to local tombs, veneration of saints, mystical experiences as
non-Islamic practices, the channels through which General Zia executed wahabi Islam
were education, press, polity judicial· and administrative machinery and states supported
ideological engineering projects?43 In the words of Nayyar, "The full impact of what
happened under General Zia is now being felt in rising religious military sectarianism and
violence in our society and politics, and generation of young Pakistanis is going through
the same education. 244

Following the huge set-back suffered by the Arabs against Israel, there emerged
in. the region a power vacuum which Saudi Arabia with its enormous petro-dollars and

240 For details, see Iftikar H. Malik, State and civil society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority: Ideology and
Etlmicity (Oxford: St Antony's Macmi1lan, 1997), pp.l39-167.
241 See K.K. Aziz, Murder of History (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1992).
242 "Letter to the Editor", Frontier Post, May 11, 1992.
243 Stephen Vertigans, Militant Islam: A Sociology of Characteristics, Causes and Consequences (London:
Routledge, 2009), pp.l06-107.
244 A.H. Nayyar has made a critical study of the curricula and state of education and textbooks on Pakistan.
The above quotation is from Massoud Ansari, "Lessons in intolerance", Newsline, May 2004, p.8.

102
political patronage sought to fill. The oil boom of the seventies provided the ground for
constructing a new ideology to counteract Pan-Arabi sm. Labeled as "Petro Islam", the
main aim of this ideology was to promote Muslim universalism, a safer doctrine than the
geographically limited but politically more troublesome idea of Pan-Arabism?45 In
pursuit of this dream, the oil-rich Gulf States, Saudi Arabia in particular disbursed large
amount of fmancial and multilateral aid to Muslim-majority countries like Pakistan.
Internally, the leftist march in Pakistan during the 1960s and the early 1970s was viewed
with alarm by the Gulf countries, which prompted them to provide aid to strengthen
Islamic institutions in the country. The resultant linkages between the Pakistan-based
religious bodies and their external patrons undermined the government control over the
activities of the Islamist groups. 246 Apart from generous financial grants for Islamic
institutions, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states also provided resources to train
jihadi activists to fight the war in Afghanistan. The funds meant for the war against the
Soviet gave rise to a growing number of militant madrassas with sectarian and lihadi
base rather than any ethical scholarship. 247

The lamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan had very cordial relationship with Saudi officials.
Thanks to the personal effort of A.A. Maududi who advised Saudi Arabia on various
proposalS?48 The Jamaat was important for Saudi Arabia since it helped spread Wahabi
Islam allover the Islamic world and Pakistan in particular. Maulana Maudoodi had the
distinction of being the first foreigner to be honoured by King Faizal for outstanding
contribution in the propagation of Islam. The Saudi media also highlighted his
achievements as a 20th centmy reformer (mujaddid).249 In the Saudi campaign, Pakistan
came to occupy a prominent place as an ideological playfield. The Saudi ruler provided
consultancy, literature apart from infusing funds and advice in the name of Islam. Given

245 Douad Ajami, "The E~d of Pan-Arabism", Foreign Affairs, vol. 57, no. 2 (Winter 1978-79), p. 365.
246S. V. R. Nasr, "Rise ofSunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulema in
Society and Politics", Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000), pp. 142-144.
247Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International
System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 195-197.
248Maududi had proposed to the Saudi Arabian King to establish an Islamic university in Medina. The
blueprint of the institution as prepared by Maududi was duly approved by the royal family.
249 Pleshov, Islamism, n. 195, p. 182.

103
its past political ties with the Saudi Kingdom and their proximity to USA, Saudi
campaign in Pakistan was welcome. There are instances where Saudi officials numbering
as many as 20 who participated in symposium organised by the 11 in Peshawar (1979).
The objectives of the meet was to discuss the (1) greatness of Islam as a means of
solution to all the problems. (2) the state of Pakistan's economy; (3) Jihad and Islamic
renaissance. 250

Domestic Impact

Zia's Islamisation programme embracing all spheres of public life had

implications for Pakistan's future identity, polity and society. First of all, Zia was
reasonably successful in institutionalising the country's Islamic identity. "The official
lies of the Pakistani state present the country as one united nation with a common history,
common culture, common language and common religion,,?51 In other words, Zia's
Islamisation was meant to reinforce this myth of Pakistan as a homogeneous state based
on a shared cultural patrimony. However, the ideological engineering undertaken by the
Zia regime to realise this purpose of creating a homogeneous Pakistani state included
both the corrosive and persuasive methods. The official patronage to Islam, for instance,
dissolved the dichotomy between a Muslim majority state on one hand and Islamic state
on the other. It put an end to the lingering controversy surrounding Pakistani identity
since its inception?52

In a way this new official identity both at the discursive as well as the empirical
level narrowed down the scope for flexibility to define Pakistani national identity in non-
Islamic terms. This was reflected in the most violent agitation against the Ahmadis who
became targets of religious right wing groups as well as government persecution. Zia ul-
Haq inserted section 298-B and 298-C into the Pakistan Penal Code, which prevented the
Ahmedis to use Islamic terminology and made it a criminal offence for them to ''pose'' as

250 'US Involvement in the Islamic countries", Documents form the U. S. Espionage Desk 9460, Tehran,
n.d, pp. 27-28.
251 Adeel Khan, Politics of Identity, n.47, p. 25.
252 Early years of Pakistan were ruled without a constitution. It took the leaders 9 years to frame and adopt
its first constitution. The main reason for its delay was the contention over the role of Islam in the new
state. Pakistan saw three constitutions in the first 26 years of its birth. All constitutions declared Pakistan
to be an Islamic state but a lot of ambiguities surrounded the term and its implementation.

104
Muslims, to "preach and propagate Islam" or "call his place of worship as Masjid." Any
Ahmedi who fails to respect the sensitivity of the Muslims was liable to be punished
under criminal charges?53 There are numerous instances of false cases being instituted
against Ahmedis in Pakistan for displaying Kalima for calling Azan for posing as
Muslims, for celebrating Ahmediya centenary and 100 years anniversary of the eclipse of
Sun .and Moon that occurred in 1894 as a sign for the promised Mahdi, for commenting
upon the anti-Ahmadiya Ordinance. 254 Their media publications were targeted under
instructions of government authorities and their intellectuals dishonoured. 255

The other instances which foreclosed the options of a broader national identity
was lowering of the status of other minorities, the strict imposition of Urdu and
dissolving sectarian identity into a broader Islamic (Sunni) identity. One notorious law
which had enough scope for its arbitrary enforcement was the Blasphemy law, which
carried a death sentence for anyone using derogatory remarks against the sacred person
Prophet Mohammad. The laws were basically used to intimidate the Christians and
Ahmedis and settle scores. "In a country with such a tiny non-Muslim minority, as
existed in Pakistan, such a law was totally unnecessary for no one would dare heap
gratuitous insults on the person of the prophet, and that any such law would only be used
to hound the minorities.,,256

Pakistan was confronted with the imposition of Urdu despite the fact that it had a
rich history of regional languages. However, the ideology of the state was propagated
through Islam, and Urdu. It was "imposed from the top to serve the nation state's need
for a national language.,,257 The imposition of Urdu as a part of the Pakistani identity
created the feeling of governmental indifference to regional cultures, history and its

253 For details, see Lau, The Role ofIslam in the Legal System, n. 162, pp.502-503.
254 Pande, Politics of Ethnic, n. 83, pp. 173-176.
255 The various publications headed by the Ahmediyas were 'AL-Fazl', 'Ansarullah', 'Misbah', 'Khalid'.
The publishers and editors of these papers and periodicals were slapped with many charges. Ibid., p. 175.
Pakistan's only Noble Prize winner physicist Dr. Abdus Salam was ignored both by the media and
government. For details see P. Hoodbhoy, "Abdus Salam-Past & Present", The News, January 24,1996.
256 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror
(Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 104.
257 Adeel Khan, Politics ofIdentity, n. 47, p. 71.

105
folklore in the name of national unity. Likewise, the state's attempt to dissolve sectarian
identities through Islamisation led to the sharpening of the Shia-Sunni Schism. Pakistan
being an Islamic state meant strict enforcement of Islamic laws by the State. Given the
diversity of interpretations of various schools of Islamic law and thought, it was a
complex question to decide as to which school of law would be supported by the state,
and how that would affect followers of other school of Islamic law?58

Zia's imposition of Zakat (Islamic tax) on Muslims triggered waves of discontent

among the Shias who refused to pay the tax based on the Hanaji School of Sunni law.
This resentment later led to their political mobilization into an organised movement
known as Tahrik-i-NiJaz-i-Fiqh (Movement for the implementation of the Jafari LaW)?59
The Shias also disagreed about certain kinds of punishments for offences in the Hudood
ordinance. The Shia definition of theft was different from that of Sunnis and they
followed a different punishment for the offense. 260 The other demands of the Shias
included enforcement of the Jajari jiqh, separate courses in their theology for Shias,
appointment of a Shia judge in the Federal Shariat court, adequate Shia representations in
higher level courts, establishment of a separate Shia trust and abolition of all unnecessary
restrictions for azadari processions?61

The Pakistani Shias were inspired by the 1979 Iranian revolution and the
charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The majority Sunnis were suspicions of
Shia's revolutionary rhetoric and to counter militant activism of the Shias under the
organization of Sipah-i-Muhammad the Sunnis had their own radical party known as
Sipah-i-Sahaba. 262 One finds a striking similarity in their recourse to violent activity

258 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalitation of Shi'l and Sunni
Identities", Modern Asian Studies, 32, 3 (1998), p. 692.
259 Shia law was developed under the guidance of Ja far al Sadiq (d. 765), who happens to be the sixth
imam
260 Afak Haydar, "The Politicization of the Shias and the Development of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-fiqh-e-
Jafaria in Pakistan", in Charles Kennedy, Pakistan: 1992 (Lahore: Pak Book Corp, 1993), p. 80.
261 Ibid., p. 87.
262If the main aim of the Sipah-i-Muhammad was to preach Shi-ism in a predominantly Sunni state, the
Sipah-i-Sahaba evoked Sunnism. The goals of the Sipah-i-Sahaba was to combat Shia influence in
Pakistan, to declare Shias non-Muslims, to strive for state interventions during Muharram-processions, and
to make Sunni Islam the officially recognized religion. The political goal of the organisation was to model

106
against each other. These religious motivated sectarian radicals target rival sects and are
responsible for sectarian riots in Karachi and elsewhere in Pakistan. The fundamentalist
orientation among Shias and Sunnis had, however, its roots in the historic conflict arising
from the right of succession following the death of Prophet Muhammad?63 Thus, on the
surface Islamisation appears to be a positive development in terms of contributing to the
strengthening of the new Pakistani identity, but on closer scrutiny one fmds the sectarian
schisms and ethnic divide between Punjabis vs. rest undermining the societal cohesion
and political stability.

Polity

The nexus between the fundamentalists and the army was already there, but Zia
legitimised it which spelt danger for the restoration of democratic polity. The Islamic
lamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan which commands heavily indoctrinated cadres supplied the
Zia government the theoretical blueprint for Islamisation and the strength of the political
organization to carry such a programme through out the state. The cadres of Jamaat had
a strong presence not only in educational institutions but also in the anny and Civil
services. The Islami Jamiyat-i-tulba which is the student wing of the lamaat-i-Islami
controlled university student elections for long. Last but not the least, the steady flow of
funds from Riyadh for the "Islamic movement" in Pakistan made the work easier. 264

Pakistan according to the rule of the "rightly-guided caliphs of early Islam." See Muhammad Q. Zaman,
Sectarianism in Pakistan, n. 258, pp. 701-702.
263 The name Shia is originally derived from Shiat Ali which means the Ali factions. It was first used
during the Caliphate of Ali-ibn-abi Talib to distinguish his supporters from the partisans of the murdered
third caliph, known as Shiat Uthman (faction). However, the term Shia came to be used in a broader sense
to refer to those, who hold that legitimate authority rest with a member of the Prophet family.The denial of
Ali's right to succeed the Prophet laid the seeds of a prolonged conflict between the two major factions
within the Islamic community, Sunnis and Shia. The other historically significant event was the massacre
of Ali's youngest son Al Hussain at Karbala about 100 kms south west of Baghdad, by the Umayyad army
in 680 A.D. The killing of Hussain and his followers took place on the 10th day of the Muslim month
Muharram, which turned into a tragic day of mourning and remembrance known in Shi'i religious literature
as the Ashura day. Muharram has political significance for the Shias as the believers use the occasion to
articulate their grievances against the followers of Sunni Caliph and this in some way constitutes the core
of the Sunni-Shia animosity. See Etan Kohlberg (ed.), Shiism (Aldershot & Hants: Ashgate Publications,
2003); Heinz Halm, Shiism (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2004), pp. 1 to 27.
264Duran Khalid, "The final replacement of parliamentary Democracy by the Islamic System in Pakistan"
in Zingel Lallemant (ed.), Pakistan in the 1980s: Ideology, Regionalism, Economy and Foreign Policy
(Lahore: Vanguard, 1985), p. 271.

107
 The biradari bondage too played its role in bringing Zia closer to lamaat-i-Islami.
Mian Tufail Muhammad like Zia belonged to the Ara tribe and the same village in
Eastern Punjab. Zia had a mentor in Abd-al-Havy who belonged to the Tab/ighi Jamaat.
I

It is this supremely orthodox group which supplied most of its preachers to the army. A
closer analysis of Tablighi Jamaat and lamaat-i-Islami brings to fore their differences
and rivalry but looked from a larger perspective they may be regarded as allies. 265 This
nexus between religious fundamentalist and the army proved to be an obstruction to
successive civilian governments which could not function in the face of such a
formidable combination. Whether it was in the formation of the government or its
dismissal, the function of this nexus remained central. Inevitably, transition to democracy
in the 1990s encountered the challenges that largely stemmed from this infonnal alliance.

Consequently, Islamists parties which had remained peripheral began to exercise

disproportionate influence whether in the fonnation of the government or in the
mobilisation of public against the government. Secondly, despite their poor electoral
performance they continued to influence the policymaking.266 This phenomenon
explained why civilian governments failed to act against right-wing forces and more
importantly initiate reforms towards the reversal of the Islamisation process set off by
Zia.

Society

Zia's Islamisation created deep fissures in Pakistani society. The imposition of

Hanafi law provoked sectarianism and led to the emergence of radical Shi'i and Sunni
groups. The existence of hostile sectarian groups and their numerous clashes all over
Pakistan exposed their fragile bonds and contributed to rising militancy in the state. (See

265 Ibid., p. 271. Also, a better understanding of Jamaat Tabligi, see Barbara Metcalf, "Traditionalist
Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis and Talibs", Social Service Research Councz1, Nov. 1,2004.
266 Saeed Shafqat, "Transition to Democracy: An Uncertain Path", in Rasul B. Rais (ed.), State Society, n.
81, pp. 241-245. Dr. Shafqat mentions the historical obstacles which undermined democratic institutions.
He says if Ayub regime met the interests of the business community, military and bureaucracy Zia catered
to the interests of the religious groups and trader-merchant group who developed powerful lobbies and
threatened democratic norms. .

108
the Table 1.1)" In the year 2001-2002 Pakistan was home to fifty eight (58) religious
267
political parties and twenty four (24) armed religious militias.

Total 862 629 208

Source: The Nation (Islamabad), September 1, 1994

The Islamisation process saw the legitimisation of violence in the name of Islam.
Islam had a larger appeal as a new identity justifying non-democratic elections and use of
violence to achieve political goals. Indicative of this was the increase in madrasas,
encouraging the yo~g Pakistanis to fight for Jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. In this
context the separatist movement in Kashmir was increasingly viewed in Pakistan more as
a struggle for Islam (religion) thereby attracting wider support cutting across the regional
and class divide.

Zia played a vital role in developing madrassa networks where the seeds of
religious fanaticism were planted and allowed to grow. These seminaries were essential
support base for the Jehadi groups in the 1980s. The International crisis group's report
on Pakistani madrasas says, "Education that creates barriers to modem knowledge

267 Saeed Shafqat, "From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba" in
Jaffi'elot (ed.), Nationalism without a Nation, n. 157, p. 133.

109
stifling creativity and breeding bigotry has become the madrasas defining features.,,268
At a time when there is the need for modernist educated intellectuals to counter Islamists,
providing good education still remains low in the priority of the govemment.269
Militarisation of Pakistani society needed to project a pennanent enemy. The "ideology
of Pakistan", which penneated all debates during Zia's tenure found its way to text books
and was successful in focusing on India as its enemy. For reasons more than one
Pakistan's neighbours other than India are not fit to be bracketed as enemies. Thus,
keeping the insurgency in Kashmir alive by aiding and abetting the forces hostile to India
and projecting the supreme importance of the Pakistan army fitted well into the scheme
of things. 270

Equally significant was Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan conflict since the
Soviet invasion. Afghan rebels were given access into Pakistani bases for sanctuary and
logistical support. The lSI of Pakistan was the only party responsible for the transport of
arms and nearly 40 percent of arms were diverted from reaching the mujahideen and.
made their way into Pakistan. Small arms were openly sold in the local bazaars often
with the complicity of the guerillas and their leaders.271 The proliferation of arms
contributed in no mean measure to militarization of Pakistani society. In varying degree
all this led to Pakistan's engagement in external misadventures. The acceptability of jihad
was reflected in the limited resistance to Pakistan's external engagement in Afghanistan
transforming the local resistance against Soviets into a global Islamist campaign.

The role of civil society was negligent and its effectiveness waned due to Zia's
authoritarian policies and Islamisation programme. Hence, there was limited space for the

"Pakistan, Madrasas, Extremism and Military", International Crisis Group, July 29, 2002 at
268
www.crisisweb.orgllibrary/documentslreport-archive/A400717-29072002. pdf.
269India's expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP is 4.1 %, Bangladesh 2.5 and Pakistan is 1.8%.
See, "Table 3", Human Development in South Asia 2003, (Islamabad: The Mahbub ul-Haq Human
Development Centre, 2003).
270 The junta regime stirred the debate that Muslims of the subcontinent were a separate nation and
reiterated the old Pakistani position that Kashmir is.an unfinished work of Partition and they have a cllJ.im
over it. Backing their stance in action they sponsored cross-border terrorism and Jehadi groups to bleed
India in the long run. See K. Shankar Bajpai, "Untangling India and Pakistan", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82,
No.3 (May/June 2003), pp. 191-122.
Marvin G. Weinbaun, "War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role", The Middle East Journal,
271
Vol. 15, No.1 (Winter 1991), p. 74.

110
autonomous associations to grow and articulate against the arbitrariness of the state.
Given the strong nexus between the military and the landed elite, state elite could afford
to ignore the need for land reforms, independent judiciary empowerment, free press and
issues like legitimacy. As an analyst has aptly observed, "The landed elite, who have
benefited from a politics of patronage and corresponding oligarchic polity, have
consolidated their position and successfully transformed themselves into a trans-regional
power group. The state, in alliance with the feudalists has evaded the urgency of an
honorific social contract with civil society, and damaged itself to the extent that an
autonomous, invisible government run by intelligence agencies has unleashed its own
forces of blackmail, harassment and torture.'.272

In addition to the growth of private armies, the 1980s saw the mushrooming of
extreme right-wing militant organisations in Pakistan. Some of them were Harkat-ul-
Jihad~i-Islami and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and those groups involved in Afghan jehad.
The year 1993 saw the merger of these groups to form Harkat-ul-Ansar for carrying out
subversive activities in Kashmir?73 The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen linked to the Deoband
School of Islam was ideologically to the product of Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-ulema-i-
Islam. These jihadis were drawn from almost all strata of society. What was new about
them was that many came from non-weapon bearing areas as opposed to martial areas
which indicated greater militarisation.274 In sum, Zia's Ishimisation created a new base
for political consensus with limited opposition, supportive of Pakistan's external mission
as well as its internal policies.

H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity, (St.
272 -Iftikhar
Anthony's College, Oxford, 1997), p. 10.
273 Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism, TI. 256, p. 202.
274 Ibid., p. 202-203.

111