European Management Journal (2012) 30, 74– 81

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/emj

Improving referral management by quantifying

market mavensÕ word of mouth value
a,* b
Gianfranco Walsh , Ralf Elsner

a
Institute for Management, University of Koblenz-Landau, Universitätsstrasse 1, 56070 Koblenz, Germany
b
RHENANIA BuchVersand GmbH & Co. KG, 56061 Koblenz, Germany

KEYWORDS Summary Market mavens reportedly play important roles in the purchase decisions of
Customer lifetime value; other consumers, but this assumption has never been tested empirically. Prior research
Market maven; has profiled mavens and explored their motivations, without ever considering actual refer-
Word-of-mouth; ral behaviour. This investigation applies equity theory to the question of referral behav-
Referral behaviour iour; it also represents the first empirical research into the referral value and customer
lifetime value of market mavens. A large-scale survey of 2700 customers enables the
authors to identify mavens and non-mavens and determine how they differ in terms of
their referral value. The results indicate that market mavens, compared with non-mavens,
engage in stronger referral behaviour that leads to more new customers and revenue for
the firm. Theoretically the findings offer a better understanding of referral behaviour;
managerially, they can help firms amplify their new customer acquisition efforts by indi-
cating which customer groups they should target with referral reward programs.
ª 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Service firms that hope to capitalize on the lifetime
value of customers must manage the sales potential of
customer referrals proactively (Biyalogorsky, Gerstner, &
Libai, 2001). Leveraging the value of customers therefore
represents a primary organizational goal and has prompted
many firms to attempt referral and reward programs
(Bayón, Gutsche, & Bauer, 2002; Kumar, Petersen, & Leone,
2007; Ryu & Feick, 2007). Research into customer
referral behaviour suggests that stimulating such referral
* Corresponding author. Current address: Friedrich Schiller Uni-
versity Jena, Carl-Zeiss-Strasse 3, 07743 Jena, Germany. Tel.: +49
(0) 3641 943110; fax: ++49 (0) 3641 9 43112.
E-mail address: walsh@uni-koblenz.de (G. Walsh).
behaviour encourages new customer acquisition (Ryu &
Feick, 2007; Trusov, Bucklin, & Pauwels, 2009; Villanueva,
Yoo, & Hanssens, 2008). For example, von Wangenheim
and Bayón (2007) demonstrate that word-of-mouth (WOM)
referral affects new customer acquisition and the customer
lifetime value (CLV) of the customer who grants the refer-
ral. Similarly, Kumar et al. (2007) note that the most valu-
able customers are not always those who buy most but
rather those whose WOM attracts the most profitable new
customers. Trusov et al. (2009) also show that WOM refer-
rals are more effective than traditional forms of marketing
for new customer acquisition, with elasticity 20–30 times
greater than that for traditional marketing. Such research
confirms the relevance of customer referral value (e.g.,

0263-2373/$ - see front matter ª 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.emj.2011.04.002
Improving referral management by quantifying market mavensÕ word of mouth value
Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006; Godes & Mayzlin, 2009; Helm,
2003).
Yet previous studies have not included empirical re-
search that focuses on consumers who have general product
knowledge that they disseminate and who appear to influ-
ence othersÕ purchase decisions, that is, market mavens
(Feick & Price, 1987). Feick and Price (1987, p. 85) define
market mavens as ‘‘individuals who have information about
many kinds of products, places to shop, and other facets of
markets, and initiate discussions with consumers and re-
spond to requests from consumers for market information.’’
Market mavens provide market information and knowledge
to others, as well as glean additional information from oth-
ers. Despite the widespread belief that market mavens are
effective marketing information disseminators though, their
referral power (i.e., measured as the number of referrals
during a specific period) and lifetime value have not been
measured. This surprising oversight suggests the strong need
for additional research to understand which customers are
most effective in terms of acquiring other new customers
and generating additional sales. Such research would help
firms allocate their marketing resources from less effective
to presumably more effective customer referral groups. Von
Wangenheim and Bayón (2007) even call specifically for re-
search into the referral behaviour of market mavens.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to
investigate empirically the referral value and CLV of market
mavens. Our findings contribute to a better understanding
of the effectiveness of their referral behaviour. Beyond
being theoretically interesting, this study is relevant from
a managerial perspective, in that it provides insights into
an important customer group that can amplify firmsÕ new
customer acquisition efforts, as well as guidance for manag-
ers regarding how to allocate rewards in effective referral
reward programs. By addressing a notable limitation of cur-
rent referral programs—namely, that they are often directed
indiscriminately at all customers (Kumar et al., 2007)—our
findings can help companies design more focused referral
programs as part of their wider WOM strategy.
Literature review and hypotheses
Word-of-mouth communication can have a substantial influ-
ence on product choice (e.g., von Wangenheim & Bayón,
2007). Therefore marketers try to exploit consumers who
might influence others and build communication channels
with interpersonal communicators, such as opinion leaders
and market mavens, to reach and influence a wider market
(Godes & Mayzlin, 2009). Although both opinion leaders and
market mavens can be effective information disseminators,
market mavens seem more effective, because they have
more comprehensive, overall, market-related knowledge
and appear willing to disseminate broad information that
may not be product specific (Feick & Price, 1987; Wied-
mann, Walsh, & Mitchell, 2001). An opinion leader instead
is an expert within a specific product category who spreads
information only about that category (Stokburger-Sauer &
Hoyer, 2009). Moreover, mavens acquire and pass on infor-
mation about products, whether or not they buy those prod-
ucts. Wiedmann et al. (2001) argue opinion leaders tend to
be most knowledgeable about, and thus most effective for,
75
new product introductions, whereas market mavens are
more useful throughout a productÕs lifecycle, because their
interest is not limited to new products. Broadly speaking,
opinion leaders are more motivated by egoistic but mavens
by altruistic considerations (Walsh, Gwinner, & Swanson,
2004; Walsh & Mitchell, 2010). In particular, Walsh et al.
(2004) demonstrate that motives other than personal utility
maximization drive the behaviour of market mavens.
The existence of such general marketplace influencers
and their ability to aid in product and message diffusion
has prompted various studies to investigate market mavens
in different product contexts (Belch, Krentler, & Willis-Flur-
ry, 2005), and across countries, including Hungary (Coulter,
Feick, & Price, 2002), Israel (Ruvio & Shoham, 2007), and
South Korea (Chelminski & Coulter, 2007). Thus, the notion
of a general marketplace influencer who possesses knowl-
edge in several areas appears robust and applicable across
different marketing channels.
Yet research on market mavens remains limited in at least
two respects. First, despite considerable work to identify
mavensÕ demographic and psychographic characteristics
and determine their motivation to pass on product-related
information (e.g., Price, Feick, & Higie, 1987; Walsh et al.,
2004), surprisingly little research deals with actual referral
behaviour. Several previous studies postulate that mavens
make referrals that lead to new business for the firm (e.g.,
Dawar, Parker, & Price, 1996; Walsh et al., 2004), but none
has examined the validity of this assumption empirically.
However, to quantify the returns on the WOM value of market
mavens, their actual referral behaviour, rather than inten-
tions, should be analyzed, because stated intentions often
provide only weak predictors of behaviour (Morwitz, 1997).
Second, we know little about the specific value of ma-
vens compared with non-mavens. Extant research tends to
frame mavens according to their active and passive commu-
nication behaviour and influence on peers. We argue that
mavens are important end customers in their own right
too, because they draw on their own consumption experi-
ence when advising peers, which suggests they may pur-
chase the products and services they discuss (Wiedmann
et al., 2001). That is, early research featured the assump-
tion that mavens engaged in WOM about products they hear
or read about, but more recent research has shown that
they like talking about products they buy and own (e.g.,
Coulter et al., 2002; Walsh & Mitchell, 2010). Therefore,
we predict mavens are important not only as WOM agents
but also as a potential customer target group.
To develop a theoretical explanation of market mavensÕ
more effective referral behaviour, we turn to equity theory
(Adams 1963, 1965; Oliver & Swan, 1989), from the field of
individual psychology, which suggests that people desire
equitable and fair exchanges. Equity has been applied to
dyadic exchanges but also functions in relationships in which
one member of the dyad (i.e., the market maven) interacts
with a person outside the dyad in a way that benefits the
other dyad member (i.e., the firm). In this extended dyadic
relationship, the market maven receives valuable resources
from the firm (e.g., product-related information, ‘‘good’’
products) and, in an attempt to reciprocate, engages in vol-
untary and discretionary behaviours such as recommending
its offerings to others (Bettencourt, 1997; Groth, 2005). In
so doing, the mavens equalize the input-to-output ratio be-
76
tween them and the firm, while also satisfying key motiva-
tions for passing on information to others, namely, their
sense of obligation to share information and their desire to
help others. To non-mavens, such obligations are far less rel-
evant, as evidenced by previous research on motivations to
engage in WOM behaviour (Walsh et al., 2004). The assump-
tion that mavens make more referrals than non-mavens is
also consistent with the fundamental tenet of the market
maven concept, which stipulates that mavens receive and
give more referrals than other customers (Feick & Price,
1987). Therefore, we capture market mavensÕ greater pro-
clivity to engage in WOM with the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Market mavens make more referrals than do
non-mavens.
It also has been well established that market mavens
have an information provision tendency. They collate infor-
mation from different sources and pass it on, but they also
talk about the products they buy for themselves (Belch
et al., 2005; Coulter et al., 2002; Feick & Price, 1987). Be-
cause mavens rely on their own consumption experience as
much as on other information sources when providing infor-
mation to others (Wiedmann et al., 2001), they are more
likely than non-mavens to buy the service they recommend.
This greater buying propensity is particularly likely among
mavens who already are in a relationship with the service
firm. Customer equity theory suggests that customersÕ per-
ceptions of the quality and strength of their relationship
with the firm and their evaluations of the firmÕs offerings
shape their behaviour (e.g., Garbarino & Johnson, 1999).
Thus, we predict:
Hypothesis 2. Market mavens account for more sales (i.e.,
buy more from a particular firm) than do non-mavens.
As these first two hypotheses indicate, we anticipate and
attempt to show that mavens are more valuable than non-ma-
vens. In addition, because mavens seek, possess, and dissem-
inate information actively (Feick & Price, 1987), they not only
give more referrals than non-mavens to other prospective
consumers, but they also boost buying interest among pro-
spective consumers. Such active and passive communication
behaviour should be reflected in mavensÕ higher lifetime va-
lue, compared with non-mavens. For this study, we concep-
tualize CLV as a customerÕs spending and referral activities
during a designated period, which includes the sales or reve-
nues resulting from referral activities by existing customers.
Accordingly, mavensÕ greater referral activities should in-
crease their CLV, relative to non-mavensÕ CLV. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3. Market mavensÕ customer lifetime value is
greater than that of non-mavens.
Methodology
Sample
We obtained data from a questionnaire administered by
e-mail, which is becoming a well-established data collection
G. Walsh, R. Elsner
method (Evans & Mathur, 2005). The sample came from the
database of a large German mail order firm that specializes
in books and music CDs. This context is appropriate, be-
cause market mavens often use non-store retailers and are
responsive to direct mail (Schneider & Rodgers, 1993). The
mail order firm uses rewards to instigate referral behaviour
(e.g., free books) and tracks referrals through unique cus-
tomer identifiers; rewards provide an established means to
increase referral likelihood (Ryu & Feick, 2007). From the
database, 36,571 randomly selected customer e-mail ad-
dresses received the survey instrument. A total of 2718 cus-
tomers completed the survey, for a response rate of 7.4%.
The unique customer identifiers made it possible to deter-
mine how many referrals each of the 2718 customers made,
as well as identify migratory customers and ensure they
were not counted as new customers when they returned,
after switching to a competitor (Rust, Lemon, & Zeithaml,
2004). The sample included more men (74%) than women
(26%). Their ages ranged from 17 to 90 years (mean = 55.6,
SD = 13.5), and respondents had long average relationships
with the company, of 6.2 years (16.1% lasted 10 years or
more).
We undertook several efforts to reduce and assess non-
response bias. First, the questionnaire was relatively short.
Second, we employed the procedure recommended by
Armstrong and Overton (1977), who propose an extrapola-
tion method and a comparison of early and late survey
respondents. We distinguished respondents who took the
survey in the first two days and those that took it in the
last two days of the week; of the late respondents, we
identified 151 market mavens. We conducted a mean com-
parison of the early and late responding mavens with re-
gard to both the maven scale and the number of
referrals. The comparison of the item means and standard
deviations showed largely consistent response patterns
across early and late respondents (Mearly = 2.85; Mlate =
2.87). Non-response bias therefore did not appear to be
present in the data.
Measures and identification of market mavens
We used a translated German version of the original six-item
market maven scale (Feick & Price, 1987) (see the Appen-
dix). The scale measures a personÕs self-perceived tendency
to be a general provider of many types of market informa-
tion to others on an informal basis. This scale has good reli-
ability (alpha = .89).
Using trichotomization, we categorized the respondents
as low, medium, or high on the market maven scale, consis-
tent with several previous studies (e.g., Feick & Price, 1987;
Walsh et al., 2004). The high maven group consisted of 763
respondents (nmedium = 850; nlow = 1105). To identify market
mavens, we divided the whole sample as closely as possible
into thirds, though the distribution of scores (skew-
ness = .14) meant the three groups were not exactly equal
in size. We defined respondents as market mavens if they
scored in the top third on the maven scale and as non-ma-
vens if they were in the lowest third. Consistent with previ-
ous studies (Feick & Price, 1987; Walsh et al., 2004), those
in the middle third did not appear in our subsequent
analyses.
Improving referral management by quantifying market mavensÕ word of mouth value 77

Table 1 Referrals.
P
Group Average relationship tenurea (years) Recommenders Referrals Referral rate Pref (%)
res

Overall sample (n = 2718) 4.3 22 62 2.3

Non-mavens (n = 1105) 5.4 8 14 1.3

Mavens (n = 763) 3.9 9 43 5.6

a
The tenure values pertain to non-mavens and mavens for whom complete referral data were available; the relationship tenures of all
non-mavens and mavens were 8.1 years and 7.4 years, respectively.

Table 2 Non-mavens versus mavens, customer lifetime value comparison.

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Non-mavens (n = 736)a

Revenue
Annual referral rate 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Referred customers 3 5 6 7 8
Referred customers yearly sale € 24.20 € 40.42 € 53.72 € 64.63 € 73.57

Retention rate 82% 82% 82% 82% 82%

Active non-mavens 736 604 495 406 333
Non-mavensÕ revenue € 154,013.21 € 126,290.83 € 103,558.48 € 84,917.96 € 69,632.72
Total revenue € 154,037.41 € 126,331.25 € 103,612.21 € 84,982.59 € 69,706.30

Costs
Total costs € 120,149.18 € 98,538.38 € 80,817.52 € 66,286.42 € 54,370.91

Profit
Gross profit € 33,888.23 € 27,792.88 € 22,794.69 € 18,696.17 € 15,335.39
Discount rate 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.16 1.22
NPV profit € 33,888.23 € 26,469.41 € 20,675.45 € 16,150.45 € 12,616.46
Cumulative NPV profit € 33,888.23 € 60,357.64 € 81,033.09 € 97,183.54 € 109,800.00

Lifetime value € 30.86 € 54.97 € 73.80 € 88.51 € 100.00

a
Mavens (n = 504)

Revenue
Annual referral rate 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5%
Referred customers 11 20 26 31 36
Referred customers yearly sale € 288.92 € 495.73 € 662.63 € 797.31 € 906.00

Retention rate 81% 81% 81% 81% 81%

Active mavens 544 441 357 289 234
MavensÕ revenue € 124,925.85 € 100,815.16 € 81,357.83 € 65,655.77 € 52,984.21
Total revenue € 125,214.77 € 101,310.89 € 82,020.46 € 66,453.08 € 53,890.21

Costs
Total costs € 97,667.52 € 79,022.50 € 63,975.96 € 51,833.41 € 42,034.36

Profit
Gross profit € 27,547.25 € 22,288.40 € 18,044.50 € 14,619.68 € 11,855.85
Discount rate 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.16 1.22
NPV profit € 27,547.25 € 21,227.04 € 16,366.89 € 12,629.03 € 9753.83
Cumulative NPV profit € 27,547.25 € 48,774.29 € 65,141.19 € 77,770.22 € 87,524.05

Lifetime value € 36.44 € 64.52 € 86.17 € 102.87 € 115.77

Notes: For confidentiality, revenues and costs are transformed. The non-maven lifetime value is € 100.00. Costs include all directly
attributable costs for advertising, order processing, merchandise, and order fulfilment. NPV = Net present value.
a
In year 1, 736 non-mavens and 544 mavens were considered, because we included only customers for whom data were available for the
considered period. In year 2 and thereafter, the numbers of non-mavens and mavens diminish because of their respective retention rates
of 82% and 81%; for example, 736 non-mavens in year 1 · 82% = 604 non-mavens in year 2.
78
Results
To compare mavens and non-mavens in relation to their
referral behaviour, we calculated a key metric, the referral
rate, for each respondent group. To calculate the referral
rate, we used.
P 5%, the maven CLV lies approximately 15.8% above the corre-
Pref ð1Þ
res
where ref represents the number of referrals (per customer
group), and res represents the number of respondents.
Of the 2718 respondents, 22 provided a total of 62 refer-
rals in the past, resulting in a referral rate of 2.3%. Of those
22 respondents, 9 were mavens and 8 were non-mavens.
The 8 mavens offered 43 referrals, compared with just 14
referrals by the 9 non-mavens (5 referrals came from the ex-
cluded middle maven group). Thus, the mavens exhibited a
total referral rate of 5.6%, compared with non-mavensÕ 1.3%
(see Table 1); they were more than four times as likely to
make referrals. Considering the time interval in which we
observed these recommendations, the annual referral rate
of mavens (1.5%) was more than seven times higher than
that of non-mavens (.2%).1 Taken together, these results
provide strong support of H1.
Although not formally hypothesised, we also found a
longer relationship tenure among non-mavens than mavens
(8.1 vs. 7.4 years). We did not ask respondents in our sample
directly about their relationship intentions, but we might
speculate that mavensÕ shorter relationship tenure relates
to their variety-seeking tendency. Previous research has re-
ported that market mavens (especially women) are variety
seekers (Wiedmann et al., 2001), and Stokburger-Sauer
and Hoyer (2009) assert that mavenism is driven by consum-
ersÕ variety seeking. Variety seekers tend to switch brands
and retailers, even if their current brands and retailers sat-
isfy their needs (Fishbach, Ratner, & Zhang, 2011; McAlister
& Pessemier, 1982). They also may switch brands and retail-
ers because they hope to experience better alternatives or
increase their stimulation by bringing something new into
their lives. Experiencing new brands and retailers gives mar-
ket mavens more to talk about with their peers, which
would be consistent with the general definition of market
mavens.
For the test of H2, we compared the year 1 revenues
of non-mavens (€ 154,013.21) and mavens (€ 124,925.85).
The mean revenue of non-mavens equalled € 209.25
(154,013.21/7362), compared with € 229.63 for mavens
(124,925.85/544) (Table 2). The mean difference is signifi-
cant at p < .05, in support of H2. This mean difference holds
for the subsequent four years as well.
To test H3, we considered the mail order companyÕs antic-
ipated cash flows from specific respondents (Table 2). We
1
For maven recommenders, we had complete referral data for
3.9 years; for non-maven recommenders, we had them for 5.4
years. The annual referral rate, which we used to calculate the CLV
(see Table 2), was as follows for mavens: 43 referrals/763 mavens/
3.9 years = 1.5%; and for non-mavens: 14 referrals/1105 non-
mavens/5.4 years = 0.2%.
2
For this analysis we included 736 non-mavens and 544 mavens in
year 1 (instead of 1105 non-mavens and 763 mavens), because we
included only customers for whom data were available for the
considered period (Table 2).
G. Walsh, R. Elsner
calculated CLV, at the individual level, as the sum of accumu-
lated cash flows, for which we also considered each respon-
dentÕs referral intensity (i.e., annual referral rate, number
of referred customers, and yearly revenues of referred cus-
tomers) (von Wangenheim & Bayón, 2007). Over a five-year
planning horizon, with an assumed annual interest rate of
sponding non-maven value. Consequently, we confirm H3.
Furthermore, non-mavens and mavens have about the
same customer retention rate (82% and 81%, respectively;
see Table 2), which suggests that mavens are just as likely
as non-mavens to become inactive customers. This result
is interesting, considering mavensÕ shorter relationship ten-
ure (7.4 years) compared with non-mavensÕ (8.1 years). The
similar retention rate, combined with a shorter relationship
tenure, seems to suggests that the mavens in the sample on
average are in an earlier stage of their relationship with the
mail order firm.
We also compared non-mavensÕ and mavensÕ cancellation,
inquiry, and complaint behaviours. Their cancellation rates
were the same—38% (i.e., 418 of 1108 non-mavens, and 287
of 763 mavens). Although the ratios of inquiries directed at
the mail order firm differed slightly (0.97 for non-mavens,
1.11 for mavens), this difference was not significant. Finally,
the complaint ratios of non-mavens and mavens were
comparable (0.25 and 0.21, respectively), again with an
insignificant difference. Although we thus found no key
differences on these three variables, mavens appeared to
engage in referral behaviour on behalf of the firm, even de-
spite their cancellation rate of close to 40% and complaint
rate of more than 20%. This discrepancy suggests that ma-
vensÕ motivation to share and pass on information is stronger
than any issues they may have with the service provider.
Discussion and implications
Although the market maven concept rests at the centre of
much management and marketing research and practice,
we still know little about the referral and monetary value
of this important customer group. To address this void, we
have examined the WOM referral power of market mavens.
As an important theoretical contribution, this research pro-
vides clarity regarding the referral power of market mavens.
Beyond examining this core element of referral behaviour,
we consider the revenues and CLV of market mavens and
non-mavens. Our study demonstrates that market mavens
offer more referrals than non-mavens and achieve a consid-
erably higher conversion rate. Also, mavens buy more, and
the average order value and cash contributions of new cus-
tomers acquired through the referrals of market mavens are
higher than the cash contributions of new customers ac-
quired through non-mavens (Table 2). This finding is consis-
tent with recent research; for example, Schmitt, Skiera,
and van den Bulte (2011) demonstrate that customers ac-
quired through referral programs are more valuable than
other customers. Our research thus builds on and extends
research that has examined market mavens in terms of their
demographics, psychographics, innovativeness, and use of
information (e.g., Coulter, Price, Feick, & Micu, 2005;
Goldsmith, Clark, & Goldsmith, 2006; Ruvio & Shoham,
2007; Slama, Nataraajan, & Williams, 1992; Slama & Wil-
liams, 1990).
Improving referral management by quantifying market mavensÕ word of mouth value
Such extensions are particularly pertinent considering
the increasing importance of customer referral programs.
Many companies use these programs as a cost-effective
means to acquire new customers. Our results indicate how-
ever that marketers need to take a more focused approach
to managing their referral programs. Specifically, instead of
targeting all existing customers, firms should direct their
referral programs at those customers with the greatest
referral power, namely, market mavens. Obviously, conven-
tional management wisdom holds that investment decisions
should yield a benefit; the monetary benefits of an invest-
ment in a referral program targeted at mavens is likely to
outweigh the costs of investment. In other words, a focused
approach makes sense only if the firm is confident it can
reach a sufficient number of market mavens through its
referral program. Otherwise, the firm might keep using a
traditional referral program that includes all customers
indiscriminately. However, quantifying the WOM power of
market mavens can increase both the effectiveness of refer-
ral programs and the return on new customer acquisition
investments. It also can provide marketers with insights into
ways to build more effective referral programs.
This study offers several theoretical contributions. Show-
ing that mavens make more, and more valuable, referrals is
meaningful, because researchers thus far have focused
mostly on profiling and identifying market mavens in differ-
ent consumption contexts. No research, to the best of our
knowledge, has linked market mavens empirically to rele-
vant monetary variables. In accordance with the tenets of
equity theory, we find that mavens exhibit more discretion-
ary behaviour in their referrals than do non-mavens. The
referral rates of mavens (5.6%) and non-mavens (1.3%) that
we identify are on par with the mean referral rate of 1.3%
reported elsewhere (Shi and Wojnicki, 2007). The notion
of giving back to the company, in a way equal to the value
gained from the company, also is consistent with research
by Hennig-Thurau, Gwinner, Walsh, and Gremler (2004),
who identify several motivations for consumers to engage
in WOM, including their felt need to reward the company
for a good product or service. Moreover, our results provide
clear evidence of the greater value of mavens, at least in a
mail order context. Further research should consider other
contexts and try to use larger customer samples. Of the
2718 customers surveyed for this research, only 17 (n = 8
non-mavens, n = 9 mavens) who made referrals appeared
in our subsequent analyses and hypotheses testing, which
represents a study limitation. There may be different rea-
sons for these relatively low recommender and referral
numbers; for example, perhaps not all customers of the
mail order firm respond well to referral incentives.
Research indicates that some customers never respond
to either non-monetary and monetary incentives. In Hen-
nig-Thurau et al.Õs (2004) typology of the motives of con-
sumer (online) WOM, they show that consumersÕ desire for
social interaction and economic incentives, concern for
other consumers, and the potential to enhance their own
self-worth are the primary drivers of WOM behaviour. Their
findings indicate that consumers engage in WOM even in the
absence of monetary incentives. The mail order firm with
which we collaborated might have such recommenders
among its customers, but people who make non-incentivised
referrals do not show up in our data. Also, a considerably
79
larger number of customers (more than n = 62) might have
received and acted on a recommendation but not notified
the mail order firm, in which case those recommenders
would not appear in our data either.
We have focused solely on referral givers, not recipients.
Although we can determine whether a person has received a
referral and how much he or she spent, we know little about
the reasons he or she becomes a customer. Godes and
Mayzlin (2009) report that opinion leaders are effective
spreaders of WOM among loyal customers, but their effec-
tiveness diminishes for less loyal customers. Perhaps a sim-
ilarly differential effect emerges for mavensÕ referrals, a
possibility that might be investigated in additional studies.
Nor have we investigated customersÕ reasons for engag-
ing in referral behaviour. To encourage mavens to share
general marketplace or product information with other con-
sumers, firms must understand what motivates a maven to
engage in WOM behaviours. Although some research exists
on these motivations (e.g., Stokburger-Sauer & Hoyer,
2009; Walsh et al., 2004), no studies investigate them in
relation to actual referral behaviour and CLV, which repre-
sents a potentially fruitful area for further research. Re-
search that considers drivers of mavensÕ referral behaviour
could thus extend the findings of our study, perhaps by iden-
tifying different motivations associated with different levels
of mavensÕ referral power and CLV.
Further research also could investigate changes in refer-
ral behaviour over time. In a recent study, Garnefeld, Helm,
and Eggert (2011) show that WOM communication can have
consequences for the sender, especially in relation to her or
his attitudinal and behavioural loyalty. It thus would be
insightful to learn about mavensÕ referral behaviour and
CLV over time.
Our data came only from Germany, so the results may be
generalizable only to countries with similar culture and/or
retailing infrastructure. Additional studies should investi-
gate mavensÕ referral behaviour and CLV in other countries,
considering that the nature of interpersonal communication
can vary enormously by country. For example, Schumann
et al. (2010) study cross-cultural differences in the effec-
tiveness of WOM in 11 countries and find that received
WOM has a positive effect on customer service quality per-
ceptions. Moreover, they report that received WOM has a
stronger effect on the evaluation of customers in high
uncertainty avoidance countries than in those with low
uncertainty avoidance scores.
For managers, harnessing the referral behaviour of ma-
vens is advantageous, from the standpoint of effective
referral programs. Many firms consider referrals a key ele-
ment in their wider customer relationship management
strategy (Buttle, 2009). An important tenet of relationship
management is that firms should build long-term relation-
ships with valuable customers (e.g., Payne & Holt, 2001).
Our findings show that customer value derives from both
customer spending and referral behaviour. Moreover, our
findings align with Kumar et al. (2007), which show that
the most valuable customers are those who bring in new
business through WOM, not necessarily those who spend
the most. Companies should grant incentives to existing
customers who provide evidence that they have helped
recruit a new customer. Furthermore, we show that market
mavens have greater lifetime values than non-mavens.
80
Considering the power of consumer-to-consumer product
recommendations, firms should value those mavens who ex-
hibit positive attitudes toward the firm and its products and
also engage in product-specific communication. Finally,
with a greater understanding of mavensÕ referral power,
marketers can develop targeted referral programs. To fur-
ther increase the effectiveness of these programs, firms
might match the incentive with customersÕ expectations;
Kornish and Li (2010) recommend for example that firms ad-
just rewards to the sensitivity of the product category being
recommended, such that more sensitive categories require
higher rewards. Our study offers a means to clarify the
referral power of market mavens and their CLV in terms
of new business and thus another context for matching re-
wards appropriately.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Christine Albrecht and Andreas Nickenig
for their help organizing the data set used in this research
and Florian von Wangenheim for his insightful comments.
They also thank the anonymous EMJ reviewers for their con-
structive comments.
Appendix A. Appendix
Market maven scale.
Item Factor loading
AVE = .64
CR = .93
a = .89
I like introducing new brands and .82
products to my friends
I like helping people by providing .84
them with information about many
kinds of products
My friends think of me as a good .88
source of information when it comes
to new products or sales
People ask me for information about .83
products, places to shop, or sales
If someone asked me where to get the .76
best buy on several types of products,
I could tell him/her where to shop
Think about a person who has .66
information about a variety of
products and likes to share this
information with others. This person
knows about new products, sales,
stores, and so on, but does not
necessarily feel that he or she is an
expert on one particular product.
How well would you say that this
description fits you?
Notes: Five-point scale, 1 = ‘‘very true,’’ 5 = ‘‘very untrue.’’
AVE = average variance extracted; CR = composite reliability;
a = CronbachÕs alpha.
G. Walsh, R. Elsner
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