VII.

Political Party; Party-List Organization

1. Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC GR 136781
 Whether or not 20% allocation for party list representatives in section 5 (2) article 6 of the consti is
mandatory or merely a ceiling. Must it be filled up completely all the time
o 20% Allocation is a CEILING, Not Mandatory, the mechanics by which it is to be filled up
has been left to the congress
o RA 7941 congress declared therein a policy to promote “proportional representation” in
the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit
them.
Necessary for them to obtain ATLEAST 2% of the total votes cast in order to be entitled to a party-
list SEAT
 Those garnering more than this could have ADDITIONAL SEATS in proportion to
their total number of votes
 NO MORE THAN 3 SEATS

2. Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC GR 147589 (2001)

 POLITICAL PARTIES May PARTICIPATE in Party-List Elections
 Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
o Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may
be registered under the party-list system.
o Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-
list system.
 We quote the pertinent provision below: For purposes of the May 1998 elections,
the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
o Not any political parties may participate. Must represent:
 1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties; and
 2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
 3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole.
o Not enough that they represent the marginalized and underrepresented
 Must ACTUALLY and TRULY REPRESENT the marginalized
o While it is not Exclusive. it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can
be represented under the party-list system.
 the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by
the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”

3. Baranggay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC GR

179271 (1995)
 Those receiving more than 2% shall be entitled to additional seats IN PROPORTION to their total
number of votes
o 3 seat Cap
 in computing for the additional seat, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they
have already been allocated to every two percenter
o Those garnering more than 2 percent of votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes” is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 2 percent threshold ONLY IN RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF
ADDITIONAL SEATS
 The court Voted 8-7 continue the ruling in VETERANS, disallowing political partied from
participating in the party-list directly or indirectly

4. Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC GR 203766

  ABANDONING Ang bagong bayani and BANAT ruling
 3 GROUPS may participate
o (1) national parties or organizations,
o (2) regional parties or organizations, and
o (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
 They don’t need to organize along sectoral lines and DON’T need to represent
any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
 Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking
in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector
 A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector
they represent.
 must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors.
 The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
 Parties shall not be disqualified if there is Atleast 1 qualified member.
 Political parties CAN PARTICIPATE in party list system, PROVIDED that they do so through
their BONA FIDE SECTORAL WING
o Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list
elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to
the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political
constituencies
o The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into
the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic
and multiparty.
 The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties.
 not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented,
and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.

5. Palparan v. HRET GR 189506

o Petitioner contended that (even though he won already a seat in HOR) that his qualification is only
an internal issue in the party, and not within the ambit of HRET
 HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives
 party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications
 district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House
of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins

VIII. Automated Elections

1. Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, 10 September 2009
 PCOS Comelec under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code for that matter relates to the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relating to the conduct of elections to
public office to ensure a free, orderly and honest electoral exercise
 The worst case scenario of course would be the wholesale breakdown of the 82,000 PCOS
machines. Nonetheless, even in this most extreme case, failure of all the machines would not
necessarily translate into failure of elections
 The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of
government. It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means
and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was created to
promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections
 Separate opinion CJ Puno in Roque v. COMELEC
 COMELEC DETERMINATION as to minimum systems capabities of PCOS must be respected.
 This Court is neither constitutionally permitted nor institutionally outfitted to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of the system or of the nuances of the available technology. It is ill-equipped to deal with the
complex and difficult problems of election administration. This inordinately difficult undertaking
requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the
province of the legislative and the executive branches of government.

2. Capalla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201112, 13 June 2012

Controversy regarding the extension of the contract of the Automated election system
 COMELEC:
o (1) Article 6.6 of the AES contract which states the option period was amended by the
extension agreement;
o (2) the exercise of the OTP is not covered by RA 9184, because it is merely an
implementation of a previously bidded contract;
o (3) taking into account the funds available for the purpose, exercising the OTP was the
prudent choice for the Comelec and is more advantageous to the government; and
o (4) the exercise of the OTP is consistent with the technical requirements of RA 9369.
 Can Smartmatic-TIM unilaterally extend the option period? Can the Comelec accept the
extension?
o We answer in the affirmative.
o reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the Parties are
given the right to amend the contract which may include the period within which to
exercise the option.
o No prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that the contract is still
effective.
o Public bidding is not required here (even though AES is not an ordinary contract)
 1) the offer to the public; (2) an opportunity for competition; and (3) a basis
for the exact comparison of bids.

i. Smartmatic not granted additional right that was not previously available to the other
bidders
ii. Amendment was not substantial
 The contract amount not only included that for the contract of lease but also for the
OTP. Hence, the competitive public bidding conducted for the AES contract was
sufficient. A new public bidding would be a superfluity.
 An option is only a preparatory contract and a continuing offer to enter into a
principal contract. Under the set-up, the owner of the property, which is Smartmatic-
TIM, gives the optionee, which is the Comelec, the right to accept the formers offer to
purchase the goods listed in the contract for a specified amount, and within a specified
period.

o It was more advantageous for COMELEC to agree with the extension because 7 billion
previously paid as rents would just be expenses, in the chose made, it is now made part
of the purchase price of the goods.

IX. Recall
1. Garcia v. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 100
o Enrique Garcia was elected governor of bataan. Other officials met and had a
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY to initiate the recall election of Garcia.
o Section 70 of RA 7160 as unconstitutional?
o
o Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term
of office.
o The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their
sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is
implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be
indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs.
o Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the
people in a representative democracy.
 o The Constitution DID NOT PROVIDE FOR ANY MODE, let alone a single mode, of
initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of
initiating recall elections
o section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly
given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment
dictates.

o all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and

component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the
provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties.

o Secondly; the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level includes all the elected
officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater probability is
that no political party can control its majority

o Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected
public official is loss of confidence of the people

o If the petition would succeed, the result will be a return to the previous system of recall
elections which Congress found should be improved. The alternative mode of initiating
recall proceedings thru a preparatory recall assembly is, however, an innovative attempt
by Congress to remove impediments to the effective exercise by the people of their
sovereign power to check the performance of their elected officials.

o 2 reasons

o to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people
o to cut down on its expenses

o INITIATION BY THE PRAC: is initiation by the people, made indirectly by the

representatives

2. Claudio v. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 388

o Recall REFERS TO THE RECALL ELECTION ITSELF and not the preliminary proceedings to
initiate recall
o begins with the convening of the preparatory recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at
least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit,
o and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC,
o the verification of such resolution or petition,
o the fixing of the date of the recall election,
o holding of the election on the scheduled date

o 2nd reason why the term "recall" in paragraph

o (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation itself.
o There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls:
 (1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of
office of the official concerned,
 (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular
local election.
o 3RD reason to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for
the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly
restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members.
o wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election.
 they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.

o within 1 year, DOESN’T INCLUDE ELECTION PERIOD

3. Goh v. Bayron, G.R. No. 212584, [November 25, 2014])

 o The recall against Bayron was suspended because it doesn’t have an appropriation in the
general appropriations act,
o The issue was that
o Section 75 expenses incident to recall election- all expenses to recall elections shall
be borne by the COMELEC.
 Shall be includes in the annual general appropriations act (fund at disposal
of the COMELEC)
= There is an appropriations in the GAA 2014 for recall elections as a line item for the
conduct and supervisions of elections, referendum, recall votes and plebiscites
=^ can be augmented from the COMELEC’s savings to fund the conduct of recall elections in
2014.
o recall elections only require operating expenses, not capital outlays. The COMELECs
existing personnel in Puerto princessa are the same personnel who will evaluate the
sufficiency of recall petitions and conduct the recall elections
= we see no reason why the COMELEC is unable to perform its constitutional mandate to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

= Therefore suspension of the recall election against Bayron was inappropriate because there
was proper funds for recall elections

X. Failure of Elections, Postponement of Elections, Special Elections

1. Sison v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134096, 03 March 1999
2. Soliva v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141723, 20 April 2001
3. Ampatuan v. COMELEC, 375 SCRA 503

XI. Election Offenses

1. People v. Ferrer, 54 O.G. 1348
2. Mappala v. Nunez, 240 SCRA 600
3. People v. Bayona, 181 Phil. 186
4. Lozano v. Yorac, G.R. No. 94521, 94626, 28 October 1991
5. Ong v. Martinez, G.R. No. 87743, 21 August 1990
6. Regalado v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 115962, 15 February 2000
7. Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 211789-90, 17 March 2015
8. COMELEC v. Tagle, 397 SCRA 618 (2003)
9. Tapispisan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157950, [June 8, 2005], 498 PHIL 733-751
10. Causing v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 199139, 09 September 2014