3 Distinct Roles a captain commonly performs:
(Inter-Orient Maritime case)
1. He is a GENERAL AGENT OF THE SHIPOWNER;
2. He is a COMMANDER and TECHNICAL DIRECTOR of the vessel
(most important role for this has something to do with the
operation and preservation of the vessel during its voyage and
the protection of the passengers, if any, and crew and cargo);
3. He is a REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COUNTRY under whose flag
he navigates.
INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., SEA HORSE SHIP,
INC. and TRENDA WORLD SHIPPING (MANILA), INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RIZALINO D.
TAYONG, respondents.
The captain refused to leave the port, contrary to the ship agent's
instructions, until the supplies he requested necessary for the
welding-repair of the turbo-charger and the economizer were
delivered. Subsequently, the captain was dismissed.
Issue: Was the captain remiss of his duties?
H: NO. The captain has the authority to decide. The captain of a
vessel is a confidential and managerial employee within the
meaning of the above doctrine.
A master or captain, for purposes of maritime commerce, is one
who has command of a vessel. A captain commonly performs three
(3) distinct roles:
(1) he is a general agent of the shipowner;
(2) he is also commander and technical director of the vessel; and
(3) he is a representative of the country under whose flag he
navigates.
Of these roles, by far the most important is the role performed by
the captain as commander of the vessel; for such role (which, to
our mind, is analogous to that of "Chief Executive Officer" [CEO] of
a present-day corporate enterprise) has to do with the operation
and preservation of the vessel during its voyage and the protection
of the passengers (if any) and crew and cargo.
In his role as general agent of the shipowner, the captain has
authority to sign bills of lading, carry goods aboard and deal with
the freight earned, agree upon rates and decide whether to take
cargo. The ship captain, as agent of the shipowner, has legal
authority to enter into contracts with respect to the vessel and the
trading of the vessel, subject to applicable limitations established by
statute, contract or instructions and regulations of the shipowner.
To the captain is committed the governance, care and
management of the vessel. Clearly, the captain is vested with both
management and fiduciary functions.
More importantly, a ship's captain must be accorded a reasonable
measure of discretionary authority to decide what the safety of
the ship and of its crew and cargo specifically requires on a
stipulated ocean voyage.
The captain is held responsible, and properly so, for such safety.
He is right there on the vessel, in command of it and (it must be
presumed) knowledgeable as to the specific requirements of
seaworthiness and the particular risks and perils of the voyage he is
to embark upon. The applicable principle is that the captain has
control of all departments of service in the vessel, and reasonable
discretion as to its navigation. It is the right and duty of the
captain, in the exercise of sound discretion and in good faith, to do
all things with respect to the vessel and its equipment and conduct
of the voyage which are reasonably necessary for the protection
and preservation of the interests under his charge, whether those
be of the shipowners, charterers, cargo owners or of underwriters.
It is a basic principle of admiralty law that in navigating a
merchantman, the master must be left free to exercise his own
best judgment. The requirements of safe navigation compel us to
reject any suggestion that the judgment and discretion of the
captain of a vessel may be confined within a straitjacket, even in
this age of electronic communications.
INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., SEA HORSE SHIP,
INC. and TRENDA WORLD SHIPPING (MANILA), INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RIZALINO D.
TAYONG, respondents.
FACTS:
Captain Tayong called the shipowner, Sea Horse Ship
Management, Ltd., in London and informed them that the
departure of the vessel for South Africa may be affected because
of the delay in the delivery of the supplies. 8
He was advised to contact Mr. Clark, the Technical Director, for a
solution for the supply of said oxygen and acetylene. 9

On 16 July 1989, while at the Port of Hongkong and in the process

of unloading cargo, Captain Tayong received a weather report
that a storm code-named "Gordon" would shortly hit Hongkong.

Precautionary measures were taken to secure the safety of

the vessel, as well as its crew.

On 21 July 1989, Captain Tayong followed-up the requisition by

the former captain of the Oceanic Mindoro for supplies of oxygen
and acetylene, necessary for the welding-repair of the vessel’s
leaking turbo-charger and the economizer.

While the vessel was en route from Hongkong to Singapore,

Captain Tayong reported that the vessel had stopped in mid-
ocean for six (6) hours and forty-five (45) minutes due to a leaking
economizer.

He was instructed to shut down the economizer and use

the auxiliary boiler instead. 4

When the vessel arrived at the port of Singapore, the Chief

Engineer reminded Captain Tayong that the oxygen and acetylene
supplies had not been delivered.
Mr. Clark responded that by shutting off the water to the
turbo chargers and using the auxiliary boiler, there should be
. Ruling
Captain Tayong, however, communicated to Sea Horse his
reservations regarding proceeding to South Africa without the
requested supplies, and was advised to wait for the supplies.
On August 1, 1989, the supplies were delivered and they
immediately sailed for Richard Bay.
When the vessel arrived at the port of Richard Bay, South
Africa on August 16, 1989, Captain Tayong was instructed to
turn-over his post to the new captain. He was thereafter
repatriated to the Philippines, without being informed of the
charges against him.
The POEA dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
Captain Tayong, holding that there was valid cause for his
untimely repatriation.
The NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the POEA and
directed petitioners to pay the Captain (a) his salary for the
unexpired portion of the contract at US$1,900.00 a month,
plus one (1) month leave benefit; and (b) attorney's fees
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award due.
Issue:
Whether or not Capt. Tayong’s refusal to sail from Singapore
to South Africa without the supply of said oxygen and
acetylene was an actual and sufficient basis for the alleged
loss of trust or confidence on the part of the petitioner?
no further problems
A master or captain, for purposes of maritime commerce, is
one who has command of a vessel. A captain commonly
performs three (3) distinct roles: (1) he is a general agent of
the shipowner; (2) he is also commander and technical
director of the vessel; and (3) he is a representative of the
country under whose flag he navigates. 16 Of these roles, by far
the most important is the role performed by the captain as
commander of the vessel; for such role (which, to our mind, is
analogous to that of "Chief Executive Officer" [CEO] of a
present-day corporate enterprise) has to do with the
operation and preservation of the vessel during its voyage and
the protection of the passengers (if any) and crew and cargo.
It is a basic principle of admiralty law that in navigating a
merchantman, the master must be left free to exercise his
own best judgment. The requirements of safe navigation
compel us to reject any suggestion that the judgment and
discretion of the captain of a vessel may be confined within a
straitjacket, even in this age of electronic communications. 22
Indeed, if the ship captain is convinced, as a reasonably
prudent and competent mariner acting in good faith that the
shipowner's or ship agent's instructions (insisted upon by
radio or telefax from their offices thousands of miles away)
will result, in the very specific circumstances facing him, in
imposing unacceptable risks of loss or serious danger to ship
or crew, he cannot casually seek absolution from his
responsibility, if a marine casualty occurs, in such instructions.
23
The critical question, therefore, is whether or not Captain
Tayong had reasonable grounds to believe that the safety of
the vessel and the crew under his command or the possibility
of substantial delay at sea required him to wait for the
delivery of the supplies needed for the repair of the turbo-
charger and the economizer before embarking on the long
voyage.
Under all the circumstances of this case, we, along with the
NLRC, are unable to hold that Captain Tayong's decision
(arrived at after consultation with the vessel's Chief Engineer)
to wait seven (7) hours in Singapore for the delivery on board
the Oceanic Mindoro of the requisitioned supplies needed for
the welding-repair, on board the ship, of the turbo-charger
and the economizer equipment of the vessel, constituted
merely arbitrary, capricious or grossly insubordinate behavior
on his part.
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING V. CA
A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and
licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain
waters, to guide vessels into or out of ports, and entrusted
with the navigation of vessels on the high seas. The pilot
supersedes the master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all
matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the
master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed,
course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like.
The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding
the presence of a pilot. There are occasions when the master
may and should interfere and even displace the pilot, as when
the pilot is obviously incompetent or intoxicated and the
circumstances may require the master to displace a
compulsory pilot because of incompetency or physical
incapacity.
Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals
Russian vessel that arrived in Manila, owned by Far Eastern
Shipping. It was assigned berth no. 4. There is such a thing as
compulsory pilotage -- there is a pilot assigned to pilot the
vessel outside the break water until it reaches its birth. In
this case, A was assigned to the vessel. The captain of the
vessel was beside A. Under the rules of compulsory pilotage,
once a pilot takes over the helm, the captain will have to
stand aside and surrender all his authority to the pilot who is
more familiar with the docking maneuvers. Now, A hit the
pier. PPA filed a complaint against Far Eastern Shipping.
Issue: Can the captain of the vessel be considered negligent
in this case? Because the only way that Far Eastern shipping
can be held liable is for the courts to declare the captain
negligent.
HELD: YES.
A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and
licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain
waters. In a broad sense, the term "pilot" includes both (1)
those whose duty it is to guide vessels into or out of ports, or
in particular waters and (2) those entrusted with the
navigation of vessels on the high seas. However, the term
"pilot" is more generally understood as a person taken on
board at a particular place for the purpose of conducting a
ship through a river, road or channel, or from a port.
Under English and American authorities, generally speaking,
the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be
obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He
becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all
directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing,
anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is
employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his
duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to
decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law,
the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is
deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains
command and control of the navigation even on localities
where pilotage is compulsory.
While it is indubitable that in exercising his functions a pilot-
is in sole command of the ship[69] and supersedes the
master for the time being in the command and navigation of
a ship and that he becomes master pro hac vice of a vessel
piloted by him,[70] there is overwhelming authority to the
effect that the master does not surrender his vessel to the
pilot and the pilot is not the master. The master is still in
command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a
pilot. There are occasions when the master may and should
interfere and even displace the pilot, as when the pilot is
obviously incompetent or intoxicated and the circumstances
may require the master to displace a compulsory pilot
because of incompetency or physical incapacity. If, however,
the master does not observe that a compulsory pilot is
incompetent or physically incapacitated, the master is
justified in relying on the pilot, but not blindly.
The master is not wholly absolved from his duties while a
pilot is on board his vessel, and may advise with or offer
suggestions to him. He is still in command of the vessel,
except so far as her navigation is concerned, and must cause
the ordinary work of the vessel to be properly carried on and
the usual precaution taken. Thus, in particular, he is bound
to see that there is sufficient watch on deck, and that the
men are attentive to their duties, also that engines are
stopped, towlines cast off, and the anchors clear and ready
to go at the pilot's order.
A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent
that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of
the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the
pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky
maneuver.
In sum, where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the
master being required to permit him to navigate it, if the
master observes that the pilot is incompetent or physically
incapable, then it is the duty of the master to refuse to
permit the pilot to act. But if no such reasons are present,
then the master is justified in relying upon the pilot, but not
blindly. Under the circumstances of this case, if a situation
arose where the master, exercising that reasonable vigilance
which the master of a ship should exercise, observed, or
should have observed, that the pilot was so navigating the
vessel that she was going, or was likely to go, into danger,
and there was in the exercise of reasonable care and
vigilance an opportunity for the master to intervene so as to
save the ship from danger, the master should have acted
accordingly. The master of a vessel must exercise a degree of
vigilance commensurate with the circumstances.
In general, a pilot is personally liable for damages caused by
his own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel,
and to third parties for damages sustained in a collision.
Such negligence of the pilot in the performance of duty
constitutes a maritime tort. At common law, a shipowner is
not liable for injuries inflicted exclusively by the negligence
of a pilot accepted by a vessel compulsorily.The exemption
from liability for such negligence shall apply if the pilot is
actually in charge and solely in fault. Since, a pilot is
responsible only for his own personal negligence, he cannot
be held accountable for damages proximately caused by the
default of others, or, if there be anything which concurred
with the fault of the pilot in producing the accident, the
vessel master and owners are liable.
PARTIES: Gavino- compulsory pilot;
FACTS: On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying
under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by
the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC for brevity's
sake), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver,
British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning.The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila
International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto
Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to
supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen
Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots'
Association (MPA for brevity's sake) to conduct docking
maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth
No. 4. Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine
anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the
master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After
the briefing, the vessel proceeded to Manila International
Port. When the vessel reachd the landmark one-half mile
from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. Gavino
ordered the anchor dropped. However, the anchor did
not take hold as expected. Victor Kavankov also noticed
that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter
gave the "full- astern" code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the
vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier. On January 10, 1983, the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, for brevity), through the
Solicitor General, filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 39, a complaint for a sum of money against
Far Eastern Shipping Co., Capt. Senen
C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots' Association.
LOWER COURT RULING: In a decision dated August 1,
1985, the trial court ordered the defendants therein
jointly and severally to pay the PPA the amount of
P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and the costs
of suit.
ISSUE: WON Gavino is liable for damages.
HELD: Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into
Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Upon assuming
such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the
universally accepted high standards of care and diligence
required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and
knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters
over which his license extends superior to and more to be
trusted than that of the master.The negligence on the part of
Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less
responsible for the allision. His unconcerned lethargy as
master of the ship in the face of troublous exigence
constitutes negligence. Our own evaluation is that Capt.
Kabankov's shared liability is due mainly to the fact that he
failed to act when the perilous situation should have spurred
him into quick and decisive action as master of the ship. In the
face of imminent or actual danger, he did not have to wait
for the happenstance to occur before countermanding or
overruling the pilot. By his own admission, Capt. Kabankov
concurred with Capt. Gavino's decisions, and this is precisely
the reason why he decided not to countermand any of the
latter's orders. Inasmuch as both lower courts found Capt.
Gavino negligent, by expressing full agreement therewith
Capt. Kabankov was just as negligent as Capt. Gavino.