HERACLITUS

SEMINAR
1966 / 67
Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink

11

Translated by
Charles H. Seibert

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA PRESS

(Jniversily, Alabama
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The translator g^tefully acknowledges
permission to quote from copv-
CONTENTS
nglm-d works as follows: (i) from G. S. Kirk,
H.ractuJ; The Cos.ic7Z
«. edited w,th an In.roduaion and
Ck,mmentary (Cambridge' CaX
bndge Un-versuy Press, 1970): (2) from G, S.
Kirk and J. E. Raven rl
PresocraUc Pktosophers: A Cntical Hutory
u,ith a SdecHon Translator's Foreword
of Texts (Cambr dge
Cambridge Un.yers.ty Press. 1957); (3) from vu
Friednch Holderlm: PaeJis
fV«^«.«(i translated by Michael Hamburger
(Ann Arbor: University oi Preface to the German Edition
Jdii
M,ch,gan PresM966); and ,4) from AU.ic
n-anslated by Eh^beth Henderson,
Poe^. by Friedrich hSi/ 1 Mode of Procedure.— Beginning with Fragment 64
Henderson, published by Oswald Wolff
copyright ©
1962 by Eli.^beth (Correlated
(Publishers) Ltd.. London. Fragments: 41, 1,50,47)
3

2> Hermeneutical Circle.— Relatedness of gv and ndvra (Correlated

Fragments: 1, 7, 80, 10. 29, 30, 41, 53,
90, 100, 102, 108, 114) 15

O JiavTa-6Xa. jtavta fivro— Different Exposition

of Fragment 7
(Correlated Fragment 67).—jiav kQn^6\
(Fragment
1 1 ).— Maturation Character of the Seasons (Fragment
Library of Congress Cataloging in
1 00) 27
Publication Data

Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976.

Heracliius Seminar, 1966/67.

Translation of Heraklit, which is a summary

of the
papers from the Heracliius Seminar held
at the University
of Freiburg i. Br., during the winter semester
1966-1967.
5 The Pioblem of a Speculative Explication.—jiijo AeCttoov
and
time? (Fragment 30)
^g
1. Heracliius. of Kphes us—Addresses, essays, lectures.
I. I-ink, Eugen, joint author.

B223.H4.113 182'.4
11. Title
78-27261
6 nvQ and Jidvra (Correlated Fragments:
30, 124, 66, 76, 31) 61
ISBN 0-8173-6628-8

Difference of Interpretation: Truth

of Being (Fragment 16) or
Cosmological Perspective (Fragment
64).-Heraclitus and the
.'' '^''*, Mat erofTh.nkmg.-The
Not-Vet-Metaphysical and the
No-Unger-Metaphysical.-Hegel's Relationship to the

i^t Translated into English from Herahlit

copyright © 1970 by Vittorio Klosterinann Verlag.
Greeks.-JiuQog Tpojiat and Dawn.
(Correlated Fragments: 31,
71
English translation and addenda
Copyrighi © 1979 by
8 In
ntertwitjing of Life
The University of Alabama Press and Death (Correlated Fragments: 76 36
All rights reserved ^^'"" "* ""'"^"^ ^"'l ^^ods (Correlated Fragments: 62,'
•J""*'' States of America
67 88)
8 2 O^^'^'^'J""^'' "l}^'-'
 TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD
y Immortal: Mortal (Fragment 62). —6v t6 ooqxSv (Correlated
Fragments: 32, 90) 97

The fragments of Heraclitus have, from the beginning, attracted and

XO The Standing Open of Gods and Humans (Fragment 62). The influenced philosophical thinking. It is hoped that this translation will
"Speculative" in Hegel/ — Hegel's Relationship to allow access by English-speaking readers to the continuing attempt at
Heraclitus.— Life - Death (Correlated Fragments: 88, 62) interpretation.
108
The two principal contributors to these conversations are Martin
Heidegger and Eugen Fink. Of the two. Heidegger is certainly the better
XX The "Logical" in Hegel.
—"Consciousness" and known to English-speaking readers. His readers will find a familiar voice
"Dasein." —Locality of Human Beings between Light and Night. here. His interpretation of Heraclitus continues to take its orientation
(Correlated Fragments: 26, 10) 122 from the fragments that deal with X6Y05 and with dXTJOeia.' These
themes have recurred in Being and Time, Section 44, An Introduction to
Metaphysics, What is Called Thinking?, the "Logos {Heraklil, Fragment 50)"

—
J.ft Sleep and Dream Ambiguity of fijiTeoOai (Correlated and "Aletheia {Heraklit, Fragment 1 6)" essays in Vortrage und Aufsatze, and
Fragments: 26, 99, 55) Nietzsche, II, Section IX. In addition to continuing Heidegger's interpre-
137
tation of Heraclitus, the present work is the occasion for interpretation
of other thinkers and poets, notably Hegel and Holderlin, as well as
XtJ Reference to Death, Awaiting - Hoping (Correlated Fragments: self-interpretation by Heidegger.

27, 28). —The "Contraries" and their "Transition" (Correlated Eugen Fink, the other principal contributor, is less familiar in the
Fragments: ill, 126.8,48.51).—Closing Question: The Greeks English-speaking philosophical world. This book is the first translation
as a Challenge of Fink's work into English, His role in these conversations is to provide a
150
preliminary interpretation of the fragments that will give the discussion
a "basis and a starting place for a critical surpassing or even destruction,

Notes and [will enable] us to establish a certain common ground appropriate to

163
inquiring discourse." Throughout the book, the conversations lake their
Glossary 166 sustenance from Fink's lead.
The pervading theme of interpretation is the relatedness of hi [the
Page Guide 171 one] and xa Jidvra [the many]. This relatedness is exemplified in many
different instances in the conversations of this book. Moreover, the con-
versations as a whole might well be underst«x»d as one more instance of
this fundamental theme in Heraclitus' thinking. For, while there is a
tension between the multiple interpretations of Heidegger, Fink, and
the seminar participants, the interpretation is nonetheless unified at
important points of agreement. While it is nut a translator's place to
rehearse the details of a text, it may be helpful to alert the reader to
passages in which the cnnversants speak foi themselves about their
agieements and differences.
Regarding the multiplicity of interpretations, it may be worth noting
that the present book records conversations, and is not the finished work
of a single author. Not only does the conversational origin of the book
set apart from other recent interpretive attempts, it also accounts, at
It

least in part,for the imaginative and experimental character of the in-

terpretations. In conversations, we can rarely anticipate the responses of
 VIII
those with whom we talk. And if an interlocutor disagrees with us, we are
often forced to take an imaginative, experimental step into areas about
which we have not previously thought. What results in the present case is
a mixture of premeditated consideration of the text and imaginative,
extemporaneous response. Of course, not all the experiments work, as
Fink himself predicts in the opening remarks and affirms at times
throughout the text.
Regarding more specific points of disagreement, it may not be acci-
dental that Heidegger cites Fragment 1, with its concern for the Xoyog,
soon after Fink begins his interpretation with a reference to Fragment
64, which deals with xteawv6c; [lightning] and ra JiAvta. But perhaps the
clearest summary of the differences of interpretation of Heidegger and
Fink is elicited by Heidegger from one of the participants in the begin-
ning of the seventh seminar session. In contrast to Fink's "surprising"
and "unusual" beginning, Heidegger makes clear his different begin-
ning fiom the X^YOS and from iX^eeia, While the participants record
diversity of opinion at many points, perhaps the most general expression
of difference is the remark that, "More is said in the interpretation of the
Fragments than stands in them."^ Regarding this difference of opinion,
more is said bek»w.
The unity that binds the multiplicity of the Heraclitus interpretations
is indicated by Heidegger toward the end of the sixth seminar session,
Hesays,"Bothof us are in agreement that ifwe speak with a thinker, we
must heed what is unsaid in what is said. The question is only which way
leads to this, and of what kind is the foundation of the interpretive
step."^ This observation marks not only a unifying theme in these conver-
sations, but also a unifying theme in Heidegger's own method of think-
ing alx)ut the tradition. As early as Kant and the Problem of Melaphysks
(1929), Heidegger says:
Nevfrthflcss, an inteipietati<Ki limited to a recapilulalion of whal Kaiii
explicitly said c;innever Ixf a real cxplitaiion. iithe business of the latter is
to brin^ ii> light whal Kant, over and above his express formulation, iin-
cdvered in the course ol his laying of the foundation. To l>e sure,
himself is no longer able lo say anything tonccining this, but what
essential in all philosophical discourse not found in the specific propo-
is
sitions (il which it is composed but in that which, although unstated as
such, is made evident through these propositions.^
The same position is maintained in Heidegger's closing remarks in
seminar session thii teen in the present book. There, as in Section 44 of
Being and Time (1927), it is 6Xr|9KLa that lies unsaid at the base of what is
said by the Clreeks.
In similar hishion. though not in ihc same words. Fink's "speculative"
interpretation is consonant with Heidegger's method of interpreta-
IX
tion. This is perhaps most explicitly shown in the opening considerations
of seminar session five. There Fink indicates that the method of in-
terpretation consists in the attempt to pass from the concrete state of
affairs presented in the fragments over to an unsensuous, though not
transcendent, domain.^ Again, Fink speaks of the attempt lo com-
prehend macrocosmic relations from the microcosmic relations which
are directly presented in the fragtnents.^ And finally:
When 1 speak of thoughtful transposition into another dimension, that is
only a first attempt tocirtumscribe the manner of our pnKcdure. because
we still do not know what it means lo go over into another dimension. Ifwe
wish to speak of an analogy in this conneciion, then we must think it in a
specific way. In this analogy, only one side is given to us, namely the
phenomenal one. As we hold selectively to specific phenomenal structures,
we translate them into large scale in an adventurous attempi.'
Readers who are familiar with recent English-language scholarship
and interpretation of Heraclitus may find the speculative method of
these conversations injudicious or lacking in caution. Some may object
with one of the participants that, "More is said in the interpretation of
the fragments than stands in them." Or the reader may, with Heideg-
ger, regard the speculative treatment as "venturesome" or even
"hazardous."'* The more fragmentary the evidence, it might be argued,
the more cautious we should be, and the more we must eschew specula-
tiveRights of imagination.
But before dismissing this interpretation just because it is speculative,
we ourselves must be more cautious. Professor Fink goes to some
a bit
lengths to explain how and why he departs speculatively from the spe-
cific content of a given fragment. And it may also be argued that, given
the very nature of these fragments, no interpretation, cautious or uncau-
m tious, can remain only with what is immediately given in the fragments.
It is precisely the fragmentary character of the fragments that not only
allows but even demands a speculative approach in interpretation. This
Kant Iragmentary character demands that we seek what is unsaid in what is
is
said, since
it is clear that Heraclitus was concerned with much more than
the fragments of experience to which we are, for the most part, hmited
and that are often recorded in the existing fragments. If Heraclitus
meant no more than is said in the fragments, many would be trivial and
useful only as exercises for learning the ancient Greek language. Even
though a particular fragment may, for example, explicitly mention only
the coniinually fiowing waters of a river (Fragments 91, 12). Heraclitus
himself in other fragments sets these concrete images into the context of
the dynamic relatedness of all things to the one, and of the one to all
things. The fragmentary character of the fragments is an invitation to
see beyond them.
 I
XI

Within the context of recent interpretive and critical scholarship on and death, becomes in a distinctive sense the clue for understanding of the
Heraclitus, one of Fink's particular interpretive strategies is noteworthy. opposing relatedness of £v and ndvxa.*
entirety of the
This strategy may be most easily indicated by reference to some remarks
in the preface to G. S. Kirk's Heraclitm: The Cosmologicat Fragmenli. On Again at the end of seminar session eight, Fink summarizes the interpre-
page xii of the preface. Kirk writes: tive struggle with TQony| [turning] in the following words.

In the present study only about half the total number of extant fragments We came to no result, and perhaps we will come to no final result at all. But
receive detailed consideration. "The cosmic fragments" are those whose the all too familiar explicaii<m of Tgonti has wandered into the foreignness
subject-matter is the world as a whole, as opposed to men; they include and darkness of the formula, "to live the death of something." We tould
those which deal with the l,ogos and the opposites, and those which de- perhaps think the relationship of fire lo earth, to air, and to water rather in
scribe the large-scale physicalchanges in which fire plays a primary part. reference to life and death, so that, with reference to the difficult relation-
They do not include those which deal with religion, with god in relation to ship of tension of life and death, we could tome to a certain anthropologi-
men, with the nature of the soul, with epistemology. ethics or politics; nor cal key for the n on -anthropological foundational relatedness of Ev and
do they include Heraclitus' attack upon particular individuals or upon men navza.'"
in general, although the ground of these attacks is very often an impercip-
ience of the Logos or its equivalents. These fragments, which might be human phenomena of life and death, as well
Fink has used precisely the
termed "the anthropotentric fragments." could be made the subject of a as the relationshipbetween mortals and immortals, in his interpretive
later study.
attempt to understand the relatedness of Ev and i6 Jidvta. The present
work is a complement to Kirk's book, and partially fulfills, in its main
Defending this procedure, Kirk writes further: outline, the task left undone by Kirk.
The strategy of using the anthropological fragments as a clue for
. . . the fragments fall not unnaturally into the two classes which I have
interpreting the cosmological fragments is important in another respect,
indicated, which can be separately treated — provided full cross-reference
namely with regard expressed doubt that, "More is said
to the previously
is carried out — without distortion either of individuiil fragments or of the
in the interpretation of the fragments than stands in them." I allude here
subject as a whole. This justification only applies, or course, to a work
which, like this one. consists essentially of a series of commentaries on to Kirk's observation concerning the "synoptic" character of Heraclitus'
individual fragments. It remains true that Heraclitus to(>k a synoptic view thinking. Fink's method of employing one set of fragments to interpret
of the problems he was facing, and that his answer to any one of them another would seem to strengthen the interpretation. Despite many im-
cannot be entirely dissociated from his answers to all tlic others; in particu- plicit and explicit references to other, later thinkers, Fink's interpretive
lar, his views on the constitution of the soul and its means of contact with strategy may
allow some assurance that in the long run Heraclitus'
the outside world bear upon the nature of the l^gos, and vice versa. The thought is interpreted as an integral whole, and is not interpreted by
author has had the anthropocenlric fragments in mind when considering means of reference to a foreign scheme of thought.
the cosmic ones; and since most of his readers are likely lo be familiar with
This translation is not the product of one person working alone. My
all the extant fragments, the dangers of misunderstanding are slight.
aim has lx.'en to hear the book with two sets of ears, one English and one
derman, hoping thereby to lose or distort as little as possible of the
Against the background of these remarks, two passages in Fink's in-
original. The
help of Professor Manfred S. Frings, editor of the Cierman
terpretation stand out. In seminar session 7, while attempting to under-
edition of the CoUecled Works of Max Scheler, has been crucial in pursing
stand the words TCVQog i^ojiat [transformations of fire], Fink says: this aim. Because his native tongue is (ierman, he has frequently been
the needed supplement that allowed retrieval of nuances that would
We do not understand the turning over of fire into what not lire in ihc i.s
oihenvise have been lost. 1 remain indebted to him, and thankful for his
sense of a chemical change or in the sense of an original substance which
changes (aXXoiwoi;) oi in the si-nse of an original element which masks senience-by-sentencc reading of the text.
ilsell through
emanations. Rather we will view the entire ran^e which
its
Other people have been consulted regarding various portions of the
binds and breath ol flie in connection with life ami dcaih.
fire, sea, earth, manuscript. John Cody of the Classics department of Northwestern
.'Apparently, we rcveit to ;nithri>(>iil<)giral fragmcnls in opposition lo cos- University has read the manu.wript with a concern for correcting my
mological tiaginenis. In iiulli. however, it is not a qtiestioii of resiiicLion ^i glt>ss of Cieek w(»rds and translation of Creek phrases. The IxKik has

to human phenomena; rather, what pertains to being human, such as life surely benefitted from his checking of my Greek "homework." F. Joseph
 XII
PREFACE TO THE
Smith was consulted on points of particular difficulty, and he has read GERMAN EDITION
some of the chapters in their entirety. The advice and encouragement of
these men are greatly appreciated. Ultimately, however, I am alone re-
sponsible for this translation and for any defects it may contain.
All footnotes of the original book are retained in the present transla-
In the Winter Semester of 1 966/67, a Heraclitus seminar was held
tion. Footnotes of the translator are followed by "(Tr.)." To facilitate at the
University of Freiburg i. Br., organized mutually
access to the text, the first occurrence of each Greek work is accom- by Martin Heidegger
and Eugen Fmk. The summary text of the seminar is herewith
panied by an English gloss within square brackets, provided none is submit-
ted. It was planned to continue the interpretation
given by the authors. A glossary of Greek terms is at the back of the over a series of semes-
ters, but this plan cannot be realized. The present
book. A page guide correlating the page numbers of this translation and publication is a torso, a
fragment concerning fragments.
those of the German edition is also provided.

Freiburg im Breisgau Eugen Fink

Winnetka, Illinois Charles H..Seibert April 1970
I

HERACLITUS

I
 Mode of Procedure. —Beginning with Fragment
64
(Correlated Fragments: 41, 1, 50, 47).

Fink: open the seminar with hearty thanks to Professor Heidegger for
1

assume spiritual leadership in our common attempt to

his readiness to
advance into the area of the great and historically important thinker
Heraclitus. Herachtus' voice, like that of Python, reaches us over a
thousand years. Although this thinker lived at the origin of the West,
and to that extent is longest past, we have not overtaken him even now.
L'd From Martin Heidegger's dialogue with the Greeks, in many of his writ-
ings, we can learn how the furthest becomes near and the most familiar
becomes strange, and how we remain restless and are unable to rely on a
sure interpretation of the Greeks. For us, the Greeks signify an enor-
mous challenge.
Our seminar should be an exercise in thinking, that is, in reflection on
the thoughts anticipated by Heraclitus. Confronted with his texts, left to
us only as fragments, we much concerned with the philological
are not so
I problematic, as important as might be,' as with advancing into the
it

matter itself, that is, toward the matter that must have stood before
Heraclitus' spiritual view. This matter is not simply on hand like a result
or like some spoken tradition; rather, it can be opened up or blocked
from view precisely through the spoken tradition. It is not correct to
view the matter of philosophy, particularly the matter of thinking as
Martin Heidegger has formulated it, as a product lying before us. The
matter of thinking does not lie somewhere before us like a land of truth
into which one can advance; it is not a thing that we can discover and
uncover. The reality of, and the appropriate manner of access to, the
matter of thinking is still dark for us. We are still seeking the matter of
thinking of the thinker Heraclitus, and we are therefore a little hke the
p<»or man who has forgotten where the road leads. Our seminar is not
concerned with a spectacular business. It is concerned, however, with
serious-minded work. Our common attempt at reflection will not be free
from certain disappointments and defeats. Nevertheless, reading the
text of the ancient thinker, we make the attempt to come into the
spiritual movement that releases us to the matter that merits being
named the matter of thinking.
Professor Heidegger is in agreement that I should firsi advance a
preliminat7 interpretation of the sayings of Heraclitus. This interpreta-
tion will give our discussion a basis and a starting place for a critical
 /'^

surpassing or even destruction, and il will enable us to establish a certain We make

kind. the tacit assumption that xd Jidvio, in the sense of
common ground the
appropriate to inquiring discourse. Perhaps a preview many in entirety, forms the entirely of finite bounded things. The stone.
of the particularlanguage of Heraclitus' sayings is premature before we for example, is part of a mountain. We can also speak of the mountain
have read and interpreted them individually. The language of Heracli- as
of a thing. Or is it only a linguistic convention to call what has a determi-
tus has an inner ambiguity and multidimensionality, so that we cannot
nate outline a thing? The stone is found as rubble on the mountain;
give it any unambiguous reference. It moves from gnomic, sentential, the
mountain belongs in the mountain range; the latter on the earth's crust;
and ambiguous-sounding expression to an extreme flight of thought. and the earth itself as a great thing that belongs, as a gravitational center!
As assigned text in our seminar, we will work with Fmgmenle der Vor- in our solar system.
sohaliker by Hermann Diels.^ For our part, we choose another arrange-
Heidegger: To begin, wouldn't it perhaps be appropriate to ask
ment. This should cast light on an inner coherence of the fragments' whether Heraclitus also speaks of xd Jidvxa in other fragments, in order
meaning, but without pretending to reconstruct the original form of
to have a specific clue from him about what he understands by xd
Heraclitus' lost writing, Ueqi (pijoEW? [On Nature]. We shall attempt to ndvxa?
In this way we get closer to Heraclitus. That is one question. The
second
trace a thread throughout the multiplicity of his sayings in the hope that
question I would like to put under discussion is what lightning has to
a certain track can thereby show itself. Whether our arrangement of the
do
with xd Jidvxa. We must ask concretely what it can mean
fragments is better than that adopted by Diels is a question that should
when Heraclitus
says that lightning steers xd Jidvxa. Can lightning steer the
universe at
remain unsettled. all?
Without further preliminary considerations, we shall proceed directly Participant: If we begin by taking lightning only as a phenome-
to the midst of the matter, beginning our interpretation with Fr. 64: xa non, then we must wonder that it should steer the universe,
since light-
6e Jiavra otaiti^ei xE^auvog. This sentence is clearly intelligible to nmg as a phenomenal entity, as a sensuously perceptible, luminous ap-
everyone in what it appears to mean. Whether it is also intelligible in pearance, still belongs together with all other endties in the universe.
what this meaning concerns, however, is another question. But first, we Heidegger: We
must bring lightning into connection with the
ask what this sentence means. As soon as we reflect on it somewhat more, phenomenon of nature, if we wish to understand it "in Greek." T"^
we immediately depart from the easy intelligibility and apparent famil- Fink: Lightning, regarded as a phenomenon of nature,
means the
iarity of the sentence. Diels' translation reads: "Lightning steers the uni-
outbreak of the shining lightning-flash in the dark of night.
verse." But is "universe" the fitting translation of t6 ndvra? After due Just as
lighinmg in the night momentarily flashes up and. in the
brightness of
deliberation, one can indeed come to equate xii ndvra and "universe," the gleam, shows things in their articulated
outline, so lightning in a
But first of all. xb. irdvia names "everything" and signifies: all things, all deeper sen.se brings to light the multiple things in their
articulated
of what is. Heraclitus speaks of xa niivTa vis-a-vis KEpawdg [lightning]. gathering.
In so doing, he enunciates a connection between many things
and the Heidegger: I remember an afternoon during my journey in
one of lightning. In the lightning bolt the many, in the sense of "every- Aegina, Suddenly 1 saw a single bolt of lightning, after which no more
thing," fiash up,whereby "everything" is a plural. If we first ask naively followed. My thought was: Zeus.
about xd jidvxa, we are dealing with a quintessential relatedness. If we Our task now
consists in looking with Heraclitus for what xd Jidvxa
translate xd jrdvxa as "all things," we must first ask, what kinds of things means. an open question how far a distinction was already possible
It is
there are. At the outset, we choose the way of a certain with him between "everything" in
tactical naivete. the sense of the sum of individuals
On the one hand, we take the concept of thing in a wider sense, and then
and
everything" in the meaning of the embracing allness.
we mean alt that is. On the other hand, we also use it in a narrower sen.se.
The other task,
which is first posed fbr us by Fr. 64. is the
connection between xd Jidvxa
It we mean things in the narrower sense, ind lightning. We must also bring Heraclitus'
then we can distinguish be- lightning into connection
tween such things as are fiom nature ((pijOEi 6vxa) and such as are the with lire (JtiiQ). It is also essential
to observe who has handed Fr. 64 down
product of human technics (x^x^il 6vza). With all the things of E<' us. It
is the Church Father Hippolytus
nature— with the inanimate, like stone, and with the living, like plant,
who died roughtly A.D. 236/37.
rruni Heraclitus' time approximately
eight hundred years pass Ijefore
beast, and human (in ,so far as we may speak of a human as a thing)— <'ur
we fragment is cited by Hippolytus. In the context, Jivp
and xdonog
mean only such things as are individuated and have determinate out- la.smos] are also mentioned. But we do not
wish to enter here into the
lines. We have in view the determinate, individual thing that, to be sure, philological problematic that emerges in view
of the connection of the
also has a particular, common character in itself, as being of a certain ''agment and the context of Hippolytus. In a conversation
that I held
 with Carl Reinhardt in 194 1, when he stayed
here in Freiburg, I spoke to
Fink: If I have spoken of movement, we must distinguish, on the
hiiii about the middle ground between
pure philology, which intends to
find the real Heraditus with its philological one hand between the movement that lies in the lighting of lightning, in
tools, and the kind of
philosophizing that consists in thinking without the outbreak of brightness, and on the other hand, the movement in xd
discipline and thereby
assuming too much. Between these two extremes there Jtdvra, in things.The movement of brightness of lightning corresponds
a middle
is
movement that goes out from f v to oo(p6v and continues on in the
ground concerned with the to the
role of the transmission of understanding, of
sense as well as interpretation. many things in entirety. Things are not blocks at rest; rather, they are

With Hippolytus we find not only TriJe but also iKitvQOiaig diversified in movement.
[confiag- Heidegger: Td ndvta are thus not a whole, present in front of us,
raiion], which for him has the meaning of
the end of the world. If we
but entities in movement. On the other hand, movement does not occur
now ask what xti jidvta, lightning, and also steering mean in Fr. 64, we
as x£vTtai5 [motion] in Heraditus.
must at the same time attempt to transfer ourselves into the Greek
world Fink: If movement does
with the clarification of these words. So that we can not also belong among the fundamental
understand Fr. 64 in
a genuine manner, I would propose that Fr. 41 be
words in Heraditus, it still always stands in the horizon of problems of
added to it: elvaiyitQ his thinking.
gv t6 ooqxSv, ^£0100601 yvMnnv, 6t^ IkuP^qvtjoe
Jidvra 6i(i JiAvrtuv.
Diets translates: "The wise is one thing only, to understand
Heidegger: To Frs. 64 and 41, we now add Fr. 1: tou bk Xdyou
the thoughts
that steer everything through everything." Literally
TOTJfi' ^6vT05 de£ d^TJvexoi Y^vovrai dv9eo)Jioi ital KQdadev f\ dxoijaat xal
translated. Jidvxa
bia 3t(ivxo>v means: everything throughout everything. The dxoTJoavxes Td JtQUTOV. vivoti^cov ytxQ jtdvTOJv xoTd t6v Xdyov T6v6e
importance dneieot-oiv kolxaai, JteiQt&n^voi xal kn^tov xal ggyojv ToioiiTOJv, dxoiitfv
of this saying lies, on the one hand, in Itv to tro(p6v [the wise is
one thing t/(j) 6LT^yEU^aL xaTd qnioiv SLaLQ^on- Ixaorov xaL (ppd^tov 6x105
onlyj and. on the other, in iHivra 6ia n&vxurv. Here above all we must ^xei. Toiig
take into view the connection of the beginning
6e dUou5 dveQcbnou; XavSdvEi 6x6aa ^vEee^vTEg jtotovaiv, dxtuojiEQ
and the end of the sen- 6x6oa efi6ovTE5 kniKavBavovzai.' At first, only YivofiEvtov yaQ jidvTtuv
tence.
Fink: There is a similar connection,
on the one hand between the
xoTd t6v ^ov t6v6e interests us. We translate, "For although every-
thing happens according to this X6yog [reason, speech, word]." If Hera-
oneness of the lightning-Hash, in the brightness of which
the many show ditus speaks here of yLvon^cov [coming into being], he is, nevertheless,
themselves in their outline and their articulations, and xit Jidvra,
and, on talking of movement.
the other, between the oneness of ootp6v
[the wise] and jrAvxa bih
Fink: In Yivo|4ivo)v yiiQ jidvtaiv [coming into being of everything],
JidvTCuv. As Kepawo; relates to td jidvta.
gv to oocpov relates analo-
gously to jidvta 6td Jtdvxtov.
we are dealing with things being moved within the cosmos, and not with
Heidegger: I certainly grant that lightning and gv to ao(p6v stand
the movement that issues from X6yo<;.

in a relation to one another. But there is still

Heidegger: ywo\ib/byv belongs to yeveaig [genesis]. When the Bible
more to notice in Fr. 41. In
Fr. 64 Heraditus speaks of tq Jtdvra, in Fr.
speaks of Yeveois, it means by this the Creation, in
which things are
41 of jrdvxa 6id Jtdvrtov. In
Parmenides 1/32 we also find a similar phrase: 6id JidvTog brought into existence. But what does yiveai^ signify in Creek?
Jidvra
JiE0(DVTa. In the Participant: YevEot^ is also no concept in Heraditus.
phrase jidvTa 6id jrdvruv, the meaning of 6id is above
ail to Ije questioned. To begin, it means
Heidegger: Since when do we have concepts at all?
"throughout." But how should
we understand -throughout:" topographically, spatially, causally Participant: Only since Plato and Aristotle. We even have
or how the first
philo.sophical dictionary with Aristotle.
else?
Fink: In Fr. 64 Td JidvTO does not mean a calm,
Heidegger: While Plato manages to deal with concepts only with
static multiplicity,
but rather a dynamic multiplicity of entities. In Td
difficulty, we see that Aristotle deals with them more easily. The word
Jidvra a kind of
movement is thought precisely in the reference back to lightning. In Ytvonevwv stands in a fundamental place in Fr. I.
the Fink: Perhaps we can add a comment to our
brightness, specifically the clearing which di.scussion. We find
the lightning bolt tears open,
YfVEOig in an easily understood sense with living
TO jrdvra Hash up and step into appearance. 1 he being beings, phenomenally
moved of id seen. Plants spring up from seeds,
Jtdvra is also thought in the lighting up beasts from the pairing of parents.
of entities in the deariim of and humans from sexual union l>etween man and woman.
Mghuiing. "
Y^eoig is also
native to the phenomenal region of ihc
HEiDKGGtR: Al us leave aside vegetative-animal. Coming into
first, let words like -clearing" and existence (YtyvEoeai) in this region is at the same
"brightness." time coupled with
passing away (tpeetpEa6ai). If we now refer yeveol; also
to the region of
 8
g

we operate with an expanded, more general, sense of

lifeless things,
this Fink: If we now start out from coming-forth.
word. For we refer veveoi; to ra jravra, we expand the sense of
if coming-forth-to-
V^veois beyond the phenomenal region in
^ipp^Y^ncc [Zum.yorsch,in-Kommen]. wherein you see
which the Renesis- the Greek mean-
ing of YiVo,.^c«v as thought in
phenomenon is otherwise at home. y^Eatg, then we al«> have a reference
the brightness and gleam of lightning "o
Heidegger: What you understand by the phenomenal in which the individual
thing
sense of the stands and flashes up. Then we would
word yeveaig we can also label as ontic. have the following analogic"!
correlation: as lightning on a dark
Fink: We
also meet the widening of the
original, phenomenal in Its specific outline all at once,
night lets us see everything
indivX
meaning of Y^veois m
common language, for example, when we speak of so this would be in a shTrt time
same as that which happens perpetually span the
the world's coming into existence. We
use specific images and domains
in
m Fr. 30. The entry of entities in their determinateness ^^
de(^aK,v [ever-living fne]
of ideas in our representations. With ylvohevwv, in Fr 1 is thought in the
we are con moment of bnghtness. Out of Fr. 64 comes |

cerned with the more general sense of yiveaig. For

ta jrdvxa does not ta Kdvra: out of Fr Jl'
come into existence like that entity which comes into existence
in accor- Xoyov. Larlier we tried to discern the
dance with yiyeaig in the narrower sense, and also not like living movement of lighting in the lightn-
beings. ng bolt. Now we can say that it is themovement of brin^ging forth o-
It IS another matter when, in the
coming-in to-existencc of things, manu- appearance. But brmging-forth-to-appearance,
facture and production (zixw\ and nolr\ai<;) are
also meant. The jrottioig
which lightning accom-
plishes n entities, is also a steering
of phenomena is, however, something other than
does not come into existence by means of the potter's
IS begotten by parents.
the yevEOi^. The jug
hand like the man
themselves. Things are moved
ing, waxmg and waning,
intervention in the moving of
in the manner of advancing
of local movement and alteration
ment of hghtnmg corresponds to the
and
things

The move-
S
Heidegger: Let us once again clarify for oursevles what moving of gv x6 ooaxiv. The steer
our task is mg movement is not thought with respect to the
We ask what does id n&vxa mean in Fr. 64; and
:
n6^na 6ia JidvTajv in Fr lighu^ing or with
4 1 and vivoiiEvtov yixQ nAvxov in Fr. 1 ? xoto t6v Xoyov
;
[according to the
Logos] in Fr. I corresponds with gv to ao^>6v in bringing-forth-to-appearanc'e and^con
Fr. 64.
Fr. 41 and XEpain'6c in
^ ^
?nuttT:;h
nnues to effect things. xl'"'^
The movement of steering intervention
moving of things happens in accord in the
Fink: In
vivon^wv the sense of y^eoig is used in widened manner. with the \6yog. The movement
of
Heidegger: But can one actually speak of a widening here? '" '."^'""^ "' "^"'"'"^ ^^'^ wisdomlirnaTu^'
I mean that'ru'r however,'t
ha must, T"" be distinguished from the
that we should try to understand "steering." movement that issues
"eveiything throughout
everything," and now the movement that is
thought in vlvoh^ojv in a of the one and the many that appear m the
genuine Greek sense. I agree that we may not one, but also with the efficacy
take the meaning of ol^the one in reference to td ^dvta, which
V^veoig in yivon^vojv narrowly; rather, it is here a matter of
comes to expression innd^a
a general 6ta .dvxcov^ ,t could be that Axiyo; in Fr.
expression. Fr. 1 is considered to be the
beginning of Heraclitus' writing
1 is another word for ^^In
Smething fundamental is said in it. But may we now refer
thought in YEveoi; in a wide sense, to coming-forth
ywon^wv WAEttog IS the ndviiov Baaike^g (king
of everything], the war^hat de
[Hen>orkomwnP In ^""'"'^^' ""'^^'"^"' °f "^'"^^ ^-^^
anticipation, we can say that we must keep
in view the fundamental trait ^^:ZT:. the Iphe'e -"^ - tf
ot what the Creeks called being. Although
I do not like to use this word
Heidegger: Do you
wish to say that what
any more, we now take ii up nevertheless. meant
ygVEOi; in Yivotifvojv, he does not mean
When Heraclitus thinks y vo,W YO^ ^rdvxcv serves to determine more clo^ly
is by y^eaic in
"becoming" in the modern "^
Do the iTofFr
you then understand 6id causally:^
sense; that is, he does not mean a process. '

But thought in Greek, yiysaic

rneans -to come into l>cing," to come forth ^ ''°"''' ""'>' ^'^^ ^« ^^y 'hat lightning,
in presence. We now have oi^nT'A '"l""/^^: which tears
three different concerns, drawn ^"''-
out of Frs. 64, 41, and
must hold ourselves, if we wish to come into the
1. to which we " ; t
sin : t^hf f'1-
"""" " "^"^
^

!^
"P ^"'^ ''^'-" -<5-idu
'" '''

'^"^ '""''"^ power of y^eoic

''^"^^

clear concerning tq -nanntr fT- . i„ ,he

^6vTa. Let us also draw on Fr. 50: oix "'' P--^ '"" 'he movemen s of
^(loO, dUa tou k6yov AxouoavTac i.r ^IrTu
6m.o>.oyeiv oocpov ^oTiv gv itdvra ftvai. Diels' ''Sh'"'ng. 't'^-"^^-"-^
the Wyo5 of Fr. also relates to
translation runs, "Listening movSiln^ '^J- xd ^dvta. The I

"^''^ '-"'S-fo-'h and establishes, steers

not to me hut to the I^gos (X6yog),
one. Before
it is wi.^e to say that everything
is TZl" r'-
'"^' ^"""P*'"^^ '" 'he lightning movement that
and de-
all else, this saying centers on gv. n6vza, and dHoXoyeiv. 'Sngs forth
 10
11

Participant: The relationship of the lightning

movement and the Fink: One can also subsume steering under movement. But
movenrient of entities is no relationship of effect. with
When it was said that Heraclitus, the steering of lightning is that which stands face to face with
the hghtning movement that brings-forth-to-appearance
passes into the all movement in entities like the lightning stands face
to face with that
movement of things, no causal relationship is intended
between the which shows itself in its light. Thus, steering does not have the
movement that brings-forth and the movement of what character
is brought-forth of being moved like entities, but rather the character of bringing move-
Rather, that which stands here in the problem-horizon
is the difference ment forth in entities. Add to this that steering, which concerns
between movement in being and movement in entities, xit
specifically be- n&vxa, is no steering of individual things, but of the quintessential
tween movement in unconcealing and movement whole
in what is uncon- of entities. The phenomenon of steering a ship is only a jumping
cealed. off
place for the thought which thinks the bringing-forth of the
Fink: We distinguish the lightning outbreak whole of
of light, as movement entities in the articulate jointed-whole. As the captain, in
of bnnging-forth, and the coming-forth in it of every the movement
specific entity in its of the sea and winds to which the ship is exposed, brings a course
movement. The mstantaneousness of lightning is an to the
indication of an movement of the ship, so the steering bringing-forth-to-appearance of
impermanence. We must understand lightning as the briefest
time pre- lightning gives to all entities not only their outline but also
cisely as the
mstantaneousness that is a symbol for the movement their thrust.
of The steering bringing-forth-to-appearance is the more original move-
bnngmg-forth, not itself in time but allowing time.
ment that brings to light the whole of entities in their manifold
Heidegger: Isn't lightning eternal, and not merely being
momentary? moved and at the same time withdraws into it.
Fink:The problem of the movement that brings-forth, in
its rela- Heidegger: Can one bring the steering of Fr. 64 (otaxfCiEL) and
tionship to the movement of what is brought-forth. of
we must think in the Fr. 41 (^XTjp^evT)OE) into association with 6iA? If so, what then results
nexus of lightning, sun, fire, and also the seasons, in which as
time is the meaning of 6idt?
thought, rhe fiery with Heraclitus must be thought
in more aspects for Fink: In 6ia a transitive moment is thought.
example, the fire in the sun and the transformations
of fire (jivqoc, Heidegger: What meaning does "everything throughout every-
ZQ07zai.y Fire, which underlies everything,
is the bringing-forth that thing" now have?
withdraws Itself m
its transformations as that
which is brought-forth 1 Fink: I would
bring Jidvra &ia jr<ivT:a»v into association with
like to
would like to bring n&vza bih Jtdvraiv in Fr. 41 into
connection with nugog TQOJtaL. The
transformations of fire then imply that everything
KVQOC, teojiaC. Lightning is the sudden burst
of light in the dark of night goes over into everything; so that nothing retains the definiteness
If now the lightning is perpetual, of its
it is a symbol for the
movement of character but, following an indiscernable wisdom, moves itself
bring] ng-forth. through-
out by opp<>.sites.
Heidegger: Are you opposed to an identification of lightning
^' fire Heidegger: But why does Herachtus then speak of steering?
and also war?
Fink:The transformations of fire are in some measure a circular
Fink: No, but the identification here one of identity and noniden-
is movement that gets steered by lightning, specifically by
tity. oocpov. The
movement, in which everything moves throughout everything through
Heidegger: We must then understand identity as beloneine- opposites, gets guided.
together. ^ *
Heidegger: But may we here speak of opposites or of dialectic
Fink: Lightning, fire, sun, war, Xovo;. and ao(p6v at
are different lines all.'' Heraclitus
knows neither s<»melhing of opposites nor of dialectic.
ot thinking on one and the same ground. In
nvgo^ xeortaL the ground of Fink: True, opposites are not thematic with
everything is thought, which, changing itself over, Heraclitus. Bui on the
shifts into water and other hand, it cannot Ije contested that from the
earth. phenomenon he points
i'> opposites. The movement in which everything transformed
Heidegger: Thus, you mean the transformations is
of things with 'hnnighoui everything is a steered movement. For
respect to one ground. Plato, the helm is the
analogy for exhibiting the power of rationality
in the world.
Kink: The ground meant here is not some
substance or the abso- Heidegiier: You wish to illustrate what steering means
lute, but light and time. by naming
that which steers, the ^iy^S- But what
steering as a phenomenon?
is
Heide<;ger: If we now stay with our source material
and especially Fink: Steering as a phenomenon is the movement of
with the question concerning biix in Fr. 4 a human who,
1 can't we then determine 6l6
,
for example, brings a ship into a desired
from steering (oiaxi^etv)? What does steering course. It is the directing of
mean"^ "lovement which a rational human pursues.
 12 13

Heidegger: In the experiment which we undertake, The Greeks did not have faith in their gods. There is— to recall Wilamo-
there is no
question of wanting to conjure up Heraclitus
himself. Rather, he speaks witz —no of the Hellenes.
faith
with us and we speak with him. At present, we Fink: However, the Greeks had myth.
reflect on the phenome-
non of steermg. This phenomenon has today, in the age Heidegger: Nevertheless, myth is something other than faith.—
of cybernetics,
( become so fundamental that it occupies and determines But to come back to noncoercive steering, we could ask how things
the whole of stand
natural science and the behavior of humans so with genetics. Would you also speak of a coercive steering
that it is necessary for us there?
togam more clarity about it. You said first that steering means "bringing Fink: Here one must distinguish between the natural
behavior of
something mto a desired course." Let us attempt a still genes, which can be interpreted cybernetically, on the
more precise one hand, and the
description of the phenomenon. manipulation of factors of inheritance, on the other,
Fink: Steering is the bringing-into-control
[In-die Gewalt-Bnngen] of Heidegger: Would you speak of coercion here?
a movement. A ship without rudder and helmsman is a plaything Fink: Even if coercion is not felt by the one overpowered,
of the it is still
waves and winds. It is forcibly brought into the desired coercion. Because one can today coercively intervene
course only and alter the be-
through steenng. Steering an intervening, transfiguring movement
is havior of genes, it is possible that one day the world will be
ruled by
that compells the ship along a specific course. It druggists.
has the character of
violence m itself. Aristotle distinguishes the movement that is native to Heidegger: Regarding genes, the geneticist speaks of an alphabet.
things and the movement that is forcibly conveyed to things. of a store of information, which stores up in itself a definite
quantity of
Heidegger: Isn't there also a nonviolent steering? Does the charac- information. Does one think of coercion in this information
theory?
ter of violence belong phenomenon of steering? The
intrinsically to the Fink: The genes that we discover are a biological finding.
However,
phenomenon of steering
ever and again unclarified in reference to
is as soon as one comes to the thought of wanting to improve
the human
Heraclitus and to our present-day distress. That natural race through an altering steering of genes, it is thereby
science and our not a question of |
life today become ruled by cybernetics compulsion which brings pain, but indeed a question of coercion.
in increasing measure is not acci-
dental; rather,
it is foreshadowed Heidegger: Thus, we must make a two-fold distinction: on the one
in the historical origin of modem
knowledge and technology. hand, the information-theoretical interpretation of the
biological; and
Fink: The human phenomenon of steering is characterized on the other, the attempt, grounded on the former, to actively
by the steer.
moment of coercive and precalculated regulation. It is associated with What is in question is whether the concept of coercive steering is in
place
calculative knowledge and coercive intervention. The in cybernetic biology.
steering of Zeus is
something else. When he steers he does not calculate, but he rules ef- Fink: Taken strictly, one cannot speak here of
steering.
fortlessly. There tends to be noncoercive steering in the region of the Heidegger: At issue is whether an ambiguity presents itself in
the
gods, but not in the human region. concept of information.
Heidegger: Is there really an essential connection between steering Fink: Genes exhibit a determinate stamping and have,
thereby, the
and coercion? character of a lasting stock [Un^spekkem]. A human lives his life, which
Fink: The helmsman of a ship is a man of skill. He knows his way he apparently spends as a free being, through genetic conditioning,
about in the tides and winds. He must make use of the driving t-veryone is determined by his ancestors. One also
wind and speaks of the learning
tide in correct manner. Through his steering he removes the ship coei- ability of genes, which can learn
like a computer.
cively from the play of wind and waves. To this extent one must thus see Heidegger: But how do things stand with the concept of
informa-
and also posit the moment of coercive acts in the phenomenon of steer- tion?
ing. Fink: By the concept of information one understands, on
one
Heidegger: Isn't present day cybernetics itself also steered? hand, injai-mare. the
stamping, impressing of form; and on the other, a
Fink: If one would think of E[^ae^lEvrl [destiny] in this, or even lerhnique of communication.
fate.
Heidegger: Isn't this steering noncoercive? We musi look at vari- Heidegger: If genes determine human behavior, do they
develop
ous phenomena of steering. Steering can be, on the one hand, a 'he information that is innate to
coercive them?
holding in line, on the other hand, the noncoercive steering of the fiNK! In some measure. As to information, we are not
gods. dealing here
The gods of the Greeks, however, have nothing to do with religion. with the kind of information that
one picks up. What is meant here is
 14
ihathe behaves as if he were to get a command
from the genetic stock.
I-iom this point of view, freedom is planned
freedom.
Heidegger: Information thus implies, on the
one hand, the stamp-
ing and, on the other, information-giving,
upon which the informed
being reacts. The human mode of behavior
becomes formalized through
cybernetic biology, and the entire causal
structure becomes converted
We need no philosophy of nature; it suffices, rather, if we clarify for
ourselves where cybernetics comes from and where
it leads to The gen-
eral charge, that philosophy understands
nothing of natural science and
always hmps along behind it, we can take without
being perturbed It is
important for us to say to natural scientists what they are in effect '
doing.
We now have seen a multitude of aspects in the phenomenon
of steer-
ing. KEQavwdz, gv, oo(p6v, Xoyo;, nvQ, "HMog,
and n6\E^oz, are not one
and the same, and we may not simply equate them; rather,
certain rela-
tions hold sway between them which we wish to
see, if we want to become
clear to ourselves about the phenomena. Heraclitus
has described no
phenomena; rather, he has simply seen them. In closing,
let me recall
47: iii] elxfi jzeqi xojv
\ityi(nwv ODjipaUwueea. Translated, it says:
con-
cernmg the highest things, let us not collect our words out of the
blue
that IS, rashly. This could be a motto for our
seminar.
Hermeneuticai Circle. — Relatedness of Iv
and Jidvxa (Correlated Fragments: i, 7, 80, 10
29,30,41,53,90, 100. 102. 108, 114).
Fink: As a result of Fr. 64, we are driven to the difficulty of elucidating
the expression xa Jtdvta. I intentionally do not speak of the concept of
Tct iidvTa in order to avoid the idea of a Heraclitean technical
vocabu-
lary. The expression xa Jtriivra has shown itself to us in Fr. 64
as that on
which lightning comes to bear in a steering way. Lightning, as the open-
ing light, as instantaneous fire, brings xa 7i6vxa to light, outlines each
thing in its form, and guides the movement, change, and
passage of all
which belongs in xd n&vza. In order to focus more sharply the question
of what or who xa n6.vxa are, whether individual things or elements
or
Fr counter references, we began with a preliminary look at other fragments
that also name xh it&vxa. if we disregard what we have already
brought
into relation to Fr. 64, fifteen text citations follow in
which we wish to
examine how far, that is, in what respects xit n&via are addressed. In Fr.
64 it has been indicated that lightning is the steerer. It is not a question
of an immanent self-regulation of Jidvxa. We must distinguish lightning
as the one from the quintessential many of ndvxa.
Participant: If the steering principle does not lie within the whole,
must it be found outside or above
the whole? But how can it be outside
the whole?
Fink: If we press it. the concept of the whole means a
quintessence
that allows nothing outside itself; thus, it
apparently does not allow what
you call the steering principle. But with Heraclitus, it is
a question of a
counterreference, at present still not discernible by us, between
the &v of
ighining and xa jidvxa. which are torn open, steered,
and guided by
lightning. As a formal logical quintessence xd ndvxa signifies a concept
of "everything," which allows nothing
outside itself. It is, nevertheless,
questionable whether the steering is something
external to xd Jidvxa at
all. Here a very
peculiar relatedness lies before us, which cannot be
expressed with current relationship-categories. The relatedness in
at all
'luesiion, between the lightning that
guides td jidvxa and td ndvxa itself,
IS the
relatedness of one to many. It is not. however, the relationship
of
Ihe singular to the plural, but the
elatedness of a still unclarified one to
i
the many in the one, whereby
the many are meant in the sense of quin-
'essence.
Heidegger: Why do you reject Diels' translation of xd Jidvxa as
Universe?
 16 17

Fink; If, in Fr. 64, t6 iiav [the whole] were to stand Heidegger: Wittgenstein says the following. The
in place ofxa difficulty in
Jtdvxa, It would be justifiable
to translate with "universe." xii which thinking stands compares with a man in a room, from which he
n&vxa do
not form the universe; rather, they form the wanis lo gel out. At first, he attempts to get out through the window, but
quintessence of things
found in the world. The universe is not xit
ndvxa; rather, lightnins itself it is loo high for him. Then he attempts to get out through the chimney,

ISworld-forming. In the gleam of lightning, the many which is too narrow for him. If he simply turned around, he would see
things in entirety
come into differentiated appearance, xa JtdvTa is the realm that the door was open all along.
of dif-
ferences. Lightning as gv, however, is not
contrasted with xa Jidivia as We ourselves are permanemly set in motion and caught in the her-
one neighlwrhood against another or as cold against meneutical circle. Our difficulty now consists in the fact that we search
warm.
Heidegger: On your interpretation, are lightning and universe for a clue about the meaning of xa Jidvxa in central Heraclitean frag-
thus the same? ments without having already involved ourselves in a detailed interpreta-
Fink: I would formulate it otherwise. Lightning is not the
like to tion. For this reason our search for the meaning of Heraclitus' xa Jidvxo
universe, but it is as the
world-forming. It is only as world-form. What is must also remain provisional.
to be understood here by world-form must Participant: If we attempt to make clear to ourselves the meaning
be elucidated more precisely
Heidegger: I myself would like to add a supplement to of xd Jtdvia starting from a fragment, can't we revert to Fr. 50 in which it
what I
explained during the last session concerning cybernetics, i is said, "Everything is one?"
don't want to
allow a misunderstanding to arise from my Heidegger: But everything we have of Heraclitus' fragments is not
allusion to modern cyber-
netics in the course of the discussion about what steering is. Misun- the whole, is not the whole Heraclitus.

derstanding would arise if we restricted ourselves to what Fink: I don't imagine that one can jump at Heraclitus' obscure
is said about
steering in Frs. 64 and 41, and if we constructed a saying as a maxim for interpretation. Likewise, we cannot appeal to Fr.
connection between
Herachtus and cybernetics. This connection between Heraclitus 60, which says that the way up and the way down are one and the same,
and
cybernetics lies much deeper hidden and is not so easy to grasp. for an understanding of what a way is, for instance, a way in philosophy
It goes
in another direction that we could not discuss
in the context of our or a way through the fragments of Heraclitus. Here Heraclitus does not
present awareness of Heraclitus. Nevertheless, the meaning express the customary understanding of way. It also pertains to the
of cybernet-
ics lies m
the origin of that which prepares itself here with
Heraclitus in
hermeneuiical difficulty mentioned by us that each fragment remains
the relatedness of tv and xa Jidvxa. fragmentary in its explication, and in connection with all other frag-
Fink: If we now make the attempt to look at how x6 n&vxa ments, it does not yield the whole of Heraclitus' thought.
is men-
tioned in other fragments, we still intend no explication of the Heidegger: In the course of our seminar we must make the at-
separate
fragments. tempt to come through interpretation into the dimension
required by
Heidegger: If have postponed a question put by one of the par- Heraclitus. Indeed, the question emerges how far we
I implicitly or
ticipants, happened under the constraint of a fundamental diffi-
has explicidy interpret, that is. how far we can make the
it dimensions of
culty in which we now find ourselves. Wlierein lies this difficulty? Herachtus visible from out of our thought. Philosophy can
only speak
Participant: The questions thus far touched on can only and say, but it cannot paint pictures.
be an-
swered when we have won a deeper understanding of Fink: Perhaps also it can never even point out.
whai our consid-
erations have referred to up to now. But above
all: we are supposed to
Heidegger: There is an old Chinese proverb that runs, "Once
know at the very beginning, as well as after consideration of a fragment, pointed out is better than a hundred times said." To the
contrary, phi-
what xa Jtdvxa means. However, we can understand losophy is obligated to point out precisely through
the meaning nf tci saying.
Jidvxa only in the context of all the fragments in which Fink: We begin with the passages in which Jidvra
xa Ji6vxa is are mentioned in
mentioned. On (he other hand, we can work out the contextual order to look at how ndvxa are spoken of. We
whole begin with Fr. I which has
,

only through a step-by-s(ep procedure through individual already concerned us. The phrase
fragments, which alone now interests us runs:
which already presupposes a prior understanding of what is meant Yivojifvcov ydg Jidvxuv xatd xov X670V. We ask in
what respect ndvxa are
by xct
n<Svxa. The basic difficulty before which we stand is, mentioned, irdvxa are designated as ytvonEva. But what
therefore, the hei- does thai mean?
meneutical circle. we conceive Y^VEoQai narrowly, it means the coming-forih,
the bur-
Hkideger: Can we get out of this circle? geoning of a living being from another. But in
order to understand the
Fink: Mustn't we rather enter into this circle. extent to which Jidvxa are yivoneva in Fr.
1, we must bear in mind tlie
 18
19

naxft t6vWyov. Jidvra are moved in accord with Wyog. VLv6|xeva ndvta
viduality of ndvxa that, in Fr. 1. are spoken of as moved,
at thesame time stand in a relationship to humans who become uiicom^ and moved,
that is, accord with the XoYog.
in
prehending (d^uvetoi yCvovxai fivepwiioi). who do not understand
the Heidegger: Following the overall sense of Fr. 7, ndvta
X6Y05 in accord with which Jtdvta happen and are moved. are thus
related to yviboiq [inquiry], to grasping humans.
Heidegger: Let us also include among xata xov ^^yov the
t6v6e. Fink: yvcbaig with respect to ndvxa is possible,
Fink: The demonstrative t6v6e means: in accord with this Xoyog, however, only in so
far as jrdvra are distinct in themselves. Jidvta are moved
which then is discussed in what follows. in accord with
XoYo;. Ill their movement, in their change and passage, which lightning
Participant: Isn't it more appropriate to translate d|iJvEToi steers, they are at the same time
YLVovxai not with "becoming uncomprehending," but with distinct by themselves. The movement
"prove to be of the outbreaking lightning
u ncom prehe nd ng" ? i
gleam lets Jidvra come forth as distinct by
themselves.
Fink: When 1 translate vivovxai with "become," and put it in a Heidegger: Yet with the preliminary orientation, concerning
relationship to ylvoji^vcov yag JcdvTtov. I understand by it only a colorless the
way Tct Jidvra are addressed by Heraclitus. you have
already landed us in
becoming.
:m entire philosophy.
Heidegger: The beginning of our consideration was Fr. 64, in
Fink: But I still want to stick to the point
which we view the relatedness of steering lightning to xa n&via. that is. that the essential thing in
Fr. 7 is the reference of ndvra back to yvfooig
the relatedness of gv and irdvta. Further fragments and tuAyviooi^.
should now show us Heidegger: While Jidvta in Fr. 1 are seen in their
m what manner and in what respects this relatedness is mentioned. reference to
h.)yo<;, which is not of human character, they are
Fink: In Fr. 1, in which jidvta are spoken of as moved, mentioned in Fr. 7 in
their their reference to human
movement is related to ^^ayog. In the same fragment, the relationship of cognizance. Subsequently. 6iavoEia9ai [think
through] and biaUyzaQai [dialogue] then develop
humans to Xoyog is also mentioned in so far as humans do not under- themselves out of
biayiyvo3ox2iv [distinguish], diavvoiev is an
stand the \6yo<; in its moving relatedness to the moved Jidvra. From indication that Jtdvra are
Fr. characterized as what is distinguishable, but
1 ,
1
would like to move to Fr. 7: d navia m
Svra xajwo; yevolto. ^iVEg &\ guished.
not what is already distin-
'

6iaYVOLev.^ In what manner are TOvta spoken of here? Do

6vTa [things Participant: UX6yog is discussed in Fr. I, and 6idYva.oi; is dis-
that actually exist] elucidate Jtdvta or Jtdvra meant as an indetermi-
nate number of
is

a quintessential kind, so that we must translate:

cussed m
Fr. 7, can't one then refer the
yvwots of jrdvra to X6yos?
every Heidegger: You assume too much thereby. You
Svxa? 1 believe that rtdvta are understood here as distinction. pursue the con-
nection betweenhuman yvwotg and XoYog. But we want first to get
Heidegckr: That they are distinct emerges from dtayvoiev [would acquamted with the different ways in which Heraclitus
discriminate]. speaks of td
Jtuvta.
Fink: In Fr. 7, a familiar phenomenon
mentioned, a phenome-is
Participant: But isn't the ontic being [Sfiendsfin] of jidvia, which
non which disguises differences, namely, smoke. In smoke, to be sure,
comes to speech in 6vta. a quality of jidvxa which
distinctions become eliusive, but it does not eliminate those distinction.s is a necessary presup-
posiiion for ^Ldyvtooi;?
which become evident in ftioYVoiEV. Above all. the moment of being
Fink:I concede that the ontic
being of Jtdvra is a necessai^ piesup-
distinct is to be noticed in the word combination irrdvia
td fivra. for the discerning human cognizance. But
I>'>sition
Heidegger: How is ndvia thus to be comprehended? fivia is no quality of
Fink: Jidvia
TOvta. We
must, however, keep in mind that flvra is added
to the con-
xit flvta does not mean an enumeration of 6vTa and tent of navza in Fr. 7 as
hitherto treated.
does not signify 'all which is," but the ndvia which are, are set off from
Heidegger: But do we then know what td Svra means?
one another, are distinguished, ndvra, collectively as 6vTa, are the corre-
only
We would
come closer to the matter, if we would l>e concerned with
late of a fttayvcooLg [diagnosis]. The diagnostic the nose
character of a distinguish- ttif eyes, and
with hearing.
ing is sharpened in regard to smoke as a distinction-obscuring phenom-
Fink: In our context, the phrase xai
enon. Thus. ndvTO in Fr. 7 arc viewed as distinct. Yivofieva Jidvia xqt' ?0iv xai
Xetwv m Fr. 80 now interests us.= Here also ndvta
Heideggeh: What information concerning ndvxa does Fr. 7 give us Yivoufva are named'
'".w however, not Hard tov
vis-a-vis Fr, I ?
Xoyov t6v6i; as in Fr. I. but mt' fptv [ac-
coiding to strife]. At first, we leave
Fink: In Fr. the emphasis out of account the phrase jcal XPetw
7, lies on the distinctness, on the indi- laccordmg to obligation]. Now jidvta and their mannei
of movement
 20
21

are referred not to Wyog, but to strife. In Fr. 80, Jidvra enter into a
Fink: In Fr. 10. a relatedness is articulated between Jidvxa, in the
context of meaning with strife. It is reminiscent of n6kE\ioc,- — Fr. 53, to
sense of many and the one. and a relatedness of the one to
in entirety,
which we will yet turn.— From Fr. 10, we single out the phrase: ex
the many in entirety. Here, the one does not mean a part.
JidvTiov gv xai i% tvoq mivTa.* Here also we meet with a becoming, but Heidegger: Our German word Eins [one] is fatal for the Greek 6v.
not with what is meant by the movement of individual entities; rather, we
meet with the becoming of a whole.
To what extent?
Fink: In the relatedness of h/ and ndvxa, it is not only a matter of a
Heidegger: If we view it naively, how could hi K&vztav Iv be
lounterreference, but also of a unification.
understood?
Participant: I would like to understand h/ as something complex
Participant: Read naively it would mean that a whole gets put
in opposition to a numerical conception. The tension between §v and
together out of all the parts.
navTCi has the character of a complex.
Heidegger: But the second phrase, ki, ^vo; Jidvxa, already indi-
Fink: ^v is lightning and fire. If one wishes to speak here of a
cates to us that it is not a question of a relationship of a part and a whole
complex, one can do so only if one understands by it an encompassing
which is composed of parts.
unity that the many in entirety gather in themselves,
Fink: In Frs. I and 80, Jidvra yLyvoneva are mentioned. Their
Heidegger: We must think Ev. the one [das Eine], as the unifying.
being moved was referred on one hand to X6yoS and on the other hand
To be sure, the one can have the meaning of the one and only, but here
to strife. In accord with Xxiyo? and strife means: in accord with the
it has the character of unifying. If one translates the passage in question
movement of Xoyo^ and strife. We have distinguished this movement from Fr. 10. "out of everything, one; and out of one, everything," this is
from the being moved of Ji6vTa. It is not the same kind of movement as
a thoughtless translation. £v is not by itself a one that would have nothing
the movement of Jidvra. In Fr. 10, movement is brought up, but in the
to do with Jtdivta; rather, it is unifying.
sense of how one comes out of everything and everything comes out of
Fink: In order to make clear the unifying unity of Ev, one can take
one.
as a comparison the unity of an element. However, this is not enough;
Heidegger: Which movement do you mean here?
rather, the unifying unity must be thought back to the qne_oOigh.tDi_ngi tr.
Fink: The world-movement. With this, nevertheless, too much has
which, in its gleam, gathers and unifies the many in entirety in their
been said. We have noticed that one can understand ky, JtAvutov Iv distinctness.
naively as a relationship of part and whole. That one comes out of many
Heidegger: Ev runs throughout all philosophy till Kant's Tran-
is a familiar phenomenon. However, the same thing does not allow ex-
scendental Apperception. You said just now that one had to consider Iv
pression in reverse manner. Many does not come out of one, unless we
in its relatedness to K&vxa, and Jidvra in its relatedness to h/ in Fr. 10,
mean only bounded allness in the sense of a multiplicity and a set. xa together with Xdyog and strife in its reference to ndvra in Frs. I and 80.
nAvra is, however, no concept of bounded allness. no concept of set, but However, that is only possible when we understand \dyog as gathering
a quintessence. We must distinguish the concept of allness, in the sense and Sgig [strife] as dismantling. Fr. 10 begins with the word oxivdiJiLES
of quintessence as it is given in la ndvra, from the numerical or generic [contact]. How should we translate this?
allness, that is, from a concept of relative allness.
Participant: I would propose: joining-together [Zusammenjugen].
Heidegger: Do all the books that are arranged here in this room Heidegger: In this, we would be concerned with the word "to-
constitute a library? gether." Accordingly, Iv is that which unifies.
Participant; The concept of a library is ambiguous. On one hand, Fink: Fr. 29 seems at first not to belongin the series of fragments in
itcan mean the entire set of books lying here before us; but on the other which Jidvra are mentioned: aleeuvrai yiiQ gv dvrL djidvTOJv oE dQioroi,
hand, it can also mean the equipment other than the books, that is, the xWo; devoov Ovtitwv.' For here Jidvra are not mentioned directly in a
room, the shelves, etc. The library is not restricted to the books that s[K'cific respect; rather, a human phenomenon is mentioned, specifi-
belong to it. Also, when some books are taken out, it is still a library. call) that the noble minded prefer one thing rather than all else, namely
,

Heidegger; If we take out one book after another, how long does it
remain a library? But we see already that all the individual books to-
gether do not make up a library. "All," understood as summative, is quite
different from allness in the senseof the uniiy^of the peculiar sort that
""
everlasting glory rather than transient things. The comportment of the
uoble minded is opposed to thai of the jioXXol, the many, who lie there
like well-led cattle. And here, nevertheless, the reference in
question of
is £v and Jidvxa is also to be seen. According to the prima facie meaning, Iv

not so easy to specify at first. --

IS here the everlasting glory that
occupies a special place vis-a-vis all else.

I
 22 23

But the hagmeiil expresses not only the compoitnient of ihe noble same for beings." By beings, he evidently understands living
the all
minded in reference to glory, (ilory is standing in radiance. Radiance,
We wish, however, to translate i3in;6via)v: for the entirety of
beings.
however, reminds us of the light of lightning and fire. Glory relates itself
ndvra.
lo all other things as radiance to dullness. Fi 90 also belongs here in so
.
Hkidecger: tov aiixov djidvxiov stands only in Clement of Alexan-
far as it speaks of the relationship oi gold and goods. Gold also relates
dria, and is missing in Plutarch and Siinplicius. Karl Reinhardt strikes it.
itself togoods as radiance to dullness.
I would like to mention him once again, because I would like to refer to
Heidegger: Fr. 29 also names the jroUof next to the 6qiotol [the his essay, "Herahlih Lelire vom Feuei" (first published in Hermes 77, 942, 1

l>est]. the JtoWxji are compared with the djieCeoioiv, with the
In Fr.
pp. 1-27), which is especially important in methodological resjiects." It
1,

untried, who are contrasted with ky<a. that is, with Heratlitus. But we
was just thirty years ago, in the period during which I held the three
may not understand this opposition, as Nietzsche did. as a separation of lectures on the origin of the work of art, that I spoke at length with Karl
the prideful from the herd, Heraclitus also mentions one of the seven Reinhardt, in his garret, about Heraclitus. At the time, he told me of his
wise men, Bias, who was born in Priene, and says of him that his reputa-
plan to write a commentary on Heraclitus with an orientation toward
tion greater than that of others (Fr. 39). Bias has also said: oE nXEiOToi
tradition and history. Had he realized his plan, we would Ije much aided
is

fivepcuTEOL JtaKoi, most men are bad. The many do not strive, like the today. Reinhardt had also shown in the aforementioned essay that jtOq
noble minded, after the radiance of glory; ihey indulge in transitory cpgovitiov [sagacious fire], standing in the context of Fr. 64, is genuine
thingsand therefore do not see the one. and on that account is lo be looked at as a fragment of Heraclitus. What
Kink: In Fi-. 29, wc must ihink of glory in regard to radiance. The
the distrovery of new Heraclitus fragments implies, he indicated thus:
radiant is the fiery in opposition to that which the many and the
bad "An unpleasant outcome results. It is not impossible that with Clement
prefer. The noble minded, who aspire above all else to glory, stand near and the Church Fathers a few unknown words of Heraclitus flood about,
ihe thinker, whose glance is oriented not only to Jidvxa, but to ev in its
as though in a great river, which we will never succeed in catching unless
relatedness to tovto.
we were referred to ihem from another source. To recognize an impor-
Hkidegger: Pindar alst) connected gold, and thus the radiant, with tant word as important is not always easy." Karl Reinhardt is still with us.
fire and lightning. The preceding inspection of Fr. 29 has indicated to us Fink: In Fr. 30, the reference of ndvta and x6a|ioc; is thought. We
that a six-cific human cttniporlment ismentioned.
at first leave open what x6o[i05 means with Heraclitus. Let us l<»ok once again al
Fink: In this comporiment of the noble minded, the fundamental Fr. 41 which has already occupied us: h/ to oocpov, ^jiioraoSai YvailtTjv,
relatedness ofev and Jidtvra is mirrored in a certain manner in everlast- Here oocpov added We
6T^ti ^xwl^Egvijoe jrdvxa 6id Jtdvrwv." is to &v.
ing glory. Also in Fr. 7, Jtavxa stepped into association with human have already looked for the lelatedness of ^v and ndvia in the frag-
comportmeni. There, however, it was discerning cognii^ance. In Fr. 29, ments. We must ask whether cracpov is only a property of ev as unifying
Jiavia are also .seen in their leference back to a human comporiment. unity, or whether it is not preci.sely the es.sence of £v.
But it is not a question of a knowledge relationship; rather, ii is a ques- HEinKc;<;KR: Then we could put a colon between ev and oocpov. ^v:
tion ot a relationship of preference of one thing over another. Glory, OOfpOV.
however, is not distinguished by degiees from othei- jxjssessions; rather, Fink; oocpcW. as the es.sence of the unifying ^v, grasps ev in its com-
it has the character of distinction in opposition
to all other rhings. Ii is plete fulltie.ss of sense. If h/ up lill innv appears lo us to withdraw, we
not a question of ]3iefereiice for one ovei' another, but of preference
of have in Fr. 41 the first more accurate characterization as a kind of evcool^
the only ini])ortaiu matter as against all others. As the noble minded
[imiflcation], alth<)Ugh this concept is laden with Neoplatonic meaning.
picfer the only important matter, the radiance of glory rather ihan all
Ilt.iDKCitiKK: fv runs through all of metaphysics; and dialectic is also
other things, so the thinkei- thinks on ihe linifyiiig one of lightning, in not to Ix' th()ughl without ev.
ibehghi of which :TdvTa come to appearance, nol only aboiil JittVTu. .\nd
In Fr. .5:^, lo which we have already alludcft in connection
Fink:
just as the many prefer transient things to the radiance of glory, so with Fr. HO. itdvta gets placed in relationship to ;ioX,E|ioc. Ihe fragment
humans, the many, do not understand ihe unifying ev (which includes has the following word order: FloXruoc irdvxtuv (itv jTUTTjy EOti. jrdvrCDV
Jiltvia in theii- distinction) but only ihe tovtu. the many
things. fir (ktoi>.EiJ5, Jttti Toijc; ^iev Beouc; e6el^e tou^ 6f dvftywjtot'c;, lotig (ttv
In Kr. 'M). the focus of ih<)uglit is <)rientei:l lo the relationship of
mivTa 6o>jX.o\j5 f Jtoftioe TOi'g bk ^"KEvQiQovc,. Dieis translates: "War is the father
and Kooiinc;. The citation whith alone is now inieresling to us runs: ''W<\ king of all ibings. He established some as gods anil the others as
x6o|iov t6v6e, tov oiitov 6jidvT0)v, Diels translates: -"rhis world-oider.
luiinans; some he made slaves and the others free." The rcfeicnce of
 24 25

jidvra to jroXtno; has already indicated itself to us in Fr. 80, where egig
is
mentioned. Now war, that is, strife, is named lather and Iting oJ all
things.As the father is the source of children, so is strife, which we must
think together with ?v as lightning and fire, the source of ndvia. Ihe
conneciionofn:6>^Hoc;asfaihcr to ndvia repeats itself in aceriain way in
the relationship of JioXeno? as sovereign to navza. We must hring
Paodeii; [kingj into association with the steering and directing ol light-
ning. As lightning tears open the field of ndvro and w<jiks here as the
ful, good, and just; but humans have assumed some to be unjust and
others to be just." In Fr. 7, ndvia were related to human grasping. Now
Heraclitus speaks not only from the human but also from the divine
reference to Jidvra, Kverything is beautiful, good, and just for god. Only
hiunans make a distinction lietween the just and the unjust. The genuine
and true view on Jidvra and ev is the divine; the human is ingenuine and
deficient. InF"r. 29, we see a similar double relaiedness of Jidvta and ^v.
i There was the noble minded who preferred the radiance of glory
ii

driving and reigning, so war as ruler directs and reigns ovei- ndvxa. rather than all else, whereas the many indulged themselves in transient
Heidegger: When he speaks of father and ruler, Heraclitus grasps things and did not aspire to everlasting glory. Here it is the divine and
in an almost pt>eti( speech the sense of the dp/i) [ultimate principle] the human aspects that are placed in opposition.
of
movement: ngtuiov 66iv i\ hgxi] Tf|5 xivfioetos. I he origin of movement Fr. 108 names ootpdv as that which is set apart from everything: otKpov
is also the origin of ruling and directing. ecriL JidvTtov xextupLon^ov.' Here oo(p6v is not only a determination of
'

Fink: The phrases n6'kE\iog jidvrayv narf\Q and jrdvrajv ^aaikE6<; fv as in Fr. 41, but as ev that which is set apart from Jidvta. ootpov is
it is

are not only two new images; rather, a new moment in the relaiedness of thatwhich holds itself separated from Jidvta, while still encompassing
hr and Jidvta comes to speech in Ihcm. The way that war is the father of them. Thus, ndvta are thought from the separation of ^.
Jidvtajs designated in e6fi^E [established, brought to light]; the way that Heidegger: xe^qlohevov [set apart] is the most difficult question
war is king of Tidvra is said in EJiotijof [made]. with Heraclitus. Karl Jaspers says about this word of Heraclitus: "Here
Fr. 90 mentions the reference between n&vra and the exchange of the thought of transcendence as absolutely other is reached, and indeed
fire: iivq6i; te ^.vTa(ioi|Jri td jidvra xai kvq dndvtojv."' Here ev is ad- in full awareness of the uniqueness of this thought." (Die gjoxsen
dressed by name as fire, asit was formerly designated as lightning. The Philosopheti, Bd.I, S. 634).'^ This interpretation of XExioeiG|ievov as tran-

relationship between fire and ndvxa does not have the eharacter here of scendence entirely misses the point.
bare yEveoi;, of bring-about or bringing-forth (making), but rather the Fink: Again, Fr. 14 provides another reference to td Jidvra: |iiv
1

character of exchange, voo) >.eY0Vta5 loxupL^Eoeai xQil to) £\)vai jrdvrov, 6xo>ajiEe vonto JioJiig,
Heidegger: The talk of exchange as the way that tire as ^v relates xal jvokv EoxueotEQCD;. TQ^tpovtai ydg Jidvxe; o[ dveetojiEiot \6\i.oi hnb
itself to Jidvra has the appearance of a certain leveling. k\6^ zov Otioit. We can skip over the last .sentence for our present con-
Fink: This appearance is perhaps intended. Fr. 100 offers itself sideration. Diels translates: "If one
wants to talk with understanding, one
now for consideration. It runs: wgag at Jidvxa tpEQOvoi "The .seasons must strengthen himself with what is common to all, like a city with the
which bring Jidvia.'" Till now we have heard of steering and directing. law, and even more strongly." Here also, Jidvta are viewed from a spe-
showing and making, and now Heraclitus speaks of a bringing. Ihe cific human behavior. It cannot be decided at first glance whether only
hours, that is. the limes, bring jrdvia. Therewith, time comes into ev in the xoivov [public realm] of the city is meant by what is common to
an express manner. Time was
already named in a covert manner in everything, or whether it does not also refer to Jidvta. In the latter case,
lightning, and is also thought in the seasonal times of fire and in the sun. the fundamental relatedness of hi and Jidvta would reflect itself in the
Jidvta are what isbrought by the times. human domain. As the one who wants to talk with understanding must
Heii)e<;gek: Do you
lay more emphasis on time or on bringing? make himself strong with what is common to eveiything. so must the
Fink: I am concerned with the very connection between them. But judicious one make himself .strong in a deeper sense with the ^v, which is
we must stillopen how time and bringing are here to Ix- thought.
leave m company with Jidvta.
Bringing is an important moment which we must later
Hi.:iot:(:<;ER: HEinEG<;t:H; After ^uvdv[common] we must put a big (juestion
heed in the cjueslion concerning dialectic in 0U|i(pEe(.i|itvov [something mark, just as we do after XEXtogiofievov. Ihe question mark, however,
that is brought logelhei] and 6iatpE06|ievov [somelhing that is brought means that we must set aside all familiar i<lcas and ask and refiect. ^uvdv '

apart]. IS a separate, complex problem, Ix-cause here §vv vdcu

[with mind] comes
Fink: In Fr. 102. JtdvTU is viewed in a two-fold manner. It runs: tw into play.
HEV 6t(j) xiika jidvTtt xal dyaed xai bixaia. &vQQMnoi 6k G hev dftixu Fink; Now we have examined in which respect td Jidvta are men-
rmf i>.ii(paoiv Q 6e bUaia. Diels translates: "For god everything is Ijeauti- tioned in a series of fragments. We have still given no interpretation,
 26

therewith. Nevertheless, in passing through the many citations

whai xa
nAvxa means h^is not l>ea,me t leaie> to us.
Jiavta has Income n.oie (|ues[i<»u.ble
Rather, the expression ta jidvia-oXov, ndvTa-ovra Different —
in reference to the cases evhibiied Kxposition of Fragment 7 (C^orrelated Fragment 67).
It has become more
questionable to us what jrcivia are. wh;.t their com- jidv EQJiexov (Fragment 1 1).
ing to appearance is, and how
the reference ol Jiavta and i:v must l)e
thought and where this reference belongs. Maturation Character of the Seasons (Fragment 100).
When we say cuesti<.nable"
[fragi^mrdig], ,t means that the emerging
questions [Fr/.gen] are worthy
'
being asked.
lu'uidig] ot
Participant; Frs, 50 and 66 also l^elong in the series oC enumer-
ated fragments that (real oljidvra. Heideggeh: Let us look back to the theme of the last seminar.
Hkidk(;(;kh: Fr. 66 is disputed by Clement,
whom Karl Reinhardl Participant: In passage through the fragments in which id jrdvra
characterizesas the Greek Isaiah. For Clement
sees Heradituseschaiolog- is mentioned, we attempted to view the respects in which the phra.se tq
ically. Again, 1 emphasize that
it would be of inestimable jidvxa is sptjken by Heraclilus. These respects are the reference of navru
value il Kail
Reuihardt's commentary, oriented toward tradition to Xoyoc. to strife, to war as father and king of Jidvxa, to the unifying ev,
and history had
come down to us. r. u-. Reinhardl was no professional to xooiioc,, to the exchange of the, to ooqxW, to XEXflJi-OMi'vov, to the
philo.sopher but
he could think and see. .seasons, moreover, to the human comportment of discerning cogni-
zance, to the preference for one rather than all else, to stiengihening
oneself with what is common to all, and to the different divine and
human relation to iravra.
Heidec;(;er; Have we yet extracted what id nidvta means from
these manifold references?
Participant: Provisionally, we have interpreted xd Jidvxa as the
quintessence of what is individual.
Heide(;(;er: But where do you get the individual from?
Participant: In all the fragments, the view is oriented toward the
individual, which is taken together in the quintessence, xd jrdvxa.
Heii)E(;<;er: What does "individuar' mean in (ireek?
Participant: gxaorov.
Hilidec;ger: In passage through a series of fragments, we have
viewed the reference of id Jidvxa to ?v and that which belongs lo ev. Bui
in pursuit of the manifold references in which xd Jidvxa are mentioned,
we aie still not successful in characterizing more closely the phrase xd
Jidvxa. xd Jidvxa are also spoken of as dislingui.shed within themselves.
How is that lo Ix.- understood?
Pari icipant: "Fhc entirety of Jidvxa can l)e addressed as x6 oXov.
I his entirely is the quintessence of self-distinguishing Jidvxa.

Heidec;ger: Bui whai is the quintessence? Doesn't it mean the

whole?
Participant: The quintessence is thai which incloses.
Heiok(;(;er: Is there something like an inclosing quintessence with
llcra<liius? Obviously ni>l. Quinle.s.sence. inclosing, grasping and coni-
])rebeiiding is already by un-Cieek. With Heraclilus, there is no
itself
concept. .And also with Aristotle, theic still are no concepts in the pro[x.-r
sense. When does the concept arise for the first lime?
 28 29

Participant: When Xoyos, specifically the stoic xaTdX»)Tpig (direct of things, or than the wholeness of a summative kind. ?v is also not to be
apprciiensionj, gets transhiicd ami iindcrsKKxl as conceplus [concept]. understood like the xdojiog in Ti^aioz, [Timaem], which Plato specifies as
Hhideggkk: To talk of the concept is not (ireeit. It is not consonant a living being with extremities turned inside.'-' The wholeness of hi
with what we will treat in the next seminar. Ihere wc niusi also deal means the totality which we must rather think as £(paipog [sphere]. Thus
cautiously with the word "quintessence." we must discriminate the manifold of things and elements, the quintes-
Fink: Wiien
speak of quintessence, I would like to lay the em-
I sential entirety of ndvca, and the totality thought in hi, which lets the
on auvExov [keep together]. When the paiticipani said that I have
phasis entirety of ndvra come forth to appearance, and which surrounds it.
explained ta ndvta as ihe quinie.ssence ol the individual, he has claimed Hf.idec;ger: What do you mean by entirety? Once one has arrived
more than I have said. I have precisely not decided whether la ndvra at entirety in thinking, the opinion may emerge that one is at the end of
means an entire constellation of what is individual, or whether this thinking. Is that the danger which you .see?
phrase does not rather refer lo the elements and the counte preferences. Fink: At this point. I would like to speak of a double ray of thought.
.\i first, I understand xd n&vza only as the entire region
to which noth- We must di,stinguish the thought of things in the whole and the thought
ing is lacking; to which region, nevertheless, something is opposed. That that thinks the universe, the totality, or hi. I would like thereby to avoid
to which JidvTQ stands in opposition, however, is not alongside them; TO Jidvxa, which are referred back to ev as lightining, becoming under-
rather, it is wjmcthing in which jrdvxa are. Thus seen. KeQawvo; is no stood as a universe closed in itself.
longer a phenomenon of among
others in the entirety of xh
light Heidegger; If we speak of wholeness in reference to td Jidvra. the
Jidvra, We do not deny that in the entirety of what there is, lightning too danger then consists in ?v becoming superfiuous. Therefore, we must
is included in a pre-eminent manner which points in the direction speak of entirety and not of wholeness with regard to Td Jtdvra. The
of a
siimmvm ens [supreme entity]. Perhaps Kepawog as thought by Hera- word "entirety" means that Jidvxa are in entirety not as in a box, but in
rlitus is. however, no em [entity] which belongs with id Jidvra. also the manner of their thorough individuality. We choose the word "en-
no
distinci ens, hut something which stands in a relationship, still unclear tirety" on two grounds: first, in order not to run the danger that the last
to
us, lo id Jidvra. We have first formulated this relationship in a simile. As word be spoken with "the whole"; and second, in order not to under-
lightning tears open light, and gives visibility to things in its gleam, so stand Td Jidvxa only in the sense of Exaora.
lightning in a deeper sense lets ndvta come forth to appearance in its Fink: In a certain manner xd Jidvxa are the many, but precisely not
clearing. Jidvxa, coming forth lo appearance, are gathered in the bright- the many of an enumerated .set; rather, of a quintessential entirety.
ness of lightning. Because the lightning is not a light phenomenon inte- Heidegger: The word "quintessence" is on the one hand too static,
rior to the entirety of ndvca, but brings Jtdvra forth to appearance, the and on the other it is un-Greek in so far as it has to do with grasping. In
lightning is in a certain sense set apart from jtdvra. Lightning is, there- Greek, we could speak of negiexov [embrace]. But ix^\.\ [to hold] does
fore, the Kfeatjv65 ndviorv xex'^Q'-aufvoc. But as thus set apart, light- not mean grasping and grip. What comes into play here, we will see from
ning is in a certain manner also the joining and again the dismantling in the following fragments.
reference to itdvia. td rtdvia means not only the entirety of individual In order to return now to the fragments which we went through in the
things. Precisely when one thinks from out ofmigoc; XQOKai [transforma- lastseminar: we have seen that they speak of xd jxdvxa in different ways.
tions of fire], it is rather the transformations of fire throughout the great For example, Fr. 7 is the only one in which Heraclitus speaks of Jidvxa as
number of elements which makes up the entirety of individual things. flvxQ,and in which 6vxa is used at all. Precisely translated, it runs: If
IiKlividual things aie then \iiv.x(i, that is, mixed, out of the elements. everything which is were smoke, noses would discriminate. Here
Hkideggkr: In what would you see the distinctitm between entirety 6iaYiYva)oxELV is mentioned. We also speak of a diagnosis. Is a diagnosis
and wholeness? also a distinguishing?
Fink: We speak of wholeness in the whole structure of things which Participant: .A diagnosis distinguishes what is healthy and what is
we can address as 6J,a, and of the entirety i>f things, of the 6Xov, in which sick, what is conspicuous and what is not conspicuous in relation to
everything distinguished is gathered and set apart in a specific ordering. sickness.
HKini':(;<-.HR: Do you understand entirety as flXov oi- xae6>Lov Pariicipant: To speak in the terminology of the physician: the
[universal]? physician seeks specific symptoms of sickness. The diagnosis is a passing
I- INK- Biufi^-ov. the entirety of Jidvxa, is derivative from ev, which is through the body and a precise, distinguishing cognition of sympt<uns,
a wholeness of a completely different kind than the structural wholeness Hkidegger: The diagnosis rests on the original meaning of 6ia and
 30 31

means, first of all, a running through and a going through the entire Fink: I understand smoke as a phenomenon that veils the distinc-
body in order to come then to a distinguishing and a decision. From this tions of n6.vxa, without the distinctions disappearing entirely. For it is
we ah-eady observe that the bLaYLyvtiJoxeiv is not only a distinguishing. the nose that, in passing through the veil of JHivra, cognizes distinctions.
We must, therefore, say: If everything that is were smoke, noses would Heidegger: Thus you take 6id as "throughout the smoke. To the "

have the possibility to go through them. contrary, I understand 6i.d as "along the smoke." ftiaYiyvtooKEiv here
Participant: The distinguishing of entities would then happen by means that the possible manifold, immanent to the smoke, can be gone
means of the sense of smell. through and cognized.
HEiDtxiGER: But can the senses distinguish at all? This question will Fink: Whereas, on my preliminary interpretation, smoke veils a
occupy us later with Heiaclitus. But how does Heraclitus come to
still multiplicity, on your explication smoke is itself a dimension of multi-
smoke? The answer is not difficult to find. Where there is smoke, there is plicity. The question about xa 6vi;a depends on the way we understand
also fire. smoke. 6iaYiyvci)cn(eiv in the sense of distinction and decision presup-
Fink: If Heraclitus speaks of smoke in Fr. 7, then it means that the poses the ftid in the sense of "throughout" (minced).
smoke makes 61(115 l^'ghi] more difficult in reference to n&vxa xix Svxa, Participant: If all things would become smoke, then isn't every-
that, nevertheless, through the concealing smoke a
in passing thing one, without distinction?
bmy\.fjii>av.>L\y is way of ^ivtc [the nostrils]. We must also
possible by Heidegger: Then noses would have nothing more to do, and there
observe that Heraclitus does not say something like: If everything that is would be no bi6.. Fr. 7 denies precisely that everything that is would
becomes smoke. Rather, he says: If everything which is would become Income homogeneous smoke. If that were the statement of the frag-
smoke, ment, then no tliayvoiev could follow. We have brought Fr. 67 into play
Heidk<;gkr; We must understand the YLVeoSai [coming into exis- precisely ix^cause it contains an allusion to the fact that smoke is filled
tence] in Yt'VoiTO [would lx.'ComeJ as 'coming-forth." If everything that is with a manifold.
would come forth as smoke ... In the fragment, the Jidvia xa. ovra are Fink: Our attempt at interpreting the fragments of Heraclitus
straight away allied with a biavvwoi;. In the background, however, they began with Although we have already discussed a number of
Fr. 64.
are spoken of in respect to a charactei that is connected with fire. other fragments, this was above all because we wanted to learn in what
Fink: You bring smoke into connection with fire. Smoke stands in respects xa ndvra are mentioned. From Fr. 64, with which we Ijegan our
relation to the nose. That would mean that the nose also stands over the sequence of fragments, we now turn to Fr. II. It runs: Jictv yoq ^ginETov
smoke in a relation to fire. However, is ii not precisely the 6^115 which is JtXriYti vt-HETQi, I^ils translates: "Everything that crawls is tended by
the most fire-like in meaning? I would suppose that the sunlike natuie of (god's) (whip)blow." What can be the reason for arranging this fragment.
sighi can receive the firey more than the nose. Additionally, smoke is which declares that all crawling things are driven to pasture with a blow,
something derivative from fire. Smoke is, so to speak, the shadow of fire. liebmd the Keeauv6;-liagment? Approaching from another viewpoint,
One must say: If everything which is would become smoke, as that which isit also declared here how lightning steers and
how it guides ndvia; or
is derivative from fiie, then noses could cognize what is something entirely different aimed at in this fragment? Let us proceed
by means of is

resistance. However. I would suppose that 6i|)L5, rather than the nose, is in the explication of this fragment from the word nhc\yi\
[blow]. Diels
allied with fire. translates: with god's whipblovi,'. True, god is mentioned in the context,
HEiDKtiCiF.R: Nevertheless, I Ix'lieve that something else is meant by but not in the fiagment itself. We attempt an explication of the saying
the nose and smoke. Let us look at Fr. 67. There it says, among other without ibeieijy putting it in the context.
ihiiigs: dUoioiJTaL bi So)otoq {kvq). bnmav av\i^iyf[ Qvui\ia.ai\, Heidegger: You wish not to include the god. But with Aeschylus
6v<nid^tTUL xae' f|6oviiv fxdorou. -liui he changes Jusi like fire which, and Sophocles we find nkr\'{f\ in connection with the god (Agamemnon
when it is mixed with incense-, is named accoiding to ihe riagrance of :'67. .-\jiiK 1:17).
each one." n our context of meaning, the word we are concerned with is
1 Fink: In
ii\t\Yf\, I see another fundamental word for lightning. It
6tiij)na, incense. Depending on mixed with fire, a
ihe incense, which is means, then, the lightning lw)lt. On this ground, it is justified to turn
fragrance is sprea<l by which ibe fragrance is then named. It is important fi'om the Kt-Qcruvog-fragmem to Fi. II. Bin let us first stay
with the
here that the smoke of fire can be vaiiousK fragrant. That means that literal language of Heraclitus' saying; everything that crawls is tended
the smoke itself has an inherent manifold ol distinctions, so that it can be and driven to pasture by the blow. 'I'he whip blow drives the herd for-
cognized with the nose as a specific this or that. ward and tends it while it is on the pasture. Apparently, in the literal
 32
language, a grazing herd is spoken of, which is driven forward and
tended by means of ihe blow of ihe whip. But if we now refer the blow to
the hghining Ixjlt, then the blow is also thunder, which resounds
through the wide spaces, the voice of hghtning, which drives forward
and guides all crawhng things. ve(ieiv means on one hand to drive to
pasture, lend and feed; on the other, however, lo dispense and allot. We
can then say: everything which crawls is alloted by the blow as the voice
of lightning.
Heid£(;g£r: v^HEtaialso refers to NenEOLg [goddess of retribution].
Fink: NenEoig. however, does not have only the meaning of alloting
and dispensing.
Participant: VEHctai refers equally to v6(W)g [custom, law].
Fink: vojjoc regulates for all the citizens of the city the dispensing of
what is appropriate to them. The obvious image, which is, however, no
allegory, means that everything which crawls is put to pasture with a
blow being allotted to it. In ventTai the coerciveness of what befalls one
(being driven forward by a blow) connects with the tranquility of graz-
ing. We must hear many things together in ve^etaL: guiding, pursuing,
and steering of the blow and being driven. To the latter there also
belongs a tending and being steered. Allotment also belongs to the tran-
quil sense of grazing. Grazing as allotment is protection as well as getting
steered in the sense of being forced.
Heideggur: 1 would like to read a few verses from Holderlin's
poem, "Peace."
Unyielding and unvanquished, you strike ahke
The lion-hearted. Nemesis, and the weak.
And from the blow your victims tremble
Down to the ultimate generation.
You hold the secret power to goad and curb
For thorn and reins are given into your hands,
(Stuttgart edition, vol. 2, 1, p. 6, lines 13-18)'''
Fink: Astrophe from Holderlin's poem, "Voice of the People" (first
edition), also belongs here:
And, as the eagle pushes his young and throws
Them from the ne.si, to look in the fields for prey.
So, too. tile sons of man are driven
Out and away by the God's own kindness
(Stuttgart edition, vol. 2, 1, p. 50, lines S.^-Sfi)"
The kindness of the gods unites in itself the grace and the coercion
which we must li.sien for in vejieTm in Fr. 11. Therewith we have a
preliminary orientatitm concerning that which JlXTiyfj and VEHfiai mean.
But does the blow, which guides and allots, refer generally to xa Jidvxa?
In the saying iiself, xa navxa are not mentioned. Instead of this, it
mentions jrav fepnExov. li would seem as though a specific field were
33
carved out of id Jiavia. nav ^qjietov means everything which crawls.
Here it is not a question of the grammatical singular, but of a singular
that means a plurality: everything that crawls. Is the sphere of land
creatures that crawl outlined in opposition to creatures which live in the
air and in the water? Is the manner of movement of land creatures
characterized as crawling in contra.st to the quicker flight of birds or the
quicker swimming of water creatures? I would like to answer the ques-
tion in the negative. My hunch is that with Jiav ^qhetov we are not
concerned with a bordered region, but rather with the entire region of
xif. Jidvra; that is, from a specific aspect that specifies JiAvxa in entirety as
crawling. Jiav ^q71Ex6v must then be read xa iriivTa djg tgKExa [everything
as crawling]. In that case, Fr. 1 1 speaks of Jiavxa in so far as they are
crawling. To
what extent? What crawls is a conspicuously slow move-
ment, the slowness of which is measured by a quicker movement. Which
quicker movement is meant here? If we bring Jidv ^giretov, or Jitivxa the,
§QjiExd into connection with n\r\Y{\. it is the unsurpassably quick move-
ment of the lightning boll by which the movement of n&vxa as crawhng
must be measured.
Heidegger: If we no longer understand the lightning bolt only
phenomenally but in a deeper sense, then we can no longer say of its
movement that it is quick or quicker than the movement of Jidvxa. For
"quick" is a speed characteristic that only pertains to the movement of
JldvTCl.
Fink: The talk about "quick" in relation to the lightning bolt is
inappropriate. Measured by the quickness of lightning, everything that
comes to appearance in the brightness of lightning, and has its pas.sage
and change, is crawling. Seen in this way, Jidv tQKExdv is also a statement
alK)ut xd ndvxa. Now, howevever, td Jidvxa are looked back at from
lightning. The crawling of ndvra is a trait that we could not immediately
attribute to them as a qualitative determinalion. The manifold
movements that Jidvra in entirety went through are a lame movement as
compared to the movement of the lightning blow that tears open lighted
space.
Heidkgger: In order mind again the course of the in-
to bring lo
terpretation of Fr. 1 1 , just now put forward, we ask ourselves how the
fragment is, therefore, to be read.
Participant: The explication, the purpose of which was to relate
JTdv eqkexov to xd Jidvxa, began not with Jidv eqjtetov, but with
Ji\jyYf\
and VEHExai.
Hkidegger; That means that the saying is to l>c read backwards.
How it is we can read nav kgnexov as Jtdvxa tbg tQTtExa,
possible that
developed out of JiX,T|Yti and vE^iExai. From Jtdv ^pJieTtW alone, we cannot
learn the extent to which ndvxa are also mentioned with Jidv ^pjtEXOV.
Bui by means of Jtkf]Yf\ and vtjiexai, which refers back to the lightning-
 34 35

fragment, it becomes understandable why ndv ^QJietcW must be under- ning to glow faintly and become dim. If, now, "HX105 in the sense of the
stood as xa navia.
long enduring lightning lM>lt replaces lightning, then we must not forget
Participant: I would like to ask a foolish question. C^an one really
that this fire not only illuminates, but also measures the times. "HXiog is
understand Jiav ^gneiov as xa itdvia? For only the living being is spoken
the clock of the world, the world -clock; not an instrument that indicates
of in Jidv fegntnW, but xd Jtdvta also encompasses the inanimate.
times, but that which makes the seasons possible, which brings all. We
Heiduggek: Ihe t-xplication of Fr. began with the word it^-TiYri
1 1
cannot understand the seasons in the sense of fixed spells of time or as
that was referred to the lightning lx>lt Ihat steers id Jidvxa, as is said in
stretches in homogeneous time, but as the times of days and of years.
Fr. 64. The cxplicaiion was directed to ^v. In starting from ev in the
These limes of years are not the lingering but the bringing. Jidvxa are
specific form of the lightning boll, it was made clear that and how Jidv
not so gathered that ihey are contemporaneous, but they are in the
fQJiExov is to be comprehended as xd n&vza. Your question about the
manner that they arrange themselves xax' eqiv and Kuxct xov \6yov.
inanimate which would also belong to tovto is in fad foolish, because a and are steered by the begetting, fulfilling, and produc-
jidvta rise, act.
specific domain is therewith marked off in opposition to another do-
ing seasons.
main. The present explication of F'r. 1 1, however, has shown that with Heidegger: Let us try to clarify the extent to which time is men-
jtdv EQiTEXov il is not a matter of a demarcated domain but of something tioned in Fr. 100. What are seasons? .Alongside the three Hesiodic
universal. sca.sons, Exivo|iLa, Alxt), and EleiivT) [Good Order, Justice, and Prosper-
Fink: We must read ^Qntid. Crawling
jidv ^0JtEt6v as Jidvta (1)5
ous Peace], '^ there is also OoXXttJ, A-0|6, and Kapjiti). SoXKo) is the ,

does not mean here a property of specific things, namely living things on springtime, which brings the shoot and blossom. Aii|(!) means summer,
the earth. Rather, crawling is a character of itdvxa in entirety, which ripening and maturing. KaQJTio means autumn, picking of the ripe fruit.
does not reveal itself immediately, but only in relation to the suddenness These three seasons are nttt like three time periods; rather, we must
of the lightning which lets xci jtdvra appear in its brightness. In understand them as the whole maturation. If we want to speak of
comparison to the suddenness of the lightning Iwilt that tears open light, movement, which form of Aristotlian movement would come into ques-
the movement of ndvxa that are gathered in the brightness of lightning tion? First of all, what are the four forms of movement with Aristotle?
is a crawling movement. Between the suddenness of lightning and the
Partigipant: ofi^Tiai; and cpBioic [growth and wasting away],
crawling of Jidvxa, there is no relationship as Ixrtween the extratemporal YEVeoig and tpOogd [genesis and corruption], tpopd and as fourth
and the intratemporal. On the other hand, it is also not a matter of the d?J.OLC0OL5 [productiveness and alteration].'*
relatiimship of Achilles and the torioise. F.verything that moves about in Hkidegger: Which form of movement would be most appropriate
lightning's dimension of brightness is driven by the blow. In this Ix-ing to the seasons?
driven, Jidvro gain the character of crawling in reference back to light- Participant: aO^tioi? and (pBiois as well as Yeveoig and (ffJoQd.
ning. Fr. does not mention a shepherd who, turning out to pasture,
1 1
Heideg<;er: dXXoiwatg is contained in these forms of movement.
distributes and guides. Fr. says nothing of a giiider, but mentions
1 1
Spring, summer and autumn are not intermittent, but something con-
jidvxa in the character of their being struck and l>eiiig the subject vis-a- tinual. Their maturation has the character of continuity, in which an
vis the lightning lx)lt. Fr. does not relate to Fr, 64 as a partial domain
1 1
dWLo(ajoig is contained.
to the entirely of Jtavia. Much more, it expresses something about the Fink: "Ihe movement of hfe in nature is, however, growth as well as
relationship of jrdvra to naked power which drives and guides. withering. The first part is an increasing to dx^l^ [acme], the second part
Heidegger: Kxplication of Fr. II puts before us the ([uestion ^1 withering,
whether Ji^ilY»l and veiietcil actually allow a reference to the lightning Huoeggek: Do you understand fruit as being already a stage of
boll, so that :idv ^qjietov is to be understood, not regionally as a single decline?
aiea within the entirety of Jidvxa, but as the eiitiiety ot Jidvxa itself. Fink: The life of a living lieing forms a lising and falling Iwaw.
Fink: We turn to Fr. 100: fygaq, at Jidvxa tpeeovot. Diels translates: Human life is also a steady but arching movement, in its successively
"the seasons, which bring everything." In the context "H>,i05 is men- foUtming aging.
tioned, which is another name for fire as well as lightning. In ibis fiag- Ih.iDEtif.KK: .Age corresjxtnds to fruit in the sense of ripening,
ment there is a connection Ix-tween "HXioc;, and time. We can ask
light which understand not as a declining but as a kind of self fulfillment. If
I
oin-seivc-s whether lightning isn't i>nly a momentary lire in contrast to lime comes into play with the seasons, then we must let go of calculated
"HA.105, which is a fire of greater constancy, il not everlasting, but Ijegin- lime. We must attempt to understand from other phenomena what time

36
means here. Also, we may not separate the content of time from the
form of time. The character of bringing l>el<>ngs to lime. In our lan-
guage we also say: lime will tell.'" So tongas we understand time as bare
succession, bringing has no place.
Fink: In order to win an understanding of the maturation charac-
ter of the seasons, we must disregard homogenous time, which one
represents as a line and as bare succession and in which the time content
is abstracted. Such an abstraction is impossible with the seasons.
HEiDEtiGER: Fr. 100 places us before different questions. To what
extent may one take the seasons together with K&vxa? How must time be
thought, if one wishes to speak of it here, especially if one saysof it that it
brings. We mustsimply get clear to ourselves in what .sense time brings.
Fink: In it is necessary not to think time as a colorless medium
this,
in which things swim about. Rather, we must seek to understand time in
reference to the yiYV^oQai of ndvra.
Heidegger: We must think time together with (pvoL?.
Fink; Pre.senily, we
stand before the question whether Fr. 100 is
able to give us still further references to the matter that we attempt to
think, or whether it is not more appropriate to revert first to Fr. 94.
HeideG(;er: The 2500 years that separate us from Heraclitus are a
perilous affair. With our explication of Heraclitus' fragments, it requires
the most intense .self-criticism in order to see something here. On the
other hand, it also requires a venture. One must risk something, because
othei^wise one has nothing in hand. So there is no objection to a specula-
tive interpretation. We must therefore presuppose that we can only have
a presentiment of Heraclitus, when we ourselves think. Yet, it is
tion whether we still can measure up to this task.
1
—
"HXiog, Daylight Night, jiexga-xeQuaTa
(Correlated Fragments: 94, 120, 99. 3, 6, 57, 106, 123).
Fink: In the last seminar session we have let some questions stand un-
masicred. Today we are still not in a p(»sition to somehow bring the
openness of the explication situation to a decision. After discussion of
the "HXioc;- fragment [sun fragment] we attempt to come back to Frs. 1
and 100 in which Jiav ^gjiextiv and tIJQai [seasons] are mentioned.
We have seen that cb@ai, the hours and the limes, are not to be taken as
a stream of time or as a temporal relation that, subjected to metric
leveling down, is measurable and calculable. Hours and times are also
not to be taken as the empty form in contrast to the content of time, but
as tilled time which begets and produces each thing in its' own time. a>Qai
are no hollow forms, but rather the times of the day and of the season.
The limes of day and seasons apparently stand in connection with a fire
that does not, like lightning, suddenly tear open and place everything in
the stamp of the outline, but that holds out like the heavenly fire and, in
the duration, travels through the hours of the day and the limes of the
season. The heavenly fire brings forth growth. It nourishes growth and
—
maintains it. The light-fire of "HXiog tears open different from
—
lightning continually; it opens the brightness of day in which it allows
a ques- growth and allows time to each thing. This sun-fire, the heaven-
illuminating power of "HXiog, does not tarry fixed at one single place,
but travels along the vault of heaven; and in this passage on the vault of
heaven the sun-fire is light- and life-apportioning and time measuring.
The metric of the sun's course mentioned here lies before every calcula-
tive metric made by humans.
If we now turn to Fr. 94 in which the talk is explicitly about this
heaven-fire, then we remain on the trail of fire, which we have already
trod with the Kegaiivig-fragmen t. Fragment 94 runs as follows: "HXL05
yag oiix iiJieeprioeTai (lexga' ei 6b iif\, 'Egiviieg ^iv Aixeg 'ejcixoueoL
e^ewQtiooiJOLV. Diels translates: "(For) Helios will not overstep his mea-
sures; otherwise the Frinyes, ministers of Dike, will find him out. If we
"
let this fragment work upon us without particularly thorough prepara-
tion, what is expressed in it, supposing that we be permitted to take the
sayings of Heraclitus as a model of a thematic statement?
Kiist of all, the word \ie.XQO. [measure] is problematic. Which measure
does the sun have or set up? Does the sun it.self have measures in which it
travels along the vault of heaven? And if the sun sets up measures, which
measures are these? Can we determine more closely this distinction be-
 38
tween the measures that belong to the sun itself and those that it sets up?
First, we tan understand ttetga in reference to the passage and course of
the sun. "HX105, as the tire that travels the heaven, has specific measures
in its course like the measures of morning light, of midday heat and of
subdued twilight. If we look only toward the phenomenon of the sun's
course, we see that "HX,io5 exhibitsno even, homogeneous radiation, but
rather timely differences in the way of lieing luminous. Al the same time,
however, by the measures through which the sun passes in its passage,
the nourishing fire is apportioned in various ways to the growth of the
earth that is found in the sun's brightness. The second meaning of [lexQa
lies therein: the measures of light and warmth which the sun apportions
to growth. We can on one hand distinguish the measures which are
exhibited by the course of the sun itself, and on the other hand those
measures which ihe sun sets up 10 what it shines on in the way that the
sun apportions the llery to it, HEtgacan thus be iiiidcrsKMid in a two-fold
manner: the HFxpa of the sun's course and the n^XQa that works down
from the sun's course to what nourishes itself from the sun's light. How-
ever, does the sun also have HEXQa in yet a completely different sense?
Is "HXL05, which is bound to the measures of its course and which apjKir-
tions from there ihe nourishing fire to everything found in ihe sunlight,
is this °HXlo5 squeezed into measures in a completely other sense? Is there
perhaps also \i£TQa in such a manner that the entire double domain of light
is determined by measures? When Heraditus says, "For "HXiog will not
overstep his measures," a natural law of "HX105 is in no way formulated
here. It is not a matter of the insight that the sun's course is subject to any
inviolable natural law, for then the second sentence would have no
meaning. In this sentence it says that in case "HXio? should overstep his
measures the Erinyes, helpers of Dike, would track him down and bring
him to account. But what is a restriction, a holding to measure of "HX105?
"HXiog will not overstep his measures. Can we imagine at all that he
would Ix.- able to overstep his measures- We have brought to mind two
ways in which he would not take the correct way across the vault of
heaven. One could imagine that he suddenly stops, jierhaps at the com-
mend of Joshua for the time in which Joshua waged battle against the
Amorites. That would l)e an overstepping of the ti^tga of his own na-
ture. In such a case he would no longer be in accord with his own nature
of flerv power. "The sini could change her own essence if she traveled
along the vault of heaven in a maimer other than in accord with nature.
'ihe sun could overstep her measures if she ran from north to south
instead of from east 10 wesl. However, a completely different manner of
overstepping iJie lK)undary would lie siipjxtsed if "HXioc; weie lo bieak
into a domain of w hich we could not speak further at the moment, for
this domain lies beyond the Ijrigbtness of "HX105 in which the many arc
gathered. Then "HXiog goes out of the sun's domain in which everything
39
isone in another sense. That would also be a going astray of the sun;
now, however, not in the manner of deviation from the sun's path, but in
the manner of a breaking into the nightly abyss to which "HXioc; does not
Ijelong.
In order to bring this thought somewhat nearer, let us include frag-
ment 120 in which XEgiiaxa [boundaries] and not ^teTQa are mentioned:
f\ov<; xaL tajtEQac, TEgnaxa f| fipxtog xaL Aviiov xr\q &Qy.xov oipog aEepiou
Aujg. Diels' translation runs: "The boundaries of morning and evening;
The Ijear and, opposite the !x;ar the boundary stone of radiant Zeus."
My question now is whether the domain of the sunny is encircled by the
xEpftaxa (which with XEenaxC^Eiv = to confine, lo connect), that is, encir-
cled on one hand by morning and evening, and on the other hand by the
bear and by the boundary stone of radiant Zeus, which lies opposite the
bear. I identify the bear with the North Star so that the boundary stone of
radiant Zeus, which lies opposite the tear, would lie in the south of the
vault of heaven. Fr. 120 implies then that"HX,Lo?, which moves across the
vault of heaven from morning to evening, is confined in the possibility of
its deviation toward north or south by the bear and the boundaiy stone
of radiant Zeus which lies opposite the bear. Therefore, we must think
radiant Zeus together with "HXiog as the power of day which illuminates
the entirely of td Jtdvxa. This entire domain of the sun is closed in four
directions of the heaven, in which case we must under.stand xeQuaxa as
theouter boarders of the domain of light in distinction from ^£TQain the
sense of specific places on the familiar path of the sun.
Heidegger: How do you read the genetive: fjoOg kqi SontQag?
Diels translates, "Boundaries of morning and evening,' which is to be
understood as, "Boundaries for morning and evening. But do you wish
"
to read, "The Ijoundaries which form morning and evening"?
Fink: I stick with the latter, but I ask myself whether the meaning is
fundamentally changed by this difference and also by the manner of
reading, "Boundaries for morning and evening." if we understand
XEQuaxa as boundary places, iht morning as the east boimdary, the even-
ing as tile wesi boundary, ibe bear as norih l>oundarv and the boundarv
sione opposite the bear as the south Ixnnidary, then we have, as it were,
ihe four coiners of the world as the field ol the sun's realm. Thus seen,
xtQ^aia would not be equated with the two meanings of n^ga just
mentioned. That which Fr. 120 says in icference to TFQuaxa would !)e a
liiircl meaning ol hexqu that we must include with !>oih of the others in
ordei lo take in view the full meaning of ^fTQa in Fr. 94. In this case as —
a deeper-going cxplicaiion of this fragment vvitl reveal lo us
—
precisely
ihe third meaning plays a prominent role. "Ihe first meaning of [ifipa
that we accentuated concerned the places and times through which the
'•im passes from morning through midday to evening. In a second sc'nse.
tiFTpa means the measures thai arc sent from the sun for things. A
 40
deviation trom the measures that are sent would, for growing and living
things, mean that the sun is too hot, too close or too lar away. The third
meaning of [i^XQa, which we have picked up out of Kr. 120, signifies
T^enaxa in which the sun's entire domain of light is enclosed. Were
"HXiog to overstep the Ijoundin y tiiai is fixed by the four corners of the
world, the Erinyes, helpers of Dike, would find "HXloc; out. Such an
overstepping would not only mean a deviation from the familiar path;
rather, such an overstepping would mean a breaking into a nightly abyss
to which the sun's domain does not Ijclong.
Heidegger: When you grasp rioOg xal ^ontpa; as genitivm subiec-
tivus [subjective genitive] then you come into proximity of the third
meaning of ixiiQa.
Fink: do not want at first to maintain this as a thesis. Rather, I am
1 the North Star and the daily culmination point of the sun's passage, then
only concerned to show three possible meanings of [leTga, whereby the
third signifies that which Fr. 120 says about TEpnaia.
Heidegger: In ordinary language use, we distinguish, in reference
to [iEXQa,between the measure and the measured.
Fink: We can understand measure in a topical and in a chronos-
related sense. The first significance of HEXga means the measures that
the sun will not overstep, the measures in the sense of the places and
times of its path across the vault of heaven. Measures mean here, how-
ever, not natural laws, but they concern rather the CpVJoi? of "HX105. The
constancy of the sun in its daily and yearly path derives from its (pi3oig.
"HXio? remains held in the measures of its path by its own essence. The
second meaning of \iiixQa signifies the measures, dependent upon the
measures of the sun's path, in reference to the growth in the sun's field.
Here agrowth and decline is possible, afxjve all when one thinks on the
on the overstepping of the sun's measures which
^XJiii0a)OL5 -teaching,
consumes everything. f "HXiog holds in his natural path, the growth that
I overstepping and brings him to account is Dike with her helpers. Dike is
is illuminated by him has its blossoming and its proper times. The third
meaning of jiEtQa is to be seen in the confinement of the sun's realm by
the four corners of morning, evening, the bear and the Ixtundary stone
which lies opposite the fjear. Inside this encircled domain, "HXtog travels
and rules. The jurisdiction of "HXiog is closed in by the four xepnaxa.
Heidegger: Then we must strike the genitive "of in Diels' transla-
tion. Then one must not translate, "boundaries of morning and eve-
ning," but rather, "boundaries which form morning and evening."
Participant: In the commentary of the Diels-Kranz edition, it
indicated how the translation is There we read, "The
to be understood.
interpretation of Kran/, Berl. Silz. Ber., 1916. 1161. is chosen here:
Morning and evening land gel separated by the coinmunicalion line of
the North Star with the (daily) culmination poini of the sun's path which
Helios Iniay not overstep (B 94) (— Zfuc aiOpLOC [radiant Zeus] tompare
22 C IZ. 4, Pherecydes A 9, Empcdocles B 6, 2 et al),"
41
Fink: But then x^Qfiaxa would no longer have the sense of bound-
aries that form morning and evening. In such a view, morning and
evening liecoine almost a determination of a region that seems to me
questionable.
Participant: The translation is oriented around the idea of Orient
and Occident, which get separated by the communication line of the
North Star with the daily culmination point of the sun's passage. I myself
would not follow this interpretation either, since there was not yet the
idea of Orient and Occident in Heracliius' time. Rather, this idea can he
assigned only from Herodotus on.
Fink: The Kranz interpretation does away with the Ixiundary
chaiacier of moiningand evening. If one speaks of the one line between
also the plural, tFQuata, is no longer quite understandable. Although
the explication given by Kranz is a possible answer to the difficulty that
Fr. 120 presents, still it seems to me as if the lectio diffuilior [more difficult
rendition] is thereby precluded.
We have brought to mind the ambiguity of (iexqo of 'HA.105 in refer-
ence to Frs. 94 and 120. That has been only an attempt. We must now
take into consideration the other sun fragments as well as the fragments
concerning day and night.
Heidegger: In talking through the three meanings of the iiexQa of
"HXtog, you wanted to concentrate on the third meaning that you indi-
cated at the beginning of the discussion of Fr. 120. In Fr. 94, this third
meaning is given by the second sentence which is started by zl bk [iVj
[othei"wise], and in which Dike and the Erinyes are mentioned.
Fink: Perhaps "HX105, who appintions everything, is himself con-
fined by another power. The jurisdiction that finds him out in a case of
the diety of ibe just, ihe diety who watches the boundary l»elween the
domain of tlie sun's brightness and of what is found therein, and the
domain of the nightly abyss that is denied to us. The guardians of this
boundary are the helpmates of Dike. "Fhey watch out that "HX105 does
iioi over.step his own domain of power and attempt to break into the
dark at)yss.
Heidegger: On this third possible meaning of hexqo you p<jint to
r-r. 120 as support.
is Fink; If we now go back to the phenomena, we find the strange fact
ihai daylight runs out in lx>undlessness. We have no Ixjundary to day-
light. If we speak of the vault of heaven, we do not mean thereby a dome
which closes off; rather we mean the sun's domain of daylight which
runs out in endless openness. We also know, however, ihe phenomenon
ol locking up of ihe open heavens, the heaven clouded over. Bui there is
still one other l^>undary of the ligbi domain, and that is the soil on which
 42
we walk. Light, as the element of the flei-y, together with the element ol
the air, lies on the earth and in a certain manner also on the (K:ean. The
ocean also forms a boundary for the realm of light, although the ocean
lets in the light up to a certain depth. Its transparency is confined.
The
opaqueness of the earth, which leads to the Ijoundedness of the o|x^n
domain at light, is a peculiar phenomenon that is not evident to us for
the most part. We find ourselves on the opaque earth, at which the
domain of light has its l>oundary. Over us, however, light's domain of
power extends in open endlessness. Ihe opaqueness of the earth has a
meaning for the passage of the sun. In accord with the immediate phe-
nomenon. "HX105 rises out of the bowels of the earth at morning: in
daytime he moves along the vault of heaven and he sinks again into the
closed ground of earth at evening. Thai is said as a description of the
immediate phenomena without esoteric symlxilism.
Now we turn to Fr. 99, which evidences the geneial structure; ei nr|
f|>.io5 ^*, gvExa tfiiv aUcuv fioxQuyv et(f)Q6vr\ fi;v f|v. Diels translates:
'Were there no sun. it would \->e night in spite of the other stars." "HJlio;
is the star that alone brings full brightness. Now, however, he is not
only
indicated in his power, in his superiority over the other stars, hut the
structure, which we do not see in "HXio^ himself, becomes clear in the
other stars. The other stars are lights in the night. We have here the
noteworthy feature thai luminescence exhausts itself in its radiated light
space and is walled in by the dark of night. The other stars ate gleaming
points in the night heaven. The moon can also illuminate the night in a
.stronger manner than the stars, but the mcMin cannot extinguish them as
alone 'HA-iog can. We must put the following question concerning the
other stars in the night. If "HX105 presents himself as a realm of light
above the opaque ground, and if he seems to go on in open endlessness,
can we not also understand the structine of HXioc and tq Jidvra in
' ments which treat of day and night. Fr. 57 l)elongs to these. The most
termsof the other stars as lights in the darkness of night? That is, can we
understand the whole world of the sun as a light in the night which, it is
true, not certified by the phenomena? We would then have to say that
is
as the stars are a tight in the night, and as the sun's domain of light has its
l)oundary at the closedness of earth, so the entire world of "HX,loc;, to
which the entirety of jrdvTa Ijclong. is encircled in a deeper sen.se by a
nightly abyss which confines the domain of power of "HXiog. The
helpmates of Dike watch from the lx>imdary Ix'lween the light domain of
'HXtog and [he dark abyss, 'Ihe sun hei-self we do not see like one of the
stai-s in the nigbt, but only in her own brightness. Fr. ^ speaks thereof:
eiiQo; nobog uvOewnELOD. As phenomenon, the sun has the width of a
human foot.
IIeidecglk: When you speak of 'phenomenon." you mean that
which shows itself in its immediacy, and not the phcnomenological."
f ink: Fr. 3 also speaks in the manner of allegory. To lx.'gin with
43
says that only a tiny, insignificant place belongs to the sun as a source of
light with its own brightness, so that the opening power of "HXio? in the
opened light space itself appears to be only a negligible affair. What
opens veils itself in a certain manner in what is opened by it, and takes a
[x)sition l>elow the things encircled by it as the light power. To the extent
that the sun appears in the firmament in the width of a human f(x»t,
ascends, sinks and disappears, she is new on each day. as Fr. (i says; veoq
f (p T|(i,EQTi icrtiv. Heraciitus gives no scientific stipulation that each day the
sun arises new. The newness of the sun on each day does not contradict
the fact that she is the same sun each day. She is the same, but always
new. We must hold on to this thought for the question concerning the
sun as a form of kvq iet^toov. which perpetually is, but ^as Fr. 30 —
—
says is kindled and qtienched according to measures, wherein the con-
stant newness itself comes to expression. When we come to Fr. 30 the
concept of fietga will allow itself to be deteimined more precisely.
From Fr. 6 we turn to Fr, 57: 61660x0X05 ^e jiXeiotcuv 'HoioSog-
toOtov ^nioxavtai likEima efSevat, 001:15 f|nt0T)v xai fvqjgoviiv oiix
Eyivtuoxev- eori yag
ev. Diels' translation runs, 'Hesiod is teacher of the
many. "Fhey are pursuaded by him that he knows most; he, who does not
know day and night. Yet, one is!" In what does the suppo.sed wi.sdom of
Hesiod consist? To what extent has he, who has written alH)ut days and
works, not known day and night? Day and night are alternating condi-
lionsof the sun's land in which it is bright and dark in rythmic alteration.
The darkness of night in the domain of the sun is something other than
the closedness of the soil into which no light is able to penetrate. The
dark night is illuminated by the glimmering stars. In contrast to the
closedness of the earth, the dark of night has by itself fundamental
iliuminabitiiy. together with the sun fragments we must think the frag-
diffuiilf phrase in it is eori yay Ev|Yet, one is]. If day and night are to be
one. then wouldn't the plural EiOL [are] have to stand in place of the
singular t'ori [is]? Is the indistinguishabiliiy of day and night meant here,
or else something completely different which does not show itself at first
glan<c. Our (juestioii is: does Fr. 37, sjxjkenout of fc-v. contain a statement
uincerning day and night? Are day and night in ev, <)r aie they i;v?
Hesiod has evidently understood most of day and night, and yet he is
reproved i)y Heraciitus !>ecau,se he held day and night to Ik.- of dilferent
kinds. Ill Hesiod's I'hmffmy the contrast of day and night means some-
thing other than merely the contrast of two conditions of transparent
space in which light can be present or absent.
Perhaps il is too d.ning il we think in this connection about the strife
ol ihe Olyiiipian gods with the Titans. Here a cleft runs through the
entirety that draws together lor lleiaclitus. if not in the evident, then in
it 'he unseen barinony. One can read the IcxiydQ t'vin this .sense. Day and
I.
 44 45

night do not comprise any distinction you please, but rather the original Fink: The of day. however, is held against a positing of
\iia cpitot^
form of all distinctions. The contiast of day and night also plays a role good and had. propitious and unpiopitious days. The oneness of
that is,

with Parmenides (nopifid^ yitg KaxifJEvro 6iJO vvwuotg 6voji(i^iv) [For (he nature of day stands against such distinction of the days. This, how-
they made up their minds to name two forms].'" however, in reference ever, not to l)e equated with the Eotl yiiQ £v in reference to day and
is
to mortals. If one understands eotl yap fv in the sense that day and night night.The distinction of good and bad days does not have the .same
are one in §v, then wouldn't the plural elai have to stand in place of ?ctti? importance as the distinction of day and night. Accordingly, §v is in each
Seen grammatically, is a pluial possible here at all? For me the <]uestion case different.
is whether, instead of reading, "day and night are one &v or are in t^," Heidec;c;er: Nevertheless, you are in a certain way right in connect-
one must read, "there is ev." In this case, vanishing of distinctions would ing Vrs. 57 and 106, In Ixtth fragments the talk is about an ignorance
have another sense. Hesiod knew his way around, but he did not know of in reference to Hesiod, The one time, he misunderstands ^v in reference
&V. that it is. "For there is ^v." Thus read. ?v is not to be comprehended as to day and night; the other lime, he misunderstands the one and the
predicative, but as the subject of the sentence. same cpuoi^ of each day. To this extent, ^v and nCa (pvoig do hang to-
Heidecger; Then fori ydQ ¥y is to be taken absolutely. To think of gether.
it differently or to believe that Hesiod did not recognize day and night Fink: Fr. 106 is, rather, only a parallel to Fr, 57. In the latter,
would be an unreasonable suggestion. Hesiod is found to lie unreliable as the teacher of most people. He, who
Fink: When Heraclitus says that Hesiod has not recognized day and is versed in the fundamental distinction of day and night, has not ob-
night, that is an intentionally provocative statement. served that there is ^v.
Heide(;ger: One does not need to be Hesiod in order to distinguish Heidegger: Most people are, for Heraclitus, they who do not know
day and night. When he treated of day and night he did so in a deeper what matters. The nXEtaroi [the greatest number] are the same as the
sense than in the manner of a mere distinction that each of us performs. JloXXot [the many]. We cannot translate tfvoic, in Fr, 106 with essence.
Thus, Heraclitus cannot have wanted to say that Hesiod has distin- Fink: When we say "essence," it is not meant in the sense of e.isentia
guished day and night, but that he has erred since day and night are one. [substance].
We cannot accept Dials' translation. "Yet, one is!" Heidegger: If we include Fr. 12-3, tpijoig xQiijireoOai ffikEi [Nature
Fink: "Yet. one is!" sounds like "They are one of a kind." I am loves to hide], how then is tpijoig to l>e understood?
unable to connect any sense with this translation. Day and night are Participant: In the sense of emerging.
familiar to us as the changing conditions, as the basic rhythm of life, as Heidegger: The connection of cpi^oig and Ev will concern us in
presence and absence of the sun in her light in the domain of the open. greater detail later.
The domain of the open can be daylight or dark night. This distinction is Fink: For me. the puzzling word in Fr. 57 is ^<m yiiQ ?v. We have
familiar to us in its rhythmic return. In the way that the return is translated: For there N. But what kind of ^ is treated here? Isit ?v in
is

adhered to, "HX105 shows adherence to measures that he has and that are
protected from outside by Dike. When Heraclitus says that Hesiod mis-
understood day and night, he does not thereby wish to maintain that
Hesiod has overlooked the fact that day and night form no distinction at
all. Rather, Heraclitus wishes to maintain that day and night are one in
thinking back to Sv, and that within gv they are set apart as opposite
relations, as we can also find in Fr. 67, where it says that god is day night,
ibe sen.SL- of a counterword to la niivta, and thus the ^v of lightning, of
the blow, of the sun and of lire; or is still another fv meant here? My
supposition tends to lie that it is a question here of ^v in the sense of the
oneness of Ixjth domains of "H>.l05 and of night, which is guarded by
Dike and her helpmates. This new .sense of ev will first become clearer
tor us if we include the life and death fragments. The night meant here
is the nightly abyss by which the sun's domain is encircled at the four

winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger, Heraclitus is much more Tf piiUTO as they are called in Fr. 1 20. .Apart from this interpretation, one
concerned here with ev in quite another manner. could also argue as follows. If &v is mentioned in Fr. 57 in reference to
PARTit:iPANT: Musn't we also take Fr. 106. in which ^(a (puo'.g day and night, it is then a question of the Sv of the land of sun in which
f|[i^Qac [one nature of day] is menticmed, along with Fr. 57? the sun is present and absent in rhythmic change; and indeed in such a
Heidegc;kr: How do you wish to bring Ijoth fragments into connec- manner that in the change of day and nighl the domain remains in
tion? which the sun is present and absent. There is tv in so far as the structure
P.\RTic:iPANr: I would think jiCa cpuoic; [one nature] together with of the vault on which (he sun moves remains, and in so far as the relation
£oTi yixQ gv. of opposition to the land that lies under the sun remains, even though

f
 46
the sun temporarily is and new on each new day. Thus seen, h/
absent
would be the vault of heaven. However, this explication is not acceptable
to me. I do not understand, "there is ^v," in this sense.
He[degger: Why do you reject this interpretation?
Fink: Because for me the unionof day and night under the vault of
heaven is too easy :i reading. When Heratlitus says "there is ev" in refer-
ence to day and nijrht, the land of sun is meant with the day, and the
dark abyss that incloses and encircles the land of sun is meant with night.
The sun'.s domain and the nightly abyss together form i'v,
Heide(;(;er: Is the ev that you now have in view something like an
over-being that surpasses even being: I suppose that you want to get out
of being with your interpretation of ev, which departs from the hitherto
existing illuminating h/ of lightning.
Participant: I do not believe that ev as the double domain of the
land of sun and the nightly abyss surpasses l>eing. If the preceding
interpretation has, in starting out from the KEQauvog-fragment, focused
first on the structural moment of the light character in being, the uncov-
ering, then the current interpretation, when the nightly abyss is men-
tioned, focuses on the structural moment of closedness in being, on the
concealment that belongs essentially to uncovering. Therefore, the expli-
cation does not surpass being; rather, it goes deeper into being than the
preceding awareness, since it lakes in view the full dimensionality of
being.
Fink: Our explication of Heraclitus began by our illuminating the
reference of lightning and la JtAvxa. Lightning tears open the bright-
ness, lets TO navTU come forth to appearance and arranges each thing in
its fixed outline, .-\nothername foi' ?v is the sun. The sunlight, which
runs out over us in open endlessness, finds a Ixjundary at the closedness
of the soil. In his own field of light, "HXio^ has only the width of a human
foot. He moves alont>; in fixed measures on the vault of heaven. By his
own measures, grow'th and living creatures, which are shined upon by
"HXloc;, have their specific measures. Within the realm of the sun there is
a general di.stinction between day and nighi that is posited with the
presence and absence of the sun. The domain that is encircled by the
four TCQuata remains even when the sun seems to sink away. The struc-
ture of fv then shifts ovei from the temporary presence of the sun to
oipavoc; [heaven]. One can then say that the distinction of day and night
is not so important In grasp lx;cau.se under oiipavoc; day and night alter-
nate and the relation of a vault ot heaven to the many thereunder re-
mains. Ilcstod had distinguished day and night and thereby no! consid-
ered thai day and night is only one disiiiuiion within oiiyavo^. This
interpretation still does not appeal to me. Precisely when we consult the
fragments on death and lile, the other dimension of closedness will show
itself to us Ijeside the already familiar dimensions of the light chaiacier
47
and openness. The Ev which Heraclitus attempts to think in Fr. 57 is the
unity of the double domain.
Heideggkh: But how do both domains hang together?
Fink: The light space of lightning or of "HXio;, in which rtdvra
come forth to appearance and move into their oudine, is encircled by a
dark abyss. "HXio; is not permitted to overstep the boundary set to his
domain of power and go into the nightly foundation, because he will be
brought to account by the Erinyes, who guard the boundary of the
double domain.
Heidecgeri Is it here a question of two domains or of one and the
same which is distinguished in iiseir- Ut us put this question aside for
the moment. We will come back to it later. I would like once again to go
into foTL YCtQ ?v. Can one place the plural eiol here at all? Diels sets a
semicolon before fori yiiQ h/. Seen purely stylistically, a period and not a
semicolon would suitably have to be placed in Heraclitus" language.
Perhaps Diels was misled into using the .semicolon by the subsequent yoe
[yet]. A period is therefore called for, because in ectii yag ^v
something
uncommon follows which must ix sharply contrasted with what has pre-
ceded.
Fink: Most people are familiar with the distinction of night and
day. Hesiod, who treated of day and night, also belongs to them. But
he
did not understand day and night because he did not know '%vv6v. The
l<m yitQ gv works hke a blow. It is intentionally thematic and is said like a
dictate.
Heidegger: Because Hesiod did not know ^\iv6v. Heraclitus can-
not asst)ciate with him. They lx)th speak a different language.
Fink: In eoiL yixQ ev Heraclitus does not think the vanishing of
distinctions, but the Iv of the double domain, rhcrc is b/. Here h/ is the
subject of the sentence. One must come dimension of ev as the
into the
double domain in order to go beyond the noUot. Heraclitus would not
say that Hesiod is a blockhead. When he reproves Hesiod it is only
l>ecausc Hesiod is a speculative blockhead, eoti yiiQ ev is foundation for
ovv. iyivMCTKEv [does not know].
Heidegger: Heraclitus does not name the ground but only says
that Hesiod does not know it.
Fink: The ignorance of Hesiod is unmasked by the gort yiiQ ev.
Pari icii'ant: It remains a difficulty for me to what extent EOTt yiiQ
EV shoukl Ix: illuminating alxiul the ignorance of Hesiod. which shows
iLsell in thinking alx)ut day and night. It must therefoie lie
determined
by us in which relation goti ya^ ev stands to Hesiod's knowledge of day
and nighl.
Fink:You refer yiiQ too directly to Hesiod's misunderstanding
alxHildav and night. Hesiod has inlerpreted the phenomenon of day
and night not just dif fereiuly from Heraclitus. There is not another view
 . —
48

of day and night tliar replaces Hesiod's differentiation of day and night

here. Rather. Heraclitiis speaks out of the knowledge of Ev when he says

The Problem of a Speculative
that tlie partition
of day and night tonuadicts the fundamental charac- Explication. jcOq dei^toov and
terof being. Time? (Fragment 30).
Heiukoger: Hesiod Ix-longs to the people who are named in Fr. 72:
xal olg xae' fin^gav ^yxvQoOoL, xaOxa aixoL? ^eva (paivatai. "And tliose
things with which they jostle every day seem strange to them." Hesbjd
jostles daily with the distinction of day and night.
Fink; Day and night are for
HiJDtGGER: When Professor Fink interpreted nvg &e01,(hov, which oc-
him the most daily and the most
curs in Fr. 11,1 asked what he was actually doing. I wanted to drive at
nightly . .

Heidegger: hut remains strange to him

the question of how this attempt to think with Heraclitus should be
. . . il in what they actually
are, when thought from ?v. made. In this connection, there was mention of a speculative leap that
suggested itself in a certain way in so far as we start reading the text from
we finally view the Helios and the day/night fragments
Fink: If
the immediacy of the expressed content and, in so doing, arrive through
together, we can say the following. The heaven-fire of the sun behaves
the process of thinking at the expression of something that cannot be
similarly toward everything that has continiience by the sun's passage, as
verified by way of immediate intuition. If one thinks schematically, one
the lightning toward jidvia. The sun gives light, outline and growth and
can say that we go from a statement according to perception to an unsen-
bi ings the time for everything that grows. The sun is determined in her
suous statement. But what does "speculative" mean?
passage hy \iixQa. which has to check her, because she is otherwise
Participant: "Speculative" is a derivative from speculum (mirror)
brought to account by the helpmates of Dike. The sun also determines
and speculari (to look in or by means of the mirror). The speculative,
the \ieTQa for the increase and growth of things. She will not overstep the
then, is evidently a relationship of mirroring.
[i£XQa bul will remain within her domain of power, which is confined by
Heidegger: Presumably, the mirror plays a role. But what does the
the four xepnaTa. The deeper meaning of Dike still remains obscure for
word "speculative" mean in ordinary terminological use? Where in phi-
the present. Till now. Dike is clear only as a power superior to the power
b.sophy is Latin written and spoken?
of "HXiog. Although "H>.LOg and Zeus are the highest powers on earth,
Participant: In the Middle Ages.
"HXio; has a power on the earth that overpowers brightness. The [lixQa
Heidegger: There ex'tstimalio speculativa [speculative judgment] is
ot "HX105 have been explained to us in a three-fold sense. First we distin-
mentioned in distinction from existimalio praclka or also operutiva [practi-
guish the HETQQ of the sun's course, second the nexga of things under the
cal or operative Judgment]. Existimalio speculativa is synonymous with
sun's course and third the n^xpa, which encircle the entire domain of the
exhtimalio iheoretica [theoretical judgment), which is oriented toward the
sun's brightness. Reference to Fr. 3 has shown us the structure of the
emplacement of "HXiog in the brightness proper to him. Fr. 6 thinks the
species [type]. Species is the Latin translation of EE605 [form]. What is
meant here is, therefore, a seeing, a SEtoQEiv that is, a theoretical consid-
daily newness and always-the-sameness c»f the sun together. The one
ering. Kant also speaks of the speculative in the sense of theoretical
cpiJOLg of day is the same cpuoig also with respect to the well known
reason. But how does this affair stand with Hegel? What does Hegel call
distinction of good and bad, propitious and unpropitious days. We must
speculation and dialectic?
take all these thought motifs together, without rashly identifying them.
Participant; The speculative and dialectic designate Hegel's
Still it l>ecomes constantly more view the man-
difficult for us to hold in method of thinking.
ifold of relations. This difficulty already shows itself in reference to the
Parhcipant; With speculation, Hegel attempted to reach beyond
differences of the immediate phenomena we have considered and the
the finite into infinity.
paths of thought determined by them.
Heidegger; Hegel does not first start out with the finite in order
then t<i reach infinity; rather, he Ixgins in infinity. He is in infinity from

the start. With my question alxjut the speculative, I only wish to make
clear that the attempt to rethink Heraclitus is not a matter of the specula-
live in the proper sense of Hegel or in the sense of the theoretical. First
of all, we must renounce talking in any manner about the method ac-
 .

50 51

coidiny to which HeriK lilus would think. On the one hand, we must see us, we must attempt to avoid being misled by the developed thought
tn u— as Processor f'iiilc h;is done up to this [joini— [h;itwe malce clarifi- paths of metaphysics. In order to indicate the mannerof our procedure,
tations with the intention of helping ihu participants follow more clearly let us go once again into Fr. 11. Translated,
it runs: Everything that

and precisely the steps thai we have made thus far while reading crawls driven to pasture or tended with the blow. An image is men-
and is
thinking the text and that we will make later on. We tioned there that we know from the phenomenal environment and that
can clarify the
problem which stands Ix-hind that when Professor Fink gives us an we can bring to mind. In a rural region or in an agrarian state, the
easily
example. tx-ast isdriven to pasture with the whip blow. We can then read iidv
Fink: The manner
of our reading and procedui-e is characterized EQJiExov as pasture animals. The image that Heraclitus mentions implies
in that we out fiom what is made present to us of the matter named
start that the pasture animals will !«; driven to pasture by the shepard with the
m HcnK-liius' sayings, as though this matter were jying immediately whip blow, indeed so that they change pasture ground from time to
before oui- eyes. In his fragments, Heraclitus does' not speak in time.
any
veiled manner like the god in Delphi, of whom Heracliius says: owTt Heidegger: Tending is a driving as well as a leading.
Xeyei oute v.Qvnx£i dUa OTinaivei.'^ His manner of sjieaking cannot be Fink: For our explication of vehetqi, driving and leading are the
equated with that of the god in Delphi. In reading the fragments, we meaningful moments of sense. Now, when we also hear NefieoLg in
first up the phenomenal findings and attempt their clarification.
pick ve|iexai as the power that allots and faiefully determines, then we have
We do not. however, make the phenomenal findings clear in their full left the immecliate phenomenon ()f tending and entered thoughtfully
extent; rather, our clarification is already selectively .steeied. upon the unsensuous domain. We understand veneiai no more as the
Heidegger: By what is it selectively determined? driving and leading of the shepard in the sense of alloting and dispens-
Fink: The selection is determined in that we always come ing of what is appropriate to actual pasture animals, but as an alloting
back from
Heraclitus' saying and seek each feature in the immediate and dispensing reign. Then the question suggests itself whether that
phenomena
that are mentioned in the fragment. An empirical phenomenology which is said in small scale in the fragment cannot also be said in large
of the
sun would yield an abundance of phem»menal features which scale. The niicrocosmic and iDacrocosmic relationship stiggcsts itself as
would not
be meaningful at all for the sense of the sun fragments. First jX'rhaps a most harmless expression. The thoughtful tiansposition of
we read the
Iragment with a certain naivete. We
attempt to bring into relief a few phenomenal structures into another dimension, however, brings with it
features in reference to ihe things which are correlates a iransformalion of the structuies fiom which we first .start out.
of our .sensuous
peiceptions in order, in a second step toward the features and Heii>e(;c;er: Yet, the thoughtful trans[X)sition implies a specific
refer-
ences thus extracted, to ask how they can be thought in a deeper kind of thinking alxint the appearance of which we are still ignorant.
sense.
From immediate seeing of sensuous phenomena, we go over to an un- Fink: When I speak of thoughtful transposition into another di-
sensuous, though not tianscendent, domain. Here, we may mension, that is only a first attempt to cii cumscrilx; the manner of our
not utilize
the scheme, which we find in metaphysics, of phenomenal, procedure, because we still do not know what it means to go over into
i.e., sensible,
and intelligible world, and operate wiih a two-world
doctrine of another dimension. f we wish to s|>eak of an analogy in this coimection,
1

metaphysics. Talk about a sensible and iniflligible domain is then we must think it in a specific way. In this analogy, only one side is
highly
dangerous and cloublful. given to us, namely the phenomenal one. As we hold selectively to spe-
HEii>E(;(.r:K:fi would Ik; more appropriate if we designate cific phenomenal structures, we translate them into large scale in an
the phe-
nomenal domain as ontic . . advenutious attemjjl. In Fr, II. we translate the way and manner in
fiNK: and the unsensu<)us domain as allied with Ix-'ing. What is
. . . which her<l is k-a<l to pasture into the large scale of the entire actuality
:i

reniaikabic, however, is that we can comprehend the fragments ui which a lending and alloting leign ol things and elements happens.
of
Heraclitus in a naive manner also, and then still connect a deep The enlaigement of a six.-cial individual pheuonieuon into the whole
sense
['Dirii Helen Shin] wiib them, so that we m>uld ]X'ihaps l>e a form under which we could si>eak of the way of our
cannot even call the genuine
philos<)pluc;il sense a deep sense iTifJ.\inn\. aiiempi to think willi Heraclitus.
Heii)eo(;kh: t;an one speak of a philosophical sense Heideg<;ek: regard this formulation of your procedure as
at all? I

Fink: CertainK we may not speak of a conce])iual meaning dangerous. Perhaps we can sav that lleiacliiiis does n<)i see the huge
of
Heraclitus- sayings. Since we have ilie language of scale from tfie small but, the other way ri>imd, sees the small scale from
metaphysics l>ehind

,
 52
53

the large.We must disiiiiguish on one hand our attempt to rethink ilie of his sayings consists in the fact that working from the large .scale,
fragments of Heniclitus and on the other h^nd the way that Heraclitus
Heraclitus can also say sftmething in reference to the everyday.
himseli has thought.
Heidegckr: Perhaps you have already said too much.
Fink: What Heraclitus thinks in large scale, he can only say in small
Fink; Our starting point, however, in explicating the fragments,
scale.
consists in the more or less known traits of the phenomena. I want to
Heidegger: Thinking and saying have their special difficulties. Is it
attempt to clarify still another fragment which has already concerned us.
a question of two different matters? Is saying only the expression of
Fr. 99 reads in translation, "If the sun were not, it would be night on
thinking?
account of the other stars. Here is pronounced not only a eulogy of the
"

Fink: The distinction lielween inner thinkingand the articulation power, of the strength of "HXioc; which drives out darkness, but we see in
of thinking in language is an idea that we have fiom the hi.story of
the other stars the possibility of being lights in the darkne.ss. Light shines
philosophy. There is the view that philosophical thinking cannot say
in the darkness. 'Ihat means that the circuit of lights is surrounded by
completely everything that it thinks; so that, in a certain way, what phi-
the night. l"he stars and the moon indicate the possibility of the lights
to,st>phy thinks remains behind the linguistic expression. The deepest
being imbedded in the dark of night. Here lies the jump-off for our
thoughts are then fieeHTOv [unspeakable], ihis model does not apply to
question. Could it not be that as the stars are imbedded in the night, the
Heraclitus. His sayings are no hierophantic, withholding speech about
open-endless domain of the sun is also imbedded in a nonphenomenal
the linguistically inscrutable mystery. Heraclitus does not know the op-
night?
position of the linguistically open and the impenetrable mystery that gets
Heidegger: When you speak of "endless," that is no Greek idea.
thought as refugium or asylum ignorantiae [refuge or asylum of igno-
Fink: With the expression "open-endless" I mean only the phe-
rance]. It is something else when we think the mystery in a completely
nomenal feature that we see no wail when l(K)king up, but rather only
different manner. Heraclitus speaks in a language which does not know
the character of running out and of not arriving. The phenomenal state
the stark difference between inner thhiking and outward saying.
of affairs addressed in Fr. 99, that lights can be imbedded in the dark of
Heidec;ger: But how about thinking and saying? We will also have
night, has put before us the question whether or not the sun's domain,
to say for Heraclitus that there is a saying to which the unsaid tjelongs,
and thus TlXiog in his reference to la mivra, can have [i^Tpa on his part
but not the unsayable. The unsaid, however, is no lack and no barrier for
which we cannot immediately see. In jumping-off from the phenomenal
saying.
imbeddedness of the stars in the night, we have attempted to take in view
Fink: With Heraclitus we must always have in view the multidimen- the nonphenomenal encirclement ot the sun's domain by a nonphe-
sionality of speaking that we cannot fix at one dimension. Seen from the
nomenal night. We have attempted to clarify what the HEXpa of the sun
immediate statement, only the pasture animals in their manner of
pertain to in three ways; first, as the neTpa of the sun in her course;
movement are named in Jiav epJiexov. But now we have attempted to second, as the (lEtga which are apportioned by the sun to everything
read and interpret Jictv feprtExov as Jidvxa (b; ^pnExd, and we have re-
lying under her; and finally, as the \iixQa. in the sense of the x^Qnata
ferred nKi\Y^ to the lightning Iwlt. In this consists our jump-off into the
named in Fr. 120, which encircle the sun's domain, the domain of the
nonphenomenal domain. Measured by the tremendously sudden sun's brightness and the Jidvxa found in it.
movement, everything thai stands under the lightning in its light-shine
Heidegger; In this connection, you have spoken of the night. But
and is brought into its stamp has the character of an animallike, i.e., slow
how do you understand the night?
movement. It is to be asked, however, whether it is a matter of two levels,
Fink: The four xepnaxa confine the sunny world at its four ends.
so that we can say: as in the sensory domain the animal herd is put to
Ibis encircled domain is characterized by the temporary presence and
pasture by the whip blow, so in the whole all things are steered by
absence of the sun, from which the problem of day and night arises. As
lightning. I would like to think that we may not set both these levels off
seen liom the phenomenon itself, we are all of Hesiod's opinion. Im-
S(j sharply in contrast from each other. If we speak of two levels, then
mediate seeing indicates that day and night alternate. Against this,
there is the danger that we make comparisons from the phenomenal
Heraclitus formulates the provocative sentence and says: although
level and l>egin to move into unrestricted analogies. If we suppose the
Hesiod appears to understand mo.st alxuit human works and days, be
two levels to l)e sharply distinguished, then we miss precisely their inter-
has not understood that day and night are one. For our part, we have
play. Heraclitus knows no fixed levels; but we must precisely notice, with
asked whether ibis l)eing one is to be read directly as il is said, or whether
interpretation of his fragments, that and how they interplay. The force
we must avail ourselves of a more difficult rendition. In the lattei' case we
 . .
54
must say: Hesiod had held day and night distinguished; however, there
is i\. So understood, day and night do not coincide; bul from knowledge
of ^ even the most conspicuous distinction between day and night can-
not in the end be accepted as such. There is the one, and if there is
success in coming into knowledge of the one {6\io\oyeiv), then that
which is torn asunder in opposition is suffused by the single unity of h/.
So far as Heraclitus thinks from out of ev, he cannot allow the demarca-
tion made between day and night by the most knowledgeable teacher.
Hehjeccier: You thus distinguish a manifold essence of night. On
one hand, you distinguish the night from the daily day, and then you
under.stand night also as the closedncss of earth, . .
Fink: whereby the closedness of earth is the boundary of the
. . . gauge. Among other tilings, he asks about rhythm, and shows that
sun's domain. The realm of the sun in her reference to xa ndvra is the
domain of openness in which day and night are in exchange,
Heidegger: . , . and day and night in their exchange are
another night?
Fink: Perhaps.
Hkiim.gger: With my questions, I would only like lo gel at the place
from which you speak of another night.
Fink: If I have spoken of another, more original night, of the
nightly abyss in explication of the sun fragment, I did so in preview of
the death-life fragments. From there 1 have viewed the deeper sense of
the pheni>menon of closedness of the earth and in a certain way al.so of
the .sea as the boundary of the sun's domain. Only when we first consider
life and death will we see how the realm of life is the sun's
the relation of
domain and how a new dimension breaks ojjen with the reference to
death. The new dimension is neither the domain of openness nor only
the closedness of the earth, although the earth is an excellent symbol for
the dimension of the more original night. Hegel speaks of the earth as
the elementaiT individuum into which the dead return. The dimension of
the more original night is denoted by deaih. That dimension, however, is
the realm of death, which is no land and has no extension, the no-man's-
land, . .
Heiue(;c;f,k: cannot be traversed and that also is no dimen-
. . . that
sion. 'Fhe difficulty lies in addressing the domain denoted by death.
Fink: Perhaps language in its articulation is at home in the domain
that is itself articulated, in the domain of the sun. in which one ibing is
separated from the other and set into relief against the othei. and in
which the individual has si^cific outline. If now, however, we under-
stand EV nol only in the sense of the dimension of o|x;nness, of the
brightness of lightning and the Jidvcu found in it, but also as llie more
original night, asilu- mountain range of l)eing [(/^/,< (iehiigd<-\Sehis] which
is no counirysitle, which has n<) name and is unspeakable although not — fjv ixn xai ecttiv xal ecttqi nvQ dei^wov, dnTouFvov hetqu xai djtoapEv-
in the sense of a limit of language— iben we must also take in view a
. .
55
second dimension in ^v, alongside the dimension of the sun's domain.
The dimension of brightness is imbedded in this second dimension, and
death points lo it. Still, that at which death points is a domain that
nolxjdy can find in life-lime. The more fragments we read, the more the
question marks accumulate for us.
Heidegger: In connection with what has been said concerning lan-
guage, I would like to refer lo the lecture "Sprnrbe ah Rytkmus" ["lan-
guage as Rhythm] by Fhra.sybulos Georgiades, delivered in the lecture
series "Die Sprache" ["Language"] of the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts
and the Berlin Academy of Arts, as well as in his book Mmik und Rylhmiis
bei den Griechen^° In both works, he has spoken excellently about Ian-
^110^65 has nothing to do with ^eo) (flow), but is to be undersKxid as im-
. . print. In recourse lo Werner Jaeger, he appeals to a verse of Archilochos,
Fr. 67a, where ^roiioq has this meaning. The verse reads: YtYvotoxE
6' otog
still in
^uotiog 6v9e(i)Jiou5 Exei- "Recognize which rhythm holds men." More-
over, he cites a passage from Aeschylus' Prometheus, to which Jaeger
likewise has referred and in which the ^Oftdg or ^ue|iil;u» [bring into a
measure of time or proportion] has the same meaning as in the Ar-
chilochos fragment: iJ)6' ^Qeij8(tiO|iai {Prometheus 241). Here Prom-
etheus says of himself, ". in this rhythm
. . am bound." He, who is held
1
immobile in the iron chains of his confinement, is "rhythmed," that is,
joined. Georgiades points out that humans do not make rhythm;, rat her,
for the Cireeks, the ^uBfiog [measure] is the substrate of language,
namely the language that approaches us. Georgiades understands the
archaic language in this way. We must also have the old language of the
fifth century in view in order to approximate understanding of Hera-
clitus. 'fhislanguage knows no sentences. .
Fink: that have a specific meaning.
. . .
Heidegger: In the .sentences of the archaic language, the state of
affairs speaks, not the conceptual meaning.
Fink: We have begun our explication of Heraclitus with the light-
ning fragtnent. We have turned then to Fr. 1 1. in which it is said that
everything which crawls is tended by the blow, whereby we brought the
blow into connection with the lightning bolt. Finally, we have taken the
sun and the day-night fragments into view. Here it was above all the
three-fold sense of [ifiQa, the reference of sun and time and the imljed-
dedness of the sun's domain in an original night. 'Fhe lK)undaries l>e-
tween the sun's domain and the nightly abyss are the four lEenaxa. In
the sun we have seen a time-determining power which proportions the
measures of lime. 'Fhe next Iragmein in our series is Fr. 'M). MOt^ov
TovftE, Tov ar'Tov ootavrow, ovte iig flfiuv oute dvfletimcov fjiotr|Ofv, bXK'
vunEVov HEtya. Diels iianslates. "rbis world order, the same for all be-
 56 57

ings,was created neither l»y gods nor by humans; rather, it was always Heiuiigoer: Then we must also put "the eternal living fire" as the
and and will be eternal living lire kindled in measures and quenched
is subject of the second half of the sentence instead of Diels" translaiitm
in measures." At llrst we interpret only the second half of the fragment. "she" (i.e., the world order).
Lijijhtning. we could say. is the sudden Tire, the sun is the fire in orderly Fink: When Heraclitus now says of eternal living fire that it is kin-
passage of ihe coiu'se of lime, bin kvq atil;(iK)v [eternal living fire] is dled after measures and quenched after measures, that appears to con-
something that we do not find in the phenomenon like the lightning and tradict the Aei [eternal], and sounds like a shocking specification to us.
the sun. Heidegger; Let us at first leave this quesdon out of account. In
HKinE<;(;ER: How do
yon wish lo translate xoonog? order to stay with what you have first said: do you reject saying that the
Fink: I would like to pass over the first half ol Fr. 30 and aiiempt to world order is the fire?
interpret only the second half. If we translate x^o^o^ with woild order Fink: The world order is no work of gods and humans, but the
or ornament, then we must bring that translation into connection with work of the eternal living fire. It is not, however, the work of the fire that
Fr. 124, where the talk is of the most l^eautiful xoonog as a junk heap. always was and is and will Ijc, because the eternal living fire first tears
When we now attempt to read and interpret Fr. 30 from the end, we open the three time dimensions of having-been, being-now, and
must.also return to naivete. A phenomenal fire continues in burning. coming-to-be. Heraclitus speaks in Fr. 30 first in a denial: the HOt^io^ is
The conflagration of fire is a process in lime. The fire was yesterday, is not brought forth (Diels' translation, "created," is out of place) by one of
today and will be tomorrow. Now. however, my question is: are i\v dei the gods or one of the humans. We can also say: the x6o|xog is not
[was always], gariv [is], and fcjiai [will be], in reference to tcvq dettcoov, brought forth to appearance byoneof thegodsor by a human. Therein,
determinations of the ways of fire's being-in-time? Is the 6e£^a)ov [eter- we already hear the fiery character of fire. The k6o(io5 as the beautiful
nal living] of fire thought by always-having-been. Iieing-now, and joining of JiAvta comes forth to appearance in the shineof fire. That the
coming-to-l)e? Bui must we ihink thefire in terms of the familiar way xoono? as the beautiful jointed order is not brought forth to appearance
that we specify duration, with only the difference that the nsual fire that by one of the gods or by a human, is first only to be understood in the
is ignited lasts a while and goes out again and thus has not always been, is sense that gods and humans have a share in the power of fire among all
not always, and will not always How
deC^toov to be understood?
Ije? is the beings of the x6onog: and they are productive. Gods and humans are
Does it mean the perdurance of fire through the whole time"' Do we not productive, however, not in the manner of the most original KoCiioi^
then think the fire named here by Heraclitus too naively, if we suppose [production], which produces the kvq def^iuov. In the explication of Fr.
that its would l>e that it always was. is present and will
distinct character 30, however, I wish fir.st to question whether time characteristics are
always be? would rather suppose that we must think the other way
I asserted in the term nvQ heitfjiov. The nvg dei^owv is neither like a
around. The fire is not always past, present, and coming; rather, it is fire process within time, nor is it comparable with what Kant calls the world
that first tears open having-been, being-now, and coming-io-be, stuff as the basis of the constantly extant time. The fire mentioned by
Heidf.cger: But what is the subject of the .second half of the sen- Heraclitus is not in time, but is itself the time-allowing time that first and
tence on your inteipretatiim? For Diels it is koohoc. of which he says foremost lets ^v [was], eoxi [is] and Eatai [will be] break out; it does not
thai it has been bi-ought forth neither by gods nor humans. Rather stand under these. If we tentatively take tivq iiElt,wov as the time-
Moojio; always was, is, and will Ix- eternal living fire. allowing, time-opening, then dei stands in a taut relationship to t^v, eoti,
Fink: I reject this translation. 1 understand nvQ [firej as the subject and eoxai, and furthermore to what the concluding phrase of Fr. 30
of the second half of the sentence. concerns, in a taut relationship to the kindling after measures and
HEint:(;t;ER: Do you make a break before dU' [rather], so that the quenching after measures.
following has nothing to do with the preceding? Heidegger: For me the central que.stion now is where you start out.
Fink: 'Flie k6o[ioc a.s the Ix-'aiiiifnl joining of irdvia is that which Do you start out from i\v, ecttl, and eorai or rather from nvQ AeL(I,a)ov?
shines in fire. To this extent the first and second halves of the sentence Fink: I start out with nvQ dEtCtoov and go from it to f|v, loii, and
have much to do with one another. The fire is the productive power of eotai. If one reads word for word, the three-fold of lime is said from
biin^ing-hnih. (iods and humans shine up and are brought lo uiicon- dEd^OiOV.
ceale<l lx.-ing only Ijecause there is fire to which they stand Heii)k(;(;kr: In other words, said out of what perpetually,
in a preemi- it is is
nent relation. that ii was. is. and will be.
 .

58 59

Fink: This thought is hard to carry through. So long as we

read the rather, it is the time-forming in the sense of the appfjrtioningof time for
fragment naively, we niiisl say that the talk is of an eternal hving fire
all that is in lime. We have previously thought this apportioning of time
that always was and is and will Ix.'.
in the driving lighlninglxilt and in the fire of "HU05. We may not deter-
HtiDEGCKR: The ^v and fotai have no sense in reference to mine the time of fire, which forms the times for ta ndvra, in a captious
Asi^wov'
1ef erence from concepts of Ijeing-in-time back to the most original time.
Fink: The J^v means what is gone; the earai means being not yet. It The easy version runs: Fire was always and is and will be. Com-
is not fire that is past and will be; rather, (ire first
and foremost opens prehended thus, fire is something standing, extant and merely lying
the way ftjr arising in time, tarrying in time, and going under in time.
there, which subsists through the course of time. This remaining is
Fire as the time-allowing lime first and loremust breaks open the three
charatterized by the temporal dimensions of having-been, being-now
time ecstacies of past, present, and future.
and coming-to-be. But then one already has time, and one brings tem-
Heidegger: 'i'here is the possibility for passing, so that it itself can- poial concepts to bear on ihe time-forming fire. The more difficuli
not always have been. But when you speak of time-allowing, in what
version, on the contrary, runs: That the ^v, eoti, and Edtai first arise
sense do you mean that?
from the time-allowing of fire.
Fink: In the sense of apportioning of time. Hi;ide(;ger: Fire is, thereby, not only as glow, but as light and
Hkii>egger: You understand the allowing as ap|3ortioning. But how- warmth, .

is time meant in the time-allowing? Fink: and is, therefore, to be understood as llie nourishing.
. . .

Fink: We must distinguish time-allowing and the apportioned lime

Heidkgger: Afxne all. the moment of shining is important to nvQ
(hat things have in such a way that they have already lx;en for a while,
dei^toov.
are present, and will also he yel a while. This manner of Ijeing-in-timc
Fink:The fire is that which brings-forth-to-appearance.
belongs only does not, however. lx;long to the eternal living
to things; ii
Heidegger: If we understand fire only as a fiasb in the pan, it
lire which first lets the three time ecstasies break out. nvQ aet^toov is the
would yield no shining.
tearing open of having-lxfen, Ijeing-iiow and coniing-io-ljc. 'Fhat which
Fink: From out of shining we must think back to Koatto;. It is what
stands in the shine of flic receives the time apportioned to its tan-ying
shines up in the shine of fire. Firsl we must ask ourselves how, by way of
from this original opening of time. The fire sets measures. The hardness the innertemjxnal characteristic of ;riTJQ 6si^ox)v, can Jitie Aei^tiKJV be
of the problem would disappear if one sup]H>sed that nvQ afi^wov were
referred to as that which first of all releases past, present, and future
determined by the tempoial evidence of !>eing-in-time. The question, from out of itself?
however, is whether it is meant that the fire always was and is and will be,
Heidegger: You speak of releasing. How is this usage to Ije under-
or whether a productive relation is to l)e thought lx;tween the fire and stood more closely? Nature is also released with Hegel. How does jiOq
tiv. eoTi. and farat. ctEL^toov release pa.st, present, and future? For me the question is
Hi:ii)k<.(;er: When you speak of the time-allowing of nvQ dti^oiov. whether that which subsequently comes in any way suppoits your in-
don't you mean thai in [he ordinary sense, as we sometimes .say, "some- lerpietation, or whether thai which comes makes your interpretalion
one allows another time"? p()ssible.
Fink: time that ihe flie allows, by apportioning time to things,
I'he Fink: What troubles me is the taut relationship l>eiween det^wov
is no empty lime form, no medium separated from contenl,
but is. so lo and T^v, and eotul. 'Fhe dei of JtiJQ and the three lime delerniina-
Eoxi.
speak, lime with its toiitem, ttons don't appear lo me to go together so easily. What has Ix-en, is, and
Heiih;<;(;kk: Of the lime thus given, one must say: it tarries. It is not comes to be do not refer to fire. Rathei', we must understand the spring-
a depository in which things appear as dispensed; rather, time as appor- ing up of baving-l>een, iK'ing-now, and coming-to-l>e for la n&vra ii om
tioned is alieady refened lo that which tarries. out of fire.
Fink: 't'o wbai is individual. Heidegger: would like to have a clue for this step of your in-
I
Heioeggkh: Lei us le:ive aside what is indi\idual. liul do voii wish terpretation, ,So long as do not see ibis clue, one could say that the step
I

lo say thai we go beyond the ordinaiy comprehension of lime with from Jiav EgntTtSv lo Jiavxa d); EpjiEid and from the nighi, which sui-
yi)ur
interpreiaiion of lime and of lime-allowing? rounds the stars and nio<ni, to a moie oiiginal nighi, wliiib loiitines the
Fink; pioceed iiisi from ilie sliangeness that hvq At(t,0jov in Fr.
I
domain of the sun. is indeed to \x carried ihroiigii, Ii is to Ik- canied
'Mi is mentioned as a piocess in lime,
while is pie< iseK not in lime;
il through because a clue is given, however, that the step fioni tzvq ctEi^oov
 .

60 6
and the three time determinations toward the time forming of jivq
dteCtpCoov, in the sense of the letting spring up of having-been, being-
nvQ and Jiavra (Correlated
present, and coming-to-be, has no clue, and cannot, therefore, be rightly Fragments: 30, 124, 66, 76, 31).
carried through.
Fink: For me the clue is this, that it is impossible to talk of jivq
dEt^toov as within time. Otherwise, it becomes a thing that happens in
the world, perhaps also the highest thing, the summum ens, which, how-
The seminar began with the report of one of the participants on Her-
ever, is an midst of things. Seen thus, it would be subordinate
ens in the
mann Frankel, "Die Zeitauffassung in der Frithgrieckuchen Literatur,"
to time. My question is, however, whether the determinations of being-
printed in Wege und Formen friihgriechischen Denkens, I960."
in-time are not subordinated to jivq det^toov.
Fink: In her report, she has shown that in Homer xpovo? [time]
Heideggkh: So far as I can see, there is only this clue, that kvq
means the long, lingering time, the endurance of time understood in
AeC^coov no thing and that, therefore, no "was," "is" and "will be" can
is
awaiting, or rather the time that still remains for mortals who suffer
be predicated of it, . .

long. Both are specific forms of time.

Fink: and also no perpetuity in the ordinary sense.
. . .
Heidegger; It is important for us that there is no theoredcal con-
Heidegger: We stand before the question of how jiijq dEi^tiK)V re-
ceptual determination of time as time with Homer and Hesiod. Rather,
One does not get further. In the summer semester of
lates itself to lime.
both speak of lime only out of experience.
1923 in Marburg, while working out Being and Time, I held a lecture on
Fink: Professor Heidegger's question started out from Frankel's
the history of the concept of time. As I investigated the archaic idea of
expression of day as aunity of encounter, i.e., from the idea of a manner
time with Pindar and Sophocles, it was striking that nowhere is time
of givenness according to the encounter. The question was whether time
spoken of in the sense of the sequence. Rather, time is there taken in
refers to an encountering subject, or rather to be understood as con-
—
view as that which first grants the sequence similarly as in the last
is

crete lime in the sense of the different ways that we are in time, except-
paragraphs of Being and Time, although the problem is there viewed
ing that we encounter time. It is dangerous if we speak about the en-
from Dasein. 1 look at my walch and find that it is three minutes
counter of time, because it is then referred to consciousness. Then we
before 7 P.M. Where is the time there? Try to find it.
move into the distinction of the time of consciousness, in which we live,
and objective time, which is separated from subjectively encountered
i time. The question was what specific time is; whether the specificity of
time is to be grasped from its encountered character or from another
approach, which lies outside the distinction of subjective and objective
time.
Heidegger: I object to the expression "unity of encounter." When
itwas said by one of the participants that Homer presents a specific idea
of lime, and that this specificity rests in the encounter of long tarrying
and waiting, this is correct. 1 object only to the formulation. For the
Greeks did not "encounter." Let us break off discussion connected with
the report, because we lose too much time otherwise. But what does it
nu;in when we say that we lose time? On what presupposition can we
lose time at ail?
Participant: Only when time is limited to us can we lose time.
Heidkc;gek: Being limited is not decisive. Rather, in order to lose
something, we must have it. I can only lose time, if t have time. If i say
thai I have no time, how is time then characterized?
Participant: I presuppose thai lime is available to me.
Heide(;c;er: Regarding time, that means that it is characterized as
time for ....

62
Participant: As time for this, time is not the time for something
else. For it is time to do this rather than something else.
Heidegger: Time, as "not the time," is the privative characteriza-
tionof lime. The one character of time that we have emphasized is time
as time for. .Another character of time to which I would like to refer
. .
shows itself when 1 look at the clock and say that it is 5:45 P.M. Now I
ask, where is time?
Participant: Therewith, time shows itself as clock-time or mea-
sured lime.
Heidegger: When I look at the clock and say that it is 5:45 P.M.,
and ask where time is, does this question make sense at all?
Participant: It is a problem whether one can ask where time is.
Heidegger: Hence, I ask you, can one ask at all where lime is?
Participant: In 1962. in your lecture "Z«(M7idS«m,"you have said
that time is prespatial.^^ Accordingly, that would mean that one cannot
ask where time is.
Heidegger: On the other hand, we read off the time from the
clock. I look at the clock and read that it is 5:45 P.M. Clearly something
doesn't make sense here. With Hegel, we must write it on a sheet of
paper. Bui how? We must write that now it is 5:45 P.M. In the now, we
thus have time. I do mean time with the now. We will come back to this
question when we enter into Fr. 30 and observe the difficulty that lies in
the saying of f|v, eoriv, and ?cn:ai in reference to irugiieL^toov. It seems to
me that here would be the place to consider whether time is mentioned
at all in Fr. 30.
Fink: Yet Heraclitus speaks of dtf ^v, Eoxl, and Imai.
Heidegger: If we say that Fr. 30 speaks of time,do we go beyond
the text?
Fink: But still, Heraclitus clearly used time determinations.
Heidegger: That means, therefore, that he did not speak themati-
cally about lime. This observation is important in order to follow up the
step that you pursue in your interpretation of Fr. 30, the step in which
you determine the relationship of jiuq diei^iDov and x6a\iog. We can read
the fragment also trivially, if we say that f\v, Itni and Icnai are the
anticipatoi-y interpretation of det^coov. In this case, what would de£
mean?
Participant: The &t'i would be underst<H>d as a connection of elvai
EOEoOai [aljout to lie), and yeveoOoi [to have been}.
[to l»e],
Heidegger: What kind of a connection is that? If we read Fr. 30
almost trivially and understand i\v. eotl, and eotol as anticipatory in-
terpretation of AeC, what does it then mean? Is time presupposed in
"always"?
Participant: The "always" can be an innertemporal determina-
tion.
^1
—
63
Heidegger: The "always" is then understood as "at all times "
"permanent." In Latin one speaks of the sempilemitas [always-eternity].
That we do not really make progress here is based on the fact that in the
fragment time is not spoken about thematically; nevertheless, the in-
terpretation attempts to take time into view in a decisive sense. Only
thus, I believe, can we make clear to ourselves the way of your interpre-
tation. While, according to the trivial rendition, the first half of the
sentence says that the k6o(io5 is brought forth neither by one of the gods
nor by a human, and the second half, which begins with 6XX6, says that
the x6a\ioq always was, is, and will be eternal-living fire, according to
your interpretation the subject of the second half of the sentence is not
xoonog but nvQ.
Fink: According to the smoother version, as Diels proposes, fire is a
predicative determination of Kootio;. Yet the antecedent phrase should
already draw attention. If we translate, "this xoonog is brought forth to
appearance neither by one of the gods nor by a human," then Koojio^
—
although spoken negatively moves into view as something brought
forth. Thereby, the connection to fire as that which brings forth is al-
ready given. We do not understand fire as a predicative determination
of xoanog; rather, we understand x6o(ioe from out of fire as the beauti-
ful joining of zix K&vxa which is brought forth to appearance neither by
one of the gods nor by a human. There was always and is and will be
eternal-living fire in the light-shine of which the beautiful joining of tA
Jidvxa shines up, "It always was and is and will be" we must understand
in the sense of "there is." Thus seen. jt6ono5 is comprehended from out
of fire, and not fire from out of x6o^o?. This rendition would fit in with
the trail in which we have interpreted the connection of hghtning and
sun lo xiin&vxa up to now. The reference of Jivg and x6o(W)s would be a
special relationship of Ev and Jidvta, according to which id ndvTa stand
in the light-shine of fire. The smoother rendition has the advantage that
the subject remains the same in both halves of the .sentence. Thus, fire
becomes a determination of xoono; instead of, the other way around,
>t6ono5 being brought forth to appearance in the shine of fire. Only if
the subject in the second half of the sentence is not x6o(io;, is there a
superiority of fire vis-a-vis w^onog. Here we could also point to Fr. 124:
fiojieg a&Q\ia elxf| xex^h^viov 6 xdW.Lcrro? (6) wapiog. Diels translates:
"(Like) a heap of things (?) scattered at random, the most beautiful
(world) order." Here the most lx;au[iful world order is said to be like a
junk heap.
Heidegger: One could translate xdXXioncog x6o|iog: the x6aftoc; as it
can only be in general.
Fink: The most l^eautiful xoo^o^, the most beautiful ordered en-
tiretyof all Jidvta, comes forth to appearance in the shine of fire. If this
xoajiog is like a junk heap, we have a hard contrast between xdW-ioto?,
 64 65

which is referred tox6oti05, and the derogatory manner of talking about productive [poutisckel power. But this negation sounds paradoxical, be-
adQiia. To what extent can the most bt-autifiil xoonog be compared to a cause it would never readily occur to anybody that a human has brought
heap of scattered things? To the extent that we compare it with the nvQ forth the entire order of jrAvta. Humans do not bring forth the x6o|xo5
that brings forth. Compared with the
brings forth to appear-
fire that in the sense of the entire joining of Ji6vTa, except the xoonoc; in the sense
ance, the most beautiful xoonoc; seems like a heap of scattered things. If
of the JtoXig while the gods bring forth the K6a\ioq in the sense of
[city];
we read Kr. 124 in this way, it can support our interpretation of Fr. 30, the world-rule, in a limited manner in so far as they cannot
though
which depends on the superiority of fire vis-a-vis the xoanog. intervene in the power of Molga [goddess of fate]. Humans and gods are
Heideciger: Ii is difficult for me to comprehend that the most productive l>ecause they partake of the productive power of fire in an
beautiful xoonog stands in need of yet another determination. extraordinary manner. Humans make only little xoohol and not great
Fink; I understand the fragment such that the most beautiful ones, but only because they paitake in the 110(11015 of itiJQ. C^ds and
xoonoq receives the negative character of a heap of scattered things in humans are distinguished beings in the xoono^, while gods are deter-
reference to the £v of jitjq. mined by a still greater nearness to nvQ dEi^coov. Out of participation in
Heidegger: Thus, the question is whether Fr. 124 can be used as the productive power of fire, humans have the capacity of te^vt] and of
support for the explication of Kr. M). establishing states, fkjds bring forth no
but rather world dominion,
state,
Fink: The xdU-ioiog xoonog can be characterized as a confused Ctods and humans are enfeoffed with their own productive power by the
heap not only in leference to the 6v of jiOq, but also in reference to the productive dominion of fire, which overrules them, and only therefore
other ev, which first comes to view with the dimension of death. can it be said of them in a denial that they have not brought forth the
Hkioegger: Above all, 1 am concerned to make clear to the partici- great X60H05. Before (sXKa in Kr. 30, 1 would put a semicolon, and then
pants the manner in which you proceed. You set yourself off from the translate further: but it was always and is and will be eternal-living fire.
more naive, smtxHher version and prefer the more difficult version. If The jioCtjoi; of fire is the 6iax6onT)ai5 [setting in order]. What was
we read Fr. 30 smoothly, then it concerns a statement about the x6a|io5 earlier spoken of as oCaxiCet and ^xv[iepVTiaE is now the producuve
[hat is brought forth neither by one of the gods nor by a human, but that power of fire for the xdojiog.
always was, is, and will be eternal-living fire. Then the xooiio; is some- Heidegger: Yon do not think power metaphysically. You do not
thing that is. This statement is then, as yon wish to say, completely think metaphysically any longer, Heraclitus does not yet think metaphys-
un philosophical. ically. Is that the same? Is it a question of ihe same situation of thinking?
Fjnk: a certain philosophical element would then lie only in the Fink: Presumably not. For we, in distinction from Heraclitus, are
&ei, in the eternalness of the world. stamped i>y the conceptual language of metaphysics. Perhaps, with the
Heidkggkr: Vou say that, however, undei- the presupposition that fundamental ideas of metaphysics, we get scarcely beyond metaphysics.
Heraclitus is a philosopher. In Heraclitus' time, however, there were as Heidegger: That is to be noticed for the interpretation, and also
yet no philosophers. for the connection of the not -yet-metaphysical and the no-more-
Fink: To be sure, Heraclitus is no philosopher, but he is still a iflhyg nietaphysical. which is a special, historical connection. The expression
Tois aofpov, a friend of ootpov. "not metaphysical" is insufficient. We no longer interpret metaphysically
Heidegger: That means thai you do not interpret Heraclitus a text that is not yet metaphysical. I n back of that a question hides that is
metaphysically. As against the naive rendition, you require a philosophi- not now to l>e raised but that will be necessary in order to Ix" able to make
cal rendition that is not yet metaphysical. From what herineneutical the way of youi- inlerpreiation clear.
position do you attempt that? Kink: Now we
can refer to the less smooth explanation to the con-
Kink: It pu/zles me that nvQ &£it,wov should Ix; s(Kjken of as the cluding phiase: cuixoiisvov nctga xai dnoopfwlJuEvov, nEtga. If fire is
essential predicate of xoofio;. while K6a\ioq. as the joining of JttivTa, always living, it is not quenched as such. Rather, it is kindling and
steered by lightning and standing in the light-shine of "H^iog, can not ((uenthing in reference to the xoonoc, and it sets measures for day and
it,self Ik.' the fire but is the work of fire. In the antecedent phrase it is said
night and all things that stand in the openness of the alternation of day
that this xoonoc; is brought forlh to appcaraiue neithei- by one of the and night. Tlif dn;T6|ievov \ikxQa xai 6iioa|iEwiJnFvov HExya is no de-
g<Kis nor by a liiniian. Surprisingly, we must now ask to what extent it termined state of fire. It is not .something that happens to fire. Rather.
can Ix.' said that no human has brought forth the entire ordei- of things. the kindling and quenching according to measures hapjK'iis in reference
This negation is only possible Ix-cause humans are distinguished by a 111 ibat which comes and goes in the shine of fire. Tlie fjv. eotiv, and
 —
66 67

iuiai also pertains to what shines up in the shine of fire. We understand [xissible through il. Herein lies a covering of the original by the deriva-
the three time determinations not as temporal marks of distinction of tive. Were we lo ap[>ease ourselves with the immediate wording of the
KVQ det^toov way around, from out oi the act of niiQ we
but, the other fragment, and give preference to thesmoother rendition, ihen nvQ
understand the having been, the now, and the coming of things that dEL^toov would have past and future; and it would now no longer be
come forth to appearance in the shine of fire. Things have their l)eing- what it was. and nol yet be that which it is coming to be.
in-time in the manner of originating, tarrying, and disapi>earing. While Heideg(;er: We have said ihat we no longer interpret metaphysi-
they tarry, they spread themselves out l)etween the now, the having cally a text that not yet metaphysical. Is the no-longer- metaphysical
is

been, and the coming. already included not-yet-metaphysicat.

Heidegger: In tlie fragment, "was," "is," and 'will l>e" are men-
tioned. You, however, speak of having-been. being-present, and
coming-io-l)e. Clearly, it is a matter of S()mething different. While lime
determinations are used in (he fragment, in your interpretation you take
time as such to be thematic.
Fink: The always living source of time can only be addressed with
names taken from xa Jiavia.
HEiDEtiGEK! I agree with that, but what concerns me now is the
him that ^v does not mean having-been as having-been.
Fink: 1 am ama/ed at the hard bond of iiuq ^ei^tDovand i^v, ^crtiv,
and ?OTai. Perhaps we can say that in a certain manner it cannot be said
of jiiJQ aeC^toov that it only is, because il is not eternal. Rather, we must
say thai as the brightness of the lightning and sun brings iravra forth to
appearance and into the outline of its geslalt, so il is the dei of kvq that
brings it about that Jiavta, which stand in the light-shine of fire, were,
are, and will be. However, the difficulty lies in the fact that the charac-
teristicof being-in-lime of Jidvta places itself back upon nvQ 6ei^(i>ov as
the s<»urce of the ways of being-in-time. Of kvq aEL^toov, however, one
cannot say that it was, is, and will Ix;, For then one comprehends il like
something extant. What would it mean to say that nvQ &titfaov is now?
Does it have a specific age, so thai il is older in each moment? And what
would it mean to say that il always was and will be? Always having-fjeen
means that it has past times behind it, just as coming-to-be means that it
has a future before il. Can one say of jruQ det^coov that it has past times
behind il, thai it now has presence and has a coming presence in the
future? Here KVQ deC^tuov is mentioned in the manner in which things
are in time, spring forth, tarry, and disappear, have past, present, and
yi the
Fink: That would be Heraclitus interpreted by Heidegger.
Heidegger: It does not concern me lo interpret Heraclitus by
Heidegger; rather, the elaboration of the reasons for your interpretation
concerns me. Both of us are in agreement that if we speak with a thinker,
we must heed what is unsaid in what is said. The question is only which
way leads to this, and of what kind is the foundation of the interpretive
step. To answer this question seems to me especially difficult in refer-
ence lo time in Fr. 30. Consequently, I have asked about the "always."
How should we understand il? In the setting of your interpretation,
what does "always" mean? If I ask you, is it the nunc slatt,\ [the standing
now], and you answer no, then I ask, what is il? Here we are faced with a
question mark.
Fink: The special difficulty lies in the fad thai what precedes as the
source of lime cannot be said at all in appropriate manner. In reference
to the source of time, we find ourselves in a special predicament.
Heidegger: You emphasize the predicament in which we
rightly
find ourselves. The which we stand consists not only in
difficulty before
the step of thought but also in our rethinking. We must have sufficient
clarity about what is to be thought in order to hear Heraclitus in the
correct manner. Nevertheless we cannot resolve whal has lo be thought
in terms of one fragment; rather, we must —
as you have already said
have all the fragments in view for the interpretation of one fragment. 1
am again and again concerned to make clear the sequence of steps of
your interpretation. Therefore, 1 have indicated that lime becomes
thematic with your slep of thought, while in Fr. 30 time comes to view
only as an understanding of time, without becoming thematic for Hera-
clitus.

future. Bui nvQ ^Eltfoov, on its pari, lets past, present, and coming Fink: Concerning ihe phrase. f|V dttl xai eartv xai fotui nvQ
spring forth. We must be wary of comprehending nvQ dEL^orav as a ("tEi^wov was always and is and will lie eternal-living fire]. I will nol
[it

perpetual slock. coniend that we have within easy reach an interpretive possibility that will
Heidegger: For me, the question is, what is ihe reason for this allow us to address the source of time, which is hidden by imratemporal
reversed step of the interpretation. For you. the 6ei l;>ecomes the source determinations, without iniratem[x>ral deierminaiions. For that would
foi i^v, t-QTiv, and eorai. mean that we would already be able lo retrieve the premctaphysical
Fink: As to ihe source of the three time determinations, the reason language.
for my reversed interpretive step lies in nvQ def^orav, which
the fact ihat In this connection, let us glance at Fr. 66, which should l>e correlated
is not itself iimeitem|x>ral, is addres.sed by means of what is fii st made now only in order lo indicate the superiority of Jiiig vis-a-vis ypa^Log and
 68
la ntivTa. It runs: nAvxa yiig xb nvQ ejiEX,e6v kqivei xal xaiaXtiijifTai.
Diels Iranslales; "For fire, having come upon thtm, will judge and ap-
prehend (condemn) all things.'" In this translation it is questionable
whether xpivei must l)e translated as "will judge" in the sense of an end
situation, or whether ii must not rather be translated as "will divide."
And it is questionable whether xaTa^i|teTai must be comprehended as
"will be struck into its imprint." We must then say that fire will, at the
time it brings Ta ndvra forth to appearance, divide (hem and strike each
thing into its imprint. Thus, the superiority of fire is also indicated here
vis-a-vis xa Jidvia, which are mentioned in Fr. 30 by the name of the
KOOfio?, thai is. the entire order. The more difficult rendition of Fr. 30,
suggested by me, requires thai the subject of the first and second halves
of the sentence changes. According lo the smoother rendition, the sub-
ject of the antecedent phrase, xoanog, will also be retained in the second
half. Seen linguistically, this version might be the more easy; but seen
thoughtfully, it appears to me objectionable. The more difficult rendi-
tion implies that in the antecedent xt)oju>5 comes into view
as something brought forth, but xoonog is held away from the power of
gods iand humans to bring forth. As something brought forth, the
xoafiog. which arises neither from the jtoltiolc; of gods nor of hiitnans,
points to bringing- fort b-io-appcarance. Therefore, the subject can no
fire's
longer x6onoc; in the second half of the sentence. For otherwise kvq
l>e
de(^tix»v would be a predicative determination of X60H05, notwithstand-
ing the fact that xiio(«)5 something brought forth by fire. Thus, we
is
must read: neither a god nor a human brought the y.6a\ioz forth to
appearance: rather, it was always and is and will always be living fire—
which biings the xoojio; fonh to ap|>earance. We can understand the
phrase, "was always and is and will be," almost in the sense of "there is."
But the way in which there is nvg aeCC,ox)V is the manner in which kvq
dei^wov bestows the three ways of being-in-iime on ndvia. If we read Fr.
30 thus, a decisive advantage of fire over xdonog emerges, an advantage
that is sup|xirted by Fr. 66, The question, however, is whether we may
read Fr. 30 such that nvQ dcL^coov, which is mentioned in the three time
determinations, isthe decisive factor. In this connection, we can ask
wheibei' we tan draw the superiority of fire from Fr. .SI although
al.so
it includes new motifs of thought.
Participant: Musn'i we also include Fr. 76 here: ^f| kvq tov yf\g
Bdvaiov xai 6.r\Q t,T| tov JTUpog OdvaTov, vboiQ t,r\ xov degKK 66vatov. yii
TOV uftaTog. Translated by Diels, it runs: "Fire lives the death of eai th
and air lives ihe death of fire; water lives the death of air and earth thai
of walei."
Fink: In ihis fragment the movement is spoken in the joining
words: fire lives ihe death of earth. That means that il is not a question
here ol a simple going over; rather, it is a question of the interlocking of
69
life —
and death a problem lo which we will pay attention separately. Also
concerning Fr. 31, we wish to use here only the words of Heraclitus
himself in our consideration: Jtneoc xptmai nQtbrov OdXaooa, Qakaa<jt\g
Af x6 nev f\\i.icFv yfj, xo 6e f\\iiav 7iQr\aTi]Q. (yfi) BalXaaaa ftiaxEexai, xai
liexeEExai el5 xov aOxov Xoyov, 6xoloc nQooOEV t^v f\ yeveoBoi yfi. Diels
tianslales: "C^hangc of fire: first sea; of sea, however, one half earth, the
olher half breath of fire. The earth melts as sea, and this receives its
measure according to the same sense (relationship) as it acknowledged
before it became earth."
Heide(;(;ek: Let me refer at this p<»int to an essay by Bruno Snell on
TQCiJiY\ in Hei-mes 61, 1926.
Fink: Diels translates. "Change of fire," while Heraclitus speaks in
the plural of TQonaf, changes, transformations. But how should we
understand the transition of fire into sea and from sea into earth and
breath of fire, as well as from earth into sea and sea into fire? Is it here a
question of the familiar phenomenon of one aggregate state passing
and is named over into ihe other? Is it intended here that some elements go over and
turn themselves into others? Does Heraclitus speak of transformations
of elements, such as we see aggregate states going over; as, for instance.
liquid goes over into steam or fire into smoke? What are the Tponaf?
Does Fleraclitus speak of a multitude because fire converts itself into a
series of different things? At first, it looks like a series; lire converts itself
into sea, sea converts itself half into earth and half into breath of fire.
C;anwe inquire here at all about everyday, famihar kinds of events?
From the phenomenon, we know only the change of aggregate states.
However, we are not witnesses of a cosmogonic process. What is very
difficult to see is the conversion of fire into sea, while the sea, that is,
water, isnevertheless that which most quenches fire. The general ques-
tion is whether we are right if we take the transformations of fire as if
everything were first fire, and as if there were then a separation of water,
of which one half would Ix; earth and the other half the breath of fire.
Presumably, we are not dealing at all with a relationship of mixing in
sequence and at the level of ndvxa. Rather, I would suppose that the fire
is op[x»sed to the sea, the earth, and the breath of fire, that the fire thus
— relates it.self in opposition to the sea, the earth and the breath of fire as
xtQctnvoc; and "HJtio^ are in opposition to ndvxa. The fire, as the &v,
would then turn alxuii in different ways, as xd Jtdvxa show themselves.
This interpretalion should at first l>e formulated only as a question. If we
understand XQOJir| only as turning over in a local motion. Fr. 31 is not at
all intelligible. For we cannot say that fire turns into water, earth, and
breath oi fire in a local motion. If xpojlfi means turning in a local motion,
of whal then do the overlurnings of fire mean? Nevertheless, Heraclitus
says [hat fire turns first into sea. Yet here a local motion is evidently not
thought. Does file move in such a way that il first fx.'comes water, and
 . —
70

does water move in such a way thai half becomes earth and the other half
becomes breath of fire? If we understand xeonai in ihis sense, ihen we Difference of Interpietation: Truth of Being
take fire as a kind of primary substance, which assumes different forms {Fragment 16) or Cosmological
o( appearance in sequence. My question, however, is whether one can
make Jiueo; XQonai clear by the changeover of aggregate states familiar
Perspective (Fragment 64). —
Heraclitus and the

to us.
Matter of Thinking.
Heidegger: Would you say that fire stands behind eveiyihing? —
The Not-Yet-Metaphysical and the
What is questionable, however, is what "behind" means here; alcove all, No-Longer-Metaphysical. Hegel's —
whether fire stands iK-hind everything in the manner of a primary sub- —
Relationship to the Greeks. nugog Tpojiat and
stance, . .
Dawn.
Fink: or whether one must not begin here also from the re-
. . .

(Correlated Fragments: 31, 76).

latedness of £v and Jidvia, and whether one must give up the thought of
a basic matter. Our task here will again l>e to work out the more difficult
rendition.

Heidegger: Since we have interrupted our seminar for three weeks

over Christmas, a short synopsis of the way of our undertaking till now
might prove useful. If an outsider were to ask you what we work at in
our seminar, how would you answer such a question?
Participant: Discussion of the problem of time in Fr. 30 was cen-
tral in the last hours before Christmas.
HEiDEG(iER: In other words, you have indeed let yourself be misled
by the explication of Fr. 30 which Mr. Fink has given. For as we have —
emphasized again and again—time does not come to the fore at all with
Heraclitus.
Participant: But Fr. 30 leads to time determinations, and our
([uestionwas how these ought to be understood.
Heidegger: With that, you go into a special question. But if some-
Ixjdy asked you what we work at in our Heraclitus .seminar, and if he
wanted to hear not alxjul individual questions but alx)Ut the whole; if he
asked whai we have begun with, what would your answer Ix^?
Participant: We have liegun with a methodical preliminary con-
sideration, that is, with the question of how Heraclitus is to \x under-
stood.
Heidegger: What has Mr. Fink done at the beginning of his in-

K'i])retation?
Pakiicipant: has started with a consideration of xa Jidvta.
He
Heide(;(;er: But how does he come to la navTO?— If 1 speak with
you now. I ihus speak wilh everyone.
PARiiciPANr: riirough Fr. M: tu 6f jiavxa oi:a>tit,fi Kegauvo;.
Heidegger: In the explication, have we begun with xa ndvta or
with lightning? For il is im[X)riani to distinguish thai.
Participan'i First, we have asked ourselves how za Jidvxa is to l>e
:

translated; then, we turned to ihe iightning; and finally, we have looked

at all ihe fragments in which xd ndvxa is mentioned.
 . . .

72
73

Heidegger: Mr. Fink has thus begun ihe explication oC Heraclitus

Participan'i: . . . our taking into view the relationship between
with the lightning. Is this Ix-ginning a matter of course? Is it not surpris-
lightning and to ndvra.
ing?
Hkidkgger: What follows after that?
Participant: If one considers the starting points made elsewhere,
Participant: .An explication ot Fr. II.
this beginning is unusual.
Heidegger: But how do we come to this fragment? What is the
HtiDEGGER: Mr. Fink, who l)Cgins with the lightning, is, as it were,
jKTtinent motif that leads us from Fr. 64 to Fr. ? 1 1

struck by lightning. With what does Heidegger begin?

Participant: What Heraclitus him.self said gave us support for this
Pahticipani': With the Aoyoc [gathering-process].
transition. In Fr. 64, he speaks of xd ndvra. in Fr. 1 of Jidv ^qjietov, 1

Heideg(;er: And l)eside that . ,

which we have understood as itdvta (i)? §QJiETd.

Participant: with 'A>.f|9ELa [nonconcealment].^''
. , .

Heidegger: But where lay the pertinent support for such a proce-
Heidegc;er: But how does Heidegger come to 'AX.T|6ELa?
dure?
PAR-nciPANT: By Fr. 16: to [iri 60v6v jiote nwg &v ti; XofWi,^'' ,
Participant: Lightning (lightning boll) led us to n\-ff\ (blow).
Heidegger: Where this fragment is used as a basis for a Heraclitus
Heidegger: Besides, we saw a relevant connection Ijetween steer-
explication, one must also read it as the llrst fragment. But how do Frs.
ing (otax(^ci) and driving (vEHETat). Theiefore, we took up first the
64 and 16 come together, or how is Fr. 64 distinguished from Fr. 16?
relationship of lightning and xd ndvra. and finally, we t»H»k up the
Wherein lies the distinction l>ctween both beginnings?
lelaiionship of JiX.Tiyi'i and ndv e^jtetov. Then we turned . .

Participant: In Fr. 16, to \ii\ 60vov jiote [thai which never sets]
Participant: ... to the sun fragments.
stands at the central point; in Fr. 64, it is xepauvog [lightning].
Heidegger: The explication began with the lightning or lightning
Heidegger: Are both fragments, and thus both lieginnings, identi-
Ik)Ii,then turned to the sun, and after that to nvQ dEL^tuov. Later, we
cal?
must specify more exactly the references of lightning, sun, and fire.
Participant: No.
What we have thematically treated up to this point has now become
HEiDEGtLERi Take Fr. 16 entire, and compare it with Fr. 64.
clear. But how d(»es Mr. Fink proceed in explication of the fragments?
Participant: The distinction i>etween the two fragments consists in
Participant: The explication has become a problem for us.
this, that only tci n&vza is mentioned in Fr. 64, while the human being
Heidegger: To what extent is the explication a problem? How
comes into play in Fr. 16.
w(»uld you characterize the procedure of Mr. Fink? The manner of his
Heidegger: We are thus concerned with a great difference. The by no means to be taken for granted, but is rather to be
explication is
question be what the different starting point of Frs. 64 and 16,
will
designated as venturesome.
respectively, signifies; whether or not an opposition is displayed here.
Participant; More has been said in the interpretation of the frag-
We will have to ask this question explicitly. But what could one reply if it ments than stands in them.
were said that the human becomes thematic in Fr. 16, while he is not hazardous. But Mr. Fink does
Heide(;ger: The interpretation is
mentioned in Fr. 64?
not interpret arbitrarily; rather, he has his grounds for preferring the
Participant; If tq jidvra comprehends all entities, then the
more difficult rendition and the hardness of the problem. What is the
human is co-thought as an entity.
])roblem we are concerned with heie? With what right does he prefer the
Particihani Fundamentally, I agree with that. But then it is not
more difficult rendition? l^t us take Fr. 30 as an example.
:

said in Fr. 64 how a human, in distinction to all nonhuman navxa, is and

Participant: In each case we have preferred the more difficult
stands in relationship to lightning. On the contrary, Fr. 16 expressly
rendition so that the subject matter comes to the fore.
names the way that a human behaves toward to nf) ftOvov jiote.
Heide(;ger; What matter is that?
Heii>i:(-(;er: A human is also named in Fi'. 64 in so far as he is and
Participant; The matter is already suggested in a manifold,
Ix-longs as an entity to id TtdvTa. But the questittn is whether we already
perhaps most explicitly in reference lo the time <|uestion.
think of a human when we take him as an entity which Ixjlongs to Tct
Heide(;c;er; do not allow talk aljout lime now. Let us bracket
I
Jidvra like all other eiilities. whether wc must not think of him otherwise
iK'ing and time now. What matter is treated that should come to the
as an entity in the midst of Jtdvta. Let us. therefore, keep in mind that
foie? "Fhiiik of Mr. Fink's introductory remarks.
the iK-ginning of Mr. Fink's Heraclitus explication is surprising. Ihis
pARTiCiHAN-r: 'Fhe matter of thinking.
beginning with the lightning then leads to
Heidegger: And the matter of iliinking is? We must say ihat the
. .
 74 75

matter of thinking is thai which we seek, that of which we still do not form a totality, and that on the other hand xd iidvxa are supposed to
know. The same outsider, after he has listened to what you answer to his stand in a reference to something that does not belong to the totality.
question, could reply to you that when we deal with Heratlitus we sil, as Heide(;c;er: You would say that with the totality we have every-
it were, in an ivory tower. For what we are doing would have nothing to thing, that with it we are at the end of thinking. On the other hand, a

do with technology and industrial society; rathei', it is nothing but manifold is mentioned that exceeds the totality. If Tdjidviais the totality
worn-out stories. What would Ix' the answer here? of ovxa, what is as a whole, is there still something which leads further?
Participant: It is doubtful that we are dealing here with worn out Participant: Although you have said that the word "l>eing" should
stories. For we do not take Heraclitus as a thinker of the past. It is rather l>e bracketed, we cannot now refrain from naming being as what leads

our intention lo bring something to the fore in the exposition of Hera- further than what is as a whole.
clitus that is possibly something other or quite the same. For us, there is Heidegcer: Till now, the conversation was not about being. Being
no concern for an exposition that has to do with a past matter. is something that is n<»t an entity and that does not l>elong to what is as a

HKiDEtiGicR: Do we thus provide no contribution to Heraclitus re- whole. The more ditllcult rendition consists in this, that we do not read
search? the fragments onticaily, as we read the newspaper, that reading of the
Pa HI ic I pant: I would not say that, because our problematic can fragments not concerned with things that become dear simply. Rather,
is

also be helpful for research. the difficulty is that here it isobviously amatterof a kindof thinking that

Heidi:(;ger: We seek the determination of the matter of thinking in
conversation with Heraclitus. We intend thereby no thematic contribu-
tion to Heraclitus research. We are not interested in this direction.
Perhaps what we are doing is also inaccessible for Heraclitus research.
The way and manner in which we speak with the fragments and listen to
them is not the simple, everyday way and manner of formuig an opinion,
as when we read the newspaper. Mr. Fink forces you to think olheiwise.
The greater difficuhy of the more difficult rendition is not only related
by degrees to our capacity of apprehension. What seems here like a
grammatical comparative is presumably another distinction.
pAKTit;iPANr: A comparative presupposes that .something which
stands in a context gets compared. Between the .simple, everyday think-
ing and understanding and that which is called the more difficult rendi-
tion, there is clearly a gulf ihat is worthy of emphasis.
HKiDKtiCEH: We have thus looked at the reference of JioLvra and
lighining, ta JidvTu and sun, to jrdvta and Hie. In Fi-. 7, jtavta xu ovia
was mentioned. In the reference of xa Jtdvra to lightning, to the sun, to
lets itself into something that is inaccessible to direct representation and
thought: that is the genuine background.
Another difficulty is the following. The kind of thinking that thinks
what is as a whole in regard to being is the way of thought of
metaphysics. Now we said in the last seminar that Heraclitus does not yet
think metaphysically, whereas we no longer attempt to think metaphysi-
cally. Has the "not-yet-metaphysical" no reference at all to metaphysics?
One could suppose the "noi-yet" lo be cut off from what follows, from
metaphysics. "Fhe "not-yet" could, however, also be an "already," a cer-
tain preparation, which only we see as we do, and must see as we do,
whereas Heraclitus could not .see it. But what about the "no-longer-
metaphysical'"?
Participant: This characterization of our thinking is temporarily
unavoidable, Ix^cause we simply cannot put aside the histoiy of
m metaphysics from which we come. On the other hand, regarding what
the not-yet-metaphysical" deals with, perhaps t<x) much is already said
in this characteri/ation.

fire and to Sv, which we have come across, what is the gieater difficulty Ifi.ioi';<;(;t:ii: If Heraclitus cannot say that his thinking is not yet

of the more difficult rendition in distinction to the naive manner of metaphysical l>ecause he caiint>t yet preview the coming metaphysics, .so
reading? must we say of ourselves that we no longer aitenipi to think metaphysi-
PAKri(;iPANT: The question is whether the reference of jrdvta to cally, and indeed l)ecause we come from metaphysics.

lightning, to the sun, to fire, to ^v, to n6\£\ioQ. or to Ax'iyoc each case is in Paki [cii'AN'i: .An ambiguity lies in "no-longer." On one hand, it can
different, or whether the expressed multiplicity of that to which to lie (omprehended in the sense of a
tempoiai <leterminaiion.
sujjttrficial.

Jtdvra refers is only the name of a manifoki. I hen it implies that metaphysics lies l)ehind us. On
the other hand, it can
nKn)E(;<;EK: The difficulty l>efore which we stand is the manifold of .ilso lie underslood such that the lx.-aringon metaphysics is maintained.

ligliuiing, the sun, fii-e, t'v, war and Xoy^'S '" their relationship lo xa aliboogh nol in ilie manner of a rnelaphysical c()unier|>osiiion wiiliin
jidvxa, or to xd flvxa. The manifold docs not belong to Jtdvxa or to ovxa. metaphysics.
Bui lo what docs it ilien belong? HEinE(i<;KK: You wish lo sav ibat "'no-longer-metaphysical" does
pAttTi<;[i'ANr: see the ditticullv in this, that on one hand xd Jidvxa
I nol mean that we have dismissed metaphysics; latlier, implies that il

ii
 , .

76 77

metaphysics still clings to us, ihal we are not free of it. Wliert- within must think the concepts new each day. We have, for example, the state-
Wfstcin philosophy is the lelatioiiship of epochs to each other thought ment that this glass full. Someihing is said, therewith, atx>ut what lies
i.s

in most decisive manner? lK:foie us, but the reference to an 1 is not thought. When this reference

Participant: With Hegel.
Heidk(;(;er: Ifwf s;iy thai we no longer attempt to think metaphys-
but remain nevertheless referred to metaphysics, then we could
ically,
designate this relationship in Hegelian fashion as sublation. None of us
knows whether metaphysics will reappear. In any case, the "no-longer-
metaphysical" is more difficult to s(M;cify than the "not-yet-
metaphysical." But what about Hegel and the Greeks? Doesn't he lake
them to some extent all in the same breath?
Participant: With Hegel, another understanding is presented of
what a beginning is.
Heidegger: The question about the beginning is too difficult for us
now. The answer which wish is simpler. What character, according to
1
Hegel, has Greek thinking for philosophy?
Participant: A character of preparation.
Heidegger: This answer is too general. More specifically said
Participant; In the preface to the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel
says that everything depends on comprehending and expressing truth
not only as substance, but just as much as subject.
Heidegger: How is that to be understood? But first: is the "Pref-
ace" you mention the preface to the Pkenomenalogy?
Participant; It is the preface to the system of science, whereas the
"Introduction" is the real preface to the Phenomenology.
Heideggkr: The "Preface" thus pertains to the Logif. and not only
liecomes thematic for thinking, for the I, then what lies liefore us be-
comes what lies opposite us, that is, it tecomes an object. In CJreek there
are no objects. What does object mean in the Middle Ages? What dttes it
mean literally?
Participant: What is thrown up against.
Heidegger: The object is what is thrown up against whom? Can
you throw the glass up against yourself? How can 1 throw something up
against my.self without something happening? What does suhiectum
[substance] mean in the Middle Ages? What does it mean literally?
Participant: What is thrown under.
Heidegger: For medieval thinking, the glass is a suhiectum. which is
the translation of OnoKet(ievov. Ohieclum [representation], for the Middle
.Ages, meant, on the contrary, what is represented. A golden mountain is
an object. Thus the object here is that which is precisely not objective. It
. . is subjective. I have asked how the Greeks think according to Hegel's
interpretation. We have said thai in their thinking the reference to the
subject does not become thematic. But were the (ireeks still thoughtful?
For Hegel, nevertheless, their thinking was a turning toward what lies
l>efoieand what underlies, which Hegel called the thinking of the im-
mediate. The immediate is that between which nothing intervenes.
Hegel characterized all of Greek thought as a phase of immediacy. For
him, philosophy first reaches solid land with Descartes, by beginning
with the I.

to the Phenomenology of Mind. In the "Preface" Hegel says something Participant: But Hegel saw a break already with Socrates, a turn-
fundamental aljout philosophy, that it should think the truth not only as ing toward subjectivity that goes along with mores, in so far as these
substance, but also as subject. In (ireek, substance means . . lx:coine morality.
Participant: . . . ^jioxelubvov, and what is underlying. Heidegger: That Hegel sees a break with Socrates has a still sim-
Heidegger: How is substance thought by Hegel? If I say that the pler ground. When he characterizes Greek thinking as a whole as a
hou.se is big or tall, how is the manner of thinking that only thinks phase ot immediacy, he does not level down inner distinctions like that
substance to be characterized? What is not thought here? between Anaxagoras and Ari.siotle. Within the phase of immediacy, he
Participant: The movement between the house and being tall. sees a divisittn comprehended by the same three-fold scheme of
Heidegger: The Greeks, who according to Hegel think only of — —
innnediacy mediation unity. He does not, thereby, apply an arbitrary
substance, inoxEi[iEvov, have categories for this. scheme; rather, he thinks out of that which is for him the truth in the
Participant: The movement can only come into view when yet sense of the ab.solute ceriainiy of the absolute spirit. Nevertheless, the
another basis supervenes, the subject. classification of metaphysics and Greek thinking is not so easy for us,
Heidegger: When it is said that the house is tall, what is not becau.se the question alxiui the deteimination off-reek thinking is some-
thought therein? thing that we must first pui lo question and awaken as a question.
Participant: The one who thinks. The question from ibe seminar Ijefbie last, conceiiiing what the
Thus, what kind of thinking
I-lKiOEGCiER: is that which simply views speculative means wilh Hegel, still remains unanswered.
ino}tf[nFVov and not the subject? PAkTic:iPANr: Speculation for Hegel means the view [An\rliiiuung]
Participant: I hesitate to say the overused words. of eternal iruih.
Heidegger: In philosophy no word or concept is overused. We Heidegger: This answer is too general and sounds only approxi-
 78 79

mate. With such academic questions, one has no recourse to an index, also reject the interpretation that thinks this phrase together with Fr. 89,
but to the Encyclopedia. There the speculative is a determination of the in which it says that those who are awake have one common world, while
logical. How many determinations are ihere and what are the remaining ihose who sleep turn each one to his own I do not understand tov
world.
ones? auTOV djidvTCJV as the same, that is, the one and common world of those
Participant: In all there are three dimensions of the logical, which who are awake (xoivog x6o(i05) in opp<}sition to the private world (E6io;
correspond to the three determinations already named, immediacy, x6o^u>5) of those who sleep. I interpret Sjiavxa in the .sense of id Jidvta.
mediation, and unity. .Although djiavTEc; customarily refers to humans and living beings,
Heidegger: Are the three deteiminations of the logical three much as Jidvrov, here means only that Heraclitus
6JidvT(0V, just as
things side-by-side? Evidently not. The first moment, which corresponds speaks by reason of the flow of language, instead of from irdvttuv
to immediacy, is the abstract. What does abstract mean with Hegel? 6n:dvTa>v.
Participant: What is separated and isolated. HEiDEtiGER: But what then does Jidvta mean?
Heidegger: Better: the thinking of one-sidedness, which only Fink; ndvxa form a Joining and come forth in the shining up of fire
thinks one side. peculiar that the immediate should be the abstract,
It is in their determination and character.
while for us the immediate is rather the concrete. But Hegel calls the Heidegger: C;an't one also start from a plural, where xoohol are
immediate abstract in so far as one looks at the side of givenness and not the many statesof an entire order of ndvTa?x6anovT6v6e would then be
at the side of the I. The second moment of the logical is the dialectical, this one state in distinction to others.
the third is the speculative. The Hegelian determination of the specula- Fink: But there is no passage in Heraclitus in which he speaks of
be significant for
tive will us, when we will be concerned at an important many xoonoi.
part of the seminar with the apparent opposition of iDcginning with Heide(;ger: However, the xovfte marks a place at which a new
Me0auv65 or with to \tf\ bv\6\ jiote jcu)c; fiv tlc; XdBoi. theme fjegins. On your interpretation, x6o|i05 is to be understood on-
Now 1 still have a question for you, Mr. Fink, which concerns Fr. 30. tologically as much as ontically.
Do understand you correctly when you comprehend x6a|io; as identi-
I Fink: Heraclitus stands neither on the sideof ndvTanoron the .side
cal with xa Jidvxa in your interpretation? of fire; rather, he takes up a curious position lietween them,
Fink: xooiiog and id jrdvra are no! identical, but x6o|io5 does in- Heidegger: With that we can now return to Fr. 31.
deed mean the jointed whole of id Jtdvra, the whole stamping, which is Fink:I attempt first to expose a thought that contains a proposal

not fixed but moved. Heraclitus speaks of manifold ways of movement, for an interpretation of Fr. SI. In the last seminar we expressed our
as in strife or war. doubt as to whether transformations or overturnings are meant with
Heideciger: Does x6o^og then belong in the sequence of lightning, TQOJiai. If it is a questicm of transformations, then we think of the
sun, and lire? d>.^o(ojOLC. of a basic substance. If we translate TQOJiai with overturnings,
Fink: Not without further consideration. That could only be said if then —we could ask—do we mean the turning points in the way of the
x6o|i05 were thought not as the order brought forth by fire, bui as the sun-fire in the firmament which measure time?
ordering fire. If xoonog had the function of 6iaK6o[i>]aL5, then it would HEiDEGtiER: Is KUQog tgonai a frpnitiviLs subitrliis or a gfnilh'UA iibiec-
also belong in the .sequence of basic words. lus (subjective genitive or objeclive genitive|?

Heide(;gi-;r; is mentioned. If we hold that

In Fr. 30. xoojiov Tovfte Fink: The tgoJiaC are asserted of fire. However, a difficulty lies in
together wiih Mard tov VSyov t6v6E. then couldn't xoo^ov xovftt, corre- the fact that we have from ihe history of metaphysics familiar and com-
sponding with ktyov T6v6e, mean the same as this xoovwig. which is still to mon ideas and developed and general ways of thought in which we are
l)e treated, which is still to Ix- ihematized? always already moving, and from which we are also apt at (Irsi to inter-
Fink: .\1xjvc all, the demonstrative T6v6f does not mean an indi- pret Fr. 3f. One such idea, already given to us from metaphysics, is the
vidual this, not this x^onog, which is now as oppo.sed to other x6ohol. idea of an underlying substance that shows itself in many disguises.
When it is said that the xoofjoc is broughl forih as ibe j<)iinecl oider, a Heide<:ger: jivqi):; is then genith'u^ obierlivus.
x6ono5 ill the singula), which iK'longs to a pluiality of x6o|iOL, is not Fink: Grnitivus ohieclivii^ Another .scheme pre.sents
and \uliifclivii.\.

meant (hereby. Of this xoofio^ it is said: toy aOxov im&VTUiv [the same from ancient speculation on the elements, in which one or
ilself to us
for ail beings]. Wliellier this is Heraelilu.s' phiase, we leave aside now. another element is declared to Ix- ihe original element. Does TiVQ also
Diels translates ajidvicov as "all living beings." I reject this translation. I have the f'unctiiiii of a basic element ihal converts itself thn>ugh thai

80
which emenates out of it? Two common schemes with which we could
attempt to interpret Jiiieck igojiai are the a>Aoi(«OL5 of an underlying
substance and the emenation of an origiual t-lement. But 1 l>elicvc that
we must entertain an extreme distrust of such conceptions. In the text it
says: ovfrtmnings of fire, first into sea. The fire turns itself over into sea,
that is, into that which we understand as a power opposed to lire. /\t
first, we could suppose that it is a question of the sharp, ontic ()ppt>sition
of fire and waler that is familiar to us. In the small domain of the human
environment, there is the phenomenon that water quenches fire and
that fire can vaporize water. But such reciprocal contest and annihilation
is only possible on the soil of earth. Clearly, the fragment does not refer
to this small domain, but rather to the great domain of the wcjrid. Here
—
we have a view of fire in the heavens, the sea, and the earth the sea that
girds the eaith. In the great domain of the world, the domain that
presents itself to do not
us in the view of the world, fire and water
annihilate each other.
The view of the world [We/l-Anschauung] is not understood here
ideologically; rather, it means the immediate view of the great relation-
ships of the heavenly stars, the sea that lies under them and the earth.
When Heraclitus says that fire first turns itself over into sea, we suspend
the schemata of aXXottooLg and emanation, even though we are still not
able to think what "turning over" means. The sea turns itself half into
earth, half into breath of fire. Then we read that the earth is passed into
sea and that earth dissolves in the measure in which sea was before, when
sea l)ecame earth. Nothing more is said in the fragment concerning
whether and how the breath of fire turns further. With the breath of
fire, the overturning is brought to a close. All that is spoken of is the
turning of fire into sea and the sea's turning half into earth and half into
breath of fire, and finally of earth turning into sea. Fire turns itself over
into sea, this splits into earth and breath of fire, and half of the earth
turns back into sea. Apparently a reciprocal exchange of water and
earth, of fiuidity and solidity, is mentioned. What is fitr us a familiar
distinction of opposites dissolves itself. No further turning and no re-
I Heidegger:
turning to fire is declared concerning the breath of fire. Ihe differences
of sea, earth, and breath of fire are referred back to a common origin, to
a genesis which is posited step by step; but we still do not know the
character of the genesis. If now we cannot apply the familiar scheme of
dXXoitooi^, that is, the scheme of the original substance with its states and
modes and the scheme of emanation, then we get int<» a difficulty. How
then should we interpret the m^QOQ TQOJtOl? We must ask what Hera-
clitus has ihoughtfiilly experienced aiul taughi sighi nl. I aitempi
— —
now if you will to give a fantastic meaning to mi(X)5 Tgojtat, which is
thought as a possible answei- to the question of what Heraclitus has
tboughifully caught sight of. We could make the turning ol fire in-
. .
81
ourselves by starting out from the phenomenon of the break
telligible to
of day, from the phentnnenonof dawnon the Ionian coast. At dawn, the
expanse of the sea flashes up out of the fire which breaks out from night
and drives out night; and opposite the sea there fiashesup the shore and
land, and alwve the sea and land the zone of the vault of heaven which is
filled by the breath of fire. A deeper sense would lie in what is familiar to
us as the break of day, if we do not now think the relationship of fire to
sea, earth, and breath of fire, namely the bringing- forth -to-appearance
that is the basic event of fire, simply as the casting of light to and letting-
be-seen of that which is already determined thus and so, A deeper sense
would lie in that which is familiar to us as the break of day, if we also do
not understand bringing- forth in the sense of a building manufacture or
of a creative bringing-foith, but attempt to advance thoughtfully behind
the two expressive forms, com ing-forth- to-appearance in the sen.se of
technical and creative achievement and casting of light. In order to win a
deeper sense of the break of day, it would depend on avoiding the
scheme of technical bringing- forth in the sense of a material transforma-
tionand also the scheme of creative bringing- forth; and beside that, k
would depend on taking away from the letting-shine-up in the light of
fire the basic trait of impotence. If we could succeed in thinking back
l>ehind the familiar schemata of making, bringing- forth, and casting
light or letting-tw-seen, then we could understand the break of day in a
deeper sense. We could then say that in the breaking of the world-day
the basic distinctions of the world area, sea, earth, and vault of heaven,
first come forth to appearance. For this deeper thought we have an
immediate phenomenon in the break of day. But nowhere do we have a
phenomenon corresponding to the return course of earth into sea.
Heidecger: How would you translate TQOJtaf in your projection,
which you yourself call fantastic, but which is not at all so fantastic
Ix-'cause it includes reference to immediate phenomena.
Fink: We see the arising of fire, and in its arising the XQonai are the
turnings of fire around toward that which shows itself in the fire shine.
TQOJiai signify no material transformations . .
and also no mere illumination.
. . .
Fink: In announcement of the deeper sense of Jtttpo; TQonal, I was
concentrating on a commonness, not known in ontic relationships, of
and letting-arise in the sense of tpiioig. That
l>rin gin g- forth into visibility
isan attempt to avoid the scheme in which lire converts like an original
element over inU) other elements like water and earth. .And I attempt to
iliink this in a simile f>etween the arising of the articulated world in the
light-shine of the world illuminating fire, and the regions of Jidvra lay-
ing themselves out.
Heide<;grr: You thus lake the phenomenon of dawn as the basis of
your interpretation . ,
 .

82
83

Fink: order to avoid ihe phenomenon of transformation.

... in
thatmasks itself through its emanations. Rather, we will view the entire
Heide(;ger: You mean thereby the dawn of the world and not of a range that binds fire, sea. earth, and breath of fire in connection with life
specifit day, just as yon have in view the world-fire and not the sun.
and death. Apparently, we reven to anthropological fragments in oppo-
Fink: But in the phenomenal sun, we can think fire.
sition to cosmological fragments. In [ruth.however.it is not a question of
Heide(;ger: How should we think fire? In order to heighten the
a restriction to human phenomena; rather, what pertains to being hu-
difficulty, I refer to Fr. 54, in which the word Atpavfig [invisible] comes to
man, such as life and death, becomes in a distinctive .sense the clue for
the fore. The fire is invisible; it is the fire which does not appear.
understanding of the entirety of the opposing lelatedness of ev and
Kink: As wc have said at the outset: the fire is that which is not there
jiavxa.
in m jidvia.
HEiDEtHitK; n you proceed from day to world-day. so we could
think from the sun thither to fire.
Fink:Nowhere do we find the sudden change of fire into sea as an
ontic phenomenon.
Participant: Io what is 6aXdooT|5 referred?
Fink: To XQonai. For the turning over of sea into earth and breath
of fire is a continuation of XQonai.
Heide(;c;er: propose that we bratkel Fr. 31. The difficulty we got
I

into lies in this, thatwe have not spoken clearly enough alxjut jivq, which
we still have to do. understand neither the interpretation which is
I

accompanied by chemical ideas nor can I follow through the attempted

correspondence of day and world-day. For me, there is a hole here.
Fink: The difficulty will perhaps clear itself up if we come to Fr. 76,
in which fire, sea, and earth appear in repeated sequence. The most
important thing there is the manner in which tqojiqC are characterized.
What is named only as turning over in Fr. 31, is here spoken of as "to live
the death of the oihei ." With that, ive meet a new, surprising thought. At
first, it should sound noteworthy to us thai the dark formula of death,

which first l>ecomcs clear to us in the domain of the living, is referred to

such entities as neither live or die, like ivaler or earth. In the small
domain of htnnan ambit, we know well the phenomenon that fire va-
porizes water and water quenches fire. Here we can say that lire lives the
destiTiction of water and water lives the desiiticiion of fire.
HEiDt.cciEK: To live would mean here "to survive" . .

Fink: ... to survive the passing of the other, to survive in the an-
nihilation oi the other. Biil we have here only a poetic metaphor. In
order to understand the tpojiii-chaiacter, we must gel away from the
idea of a chemical change. .Starting from the life-death fraginenis, we
must represent to ourselves what Heiaclitus thinks by life and death.
From theie we can also iiTidei stand the a\Tanoi[iii, that is. ibe exchange
of navxu. lor fiie and of lire foi- jravia. "Fhis is a relationship like that of
gold and goods, in which connection it is more a matter of ligbi than the
value oi g<)ld. We do nol understand the tuiiiing overof flie iiuo whai is
not fite in the sense of a chemii.al Lliange oj in the sense of an (niginal
substance that changes (dXXoiojotg) or in the sen.se of an original element
 . .

85
8
The predicament of finding a concept that does not refer to building,

Intertwining of Life and Death creation or bare representation always presents itself with Husserl. In
distinction to ancient philosophy, modern philosophy does not think
(Correlated Fragments: 76, 36, 77).
appearance so much from the issue of what is in the openness of a general
Relation of Humans and Gods presencing, but rather as becoming an object and presenting itself for a
(Correlated Fragments: 62, 67, 88). subject. In the general concept of appearance, nevertheless, self-
presentatitm belongs to each entity. But each entity presents itself to
everything that is, and, among others, to the entity that is characterized

by cognition. Presentation, then, is a collision among what is, or a repre-

sentation of what is by the one who represents. But what is cannot be
to us for many reasons: first, [be-
Fink Fragnienl 31 remained closed understood with the categories of attraction and repulsion.
be a matter of dispute, on the one
cause the plural XQonai proves itself to Heidegger: Another manner of explaining representation occurs
and on the other, as a plurality of turns that
hand as a technical le.m. reference to receptivity and spontaniety.
because of the resulting problem of in
happen in sequence; and second,
Fink: Kant speaks of receptivity in reference to sensory data, and in
turn can be though, in the usual circle of ideas of
whether the concept of
stuff (AUoitooi;) or emanation of an a ceitain manner also in reference to the pure forms of intuition, space
the transformation of an original
in its manifold appearances as alien
and time. Spontaniety is based on the categorical synthesis of tran-
original element that conceals itself
mobilize a mistrust of all the scendental apperception.
forms 1 am of the opinion that we must
us from the conceptual Heidegger: Which moment do you see now in Husserl's doctrine
usual schemes of thought that are familiar to
Here, these are above all the two of constitution?
tradition of metaphysical thinking.
to clarify Fr. 3 irom Fink: In hisconcept of constitution, Husserl means neither making
schemes of oUolujol^ and emanation. The attempt 1

Ionian coast falls short, m the charac- nor bare perception of things which are independent of consciousness.
the phenomenon of dawn on the
Nevertheless, the positive characterization of the concept of constituion
of the world regions of sea,
terization of the lelting-arise and shiiiing-up
of thinkmg this neither as a remains difficult. When Husserl strove to think back behind the distinc-
earth heaven, and breath of fire, of the task
tion of making and bare perception, this problem remained in the path
real transformation of an
original substance, nor as the emanation ot an
in the technical or creative sense.
of cognition, that is, in the relationship of the subject to an entity that is
original element, nor as bringing-forth
entities by the light- already posited from the beginning. The prior question, however, is
noras the impotent illumination of already-existing whether.
back Ixihind the distinction ot
shine of fire. Perhaps it is necessary to go
.

bringing-forth and of bare casting ol Heidegger: objectivity necessarily belong.s

. . . . .

actual manufacture and creative

to think the shining-up of entities in an
Fink: ... to the being of what is, or whether objectivity first be-
light and illumination, if we wish
fire comes a universal approach to what is in modern philosophy, with which
all encompassing shine
of lightning, of the sun. or of eternal living
oi what another, more original approach is covered up.
Heideggfr; You say that the coming-forth-to-appearance
creative bringing-forth and also no bare
il- Heidegger: From this it follows once again that we may not inter-
is is no actual making, no
lime ago referred to the pret Heraclitus from a later time.
lumination. In this connection, you have some
constitu- Fink: All the concepts that arise in the dispute over idealism and
fact that a similar predicament is hidden in Husserl's concept of
realism are insufficient to characterize the shining- forth, the coming-
'°" forth-to-appearance. of what is. It seems to me more propitious to speak
The problem of constitution HusseiTs phenomenology has
in
Fink-
of of shining-forth than of shining-up. For we are easily led by the idea of
its place in the
subject/object-rcference. The perception [Gewohren]
ways of being given is consti- shining-up into thinking as if what is already were, and were sub-
multiplicity of
the unity of an object in ihe sequently illuminated. dXVi9ELa would then be only an eliciiation of what
object. With the concept of con-
tuted in the interplay of aspects of the already is in a light. However, the light, as ctXliBEia and fire, is productive
slitution Husserl attempts, to begin with, to avoid a complete realism and
holds that perception is only a comprehen-
in a sense siill unknown to us. We know only this much, thai ihe "pro-
idealism. Complete realism
of what independent of consciousness. clucitivity" {»( fire is neither a making noi' a generative bringing-forth nor
sion according to consciousness is

ihe subject makes things. an ini[)otenl casting of lighi.

^s againsi this, complete idealism holds that
 . . .

86 87

Heidegger: One could ihen say (hai coming- forth -to-appea ranee is ers or whether there are shoemakers l>ecause there are shoes. To human
neillier crealio [creation) nor iUuminatio [illumination] nor con- Dasein belong such things as are Ixjund up with Dasein's manner of
stiltition . .
being, and those are necessary things, .Alongside these, there are also
Fink: . . nor xtxvri as bringing forth. For texvij is the bringing-
.
luxury items. Also the political orders, like stales, cities, settlements, laws,
forth of a specific lorm out of the substratum of an available, though nol belong to what is. but also idols and ideals. This rough overview refers to
manufactured, material . .

Heidegger: ... in distinction to crealio
Fink: which brings-forth living creatures. We must thus bracket
. . .
out an entire catalog of current ways of thinking in order not to think
coming-forth-to-appcarance in an inappropriate manner. But such a
procedure has only the character of a via negationis [way of negation],
and does not lead a step nearer to an understanding of what the
shining.forlh of la navxa or ovia in the ev of fire, sun or Ijoyoc, means.
Heidegger: Coming-fort h-to-appearance concerns a general ref-
erence . .
a great many entities. We do not, however, know straight away how all
. . .
that we have mentioned coincides in its common feature of being which,
nevertheless, makes it different. But an ever more complete overview of
all that is would never lead
uncovering ev with or alongside xd ndvra.
to
Rather, understanding hi in its unique character in distinction to xd
itdvra depends on a XQOJrl^ of our spirit.
Heidegger: When we speak of id jrdvra, do we suppose id ovia
from the start, or is there a distinction between the two?
Fink: We think the being of what is in an inexplicit manner when

we talk about xditdvra. If ihe being of what is is referred to explicitly, if

Fink:
... the puzzling reference of l\ and Jidvra. This reference is
xd Jtdvxa are designated as ovxa, then it can mean that they stand in the
puzzling because the ev never occurs among xa jcdvra. la rtdvxa means
horizon of queslionability, whether they are actual or supposed entities.
all of what But what kind of allness is that? We know relative, specific
is.
Images, for example, which are perceived by zlxaaia [apprehension of
allness like that of genus and species. For example, we think an allness of or by phantasms], are also entities, hut they are nol that which they
species in the concept "all living things," za Jiavra. however, form no
represent. Among things, there are gradesof being of what is. There are
relative allness, but rather the allness of everything which is. Yet ev does possibilities of the appearance of things which exhibit themselves as
not under the
fall la Jidvra. Rather, the other way around, xa
allness of
other than what they are, without this appearance having to be seen as
ndvia are housed in hj, but not —
as you have once said in a lecture like — subjective deception. Reflection on water, for example, is such a phe-
potatoes in a sack, but rather in the sense of what is in being. nomenon of appearance. But it is not easy to describe the manner of
Heidegger: We must ask still more closely about xit ndvxa and being of the reflection on water. If xd ndvxa are designated as ovxa. thai
fivta. How should we interpret 6vTa? What are xd Jidvra?
can mean, on the one hand, that they have proved their quality of actual
Fink: For one thing, we could make the attempt to enumerate being, and on the other hand it can mean that the beingof what is should
whatever there is. What is, for instance, is not just nature and her things. be expressly named.
We could begin an enumeration with the elements: sea, earth, heaven, Heidegger: It seems to me that still another question conceals itself
Heidegger: The gods belong to what is. behind this one. Are Jidvxa xd Jidvxa in so far as they are dvia, or are
Fink: But with that, you already refer to what is and is unphenom-
6vTa 6vxa in so far as they are xd Jtdvxa?
enal. At first, let us stay with what is phenomenal. After the elements, we
Fink: A decisive question is now raised, in which two ways of
could name the things made up out of them. But there are not only philosophical thinking are indicated. When we think ovxa from out of xd
things of nature. Rather, there are also artificial things that we do not Jtdvxa, we move into an explicit relation to the world, but without al-
come across in nature and for which there is no pattern in nature. A ready thinking of the world. Bui if we understand xd Jidvxa from out of
human shares in bringing- forth. human, says Aristo-A human begets a <)vxa, we move in an understanding of being and think toward its whole-
tle. Thai means that he has
power of nature. Beside
a part in the creative ness. Two possible points of departure for thinking have revealed them-
that, a human brings forth artificial objects. It is an open pioblem
selves to us.
whether the Aristotelian analysis of the things manufactured in xe^vt), Heidegger: You touched on the problem of the reflection in water
with the help of the scheme of the four causes, is a sufficient determina- and the appearance connected with it. Another problem about which I
tion of the artifact. Il is questionable whether artificial things have a
am still not clear is the perception of the sun.set and the Copernican
randoni <hara<ter or whether ihey have a character of necessity. Some
revolution. The question is whether the sunset is a necessary representa-
time ago, you asked whether there are shoes because there are shoemak-
tion, or whether a seeing is possible for which the sun does not set.
 88 89

Fink: Perception of the sunset is the right of the naively encoun-

which the whokj to_ which we always already implicitly comport our-
selves, suddenly flashes up.
tered world as against the scientillc interpretation of the world. Through
Heide(;ger: Thereby we turn our questi«ming to the reference of
cultivation and indirect knowledge, a human can come to the point
EV and its many forms, and to its inner reference to xa n&vza. It is always
where he no longer sees what lies l«:iore his eyes, lo the point, for
a difficulty for me that loo little is said about xa ndvxa in the text of
instance, where he no longer sees the sunset as that which displays itselt
only in the manner seen in Heraclitus. We are forced to supplement what we do not learn about xii
immediately to his view, but displays itself
jidvia from Heraclitus with what we know about the Greek world, and
scieniific explanation.
perhaps we let id Jidvxa lie expressed by the poets.
Heidegger: The truth of the immediate experience of the world
Fink: said that we still do not have the possibility of declaring what
disap]}ears by reason of the scientific interpretation ot the world.
I

the coming-forth-io-appearance of to navxa is in the always living fire.

Fink: In earlier times, two hundred years ago for instance, life was
that time In order to investigate this problem further, we cite Fr. 76, which ap-
still centered in the nearby region. Information about life at
pears lo be one of the least certain fragments. 'Fhere are more versions
came out of the neighboring world. That has fundamentally changed
of it in which a turning (xpojiti) is thought. The Greek text handed down
today in the age of world wide transmission of news. Hans Freyer, in his
by Maximus Tyrius runs: !;t| jivq tov yfi^ BAvaxov Kai dtje ^r| xov Jtvpog
book Theorie des gegenwdrtigen Zeilallen, describes the technical world as
eAvaxov, ^36(00 ^t| xov d£QOC, Bdvaxov, yfj tov C6axog. Diels translates:
an environment of surrogates.^'' For him, scientific knowledge of (he
regard this description as an inappropriate "Fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water lives
environment is a surrogate. I

meantime technological things have become a new the death of air, and the earth that of water (?)."
view, because in the
experience. Today a human exists in the omnipresence
human What is surprising in the fragment is that the turning of earth into fire
source of
mentioned in the formula: to live the death of something else. What is
of complete global information. The world is no longer divided into
is

disconcerting is not somuch the talk of arising and birth, but rather the
neighboring zones, distant and more distant zones; rather, the world
pronouncement that fire lives the death of earth, air lives the death of
that was once thus divided today becomes covered over by technology
fire, water lives the death of air, and earth lives the death of water. The
that, through its skilled intelligence service, makes it possible to live in
most important thing seems to me to be that the annihilation of what
the omnipresence of all information.
precedes is the birth and arising of what follows. What follows comes
Heidegger: It is difficult to comprehend how the world, divided
forth in that it lives the death of what precedes. The fall of what pre-
into near and distant zones, gets covered over by the technological envi-
cedes appears to be the way on which the new and other comes forth. It
ronment. For me, there is a breach here.
is not. thereby, a question of a superiority of annihilation over what is
Fink: To a certain extent,modern man lives schizophrenically.
arising. That of significance, l^ecause later when we consider in greater
is
Heidegger: If we only knew what this schizophrenia meant. But
now is sufficient to see that we are not talking detail the formula, "to live the death of something other," we will not lie
what we have said up to
able to say that it is a matter of a circular argument. For life turns into
about out of the way matters. "Fhe problem for us is the reference of Sv
death, but death does noi turn into life.
and Jiavxa. Fmm where do we experience this reference, from Jtcivta or
In Fr. 76, it says that the death of what precedes is the life of what
from ?v or from the to and fro in the Hegelian sense? How would you
answer this problem with reference to Heraclitus?
follows. An amendment that Tocco (Sludi llal. IV 5) has made in the
lext, which is handed down by Maximus and which makes the relation-
Fink: The beginning of our interpretation of Heraclitus by way of
ship ambiguous, runs: Fire lives the death of air and air lives the death of
lightning was supjxjsed to indicate that there is the basic experience of
fii-e. Water lives the death of earth, earth lives the death of water.
Here
the outbreak of the whole. In the everyday manner of life, this
experi-
such experience. the conneclions of fire and air and water and earth are posited as mutual
ence is hidden. In evei^day life we are not interested in
relations. In the comments of Diels-Kranz we read that d.r\Q [air| is pre-
In everyday living we do not expressly comport ourselves toward the
sumably smuggled in by the stoics. The following is given as a further
whole, and also not when we knowinglypenetrate into the distant Milky
variant from the death of water, water lives the death of
this: Fire leaves
Way. liut a human has the possibility of letting Ixftome explicit that
fire or the dealh of earth, earth lives the death of water. We have no
iniplit it relationship to the whole as which relationship he always already
familiar phenomena of a change over of elements. When sea and earth
exists. He exists essentially as a relationship to being, to the whole. For
are talked alx)Ut, ii is a matter of elements on a large scale, a matter of
tlie njosi pari, however, this relationship stagnates. In <iea!ing with the
the world regions. If water is mentioned, however, it is not clear whether
lliiuker Heraclitus, one cau perhaps come to such an experience in
 90
91

the seais also meant. In Fr. 76, a revolution of fire, air,

water, and earth
ISperhaps mentioned. The overtumings mentioned here cannot quite dedvatOL, Comeg tov ^xeivov Odvatov, tov 6f fxELvan- piov TEevEWtec.
be iollowed through by us. Diels translates: 'Immortal: mortal, mortal: immortal,
for the life of
in this connection, these is the death of those, and the life oftho.se is "
we look at Fr. Odvaiog vb<j)Q Y£vea0ai,
36: ajju/rioi-v the death of these
fiSaTi 6e eavaxog Herachtus speaks here in a short, tightly worded way. Here
Yf\v yfveo9ai, ex Yf\q bi
vbvtQ yCvetqi, ^| -uftaTog be we have the
formula, "to live the death of something other," in a
yV^XA- I^iels translates: '"It is death for souls to become water, but for special way. Diels-
water, death to become earth. But out of earth comes water, and out of Kranz separate the "immortal mortal" and "mortal immortal,"
each time
with a colon. One could suppose that in one in.stance
water comes soul." The turnover is here named with the hard and it is a matter of a

ob,scure word. ylvEoig [to become]. The issuance and the hard change of determination of OvriTOL [mortals] and in the other a
determination of
soul over into water, of water into earth, of earth into water, of water dedvaioL [immortals). In the first case dedvaxoi would be the
subject
into soul, do not allow the idea that the same original substance lies and 9vT|TOL the predicate; in the second case OvriToi would
be the subject
and dedvaxoi the predicate. Does it mean that there are
l>ehind its transubstantiations. The fragment mentions ysveoQai and immortal
mortals and mortal immortals? Doesn't the phrase contradict
ytvExai and the hard word tti (out ofl. We must ask ourselves whether ex itselH- Or is
a relationship of the immortals to the mortals thought
in the sense of the issuance of something is also to be understood in the here, a relation-
ship which IS fixed by their being placed together?
sense of the whence or of the Aristotelian e| oi [out of
else in the sen.se
itself], as that which lies at the base and would change over in Heidegger: It is noteworthy that &vt]xot stands between the
a \iEta^o'Kr\
[change]. At first, it is striking that in Fr. 36 the four elements are not dedvaxoi.
Fink: Do you take dedvatoi as the subject of
clarified more. Rather, ipDxaf [souls] are mentioned. What could
ijjuxai the sentence? One
be? What is thought by i^jvxat? Do we abandon the apparent way of could ask what kind of a distinction is thought in dedvaioi
and evt|To(?
alternating change over of elements when the rubric y^vxal now emerges A simple answer would be that deavaxi^iv [to be mortal] is the negation
of BdvaTog [death].
in issuance and pa.ssage? I am of the opinion that the soul in the sense of
the human soul is not primarily meant by T[tDxai. An element of endow- Heidegger: How is OdvaTog to be determined in reference
to what
ment with con,sciousness does not enter into the activity of the elements we have said up to this point?
with k^vxai- Fink: We
cannot give such a determination yet, because we have
Perhaps we can ascertain this in a reference to Fr. 77: vuxfjoi Tegi[>iv f\ moved till now
in the domain of xd Jidvxa in reference to
nvQ det^toov.
edvatov iiYefiOL VEVEoflaL. "Fhe second part runs: ^iiv i\\iag tov exelviov Perhaps one could view death from dei^orov, if one thinks it
as the always
living, m contrast to the experience that every
edvoTOv xai. ^riv fxEtvag Tov Jin^Tepov edvatov. Diels' translation is: "For living thing is finite. But it
li is difficult to think the deiXtoov.
st)uls it is desire or (?) death to become wet. We live the death of those
souls and they live our death." When it says that we live the death of the Heidegger: Don't we learn from Fr. 76 that edvatog is distin-
souls and that the souls live our death, when, in other words, the souls
guished in contrast to YEVEotg?

stand in relationship to us so that they live our death and vice versa, then Fink: There it is said that through the death of one, another comes
they cannot easily be identified as humans. But we also have no motive forth.

for determining ^v^ai. We could at first only say that a new thought Heideg<;er: Does edvaxog mean (peogd?
Fink: I regard this identification
as doubtful. Death and life are not
motif in the turning of fire appears with ^^vxai.
normally referred to fire, air, water, and earth, in any
HEiDE(;r,ER: The difficulty here is that one does not know where case so long as one
the matter under consideration belongs, and where it has its place in
does not undei stand fire in the sense of Heraclitus.
Ix>oked at from the
Heraclitus' thought. phenomenon, we speak of life and death only in the domain of
living
things. In reference to the domain of what is
Fink: I have taken up
fragment because the formula, "to live
this lifeless, we could speak only
in a figurative sense of death
the death of something," also occurs in it, even though we still do not
and life.
Bill let us remain at first with Fr. 62. in
know who oi- what lives death as vuxai. This strange, most surprising which dedvaxoi and ovrixof
are
formula must ix.- thought explicitly by us. if we wish to keep away from mentioned. We could
say that the immortals are (he gods. an<l that the
pure ideas oi chemical transmutation, the 6XKoCii>aig and the emanation mortals are humans. The gods LUt- not deathless
in the sense of an
of the unns of file. H-}mvilum (alphii-privativei, 'fhey are not unrelated to the fate
of death.
We turn to a first consideration of Fr. 62: dOavaxoL evT|Toi, evT)Tol leather, ihey are in a certain way referred
to the death of mortals
through the reverse relation to dealh. from which they
are free. As

92
(<x)bservers, the gods have a lealtiuti lo dcaili, which relation we can say
though not tomprehend. Their rctveise relation to death has only the
character of exclusion. As d-6avaToi, the gods have a relation to mortals,
which relation appears in the form thai the life of ihe immortals is the
death of mortals. We are actustomed lo understanding lil'e and death in
hard opposition, the hardness of which cannot l>e surpassed. The oppo-
sition of" life and death is not the same as that of waim and cold, or of
young and old. In the opiM)sitions familiar to us, there are transitions,
for example, the transition of being waim to Iwfing cold, and the transi-
tion of l>eing young into being old. Stilt, taken strietly, thereis no transi-
tion of Iwing warm into Ix'irig told. Rather, that which at first has a share
in being warm maintains a share in being cold. Also, Ijeing young does
not turn, strictly speaking, into being old. Ralher, that which at first is
young turns into s{)mething old, becomes old. Such transitions are in
part reversible, so thai they tan return their eourse, and in part one way
and irrever.sibte. What at first has a share in l^ing warm and then turns
cold can also turn again into l>eing warm. However, what is first young
and then old cannot become young again. In Fr. 67, which says that god
is day-night, winter-summer, war-peace, .satiety-hunger. Heraclitus
names different oppositions that are familiar to us; however, they all
have a character fundamentally other than the opposition of life and
death. Is the juxtaposition of life and death in any way still measurable
and comparable to the juxtapositions familiar to us? In the phenome-
non, the fall of living things into death is irrev(x:able and final. True, it is
hoped in myth and religion that a new life awaits us after death, and that
death is only an entrance door. This postmortal life is not the same life as
the premortal life here on earth. But it is questionable whether talk of
"aftei^wards" and "previously"' continues to have any sense here at all.
Evidently, there is expressed in this only a perspective of those who are
living and who fill the no-man'.s-land with ideas of a life to l»e hoped for.
With familiar oppositions, which we know and which have transitions,
we find a going under of one into another and, roughly, the birth of the
warm out of the told and of the told out of the warm. But do we also
lind in the phenomenon a birth of life out oi death? Clearly not. The
bii th of what lives is an issue out of the union of the two sexes. The new
life is l«>rn out of a special intensity of Ijeing alive. Thereby, we do not
need to share the same view with .'\ristotle, that the new life is aheady
prerornie<l as a .seed in the paients, and that birth is then only the
dXXoLOiOL^ of a .still geiininal kind ol being into a develo]>ed kind of
Ixjing. Hut could we imagine how life and death are inieitwined, and
indeed nol in the sen.se that life tuins into death, but in the sense that the
transition is thought as "to live the death ol' something ol her"? Thai does
not mean: to come out of death into life. Let us t>egin with the form of
9;^
speech. We are accustomed to saying that life lives, that death dies. That
isnot meant in the sense of a redundant niannei' of expression. For we
could say that the individual dies his or rather another's death, or rather
that the individual lives his life in bis separation against the alienation
that each one experiences from the prattites and institutions and the
social situation. In such formulations the reference of an intransitive
verb to an inner accusative is at once familiar to us.
Heidegger: In order to clarify the inner accusative that you name,
we could think about Hegel's speculative sentence. Hegel gives the
example: "God is being," At first, it appears to \x a normal declarative
sentence in which God is the subject and "being" is the predicate. If this
sentence is comprehended as a speculative sentence, however, then the
distinction of subject and predicate is cancelled in that the subject turns
into the predicate. God disappears in being; being is what God is. In the
speculative sentence, "God is being," the "is" has a transitive character:
ipsum esse est deui [being itself is God]. This relationship of the speculative
sentence is nevertheless only a remote, risky analogy to the problem that
now occupies us.
Fink: But "God is being," thought speculatively, is a certain analogy
only to the formula, "to live life," but not to the other formula, "to live
the death of something other." Here "to live" is not referred to life, but
lo something that appears to be the contrary.
Heidegger: But the question is what "death" means here. We do
not know which opposition is thought between life and death.
Fink: That depends on the conception of whether death is the pro-
cess of dying, of becoming dead, or completed death. This distinction
makes the problem still more difficult.
Heidegger: What is astonishing is that the matter that is so estrang-
ing to us appears to be so glibly said by Heraclitus.
Fink: What Heraclitus says here about life and death is in general
most estranging. If we represent the state of affairs .symmetrically, then
we could not only say that the immortals live the death of the mortals,
but we could also ask whether there is a transitive dying of something.
The entanglement of life and death has its place only on the constant
foundation of life. That precludes a verbal dying.
Heideggek: If TEevecbxe; is to be understood in the present, then
Heraclitus would say that they die the life of those.
Fink: '["bus seen, the matter to be thought by us liecomes still more
toniplitaied. It would nol only be a matter of "to live the death of
sciuiething other," but al.so a matter of the contrary course in a transitive
dying, ^("dvtec; means to live another's death, whereas xeOvEWTEg means
Iwing dead. If we make the transition from life and death to Ix-ing alive
and l>eing dead, we must ask what "being" actually means in reference to
 . . .

94 95

death. Is being dead a manner of ijeing? An act is mentioned in ^covxEq:
living the death of those. That corresponds to (he formula of Fr, 76: hire
lives the death of earth.
Heidegger: In order to clarify TESvEtoTE^, understood in the active
sense, we are reminded of Rilkes phrase, "to achieve death." But the
question is whether Te9vt:(i)tE5 refers to an active dying in the present or
to Ijeing dead (finished) in the perfect.
Fink: Dying in the present is the end phase of life. What is ques-
tionable is who or what lives or dies. In the phrase diOavatoi 6vTiTOt it is
not decided whether dedvaioi is a predicative determination of 6viitol
or, conversely, whether SviiToi is a predicative determination of dedvaToi.
At first, the immortals and the mortals are confronted with one another
and tied up with one another. .
Heideggkh: and after that follows the illustration.
. . .
Fink: The phrase dedvaxoi GvriToi is no enumeration. For in that
case, the reverse formulation would not tie possible. We see that the
immortals and the mortals stand in a relation. The concept of the gods is
untouched by death and nevertheless we conjecture a relationship to
death. For it is said: while they live the death of those. To what does this
are the same; young and old are the same. Heraclilus declares the same-
ness of what seems to be different. How is xavrd [the same] to be under-
st(x)d here?
Heidegger; We could understand it as "belonging together."
Fink: Indeed, each pair, living and dying, waking and sleeping.
young and old. Ijelongs together. But how do living and dying, for
example, Ijelong together in a "same"?
Heidegger: In reference to what is same.
Fink: If Ijeing alive and being dead are the same, then they form a
.sameness that hides itself. The di.siinctness of life and death becomes
clear for the most part when they are posited as analogous to the former
two relationships. Sleeping and waking, as well as l>eing young and being
old are familiar differences to us, which are referred to the course of
time of our lives. Waking and sleeping are alternating states in the
course of time, being young and being old are two distinctive phases in
the course of time of our lives. Against that, life and death is a relation-
ship of the entire lifetime to something that overshadows it but that does
not occur in the lifetime.
Is the saying of the thinker Heraclitus a slap in the face to the current

phrase refer? Wh;it is the subject of ^covtE?? Is it the immortals or the opinion that in.sists on the distinctness of life and death as well as on the
mortals? And what is the subject of teOvEOiTEg? The gods live the death of difference between waking and sleep, being young and being old? Is it a
humans. The gods are spectators and witnesses who accept the death of matter of directing the thrust of his thinking against the trend toward a
humans as offerings. world that is divided up in differences, and doing so with respect to a
Heidegger: And humans die the of the gods. life sameness? This would not mean that phenomena would loose their dis*
Fink: I^t us also include Fr. 88: i evl t,a)v xai xEevrixog xal Tamo tinctions; rather,it would mean that they are tqiixo in relation to h/.

(tb) ^QTiyogo; Mui xaefOftov xai veov nal Y'lyoiov- itifte yag Heraclitus says that being alive— lieing dead, waking sleeping, and —
pETCUiEOovra EXEivd iaxi xcotEiva jtoi^iv ^Exajieoovta lauTa, Diels trans- Ix'ing young —
being old, are the same. He does not .say, as Dieis-Kranz
lates: "And it is always one and the same, what dwells (?) within us: living translate and therewith interpret: "the same which dwells in us." i\\dv

and dead and waking and sleeping and young and old. For this is [us] is added
to evt [within] by Diels. It is precisely questionable whether
changed over to that and that changes back over to this." When Hera- we arethe place of the samenessof great oppositions of life and death or
clitus says xaixo i ivi t,<ijv xai TtOvtixog, is living and dying or being whether the place of sameness must not rather be sought in N, to which
dead . .
humans conqxirt themselves and which they thus resemble in a certain
Heidegger: ... or Ijeing able to die meant? sense. Certainly it is at first a matter of a dictatorial assertion that the
Fink: If the living and the dead are paralleled with the waking and and the dead, waking
living and sleeping, the young and the old. are the
sleeping, the young and old, then no ability is meant. Waking and steep- same. It is not said that the three opposing pairs of opposites are the
ing, as alternating slates, are the most alternating forms of the course of same, but rather Heraclitus names three oppositions that stand in a
human life. Being young and Ix-ing old are the initial and final times of specified coiicspondence and he thinks the la^TO in relation to each one
the human course of life. The relation of waking and sleep, and of ol [he oppositions. The lifetime forms the common basis for the
young and old. aie ceriain parallels to the relationship of life and death. threefold opposites. "Fhe entire lifetime is confined by death. Within
The relationship ol life and death becomes still more complicated by life, sleep is the analog (o <leatli, being
old has a s[>ecilic reference to
them. . .
death, and waking an<l Ix-ing young are most related to l)eing alive. But
Heidkggek: . . . Ix^cause ihe kind of the three di.stinclions is quite
in Fr. 88, there is no mention of life and death, but of what is alive and

differein. what is dead. Bui how are the e\pressi<)ns "the living" and '"the dead" lo
Fink: Living and dying are one and the same; waking and .sleeping l>e understood? II we say the just (to 6ixaiov) and the beauiilul (to
 . —
96
KaX6v), then do we mean what is just or l>eiiig just, what
being beautiful?
Heidegger: Your interpretation thus goes in the direction not of
understanding the three distinttions as three cases of a species, but
rather in the direction of classifying the three distinctions in reference to
the phenomenon of time . .
Fink: . and thus toward constructing an analogical relationship.
. .
Here it is not a question of fixed distinctions. Nevertheless, we are con-
cerned with differences that form distinctions. Being alive and being
dead do not stand in a gradual relationship to one another, because
being dead does not allow of degrees. As against thai, we are accustomed
to intensifying being alive, and to distinguishing inert and high forms of
life-performance. Waking and sleep, however, turn almost unnoticeably
into one another. Life and death do not form an opposition like beauti-
ful and ugly, nor is their distinction one of degree. The nature of their
being different is the problem. As soon as we attempt to be clear about
the all-loo-familiar dialectical interpenetralion the questionable charac-
ter of the text disappears. If we start from the fact that each analogy is a
likeness of what is unlike, then we could say that sleeping
well as being old and being young, relate in a certain sense to being dead
and being alive. Perhaps it is a comparison all too full of hope, neverthe-
less, when we call sleep the brother of death and when we regard sleep as
an in-between phenomenon. Also, regarding the question about the
sense of the fomula, "to live the death of something," the tying together
of life and death is the strange thing in the transitive use of "to live." It is
a matter of interpretation whether the current model can also be
applied; so that we not only say that death lives, but also that life dies.
We came no result, and perhaps we will come to no final result at all.
to
Bui the all too familiar explication of TQOTtf] has wandered into the
foreignncss and darkness of the formula, "to live the death of some-
thing." We could perhaps think the relationship of fire to earth, to air,
and t<» water rather in reference to life and death, so that, with reference
to the difficult relationship of tension of life and death, we could come to
a certain anthropological key for the nonanthropo logical foundational
relatcdness of £v and noyxa.
9
is beautiful or Immortal: Mortal (Fragment 62).
Iv TO aocpov (Correlated Fragments: 32, 90).
Fink: Mr. Heidegger cannot come today since he is prevented by an
important trip. He asks us. however, to continue explication of the text,
so that we make some further progress in oui' interpretation of the
fragments. By means of the summary, he will inform himself about the
progress of this session in order then to express an opinion.
I^t us bring to mind the way of thought, Ijetter. the gist of open
questionabilities, that has led us in the last session. We started out from
the problem of the transformationsof fire with the question whether the
change oJ an original stuff is thereby thought, or whether a relatedness
of ev and jrdvra is aimed at. Finally, we arrived in Fr. 76 al the dark
formula, difficult to comprehend, that something lives the death of
another. This formula is then used in Fr. 62 as a mark of the relationship
and waking, as of immortals to mortals, or mortals to immortals. Is it only a matter here
of another domain for the employment of the problematic formula, "to
live the death of something"? Is the formula also meant here in the
fundamental breadth, as we have learned it in Fr. 76 in the relationship
of the elements, fire, air, water, and earth? Is it a matter of cos mo logical
references, or of cosmological counter references in so far as the for-
mula is here applied to things that stand open in a special manner to the
whole, that is, to gods and humans? Is the above mentioned formula
applied here to cosmological living beings? Perhaps that happens, be-
cause the reiartonship of immortal to mortal is analogous to the refer-
ence of fev in the f<»rm of lightning, of sun, and of fire, to the Jtdvra. Is
the fundamental relatedness, ever disconcerting to us, of Iv and jiavxa
rather sayable from out of its reflection? Is the world-relatedness of £v
and rtdvTO rather sayable from out of the relationship of gods and hu-
mans who understand l>eing? With this, the path of our problem situa-
tion is fhst of all indicated. I^t us now attempt to clarify the .structure of
Fr. 62. For we cannot say that its structure has liecome clear and distinct
at this point.
I'he Iraginetit tuns: 68uvtiToi flvi]Toi. 6vT|tol dflcivoTOi, ^u)vtec tov
^xsivarv 66vaTov, tov fte fxEivtov [iiov xeOvEmEg. Wecould translate,
"Immortal: mortal, mortal: immonal," Diels ihei'eby brings immortals
into a relationship to mortals and mortals into a reference to innnortals.
Ill addition, this lelationship is explained by the dark problem-formula
thai Diels translates as follows: "for the life of these is the fleath ()f those,
and the life of those is the death of these. "This translation apjxfars to me
 98
to lie too free. For ii does say: ^(ovte^ tov i-neivtiyv Bavaiov. tov be
EXEivov jitov TE6vEd>Te5, "in thatthey live the death of those and in that
they die the of those." If we interpiel lifldvaTOL in the familiar sense
life
as gods and 9vhto£ as humans, then it is a matter of" an interpretive step
that we cannot assert with unconditioned certainty. To l>e sure, the im-
mortals are the gods in (Jrecit myth. But there are also intermediate
beings, the heroes, who are born as mortal, half gods, and are elevated to
l>ecome immortals. Is the milieu of immortals and mortals familiar with
reliability and certainty? The problem is what is indicated by dOdvatoi.
and BvTitoi. But first we take up the mythological meaning, and com-
prehend the immortals as the gods and the mortals as humans.
The gods are also characterized in Fr. 62 from out of death. True,
immortals are indeed removed from death. They are not delivered over
to death, but they stand open to it. As immortals they must know them-
selves as the ones who win their self-understanding in the negation of
dying. They know themselves as the beings who are open to death, but
who do not encounter death, the beings who observe the death of hu-
mans, and the lieings who come to know their own permanence in the
sight of the pas.sing away of transient humans. The mortals are humans
who know that they are delivered over to death in reference alone to the
gods who always are and are removed from death. Bvrixot is not some
objective designation which is spoken from an extra-human point of
view; it points, rather, to the self-understanding of humans in under-
standing that they are delivered over to death, in so far as they know
themselves as morituri [those about to die]. Humans know themselves as
transient in view of and in reference to the everlasting gods who are
removed from death. With immortals and mortals the greatest inner-
worldly distance is named between innerworldly beings, the taut bow
stretching between gods and humans who, however, are nevertheless
referred to one another in their self-understanding and understanding
of being. Mortals know their own disappearing being in view of and in
reference to the everlasting being of the gods; and the gods win their
perpetual being in contrast and in confrontation with humans who are
constantly disappearing in time. The distinction of immortals and
mortals is characterized from out of death. But this distinction is not one
like the distinction l>ctween life and death itself. For, in iheir self-
understanding, the immortals and the mortals live and comport them-
selves toward the being of the other. The relationship of the gods to
humans is not to Ix? equated with the relationship of the living to the
dead, and yet the taut bow stretching between dBdvaioi-evTiToC and
6vr|Tot-d0(ivaTOL is thought out of the reference to life and death. The
most widely stretched out cliMinction beiween gods and humans, im-
mortals and mortals, is intertwined and is lightened together with its
99
opposite extreme —perhaps in an analogy to the relatedness of Ev and
ndvTa.
The question which leads us is whether, with the admission of the
relationship of immortals to mortals, more than just an anthropological
clue found for indicating how the fire, the sun, the lightning, as special
is
forms of ev, comport themselves toward ndvta. There is not ev and to
itdvia next to one another. They do not lie on the same plane, do not lie
on a comparable plane of the usual sort, but they are unique in their
relatedness. Their relatedness can l>e indicated with no known relation-
ship, hi is not among navxa; it is not already thought when we think to
jiavra strictly and include in this quintessence everything that is at all.
When we ourselves think xa Jidvxa as quintessence, it is not inclusive of
h/. It remains separated from to Jidvia, but not in the manner, familiar
to us. of being separated by spatial and temporal boarders or by belong-
ing to another kind of species. All usual kinds of separation are inappli-
cable to the fundamental relatedness of ev and Jidvia. But at the same
time we must also say that the unique belonging-together of ev and
Kdvta, the intertwining of what is separated, must also be seen in the
unique separation of hi and xd itdvta. §v and xd Jtdvia are tightened
together in their intertwining.
Up to now we have met with a manifold of similies; for example, as in
the night, things shine up in the light-shine of the lightning flash and
show their relief, so in an original sense, the entirety of things tomes
forth to appearance in the outbreaking light-shine of h/, thought as
lightning. Or again: as the things that stand in sunlight shine up in their
imprint in the light of the sun, so the entirety of inner-worldly things
comes forth to appearance in the ev thought as sunlight. Here, things do
not come forth side by side with the sunlight, but the sunlight surrounds
the things thus .separated from them and at the same time bound
and is
with them manner of an including light. Just so, there is also an
in the
entirety of the many xd ndvxa, not side by side with the light of shining-
forth; rather, the light of shining-forth envelops (he entirety of Jtdvra
and is "separated" from it and "Ixiund" with it in a manner difficult to
comprehend, which we could probably best clarify for ourselves in com-
pari.son with the all-embracing light. Are immortals and mortals now
also referred to each other like ev and xd Jldvxa with their greatest
separation? Thereby we understand the immortals as those who know
their own |)eipetual being only on the backgroiuid of the temporal [x;r-
ishing of humans. An<l we undei stand the mortals as humans who only
know their transient lieing by having a relationship to the immortals who
always are and who know their perpetual l>eing. We could
read dHdvaxoi
6vT|Toi, 9vr|Toi dOdvaxoi in many ways; either with Diels or else in the
following way: immortal mortals, mortal immoilals. This hard phrase
 100 101

appears to be self-coiuradictory. But one does not go especially (ar off humans to themselves and to everything around them. Thus we under-
base with a paradoxical concept ol immortal mortals and mortal im- stand "to live the death of humans" and "to die thelife of the gods" as a

mortals. The gods live iho death of mortal humans. reciprocal, intertwining relationship of the self-understanding and
Does that mean that the life ol the gods is the slaying of humans? And iniderstanding of lieing of gods and humans. The gods live the death of
on the other side, do humans die the life of the gods? Neither could we humans in the sense that they could only understand themselves as

connect any correct sense with this rendition. I would, therefore, rathei' immortals in their perpetual lx;ing against the background of what is
believe that the following .suggests itself. The gods live in comparing transient. They are only perpetual when, at the same time, they are
themselves with mortal humans who experience death. They live the referred to the sphere of change in time.
death of mortals in that, in their self-understanding and their under- According gods and humans behave precisely not as in
to Fr. 62,

standing of l>eing, they hold themselves over against the transience of Holderlin's poem, "Hyperion's Song of Fate." "You walk above in the
humans and the all-too-Hnite manner in which humans understand what light, Weightless tread a soft floor, blessed geniil / Radiant the gods'
/

is. But it is more difficult if we a.sk ourselves how we should translate Tov mild breezes / Gently play on you / As the girl artist's fingers / On holy
6e EXEivtov piov TE0VEU)Te5 [in that they die the life of those]. Could we set strings. —Fateless the Heavenly breathe / Like an unweaned infant
TcBvewTE^ [they, having died] parallel to ^cuvre; [those living]? But the asleep; / Chastely preserved / In modest bud / For ever their minds / Are
question is whether the perfect participle has the meaning ol the perfect in flower/ And their blissful eyes / Eternally tranquil gaze,/ Eternally

or whether it is to lie translated as in the present participial form like clear. — But we are fated / to findno foothold, no rest, / And suffering
dnoOvfiOKOVTEg [those who are dying]. This question can only be decided mortals / Dwindle and fall/ Headlong from one /Hour to the next,/
by the philologists. The life of the immortals is the death of mortals. The Hurled like water / From ledge to ledge / Downward for years to the
gods live the death of the mortals, and the mortals die the life of the gods vague abyss."^* Here the domain of the gods and the domain of humans
or become atrophied in reference to the life of the gods. We also use the are separated like two spheres that do not intertwine with each other, but
phrase: to die a death, to live a life. In Pr. 62, however, it says: to live the lie opposite one another without mutual reference. High above in the

death of the other, to die the of the other. If we wish to make clear to
life light, the gods wander without destiny, their spirit eternally in bloom,

ourselves what it means gods live the death of humans, we could

that the while humans lead a restless life and fall into the cataract of time and
at first reject the radical interpretation according to which the gods disappear. The way in which Holderlin here views the eternal life of the
would be cannibalistic beings. They do not live the death of humans in gods indicates that the view of mortals does not necessarily belong to the
the sense that they devour them. For they do not need humans as food self-understanding of the gods. But if gods and humans do not form two
nor, in the final analysis, do they need the offerings and prayers of separated domains, but rather form two domains turned toward each
humans. Bui what then does the formula mean: the gods live the death other, then we could apply the intertwining relationship to the begin-
of humans. I am able to connect only one sense with this sentence. I say ning of Fr. 62, which ties mortals and immortals together with each
that the gods understand themselves in their own everlasting being in other in a hard manner.
express reference to mortal humans. The constant being of the gods Pari icipant: The tying together of the gods' perpetual l>eing and
signifies a persistence in view of humans' being constantly delivered over the being of humans wandering in time has its analogy in (loethe's
to time. In this manner the gods live the death of humans. .And in the thought of perdurance in o.scillation [Dauer im Wecfuel].
same way I am able to connect only one sense with the sentence which Fink: There is, however, a perdurance as constancy in time. Kant,
says that humans die the life of the gods, or that they atrophy in refer- for example, thought the continuation of the world stuff in roughly this
ence to the life of the gods; namely, it is thereby said that humans, by manner.
understanding themselves as the ones who most disappear, always com- P.^hiicip.'^nt: (loeihe's thought of perdurance in osiillaiion does
port themselves toward the permanence that the life of the gods appears not mean constancy in time, hut goes in the direction of Heraclitus'
to us to be. thoughts.
Humans die as the transient ones not only in so far as they stand in Fink: Still, we wouldhave to know to which passage of
first

association with transients. They are not only the ones who most disap- CK»ethe"s you refer. For there is also perdurance that stands throughout
pear in the realm of what disappears, fnu rather they are at the same oscillation Hke, for example, the world stuff of Kant, which does not
time underslandingly open to the |)ernianence <)f the gods. A funda- itself pass away or come into being, but only appears as different. Thus,
mental reference to that which never perishes belongs to the relation of however, we think the relationship lx;tween substance and its atii ibutes.
 102 103

Participant; For Goeihe, perdurance consiitutes itself first and identified with £v and itdvia, but that they represent symbolically the
foremost in osciliation.
relatedness of &v and Jidvta. Immortal and moital are not themselves
Fink: That is also true in regard to substantial perdurance. But
cosmic moments that are separated and at the same lime embraced like
Heraclitus means precisely not that something endures in temporal
i'v and itdvxa. Rather both are cosmological beings who understand the
changing. For then we would have only the relationship of an original
whole, the gods from above and humans from below. If we want to speak
stuff to its forms of appearance- But that was precisely the question,
here of an analogy, we must Ix- clear thai it is always thoroughly a matter
whether the relationship of fire, sea, and eaiih is the relationship of a
of similarity by means of unsimilarily, whereby the unsimilarity is always
perduring original stuff (fire) in the oscillations of its conditions or ap-
greater. Talk about humans as imago dei [image of God] does not mean
pearances as alien forms, or whether it is a matter of quite another
that a human is a mirror image of the Godhead and similar to the
unique distinction. All inner-worldly entities have the structure of rela-
Godhead like a mirror image to the original image. A human is an image
tively perduring substances with changing conditions, or they belong to a
of God through the infinity of distance. We have no language for the
unique substance as the continuous substrate that goes on and neither
purpose of addressing the relatedness of ^
Id Tct ^vta. The hi lights up
pa.s,ses away nor comes into being. If we apply this scheme of thought for
to us only in lightning, in sun, in the seasons, in fire. Fire, however, is not
the turning over of fire, then lire behaves toward sea and earth no
the phenomenal, but the unphenomenal fire, in the shine of which td
differently than an original stuff to its many forms of appearance. How-
jtdvxa come forth to appearance.
ever, we have sought after another relationship of fire to sea and earth
Because we have no language to characterize the fundamental re-
that pertains to the relatedness of N and ndvxa. The relationship of latedness of ^v and Jidvia, and because we wish to keep Jtvpo^ iQonai
immortal gods and mortal humans takes on an analogous representation
away from the traditional blunt schemes of thought, according to which
for this relatedness of b/ and n&vza. Thereby, we think gods and hu-
an always extant original stuff changes its conditions or disguises itself in
mans not only in reference to the opposition of power and fragility, but its forms of appearance, we have started out from Fr. 76, in which the
such thai gods and humans, in order lo know their own being, have to
fundamental relatedness of ^
and Jidvia is addressed in the formula,
know one another, if ?v is ?v to ooq)6v [the one, which alone is wise], it "to live thedeath of another." From there, we turned to Fr. 62 in which
can only know itself in its highest opposition to xa Jidvia and at the same
the formula, "to live the death" and "to die the life" is said, not of fire,
time also as that which steers and guides id ntivxa. With this, we view a air, water, and earth, but of immortals and mortals. Application of that
relatedness not of the kind in which a supertemporal sphere of entities
formula to gods and humans appears at first lo stand closer to our
realtes itself to a temporal sphere of things. It is not a matter of a
human power of comprehension. The transition from Fr. 76 to Fr. 62 is
two-world doctrine of Platonic kind, but rather of a theory of the world,
no narrowing of a general cosmological reference to an an thro p logical-
of the unity of the §v and of the individual things found in the passage of
theological relationship. Ihe anthropological-theological relationship is
time. When Goethe speaks of peidurance in oscillation, he means,
no reference of two kinds of beings, but rather the relationship of how
perhaps, the constancy of nature over against the ap[>earances of nature. the two different kinds of beings understand themselves and that which
But he thereby finds himself in the neighborhood of the thought of an is. The gods understand their own perpetual Ixiing in reference to the
original stuff
death of humans. If the gods did not have before them the fall of
Participant: cannot associate myself with this conception. I am
I
humans and JidvTa into time, could they live their life, which is never
of the opinion (hat Goethe's thought of perdurance in oscillation comes broken off, in blissful self-indulgence, and could they become aware of
into the neighlxjrhood of youi- interpietation of Heraclitus. their divinity? C^ould cv, which is represented by the immortals, be by
Fink: In Fr. 30, ilv is mentioned as jiOq dcL^awv, which is an im- itself without the view of Jtdvxa; could Jidvia, which are represented by
mortal fire. The imnioital gods are the analogical keepers of the im- mortals and their understanding of l>eing, be without knowing of the
nioital fire. In Fr. 100 it says: (ItQat; at Jidvxa qitoouoi [the seasons which endlessness {>f jiOg dEi^ujov? I would like to repeal again that the rela-
bring all things]. Accordingly, K&VTa. which is brought forih by the tionship of immortals lo mortals is nm to lie equated with that of tv and
sea,sons, is ihcrefore not perpetual, bni siMiiething thai abides in time.
JidvTCi. I was only concerned to point out that one can find an index to
From —
iheie, tv behaves toward t« Jidvia as nvQ iult,(x>ov or since Pro-
the relatedness of ev and Jtdvxa in the intertwining relati<)nshLp of gods
fessor Heidegger not present today, we could dare say—as lx;ing itself,
is
and humans in their self-knowledge an<l knowledge of the oihei'. Thus,
thought as lime, liehavcs toward what is driven in lime, temiMually de-
it is a matter neither of a paiallel noiof an anal<)gy in the usual sense. All
tci mined things. 1 did not say either that dOuvaxoi and Ovnioi
are to be the fragments of Heraclitus' theology s[)eak of god only like one could
 104 105

speak of gv. All distintiions fall away in the god. Thereby, not only a
reference, i.e., "to live the death of the other" and "to die the life of '

sublimity of the god vis-ii-vis the other living Iseings is expressed, but that
another," to think toward the relationship of gods and humans, CkkIs do
which Heraclitus says al>oui the god must l>c thought from the peculiar not live the death of humans in the sense that a slaying of humans
analogous relationship of the god to ev to oocpov. Ijelongs to their life. We interpret "to live the death of mortals" as a life
In Fr. 32, Heraclitus says the following: h/ to oocpov noijvov Aiyeoeai of the gods in sight of the Ijeingof living lieings who understand being in
oi>K eQ^^EL )tai iOtXei Zt|v65 6vo|ia. "The one, which alone is wise, is not
a finite, temporal manner. In sight of humans who are delivered over to
willing and yet willing to be called by the name Zeus." In a certain death and who are not sheltered by perjielual Ijeing, the gods under-
manner we could think ^v in Zeus, if the surrounding ^v of the whole is stand their dei Efvai [to be always] and arc, as it were, the hvq d^l^CX)v,
also represented by Zeus as the highest innerworldly being. It is impor- even if they are never qei in the strict scn.se like nvQ dei^ojov is. Against
tant, therefore, that Heraclitus says otjx ^9eA^i [is not willing] first and this, humans die the life of the gods. In understanding of the perpetual
then SG^Xei [is Only after the negation can a certain analogical
willing]. l>eingof the gods, they are not allowed thereby to partake of it. Humans
correspondence be said of ilie god and ^v. win no share of the perpetual being of the immortals, but they under-
Participant: In order to carry out your interpretation of %v, one stand themselves and their disappearance in reference to the fact that
must understand £v in a two-fold meaning. On one hand, ?v is in opposi- the gods are not delivered over to death. I attempt to give one sense to
tion to xa TC&vxa, and on the other, ^
is as the unity of opposites of Ev
the formulas, "to live the death of mortals" and "to die the life of im-
and Jidvta. One cannot posit the opposition between ev and Jiavia with- mortals," in which I interpret them as the intertwining of the self-
out presupposing a bridging unity between them. Perhaps I can clarify understanding and understanding of being of gods and humans. This
myself by a reference to Schelling. Schelling says that the absolute is not intertwining relationship represents the counter reference of Ev, the
only the unity, but the unity of unity and of opposition. Thereby it is always living fire, and the temporally finite lieing of Jidvxa in general
meant that behind each opposition stands a bridging unity, if we wish to which are brought forth by the seasons. The immortal gods are the
avoid a two-world doctrine, then b^ stands not only in opposition to xd refiection, the innerworldly representations, of the always living fire as a
Ji(ivxa, but we must think gv at the same time as bridging unity. form of ev. In this interpretation, I see a possibility of understanding
Fink: Ev is the unity within which there first is the entirety of Ji(ivxa how the gods live the death of humans. They live the death of humans i

in their manifold oppositions. You argue formally with the scheme of con- not in the sense of an encounter; rather, they are referred to the death'y^
cepts from German idealism, that the absolute is the identity of identity of humans in the encounter of their own perpetual fjeing.
and nonidcntity. This relationship can be developed in other fashions. In the first and second versions of "Mnemosyne," Holderiin says: "For
Thereby, we do not, however, come into the dimension of Heraclitus. the heavenly ones are unable / To do everything. Namely, the mortals / ^3»t ]

Ev and jiiivTa form a unique distinction. It is better if we speak Reach the abyss. Thus, the echo returns / With them. I-(mg is / the time, -

here of distinction and not of opposition. Otherwise, we think all too but / What is true happens." That means that the gods, those who do not
easily of the usual oppositions like warm-cold, male-female, and so stand in need, nevertheless need one thing, namely mortals who pass
on, and thus of reversible and irreversible oppositions. One could proj- further into the aljyss. We have a simile of ^v to the Jtdvia, which are
ect here an entire logic of oppositions. Our question is directed toward ccmstantly driven a!x)ut in time, in that we see how the gods cannot, in
Ev. We came onto its trace in departure from lightning. In the view of iheir perpetuity, self-suffK iently enjoy their infinity, and how they are in
natural science, lightning is nothing other than a specific electrical ap- need of the counter reference to mortals. We have a simile of Ev and
pearance. But Heraclitus thinks the nonphenomenal rising of the en- Jtdvxa in that we see how humans, driven atx>ut in time, are in need of
tirety of Jidvxa in it. Although we have uncovered more nuances of the the counter reference to peqietiial gods for the sake of knowledge of
ev-jiavxa relatedness in going through various fragments, we still cannot their own finitude. Humans and gods have the commonality that they
comprehend this lelatedness completely. .Afterwe have learned about are not only entities in the world, but thai they live in the manner of
the EV in the form of lighliiing, lightning lx)lt, we also
sun, and seasons, understanding relationships to lieing. Humans understand tieing in a
met with the determination of ev as fire. Since we did not want to com- finite way, the gods in infinite manner. The gods exceed humans not
prehend Jiugi)5 xeoJtal in a blunt physiological .sense, we had Co search only in force generally, but in the power of their understanding of what
for mother comprehension. is. The Jidv is mortal innuorial. The Jiav is, however, no coincide/ilia
Ill It. 7(), we learned for the flist lime the formula, "to live the death
ojiposilorum. no night in which all oppositions are obliterated, to Jtdv is
of something." In Fr. 62, we found the formula again as the relationship the word in which Ev and Jidvta are comprehended together. We can
of immortals to mortals. We attempted with this formula of counter- apply paradoxical phrases to it alone.
/
 107
106 "^

and goods of exchange will ultimately fail. Never-

in their relationship
We turn now to Fr. 90: iri'Qoc if avTanoijlT]la JidvTa xai jiuq dndvicov
theless, the relatedness of nvq deCCtiwv (fv) and Tidvxa receives a direc-
OKUionEQ XQUOou xO'ih'**'^" ^"^i /qthacixiuv XQ^oog. Diels translates: "Al-
tion through the failure of that simile.
ternating change: o( everything for fire and fire for everything, like
If one thinks here of the em jiwewOLS-doc trine, then one must charac-
goods for gold and gold for goods." We appear to interrupt the line of
terize ihe relationship of transposition as follows: in place of Jidvxa, fire
Here the exchange
interpretation with this fragmeni. relationship
thought, which we could more or less think and which does not seem to
is
steps in and — —
what 610x60111)015 [ordering] is about in place of lire xd
n:dvxa step in. In this case, we would understand the relationship of fire
go along with the way that gods and humans alternately understand
and xd Jidvxa in a strict analogy lo the relationship of gold and goods. In
themselves and Ix-ing. At Insi the fragment seems to offer no special
the sense of the ^KJiiiQwoi^-docirine, in the rigid style of the Sloa, one
difficulty. The fragment speaks of an alternate counterexchange, of a
could say that Jrdvxa di.sappears in the exnuetootg of fire, and in the
counterrelationship, where the one is replaced by the other and enters
ftiaxdoiiHOL^ the fire turns into xd Jidvxa, Bui in that case we declare the
the place of the other. It appears that here the relationship of jctjq and
fundamental structure of a perpetual happening to be a temporal pro-
n&na is sjxiken of in comparison to an event in the market. We know a
cess.
market of natural exchange, or else in the more developed form of the
The difficulty we are confronted with in the simile of gold and goods
exchange of money, in which goods are exchanged for money and
in alternating relationship consists in the fact that the simile indicates
money lor goods. The goods, as multitude and variety, behave toward
something essential in the relationship of nvQ det^toov and ndvxa, but
the single form of gold like the multitude in general behaves to that
that as soon as we adopt it and comprehend it in a strict sense, il does not
which is simple, but that corresponds, nevertheless, to the multitude of
goods. Is this relationship also a form of the fundamental relatedness of
sound right any longer. The tivq dEC^oxjv as a form of ^
is in a constant

reference to td ndvxa, just as the gods stand in a constant reference to

gv and JtdvTa? The ?v, as the most simple and all embracing, stands in a
humans. This constant reference gets lost, if we wish to understand the
relatedness of opposition to xh nuvxa. In the fragment, we read: ex-
relationship of the eternal living fire to Jidvxa in terms of the
change of TO nctvra for fire and of fire for fijiavia. We also understand
exjitiQWOLg-doctrine, radically comprehended. The Diels translation of
imavta here in the sense of K&vra as in Fr. 30, in which we have con-
xd Jtdvra and djidvxuiv with "the all" is questionable. It points in the
ceived finavia not as living beings, but as synonymous with Jiovra,
direction of the exjitJQOJOig. Heraclitus, however, does not say x6 ndv or
Heraclitus speaks of an alternating exchange of xdjidvra for fire and of
Toij Jtavxoc;, but xd ndvxa and diidvxtov (Jtdvxcuv). xd ndvxa, however,
fire forxd Jidvra. What we could say about the relationship of goods and
apply to the entirety of entities. The exchange of fire into xd Jtdvxa and
gold, nevertheless, does not hold in the same way regarding the
of xd jxdvxa into fire behaves analogously to the alternate exchange of
exchange-relationship of xd Jidvxa and fire. In reference to xd ndvxa
the glimmering gold into goods and of goods into glimmering fire of
and fire, we could not where the one is, the other will go.
say that there,
gold.
The vendor in the market gives up the goods and receives money for The question that we must first leave open is the characterization of
them. Where previously the goods were, money comes in and, the other
the relatedness of 6v and Jtdvxa as a relatedness of transmutation. When
way aiound, where the money was, goods come in.
we try to illustrate the relatedness of ^v and jrdvxa by the example of the
May we comprehend the relatedness of Iv and ndvra so bluntly? maikel, ceitain features of the fundamental relatedness in question
Clearly not. The comparison becomes clearer, if we do not lake gold only
come to light. Nevertheless, this relatedness eludes us throughout all
as a specific coinage, as a form of gold, but if we rather notice the
similes indicating comparisons, and
brings us close to the Ixiundary not
il

V glimmer of gold which is a symbol of the sunny. Then the sunny, illumi-
nated gold behaves lo the goods like £v to xd Ttdvxa and, the oilier way
only of the sayable, but also of the thinkable. In Fr, 62, the intertwining
relationship of gods and humans represents the relatedness of ev and
around, xd navxa l>ebaves toward ev like the goods lo the sunny, illumi-
JTd^^a, The gods, in their counter reference to humans, are in a specific
nated gold. The glinmierof gold suggests that it is not a question here ot
sense the representatives of fv in its relatedness lo jidvxa, and indeed
any simile you please, in which we could replace gold with money. In our
Ix-cause they understand mosi alxjul nvQ deC^wov, Finally, we could say
simile il is less a matter of alternate exchange of real and token values;
thai an unhappy consciousness Ix-falls us not only as the interpreters of
rather, it is a matter of the relationship of the glimmer of gold to goods.
ihe sayings of Heraclitus; rather, it liesabove all in the sayings them-
The gold stands for the glimmer of lire of JiiJe dEii^iuov, cbe goods lor xd
selves.
jidvTH. The 7TVQ dfi^wov and xd ndvxa in their relationship of exchange
could iKii inielligibly be directly expressed. Likewise, the simile of gold
 — —
10
The Stiinding Open of Gods and Humans
{Fragment 62). Tlic "Speculative" in Hcgel.
Hegel's Relationship to Heraclitus.
Life - Death {(Correlated Fragments: 88, 62).
Heidegger: 1 was not present at the last seminar session. I am asked to
express myself on the course of thought. That, however, is a different
matter from immediate participation in the discussion. For there is the
danger that I approach the matter from the outside.
Fir.st, I would like to touch on the difHculty that was prevalent in the
last session: the determination of the relationship of gods and humans in
relation to the relatedness of £v and K&vxa. It is thus a question of a
relation between relationships. 1 intentionally speak formally now
order to let the structure be seen that lies at the basis oi the thoughts of
the last session. If we notice the approach and the course of the sessions
tillnow, the difficulty appears to me to have been to find the transition
from a relationship, still undetermined, of lightning, sun, seasons, and
fire to TO. Jtavra, to the relationship of gods and humans in their relation
to the relatedness of §v and Jidvra. The difficulty can be seen in the way
£v suddenly reveals another character. So far as I have understood the
course that Mr. Fink has in view for the seminar, it is that of deliberately
setting out from the fire-fragments and only then to bring into view all
that which one knows as logos-fragments and as specifically Heraclitean.
In this, I see the difficulty thai by the interpretation of the peculiar state
of affairs, "to live death, to die life,"' which is said of gods and humans, a
— —
correspondence and not an equation becomes visable to the actual,
thematic relatedness in (juestion of ev and JiAvxa. When we speak of the
"relatedness of ^v and Jiavxa," then it seems as if we were thinking about
a connection between t>oth which we have localized concretely and for
which relatedness we then sought a Ijow which spanned them. In the
end, however, the matter stands in such a way that 6v is the relatedness,
and that it relates to id Jidvia by letting them be what they are. So
understood, ihe relatedness is, in my opinion, the decisive point that our
determination must reach; thereby the idea of two terms is eliminated.
Precisely this idea must henceforth be held off, even though it is not yet
settled what all the references are which belong in the wholeness of
navia, and wliat the reference is of all the references to ev or in £v itself".
.Something is conspicuous to me terminologically in the summary of
the last session. Viiu, Mr. Fink, make a distinction between "cosmic" and
109
'cosmologital," and you speak of cosmic moments and cosmologicai en-
tities.
Fink: One could bluntly conceive the relationship of gods and hu-
mans, which has been formulated in the dark formula "to live death, to
die life," and say that the gods win the substance of their lives out of the
death of humans, as humans win their life out of the death of animals
ihey consume. To live the death of another would then be a process, a
jx-rpelual style of the process of life. We cannot connect any meaning
with the idea that the gods need the life of mortals like they need the
sacrificial animals of mortals in early religion. If one wants to disregard
the blunt idea, one must turn from a mere cosmic relationship between
gods and humans to the cosmologicai reference of humans and gods.
Ciods and humans are not only like other living things; rather, they are
lx>th determined by an understanding relationship to themselves and to
each other. The understanding relationship does not encapsulate the
gods by themselves. The gods do not refer only to themselves; rather,
in ihey can experience their own perpetual being only in reference to the
changeable being and being bound to death of humans. In order to
understand their own perpetual being in their self-understanding, they
must understandingly hold themselves close to the death of humans.
Understood thus, holding close is not to be understood as ontic but as
humans, who own
ontological or cosmologicai. Vice versa, relate to their
wasting away, must understandingly hold themselves close to the per-
petual being of the gods. This ontological understanding contains an
analogy to the original relatedness of Ev and K&vxa.
Heidegger: If you reject the cosmic relationship as ontic and speak
of a cosmologicai relationship instead of an ontological one, then you use
the word "cosmologicai" in a special sense. In your use of the word
"cosmologicai," you do not mean the common meaning of cosmology as
the doctrine of the cosmos. But what, then, do you have in view?
Fink: The holding [verhaltende] Ev, which contains all ndvta, and
not the cosmos, for instance, as a sy.stem of spatial points.
Heidegger: ^"hus, you do not use the word "cosmology" in the
.sense of natural science. It only concerns me to see the justification on
account of which you speak of cosmology. You have your grounds, l>e-
cause you do not say "ontic" and "ontological," but rather "cosmic" and
"cosmologicai."
Fink: The criterion lies there, where you yourself criticize ontology.
Heidegger: Vou speak alxnit the relatedness of Ev and jravia as a
wo rid -relation ship.
Fink: I do not thereby uiidci.stand it as a relationship ol two terms,
Ithink the h/ as the one which lets evei7thing arise as many in the sense
of jidvra, bui which takes them back again.
J
 . .
no
HEiDEGdtR: I don't want to tie you down to Heidegger, but
EV-n&vxa as world-relationship indeed implies thai £v, like the world,
worlds.
Fink: Thethe gathering, letting-be, and also annihilating
^v is
power. Beside the moment of gathering and letting-be. the moment of
taking back again and annihilating is important for me.
Heidegger: If" we think now of Fr. 30, which speaks of xoojiov
T6v6e, what is the use of xoojio? here in comparison lo your use of the
word "cosmology"?
Fink: jcoofiov tovSe does not mean the gathering of jrAvra in ^, but
rather the jointed whole of Tiayxa.
HEiDt:GGER: Thus, you do not use "cosmo logical" in the sense of the
Greek x6ofi05. But why, then, do you speak of the "cosmo logical"?
Fink: I do not think the cosmologica! from out of Heratlitus, but
rather from out of Kant and from the antinomy of pure reason. Pure
reason attempts to think the whole. The whole is a concept that is first
oriented toward things. In this manner, however, we can never thought-
fully experience the gathered whole. Kam exhibits the aporias of an
attempt at thought that believes itself able to think the whole on the model
of a spatial thing. Because the attempt does not manage with this ap-
proach, Kant subjectivizes the whole as a subjective principle in the pro-
cess of experience, which is complimented by the regulative idea of the
totality of all appearances.
Heidegger: The justification of your use of "cosmic -cosmological"
in distinction to "ontic-ontologica!" is thus the allness. .
Fink: . .
.
which, however,
the allness of h/. of the self-gathering,
is
letting-arise, and letting- pass-away. In reference to the clamping to-
gether of letting-arise and letting- pass-away, I refer to Nietzsche's motif
of the coupling of building and breaking, joining and undoing, of the
negation in the sway of the world.
Heidegger: I would like to touch on yet another difficulty. I share
your interpretation of Fr. 62. For me also it is the sole possible way to
interpret the formula, "lo live the death of another, to die the life of
another," in the manner you indicated. For me the question is how much
we know, according to the purest sources, about the gods in their rela-
tionship to humans with the Greeks. In reference to your interpretation
of the relationship of the gods and humans, one could bluntly say that
you impute an existenz-ontology to the gods. According to its sense, your
interpretation goes in the direction of an exislenz-ontology not Just of
humans in relationship to the gods, but also, vice versa, of the gods in
their relationship lo humans.
Fink: In the world of religion we find the strict demarcation be-
tween gods and humans. Professor Heidegger means to say. however,
that when I ascribe an existenz-ontology to the gods, this would be be-
III
cause the gods are not only distinguished from humans, but because
they distinguish themselves in their own being from humans by holding
themselves understandingly toward the death of mortals . .
Heidegger: and l>ecause they experience themselves as per-
. . .
petual Ijeings only in their self-distinclion from mortals.
Fink: Only because they have view of mortals can they experience
themselves as perpetually f>eing. The immortals are those who do not
meet death; mortals are those who are bound to death. But Heraclitus
converts this customary comprehension of Greek mythology, which lets
inortals and gods be for themselves, and which lets them turn toward
each other only occasionally. He makes this occasional relationship into a
relationship constituting gods and humans in ttieir own being. The im-
mortal being of the gods is only possible if they relate themselves toward
the mortal being of humans. The knowledge of human being bound to
death constitutes the understanding of imperishable being proper, and
vice versa, the knowledge of the perpetual being of the gods constitutes
the understanding of mortal being proper. Gods and humans do not
form two separated spheres. It depends on seeing not the chommos
[separation], but the intertwining of the godly and human understand-
ing of self and of being.
Heidegger: It is not a question of speaking in a blunt manner of
gods and humans as of different living beings, of whom the former are
immortal, the other mortal. Spoken in the terminology of Being and
Time, immortality is no category, but rather an existenliale, a way that the
gods themselves toward their fieing.
relate
Fink: godly knowledge of the being bound lo death of humans
The
is no mere consciousness, but rather an understanding relationship.
With Athena, who appears as mentor to mortals in order to bring help to
them, il is perhaps a matter of still another theme. The epiphany of the
gods is no actual mortal being of the gods, but a masking. When Aristotle
says that the life of OewQia [contemplation], which exceeds (pe6vT]ai5
[practical wisdom], is a kind of godly life, an deavaif^eiv [to be im-
mortal] (whereby b.Qa\miXfiw is formed like fUtivi^Eiv [to be Greek]),
that implies that in SetuQia we comport ourselves like immortals. In
9t(j)e(a. mortals reach up to the of the gods. Correspondingly, we
life
must say of the gods, that their comportmeni toward humans is a
"6avaTLt,£iv" [to be mortal], presupposing that one could form this word.
"Fhe emphasis lies in this, that the relationship of humans to gods cannot
fx-descril>ed externally, but rather that they themselves exist as their
alternate and counterrelationship. except that the gods, to a certain ex-
tent, have the more favorable existenz-ontology and humans, on the
contrary, the less favorable. The godly and human understanding of .self
and being must project itself in mutual imder.standing.
Heidegger: In the relationship of gods and humans, it depends on
 .

112 113

a phenomenon ihat had not been treated till now in regard to hr and iheir conversation we touch on a historical question, and noijust a ques-
K&vxa: the standing open of gods and humans. You called the open- (ion concerning the study of history. In what sense, then, Ixjth are
standing relationship between gods and humans a representative of the Hcraclileans is another question. In liibingen, they joined with Schel-
relatedness of ev and ndvta. liiig in the motto Ev xai Jictv [the one and whole]. This relationship

Fink; With this, the oo(p6v -character of ev is foreshadowed. The ev among them, which stands under this common motto, later dissolved.
is gathering unity in the manner of Xayo^ and oocpov. We may not But where does Holderlin first name Heraclitus?
interpret the oocpov-ch a ratter of ev as knowledge. In it, the moment of Participant: In "Hyperion." There he speaks of ^v fttatpeQcv
understanding reference of ev to K&vxa is thought. In the light-character 6auTU» [one set against itself].

of lightning, sun, and fire, we first have a foreshadowing of the ootpov- Heidegger: The one that in itself distinguishes itself. Holderlin
character of ^v. But we must also warn against an explication of '^y as understands it as the essence of beauty. At that time, however, beauty is
world-reason and as the absolute. for him the word for being. Hegel's interpretation of the Greeks in the
Heidegger: Let me just characterize your way of thinking. You Lectures on ike History of Philosophy goes in the same direction: being as

prepare the understanding of aotpov or nvQ qpg6vi(iov [sagacious fire] in beauty. With recourse to Heraclitus" word. Holderlin names no
Fr. 64a in a departure from lightning, from sun, from the seasons, from formalistic-dialectic structure; rather, he makes a fundamental declara-

fire, light, radiance, and shine. In this manner, it is somewhat more tion. This thought has then been changed by him into a relationship of

difficult to make the transition from the thingly reference of ^

as lightn- gods and humans, according to which humanity is a condition of the
ing, sun, and fire, to JiAvxa, over to the open-standing reference of gods existence of the god . .

and humans to each other, which the reference of ev to ootpov to n&vza Fink: .and humanity is nearer to the abyss than the god.
. .

represents. Your way of Herachtus interpretation starts out from fire Heidegger: For that reason, the relationship of gods and humans
toward X6V05; my way of Heraclitus interpretation starts out from Xoyog is a higher and more difficult one, a relation that is not to be determined
toward fire. A difficulty is hidden behind that which is still not unraveled with the terminology of customary metaphysical theology.
by us, but which we have already touched on in various forms. For your Fink; The relationship of humans and gods is also no imago rela-

interpretation of the mutual relationship of gods and humans you have tionship in so far as mortals, in their relationship to themselves, under-
drawn upon Holderlin as a comparison, that is. firstly on "Hyperion's standingly stand out into the other being of the gods, without participat-
i
Song of Fate," in which the gods are separated from humans and are not ing in it. On one side an estrangement rules between gods and humans;
referred to one another. on the other side, however, a clamping together also prevails in mutual
Fink: Without fate, like the sleeping infant, breath the heavenly understanding.
ones. This poem speaks of the gods' indifference toward humans. Heidegger: From Hegel's viewpoint wherein c<msists the affinity —
Heidegger: You have then interpreted Holderlin a second time, I between him and Heraclitus? There is a well-known sentence in the
and alluded to one verse out of "Mnemosyne," which expresses the Lectures on the History of Philosophy.
reverse thought, that the immortals have need of mortals. Still, both Participant: "There is no sentence of Heraclitus' that 1 have not
poems of Holderlin stand close by one another. The thought of taken up in my Lo^c"
"Mnemosyne" is already found in ihe "Rhine Hymn" (Strophe 8), in Heidegger: What does this sentence mean?

which it says that the gods stand in need of "heroes and humans / And Participant: It is here a matter of Hegel's understanding of
other mortals." This noteworthy concept of standing in need concerns Heraclitus.

only the reference of gods to humans in Holderlin. Where does the Heidegger: What does the sentence say regarding the relationship
rubric of "need" occur as term in philosophy? of Hegel and Heraclitus?
Fink: With Hegel in the wiiting "The Difference of Fichte's and Pahmcipani: Heraclitus is not only taken up by Hegel; rather, he is
Schelling's System of Philosophy" (1801), in which Hegel speaks of the sublaled.
"need of philosophy." Pahiicipant: Hegel sees Heraclitus dialectically from oui <)f oppo-
HEinE<;(;ER: Thus, in the same time that Holderlin lived in sition.

Frankfurt. In the question about thai which Hegel and Holderlin call HEiUE(i<;t:K: Hut what does "dialectical" mean? Now we can recover
"need," we have an essential document for their conversation in this the answer to the question, posed in an earlier season, about the specula-
—
regard for the conversation that othei"wise is an obscure problem. With tive with Hegel. What does "speculative mean in Hegel? "
 114 115

Participant: The presupposition of speculative thought is the implies that the abstract finite determination sublates itself and goes into
identity of being and thinking. its opp<)site determination. Against that, the abstract thinking of under-

Heidegger: Where does the speculative belong for Hegel?
Participant: The speculative is a moment of the logical.
Heidegger: What is a moment?
Participant: Moment comes from movere, movimentum [to set in
standing is the adherence to the determinaiion and its distinctness vis-a-
vis The entire thinking, Hegel's thinking, s|>eaks fust of al! in
the other.
ihe fundamental scheme of the subject -object relationship. The abstract
moment is the representation that is delivered over to the object without

motion, movement].
Heidegger: The phase [der Moment] depends on "the moment"
\^'das Moment"]. When Hegel says the speculative is a moment, the phase
is not meant thereby, but rather the moment. The moment is a moving
something which has a share in the movement of thinking, and which
gives an impetus. The moment becomes the impetus, and the impetus
itself is the instant; it happens in a phase [in einem Moment]. Thus, the
moment becomes the phase. What is the first moment of the logical?
Participant: The abstract or intelligible.
Heidegger: And the second moment?
reference back to the subject. It is the level of immediacy. The idea is
given over to the immediately given object without reference back to
mediation. If now the object qua object is thought, that is, in reference
back to the subject, then the unity between object and subject is thought.
But why is this unity a negative one?
Participant: Because thinking has not yet recognized the unity as
unity.
Heidegger: Think historically and concretely on Kant's synthetic
unity of transcendental apperception. It is unity in reference to objectiv-
ity. For Hegel, however, it is only this whole itself, i.e., subject and object

Participant: The dialectical. in their unity, which is the positive unity wherein the whole of the dialec-
Heidegger: It is noteworthy that Hegel understands the dialectical tical process is deposited. The glimpse of this unity, that is, the glimpse
as the second and not as the third moment. And what is the third mo- of the abstract and dialectical moments in their unity, is the speculative.
ment? The speculative, as the positive-rational, comprehends the uniiy of de-
Participant: The speculative. terminations in their opposition. When
Hegel brings Heraclitus into
Heidegger: In what connection does Hegel call the dialectical the connection with his logic, how does he then
think what Heraclitus says
second and not the third moment of the logical? When he speaks, at the alx>ut oppositions? How does he take up what is said by Heraclitus about

end of the Lo^, of the identity of matter and method, one would indeed
is the third moment. Hegel also calls the dialec-
think that the dialectical
the negative-rational. What does the rational mean for Hegel? We
tical
need all this information for our analysis of Heraclitus, even though
Hegel does not speak of Heraclitus in these pages.
Participant: Spoken from the Phenomenology of Mind, reason
sublation of the separation of subject and object.
Heidegger: Where does Hegel's terminology come from?
Participant: From Kant.
Heidegger: How does Hegel characterize Kant's philosophy?
Participant: As reflexive philosophy.
Heidegger: And that means?
oppijsitions in distinction to what we attempt? He takes the opposing
—
references of Heraclitus spoken from out of Kant as a doctrine of —
categories at the level of immediacy, and thus in the sense of an im-
mediate logic. Hegel does not see in Heraclitus the cosinological refer-
ences as you understand them.
is the Fink: Hegel inteiprets the relationship of oppositions from out of
mediation.
Hkideg(;kr: He understands the whole of Greek philosophy as a
level of immediacy, and he sees everything under the aspect of the logical.
Fink: One could also say ihat for Hegel the thought of becoming is
of sigiiifiiume in Heraclitus. One could also call Heraclitus
the philoso-
pher of (lux. For Hegel, the element of lliix gains he characicr of a model
1

Participant: As the division of two phases. lor undoing opposiiions.

Heidegger: Which phase? What does reason mean in Kant? Hkidi-:c;gkr: Becomingis movement, for which the three momenis^

Participant: For him, reason is the thinking of ihe ideas in distinc- namely, ihe abstract, the dialeclical, and the speculative are what —
tion to understanding as the thinking of the categories. The ideas are gives impetus [das Aus.stlilafrfr,-hcrnlf\. This movement, this meihod,
regulative principles, in which reason thinks totality. IS the iiiacier itself for Hegel after completion of the lMi(ir. Ihe ihiid
H[;ii)kgger: Reason in Kant is thus not referred immediately to lleiaclitean, lx.-side Hoklerlin and Hegel, is Nietzsche. But we would l>e

appearances but only to ihe rules and fundamental principles of under- going out of our way to go into this que.stion. I have touched on all that is
standing. The fundamental function of reason consi.sts in thinking the now sai<l only to show you where we nvc at this jjoini, Oiu- Heraclitus
highest unity. When Hegel says the dialectical is the negative-rational, he interpretation has a wide perspective; it also six;aks in the language of
 . . . ,

116 117

the tradition.We can speak only out of the conversation that is funda- double meaning of the Ixjw, the explication of fire as (pwg [light] and as
mental for thinking, and that is fundamental above all for the way on [hat which makes oatpiq [clear], allows shining-up, and brings to light,
which we move. and finally the character of ootpov and the }iOyoQ. The way of our Hera-
Perhaps it would be appropriate if you, Mr. Fink, indicated the further clitus interpretation is the relatedness ot ^v and jiavxa. Our explication

step that yon have in view for the progress of the seminar, setting out
from the allusion to the reference of the mutual open-standing character
of gods and humans that characterizes the phenomenon, "'to live the
death of another, to die the life of another." Thus the participants will
see where the way leads us.
Fink: 1 believe that one must drive on from the doctrine of fire and
the JTUQO^ TQOKai to the question of the relatedness of £v and navia, for
which we receive help from the fragments in which the life-death rela-
tionship is thought. The relationship of gods and humans is not to be
equated with the relatedness of h/ and Jtdvxa. In the standing open for
one another of gods and humans, we have, as it were, a brake against
thinking what is said in Fr. 90 simply as a change-over of familiar kind,
begins with the appearances of fire; it then goes over to the relationship
of life and death, to the doctrine of the contra.sts and the coincidence, to
the movement- fragments, the fragment about the god, and from there
to Ev TO ootpov [ioiivov (one thing, the only wise],^' and finally to the
seems important to me fir.st of all to gain an abun-
>jJ70c;- fragments. It
dant arsenal of ideas and ways of thought. Heraclitus operates with
many relationships. When he takes up a differentiation in the sleep-
fragments, this is not to be conceived of in the sense of copious vocabu-
lary, but of ways of understanding. His fundamental thoughts are in-
deed relatively easy to formulate, but the difficulty lies in the refraction
of these thoughts into the many waysof thought and ideas with which he
is concerned. The fundamental thought of Heraclitus is broken into a

or as transformation of stuff into another form, or on the model of the great number of ways . .

exchange of goods. We have indicated that in x&^od's [go'd], the glimmer Heidegger: which gives an insight into TOt ii6vTa.
. . .

of gold must also be thought. Here a relationship is thought between the Fink: The thinking of the one happens in a manifold manner. As
light-character of fire and that into which it turns. We must not under- with Parmenides, the b/ is thought of in a great many o*inaTa [signs] so
stand the turning bluntly in the sense of a change of stuff. with Heraclitus the relatedness of ^
and jrdvra is thought of in a great
Heidegger: We must think the radiant, the ornamental, and the many ways of understanding.
decorative element together in x6o[iog, which was for the Greeks a cus- Heidegger: Where do gods and humans belong?
tomary thought. Fink: In one regard in Jidvia, and in another regard in ^v.
Fink: But the most beautiful xoono; is also, when measured against Heidegger: The other regard is precisely what is of interest.
the fire, a scattered junk heap. To be sure, it is in itself the most beautiful Fink: The relatedness of ^v and Jtdvra mirrors itself in the relation
Joining, but in reference to the £v it compares like a junk heap. of gods and humans. Since ^
is no factual unity but rather the unity of

Heidegger: 1 would .still like to add something as to the relation- Wyo?, gods and humans are those struck by the lightning of Wyog. They
ship of gods and humans. I have called the mutual self-understanding belong together in the Xoyog-happening.
the open-standing character. But if the gods, in their relationship to Heidegger: Gods and humans in their intertwining relationship
mortals represent tv in its relationship to niivxa, then the 6v-character have amirroring function in reference to Iv and ndrvxa.
gets lost . .
Fink: In Heideggerian language, we could say that humans and
Fink: . . . and indeed because the gods, as representatives of £v, gods belong in one respect in what is, but in the essential respect they
stand in the plural, and thus appear as foreign forms. But in his theol- belong in being. This special position of gods and humans among all that
ogy, which we will turn to later, Heraclitus thinks the coincidence of is, which |x>sition does not subsume them . .

oppositions in the god. In order now of our

to clarify the further course Hkidi.gger: under all that which is
, . . . .

interpretation of Heraclitus, we must attempt to go from the fragments Fink: ... is very much more difficult to grasp. Gods and humans
that treat the relationship of life and death and the intermediate phe- exist as understanding of The godly and the human understand-
l>eing.
nomenon of sleep over to a fundamental discussion of all oppositions ing of Ix^ing are ways of the self-clearing of Ix-ing.
and their coincidence in (he god, and finally to Zeus, with which name §V Heidegger: But thai cannot l>e read in Heraclitus.
TO oo(f6v is unwilling and yet willing to l)e named. Befoie this, we would Fink: We could find the light-nature of ev by means of the relation-
also have to deal with the series of (lux- and movement-fragments, then ship l)etween gods and humans.
with the problem of 6e|j.ovLa dfpavli^ [hidden harmony], life and death Hkii)k(;(;er: Perhaps this is the appropriate place to make the tran-
in the lyre and liow, the intertwining of life and death proper in the sition to Fr. 26.
 . .

118 119

Fink: First, I would like lo return once again to Fr. 88: xavzo t' ^i, ji(ivTa? Are the changes-over named in Fr. 88 to be thought as mere
^d)v xai TEevT)x65 xai (to) ^Ye^'^opog xai xaSeOSov xal veov xal yriQaiov contentions about phenomena given and not given in the animal world,
xASe yixQ HExajreodvxa exELvd eoxi. xaxEiva jicAlv neicoiEOOVta xaiJTa. or do they concern nvQ dei^wov? Let us leave this question open.
Diels translates, '"And it is always one and the same, what dwells (?) Heideg(;er: How does ^<bv xat teOvEKog [living and dead) in Fr. 88
within us: living and dead and waking and sleeping and young and old. relate to ^tavteg [those living] and TE&Vfti)Teg [those dying] in Fr. 62? How
For this is changed over to thai and that changes back over to this." are they mentioned in the one and how in the other fragment?
Here a taiiT^ is expressed, but not a same-being [Selbigsem] of a same Fink: In Fr. 62, C<'>vte5 and TeOvetiJTeq are referred to . ,

thing [Selhigeti] lying beCore us, not the empty identity that belongs to Heidegger: . . . the manner of l>eing of immortals and mortals; in
everything there is; raiher a same-being that is referred to distinction. It Fr. 88, on the contrary, t/uiv xal XEeviiKog is referred to what is.

is referred to that which .seems to us to lie most distinguished. The
distinctions named here are not such as are in constant movement, but
are such as concern all Being alive, Ijeing awake, and being
living things.
young have a positive character for our customary ideas vis-a-vis being
dead, being asleep, and being old. But the fragment that expresses
same-being speaks not only against the tustomai7 opinion of the
superiority of living, waking, and being young vis-a-vis the dead, the
sleeping, and the old; rather, it also expresses a belonging together of
the three groups. Being asleep, which stands in the middle, has a distin-
guished inbetween position out of which an understanding standing
open is possible for being dead and being old in the sense of wasting
away.
Bui the fragment says more. Not only are living and dead, awake
.still
and asleep, young and old one and the same, but this is the change-over
of that and that again is the change-over of this. A phenomenal change-
over is only lo be seen in the relationship of waking and sleep. For what
goes lo sleep from waking also turns again from sleep back into waking.
Only the change-over from waking into sleep is reversible. Against thai,
the change-over of life into death and of being young into being old is
not reversible in the phenomenon. But in the fragment it is said that as
being awake goes over into being asleep and vice versa, so also the living
changes over into the dead, the dead into the living, the young into the
old, and ihe old into the young. Il treats the distinction of waking and
sleeping in the same manner as that of living and dead and of young and
old. But of whom is this reversible change-over expressed? The expres-
sion, "changing over again," recalls the avranoipii [interchange], the
change of gold into goods and goods into gold. There, the relationship
of the change-over is referred to the relatedness of ^v and Jidvxa as well
Fink: Not to what is, but to being alive and lieing dead, tfiyv does
not mean a living being, but rather the living as terminm [term] for being
alive, just as xeOvrixos dtres not mean something dead, but rather the
dead as terminus for being dead. The same also holds for the waking and
sleeping and for young and old. Waking and sleeping are termini for
being awake and being asleep, and young and old are termini for being
young and being old.
Heidegger: Is tfirv in Fr. 88 only the singular of the plural ^wvieg
in Fr. 62? Are gods and humans also meant in Fr. 88?
Fink: ^oxv xai teOvtixo; does not refer only to gods and humans,
for Fr. 88 is stretched wider. But for wh(»m are being alive and being
dead, being awake and being asleep, and being young and being old the
same, living beings or nvQ Aei^coov?
Heidegger: Thus, in Fr. 88 something else is said than in Fr. 62.
Fr. 62 has a wider sense.
Fink; ^oiv and TE9viix6q are lo be understood like to xaX6v, to
fifxaiov. How is the article to ^Y01Y*>Q<'G ['he waking] to be understood?
Professor Heidegger has indicated that it is not a matter of relationships
and counterreferences that would have a possessor. In the second sen-
tence of the fragment, Heraclitus speaks in the plural, which does not,
however, refer to facts but to the three different relationships. Of whom
can TaiiTO be said ai all? The coincidence thought here does not signify
one such as in a distinctionless indifference. What is meant is even a
mutual changeover. [lEToneodvTG [things changing around] refers to Fr.
90, in which dvxanoiflTi is named, the exchange of gold for goods and of
goods for gold. But what change over in Fr. 88 are not only things as
against the gathering unity, but the harder opposition of being alive and
Ixfing dead. Here a sameness is mentioned that slaps in the face and

as jrdvxa and 6v. The question is whether iransitions, referred to the contradicts the everyday opinion that insists on the difference Ix'iween
life and death. On that account, the question of where the place is, the
living who are named in Fr. 88, have their place within animalia
[animals], or whether changes-over in the sense of Jtugog XQOnai are aliode, of this change-over is disconcerting.

meant by it. Is ihe tqiito said of animalia, or rather of ji{iq det^OHW, HtiiDEGOER: Does being dead (teOvtixo?) mean the, same as having
about which we hear that il always was and is and will be (f|V Aei eoriv xai deceased?
SoTai), but which itself is no inner temporal constancy, but which raiher Fink: Ves, when XEflvriXog is said again.sl t,{i)v. It does not mean what
makes possible the having lx;en, Ijeing pieseni, and coming to Ix; of is lifeless in the sense of the minerals . .
 120 121

Hkidkggek: . . , thus not dead nature, A stone, for example, is not which they come into proximity to the dark passing of night and to light
dead.
openness.
Fink; In Fr, 88,lilt- and death, which we know in phenomenon only
Heidegger; We must gel clear what touching (Atpi^) actually means.
in a specific domain, are rt-ferred to the whole relatedness of £v and l^ter, "the touching" appears as eiyeiv with Aristotle in the Metapkysici
n&na. But let us leave this question open. For without further verifica- e 10.
tion, it cannot be .said what taiiTO is. We can at fir.st only presume that the
FiNK: What we have now said concerning Fr. 26 is only a
same-being of life and death refers to gv. Professttr Heidegger has des- foreshadowing of the difficulty with which we must begin in the next
ignated the relatedness of ev and Jiavxa as slate-of-affairs [Verkall], as
session.
being- and wo rid -state-ol'-affairs. When this original staie-of-affairs is
mentioned in the xaixd of Fr. 88, then we have a contradiction in the
phenomenon. For nol^ody dead becomes alive again. Living and dead,
waking and sleeping, young and old, are phenomena that in a certain
manner mean all the sojourn of the living in time. Life is the whole time
of a living being: death is the end of life-time. Waking and sleep form
the basic rhythm during life. Being young and being old refer to being in
the corrupting power of time which not only brings everything but also
takes everything. The que.stion for me is whether the relatedness of hi
and Ji6vTa is a relatedness of maturation.
Finally, I would like to attempt an explication of Fr. 26. It runs:
av90a)Jio5 b/ E-bffQovT] (poo? fiuiTEtai fauTtp (dno8avcijv) duioopeoOElg
fl'^eig, t,(iyv 6e &nxExai teevEWTo^ eTJ6wv, (djtoo|iEo9el5 flifeig) EYeT|YOQ(i>5

&lTETai EiJ6ovTo;. Diels translates; "A human touches on (kindles) a light

in the night, when extinguished. Living, he touches
his eyesight is on
death in sleep; in waking he touches on sleeping."
This fragment clearly begins with a human. A human kindles a light in
the night. Fr. 26 begins with the human and his capacity of kindling a
light in the night, when his oijfLg is extinguished. Diels translates 6jioo-
PEo6Ei,5 dy^v; with"when his eyesight is extinguished." But the meaning
thus suggests itself that a human sees in his dream and that he is in a —
light while in darkness during the dream. would rather translate the
!

plural, ii:ioop£o9El5 flipLg, with "extinguished in his manners of seeing."

A human has his uneasy place between night and light. The fragment
refers to the unsteady place of a human between night and light. He is
near to the light. That is indicated when he is able to lighten the night. A
human is Promethean fire thief. He has the ability to make
a kind of
light in the night, when his manners of seeing are extinguished, i.e., not
when he sleeps but when he relates to the dark. "Living, he touches on
the dead in sleep; in waking, he touches on the sleeping. Life and death "

are here bound to one another by the in-between position of sleep.

Sleeping is a manner of being alive akin with death; waking is a maimer
of lingering touching on death in the light in reference to the sleeping.
Being alive and being awake, i)eing asleep and Ijeing dead are not three
conditions, but three possible manners of relationship of humans in
 —— .

11 123

the elucidation of the three moments of the logical. But what remains to
The "Logical" in Hegel.
be asked, if one speaks of the three moments of the logical in Hegel?
"Consciousness" and "Dasein." Participant: One could perhaps say that the dialectical and the
Locality of Human Beings between Light moments appear as two sides of negativity.
s[)eculative
and Night. (Correlated Fragments: 26, 10). Hkideggeb: l^t us not go into negation and negativity.
Participant: We have forgotten to ask about the totality of the
three moments.
Heidegger: How do you wish to determine thecourseof the three
moments? The abstract, dialectical, and speculadve are not side by side.
Heidegger: First, I must make a correction regarding the last seminar
But what must we return to in order to find out how the three moments
session. In reference to Hcratlitus' word 6v ftiacpegov kavxia, ai the place
belong together? As I subsequently reflected on the course of our con-
in the summary where it says that Holderlin interprets truth as beauty, I
I was alarmed about our carelessness.
versation,
said by mistake that the same thought is to be found in Hegel in the Participant: We must ask where the Logic has its place in the
lectures on the History of Philosophy, This thought appears, rather, in the
system.
Lectures on the Philosophy oj World History, in Volume III, "The Greek and
Heidegger; We donot need to go so far, but we must ask . .

Roman World" (I.asson edition, p. 570 ff.). "Thus, the sensory is only the
Participant: what the logical means in Hegel.
. . .

appearance of spirit. It has shed fhiitude, and l>eau[y consists in this

Heidegger; We have spoken about the three moments of the logi-
unity of the sensory with spirit in and for itself" (p. 575). "The true
cal, hut we have not thereby reflected on the logical itself. We have failed
deficiency of the Greek religion as opposed to the Christian is that in it
to ask what Hegel means by the logical. One says, for example, "that is
appearance constitutes the highest form, in general, the whole of the
logical" Or one can hear it said that the great coalition is logical. What
divine, while in the Christian religion appearing obtains only as a mo-
docs "logical" mean here?
ment of the divine" (p. 580). "But if appearing is the perennial form, so
Participant; In the "Introduction" to the Science of Logic, Hegel
the spirit which appears in its transfigured Ix'auty is a thither side of
says that the content of logic "is the depiction of God, as He is in His
."
subjective spirit (p. 581). Here Hegel thinks the identity of appear-
eternal essence before the creatitm of nature and of a finite spirit."
. .

ing and beauty that is also characteristic and essential for the early Hol-
Heidegger: Let us remain at first with what the "logical" means in
derlin. We cannot go into the details of Hegel's elalx>rations, but rec-
the customary sense, i.e., for the man on the street.
I

ommend that you sometime reread his Lectures on the Philosophy of World Participant: It means the same as "conclusive in itself."
History. Then you will who had an inkling of
gain another idea of Hegel,
Heidkgger; Thus, "consistent." But is that what Hegel means when
much when, for example, he thinks Apollo as the
in (Jreek Lh<»ught
hes|jeaksofthe three pha.sesofthe logical? Certainly not. Thus, we have
knowing god, and the god of knowledge, as the eloquent, prophesying,
not made clear to ourselves what we are talking alx>ut. In paragraph 19
foretelling god, as bringing everything concealed to light, as the god
of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, Hegel says, "Logic is the sci-
l(H)king into (he darkness, as the god of light, and when he thinks the
ence of the pure idea, thai is, the idea in the abstract element of thinking."
light as what biings everything to appearance.
We do not want to dwelt too long on Hegel here. only want to make
I

Aside from that, I have still another omission to correct. We have

clear the gulf thai separates us fioin Hegel, when we are dealing with
spoken of the three moments of the logical in Hegel in the last session,
Heraditus. What does "science of the pure idea" mean with Hegel; what
the abstract-intelligible, the dialectical, and the speculative. Hut what
lor him is the idea?
have we omitted thereby? Participant: The complete self-comprehension of thought.
Participant: We have no longer asked alxtut what we understand What does Hegel's concept of the idea presuppose?
Hhidi-:<;c;er;
by the speculative in regard to our own procedure in distinction to
Think alxmi Plau>'s L6Ea [form]. What has happened between the
Hegel. I'or llie question al)ou[ the meaning of the speculative in Hegel
Platonic idea and Hegel's idea? What has in the meantime hapiwncd
tame up when one i>f the participants characlerized our attempt to think
when Hegel and modern times speak of the idea?
by starting out fi-om Heraditus with the expression, a s|x;culalive leap.
Participant: In the meantime, Plato's ibia took the road toward
HtioKGt^KK: We will talk alK)ui ihis pioblcm lalei-. For the moment,
Ix'coming a concept.
let us remain within Hegel's philosophy. We followed Hegel's text with Heidkgger; Von musi be somewhat more cautious. With Descartes.
 .

124 123

the idea becomes perceptio [perception]. With that, it is seen from the
representation of the subject and thus from subjectivity. The absolute
idea of Hegel is then the complete self-knowledge of the absolute sub-
process charac-
ject. Itis the inner coherence of the three phases in the
Heidegcjer: When you say that the reference of the gods to hu-
mans' being bound to death is no mere consciousness, then you mean
that humans are so
that the reference is no mere human representation
and so. You said that the reference of the gods to humans is an under-

terizing the self- manifesting of the absolute spirit. In this absolute, standing relationship, and you mean a self-understanding relationship.

Plato's thought of the idea, tbc self-showing, still plays a role, despite Fink: The gods can have their being only in so far as they stand
subjectivity.Why can Hegel now say that the idea is thinking? That must open for mortals. Standing open for mortals and the mortals' transient
seem paradoxical to us ai the fust glance at Hegel's sentence. The sen- Ijeing cannot be lacking from the gods. We may not understand this,

tence is only lo be understood if one observes that the Platonic idea however, as Nietzsche .says with Thomas Aquinas concerning the bliss-
becomes perceptio in Descartes. Piior to that, the ideas become the fulness of paradise, that the souls will view the torment of the damned,

thought of God, and gain significance for the notion of creatio. We give
only this brief determination of the logical in Hegel in order to see what
we are talking about when we name the three moments of the logical.
The logical in Hegel is a rubric that has full importance and that hides a
richness that one cannot quickly and easily comprehend. In paragraph
thereby suiting their biissfulness more. (Genealogy of Morals, First Essay,
15). The immortals are undoubtedly BviiToi.
They know their eternal
being not only from viewing contemplation (OECOoia). but at the same
time in ricochet back from the transient being of mortals. They are
affected by humans' being bound to death. It is difficult to find die right

19 of the Encyclopedia, it says, among other things, "But in so far as the term here.
Heidegger: want to get at precisely this point. Whether we find
logical is the absolute form of truth, and even more than this, is the
I
question. Standing
pure truth itself, it is something quite other than useful." What is truth the terminologically appropriate form is another
open is not something like an open window or like a passageway. The
here? If one wants to understand Hegel's concept of truth, what must
standing open of humans to things does not mean that there is a hole
one also ihink? Think back to what we have already said, that the idea in
open for is being ad-
Descartes becomes clara and distincta perceptio [clear and distinct percep- through which humans see; rather, standing . .
.

dressed by [Angegangensein von] things. 1 speak about this in order to

tion], and this goes together with . .

clarify the fundamental reference which plays a role in the understand-

Participant: certiludo
. . .

ing of what is thought with the word "Dasein" in Being

and Time. My
Hkidegger: Thus, with certainty. In order to be able to understand
consciousness and Dasein. How
Hegel's concept of truth, \ e must also think truth as certainty, as place in question now aims at the relationship of
as a rubric
absolute self-knowledge. Only thus can we understand that the logical isthat relationship to be clarified? If you take "consciousness"
for transcendental philosophy and absolute idealism, another position is
should \ye the pure truth by itself. This reference to the meaning of the
overlooked or
logical in \x imporlanl, when later—though not in this
Hegel will thus taken with the rubric "Dasein." This position is often
one first
—
semester ^we come to speak about the Logos with Heraclitus. not sufficiently noticed. When one speaks of Being and
with
Time,
the rubric "con-
thinks of the "they" or of "anxiety." Let us begin
Now I wish to have another clarification. You. Mr. Fink, spoke about word?
not, strictly speaking, a curious
the fact that the godly knowledge of a human's being bound by death sciousness," Is
is it
the state of
no mere consciousness, but an understanding relationship. Thus you Fink: Consciousness is. slriciiy speaking, referred to
affairs. So far as the state of affairs is represented, it is a conscious bemg
contrast the understanding relationship, which we have also called stand-
and not a knowing being. However, by consciousness we mean the ful-
ing open, to mere consciousness.
Fink: A mere consciousness of something would l>e given, for fillment of knowing.
Heidegger: speaking, it is the object of which we are con-
example, if one said that a human, as animated, knows alwut inanimate
Strictly

scious. Consciousness, then, means as much as objectivity, which is iden-

nature. Here one can speak of a meie knowledge relationship, although
tical with the first principle of all synthetic
judgments a priori in Kant.
I believe that it is also a matter of more than just a consciousness same
of Not only the understanding of lieing of immortal being telongs lo The conditions of the jxissibiiity of experience in general are at the
. . .
With con-
the self-understanding of the gods, but also, as an implicit component, time the conditions of the possibility of objects of experience.
knowing thought as
sciousness, we are concerned with a knowing, and is
the understanding of being of mortal l>eing. The godly understanding
representation, as for example in Kant. And bow does it stand now with
of being is not of a neutral kind: lalher. il is referred back to the mortal must we set
being of humans. 1 he gods understand their blissful being in ricochet Dasein? If we wish to proceed pedagogically. from where
back fiom the frailiv of mortals. out?

126
Participant; We can sel oul from the word. The concept of "Da-
sein" in Kant means actuality.
Heidegger: The concept of actuality in Kant is a dark problem.
But how does the concept oJ Dasein develop in the eighteenth centui7.
Participant: As a translation of existentia [existence].
Heidegger: Dasein means, then being present now. But how is the
:
word "Dasein" to be understood from out of the hermenueiic of Dasein
in Being and Time?
Participant: The hermeneutic in Being and Time sets out from
Dasein, whereby it does not understand Dasein in the customaiy manner
as present at hand.
Heidegger; In French, Dasein is translated by el.re~la [being there],
for example by Sartre. Btii with this, everything that was gained as a
position in Being und Time is lost. Arc humans there like a chair is
Participant: "Dasein" in Being and Time does not mean pure
human factual being,
Heidegger: Dasein does not mean being there and being here.
What does the "Da" mean?
Participant: Ii means what is cleared in itself. Human being, like
Dasein's being is no pure thing present at hand, but a cleared being.
Hkidegger: In Being and Time, Dasein is described as follows:
Da-sein. The Da is the clearingand openness of what is. as which a human
stands out. Representation, the knowledge of consciousness, is some-
thing totally different. How does consciousness, knowledge as repre-
sentation, relate to Dasein? In this you inu.st not reflect, but rather see.
Mr. Fink has referred to the fact that consciousness is properly the
knowledge of the object. In what is objectivity, and that which is repre-
sented, grounded?
Participant: In representation.
Heidegger: Kant, and with him the absolute idealism of the abso-
lute idea, was content with this answer. But what is thereby suppressed?
Fink: That wherein consciousness and object play.
Heidegger: "Fhus, the clearing in which something present comes
to meet something else present. Being opposite to presupposes the
. . . nothing is to be found in the fragment about djt6aTaoic; xfig V^X'H?
clearing in which what is preseni meets a human. Consciousness is only
[M)ssible on the ground of the Da. as a derivative mode of it. Fixmi here
one must understand the historical step that is taken in Being and Time,
which sets out from Dasein as opposed to consciousness. That is a matter
that one inusi see. have alluded to this i>ecause this relationship will still
I ligbi in the dark, eilbei' with a match or by pressing a button?
play A role Ibi' us along side ibe oilier relatedne.ss of ev and ndvTa. Both
lx;long logelbcr. With Heraclilus. aX,7i6tia, nonconcealment, .stands in
the background, even if it is not mentioned directly. He sjx^aks on this
ground, although it is not further pursued by him. Whai 1 said in the last
.
127
ses.sion is al.so to be understood from out of this: gv is the re-latedness
[Ver-halhm\ of iKivra.^* Re-laiing \Ver-halleii\ and holding mean first of
all tending, keeping, and yielding in the widest sen.se. The content of this
holding is fulfilled for us in the course of time, that is, in passage
through the fragments of Heraclitus. Mr, Fink has repeatedly alluded to
the fact that the determinations ot ev, as lightning, sun. seasons, and fire
are no images, but rather characteristics that characterize the holding
and the way and manner that xa n6.\xa are for hi, and which charac-
terize ^v itself as the unifying, gathering . .
Fink; and discharging. We
. ,
. must contrast this relatedness of &v
and 7i6vTa against the naive conception according to which &v is thought
like a depository, like a pot in which all nawxa are. One cannot apply this
new ontically lamiliar encompassing relation to the reference of ev and
there? jidvTa.
Heidegger: In Southern German, Topf[Y>o(\ means Hafen [port].
That is the same word as foriEoeai [to be brought together]. The word
"hawk" [Habicht] also belongs here, that is, the bird which grasps. Lan-
guage is much more thoughtful and open than we are. But probably this
will lie forgotten in the next centuries. Nobody knows whether one will
ever come back to this again.
last session, we began to consider Fr. 26, and to em-
Fink: In the
phasize some elements, namely the peculiar situation of humans as fire
kindling beings placed Ijetween night and light.
Heidegger: For me, the way in which the fragment is quoted by
Clement already creates a difficulty. When I read the context of Cle-
ment, it is unclear to me
which coimection and out of which motive he
in
cites Fr. 26. There it says: 6oa 6' avi nepi ijjrvou XEyouoi, id abxit
xpti ital
jifpi aav{iTO\) ^^QKo-tJELv. EKotTego; yag br\\ol ttjv dirootaoiv ifjc U'Oxfjc;. 6
HEv naW.ov. 6 6e ^xxov. Sjieq kmi Kal jrapa 'WQa%keiTov XafJelv.^" The
first sentence says in translation, "One must also hear the same af>out
death as what is said about sleep." How this text should lie connected
with Fr. 26 is incomprehensible to me, myself can find no connection.
1
Clement's text is unintelligible to me in connection with Fr. 26 Ijecause
[departure of the soul]. Clement's text is a completely different one than
that of the fragment. Another difflcully for me is the following. Hera-
clilus says thai hmnans
kindle a iighi in the night when eyesight is extin-
guished. only to Ix" ihougbt in such a way that a human kindles a
Is ihat
Fink: I would suppose that the basic situation, mentioned in the
fragment, is the human siiuaiion l>eiween night and light. .'\ human is
not just like other living l^-ings lieiween nighl and light; rather, he is a
living being who stands in a relationship to night and light and who is not
 . .

128 129

overcome by night and the dark. When his 61(115 's extinguished, he has day. The human power to clear is something other than the lighi that

the capacity, as the lieing with an affinity to fire, to bring forth fire and comes with the daylight. The light kindled by the human is the little light

light. A human relates himself to nighi and day. in the great dark of night.
Heidegger: Let us stay al first with night and day. HEiDEGtiER: When he kindles a little light in the night, he does it so
Fink: The human situation is different from that of living beings that something given to him in the darkness by the light.
is still

which are exposed to night and day. When it is night for a human, then Fink: The little light stands in opposition to the rhythmic, great
light isextinguished. Indeed, there is a seeing of the dark, d^ig does not light of day that befalls us and that has nothing dark about it. The

mean here the capacity of seeing, but the capacity of seeing in aclu [in human is the light-related l^eing who, it is true, can kindle light, but
actuahiy]. When his fiipt^ is extinguished it means, therefore, when his never such as would lie able to completely annihilate the night. The light
capacity of seeing is no longer in actu. The capacity of seeing as such is started by him is only an island in the dark of night on account of which
not extinguished with the breaking in of darkness. We also do not say his place is clearly characterized between day and night.

that a human only hears when he hears sounds. For he also hears silence. Heidegger; You emphasize night, and understand it speculatively.
Heidegger; A human sees nothing in the dark. But let us remain at first with the dark: in the dark, in twilight, a human
FiNKi Nevertheless everyone sees something in the dark. kindles a light. Doesn't this darkness in which he kindles a light go
Heidegger: I am aiming at precisely what extinguishing means. together with the light of which you speak?
Fink: Extinguishing can have two-fold meaning: first, it refers to Fink: This light that a human kindles is already an offspring. All
not seeing in the dark; second, to not seeing in sleep. fires on earth, andwhich is started by the fire kindling being, are
that
Heidegger: Let us leave sleep aside. In the phenomenon, we must offsprings, as in Plato. The gods do not comport themselves in the same
distinguish between "not seeing anything in the dark" and '"not seeing." way as humans toward light and night. A human has a Janus-like face;
If we speak now of the extinguishing of sight, that is still not clear he is turned as much to the day as to the night.
enough to me, Not seeing means . .
Heidegger: A human, who extinguishes in reference to the possi-
Fink: . . . that the ability to see is closed. With the open ability to see, bility of seeing, kindles a light. Now bjiod^zaQeiq fiV"'? becomes clearer.

we see nothing determinate in the dark. But that is still a seeing. It thus means "when he cannot see because of darkness" but not "when

Heidegger: It concerns me now to determine what is negated by he cannot see."

the extinguishing of 61^115, Fink: I translate 6\^\.z, with possibility of sight.
Fink: can read Fr. 26 such that a human kindles a light in the
One Heidegger: I don't quite understand that.
dream. way of reading appears questionable to me. When we
Still, this Fink: A human kindles a little light in the dark measured by the
say that a human is exdnguished in reference to fiiCiS- it can mean either great light.
a closing of the ability to see or a failing to find the visible on account of Heidegger: I would still like to stay with the little light; thereby we
the darkness. The latter means that the ability to see is open, but we clarify and preserve the fatito).
cannot make out anything specific in the darkness. Fink: I translate feaiixui with "for himself."
Heidegger: In the dark I see nothing, and nevertheless I see. Heidegger: But what does "for himself" mean?
Fink: This is similar with hearing. A sentry, for instance, listens Participant: It means that the little light is a private light . ,

intensely into the silence without hearing something determinate. When
he hears no determinate sound, still he hears. His barkening is the most
intense wakefulness of wanting to hear. Harkening is the condition of
possibility for hearing. It is being open to the space of the bearable,
whereas hearing is meeting the specifically bearable.
Heidegger: If we think through what is said abtmt "seeing noth-
Fink: ... as against the great one.
Heide<;«;er: fijtTEiai §arT(i) [touches on himself): why do I kindle a
candle for myself? To be sure, because the candle shows something to
me. This dimension must also be included.
Fink; 1 would like to accentuate the island-<:haracter of the little
light in which something still shows itself to me. The little light in the

ing" and "not seeing" in the situation in which a human concerns himself <iark of night is a fragmentary, insular light. Because a human does not

with a light, for example with a candle, then how is tavw [for hiin.selfl dwell in the great light, he resembles the night owl (vvKTEptftEc;), that is,
oui <)f Fr. 26 U> be uiidersi<K»(l? I am concerned to preserve the toi'TO). he finds himself on the lx»arder ofday and night. He is distinguished as
Fink: I do not regard it as pleonastic. A human has the capacity. a lieing akin to light, but who stands at the same time in relationship to

akin U> the day, to clear, even though in a weak manner in comparison to night.
 VM) 131

Heidegger: What indicates the relationship to night? limitation. AXiieeia [nonconcealment] is surrounded by tdfiy] [conceal-

Fink: At the befrjnning it says thai a human kindles a light in the ment].
night. Then it says further that in sleep he touches on the dead, and in Heide(;ger: In Fr. 26, 1 lay importance on precisely the relation-
waking he touches on the sleeping. Sleep is the twilight of life. A human ship of standing open.
does not exist in the full richness ol life in so far as he touches on the Fink: The fragment does not speak of brightness, but of light in the
dead through sleep. The dead stand in a reference to night. night. It speaks of the curious human place between hght and night

Heidegger: What does "to touch on" mean?
Fink: To touch on here does not mean to touch, but aims at a
relationship of adjoining. And it is also im[K)rtant to notice here that it is
not a question of simple txiardering, but of a relationship of adjoining.
Heidegger: Here at the table, when I lay the chalk by the glass, we
speak of a simple adjoining of Ixnh things on one another.
which is open to death and referred to death through sleep. The refer-
ence to death also belongs to the understanding of those who are awake.
For those who are awake touch on the sleeping and the sleeping touch
on the dead.
Heidegger: I am still with the light in the night. ^oOavtov [dying]
is Wilamowitz as an annotation.
stricken by

Fink: But when a human touches on the dead thiough sleep, he Participant: If one retains aJio9av6v. the fragment moves into
does not adjoin the dead like the chalk on the glass. In sleep, he touches the neighborhood of meaning of the orphic-eleusinian world outlook.
relatedly on the dark. Then the meaning of eili(Pq6vti [in the night] also changes.
Heidegger: Thus it is a question of an open-standing touching on. Heidegger; How do you understand ^d>v (living)? Doesn't one
That goes with the fact that the kindled light also grants an open- have to strike out djioOavtJv on the basis of t,ibv be [and living]?
standing quality to the little orbit of the room that is illuminated by the Participant; duioBavtiJv is an annotation to djiooPeoeElg 61)115
candle. 1 prefer that Fr. 26, and above all the fijiiExai ^auiu), come into [when his eyesight is extinguished],
the dimension of open-standing reference. To me, you go much too fast Heidegger: Referred to ^Jioeavtixv, djioofiEoeelg 6t[i15 then means:
into the spetuhitivc dimension. after the possibility of .seeing is deprived.

Fink: In that a human relates himself to the boardered space of Fink: But then the fragment moves into the domain of a mystic
light, he relates himself at the same time to that which repels the quality assertion that I cannot follow.

of standing open. One must find a word in order to be able linguistically
to comprehend the reference of the human not only to the open but also
to the night thai surrounds the open.
Heideg(;er: Ihe dark is in a certain sense also the openness, if a
light is kindled in it. This dark openness is only possible in the clearing in
the sense of the Da.
Fink: 1 would suppo.se thai we may think the concealment of the
dark not only out of the relationship of clearing of the Da. There is the
danger that one understands the dark only as lioundary of what stands
open, as the exterior walling of the open. I would like above all to
indicate that a human relates himself at the same time to the open and to
the concealing darkness.
Heide(;(^KR: What you say may Ijc true, but it is not directly men-
Heidegger: Everything that follows feauxd) is puzzling to me. ! do
not see the thrust of the fragment. What is treated in this text? &jn:ExaL
[touch on] is mentioned three times, and each lime in another reference.
First, it says that a human touches on (kindles) a light in the night. Then
it says that while living, he touches in sleep on the dead, and in
waking he
touches on the sleeping. How does dnxeiai fit in here?
Fink: First, Heraclitus speaks of &JT:xexai in reference to qxio; [light
of the kindled fire]. Touching on is also meant in fire-kindling. If a
human is the in-l»etwcen teing, between night and light, then he is also
the in-between being i>eiween life and death, the l>eing who is already
near to death in hfe. In life, he touches on death while sleeping; in
waking, he touches on the sleeping, dnxoiiai [reciprocal touching] means
a more intimate mamier than just the absiract repieseniation. Sleep is

tioned in the fragment. I will not contest the dimension you have in view. the mean between life and death. Fhe sleeping have the inactivity of the
Fink: l^t us start from the situation of light in the night. Soinelx)dy dead and the breathing of the living.
kindles a torch in the night, li casts its shine on the way. so that one can Hki»K(;(;hr: What does "awake" mean?

orient oneself on the way. in that he moves in brightness, and relates
himself to it, he relates himself at the same time to the menacing dark-
ness, for which he is understandingly open even though mjl in the man-
ner of standing open. The clearing in the concealing darkness has its
Fink: The wakeful one is he who stands fully open.
Hkiue(;ger: Awake is connected with "to awaken."
Participant: In waking up, one touches on sleep. Waking up is the
counterpart of falling asleep.
 . . .

132 133

Heidegger: Do you thus mean waking up we are at the edge

that in Heidegger: According to Aristotle, we know nothing of sleep.
of sleepf But in the fnigmeni ii is a matter of an essential reference of Fink: I would like to contest that. What Aristotle says in this way
waking' and sleep and of sleep and death. .
about sleep does not spring from a phenomenological analysis of sleep,
! ink: . .
. and
not a matter of what is accidentally given. Here it
it is
— —
which as I believe is still undone today.
is a matter of the human as the one who is belween-night-and-day. Heidkggek: I don't contest the possibility of experiencing sleep as
Heidkg(;er: For me, the in-l)eiween is still not the da. Also, we sleep, but I see no access.
sometimes call a wakeful human a bright, lively one. His attention Fink: When Heraclitus speaks of the &;n:eoeai of those who are
is
directed toward something. He exi.sts in that his bearings are in reference to those who are asleep, that cannot mean the ex-
directed awake
toward something. terior appearance. Touching on ... is a coming into nearness (6v-
Fink: The relationship between
waking and sleep is similar to that XLpaoiT]), a form of approach that does not happen only objectively, but
between gods and humans. Comportment toward the sleep that per- which includes a dark mode of understanding.
meates all wakefulness l>elongs to the self-understanding of being awake. Heidegger: If we now summarize the whole, we can say that you
Heidegger: Being waked up includes in itself the reference to have already foreshadowed where you place 6jnea6aL. The three man-
sleepiness. Naturally, that is not meant in Fr. 26. It is not a question
her« ners of ftjireoflai are relationships that a human encounters . .

of external relationships but of inner references. As understanding Fink: ... but a human as distinctive elucidation of the basic refer-
comportment toward the mortal being of humans belongs to the self- ence. As the counterreference of gods and humans was thematic before,
understanding of the gods, so also the understanding reference to sleep
now a human becomes thematic in the midst of oppositions. A human is
belongs to the self-understanding of those who are awake. Something
of the twilight, fire-kindling being in the counlerplay of day and night. It is
the meaning of sleep in the life of humans shows itself here.
the basic situation of humans to be placed in an extraordinary manner in
Fink: The countertension to sleep belongs to being awake. Bui
the the counterplay of day and night. A human does not come forth like the
sleepei touches on death. Sleep is the way of being engulfed and
being other living beings in this counterplay; rather, he comports himself to-
untied from all that is many and structured. Thus seen, the sleeper ward it, is near fire and related to aocp6v. What is said in Fr. 26 about
comes into the neighborhood of the dead, who have lost the domain of references, belongs in discussion of the counterplay of opposites. What
the di.slinctions of Kavxa,
^v holds apart and together is thought in the image of the god, in the
Heidegger: For the Hindu, sleep is the highest life. image of bow and and in &et»ovta acpavTJg. There the countertum-
lyre
Fink: That may
Hindu experience. Sleeping is a manner of
lie a ing is taken in view. But herein Fr. 26, it isnot a matlerof counterturn-
being alive, as waking is the concentrated and proper manner of being ing, but of what is opposed . .

alive. Those who are awake do not immediately touch

on the dead, but Heidegger: which belongs together.
. , .

only indirectly through sleep. Sleep is the middle part between waking Fink: A human is not only exposed to the counterplay of day and
and l>eing dead. Being dead is viewed from sleep. night; rather, he can understand it in a special manner. But the many do
Heidegger: Do you say that the experience of sleep is the condition not understand it; rather, only he who understands the relatedness of §v
of of the experience of death?
possibility and ndvia.
ink: That would Ixr saying t«x) much. Sleep is a way of being simi-
I-
Heidegger: With the difficulty that Fr, 26 creates for me, I
lar to l>eing dead, but a way that does not occur
only in an objective could— above all in order to clarify aJiTExai—.solve the difficulty only
biological sense. For in the under.standing of sleep we have a twilight when I t(H»k Fr. 10 into consideration: ouvcivie^ SXa xai oux ^^a ov^.-
understanding of Ijeing dead. In a certain manner it is true that like is cpegonEvov 6ia<pee6nevov, otrva6ov 6ia6ov, xai iv. niavTtov gv xai k^ ivoz
cognized through like and unlike through unlike. itdvTu.^" The decisive word here is ouvdiliLEq [connections]. It is the same
Heii)egc;kr: Isn't the correspondence of sleep and death a rather word as &itco [lo fasten}, but shari>ened by the oi3v [together]. Our
external view? Can one experience sleep as sleep? (lerman word kafle?i [to fasten], Hti/I [arrest], is connected with diftOJ.
Fink: I would like to aiiswei- this question positively in
the same way We can place a semicolon l)ebind oiivaTJitEg. I do not translate it with
that one says ibat one can encounter death internally. Ihere "fastcned-together," but with "leiting-belong-together." In the frag-
are dark
ways of understanding in which a human knows himself to be familiar
ment, it is not said whai determined the ouvdr^'ieg. It simply stands there.
with uncleared being. We know of sleep not only in the moment of Fink: I would say that the first two illustrations of ouvdiliLf;, 6>^
waking up. We sleep through time. xui oiixo?>.a [wholes and not wholes], prevent the oijv from being under-
 . . .

134

stood in the sense of a familiar wholeness. The usual idea of wholeness is

oriented toward joining together. But in the fragment it says: wholes and
not wholes. Thus, it is a matter of otivdipiEg, not only of simple moments
f Fink: ... of what holds
Heidegger: .
. .
135

visible. The fragment does not say that one de-

. .

velops out of everything combined, but that the unifying Sv becomes

into a whole, but of wholes and not wholes, as well as of harm<»nies and visible in the allness, from out of the allness. Is it a question here only of
not harmonies. the mlio cognoscendi [inder of knowledge] or the ratio essendi [order of
Heidegger: We tan bracket the Jtai between 6\a and oiix SXa. being]?
Fink: The fragment then says further: ex jiovtcuv ev xai e§ iv6i^ Fink: Of the ratio e.\sendi.
JiAvta [out of everything one and out of one everything]. Heidegger: But how? We understand the £% fvo^ Jidvra, but the ex
Heidegger: What is surprising is that jiAvTa and flXa occur at the nctvtojv h/ has not occurred up till now.
same lime. Fink: We already came across tx ndvrtov ev in the relationship of
Fink: flX,a are in Jidvra. goods and gold. The Jidvta as the many in entirety, which stand fastened
HEiDEt:GER: Thus, TO fiXov does not mean the world. by 2v, refer to the one. All 6vxa are already from the beginning held in
Fink: The fragment speaks in the plural of wholes . .
the care, in the guard, of EV.
Heidegger: that are not to be understood, however, in the
. ,
.
Heidegger: cannot follow thai through sufficiently.
I
sense of things. Fink: The words au|npEe6[iEvov diaqjEponevov [concord and dis-
Fink: Ai first, one thinks it is a matter here of oppositions on the cord] sound very hard. The phrase brings us up short, which is its
same level. But at the close of the fragment it is said that it is not a matter express intention. But at the same time, it is taken back in the aitvdT|iiEg.
of the union of opposites; rather, everything can be thought only from Heidegger: The reference of ndvxa and itv must be specified dif-
out of the relatedness of bf and ndvxa. ferenlly than the reference of ^v and jxdvra. To l>e sure, both references
Heidegi;er: How do you understand the kK [out of]? lielong together, but as distinguished. The e^ tvog jrdvra is not equal to
Fink: From out of ouvd^nec;. That is a form. ex ndvTorv §v, but it is the same in the sense of belonging together. The
Heidegger: Do you mean a form or the form? difficulty that has shown itself again and again in the course of the
Fink: The form. You have interpreted the relatedness of Ev and seminar lies in the methodological starting point, the Justificalion of
K&vxa as state of affairs, which I certainly do not want to contest. So long as one does not have
Heidegger: Is fx Jtdvrojv [out of everything] the same as ^^ h/6q Xoyog in view, it is hard to get through the text, and Heraclilus reads
[out of one]? with difficulty. For that reason, it seems to me that one must lake Fr. 1,
Fink: Here the ouvdipLEg is taken in view from Ixjth sides, the one which is regarded as the l>eginning of Heraclilus' writing, as also the
lime as relatedness of itdvxa and ^v, the other lime as relatedness of 6v basis for the lx;ginning of the explication of Heraclilus. With the phrase
and Jidvra. ex jrdvT(i)v ev, the question we have po.sed in reference to the relatedness
Heidegger: But we must determine that more precisely, because of J;v and Jidvxa comes into play again, namely, how the relatedness is to
the basic relatedness of 'i\ and jrdvra lies at the basis of Fr. 26 on a be determined, if it is neither a matter of a making nor of a casting of
smaller scale. light. What is ihe basic character of jrdvra as itdvia in ev, ndvra as
Fink: I cannot see it there. reined in by 6v? Only when «me sees this aspecl can one determine the ex
Heidegger: When one reads ex jrdvrtuv ev at Fust reading, just as it ndvTOJV §v. ouvdipLE^ is probably the key to understanding this.
stands there, ihen il says that the one is put together out of everything. PARnciPAN'r: If we may alsoconsider the context of Fr. 10, we find
Fink: That would lie, —
then, an ontic process which, however, is the wordarvfiTt'ev [concord] in il.
not meant in the fragment. Heidec;ger: There il says that nature brought about the first con-
Heide(;ger: But what is the meaning of Ix and then e^? ^ 's indeed ford by the union of opposites. The fragment does nol, however, say
the re-laiedness of Jidvia, but ndvta are m»t on tJietr pari the re- that the fv ixxurs oui of the many.
latedness of ?v. Fink: I would understand ouvd»|>iE5 verbally.
^"lNK: The ex must in each case l>e thouglii differenlly. The Tidvxa HEiDF.ciGEK: I lay great importance on the word ouvdijueg in refer-
are in a\ivdT|)iEg in refeience to the ev. They are held from out of ev; they ence to Fr. 26. Here, everything is siill dark. I am concerned only to see
are ovvfjtjtxoufva [fastened]. what is que.Mionable in llic matter, if one avoids operating from the
HEn>EGGER; Out of their Iwing fastened i.s the holding . . Ixiginning on the level of things.
 .
136
Participant: The word oiiv(lii|)ie? has, among others, also lieen
I
conlested.
Participant: Instead of ot)v6h|'1£5, ouW-dipifg [taking together] is a
possible rendition, which is to be understood from ouWxipfi [what holds
or is held together].
Heidegger: ouXXatipdvetv [to gather together] and ouvditteiv [to
join together] are not so far from one another.
Participant: ovX^dipLEg would be simpler to understand, and
means
taking-together. The context gives examples of it.
Heidegger: What is puzzling is the ouv, whether we now remain
with owaTpieg or aDXXdijJie^. The avv comes first before ountpepotiEvov
6LaqpEe6nEvov. cruvdiines means the belonging-together of CRincpEeojievov
and 6ia(pEedn£vov.
Fink: oiivdiltLEg means no simple clasping together, but the
clasping-logether of what is clasped-together and what is not clasped-
together. That allows itself to be understood, however, first from the
relatedness, of ?v-Ji6vTa. otrvdyieg, thought verbally, means not only the
a ing.
condition of what is clasped-together, but a happening, a constant coun-
lerplay . .
Heidegger: ... a continuous bringing-ioward-one-another. Think-
ing in Greek, we can say that everything plays here in nonconcealmcnt
and concealing. We must also see that from the beginning, because oth-
erwise everything becomes opaque.
12
Sleep and Dream— AiiilMguity of &TXEa9at
(Correlated Fragments: 26, 99, 55).
Fink: We move into a metaphorical manner of speaking, when we
speak of sleep as the brother of death. Someone who wakes up out of a
deep sleep and reflects on sleep says, "I have slept like a dead man." Ihis
metaphorical interpretation is doubtful.
Heidegger: A second difficulty is expressed with the question
whether all sleeping is also dreaming. Is sleeping to be identified with
dreaming? Today, psychology maintains that all sleeping is also dream-
the
Fink: In dreaming,
dreamed I. When we
we must
speak of a
distinguish the
light in the
one who dreams and
dream, this light is not
for the dreamer, but rather for the dreamed I of the dream world. The
sleeper, or the sleeping I, is dreaming I, who is not the I o( the
also the
dream world who is awake and sees in the dreams. In the dream world,
the 1 of the dream world behaves similarly to the wakeful I. While the
dreaming I sleeps, the dreamed i of the dream world finds itself in a
condition of wakefulness. What is important, however, is that the light of
the dream world is a light not for the dreaming or sleeping I, but for the
dreamed I. The 1 of the dream world can have different roles and vary
in its self- relatedness. A phenomenological analysis of the dream indi-
cates that not the sleeping, but the dreamed 1 kindles a light. Although
the sleeper does not see, still, as a dreamer, he has a dreamed 1 that has
encounters.
Heideggck: Thus one cannot identify sleeping and dreaming.
Fink: Sleeping is a vivid form of human absorption. Dreaming is a
mode of the real I. while being awake in the dream world is the mode of
an intentional I. The relationship of the sleeping 1 to the dreamed I, or
of the real I to the intentional 1, one can compare with recollection. The
rctolletior is not the subject of the recollected world. We must also
distinguish here between the recollecting and the recollected 1. While
the recollecting 1 belongs in the actual surroundings, the recollected I, or
the I of the recollected world, is referred to the recollected wt>rld. Only
Ix-cause we customaiily do not make the distinction between the
sleeping-dreaming I aii<l the I of the dream world, can one say that the
sleeper kindles a light in the dream. Seen phenonienologically. however,
that is not correct. The 1 of the dream world, and not the sleeping 1,
kindles a light. If one wishes to interpret fire-kindling as a dreamy fire
making, then on the one hand the phenomenological distinction be-
 138

tween the sleeping and the dreamed 1 will be ()veikK)ked and, on the
other hand, the human siiiiation, aimed al (in my opinion) in the frag-
t 139

ing to see and not being able to .see in the night, employs his power of
kindling fire, he touches on the power of light. Kindling fire is also a
touching on. Touching on the power of light is a kindling. In contrast,
ment, of standing tietween light and night gets lost. Dreaming is not the
essential distinction ol humans vis-a-vis animals. Animals also dieam, for touching on the night has anothei' character. Human
fire kindling is a

example, the hunting dog, when they make noises in their sleep. There projection of a light brightness in which many, that is, the multiplicity of
is also something like a dreamed dog-world. I myself reject the interpre-
itoXXd are lit up. I intentionally speak of noXXa now and not of JtdvTa.
tation according to which the human position lx;tween night and light is The finite, human fire is also a Ev in the sense of a
small light-shine of

a matter of dreaming. Indeed, it is a possibility of interpretation, hut one brightness in which many things show up. Here the relatedne.ssof ^ and
must ask what philosophical relevance such an interpretation has in the jidvxa repeats itself in reduced manner as the relationship of gv (in the
sense of the brightness of the fire kindled by a human) and Ko>Ad (that
whole context of the fragments.
is, the things that show up in each bounded brightness).
HEiDEGGKR: We must notice that the thesis "no sleep without
dream" is an ontic di.scovery that supprcs.ses the existential distinction of Heidegger: When you speak about kindling fire, do you mean fire
the sleeping and the dreamed I and only claims that all sleeping is also only in the sense of brightness and not also in regard to warmth?
Fink: Helios brings forth the seasons, which bring everything
dreaming.
Fink: The same thesis also levels down
the distinction Ix'tween wak- (jrdvxa).The structure of ?v, as the brightness of the sun, and Jtdvta, as
ing in reality and the dreamed waking in the dream world. the many in entirety which come forth to appearance in the sun"s bright-
Heidegger: The phenomenological distinction between sleeping ness, has a moment of repetition in reduced manner in the relationship

and dreaming is lacking in that thesis which identifies sleeping with of ev as the brightness of the fire kindled by a human and no'Kkd. which

dreaming. It is always an advantage to save the unity of the text, which is show up in this finite brightness. Human fire cannot illuminate every-
philologically always a principle to be positively valued. There are phases
thing (jidvxa), but only many things (noXkA). On the contrary, the

in philology in which everything is dropped and cancelled, and then

brightness of the sun-fire surrounds eveiything (jidvxa).

again, phases in which one iiies to save everything. When I came to Heidegger: Does the distinction between the brightness of fire
Marburg in 1923, my friend Bultniann had stricken .so much out of the projected by humans and the brightness of Helios consist in the fact that
New Testament that scarcely anything remained. In the meantime, thai one is restricted, while the latter is referred to ail?

has changed again. Fink: Yes.

The whole of Fr. 26 is difficult, especially because of dntEtai. Perhaps Heidegger; Is there brightness of fire without the light of Helios?
Fink: No. Rather, the brightness of fire projected by humans is
more clarity in this regard will come if we now proceed.
derivative from the sun's brightness.
Fink: would like to say at the outset that the entire interpretation
I

that I now give of Fr. 26 is only an attempt at interpretation. When we

Heioeggeh: We must also emphasi/e that the candlelight does not
proceed from the fact that a human kindles a light in the night, he is show anything for itself, and that a human is not a seer for himself alone.
spoken of as the fire kindler, that is, as the one who holds sway over the The candlelight only shows something, and a human sees what is self-
showing ill the light-shine of the candle only in so far as he stands always
TOHTlOL^ of fire-kindling. We mu.st recall that it was a decisive step in
human cultural development to gain power over fire—which otherwise and already in what is cleared. Openness for the light in general is the
condition for his seeing something in the candlelight.
—
was peiceived only, for example, as liglitning- to get coinmand and use
Fink: The candlelight is an insulai' light in the night, such that we
of fire. A human is distinguished fr<»m all animals by the heritage of
Prometheus. No animal kindles fire. Only a human kindles a light in the can distinguish lietween brightness and daikness. Ihe brightness of the
candlelight disperses it.self in the dark, while the brightness of Helios is
night. Nevei theless he is not able, like Helios, to kindle a world-fne that
no longei' exj>erienced as biighlness in the nighl. The brightness of the
never goes out. thai diives out the nighi. Fi-. 90 said that if Helios were
sun ill general makes possible and su])ports human seeing and ihe visual
not. it would l)e night despite the remaining stars. The moon and stars
ability to relate to what shows itself. In the brightness that a human
are lights in the night. Helios alone drives out the night. Helios is no
brings forth, in the lighl-shine kindled by him, there emerges a relation-
island in ihe nighl, but has overcome the insular nature. A human is not
ship of grasping human to gias]x-d state ol affairs in his surroun<iings
able to kindle a xd ndvTa-ilhirninating tire like Helios. In ihe nighi, his
that has the character of distanlialily. Seeing is a disiamial lieing with
possibilities of sight are extinguished, in ,so far as the dark makes seeing
tilings. As a distance sense, seeing needs an optimal nearness to what is
impossible despite open 61)115. W'hen a human, in the situation of want-
 140 141

seen. There is a constitutive distance between seeing

and whai is seen in iween the one who grasps by seeing and what is grasped. This disianiial
the unity of the overarching light that llhiminates and makes visible. distance is a fundamental way of understanding. Contrary to that would
Heidegger: Here we can draw on Fr. 55: Socov Stpi^ 6,Koi\ fi&Gx\aii^, l)e an understanding grounded in a being-in-the-proximity in the sense

TaiiTO eyia ngoxmeu}. I of immediate louthing on. Touching on is an understanding that does
Fink: oiiii^ and ^koVj, sight and hearing, are both distance senses. not come out of the survey, out of the expanse, or out of the region
The one is a relationship to the hght-space, the other a relationship to toward what is grasped.
the space of sound. Heidegger; But what about when 1 now give you my hand?
Heidegcer: The Diels translation, "Everything
of which there is Fink: That is an immediate touching of hands. In jieqi Vi'CTS [On
sight, hearing, learning, that do I you equate oijii^,
prefer," is inverted if the Soul], Aristotle calls flesh the medium of the sense of touch. But a

dxofj, and fiAerioi? [learning], and do not understand 6^1? :>nd Ako^ as phenomenological objection must be made here, because flesh is not the
|i.d6T)ois. From this we must say: "Everything of which there is learning
medium in the proper sense for touching and what is touched. Seeing is
from sight and hearing, that do 1 prefer. What one can see and hear, that referred to a visible thing, to a visible object, which, however, meets us
gives learning." out of a region. Encounter out of the open ambit, which is cleared by the
Fink: It is thus a matter of nav6<iveiv through seeing and hearing. brightness, is distinctive of the special kind of grasping that consists in
Every other sense also gives learning. However, the learning that sight the distance between the one who grasps and what is grasped.
and hearing give is preferred. Sight as well as hearing are distance senses Heidegger: And how does it relate with the reaching of hands?
and as such are characterized by the distantial relationship of grasping Fink; The reaching of hands is a coming up to one another of
and grasped. touching hands. Between the touching hands there is an immediate
Heidegger: fitpt^ and Axof| have an advantage that can be seen proximity. But at the same time, the hands can also be seen by us.
from Fr. 55. Touching ourselves is also a special phenomenon. A minimum of dis-
Fink: Seeing is a grasping in visual space, hearing a grasping into tance holds sway between what touches itself. Feeling and touching are
auditoi-y space. With hearing, we do not so easily see a ^fyov [yoke] that proximity senses, and as such they are the way of an immediate standing
spans hearing and what is heard, like light, with seeing, spans the eye at and lying near to an immediate neighborhood. One must understand

—
and what is seen. And nevertheless so I would think there is also
something here like a 1^vy6v. One would have to form here the concept
of an original silence that is the same as light with seeing. Every sound
breaks the silence and must be understood as silence-breaking. There is
also the silence into which we barken, without hearing something de-
— the relationship of the waking to the sleeping, and of the sleeping to the
dead, from the immediacy of the neighborhood of touching on.
Participant: In a phenomenological analysis of seeing and hear-
ing as the two distance senses, you have worked out the phenomenologi-
cal structure of the region that is identical with the space of seeing and

terminate. The original silence is a constitutive element forming the hearing, or with the field of seeing and hearing. You have then further
distance of the auditory space of hearing. indicated that, in distinction to the two distance senses, feeling and
Heidegger: Perhaps the silence reaches still further into the direc- touching as proximity senses are due not to the phenomenological struc-
tion of collection and gathering. ture of the region but to immediate proximity. Now it only concerns me
Fink: You are thinking of the ringing of silence. to indicate that ihe phenomenologically obtained structure of region in
domain of both distance senses not synonymous with the ontologi-
Heidegger; 1 believe that we can draw upon Fr. 55 as evidence for
your emphasis on the distance sense.
f the
cally
is

understood region in the sense of the openness and the clearing in

Fi.mk: In contiasi to the relationship, determined by distance, of
grasping and grasped in the light, or in the brightness, there is another
louthing on which shows itself in feeling \Tasien\. Here there is an im-
mediate proximity between feeling and what is felt. This proximity is not
transmitted through the medium of distance in which the seer and what
is seen, or the hearer and what is heard, are set apart from one another.
In seeing, the grasping in light is separated from what is grasped. In the
unity of the light that surrounds ihe one who grasps and the grasped,
the manifold of noXkd. shows up. A distantial di.slance holds sway be-
which something present meets a human being. For not only what is seen
and heard, but also what is felt, is encountered out of the ontologically
understood region. If 1have understood you coriedly, you have em-
ployed the phenomenological distinction Ijetween distance sense and
proximity sense, thai is, lx.'tween (he region out of which the seer en-
counters the seen and the hearer encounters the heard, and the im-
mediate proximity of feeling and felt, as springboard for a speculative
ihought according to which two different ways of understanding tieing
are distinguished. Setting out from the immediate touching of feeling
 . . . . .

142 143

and what is fell, you go over to the touching of the waking on the mental character of the clearing, that it is prior to the light, will not be
sleeping and the touching of the sleeping on the dead. seen.
Fink: I must make a slight correction of that. 1 am not so much Fink: A human, as the heir of the fire thief, has the possibility of
starting out from a phcnomenological investigation of seeing but more bringing forth light in a certain sense, but only because there is a

in reference to the structure of brightness. A small, finite fire is also a clearing . ,

unity that is not alongside things. The brightness of the Fire kindled by Heidegger: because a human stands in the clearing
. . .
. .

humans is not only the radiance on things, but the space-and-time-fiUing Fink: and indeed
. . . by nature. Not only does the occurrence of
which not only many things but many kinds of things show up.
light in things belong to standing within the clearing, but also the grasping oc-
The way that the one who grasps is in the brightness is the way of currence of the human who, however, is for the most part simply in-

dislantial perception. If finxExaL cauxu) is pleonastic when seen linguisti- stalled among things, and who does not think the light in which things
reject the pleonism. For one can say that a human are grasped. (Irasping indeed stands in the light, but it does not properly
cally, I would not
kindles a fire that is for him in contrast to the fire that is for all and in grasp the light; rather, it remains turned only toward the grasped things.
which, from the l>eginning, all humans reside as in the brightness of the The task of thinking, therefore, is to think that which itself makes shin-
day-star. A human kindles for himself a light that illuminates him as the ing up and grasping possible . .

one who is off the track and helpless. I started out from this phenome- Heidegger: . . . and also the kind of belongingness of the light to

non, and I have then characterized not only the relationship of 6v (in the the clearing, and how the light is a distinctive thing.
sense of the brightness cast by a human) to KoXXd, but also the human Fink: better analogy shows itself for the special position of hu-
No
dwelling in brightness as a distantial reference. Fire kindling cancels the mans midst
in the of xdndvxa than that they, different from all other living
moment of immediacy of touching because the fire in itself is cast over a beings, are light-nigh. Touching on the power of fire is the way of fire
distance. kindling. One can now interpret the phenomenal features mentioned
Heidegger: Somebody kindles a candle or a torch. What is pro- ontologically in that one understands the light not only as the light
duced with the kindling of the torch, the flame, is a kind of thing . . perceptible by the senses, but as the light or as the light-nature of ooqxiv,
Fink: . . . that has the peculiarity that it shines . . which makes all oacp^?. The human comportment toward oocptiv is

Heidegger: . not only shines, but al.so allows seeing.

. . human standing within the original clearing, a touching being-nigh
Fink: It makes a shine, casts out brightness and lets what shows oo(p6v in the manner of an understanding explication of things in their
itself be seen therein. essence. The danger here is that the clearing or brightness itself is not
Heidegger: This thing at the same time has the character that it fitsJ thought. In the brightness many and various things show up. There is no
itself into the openness in which humans stand. The relationship of light] brightness in which there is only one thing. In the brightness, many
and clearing is difficult to comprehend. things set themselves off. In the light, their boundedness is outlined, and
Fink: source of light is first seen in its own light. What isj
The they have boundaries against one another. The seer sees himself distin-
noteworthy is that the torch makes possible its own being seen. guished from the ground on which he stands, and from the other things
Heidegger: Here we come up against the ambiguity of shine. We on the ground and round about him. But there is also no brightness in
say, for example, the sun shines. which only one kind of thing would l>e given. In the brightness, not only
Fink: If we think in terms of physics, we speak of the sun as light a great number show up. but also many and various kinds, for example,
things also
source and of the emission of its rays. We then determine the relation- stone, plant, animal, fellow-human, and alongside natural
ship of clearing to light such that the clearing, in which the sun itself is artificially made things, etc. We do not see only things of the same kind,
but also rliffeient kinds of things. A human, brightness brought
seen, is derivative from the light as the sun. We must put precisely this in the
derivative relationship into question. The light of the clearing does not ab<»ut by him, is as the finite refiection of ocxptW in the midst of the
precede but, the other way around, the clearing precedes the light, A entirety that is the articulated joining. Human understanding in the light

light is only possible as an individual l>ecause it is given individually in happens as an understanding of inoUti. and this understanding is at the

the clearing. The sun is seen in its own light, so that the clearing is the same time variously articulated accoicling to kind and species. JioUA are
not only a multiplicity of numlx-r but also a multiplicity according
to
more original. If we trace the brightness back only to the source of light,
brightness,
we skip over the fundamental cbaiacter of the clearing. kind. In contiast to this articulated understanding in the
articulated
Heid£(k:ek: So long as one thinks in tei nis of physics, the funda- there is perhaps a manner of dark understanding that is not
 . . . .

144 145

and that does not happen in the shine of brightness thai sets apart and
joins together.The dark understanding is a kind of nightly touching on
which tan be characterized as the neighborhood of ontic relation. In the
position of Being and Time, a human is regarded as the entity that is
unique in the constitution of its being. Although he is onlically disun-
guished from all of what is, and customarily understands him.self es-
tranged from other entities, he has the understanding of the manner of,,
being of all domains of things ... ill
Heidegger: and indeed precisely on the ground of the ontJc
. . .
distinctness.
Fink: The ontic distinctness of nonhuman entities is no barrier for
human understanding of the manner of being, but precisely goes to-
gether with it. But a human is not only a cleared being; he is also a
natural being and as such he is implanted in a dark manner in nature.
Heidegger: But what do you understand by the ontic proximity?
When you say proximity, do you not then mean a small distance?
Fink; Fhe ancients knew two principles of understanding; tike
cogni/ed through like and unlike cognized through unlike. A human is
distinguished from all of what is. Nevertheless, that does not preclude
him from understanding and determining all the rest of what is in its
being. Here the principle functions that unlike is cognized by unlike. But
in so far as a human is a living being, he also has still another character of
being with which he reaches into the nightly ground. He has the double
character: on the one hand, he is the one who places himself in the
clearing, and on the other, he is the one who is tied to the underground
of all clearing.
Heidegger: This would become intelligible first of all through the
phenomenon of the body . .

There is now dark understanding that presupposes not the onuc

also a Fink: ... as, for example, in the understanding of Eros.
difference, but precisely the ontic proximity, an understanding, how- Heidegger: Body is not meant ontically here . .

ever, that lacks clarity and historical investigation. One such dark under- Fink: . ,and also not in the Husserlian sense,
. . .

standing of the nightly ground is also meant with the &nx£xa\. in refer- Heidegger: but rather as Nietzsche thought the body, even
. . .

ence to eOcpQovi], and in the manner that the waking touch on the sleep- though it is obscure what he actually meant by it.
ing and the sleeping touch on the dead. This dark understanding is no Fink: In the section "Of the Despisers of the Body," Zarathustra
kind of distantial understanding, but an understanding that stands in, says, "'Body am I entirely, and nothing else; ." Through the body . and
.

that rests on, the ontic proximity, but that exhibits no ontological abun- the senses a human
nigh to the earth.
is

dance. A human is predominantly a light kindler, he who is delivered Heidegger: But what is ontic proximity?
over to the nature of light. At the same time, however, he also rests on Fink: Human lack of ontological affinity with other entities belongs
the nightly ground that we can only speak of as closed. The sleeping and together with the ontological understanding of his manner of being. But
the dead are figures indicated by human belonging in living and dead if a human exists between light and night, he relates himself to night

nature. differently than to light and the open, which has the distinguishing,
Heidegger: The concept of ontic proximity is difficult. There is joining together structure. He relates himself to night or to the nightly
alsoan ontic proximity l>etween the glass and the book here on the table. ground in so far as he belongs bodily to the earth and to the flowing of
Fink: Between the glass and the book there is a spatial proximity, life. The dark understanding rests as it were on the other principle of

but not a proximity in the manner of being. understanding according to which like is cognized through like.
Heidegger: You indeed mean an ontological and not an onti Heidegger: Can one isolate the dark understanding, which the
proximity. IxKlily belonging to the earth determines, from being placed in the clear-

Fink: No, here it is precisely a matter of an ontic proximity. We can ing?

make clear what the ontic proximity implies on the opposite .structure. Fink: True, the dark understanding can be addressed from the
As Dasein, a human is distinguished from the rest of what is, but at the clearing, but it doesn"i let itself l>e brought further to language in the
same time he has the ontological understanding of ail of what is. Aristo- manner of the articulated joining.
tle says: i\ ijiuxn t« fivxa jrwg iaxi jrdvta. The soul is in a certain sense all Heidegger: When you say ontic proximity, then no small distance
things (jiepi \^njxf|5, FS, 431 b21). That is the manner in which a hmnan is meant in what you call proximity, but a kind nf openness . .

comes nigh to ao((niv, to Xciyog, to the articulated joining of the xooftog. Fi.nk:. hut a twilight, dark, reduced openness thai has no history
. .

Because he himselt belongs in the clearing, he has a limited ligliting ofconcepts behind it, to which we may have to come sometime. A human
capacity. As the one who can kindle fire, he is nigh to the sunlike and the has his place between heaven and earth, Ixjiween the openness of
.wpkati -like. (iXi'iGfia and ihe closedness of XtjOti. Nevertheless, we must say that all
 146
comportment toward the dark ground is lo lie experienced as torrfport-
ment when a residue of clearing remains, because in the absolute night
not only all cows are black, but also all understanding is obliterated.
Heidegger: A human is emlxtdied [leihl] only when he lives [lebt].
The body in your sense is lo be underst<K)d thus. Thereby, "to live" is
meant in the existential sense. Ontic proximity means no spatial prox-
imity between two things, but a reduced openness, thus a human on-^
tological moment. And nevertheless, you speak of an ontic proximity.
Fink: You have, one lime when you came to Freiburg, said in a
lecture that the animal is world-poor. Ai that time, you were underway
toward the affinity of the human with nature,
Heidegger: The l)ody phenomenon is the mosi difficult problem.
The adequate constitution of the sound of speech also l>elongs here.
Phonetics thinks too physicalistically, when it does not see (ftxrv^ [speech]
as voice in the correct manner.
Participant: Wittgenstein says an astounding thing in thfi
Tractalus. language is the extension of the organism.
Fink: The only question is how "oiganism" is lo be understoc
here, whether biologically or in the manner that human dwelling in the
midst of what is is essentially determined by Ijodiliness.
Heidegger: One can understand organism in the sense of Uexkiills
or also as the functioning of a living system. In my lecture, which you
mentioned, I have said that the stone is worldless, the animal world-
poor, and the human world -forming.
Fink: It is thereby a question whether the world-poverty of the
animal is a deficient mode of world-forming transcendence. It is ques-
tionable whether the animal in the human can be undeistood at all when
we see it from the animal's viewpoint, or whether il is not a proper way
that the human relates to the dark ground,
Heidegger: Ihe bodily in the human is not something animalistic.
The manner of understanding that accompanies it is something that
metaphysics up till now has not touched on, Ontic proximity fiolds of
many phenomena from which you want to comprehend &JiTtiai.
Fink: ajntxai appears at first to be spoken from a clinging to and
touching on, from the sense of touch. In touching on ihe dark power, a
neigh Ijorhood of proximity holds sway; while touching on the light is a
standing in the light. What is in the light has in itself the moment of
distantiaiity. against w hich, however, it is no objection thai a human also
touches on ihe power of light of ooqxW,
Heii>eg<;er: How do you now understand "louching on"?
Fink: Touching on the power of light of oocptW is a distanced touch-
ing on. To the coniiary, louching on the dark power is a dislanceless
touching on. Such a dislanceless touching on is the awake one's louching
147
on the sleeper and the sleeper's touching on the dead. How is the rela-
tionship of the wakeful lo the sleeping lo be determined? The wakeful
one has a knowledge of sleep that is more than simply a memory of
having slept, falling asleep, and waking up. The knowledge of the wake-
ful concerning sleep is a manner of the dark flux of life where the I is
extinguished for itself in a reduced manner. The living touch in sleep on
the manner of uncleared dwelling. A human, who belongs lo the domain
of light and barkens to it, has in sleep a kind of experience with being
returned lo the dark ground, nol in the state of unconsciousness but in
nondistinctness. While hi v.ai iidvta stands for a thinking mandate for
the relationship in the domain of light, the experience of the dark
ground of life is the experience of hi xai nav. In ev v.aX, Jidv we must
think the coincidence of all distinctions. The experience of h/ xal nav is
the relationship of the human, who stands in individuation, to the
no n individuated but individuating ground. But the danger here is that
we speak all too easily afxjul metaphysical entities.
Heidegger: When you speak of the uncleared, is that to be under-
stood as privation or as negation?
Fink: The uncleared is not privative in regard to the cleared. To be
sure, we understand the uncleared from out of the cleared. But we are
concerned here with an original relationship to Xr|0Ti, Out of the situa-
tion of an essence determined by SXiieELa, the human has at the same
time a relationship to ^.tjOtj. He does nol always stand in dtXi)6eia; rather,
he stands in rhythmic oscillation between waking and sleeping. The
night, which he touches on in sleep, is not only to be understood priva-
tively, but is to be understood as an autonomous moment alongside the
moment of day or of the brightness to which he relates in waking. As
tpiXoootpo? [lover of wisdom], a human is not only a <pl^5 of ooqxW, but
also of Xr|9Ti.
Heidegger: Is \i\Q^ to be identified with night?
Fink: Night is a kind of Xr|0Ti,
Heidegger: How do you undersland the uncleared? When you
speak of reduced openness, that .sounds like aicgTioig [privation].
Fink: Being awake is, in its tautne.ss, suffu.sed by the possibility of
ihc sinking away of tension and the extinguishing of all interest. Sleep is
a way in which we come into the proximity of !x;ing dead, and is not
merely a metaphor for death. Perhaps one must also treat phenomena
like dying ontologically sometimes.
PARTiGiPANr: I believe thai we must distinguish between the re-
duced clearedness of the daik iindeislanding. lor example, of ihe
understanding of the dark ground in sleep, and ihe dark ground itself,
which is uncleaied pure and simple, Ihe understanding of the dark
ground, and not the dark ground itself, is half cleared.
 . . .

148 149

being
Fink: A human as a torch in the nighi implies that he is allied to the grades of receding differentiation of understanding. For I^ibni/,
light-brightness of day and to the night which extinguishes all distinc- dead is still a manner of life, thai is. of undifferentiated representatitm.
since, strictly speaking, the monads
cannot die. Thereby, he interprets
tions and the possibility of sight.
the seriousness of death in terms of an extreme
weakness of conscious-
Heidegger: The experience of sleep does not imply a mere re-
ness. He interprets sleep, impotence, and death in reference to a stale
of
membering that I was falling asleep. The experience does not refer to
regression of differentiation of living representation of the lower
sleep as a mere occurrence . .

Fink: ... in conscious life, . .

monads.
Heidegger: . . . but signifies a manner of my being in which I am Heraclitus' Fr. 26. however, is not concerned with an observation con-
cerning life and death and their mediation through waking and
sleep.
implicated . .

but with a statement on the essence of humanity. A human, as the one

Fink: and that still determines me in being awake. The bright-
. . .

who is able to kindle fire and as the one who is able to touch on the
ness of being awake always stands upon the dark underground.
power of light, is at the same time also the one who is able to touch on the
Heidegger: Do you mean that in the actual [aklnellen] sense?
touching on the
Fink: Similarly to the way the gods relate understandingly in their dark in sleep and in death. But what is the meaning of
dark which does not have the distaniiality of one who grasps and what is
own life, by relating at the same time to the transient being of mortals, so expres-
Here we cling to the trouble.some
we relate ourselves wakefully to the manifold, ordered cosmos which is a grasped within the brightness?
philosophical prob-
joining. Thereby, we know at the same time in a dark manner about the sion of onlic proximity. We are concerned with the

lem of the double relationship of the human with ihe relationship to

ability to be extinguished in sleep.
light and to fire, which is a distanlial understanding of one who grasps in
Heidegger; But this knowledge is not necessarily actual [aktueli].
and with ihe undeistanding which is
Fink: No. Perhaps this knowledge may be characterized from the reference to what he grasps,
oriented to the immediacy of StPl; [touching] in which the distinctions
problem of thrownness as being abandoned to that which a human has
between grasping and grasped escape us. We have here only the
modes
to be, and which does not belong to reason. As soon as one speaks of
otherwise we
understanding of the dark ground as a relationship, one already means a of escape and absorption, and we cannot say more because
distanlial understanding. easily decline into a speculative mysticism.

Heidegger: When we
speak of the relationship to sleep, that is an Heidegger: The relationship lo death includes the question about
the phenomenon of life and sleep. We cannot
circumvent the problem of
inadequate manner of speaking. Is sleep the genuine understanding of
occurs in the fragment itself. We cannot come to
the dark ground? death, liecause death
problem independently on the basis of sleep alone.
Fink: Not the sleeper, but the awake one relates himself to sleep. grips with the
Heidegger: Concerning this reference, is there still another on-
tological possibility?
Fink:If l>eing awake is the intensity of the process of life, the taut-
ness supported by the possibility of being able to let loose the tension
is

of all fixation, of distinction and contrast in relationship to things and to

the brightness. Someone could say that we are dealing here with an
ob,servation to the effect that life relates to death like waking to sleep, or
like sleep to being dead, and that these analogical relationships would be
spoken externally. But with that, one misses our real problem, which
concerns the manner in which ihe awake one touches on sleep and the
living sleeper touches on the dead. Touching on is our problem, and not
the everyday observation or everyday philosophy according to which
sleep is the brother of death, and life and death aie regarded as
mediated through the link of sleep. In l^ibniz, we find the philosophical
tendency to attempt to understand the being of the lower monads
through dieamlcss sleep, impotence, and death, which is no death for
him in the strict .sense. The three phenomena mentioned are for him
 .

151
13
of the attempted explication, and I will in closing make an observation
Reference Awaiting - Hoping
to Death. on what has transpired thus far.
(Correlated Fragments: 27, 28).— Fink: I go to Fr. 27, which I would like to relate to Fr. 26. The text

The "Contraries" and their "Transition" runs: dveQtbJioug nevet aKoQav6vxa<; dooa ovv. EAjiovrat ovbk
60KEOUOLV. Diels translates: "When they are dead, what awaits people is
(Correlated Fragments: 111, 126, 8, 48, 51).—
not what they hope or imagine."
Closing Question: The Greeks as a Challenge. We can start the explication with the question of what ^^[^(o [to hope]
or Djii,<; [expectation] means. People are not related only to what is
immediately present, to what lies Ijefore them in their grasping ap-
prehension. They are not dependent only upon what they can get hold
Fink: Till now, we have come across humans only in relationship to the of in the perceptible environment; rather, people are, as acfive beings in
gods (Fr. 62). Fr. 26 de;ils with the human being alone, but without the encounter with what is present, projected into an anticipation of the
the fundamental word of the future. This projection happens, among other instances, in hope. In
ignoring the other references. &iTeTai is
fragment. There is, however, a difference between ftjiiexai in reference N6noL [The Lam] (I 644 c 10—644 d I) Plato distinguishes two forms of
fear {cp6|io;) and confidence (e<i0QO5). He specifies fear as antici-
to the light, and fiuiietaL as the touching of those who are awake on the e)ji£5:
pation of what painful ((p6p05 hev fi and confidence
kqo X,ujtr|5 ^Xjil;),
sleeping and the sleeping on the dead. In Fr. 26. no narrative is told, no is

passing event is reported; rather, the basic relationships of a human are as anticipation of the opposite (Sapeos ^E f] nQO zov tvavxiov). A human
behaves confidently toward the future in anticipation of future joy and
seen, on the one hand to the power of light, and on the other, to the
powerof what is closed, which he touches in a different manner. ftjiiEtai of the approach of what threatens. Beyond that,
fearfully in anticipation

is first referred to the light, then to the darkness of those who sleep and
a human not only touches on the dead; he also comports himself toward

to the greater darkness of the dead. ftKrExm is common to all three death. So long as he so projects himself into the future, he stands in his
references. If we do not lake fire as an element, but as that which casts a ways of comportment in the project of the future, which is formed and
shine, and makes possible the distantiality of the one who grasps and mastered in part by him, but which is for the greater part determined by
what is grasped in the shine, then too little is .said with the possible fate.

translation of fire-kindling as "contact." We must ask in what reference Heidegger: How is the relationship of awaiting and hoping to be

the contact must be specified. On the one hand, it is a matter of contact specified?

with the fire that makes a clearing, and not just burning and warming Fink: In hope. I hear the anticipation of something positive; in
fear, on the contrary, the anticipation of something negative. The indi-
fire; on the other hand it is a matter of contact with, or a touching on,
vidual human lives beyond the immediate present in anticipation of what
that which does not shine up, but which closingly withdraws itself from a
is outstanding in the formable future. Thus the Athenians, for example,
human.
Heidegger: What closingly withdraws itself is not at first open, in
I

stocked up in preview of the possible event that they should begin war
order then to close itself. It does not close itself, hecau.se it is also not f with Sparta. A human also has this relationship to the future beyond the
open. threshold of death. He comports himself not only toward the future of
his coming but also lx;yond his future life toward his death. All
Fink: Self-closing does not mean being locked up. Touching on is.
life,

here, a seizing of what cannot be seized, a touching on what is untouch-
able. In the dark of sleep, a human touches on death, on a possibility of
his own. But that does not mean that he becomes dead. For it says: ^d)v
6e ajTTETaL xEevetbto;.
people attempt in thought to populate and settle the land behind
Acheron. Fhey approach death with a hesitant hope.
HEiDEC.ciER: Fhe realtionship of hope and expectation is still not
In
clear to me. In hope tlicie always lies a reckoning on something.

Hkidec;<;er: In opinion, the distress of the whole Heraclitus

my awaiting, on the contrary —
in the proper sense of the word— there lies

the attitude of adjoining what is ccuning.

interpretation is to be seen in the fact that what we call fragments are not
Fink: To l>e sure, one can six;ciry hoixr and awaiting in this man-
fragments, but citations from a text in which they do not l^eloiig. It is a
ner, hut hope does not need reckoning on something. When
to lie
matter of citations out of different passages . .

[x:ople set up hope at the grave of the dead, they Iwiieve themselves able
Fink: . .that are not elucidated by the context.
.

in a certain sense to anticipate the sphereof what cannot be anticipated.

Heii>e(;<;ek: Mr. Fink will now give us a preview of the further way
 .

152 153

/
Heidegger: Hope meuns "to concern oneself wiih something very Meinong and with which Hus.serl struggled. ftoxEiv is here not mere
is an adjoining with what is to come in awaiiing.
intensely," while there imagining, but an accepting grasp.
Hope at the same time includes an aggressive moment; aivaiiing, on the Fink: Later on, in Plato, bo^a has predominantly the sense of opin-
contrary, includes the moment of restraint. It is in this that 1 see the ion. But ogQi] 66^a [correct opinion], which has no negative sense, is also
distinction of the two phenomena. found in Plato.
Fink: In Greek, eXjilc; encompasses both. In Notiot, a human is de- Heidegger; We also come across 6oxelv. in the significance which
termined by X,ujiTi [pain] and fibovfi [pleasure]. Exijeciation (eXjif^) of we have drawn upon for Fr. 27. in Parmenides. when he speaks of
^iirij is tpojiog; expectation (fXjtCg) of if|6ovT| is OaQQog. boKovvza.
HEn)Ec;GEH: Roth altitudes fix themselves on that to which they Fink; Thus, in conclusion, we can translate Fr. 27; "When they are
refer. But expectation isihe attitudeof restraint and of adjoining oneself dead, something waits for people that they do not arrive at through hope
to what is coming. and accepdng grasping." That means that a human is repelled by the
Fink: Expectation is the philosophical attitude. A human does not inaccessibility of the domain of death.
relate himself'only to the future of his life, but he also reaches hopefully Finally, we go to Fr. 28: fioxEovra ydg 6 bo-iii,\uhxaTOC. Yivuaxei,
Ijeyond the threshold of death. But death is what is closed, indetermi- fpu^dooEt- xal [levroi xal Alxt| xaxaX,T|T[tEtaL aliEv6uxv XEtixovaq xal tiitQ-
nate, and incomprehensible. Therefore, the cjuestion is whether there is TVQaq. Here again, we must not understand 6oxeovxa in the negative
a land fiehind Acheron or a no man's land. sense of imagining.
HEmEGf;ER: Mozart said a quarter of a century before his death, Heidegger: Snell understands Sox^ovxa as that which is only a
"The grim reaper speaks to me." view. I cannot connect this translation with the fragment in any sense.

Fink: The grim leaper also commissioned his Requiem. Rilke's
epitaph also lielongs here. "Rose, () pure contradiction, desire, / to tie no
one's sleep among .so many / lids." The rose is the simile of the poet who
in many songs, or under his lids, is no more he who wrote songs, but who
has lost himself in the sleep of no one. An exjKJctant attitude lies in the
characterization of death as no one's sleep, a refusal to project what lies
i>ehind Acheron. In eXjiig, human comportment is determined by a pre-
view, and indeed either in preview of the future of life or of the
threshold of death in reference to a postmortal life. Herarlitus says,
however, that when they are dead, something awaits people that they do
not hope for. Diels translates boHiovai'v with "imagine." A derogatory
connotation of false opinion lies in imagining. But 1 fjelieve that Soxeiv
does not mean imagine here, but means "grasp." When they are dead,
such things await people as they do not arrive at through anticipatory
hope, such things as they do not grasp. The realm of death repels from
Fink: I would like to suggest an interpretation as a kind of support
for the nonimaginary 6okeiv of Fr. 27. The SoxifiiinaTo? is he who
grasps most, the one who has the greatest power of grasping.
Participant: The 60x1^0)10x05 's also the one most tested. Perhaps
we must view tx>th meanings together.
Heidegger: How does Diels translate Fr. 28?
Fink: "(For) what the most credible witness cognizes, retains, is
what is only believable. But certainly Dike will know and also seize the
fabricators of lies and witnesses." Instead of "what is believable" one
would rather expect "what is untielievable." I am not of the opinion that
6oxeovTa has the sense of what is merely posited and not verified. 66^a
in (ireek by no means signifies only mere opinion. There is also the b6h,a
of a hero and of the commander. Here b6'E,a means the manner of
standing in sight of something and not, for example, having an illusion.
Participant; bomyivnaToq is also the one of highest repute . .

itself every premature occupation and cognition. Fink; but not with the many; rather, with regard to the thinker.
. . .

Hf.ideggek: We must elucidate fioxetv still more closely.
Participant: ftex^M-^^ means to accept.
Heidegger: "To accept," however, is not to be understood here in
the .sen.se of a supposition, as when we say "I suppose it will rain this
morning." "To accept" here means. I tolerate. accept what will Ix- given
I
to me. We aie dealing here with the moment of toleration, l>ecause
othenvise 6oxeiv means an incorrectly held opinion. We must therefore
translate boxEOUOiv as to accept and to grasp. .Xccepiing does not mean
here supposition, for example, the supposition that is made thematic by
The 6oKL[i<i)TaT05 gras[x;d the ftoxeovxa, that is. the Jidvxo as the many
entities that shine up, appear, and become graspable in the appearing.
The one who grasps the most grasps things in their shining up. I trans-
late (pT)>.<iooei not as "retains them," but as "joins them." The one who
grasps the most receives the many entities and joins them. The noXkoi
are also related to boxtovxa in grasping, but they are given over to
ftoxEOVta and them. They are not able to see the unification, the
lost in
light, in which the 6oxeovxa shine up. The 6oxLHC0TaTOc; is referred to
the appearing things, and he holds them together. He watches over the
 154
ftoxtovra ill thai he refers thein to the Sv. He is not only oriented to the
many that show themselves in the shine of light, but at the same time he,
as light related, has the power to join them, and he sees what makes the
Soxeovta possible.
Heidegger: Thus, you interpret cpuXdooEtv as holding together.
Fink: That is, the holding toj^cther of things on what holds them
together; re-latedness. as you have said. The one who grasps most
grasps what shines up in a joining relatedness. The SoxtuwTaxog is,
among common people, similar to the light itself. The second sentence
of the fragment runs in translation: But surely Dike will know and also
seize the fabricators of lies and witnesses. The fabricators of lies are the
ones who have taken the^oxEovxaout of thejoint of the gathering unity,
and have grasped feoxEovxa only as such, but do not grasp the appearing
in the light of ev. Dike watches over the right grasping attitude, over the
guardianship of the ftoxt^utaxog, who hold 6oxtovxa together.
HeideG(;er: xaTai,an|iavo» also means to take in.
Fink: Here in the fragment, however, still more is meant. Dike will
find guilty those who lie. She is the watching power who behaves in
accord with the 60x1^6x0x05 when the latter hold 6vTa together as the
many in the one. The counterconcept to the ftoxifKoxaTog is the noXXoC,
who are merely lost in the many, and do not see the joining power of
light. To be sure, they see the shining up in light, but not the unity of
light. In so far as they miss a fundamental human possibility, they are
fabricators of lies. Their lies or their falsehood consists in their mere
reference to ftoxeovxa, without grasping this in reference to the unifying
one. Dike is the inspiring power to the thinker who watches over the
unity of itdtvia gathered in h/. Whether one can still refer [idexvpag
[witnesses] also to tliEuStuv [false] is a philological question. The nag-
TVQaz are witnesses who perceive the 6oKEOvxa, but only these, and not
also the brightness of the lire itself.
Heide(;(;er: This explanation is phiiologically more elegant.
Fink: By witnesses would be meant those who appeal to what they
immediately see and grasp. What those who are estranged from the
unity of h/ take notice of with regard to their grasping things is not false
in the sense that it turns out to be imaginary. "Fhcy are witnes.ses of actual
things, but they do not refer the tioxcovxa back to the collecting joint like
the boxLjiutxaxog does. have drawn upt)n Fr. 28 in support of Fr. 27.
I being wei. and being arid. If a s|x.'cirH siale of something is meant, then we
ftoxELV is here meant not in the sense of a deiogaiory iniaginitig. We also
have illusory and false comprehensions regarding what surrounds us. It
would lie nothing special if Hcraclitus were only to say that we do not
comport ourselves imaginatively in the face ol what awaits us in death.
But when he sjieaks of a ot'x e>JtovTai o06f 6oxEOuaiv [neither what they
hope nor imagine] in reference to the realm of death, which is with-
drawn from us. and if ftoxttv does not here have the significance of
155
imagining, then the assertion has a harder specification. Also in this
world, grasping does not suffice. We always move in a correct and incor-
rect grasping. There error and illusion in life. Heraclitus, however,
is
says that the grasping that we are acquainted with and place in the
service of our life conduct is not sufficient for the jxistmortal domain.
There is no grasping capable of penetrating into the no man's land.
I go to Fr. Ill: V0O005 i&yieltiv ^iioir|OEV i\bv xal 6.ya(i6v, Xino; xogov,
x<i(iaxo5 dvaitauotv. Diels translates: "Sickness makes health pleasant and
good, hunger .satiety, toil rest." 'Fhis fragment appears to he simple. One
could wonder ihat such an everyday experience turns up lormulated
among the sayings of Heraclitus. We could, however, take it as an entry in
the fragments that think the contraries in an unusual manner. When it is
said that sickness makes health pleasant, is it then as simple as when
Socrates says in the Pkaedo that, after he is freed from the painful
shackle, he now feels the pleasant sensation of scratching? Here the
pleasant feeling comes out of the past discomfort. Heraclitus says that
sickness makes health good and sweet. Either the past or the following
health can be meant thereby. Sickness-health is no distinction of a fixed
and opposing kind, but a phenomenon of contrast of such a kind that
health can develop out of sickness. The same holds for hunger and
satiety, and for toil and rest. It is a matter of a procedure of opposiles
goingover into their counterpart, of the phenomenal yoking of contrasts
in transition, ^bv [pleasant] and fiyaOov [good] are not specified as qual-
ities in themselves, but are specified as coming out of a negative state
from their counterpart, which is left behind and abandoned. Past riches
make the following poverty bitter and, conversely, past poverty makes
the following riches pleasant. These relationships of opposites are famil-
iar to us. What is important here is only that a.yaB6\ and f|6v are
specified only out of the contrast.
With this. I go to Fr. 126: xa »(HJXQa eepExai. Oepnov y^vfsxai, iiyeov
a^aivExai, xagtpoXeov voxt^exai. Diels' translation runs: 'Clold things be-
come warm, the warm c<k»Is, the wet dries, the arid is moistened." Diels
iranslates if^XQ^' Cfg^ov, iiXpov. xagqiaXEOv by cold, warm, wet, arid.
But what is meant Ibereby? It is a matter of neutral words that are prob-
lematic because, on the (inc hand, they express a s|x-citii- slate ofsornefhing
and, on the other haiul. they can mean simply being cold, being warm,
sav ihai the cold ihingtliai warms up goes out of the state of being cold in-
to the state of being warm, Ihe goingover of a thing from a state inloan
opposite one is something <lif feient from the going over of being cold
I
inlo lx.-ing warm as such. 'Fhe going over of something out of lx;ing cold
into being warm is a familiar phenomenal movement of change. There-
with, less is said than with the JiUQ<)g XQOJttti. For here we are concerned
i with the transmuiation of fire itself into something else. It is noteworthy
 .

156 157

that Heraclitus sptaks once in the plural (xa \\>vxqA) and three limes in whether a background lies therein, such that a phenomenally unfamiliar
the singular (Segfiov, iiygov. KUQ<paWov). We must make clear to our- transition and tlowing-into-one-another of otherwise fixed contraries is
selves the distinction that lieslwLween the fining over of something out of seen. Fr. 126 is ambiguous. On the one hand, it has a
banal sense, and on
being cold into being warm and the going over of being cold as such into the other hand, a problematic sense, which concerns not the relationship
mutual going over of being cold
being warm as such. If it were said that a human's being alive can go over of cold and warm things, but rather the
into being dead, that wouldn't l)c an exciting thing to say. But the asser- as such into being warm as such and vice versa. The going over of being
going over of life into death and of
tion that life itself goes over inio death, and conversely, that death goes cold into being warm behaves like the
into life, would be more problematic, and a more li7ing proposition. death into A human life, which goes over into being dead, is not now
life.

That would l)e similar to the going over of being cold into Ix'ing warm meant going
in this over. The real challenge of the fragment is to be seen
and of Ijeing warm into Ijcing cold. in the gradual equation of opposites, and not in the going over of states
Heidegger: Are xa ^vxQ^ cold things? of a thing.
Fink: That is precisely the question, whether cold things, or simply' Heidegger: challenge lies in going over as such
The . .

Fink: ... in the going over of what otherwise

stand as contrary.
being cold is meant. Cloncerning things, there are such as are cold by
nature, such as ice, and there are such as are occasionally cold, like water, Perhaps the contrariness of life and death is also fixed like that of being
which can be cold but also warm. But water can also go from the liquid cold and being warm. In the domain of reference
of this contrariness, a
state over to the form ol steam. There are, therefore, temporal and movement of things can happen such that something which is First cold
before us is
essential transitions. A more difiicult problem, however, is the relation- then becomes warm, and vice versa. But the question
ship of being cold and lieing warm as such. If TdHfuXQaareiaSvia,then whether more is said in the fragment than the banal conception, whether
which the fixed con-
are xa Svxa things that are in the stale of being, and go over into
that can the provocative thesis also lies in it according to
the state of not-being? Does x6 6v mean the temporal state of something traries go over into one another.
which lies at the basis like a substrate? Or is no thing and no matter Participant: The relationship of being warm and being cold is a

meant with to 6v, but rather the being of what is? For Hegel, being goes going-into-one-another.
over into nothing, and nothing goes over into being. Being and nothing Heidegger: You are thinking about Aristotle's dXXoitoois.
Fink: dXXotoKii? presupposes a iinonevov [what is underlying]
on
are the same for him. But in that, as in this sameness, there is an am-
carried out. Then we have a going over
biguity. Is the relationship of the Ijeing of what is and not-being a rela- w hich the (lEta^oXVi [change] is

tionship analogous to that l)etween cold and warm? When he speaks of intoone another of opposed states on a thing. A conductor can first be
found in the state of zero degrees temperature, and then warm
cold and warm, does Heraclitus mean only cold and warm things? That
up in
goes to and
cold things can warm up and vice versa is a banal assertion. But it could increasing degrees. We can thereby ask where the coldness
we refer such phenomena of
still be that the fragment includes a problematic that goes beyond this from where the warmth comes. So long as
over are not prob-
banality, if the fragment indeed would have it that !x;ing cold and being going over to an underlying substance, these goings
warm, as fixed contraries, themselves go over into one another. lematic.
Participant: We must understand the opposition lietween cold Heidegger: But is dUottoaig still a philosophical problem?
atxive all problematic because Aristotle
and warm such that warming up is already included in the cold. Fink: 1 agree with that. It is

Fink: With that, you fall back again on the easier rendition of the ultimately also interprets coming to be and passing away from out of
fragment. The told is then the cold thing that warms up. However, that aX>^(aKJLq.
specific do-
is no transition of being cold as such into being warm as such, hut only Heidegger: His philosophy of movement belongs to a
main. We must thus distinguish three things: first,
how a cold thing
the transition of thermal conditions in a thing. This thought creates no
as dUoitooi?,
difficulty. But a more difficult problem is given, if the cold and the warm bec«»mes warm; second, we must interpret this becoming
being of what is
are not cold and warm things, but lx.-ing cold and lx.Mng warm as such, of which is already an ontological problem because the
which it is then said that they go over into one another. We must attempt becomes specified; and third, ...
the going over of being cold in general into being
warm in
to read QEgiiov or uypov such as to xoXov, x6 6[xaniv, are to l>e under- Fink: . . .

general. Therewith, the distinction of l>eing cold and

being warm gets
stood in Ftato. to itahSv is not that which is iieautiful, but what brings (he
out of the slate of l>eing
naka li> beauty. For us, the question is whether only the everyday, famil- sublaled in thought. 'Fhe going over of a thing
warm only a movement of a thingly sub.strate. I he
iar phenomenon is meant with the yoking of contrasting contraries, or cold into Ijeing is
 . .

158 159

problematical coincidence of l)einf^ cold with being warm is something understood correctly what is meant, strictly speaking, by to dvTi|ovv.
else. A still more dilficuit problem is the sameness of Hades and Rather, the word is to be understood backwards, from ovmpeeov [har-
Dionysus ((buxo; 6e 'ACdric xal Aiovitooc). monizing].
Heidegger: Can one bring the distinction of cold and warm into Fink: to 6.vxi^,ovv means wha! struggle apart, what struggle against
relation to the distinction of life and death? each other, but not like two living beings; rather, like something rebel-
Fink: Life and death is a much harder distinction . .
lious that resists power. What struggle against each other is rebellious
Heidegger: wiih which there is no comparison.
. . .
self-confrontalion. What struggle apart are at the same time what collect
Fink: 1 he distinction Ijetwcen being cold and being warm is a dis- themselves and bring themselves together, if we start with the second
tinction which resides only in life. half of the fragment, the first half l)ecomes readable. The most beautiful
Heidegger: 1 he distinction of cold and warm belongs in the do- harmony proceeds out of what is Iwrn apart. Contrary to the customary
main of thermodynamics, . . .
opinion that struggling apart is something negative, what struggle here
Fink: while ihe distinction of life and death does not allow itself
. . .
in opposition are at the same time what bring together. What struggle
to be grasped in a going over such as from cold into warm. The cold and against each other harmonize in a manner such that out of them, as what
the warm are substantivized qualities. The cold can mean at once the is born apart, as the counterstruggling division, ihe most beautiful har-
cold thing or Ixring cold as such. The matter stands in a similar fashion mony grows. With that. Heraclitus thinks programmatic ally beyond
with TO 6v. On the one hand, il means what is, what comes to being, and what we previously encountered in Fr. 1 1 1, namely, the fact that cold
on the other, the being of what is. The ambiguity holds for the cold, the things can become warm and vice versa.
warm, the wet, the dry. If one reads Fr. 126 without seeking a deeper Heideggf-r: But where does the "most beautiful harmony" belong?
sense, then it is a matter only of thermodynamic phenomena, which Is it the visible or the invisible harmony?
concern the going of cold things over into warm things and vice versa. Fink: That does not allow of saying right off the bat. Fr. 48 also
One runs into the piobleni of dXXoftooig, but it apparently contains no Ijelongs in the group of fragments which deal with the contraries: xw o^v
provocative meaning, which wc otherwise know of in the Heraclitean xo^tp 6vo[ia (iio5, ^qy^v 6e Bdvaxog. "The name of the bow is life, but its
disturbance of the standing opposites. If we read the fragment in the work is death." This fragment refers not only to the absurd idea that
sense that brings to view a going over of lacing cold as such into being
it there is a misrelation between matter and name.
warm as such, then
il brings the contrary, which othei-wi.se remains as the Participant: Fr. 51 also belongs in this context. "They do not
fixed structure of the phenomenal world with all change of things, not understand how what is lx>rn apart agrees with itself: struggling union,
indeed into 6enov(ii cpavEgi^ [visible harmony], but into the 6qhov(t) like thatof the bow and the lyre."
dtpavT|5 [hidden harmony]. Fink: In order to be able to explicate this fragment, one must first
Heidegger: 1 see the difficulty in the fact that one does not know in 1
have read Fr. 48. The bow unites in itself the contrariness of the striving
which Heraclitean context Fr. 126 is found. Thus you do not mean the and the domain of dealh. The lyre is the in.strumenl which celebrates the
going over, iamiliar lo us, of a cold entity into a warm eniily, and you festival. It is also a unifying of what is at first struggling in opposition. It
also do not mean the determination of the character of Ijeing of this unifies the community of the festival. Fr. 51 views not only the relation^
going over, but . ,
ship of the lyre and the community festival, but also the relationship of
Fink: . the sameness of being cold and l>eing waim which we
. .
the dead. l~he work of the bow is death, a fundamental situation distin-
termed provocative. guished from Ihe festival. Death and ihe festival are linked logether, but
Heide(;<;er; C'an one approach this .sameness from the distinction imi only as ihe Ik»w ends are tautened by the string, bul in the manner of
of being cold and l)cing warm, and not just from ihc contrariness of life manifold counterrelaiionships. Still, we must bieak off here, because
and death? these fragments require a fundamental consideration.
Fink: 1 would slil! like U> go into Fr. H: to avxi^ouv oi!|i(pegov xal k'X
T(j)v 6Latpfe<WTtj)v KaXiioniv hQ\niviav. Diels tianslaces: "Whai struggle

against each oiher liann<nii/ing; oui of what goes apan. the ino.si lx.-auli- I don't want lo make
In conclusion. a speech, but I
HEii)Ec;t;p:R:
ful joining." to dvri^oi'v [what snuggle against each other] is a neuter question. You, Mr, Fink, said al the lx;giniiing of ihe
would like to ask a
noun. first session that "the Greeks signify
for us an enormous cbailcnge." lo
question of
Heideg<;er; This word occurs only once in HeracHtus. 1 have never what extent, I ask? You said further that it is. therefore, a
 . .
160
"advancing toward the matter itself, that is, to the matter" that must have
stood "before the spiritual view of Heraclitus."
Fink: The question is whether, out of our historical situation,
freighted with twenty-five hundred years of further thinking, we have
generally removed ourselves from the Greeks and their understanding
of being and world; and whether, nevertheless, we remain inheritors of
the Greek ontology in all connections.
Heidegger: When you speak of the challenge of the Greeks, you
mean a challenge in thought. But what is it that challenges?
Fink: We are challenged to turn about the entire direction of our
thinking. This does not imply the mending of a historical tradition.
Heidegger: Aren't the ancients also a challenge for Hegel?
Fink: Only in the sense of the sublation and further thinking of the
thoughts of the Greeks. The question, however, is whether we are only
the extension of the Greeks, and whether we have come to new problems
and must give an account of three thou.sand years, or whether we have
lost, in an ominous manner, knowledge of how the Greeks dwelled in the
truth.
Heidegger: Is our concern only to repeat Heraclitus?
Fink: Our concern is a conscious confrontation with Heraclitus,
Heidegger: But we find this with Hegel. He also stood under a
challenge by the Greeks. Only he can be challenged who himself.
Fink: . . . has a readiness to think.
Heidegger: In what regard are the Greeks a challenge for Hegel?
Fink: Hegel had the possibility to gather up, sublate, and change
the tradition in his language of concepts.
Heidegger: What does his language of concepts mean? Hegel's
thought is the thought of the Absolute. From out of this thought, from
the fundamental tendency of mediation, the Greeks appear for him
Fink: but as precursors
... as giants, . .
Heide(;ger: ... as the immediate and still not mediated. All im-
mediacy depends on mediation. Immediacy is always seen already from
mediation. Here lies a problem for phenomenology. The problem is
whether a mediation is also behind what is called the immediate phe-
.nomenon. In an earlier session we have said that need is a fundamental
—
'rubric in Hegel. For Hegel's thinking which now is meant not in the
'
—
personal but in the historical sense need consisted in the fulfillment of
what thought, whereby fulfillment is to be understood liierally as the
is
Cv'
reconciliation of the immediate with the mediated. But how about us?
Do we also have a need?
Fink: To be sure, we have a need. I>ut not a ground as in Hegel. We
do not have a conceptual world at our disposal, into which we
HEiDECiGER: can integrate the Greeks,
. . . .
Fink: rather, we must put aside the impliments of this tradition.
. . . the essay, "On the Essence of Truth," where 1 speak of "freedom," 1
.
\.
Hil
Heidegger: And then?
Fink: Wc must begin in a new sense.
Heidegger: Where does the challenge lie for you?
Fink: In that we have come in the course of the history of thinking
to an end in which a richness of tradition becomes questionable. Our
question is whether, not in a new turn toward what the Greeks have
j
thought, we can encounter the Greek world with our new experience of
being. We must ask ourselves whether we already have an experience of
being that is not stamped by metaphysics.
Heidegger: Is that to be thought such that our experience of being
matches up to the Greeks?
Fink: This depends on the truth of our situation, out of which we
can ask and speak. We can only speak with the Cireeks as nihilists.
Heidegger: Do you think so?
Fink: That does not mean that a finished program lies in nihilism.
Heidegger: But what if there had been something unthought in
the Greeks, something which determines precisely your thinking and
what is thought in the whole history?
Fink: But how do we catch sight of this? Perhaps this glimpse only
results from our late situation.
Heidegger: The unthought would be that which shows itself only
.
to our view. But the question is how far we understand ourselves. I make
a proposal: the unthought is Ai.fiGeia. In all of Greek philosophy, there is
nothing to be found concerning iiXr|9eLa as AXiieELa. In paragraph 44 b
of Being and Time, it is said regarding 6->.Vi0Eia that, "Translation by the
word 'truth', and above all the theoretical conceptualization of this ex-
pression, covers up the sense of that which the Greeks made "self-
evidently' basic to the terminological u.se of di>.Ti8eia as a pre-
. .
philosophical understanding." (Being and Time, 7lh unrevised edition,
1933, p. 2fi2 = H 219.)
^f|9£La thought a.\ &kf[Qcia has nothing to do with "truth"; rather, it
means unconcealment. What I then said in Beingand Time about 6>ti^9eLa
already goes in this direction. dXriQELa as unconcealment had already
occupied me, but in the meantime "truth" came inlieiween. 6Xti9eLa as
unconcealment heads into the direction of that which is the clearing.
How alKjut the clearing? You said last lime that the clearing does not
presuppose the light, but vice versa. Do clearing and light have anything
at all to do with each other? Clearly not. "Clear" implies: to clear, to
weigh anchor, to clear out. That does not mean that where the clearing
clears, there is brightness. What is cleared is the free, the open. At the
.same lime, what is cleared is what conceals ilself. We may not under.siand
. . . the clearing from i>ut of light; rather, we must understand it from the
. .
Greeks. Light and lire can first fhid iheir place only in the dealing. In
 162

have the clearing in view, except thai here truth always walked hehind.
The dark is, to be sure, without light, hut cleared. _Our concern JSJ.o
^xgeoeiice-unconeealineiil as clearing. That is what isuiithoughi in what
f NOTES

Translator's Foreword
is thought in the whole history of thought. In Hegel, the need consisted

of
in the satisfaction thought. Fjjlus. '"i the contrary, the plight. of.wJiat customarily ininslated into English as "reason," "speech," or
^ ILisuathou^Lin-what
,

is thought reigns.
1

"word
Xovos
"
is

However. Heidegger says in ilic "U>gos" ess:iy that the word "names that
present
Fink; Professor Heidegger has already officially ended our seminar which ealhers everything present into presence, and
lets it itsell."

cnsiomari'ly nanslated into t-nslish as "truth,"

hui Heidegger specili-
with his words. I l>elieve I can also speak on behalf of all the participants nXiiOna is

when I thank Professor Heidegger in warmth and admiration. The work cally rejecis the (lerman equivalent. W,,b>heit. and uses Unverbor^mkett. which
may be translated a.s "nontontealmcnt."
of thought can be like a towering mountain range in stark outline, like
'the safely built Alps." But we have here experienced something of the 2. Page 73 below.
Page 67 below.
flowing magma which, as a subterranean force, raises up the mountains 3.
K«n(«Hrf(A^PTOW"no/'WW«/<'(>.s'r.S 11-. .l^iiesS.Chui-chill
4. Manin Heidegger.
of thought. 206.
(Bloominston: University of Indiana Press. 1962), p.
Heidegger: At the close, I would like the Greeks to be honored,
5. Page 50 below.
and return to the seven sages. From Periander of Corinth we have the
I
6. Page 51 below.
sentence he spoke in a premonition: (leWxa to Jictv. "In care, take the 7. Lo< . cit.

whole as whole." Another word that also comes from him is this: cpiJoeiJ)?
8. Page 73 below.
c*^ xaxayoQla. "Hinting at, making nature visible." 9. Pages 82 f.
10. Page 96 below.

Heraclitus

philological
1. Comments ofthe seminar paititipants. piedominandy of a
kind, are not included for copyright reasons.
fre-Soemtie Pkilasophen: A CompUU
2 See Kathleen Freeman, Amilia to the
F,<<g»ienly i« D,>A, Frngmmlf der Vov^okraUher (Cambridge: Har-
Tum^htioo 0} the
has l«:en amsullcd. Hies rendi-
vard University Press. 1966). Though Freeman
throughout ihe present work. ( 1 r.)
lions of the fragments are newly transL.ied
Logos, as here set forth, men are always unable to
3 Diels translates: "Of the is

Ix)lh l>e!bre ihev have heard it and when

they have rust heard it.
understand.
this I^gos. men st.ll re^^m'^'e
Kor though evervihiug happens according to
have experienced such words and deeds
inexperienced people, even when .hey
thing auoiding .o iis naiure and explaining
how .

as I discuss, analy/ins each

what tliey d<, alter they wake up, just
I>ehavcs. But other men remain imaware or
awareness ol what ihcy do in sleei>."
as they lose
to become
4. has the following wording: "II alld.ings were
Dicls- tra.islauon

smoke then we would disniminale them with rlie

n.ise."

and everyihiiig lKtl)IK.'ns a.coidmg u> dissen-

5. l)i,-ls nanslaiioii urns: ilial

sion and ril)lig;ilioii." .

and o.u ol one, iveryltung

6 Diels iranslates: "out ol everyihing, one;
one thing wlii< h ihe Ih'si prefer to all else,
7. Diels translates: "(For) there is

eternal glory railiet ilian nansicnl things."

K lleiadiliis' leadiing on Fire,"
umranslated. (Tr.)
<) Dk-ls n..iislauun luis ihe lollowing word oidei -Fhe wise is one ihmg only,
;

winch evciyihmg tliunigli rvei ydiing-

to understand the diouglus
stcei
 164
165

10. DiL-ls [lansiiitcs: "Alieniutc (liansc: iif everything ftn iirc and of fire for could be misleading. For the
Heidegger's usage. But without (piaiilication, it
everything."
prefix "re-" carries quite different meaning honi the (ierman "ver-." English
11. Diels iranslates: "rhc wise is set apait from everything."
'!«-" means "again" or "back," meanings that are carried by Carman "wider-,"
12. ,Sce Karl Ja,s]H.TS, Tlif (.real Philosophers, trans, Ralph Manheim (New
hut not by "ver-." "Ver-" has a range ol meanings deriving from Latin and
Yoik: Haraniii. Brace & World. Inc.. 1966), Vol. II, p. 20. (Tr.)
CK)tbic. The [xassibility on which Heidegger seems here to depend is thai of
1,1. See Timiieus 30 a ff. (Tr,)
intensifying or heightening the meaning carried by the stem halten, meaning to
14. From Alcaic Poi'ni.\ hy Kriediich Holclerlin, translated by Kli/abeth Hender-
keep or hold. For more information, see C^ T, Onions. Ttie Oxford Dictionary of
son, © 1962 by Kli/abeth Henderson, published by Oswald Wolff (Publishers).
Engluh Etymology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). and C^orge O.
Ltd., London. ( Tr.)
Curme, A Grammar of the Genntm Language (New York: Frederick Ungar Publish-
These are ihe offspring of Zens and Themis [Law], See Hesiod, Tkeogony,
15.
ing Co., 1960), (Tr.)
translated, with an Introduction, hy Norman (). Brown (New York:
Bobbs- 29. One must also hear the same about death as what is said about sleep. For
Merrill Cb., 1953), p. 78, (Tv.)
each shows the departure of the soul, the one more, the other less, which it is
16.Regarding growth, see Ari,>-Iotle, Melupkysirs 1069'' II; regarding wasting
possible to get from Heraclitus. (Tr.)
away, see Hislaiy iij Aiiimid\ 582" 2, and Genemlion oj AnimaU 767^
4; regarding 30. Diels translates: "Connections: wholes and not wholes, concord and dis-
gene,sis and ceasing to be. see On Generation and Cormption, piiisim; legarding
cord, harmony and dissonance, and out of everything one and out of one every-
productiveness, see Phyiics 243" 8, and Generation ayid Corruption Sigi" .32; and
thing."
regarding alteration, see Pfiysirs 226' 26. (Tr.)
17. ", dif y.eit hrinff mil \irh hzw, die Zeit wird
, . e.\ hringen." Literally, "time
brings with itself, that is, time will bring it." (Tr,)
18.Parmenides, Fragment 8, line 53, The alxwe tianslation is taken from C.
S. Kirk and J. ¥.. Raven, The Prrsarratie Philosnplu'r.s: A Critical History with a
Selection of Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957),
p, 278.
19. Dicis translates; he "does not say and does not conceal; rather he gives a
sign." (Fr. 93),
20. A search o( the Library oJ Congress and National Union Catalogue and the
General Catalogue oj Piinled Books of the Hrilish Museum reveals no English transla-
tion of this Ixiok, (Tr.)
Wfge und Formen frOhgriechischen Denkens; liiemrisrhe und philosophieges-
21.
Mrsg, von Franz Tiet/e, 2 erweiterte Autl, Munchen. Beck.
chichttiche Studien.
1960. The Ixmk is not translated. (Tr,)
22. See Martin Heidegger, Zur Sachr da Denkens (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer
Verlag. 1969), pp. 1-25, esp, p, 15. See al.so Martin Heidegger, On Time, and
Being, trans, Joan Statnbaugh (New York: Harper Sc Row, 1972), pp. 1-24, esp.
p. 14.
Regarding Aoyo; and AXi^Belq in Heidegger's thinking, sec "Logos
23.
(Hcraklit,Fragment 50)" and "Aleibeia (Heraklii, Frajrmeni 16)" in Martin
Heidegger. Viirlr/ige und Au/salze (Pfullingen: Verlag (iunther Neske, 1954).
(lY.)
24. Dieis translates: "How can one hide from that which never sei.s?"
25. The Ixiok. published in 1955 by Deutsche Verlags-Anstali, Stuttgart, is not
translated, (Tr,)
26. Thisiran.sialion is from Friedrich Hiitderlin: Poems and Fragmenl\. translated
hy Michael Hamburger (.Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966), p.
79. (Tr.)
27. Ibis translation is taken from (1. S. Kirk, Herat lilus: The Cosmic Fragments.
edited with an introduction and commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1970), p. 393 O. (Tr.)
28. Separation oi' the English prefix "re "
seems necessary to acknowledge
 GLOSSARY 167

rectly concluded that he was

an "elitist" in the sense often
criticized by modern (esj>e-
cially leftist) political and so-
cial critics. The countereon-
The following glossary serves ilie Iwsit Itmciion of any glossary, namely, to cept is poltoi, the many. See
provide a partial list oi' the more he<]ueiitly occiiriing imimrtiint words, wiih emi7 twenty-six below,
some explanation oitheir ine.inin^. However, some (lualifleutions tniisi Ije made. ultimate principle. Though
3. ii^i\ (irrhe
the reader should niidersiaiid that the meanings given to the various
First,
variously characterized, Hera-
Greek words are sometimes an English translation of the German used by seems hold
clitiis to that
Heidegf^cr and Fink. The Knglish meanings are ttiil necessarily those given, for the ultimate principle in the
insiantc. in l.iddell and
Stolt, A Greek Unglish Lexirnn. changing kiismoi is logos. Hcc
Second, not all words glossed are Clreek. Because it is important, special
oiilic entries fifteen and seventeen
reference is made to the German word Dn.
below.
Third, the glossary is highly selective. Many more words could have been genesis.
4. ytveoig genesis
included. This selectivity is partly due to the fact that the fnst occurrence of each inquiry. ,See entry seven be-
grtoM
Greet word in the text is accompanied !iy an English gloss in S(]uare brackets,
low.
provided none is given by Heidegger or Fink. The selectivity of the glossary also
6. Da This (Jerman word means,
results from other motives.
literally, "here" or "there,"
The glossary has been constructed with the intent of helping the reader gain
However, in Chapter 11 of
better access to the text. First, 1 have tried to include some of the more important
the present book Heidegger
Greek words. But the glossary may be supplemented with such other works as: inierpreis Da in terms of
G.J. Seidel, Miittin Hadtg^er and the Pit'-Samilics (Univcrsiiy of Nebraska Press, Liehlung, which may be trans-
1964); Martin Heidegger, K/niy Greek Tliinkini^ (Harper Sc Row, 1975). and The
lated by "clearing." p<)int
William Richardson, S. J., Heidei^get: Through Phennmemilojry to Thoufihl (Maninus
is that a "here" or a "there"
Nijhoff, 1963). Second, the glossary may be used to gain some grasp of ihe Greek
can l>e manifest to us only
language. The
English transliteration, for example, may Ije used in learning how within a "clearing" which is
to sound the various Greek words. Effort in handling the (Ireek will !x- aided by primordial to the particular
reference to such lM)oks as: .Stephen Paine, Bi-^iniiiiig Greek (Oxford University "hei-e" or "there." Interpreta-
Press, 1961), Francis Fohes, Pliito\opliiail Greek: .-Sii Intnulnrtioii (University of
tion of Da as "clearing" is
Chicago Press, 1957). and F. E. Peters Greek Pkilo.yophiciil Tenns: A Hi-.Uirical helpful in understanding the
Itilrudtulion (New York University Press, I9(>7). Using an inductive method, the
w(n-d Daseiii. Duidn is the
reader can gradually extend understanding to include words and phi^ses noi
word Heidegger u.ses to indi-
treated in the present giossaiy.
cate the kind of being {.\ein)

unique lo humans.
7. ftitiYvtooig diagnoM This is tlie same as entry five,
I, dXi'iflfia iileOieia nonconeealment. See the except lor addition of the
Ti aiislaior's Foreword, espe- oin
prefix "dlo." As is ])i)inted
cially the first footnote. this prefix
early in t:hapter I .

2. figioTot inisUii the best. Heradilus was tra- means "throughout," or

ditionally said to have l>eeR perhaps "ihorooghly." Thor-
Ixirn into a patrician family. ough inc|ulry leads to a
*lhis iH'stowed uprxi him ccr- diagnosis.
[all! ]><>liiLi(il aufl religions to be. As Heidegger has said,
8. tivui eiiiii!
privileges which he neverthe-
the central question of his
less rejeited. Hence, when he thinking is the question ol the
refers to "the Ix-st" among meaning of Ix'lng. No single
humans, it may not Ik' di- win k of Heidegger's exhausts
 HS8 169

distinguishes ihc "onlic" from

this C|iiesii(in. The iraiisl;itor
the "ontological" in Hemgiiiid
has lijurid ihe hilroduclton to
Metaphysics helpful.
Time. See entries thirty and
thirty-two l>elow.
9. l\ Afn the one. The tounter-
22. jrdvra pniil/i all things, the universe. See
concepl, with which ken is al-
entry nine above lor the
ways associated in Heracliius,
Is panUi, the many. .See entry
coiinierconccpt, hen.

twenty-two below. See also 23. itoiiioi? poiesii production,

the Translator's Foreword. 24. ]t6>,eno5 polemoi war.
25. n6U<; poli\ city.
10. HXiog Helios Ihe Sun. Along with light-
ning, fire, and other images, 26. iioUot polloi the many. The counter-
concept is "the best," aiisloi.
the Sun is a visible analogue
of hen. By providing an il- See entiy two above. An in-
teresting essay is yet to be
luminating clearing, the Sun
written comparing Hera-
brings the many things of the
cliius' expression polloi with
univei'se (panla) together for
Heidegger's analysis of das
a unified (hen) perception.
Man, "the they," in Being and
11. 6avaT05 thanatos death,
Time.
12. Ibia idea idea.
27. TtVQ pur fire. See items ten and thir-
13. KEgauv65 keraunoi lightning. See entry ten
above, teen alH)ve.
28. ootpov sophon wisdom.
14. xCvt^ol; kinesis motion.
29. leeiiata termata boundaries. See entry nine-
15. x6o(io^ kosmos cosmos. The word carries the
teen alxive.
sense of a beautiful, ordered
3(1. x^x^ 6vTa lechne onta products of human technics.
whole.
kf\^ See enti7 twenty-one alxivc.
16. lelhe forgelfulness. In mythology,
Lethe is the river of forgel-
The countcrconcept is listed
inentry thirty-two lielow.
fulness which separates the
31. X(X>Jtai tropai transformations, changes,
underworld from the world
32. (ptioEL Avia pkysei onta things which are from na-
of the living. In the present
ture. See entries twenty-one
book, lethe indicates conceal-
ment. Note the relation to and thirty above.
33. ipvoi; pkysi\ nature.
alelheia, nonconcealment. See
34. xeovog ckronos time. Note that lime is crucial
entry I above.
to Heidegger from Being and
17. Wvo5 logos reason, speech, word. For
Time to [he essay "Time and
more on logo.\, see theworks
Being."
referred to in the Translator's
35. ^vxfi psyche soul.
Foreword.
18. nfxapoXi^ metiiMe change.
19. nFTpa THftni measures. See entry twenty-
niru- Ik.'I()w.
20. vonoc nomos custom or law.
21. Svra nnSii things which are. The West-
ern uadiiion derives its word
from this (ireek
"i)nI<)logy'"
wold. Heidegger builds on
(he (^rcck word as well as the
Western tradition when he
 I PAGE GUIDE

'1 hi- lollowing may liclp ihc reader to find passages of parUtular interest in
ihe German original.

English

(1