1999,60:3 249-273

ofReligion
Sociology

Secularization, R.I.P.

RodneyStark*
University
of Washington

Fromthebeginning,socialscientists
havecelebrated thesisdespitethefactthat
thesecularization
it neverwasconsistent
withempiricalreality.Morethan150yearsagoTocqueville pointed outthat
"thefactsbyno meansaccordwith[thesecularization]theory," andthislackof accordhasgrownfar
worsesincethen.Indeed,theonlyshredof credibility for thenotionthatsecularization hasbeen
taking placehasdepended on contrasts
between now and a bygoneAgeof Faith. In thisessayI
assemblethe workof manyrecenthistorians whoare unanimous thattheAge of Faithis pure
nostalgia- thatlackof religious was,if anything,
participation evenmorewidespread in medieval
timesthannow.Next,I demonstrate thattherehavebeennorecentreligious changesin Christendom
thesis- not evenamongscientists.I also expand
thatare consistentwith the secularization
assessment the
of secularization doctrine
to non-Christian shouingthatnoteventhehighly
societies
magical"folkreligions"in Asia have shown the slightest declines in responseto quiterapid
modernization.Finalwordsareoffered is laidtorest.
as secularization

For nearlythree centuries,social scientists and assorted western intellectuals

have been promising the end of religion. Each generation has been confident
that within another few decades, or possiblya bit longer, humanswill "outgrow"
belief in the supernatural.This proposition soon came to be known as the
secularizationthesis, and its earliest proponents seem to have been British, as
the Restoration in 1660 led to an era during which militant attacks on faith
were quite popular among fashionable Londoners (Durant and Durant 1965).
Thus, as far as I am able to discover, it was Thomas Woolston who firstset a date
by which time modernity would have triumphed over faith. Writing in about
1710, he expressed his confidence that Christianity would be gone by 1900
(Woolston 1733). Half a century later Frederick the Great thought this was
much too pessimistic, writing to his friend Voltaire that "the Englishman
Woolston .. . could not calculate what has happened quite recently. . .. It
[religion] is crumbling of itself, and its fall will be but the more rapid' (in
Redman 1949: 26). In response,Voltaire ventured his guess that the end would
come within the next 50 years.Subsequently,not even widespreadpressreports
concerning the second "GreatAwakening"could deter Thomas Jeffersonfrom

* I unuldliketo thankAndrew
Greeley,withwhomI havelongbeenexchanging
citations
on thenonexistence
of an
Ageof Faithin Europeanhistory.Directconrespondence
to RodneyStark,Deparnentof Sociology
(Box353340),
Seattle,WA98196.
of Washington,
University
249
250 OFRELIGION
SOCIOLOGY

predictingin 1822 that "thereis not a youngman now living in the United
Stateswho will not die a Unitarian"(Healy 1984:373). Of course,a generation
later,Unitarianswereas scarceas ever,while the Methodistsand Baptistscon-
tinuedtheirspectacular ratesof growth(FinkeandStark1992).
Subsequentprophetsof secularization have been no less certain,but they
have been somewhatmore circumspectas to dates. Thus, just as Jefferson's
prophesyfailed,backin France,AugusteComte announcedthat, as a resultof
modernization, humansocietywasoutgrowingthe "theologicalstage"of social
evolutionand a new age wasdawningin which the scienceof sociologywould
replacereligionas the basisformoraljudgments.But,Comtedid not sayexactly
when all this wouldbe accomplished.In similarfashion,as often as Frederich
Engelsgloated about how the socialist revolution would cause religion to
evaporate,he wouldonly saythat it wouldhappen"soon."In 1878MaxMiiller
(p. 218) complainedthat:

Everyday,everyweek,everymonth,everyquarter,the mostwidelyreadjournalsseemjust
now to vie with each other in telling us that the time for religionis past,that faith is a
or an infantiledisease,thatthe godshaveat lastbeenfoundout andexploded.
hallucination

At the startof the twentiethcentury,A. E. Crawley(1905:8) reportedthat"the

opinion is everywheregaininggroundthat religion is a meresurvivalfroma
primitive... age, and its extinctiononly a matterof time."Severalyearslater,
when MaxWeberexplainedwhy modernizationwouldcausethe "disenchant-
ment"of the world,and when SigmundFreudreassuredhis disciplesthat this
greatestof all neuroticillusionswoulddie upon the therapist'scouch,they too
wouldbe no morespecificthan"soon."
A generationlater,however,"soon"became"underway" or "ongoing." For
example,the distinguishedanthropologistAnthony F. C. Wallace(1966: 264-
265) explained to tens of thousandsof American undergraduates that 'the
evolutionary future of is
religion extinction," and while he admitted that it
might require"severalhundredyears"to complete the process, alreadywas
it
well underwayin the advancednations.And throughouthis illustriouscareer,
BryanWilson (1982: 150-151) has describedsecularizationas "a long term
processoccurring in humansociety"andpointedout that "theprocessimplicitin
the conceptof secularization concedesat once the ideaof an earlierconditionof
life that wasnot secular,or that wasat least muchlesssecularthan that of our
owntimes."
Then in 1968, in contrastto all of this intellectualpussy-footing,Peter
Berger(1968: 3) told the New YorkTimesthat the by "the21stcentury,religious
believersare likelyto be foundonly in smallsects, huddledtogetherto resista
worldwidesecularculture."Unleashinghis gift for memorableimagery,Berger
saidthat "thepredicamentof the believeris increasinglylike that of a Tibetan
astrologer on a prolongedvisitto an Americanuniversity." In lightof the recent
lionizationof the Dalai Lamaby the Americanmediaandhis cordialwelcome
 R.I.P. 251
SECULARIZATION,

to variouscampuses,Berger'ssimilenow admitsto rathera differentinterpre-

tation.In any event, whenhis predictionhadonly threeyearsleft to run,Berger
gracefullyrecantedhis belief in secularization(as I discussat the end of this
essay).I quotehis statementsduringthe 1960sonly becausethey so fullyexpress
the moodof the times,a moodthatI shared(cf., Stark1963).
Notice five thingsaboutall of thesesecularization prophesies.
First,there is universalagreementthat modernization is the causalengine
the
dragging gods into retirement.
That is, the doctrinehasalways
secularization
nestledwithin the broadertheoreticalframework of modernization theories,it
being proposedthat as industrialization,urbanization,and rationalization
increase,religiousnessmustdecrease(Hadden1987;Finke1992). Keepin mind
that modernizationis a long,gradual,relativelyconstantprocess.Wars, revolutions,
andothercalamitiesmaycausean occasionalsuddenblip in the trendlines,but
the overallprocessis not volatile.If secularization is the resultof modernization
or, indeed,is one aspectof it, then secularization is not volatileand,ratherthan
proceedingby suddenfits andstarts,it too will displaya long-term,gradual,and
relativelyconstanttrendof religiousdecline, corresponding to similarupward
trendsin suchaspectsof modernization as economicdevelopment,urbanization,
and education.In termsof time seriestrends,modernizationis a long, linear,
upwardcurve,andsecularization is assumedto tracethe reciprocalof this curve,
to be a long,linear,downward curve.Indeed,sincemodernization is so advanced
in manynationsthat "postmodernism" is the latestbuzzword, it mustbe assumed
that secularizationis at least"ongoing" to the extent that a significantdown-
wardtrendin religiousness canbe seen.
The secondthing to notice aboutthe secularization propheciesis that they
are not directedprimarilytowardinstitutionaldifferentiation- they do not
merelypredictthe separationof churchand state or a decline in the direct,
secularauthorityof churchleaders.Theirprimaryconcernis withindividual piety,
especiallybelief. Thus, Jeffersonpredictedthe next generationwould find
Christianbeliefs,and especiallyfaith in the divinityof Jesus,implausibleand
would limit themselves to the minimalistconception of God sustainedby
Unitarians.What most concernedEngelswere not bishops,but the religious
"fantasies"of the masses.Freudwroteaboutreligiousillusions,not aboutchurch
taxes, and Wallace (1966: 265) assertedthat "beliefin supernatural powersis
doomedto die out, all over the world"because,as BryanWilson (1975: 81)
explained,"The rationalstructureof societyitselfprecludesmuchindulgencein
supematuralist thinking."
This is very significantbecausein recent years secularizationhas been
defined in several ways (Hanson 1997; Tschannen 1991; Dobbelaere1987;
Shiner 1967) and, unfortunately, this permitssomeproponentsof the thesisto
shift definitionsas neededin orderescapeinconvenientfacts (cf., Dobbelaere
1987, 1997;Lechner1991, 1996;Yamane1997). One definition,often referred
to as the macroversion (cf., Lechner1996), identifiessecularizationas de-
252 SOCIOLOGYOF RELIGION

(Dobbelaere 1987; Martin 1978). This refers to a decline in

institutionalization
the social powerof once-dominantreligiousinstitutionswherebyother social
institutions,especiallypoliticalandeducationalinstitutions,have escapedfrom
priorreligiousdomination.
If this wereall that secularizationmeans,there wouldbe nothingto argue
about.Everyonemustagreethat, in contemporary Europe,forexample,Catholic
bishops have less politicalpower than they once possessed,andthe sameis true
of LutheranandAnglicanbishops(althoughbishopsprobablyneverwerenearly
so powerfulas they now arethoughtto have been). Nor are primaryaspectsof
publiclife any longersuffusedwith religioussymbols,rhetoric,or ritual.These
changes have, of course, aroused scholarly interest, resulting in some
distinguishedstudies (Casanova1994; Martin 1978). But, the prophetsof
secularizationtheorywerenot and are not merelywritingaboutsomethingso
obviousor limited. At issueis not a narrowpredictionconcerninga growing
separationof churchand state. Instead,as we have seen, fromthe start the
prophetsof secularization have stressedpersonalpiety, and to the extent that
theyexpressedmacrointerestsit hasbeen to claimthat theyareso linkedthat a
decline in one necessitatesa decline in the other. Thus, if the churcheslose
power,personalpiety will fade;if personalpiety fades,the churcheswill lose
power.Indeed,PeterBerger,long the mostsophisticatedmodernproponentof
the secularization thesis,wasentirelycandidon this point.Havingoutlinedthe
macroaspectsof secularization, Berger(1967: 107-108)noted:
Moreover,it is impliedherethatthe processof secularization hasa subjectivesideas well.As
of societyand culture,so there is a secularization
there is a secularization of consciousness.
Put simply, this means that the modem West has producedan increasingnumberof
individualswho look uponthe worldand their own lives withoutthe benefitof religious
interpretations.

As noted, recentlyBerger(1997) gracefullywithdrewhis supportfor the

theoryof secularization. I cite this passagefromhis earlierworknot to emphasize
mypreviousdisagreement withBerger,whoseworkI alwayshave muchadmired,
but as a contrastto the recenttacticby otherproponentsof secularization, who
of
seekto evadethe growingmountain contrary evidence bypretending the
that
theorymerelypertainsto deinstitutionalization andany trendsin personalpiety
areirrelevant.Letme note KarelDobbelaere's breathtakingevasionin his article
in this issue, "the religiousnessof individualsis not a valid indicatorin eval-
uatingthe processof secularization." Such revisionismis not only historically
false, it is insincere.Those who employit revertto celebratingthe demiseof
individualpiety whenever they see a fact that seems to be supportiveor
wheneverthey believe they are speakingto an audienceof fellow devotees.
Thus, at a conferencein Rome in 1993, LillianeVoye and KarelDobbelaere
(1994: 95) explainedthat becausescience is "athoroughlysecularperspective
on the world"and has come to dominatethe educationalcurricula,this has
 R.I.P. 253
SECULARIZATION,

resulted in "desacrilizingthe content of learning and the world-viewof

students."Citingearlieressaysby Dobbelaere,
theywenton to claim:
thesuccessful
removal
byscienceof allkindsof anthropomorphisms
fromourthinking
have
the traditionalconceptof "Godas a person"into a beliefin a life-force,a power
transformed
of spiritandthishasalsogradually andatheism
agnosticism
promoted - whichexplains
the
long-term declineof practices.
religious

Exactly!That is preciselywhat the secularizationthesis has alwaysbeen, and

Voye and Dobbelaere's empiricalclaims,if true,wouldfullysatisfyWoolston's
prophesy- albeit a bit late. But,as will be seen, it isn'tso. Whatis so, is that
secularization predictsa markeddeclinein the religiousness of the individual.
The thirdthing to notice aboutthe secularization thesis is that, implicitin
all versionsandexplicitin most,is the claimthat of all aspectsof modernization,
it is science that has the mostdeadlyimplicationsfor religion.ForComteand
Wallace,as for Voye and Dobbelaere,it is science that will free us fromthe
superstitious fettersof faith.Or, in the oddformulationby BryanWilson(1968:
86), "Christianity, with the impactof scientificandsocialscientifichindsights,
has lost generaltheologicalplausibility." If this is so, then scientistsoughtto be
expected to be a relativelyirreligious But,as will be seen,scientistsareabout
lot.
as religiousas anyoneelse, and the presumedincompatibility betweenreligion
andscienceseemsmythical.
Fourth,secularization is regardedas an absorbing state- thatonce achieved
it is irreversible,instillingmysticalimmunity.However,events and trendsin
easternEuropeandthe nationsof the formerSovietUnion do not supportthese
expectations.Instead,as AndrewGreeley(1994: 272) so aptlyput it, aftermore
than 70 yearsof militant effortsby the state to achieve secularization,"St.
Vladimirhas routedKarlMarx."
Fifthand finally,while mostdiscussionsof secularization focuson Christen-
dom,all leadingproponentsof the thesisapplyit globally.Thus,it is not merely
belief in Christthat is "doomedto die out,"but, as Wallaceexplainedin the
passagequoted above, "beliefin supernaturalpowers,"and this is going to
happen"allover the world."Hence,Allah is fatedto join Jehovahas only "an
interestinghistoricalmemory." However,no one has botheredto explainthis to
Muslims,as will be seen.
Now forspecifics.

THE MYTHOF RELIGIOUSDECLINE

Manyscholarsappearto believethat if ratesof individualreligiousbeliefand

participationfor most nationsof northernand westernEuropeweregraphed,
they wouldbe reciprocalto the trendsin modernization. Beginningwith high
levels of faith and practiceat the end of the eighteenthcentury,the master
trends are assumedto have been ever downward,culminatingin very low
254 SOCIOLOGY
OFRELIGION

currentlevels of religiousness.And the latterare regardedas but insignificant

residuals,soon to disappeartoo (Wilson1966, 1982;Bruce1995;Lechner1991,
1996). Forevidencein supportof these claims,we aredirectedto note a steep
decline in church attendancein much of Europeand to inferfrom this an
erosion of individualfaith as well, on the groundsthat participationis low
becauseof a lackof the beliefsneededto motivateattendance.These viewsare
wrongin all respects.
DavidMartin(1965) wasthe firstcontemporary sociologistto rejectthe secu-
larizationthesisoutright,even proposingthat the concept of secularization be
eliminatedfromsocialscientificdiscourseon the groundsthat it hadservedonly
ideologicaland polemical,ratherthan theoretical,functionsandbecausethere
wasno evidencein favorof anygeneralor consistent"shiftfroma religiousper-
iod in humanaffairsto a secularperiod"(Martin1991:465). And,astoundingas
it mayseem,the secularization thesishasbeen inconsistentwithplainfactsfrom
the verystart. Forexample,having noted the popularityof the secularization
doctrineamongeighteenth-centuryphilosophers,Alexis de Tocquevillethen
commented:

Unfortunately, the factsbyno meansaccordwiththeirtheory.Therearecertainpopulations

in Europewhose unbeliefis only equalledby their ignoranceand debasement;while in
America,one of the freestandmostenlightenednationsin the world,the peoplefulfillwith
fervorall the outwarddutiesof religion([1840]1956:319).

In the morethan 150 yearssinceTocquevillemadethoseobservations, not

only has American religiousnessnot gone into decline, the rate of church
membership actuallyhas morethan trebled(FinkeandStark1992),whileother
indicesof commitmenthaveheld steadyor have risenmodestly(Greeley1989).
Moreover,althoughthe Americancase continuesto offera devastatingchal-
lengeto the secularization doctrine,it fails in Europetoo. First,therehas been
no demonstrable long-termdeclinein Europeanreligiousparticipation! Granted,
participationprobably has varied from time to time in response to profound
social dislocationssuch as warsand revolutions,but the far more important
pointis thatreligiousparticipationwasverylow in northernandwesternEurope
many centuriesbeforethe onsetof modernization.
The secondreasonto rejectclaimsaboutthe secularization of Europeis that
currentdatado not revealthe arrival of an age of atheism."
"scientific Levelsof
subjective remainhigh- to classifya nation as highly secularized
religiousness
when the largemajorityof its inhabitantsbelieve in God is absurd.Indeed,the
importantquestionaboutreligionin Europeis, as GraceDavie(1990b:395) put
it, not why do peopleno longerbelieve,but why do they "persistin believing
but see no need to participatewith even minimalregularityin their religious
Of these two majorbasesfor rejectingclaimsaboutthe secular-
institutions?"
izationof Europe,the claimthat religiousparticipationwasneververyhigh in
northernandwesternEuropeis the one thatmuststrikemostreadersas dubious.
 R.I.P. 255
SECULARIZATION,

THEMYTHOFPASTPIETY

Everyone"knows"that once upon a time the worldwas pious- that in

olden daysmostpeople exhibitedlevelsof religiouspracticeand concernthat
todaylingeronly in isolatedsocialsubculturessuchas the Amish,ultra-orthodox
Jews,or Muslim fundamentalists. But,like so manyonce-upon-a-timetales,this
conception of a pious past is mere nostalgia;most prominenthistoriansof
medievalreligionnow agreethat there never was an "Ageof Faith"(Morris
1993; Duffy 1992; Sommerville1992; Bossy 1985;Obelkevich 1979;Murray
1972; Thomas 1971; Coulton 1938). Writing in the eleventh century,the
EnglishmonkWilliam of Malmesbury complainedthat the aristocracyrarely
attendedchurchandeven the morepiousamongthem"attended" massat home,
in bed:

Theydidn'tgo to churchin the morningsin a Christianfashion;but in theirbedchambers,

lying in the armsof their wives,they did but taste with their earsthe solemnitiesof the
moring massrushedthroughbya priestin a hurry(in Fletcher1997:476).

As for the ordinarypeople,duringthe middleagesandduringthe Renaissance,

the massesrarelyentered a church, and their privateworshipwas directed
toward an arrayof spirits and supernaturalagencies, only some of them
recognizablyChristian(Gentilecore1992; Schneider 1990; Delumeau1977;
Thomas1971).AlexanderMurray's assessmentof medievalItalianreligiouslife
is typical:"substantialsectionsof thirteenth-centurysociety hardlyattended
churchat all."The DominicanpriorHumbertof Romansin his handbookOn
theTeaching Murraynotes,advisedhis friarsthat "reaching
of Preachers, the laity
involvescatchingthemat marketsandtournaments, in ships,andso on,"which
Murrayinterpretsas "a fair enough sign that they were not to be caught in
churches."Indeed,Humbertfranklyacknowledged that the masses"rarely
go to
church,and [whenthey do attend]rarelyto sermons;so theyknowlittle of what
pertainsto their salvation."Finally,Humbertadmittedthat the regularclergy
were so involved in gambling,pleasure,and "worsethings,"that they too
"scarcelycome to church." In similarterms, Blessed Giordanoof Rivalto
reportedthat, upon arrivingin Florenceto preach,he suggestedto a local
womanthat she take her daughterto churchat least on feastdays,only to be
informedthat "It is not the custom"(Murray1972: 92-94). The anonymous
Englishauthorof Divesand Pauper([circa1410] 1976: 189) complainedthat
"thepeoplethesedays. .. areloathto hearGod'sService.[Andwhentheymust
attend]theycome late and leaveearly.They wouldrathergo to a tavernthanto
HolyChurch."1 In about1430,St. Antonino(in Coulton1938:192) wrotethat

1 Mytranslation
fromMiddleEnglish.
256 SOCIOLOGY
OFRELIGION

Tuscanpeasantsseldomattendmassandthat "verymanyof themdo not confess

once a year, and far fewer are those who take communion. . . They use
enchantmentsforthemselvesandfortheirbeasts.. . beingignorant,andcaring
little fortheirown soulsor forkeepingGod'scommandments, whichthey know
not." Antonino went on to blame most of this on "thecarelessnessand evil
conscienceof theirparishpriests."
In furthersupportof these reports,an extensivesurveyof survivingparish
churchesin variouspartsof Europerevealsthem to be too smallto have held
more than a tiny fraction of local inhabitants(Brooke and Brooke 1984).
Indeed,it wasn'tuntilthe late middleagesthat thereeven weremorethana few
parishchurchesoutsideof the cities and largertowns(not countingthe private
chapelsmaintainedforthe localnobility),at a time when nearlyeveryonelived
in ruralareas(Morris1993). Moreover,as EamonDuffynoted,a largepercen-
tage of what ruralparishesdid exist lacked a pastormuch of the time. He
estimatedthat duringthe sixteenthcentury,forexample,at least25 percentof
the parishesin the Dioceseof Strasbourg andup to 80 percentin the Dioceseof
Geneva had no clergy. To make mattersworse, even where there was an
assignedpastor,"Absenteeism wasrife"(Duffy1987:88). The bishop'svisitation
of 192 parishesin Oxfordshireduring1520 found58 absentees(Coulton1938:
156). Indeed,P.H. Sawyer(1982: 139) notedthat in northernEurope"Bishops
who nevervisited their sees were not unknown."Indeed,manysuch dioceses
weregivento papalprotegeswithoutanyobligationto reside(Coulton1938).
That religiousparticipationwas lacking even in the cities is not very
surprisingwhen we realizethat going to churchin, say, the fifteenthcentury,
requiredthe averagepersonto standin an unheatedbuildingto heara service
which was conductedentirely in incomprehensible Latinby priestswho may
indeed not have been speakingLatinat all, but many of whom were simply
mumblingnonsensesyllables.The VenerableBede([730]1955:340) advisedthe
futurebishopEgbertthat becauseso few Englishpriestsand monksknew any
Latin"Ihave frequentlyofferedtranslationsof both the [Apostle's]Creedand
the Lord'sPrayerinto Englishto manyunlearnedpriests."In 1222the Council
of Oxforddescribedthe parishclergyas "dumbdogs"(Coulton 1938: 157).
Almosta thousandyearsafterBede'seffortsto teach clergyat least the Lord's
Prayer,nothinghadchanged.WilliamTyndalenotedin 1530that hardlyanyof
the priestsand curatesin Englandknew the Lord'sPrayeror couldtranslateit
into English.This was confirmedwhen in 1551 the Bishop of Gloucester
systematicallytestedhis diocesanclergy.Of 311 pastors,171 could not repeat
the Ten Commandments and 27 did not know the authorof the Lord'sPrayer
(Thomas1971: 164). Indeed,the next year BishopHooperfound "scoresof
parishclergywho could not tell who was the authorof the Lord'sPrayer,or
whereit wasto be found"(Coulton1938:158). Acrossthe channel,St. Vincent
de Pauldiscoveredin 1617 that his local priestknew no Latin,not even the
wordsof absolution(Delumeau1977).Similarly,in 1547ArchbishopGiovanni
 R.I.P. 257
SECULARIZATION,

Bovio, of the Brindisi-Oriadiocese in southernItaly, found that most of his

priests"couldbarelyreadand could not understandLatin"(Gentilcore1992:
42).
Clerical ignoranceis not surprisingwhen we recognizethat "therewere
virtuallyno seminaries"andthereforemostpriests"learnedrubrics" anda "smat-
teringof Latin" as an apprenticeto "apriestwho had himself had little or no
training."In the fifteenthcentury,St. Bernardinoof Siena observeda priest
"whoknewonly the Hail Mary,and usedit even at the elevationof the Mass"
(Duffy1987: 88). EamonDuffy(1992) has effectivelydemonstratedthe ignor-
ance of the parishclergy from the contents of the very first "primers"for clergy
that began to be distributed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. That
booklets, most of them written in the local language rather than in Latin and
preparedfor those who alreadywere serving as clergy, were limited to the most
elementary aspects of doctrine and practice - for example, simple lists of the
sacraments and of the sins that should be confessed -shows that church
officials thought most serving clergy knew considerablyless than a modern 10-
year-oldattending parochialschool.
Given such clerical ignorance, it is no wonder that the massesknew next to
nothing in terms of basic Christian culture. The Lateran Council of 1215, in
addition to requiringall Catholics to confess and to take communion at least
once a year during the Easter season, proposed that a massive campaign of
elementaryreligiousinstructionof the laity be undertaken.Thus, at the Council
of Lambeth in 1281, the English bishops responded by adopting the aim of
teaching the laity the Lord'sPrayer,Hail Mary, and the Apostle's Creed. Later
this was expanded to include the Ten Commandments, the Seven Works of
Mercy, the Seven Sacraments,and the Seven Deadly Sins (Duffy 1992). Similar
plans to catechize the laity were adopted throughoutEurope.Despite these very
modest goals, it seems unlikely that many of the laity, other than membersof the
educated elite, ever masteredthese simple lessons - since so many priests did
not. As Colin Morris (1993: 232) put it, "Ignoranceof the formal content of
faith was general." Morris then recounted an instance of a village priest who
managedto teach many in his congregation to recite the "OurFather"in Latin,
noting that they had not the slightest idea of what it meant (possibly the priest
didn't either). Other examples come from investigations of scores of incidents
involving religiousapparitions(mostly of Mary) in Spain during the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries.These hearingsrevealedthat most parishionersreporting
such visions were ignorant of the Ten Commandments and the Seven Deadly
Sins. It wasn't merely that they could not recite them, but that they were
entirely ignorant of their contents. A typical instance involved a man who
claimed frequentvisions of Maryand who, duringan interrogationin 1518, was
asked if he knew the Ten Commandmentsand the Seven Deadly Sins. "He said
he did not know any of these in whole or in part. .. . He was asked if pride or
envy or lust or killing a man or insultingsomeone with offensive wordswas a sin,
258 OFRELIGION
SOCIOLOGY

to eachof thesehe repliedthat he did not know.He wasaskedif theftwasa sin,

andhe saidthat,God preserveus,theft wasa verygreatsin"(in Christian1981:
154).
It mustbe noted too, that even when peoplebackthen did go to church
they oftendid so unwillinglyandbehavedveryinappropriately while there.The
eminenthistorianKeithThomasnot only notedthat in late medievaltimes"it
is problematical as to whethercertainsectionsof the population[of Britain]at
this timehadany religionat all,"but "thatmanyof thosewhodid [goto church]
went with considerablereluctance." When the commonpeopledid show up in
church,often undercompulsion,theyso misbehaved"asto turnthe serviceinto
a travestyof what was intended"accordingto Thomas.Presentationsbefore
ecclesiasticalcourtsand scoresof clericalmemoirsreporthow"Members of the
for
populationjostled pews,nudged their neighbours,hawked and spat,knitted,
made coarseremarks,told jokes, fell asleep, and even let off guns."Church
recordstell of a man in Cambridgeshire who waschargedwith misbehavingin
churchin 1598afterhis "mostloathsomefarting,striking,andscoffingspeeches"
had resultedin "thegreatoffenceof the goodandthe greatrejoicingof the bad"
(Thomas1971: 159-162). A man who issuedloathsomefartsin churchtoday
surelywould not drawcheers from part of the congregationin any British
church,even if he accompanied his effortswithscoffingspeeches.
An additionalsign of the times was that peopleoften did gatherregularly
and eagerlywithinchurches,but to conductentirelyunreligiousactivities.The
Archbishopof Florencedenouncedthe Tuscanpeasantsof his diocesebecause
"in the churchesthemselvesthey sometimesdance and leap and sing with
women"(in Coulton 1938: 193). Indeed,throughthe centuriesthere was a
constant flow of complaintsand threatsdirectedtuwardlocal parishes,and,
often enougheven towardthose in chargeof cathedrals,to cease usingthem
primarilyfor indoor marketplacesand for storage of crops and sheltering
livestock.For example,between 1229 and 1367 in Englandalone there were
eleven episcopal"fulminat(tions)againstholding markets. . . in churches"
(Coulton1938:189).
Summingup his surveyof popularreligion in thirteenth-centuryItaly,
AlexanderMurray(1972:83) disputed"thenotionof an Age of Faith."Instead,
he pointedout (1972: 106), 'The friars[ofthat era]werenot typicalfiguresin a
freakishage, but, morally,freakishfiguresin a typicalage.Theirmendicantlife
wasa lastingwonderto contemporaries. They werea smallminority:OVirgins
arefew,martyrsarefew,preachersarefew,'saidFraGiordano."
To be sure,there wereperiodicexplosionsof massreligiousenthusiasmin
medievaltimesas new sectarianmovements- includingthe Waldensiansand
the Albigensians- attractedlargefollowings(Lambert1992). However,as I
have clarifiedelsewhere,such outburstsare not to be expectedwhereconven-
tional religiousorganizationsare strong,but only wherereligiousapathyand
alienationare widespread(Stark 1996a, 1996b). That is, religiousrebellions
 R.I.P. 259
SECULARIZATION,

duringmedievaltimesofferadditionaltestimonyagainstimagesof widespread
involvementin organized religion.
As Europepassedout of medievaltimes,religiousparticipationseemsnot to
have improved- however,the statisticson religiousbehaviordo. Someof the
best of these can be foundin the reportswrittenby variousAnglicanbishops
and archbishopsfollowinglengthyvisitationtripsto their parishes.Thus the
Oxford diocesan visitations reportthat 30 parishesin Oxfordshiredrew a
combined totalof 911 communicantsin 1738,basedon the four"GreatFestivals"
- Easter,Ascension,Whitsun,and Christmas.This turnoutamountedto far
less than five percentof the total populationof these parishestaking com-
munionduringa given year.Othervisitationreportsyieldsimilarlylow ratesof
participationin communionover the remainderof the eighteenth century
(Currieet al. 1977). Indeed,PeterLaslett(1965) reportedthat only 125 of 400
adults in a particularEnglish village took Eastercommunion late in the
eighteenthcenturyand went on to note "muchsmallerattendances"in other
villages.Incredibly,Laslettusesthesedatato demonstratethe unanimity offaith
in this era - the title of his book is The worldwe havelost.2Were these
twentieth-centurystatistics,they wouldbe cited routinelyas proofof massive
secularization.
If we use 1800 as the benchmark,then churchmembershipin Britainis
substantiallyhighertoday.In 1800, only 12 percentof the Britishpopulation
belongedto a specificreligiouscongregation.This rose to 17 percentin 1850
and then stabilized- the same percentagebelonged in 1990 (Stark and
lannaccone1995). In his remarkable reconstructionof religiousparticipationin
the Britishcommunitiesof OldhamandSaddleworth, MarkSmith(1996) found
there had been no change between 1740 and 1865 - a periodof intensive
industrialization. As will be noted, LaurenceIannaccone(1996) has recon-
structeda time seriesthat does showa modestdecline in churchattendancein
Britainduringthe twentiethcentury.This findingis offsetboth by the lackof
similardeclinesin mostotherEuropeannations,as well as by studiessuggesting
recent increasesin churchparticipationin lower-class,British,urbanneigh-
borhoodswhichhad longbeennotablefortheirverylow ratesof attendance(G.
Smith 1996). The "market" theory of religiousnessdeveloped in my earlier
publications (Stark 1985, 1998b;Starkand lannaccone1993, 1994;Finkeand
Stark1988, 1992)is compatiblewith religiousvariation: with increasesas wellas
decreasesin religiousness,indeedits usualpredictionis forrelativelystablelevels
of religiouscommitmentin societies. In contrast,the secularizationthesis is
incompatiblewith either stabilityor increase:it requiresa general,long-term
patternof religiousdecline.It makesno provisionfor reportssuch as that of
GabrielLa Bras(1963) that FrenchCatholicstodayparticipatemorewillingly
andfrequently,withfargreatercomprehension of whattheyaredoing,thanwas
2 He alsowrote
(p.7)that"Allourancestors
wereliteralChristianbelievers,allof the time."
260 OFRELIGION
SOCIOLOGY

the case200 yearsago.

The evidence is clear that claims about a majordecline in religious
participationin Europearebasedin parton veryexaggerated perceptionsof past
religiousness.
Participationmay be low in
today manynations,but not because
of modernization;thereforethe secularizationthesis is irrelevant.But, what
about very recent times, maybe the secularizationtheorists simply were
prematurein theirpredictions? As mentioned,Laurencelannaccone(1996) has
been able to use surveydata to reconstructchurchattendancerates for 18
nations (most of them European)beginningin 1920. In 15 of the 18 nations
Iannaccone could detect no trends even vaguely consistent with the
secularizationthesis:only in EastGermany,Slovenia,andGreatBritaindid he
observe downwardtrends that could possibly be claimed as support for
secularization,and the Britishtrendmayalreadyhave been reversed,while the
declines in Slovenia and East Germany began with the imposition of
Communistregimes.
Little wonder,then, that historianshave long expresseddismayat "un-
historicallymindedsociologists" for clingingto the mythof Europe'slost piety,
complainingthat "notenoughjusticehas been done to the volumeof apathy,
heterodoxy,and agnosticismthat existed long beforethe onset of industri-
alization"(Thomas 1971: 173). For,as AndrewGreeley(1995: 63) put it so
crisply,"Therecould be no de-Christianization of Europe. . . becausethere
never was any Christianizationin the first place. ChristianEuropenever
existed."

THE FAILURETO CHRISTIANIZE

This raisesa most significantquestion:Why wasn'tthe Christianization of

Europeaccomplished?At the start of the fourthcenturyChristianity was an
immensemassmovementsweepingover the RomanEmpire,and by the middle
of the centurya majorityof the populationprobablyhadbeen converted(Stark
1996a).What happenedthen?The failureof the earlychurchto Christianize
the outerreachesof the empireandthe restof Europeis entirelyin keepingwith
the marketmodel of religiousness(Stark 1985;Starkand lannaccone 1994;
Stark 1998b). The Christianitythat triumphedover Romewas a masssocial
movementin a highly competitiveenvironment.The Christianitythat subse-
quently left most of Europeonly nominallyconverted,at best, was an estab-
lished, subsidized,state church that sought to extend itself, not through
missionizingthe population,butby baptizingkings(Davies1996:275) andthen
canonizingthem as nationalsaints (Vauchez1997). That is, the Christianity
that prevailedin Europewas an elaboratepatchworkof state churchesthat
settledfor the allegianceof the elite and for imposingofficialrequirementsfor
conformity,but that made little sustained effort to the
Christianize peasant
masses(Duffy1987;Greeley1995).Thus, it isn'tmerelythat the state churches
 R.I.P. 261
SECULARIZATION,

of ScandinaviaandnorthernEuropecurrentlylackthe motivationandenergyto
fill their churches,they have alwaysbeenlikethis.The 'Christianization" of a
Norsekingdom,forexample,often involvedlittle morethanthe baptismof the
nobilityand legal recognitionof the ecclesiasticalsovereigntyof the church.
This left the taskof missionizing the massesto a "kept"clergywhosewelfarewas
almostentirelyindependentof massassentor support,witha predictablelackof
results.
Indeed,corruptionand sloth, as well as powerstrugglesand enforcedcon-
formity,becameprominentfeaturesof the Christianmovementin the fourth
century,almostimmediatelyupon its having becomethe officialstate church
(Johnson1976). Contraryto receivedwisdom,the conversionof Constantine
did not cause the triumphof Christianity.Rather,it was the first and most
significantstepin slowingits progress, drainingits vigor,anddistortingits moral
vision.Mostof the evils associatedwith EuropeanChristianitysincethe middle
of the fourthcenturycanbe tracedto establishment.
The "conversion" of Scandinaviais instructive. Denmarkwas the first
"Christian" nation in the north,as a successionof kingsaccepted,rejected,or
were indifferentto Christianity,culminatingin the ascensionof the devout
Christian,Knutthe Great,in 1016 (Sawyer1982;Roesdahl1980;Jones1968;
Br0ndsted1965). This now is regarded as the "official"date of the
Christianization of Denmark.However,mosthistoriansdo not equatethis with
the Christianizationof the Danishpeople, writinginsteadthat this followed
only "gradually" (Br0ndsted1965: 310) and noting that the conversionsof the
monarchswere"[n]everthe resultof populardemand"(Sawyer1982:139).
Next camethe "Christianization" of Norway.OlafTryggvason, an English-
educated, Christianconvert, seized the throneof Norwayin 995 whereuponhe
attemptedto covertthe countryby force,killingsomewho resistedandburning
theirestates.These and otherrepressivemeasuresarousedsufficientopposition
to defeathim in the Battleof Svolder(aboutthe year 1000) duringwhich he
died. Fifteenyearslater,Olaf Haraldsson,who had been baptizedin France,
conqueredNorway,and he too used fire and swordin an effort to compel
Christianization. And he too provokedwidespreadhatredleadingto rebellion,
and wasdriven into exile. When he attemptedto returnleadinga new army
raisedin Kiev,he wasdefeatedand killed at the Battleof Stikklestadin 1030.
Despite this, he soon was canonized as St. Olaf and is credited with the
Christianizationof Norway,which seems to have consistedprimarilyof the
reimposition of Olaf'sofficialpoliciesof intolerance(Sawyer1982;Jones1968).
The conversionof Icelandfollowed a somewhatsimilarpatternas both
NorwegianOlafssuccessivelyextendedtheir effortsat forcedconversionupon
their colony. At a meetingof the Althing in 1000 the Icelandersyieldedto
Norwegian pressureby adopting the law "that all people should become
Christianand those who here in the land were yet unbaptizedshould be
baptized." But, the law read on: "peoplemight sacrificeto the old gods in
262 SOCIOLOGY
OFRELIGION

private"(Byock 1988:142). Although paganismsubsequentlywas outlawed,

aspectsof paganismstill lingeramong Icelanders,and their Christianization
neverresultedin morethanthe mostminimalparticipation in the church.
The Swedishcourtremainedpaganinto the twelfthcentury,and Finland
remainedofficiallypaganuntilthe thirteenth(Sawyer1982;Br0ndsted1965).It
seemsrevealingas to the lackof effortto Christianizethe generalpopulation
that no missionarieswere even sent to the Lappsuntil the middle of the
sixteenth century (Baldwin 1900). In reality, it is not clear when popular
paganismactuallybeganto wanein Scandinaviaand,as in the caseof Iceland,
there is reasonto supposeit neverdid entirelydisappear(Sawyerand Sawyer
1993). The famousChristianmissionaryto Scandinavia,Adam of Bremen,
wroteat length of ceremonies(includinghumansacrifices)conductedin the
luxuriouspagantempleof Uppsala(Sweden)duringthe eleventhcentury(Jones
1968;Br0ndsted1965). Indeed,it seemsto have been typicalfor the Norse to
"convert" by includingChristandvariousChristiansaints(especiallyOlaf) into
the paganpantheon.Thus, it was writtenin the IcelandicLandndmabok that
Helgi the Lean 'vas verymixed in his faith;he believed in Christ, but invoked
Thor in mattersof seafaringand dire necesssity"(in Br0ndsted1965: 306).
JohannesBr0ndsted(1965: 307) notedthat "achangeof godsat the summitof
society might occur easily enough;but lowerdown on the scale there was a
natural resistance."Indeed, Br0ndsted suggests that the conversion of
Scandinaviaoccurred"only . . . when Christianitytook over old [pagan]
superstitions and useagesandallowedthemto live undera newguise."Thus,the
popularChristianitythat eventuallyemergedwasa strangeamalgam,includinga
greatdeal in the way of pagantraditionsand celebrations,some of them only
thinly Christianized(Davies 1996). Consequently,as AndrewGreeley(1996:
66) has pointedout, Christiancommitmentwasneverdeepenoughin northern
Europeto generatemuchmassattendance,nor "deepenoughto survivechanges
in the religiousaffiliationof their political leadersduringthe Reformation,
sometimesbackandforthacrossdenominational lines."
Bothof Greeley'spointsareeasilydemonstrated quantitatively.I beganwith
the 16 nations of western Europe.3For each, I calculatedthe numberof
centuriessince their supposedChristianization(20 minusthe century),with
valuesrangingfrom 16 for Italydown to 7 for Finland(Davies 1996; Barrett
1982; Sawyer 1982; Roesdahl1980; Shepherd 1980;Jones 1968; Br0ndsted
1965). This variable is basedon the assumptionthat the more recent the
Christianization, the moresuperficial.Turningto the 1990-1991WorldValues
Surveys, I created a variablebasedon the rateof churchattendance.As would
be predicted,the durationof Christianization is extremelyhighlycorrelatedwith

3 (Centuryof supposedChristianization)
Austria(9), Belgium(7), Denmark(11), Finland(13), France
(6), Germany(9), Great Britain(9), Iceland(11), Ireland(5), Italy (4), Netherlands(8), Norway(11),
Portugal(4), Spain(4), Sweden(12), andSwitzerland
(8).
 R.I.P. 263
SECULARIZATION,

contemporaryratesof churchattendance(.72). In similarfashion,the most

plausiblemeasureof participationin the Reformation(since some of these
modern nations include many areas that were independentstates in the
sixteenthcentury)is the percentCatholic,which I took fromthe 1996Catholic
Almanac.Again, as predicted,this variableis veryhighlycorrelated(.89) with
the durationof Christianization.

SUBJECTIVERELIGIOUSNESS

Steve Bruceof the Universityof Aberdeenhas long been one of the most
die-hardproponentsof the secularizationthesis. Recently,even he admitted
that, in termsof organizedparticipation,the GoldenAge of Faithneverexisted.
Indeed,Bruce(1997: 674) proposesthat the medievalchurchwas not even
especiallyconcernedto bringthe people to massas 'Svasclear fromthe very
architecture of churchesandformsof service."But,ratherthangivingupon the
secularizationthesis, Bruce now claims that the Golden Age of medieval
religiousnesswassubjective,that peoplestronglyembracedsupernatural beliefs,
Christianor otherwise.Put anotherway, Brucenow claimsthat even if the
medievalmassesseldomwent to church,most people in this era still mustbe
regardedas religiousbecausethey believed.I agree. Certainlymost people in
medievaltimesseemto have held religiousbeliefs,even if theseweresomewhat
vague and includedas much magic and animismas Christianity,and thus
throughbelief, if not throughpractice,these werereligious societies(cf., Duffy
1992), keeping in mind that a substantial of
proportion medievalpopulations
did not take their religiousbeliefs very seriously.Nor must we forgetthat a
significantnumber,probablyaboutthe sameas today,rejectedreligiousbeliefs.
As FranklinBaumer(1960: 99) put it, "Contrary to popularsuppositionthere
wasplentyof scepticismin the MiddleAges, and someof it wasquiteradical."
Judgingfromthe prevalenceof blasphemous graffition the wallsof Pompeii,the
samemustbe saidof the Greco-Roman era(MacMullen1981;Stark1996a).
Nevertheless,I too assumethat belief was widespread,and I interpretthe
prevalenceof religiousbeliefsas representinga potentialdemandfor organized
religionin these societies- a potentialin the sensethat it awaitedactivation
by suchaggressivesuppliersas the Waldensians.However,ratherthan restoring
a benchmarkof past piety againstwhich to demonstratethe secularizationof
modern-day Europe,the sameobservationapplieswithequalforcetoday.That is,
whileratesof religiousparticipationarefarlowerin Europethan in the United
States,differencesaresmallwhencomparisons arebasedon subjectivemeasures
of faith(StarkandIannaccone1994;Stark1998a).
MycolleaguesandI arehardlythe firstto notice this phenomenon.Thereis
a substantialBritishresearchliteratureon what GraceDavie (1990a, 1990b,
1994) refersto as "believingwithoutbelonging."In a recentadditionto this
literature,MichaelWinterandChristopherShort(1993:635, 648) summedup:
264 OFRELIGION
SOCIOLOGY

'What is clear is that most surveysof religiousbelief in northernEurope

demonstratecontinuinghigh levels of belief in God and some of the more
generaltenetsof the Christianfaithbut ratherlow levelsof churchattendance."
They addthat theirresearchhas"revealeda relatively,andperhapssurprisingly,
low level of secularization" - and perhapsfor that reasontheir workhas not
been much cited by other Europeansocialscientists.But it is true,nonetheless:
subjectivereligiousness remainshigh in the nationsmostoftencitedas examples
of secularization,placeswhereit is claimedthat peoplehave outgrownreligion
forgood.It seemsusefulto examineone casein greaterdetail.
Because Iceland has been proposedas the first fully (or nearly fully)
secularizednation on earth (cf., Tomasson1980), it seemsan appropriate test
case.The claimthat Icelandis extremelysecularizedis takenas self-evidenton
the basisof its emptychurches- about2 percentattendweekly.Nevertheless,
on the basisof extensivefieldwork,WilliamSwatos(1984) reportedhigh levels
of in-the-homereligionin Icelandtoday,high ratesof baptism,that nearlyall
weddingsoccur in church,and that "affirmations of personalimmortalityare
typical"in newspaperobituaries,which usuallyare writtenby a close friendof
the deceasedratherthan by a newswriter.It is hardlysurprising, therefore,that
the 1990 World Values Surveysreportthat 81 percentof Icelandersexpress
confidencethat there is life afterdeath, 88 percentsay they believe humans
have a soul, and 40 percentbelieve in reincarnation.And when asked'How
often do you prayto God outsideof religiousservices?"82 percentsaid they
prayedsometimes,and one of foursaidthey did so "often."Moreover,only 2.4
percentof the populationof Icelandsay they are "convincedatheists."Surely
this is not what usuallyis meantby a "secularizedsociety."Moreover,that 4 in
10 believe in reincarnationservesto remindus that the secularization theory
never has been limited to Christianity;all beliefs in the supernaturalare
pertinentand even a massiveshift frombelief in Jesusto the worshipof the
goddessKaliwouldnot constitutesecularization. It is worthnoting, therefore,
that spiritualismalso is extremelywidespreadin Iceland,populareven among
leadingintellectualsand academics(Swatosand Gissurarson1997). In light of
these data,claimsthat Icelandis the firstsecularizednationseemas fatuousas
do the claims,once so popularamongwesternleftists,thattrueCommunismwas
beingachievedin ChinaunderMao'sleadership.

RELIGIONAND SCIENCE

If secularizationis to showupanywhereit mustshowupamongscientists!In

an earlierstudy, my colleaguesand I examinedevidence that the conflict
between religion and science is largelyfictional and that scientists are not
notablyirreligious,beingas likelyto attendchurchas is the generalpublic.Even
morerevealing is the fact that amongAmericanacademics,the proportionwho
regardthemselves as religiousis higher the more scientific their field. For
 R.I.P.
SECULARIZATION, 265

example,physicaland naturalscientists,includingmathematicians, are more

than twice as likely to identify themselves as "a religiousperson"as are
anthropologists and psychologists(Stark et al. 1996, 1998). But, aren'tsome
scientistsmilitant atheists who write books to discreditreligion- Richard
Dawkinsand CarlSagan,forexample?Of course.But,it also is worthnote that
mostof those,like DawkinsandSagan,aremarginalto the scientificcommunity
for lackof significantscientificwork.Aridpossiblyeven moreimportantis the
fact that theologians(cf., Cupitt 1997) and professorsof religiousstudies(cf.,
Mack1996)area farmoreprolificsourceof popularworksof atheism.
Recently,quite amazingtime seriesdata on the beliefsof scientistswere
publishedin Nature.In 1914 the AmericanpsychologistJamesLuebasent
questionnaires to a randomsampleof personslistedin American Menof Science.
Eachwasaskedto select one of the followingstatements"concerningbelief in
God"(all italicsin the original):

1. I believein a God to whomone mayprayin the expectationof receivingan answer.By

"answer,"I meanmorethanthesubjective,
psychological
effectof prayer.
2. I do not believe in God as definedabove.
3. I have no definite belief regardingthis question.

Leuba'sstandardfor belief in God is so stringentit wouldexcludea substantial

portionof "mainline"clergy,andthat obviouslywas intentionalon his part.4He
wantedto showthat menof sciencewereirreligious. To his dismay,Leubafound
that 41.8 percentof his sampleof prominentscientistsselected option one,
therebytakinga positionmanywouldregardas "fundamentalist." Another41.5
percentselectedthe secondoption(manyof whom,as Leubaacknowledged, no
doubt believed in a somewhatless active deity), and 16.7 percenttook the
indefinitealternative.Clearly,these resultswerenot whatLeubahad expected
and hoped.So he gave greatemphasisto the fact that, as measured,believers
werenot in the majorityandwent on to expresshis faithin the future,claiming
that thesedatademonstrated a rejectionof "fundamental dogmas- a rejection
apparentlydestinedto extendparallelwith the diffusionof knowledge"(1916:
280).
In 1996EdwardJ. LarsonandLarryWitham(1997) replicatedLeuba's study
exactly.They foundthat nowadays39.3 percentof eminentscientistsselected
optionone, whichis not significantlydifferentfromthe 41.8 percentwhodidso
in 1914.This time 45.3 percentchoseoptiontwo, and 14.5percenttookoption
three.Thus,over an 82-yearperiod,therehas been no decline in a veryliteral

4 In a 1968sampleof Protestantclergyin California,

only45 percentof pastorsof the UnitedChurchof
Christcouldagree I knowGod reallyexistsandI haveno doubtsaboutit"(Starketal. 1971).Of Methodist
clergy,52 percentagreed.Notice thatthis itemis muchlessstringentthanthe one usedbyLeubasinceclergy
werefreeto defineGod as theywished.Given that the majorityof thesesameclergydoubtedthe divinityof
Jesus,one mustsupposethat manyof themassertedtheirbeliefsin a ratherremoteandvagueconceptionof
God,notone whohearsandanswersprayers.
266 OFRELIGION
SOCIOLOGY

beliefin Godamongscientists.Secularization,
indeed!

EASTERNREVIVALS

The collapseof Soviet Communismhad manyremarkableconsequences,

not the leastof which wasto revealthe abjectfailureof severalgenerationsof
dedicatedeffortsto indoctrinateatheism in easternEuropeand the former
Soviet Union. As AndrewGreeley(1994:253) put it, "Neverbeforein human
historyhastherebeensucha concertedeffortto stampout not merelya religion,
but all traceof religion.. . . AtheisticCommunismthoughtof itselfas pushing
forwardthe inevitable process of secularizationin which religion would
disappear fromthe faceof the earth- a processwhich,in perhapsmilderform,
is an articleof faithformanydogmaticsocialscientists."
And the results?Atheists are few, not more prevalentthan in western
Europeor, indeed,in the United States.In mostof thesecountriesthe majority
pray,andby 1990churchattendancealreadyhadrecoveredto levelscomparable
to westernEurope.Moreover,churchattendancecontinuesto rise,as do other
formsof religiousness. In Hungary,forexample,monthlychurchattendancerose
from16 percentin 1981to 25 percentin 1991,whilethe percentattendingless
than once a yearfell from62 percentto 44 percent.Meanwhile,the percentof
Hungarians who saidthey were"convincedatheists"fell from14 to 4. In Russia,
53 percentof respondentssaidtheywerenot religiousin 1991.In only five years
this fell to 37 percent.
By any measure,majorreligiousrevivalsare underwayduringthese early
daysof the post-Communist erain the old Sovietbloc.This seemsto havetaken
most social scientistsentirelyby surprise(as have all recentsigns of religious
vitality). As MaryDouglaspointed out as long ago as 1982:

No one, however,foresawthe recentrevivalsof traditionalreligiousforms.. .According to

an extensiveliterature,religiouschangein moder timeshappensin only two ways- the
fallingoff of traditionalChristianchurches[orwhateverthe traditionalreligiousexpressions
of a society],andthe appearance of new cults,not expectedto endure.No one creditedthe
traditionalreligionswith enough vitality to inspirelarge-scalepolitical revolt .. . the
explicitly Catholic uprisingin Poland,which evokes deep Westernadmiration,was as
unpredicted churchesin America.
as the riseof the fundamentalist

It wouldbe needlesslyvindictivefor me to quotevarioussocialscientistswho

once were certain that "enlightened" educatorsin "socialist"nations were
"freeingchildren"from the grip superstitionand launchinga new era of
of
permanentsecularity.But,mywill-powerdoesnot go so faras to preventa bit of
crowing,hence I quotea paperI initiallypresentedat a conferencein 1979:
[S]ecularstatescannotrootout religion,and ... to the extent that they try to root it out,
theywill be vulnerableto religiousopposition... Lenin'sbodymaybe displayedunderglass,
butno one supposesthat he has ascendedto sit on the righthand,or even the left hand,of
 R.I.P. 267
SECULARIZATION,

Marx.And, damsalongthe Volgado not light up the meaningof the universe.Moreover,

repressivestatesseemto increaselevelsof individualdeprivationand,in so doing,to fuelthe
religiousimpulse.In makingfaithmorecostly,theyalsomakeit morenecessaryandvaluable.
Perhapsreligionis neverso robustas whenit is an underground
church(Stark1981:175).

And so it was.

ISLAM

The evidenceexaminedthusfarhas beenlimitedto Christiannations.Now

let us shift to religioustrendsin Islam.In extraordinary contradictionto the
secularization doctrine,thereseemsto be a profoundcompatibilityof the Islamic
faithandmodernization - severalstudiesfromquitedifferentpartsof the world
suggestthatMuslimcommitmentincreases withmodernization!
In a studyof Muslimsin Java,JosephTamney (1979, 1980) found that
religious commitmentwas positively correlatedwith education and with
occupationalprestige.That is, people who had attendedcollege and/orheld
high statusoccupationsweresubstantiallymorelikelyto praythe requiredfive
timesa day,to give alms,and to fast in accordwith orthodoxIslamicpractice
than wereMuslimswith little educationand/orlow statusoccupations.Tamney
also recognizedthat his findingsimpliedthat Muslimpracticewouldincreaseas
modernization proceeded.In a subsequentwork,Tamney(1992) has analyzed
the 'resilience"of religion, how it has been able to adjustto challengesof
modernity.
A study of the leading Muslim"fundamentalist" movement in Pakistan
foundthat the leadersare highlyeducated(all havingadvanceddegrees),and
supporters of the movementare drawnoverwhelmingly from"thenew middle
class"(Ahmad1991).This is confirmedby dataon Turkishstudentsbasedon an
actual time series. Since 1978 there has been a remarkableincreasein the
proportionof studentsat the Universityof Ankarawho hold orthodoxIslamic
beliefs,and in 1991 the overwhelmingmajorityof studentsheld these views.
Thus, in 1978, 36 percent of studentsexpressedfirm belief that "thereis a
Heavenand a Hell,"while in 1991 three-fourthsheld this view. As Kayhan
Mutlu(1996:355) explained,faithin "theessentialelementsof Islamicbeliefsis
becomingwidespread amongthe universitystudentsi.e., the prospectiveelites,
in Ankara." Thesestudentsarethe futurepoliticalandintellectualleadersof the
nation, includingits futurescientistsand engineers.Moreover,Turkeyis, by
most measures,the most modernizedof Islamicnationsand, beginningin the
1920s,experienceddecadesof officialstatesecularityandsemi-officialirreligion,
althoughthesepolicieshave wanedin recenttimes(forreasonsentirelyclearin
the data).
Of course,these Islamicdata are fragmentary.On the other hand, no
informedobservereven needs data such as these to detect the thunderous
268 OFRELIGION
SOCIOLOGY

vitality of contemporary
Islamand to realizethat it is in direct proportionto
modernization.

ASIAN "FOLK'RELIGIONS

FollowingWorldWarII, all observersexpectedrapidandprofoundreligious

changesin Asian religions,especiallyin Japanand in the rapidlywesternizing
Chinese enclaves, such as in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. More
specifically,it was assumedthat the traditional,and highly magical,"folk"
religionsfound in these settingswouldrapidlygive way to modernity(Chen
1995;Tan 1994).Summingup the scholarlyconsensus,JohnNelson (1992: 77)
noted that "Shintoreligiouspracticeswouldseema highly likelycandidatefor
extinction within Japan'shigh-tech consumersociety."But, that's not what
happened.In Taiwantoday,there are proportionately morefolk templesthan
there werea centuryago, and a largerproportionof the population(about70
percent)frequentthese templesthan ever before(Chen 1995). In Hong Kong,
traditionalChinesefolk religionalso flourishes,with the Templeof Wong Tai
Sin, "arefugeegod"importedfromChina in 1915,havingthe largestfollowing
(Langand Ragvald1993). In Malaysia,the Chinesefolk religion"continuesto
thrive"(Tan 1994:274). Meanwhile,in Japan,Shinto is veryvigorous(Nelson
1992). In all fourcontexts an "oldfashioned," traditionalfaith has provedso
adaptable as to come to be seen as especially formodernlife.That is, folk
suitable
religion does not linger among elderly, uneducated peasants,but flourishes
amongthe young,successful,educatedurbanites(Chen 1995;Tan 1994;Lang
and Ragvold1993;Nelson 1992). Consequently,in Japan"it is commonplace
that new carsbe blessedat a [Shinto]shrine,that new residences,offices,or
factoriesbe built afterexorcismceremoniespurifyand calm the land and its
deity, that childrenare dedicatedthere"(Nelson 1992: 77). Indeed,Shinto
ritualsseemto playa moreprominentrolein Japantodaythan in the pre-World
War II days,backwhen the Emperorwasthoughtto be divine and Shinto was
the state religion. That Shinto was strengthenedby being disestablishedis
entirelyin accordwiththe markettheoryof religion.

WHAT ABOUT CHANGE?

RecentlyI spoketo a groupof Christianhistorians,someof whomfoundit

verydifficultto acceptthat secularization is not faralong. One mentionedthat
religiousnessroseprecipitouslyin Germanyin the latterhalf of the nineteenth
centuryonly to fall substantiallyin the twentieth.Anotherwent on at length
aboutdoctrinalchangesoverthe pastseveralcenturies,and anotherchidedme
in the declinein beliefin witchcraft.I had some
forfailingto see secularization
difficultyin seeinghow someof this relatedto the secularization thesis until I
realizedthat these remarkscamefrompeoplewho somehowbelievedthat this
 R.I.P. 269
SECULARIZATION,

article proposesthat there is no such thing as religiouschange!Of course,

religion changes.Of course,there is more religiousparticipationand even
greaterbeliefin the supernaturalat sometimesandplacesthan in others,justas
religiousorganizationshavemoresecularpowerin sometimesandplacesthan in
others.Of course,doctrineschange - Aquinaswasnot Augustine,and both
wouldfindheresyin the workof AveryDulles.Butchangedoesnot equatewith
decline! If next yeareveryonein Canadabecamea piousHinduthis couldhave
manyinterpretations, butsecularizationwouldnot be amongthem.Indeed,what
is neededis a bodyof theoryto explainreligiousvariation, to tell us when and
why variousaspectsof religiousness riseandfall, or arestable(Stark1998b).In
that regard,the secularizationtheoryis as uselessas a hotel elevatorthat only
goesdown.

CONCLUSION

Letme emphasizethatno one canprovethatone dayreligionwill not wither

away. Perhapsthe day will come when religionhas been relegatedto memory
and museums.If so, however,this will not have been causedby modernization,
andthe demiseof faithwill bearno resemblance to the processpostulatedby the
secularizationdoctrine.Therefore,once and for all, let us declarean end to
socialscientificfaith in the theoryof secularization,
recognizingthat it wasthe
productof wishful thinking. As a requiem,I offer final remarksby three
distinguishedscholars:an anthropologist, then a medievalhistorian,andfinally
by a sociologist.
MaryDouglas(1982: 29) has arguedforcefullyandpersuasively againstthe
secularization doctrineas having "beenconstructedto flatterprejudgedideas"
whichwill needto be discarded"whenreligioussociologymodernizes." It simply
is not true,Douglasnotes,that modernlife contrastssharplywith life in simple
societies when it comes to the prevalenceof religiousbelief. With Clifford
Geertz(1966), she recognizesthat unbeliefis not uncommonin pre-literate
societiesor, indeed,in OldTestamenttimes:

Uncriticalnostalgiaforpastagesof faithbeingout of placein religiousstudies,let us note at

once that there is no good evidence that a high level of spiritualityhad generallybeen
reachedbythe massof mankindin pasttimes.... Nordoes[anthropology] teachthatmodem
timesshowa declinefromancientstandards of piety.

AlexanderMurray(1972: 106), having demonstratedthat the original

sourcesarenearlyunanimousin theiradmissionof widespread in
irreligiousness
medievaltimes, askedfromwhence came the notion of the Age of Faith. He
concluded:

The scientificenlightenmentwastemptedto conceivefaithnot as a virtue,butas an original

sin,fromwhichthe Messiahof knowledgecameto rescueit. It followsfromthatviewthat,in
270 OFRELIGION
SOCIOLOGY

the olden days,men musthave believedall the Churchtold them.This paperhas triedto
shakethe historicalpartof thatconception.

And finally,PeterBerger(1997:974):

I thinkwhatI andmostothersociologistsof religionwrotein the 1960saboutsecularization

wasa mistake.Ourunderlyingargumentwasthat secularization and modernitygo handin
hand.With moremodernization comesmoresecularization.It wasn'ta crazytheory.There
wassomeevidenceforit. ButI thinkit'sbasicallywrong.Mostof the worldtodayis certainly
not secular.It'sveryreligious.

After nearlythree centuriesof utterlyfailed prophesiesand misrepresen-

tations of both present and past, it seems time to carrythe secularization
in
doctrineto the graveyardof failedtheories,and there to whisper"requiescat
pace."

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