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In Re Atty. Emil Jurado PDF
In Re Atty. Emil Jurado PDF
EN BANC
AM NO 90-5-2373 JULY 12, 1990
IN RE: ATTY. EMILIANO P. JURADO, JR. a.k.a. EMIL JURADO
Gentlemen,
Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated July 12,
1990.
“Adm Matter No. 90-5-2373 (In Re: Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado, Jr. a.k.a. Emil Jurado). –
The front page of the Sunday, May 27, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard, a national
daily, carried the banner headline: “Rebellion complex does not exist – SC.” And below it in
smaller type, “State back to Square One in cases vs. Enrile, et. al.” The lead article
appeared in the following page under the sub-head “High Tribunal reaffirms Hernandez
Doctrine with 14-1 vote” and the by-line of “Emil Jurado, Manila Standard Columnist” and
reported, pertinently, that according to “well-placed sources at the Supreme Court,” in a
decision penned by Associate Justice Narvasa” ** to be announced tomorrow for immediate
promulgation ** the court had “** upheld a long standing precedent known as the
Hernandez Doctrine ** (and) reaffirmed that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder
and other common offenses does not exist ** (and) “* (b)y a vote of 14 to one ** denied the
government’s motion (sic) to repeal the doctrine.” It added that said majority included Chief
Justice Marcelo Fernan and that the lone opposition vote was Justice Leo Medialea’s.
Mr. Jurado’s regular column on page 10 of the same issue which was titled “SC
decision knocks out gov’t lawyers.” And began with the word “SCOOP” in bold, reiterated
the above-quoted highlights of his page 2 report. If those details and the photographs
accompanying the report were not indication enough, mention therein of the names of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, ex-Assemblyman Homobono Adaza and lawyer Rafael Recto,
among others, made clear what the main subject of those news items was: a supposed
decision awaiting immediate promulgation on one or another of the cases then pending in
this Court that challenged the validity of criminal informations charging various persons
with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder in connection with the failed
coup attempt of December, 1989.
The Monday, May 28, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard was headlined “High Cort
ruling hailed.” The lead Article by Amante E. Bigornia on page 2 reported that the ruling
had been hailed by unnamed “legal luminaries” and added further supposed details about
its adoption which the writer attributed to the paper’s equally anonymous sources. In his
column on page 9 of the same issue, Mr. Jurado elaborated in his earlier report as follows:
While headlines and news about the matter continued to greet Manila Standard
readers on Tuesday, May 29, 1990, the tenor of these had materially changed. The
headlines now proclaimed that “Cory (referring to the President) awaits SC ruling” and
“Tribunal still deliberating rebellion complex issue.” The news inside was no longer about a
decision already reached or a ruling made. It reported a statement of the Chief Justice,
made through Assistance Clerk of Court Luz Puno, that there was no such decision and
that the matter was still under deliberation. For the first time in three days, Mr. Jurado’s
subject was silent on the subject.
The sequence of events is revealing. Having stood by their news story of two days,
Mr. Jurado and his newspaper had already began to “backtrack,” as it were, by the third,
confronted, no doubt, with the hard fact that it was not and could not be, substantiated.
On that same Tuesday, the Court en banc issued a Resolution branding as false the
news reports of May 27, 1990, declaring that as of that day, no decision or resolution on the
subject of said reports have been signed, either by the supposed ponente or any other
member of the Court, and requiring Mr. Emil Jurado (full name Emiliano P. Jurado, Jr:
hereafter, “respondent” only), a member of the bar as well as a journalist, to explain within
five (5) days why he should not be dealt with administratively” ** for publishing obviously
false statements relative to the Court’s action on a pending proceeding or otherwise
indulging in speculation or conjecture, or airing illicit information about the same.”
By the fourth day, nothing was left but excuses. In his column in the Wednesday,
May 30, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard, respondent acknowledge having received the
show-cause Resolution and sought to justify the questioned news items as legitimate
reporting duly verified [4 LR 20] by both himself and his editor-in-chief and approved for
publication of the latter. The same issued featured an editorial which relevantly:
Only on July 5, 1990 did the Court promulgate its Decision in G.R. Nos. 92163
(Enrile vs. Salazar, et. al.) and 92164 (Sps. Panlilio vs. De Leon, et. al.) upholding the
Hernandez ruling2 in the rebellion cases filed against the petitioners herein. Its contents, by
showing up the many inaccuracies in Mr. Jurado’s earlier accounts, attest to the falsity of
his report of its existence on or before May 27, 1990. Thus, insofar as concerned the
question of wheter or not the Hernandez ruling remains binding precedent, it was not a 14-
0 nor a 14-1, but a 12-1 decision, two members of the Court being on leave. The member
first reported as having dissented (Medialea, J.) did not in fact do so. He concurred with the
majority in G.R. No. 92164 and abstained from voting in G.R. 92163. It was the Chief
Justice who filed a dissent on that principal issue. No member abstained in G.R. No. 92164
by reason of either blood or past professional relationship with the petitioners therein. Of
the 12 member majority, six (6) issued or concurred in separate opinions which, without
affecting their concurrence on the main ruling upholding Hernandez, expressed dissent on,
or reservations about, some points raised and discussed in the majority opinion. The fact
1
Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Lopez Enage 152 SCRA 80 (1987); Ago vs. Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 530 (1962)
2
99 Phil. 515 (1956)
Under date of June 1, 1990, respondent filed a “Compliance” with the show-cause
Resolution which, while assuming responsibility for the publication of the news reports of
May 27, 1990 above referred to and offering his apologies to the Court “** if ** (he had) in
some way, actually hampered the administration of justice, or obstructed the orderly
workings of the Court, ** pleads in justification freedom of the press as well as the right of
the public to information on matters of public concern, both he avers, being guaranteed by
the Constitution.
What said Compliance makes immediately apparent is the wide variance between
the plain import of the news reports in question and that the of the information upon which
respondent admittedly based the same. Said reports – which according to respondent were
drafted, in part at least and in for inclusion in his column, two days before they were
actually published3 - invariably advert to the supposed ruling in the past tense, i.e., as a fait
accompli, a decision already reached, putting into writing and signed, thus” “(t)he Supreme
Court has upheld a long standing legal precedent known as the Hernandez doctrine **; (b)y
a vote of 14 to one, the Tribunal already denied the government’s motion to repeal the
doctrine **; and (t)he ** decision was penned by Associate Justice Andres Narvasa and
concurred in by 13 other justices.: Bit, also by his own account, the information upon which
he based those reports was merely to the effect that ”** the Supreme Court deliberations
clearly pointed to an overwhelming majority for upholding the Hernandez doctrine ** and
indicated ** the existence of a trend towards (such) a consensus among the members of the
Court.”4 While such information might have inspired speculation about a possible ruling, it
simply did not warrant making, much less publishing as news, a conclusion that a decision
on the matter had already been written and signed.
Thus, said reports, insofar as they assumed to chronicle an actual state of facts,
were not only objectively false, even in the context of what respondent claimed had come to
his knowledge, they were also grossly exaggerated and, at best, speculative. If all that
respondent had obtained from his unidentified sources was information had reached a
consensus, or that there was a trend towards a consensus, for upholding the Hernandez
ruling – and it is notable that even as he claims that his editors had checked out said
information prior to publication and obtained further details confirming its accuracy, he
neglects to mention any of those detains – its evolution into straight news that a ruling had
in fact been written and signed [4 LR 21] and was about to be promulgated cannot be
defended on the ground of either truth or honest error.
Neither does it merit belief that respondent’s editors had seriously applied
themselves to checking independently the capacity of information about a supposed ruling
before proposing to respondent and/or authorizing its publication. The implicit admission in
3
Compliance, p. 2, par. 1
4
Id., also pp. 4-5 par. 1
Nothing so far stated, however, should be taken as in any manner implying that
objective truth or good faith will exonerate respondent here. The really relevant question
being whether the report and comments in questions, regardless of their truth and of the
motives or purposes behind their publication, are protected by the constitutionally-
guaranteed freedom of the press and the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.5 There is no dispute of the existence and fundamental character of these
guarantees. But equally fundamental, needing no express statement or sanction in statute
or charter because inherent in the very nature of the judicial power and indispensable to
the free and untrammeled exercise by the courts of their traditional functions, is the
principle of confidentiality of all actuations of, or records or proceedings before, a Court in a
pending action which are not essentially public in character. Such principal the Court holds
to be equally firmly established by immemorial tradition and to inhere in the “judicial
power” that is vested by the Constitution in this Court and in the lower courts established
by law.6 Awareness of such principle is in fact acknowledge, expressly by respondent’s
editors in their May 30, 1990 editorial as already pointed out, and at least implicitly by
respondent himself, if indeed he is not chargeable with such knowledge as a lawyer’s. As far
as the proceedings in this Court are concerned, these confidential matters include, among
others, raffling of cases, deliberation and discussions of the en banc or the divisions, drafts
of decisions and resolutions embodying conclusions reached and dispositions agreed upon
by the members in consultation.
Nor is the tension or confrontation resulting from the interplay of these adversarial
principles a new or recent development. It is as old as their common history, a long-
standing subject of judicial inquiry, and the weight of jurisprudence thereby developed
clearly supports the view that a publication relating to judicial action in a pending case
which tends to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present
danger to the administration of justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom
and is punishable as contempt.
5
ART III, SECS. 4 and 7, Constitution
6 ART VIII, SEC. 1, Constitution
Closer to home, in In Re: Lozano and Quevedo, which involved contempt proceedings
against the editor and writer of a newspaper which published an inaccurate account of a
closed-door investigation of a Judge of First Instance, this Court, after surveying earlier
10
(1929) 36 Fed. (2nd) 230, 238-239
11
80 Conn. 668-69 Atl 1057, 125 Am. St. Rep. 141.
Upon similar considerations, contempt rulings were handed down by the Court in In
Re: Parazo13, where a reporter had refused to divulge the sources of a published account
written by his of alleged leakage in the bar examinations, and in In Re: Sotto14, where the
respondent in a published article criticizing the Court’s decision in Parazo, not only called
said decision erroneous, but portrayed its members, or the majority of them, as
incompetent, narrow-minded blunderers capable of deliberate injustice, and threatened to
present a bill in the next Congress reorganizing the Court and reducing its membership.
It is quite evident that in the particular circumstances of this case and upon
authority of the cited precedents, respondent cannot shield himself from culpability by
invoking the freedoms of the press and of information. There can be no doubt that his
published report and comments on a non-existent decision tended directly to embarrass the
court and obstruct its proper functioning, putting it to what should have been the
unnecessary task of defending or proving the integrity of its proceedings. Even assuming
that he had learned, correctly but surreptitiously through unauthorized “leaks,” of a voting
trend in favor of upholding the Hernandez doctrine, or of deliberations pointing to such a
trend, or even of a draft decision or resolution of the terms and tenor reported, premature
revelation thereof placed the Court in disrepute as an inept and incompetent guardian of its
own confidential proceedings or, worse, offered the temptation to rewrite the decision in
order to avoid such odium. These, considering that as the highest tribunal in the land, the
Court is and should serve as the model and exemplar for all lower courts to emulate,
constituted a clear and present danger to the orderly and impartial administration of
justice.
While he and his editors concede that it is the right and the duty of the Court to
protect the integrity of its proceedings, respondent would plead what he mistakenly
perceives to be a higher duly on his part, as a member of the press, to inform the public on
matters of general interest. This hoary argument finds its answer in the authorities already
cited and what has been stated about press freedom giving no license to breach the
confidentiality of pending judicial proceedings. No useful purpose is promoted, no
professional or civic obligation is served, by publishing information that is of its very
character confidential and should be kept so, before it is announced by the appropriate
authority. Another simpler answer is that there is no duty to publish false information. A
newsman owes the public no duty that he does not owe first to the truth.
Respondent cannot even pretend that he acted in good faith. He lays claim to having
been a full-time journalist for the last forty years. With that wealth of journalistic
experience, to say nothing of his legal education, and the conceded necessity of checking the
accuracy of his sources, he was inexcusably remiss in neglecting the most obvious and
direct way of verifying whether or not there was already a ruling or decision such as the
16
328 U.S. 331 at 354-356 (1946)
Respondent expresses perplexity at being called to account for the publications in his
capacity as a member of the bar, not as a journalist. This distinction is meaningless, since
as the matter stands, he has failed to justify his actuations in either capacity, and there is
no question of the Court’s authority to call him to task either as a newsman or as a lawyer.
What respondent proposes is that in considering his actions, the Court judges them only as
those of a member of the press and disregard the fact that he is also a lawyer. But his
actions cannot be put into such neat compartments. In the natural order of things, a
person’s acts are determined by and reflect, the sum total of his knowledge, training and
experience. In the case of the respondent in particular, the Court will take judicial notice of
the frequent appearance in his regular columns of comments and observations utilizing
legal language and argument, bearing witness to the fact that in pursuing his craft as a
journalist, be calls upon his knowledge as a lawyer to help inform and influence his readers
and enhance his credibility. Even absent this circumstance, respondent cannot honestly
assert that in exercising his profession as a journalist, he does not somehow, consciously or
unconsciously, draw upon his legal knowledge and training. It is thus not realistic, nor
perhaps even possible to come to any fair, informed, and intelligent judgment of
respondent’s actuations by divorcing from consideration the fact that he is a lawyer as well
as a newspaperman, even supposing – which is not the case – that he may thereby be found
without accountability in this matter.
To repeat, respondent cannot claim absolution even where the Court to lend ear to
his plea that his actions be judged solely as those of a newspaperman unburdened by the
duties and responsibilities peculiar to the law profession of which he is also a member.
Withal, it has not escaped the attention of the Court that his Compliance, despite its
strong, even passionate, plea for exculpation does not hesitate to own and beg indulgence
for fault on his own part, if any be found, and in his own words, to place him at the Court’s
mercy. And while the objectionable may, by implication, have cast doubt on the integrity of
the Court’s proceed- [4 LR 24] -ings, they attribute no official or personal impropriety to any
member of the Court. These should be considered in mitigation of the imposable discipline
or penalty.
(SGD.)