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The Tragedy of Blood-Based Citizenship
The Tragedy of Blood-Based Citizenship
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Political Theory
of Immigration in
Euripides’s Ion
Demetra Kasimis1
Abstract
Classical Athens assimilated and disenfranchised a large, free immigrant pop-
ulation of “metics” on the basis of blood, generation after generation. Yet
immigration politics remain a curiously displaced context for interpreting
ancient Greek political thought and its instructive criticisms of democratic
citizenship. Accordingly, Euripides’s Ion—the only classical text devoted to
exploring the founding myth Athens used to naturalize metics’ exclusion
from citizenship–is underexamined by political theorists. Attending to the
play’s metic figurations and historical-poetic contexts, this essay argues that
the Ion is a hitherto unappreciated immigration fable about the paradoxes
of blood-based citizenship. Drawing ultimately on the work of Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick, it shows that the tragedy is a still-relevant political critique of
the practices of concealment and disclosure—so dominant in today’s U.S.
immigration rights debate—that make political status look prior to and gen-
erative of citizenship practice.
Keywords
metics, immigration, Euripides, blood, secrecy
1
Department of Political Science, California State University, Long Beach, CA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Demetra Kasimis, Department of Political Science, California State University, 1250 Bellflower
Boulevard, Long Beach, CA 90840.
Email: demetra.kasimis@csulb.edu
232 Political Theory 41(2)
Calls to Athens
The Ion is a provocative reworking of the classical founding myth the
Athenian demos popularized as a way of establishing its exceptionalism on
234 Political Theory 41(2)
But things do not go exactly according to Apollo’s original plan. Kreousa and
Ion recognize each other while still in Delphi, and this provokes Athena to
insist they keep their blood relation a secret from everyone, including
Xouthos. For Athens to realize its democratic, hegemonic future, everyone
must believe Ion is Xouthos’s long-lost biological son.
Two scenes raise the question of Ion’s homecoming and residence in
Athens. In both scenes, the possibility of Ion’s departure is raised in light of
his newly discovered biological identity. In both, at least one character speaks
from the assumption that there is a stable correspondence between this blood
knowledge and political identity. Yet on both occasions, shortly after each
recognition scene, Ion’s political standing fluctuates: he moves from a status-
less temple servant to an Athenian metic to an autochthonous Athenian back
to an Athenian metic. In each case, Ion’s political membership is (re-)consti-
tuted by some act of concealing or disclosing of status—what is supposed to
be mere uncontroversial facticity.
Xouthos takes to heart the oracle’s insinuation that his first encounter out
of the temple will be with his (long-lost) son (534, 536). This, conveniently,
is Ion, who is incredulous of Xouthos’s disclosure and calls him “ignorant”
(526). Xouthos asks his newfound son to come back to Athens with him,
precipitating an argument two metics in Athens might have had about the
costs and benefits of living there. Ion’s long reply, to which I return shortly,
imagines his life as a metic in Athens to be without privilege and full of dan-
ger, resentment, competition, and censure. In addition to the social discrimi-
nation he would face, his arrival in Athens would cause Kreousa, his supposed
stepmother, embarrassment and pain (617–20). He begs Xouthos to let him
stay in Delphi where he is happy.
Xouthos is dismissive of Ion’s hesitance. He tells him to put an end to his
speaking and focus instead on being successful (650). Given metics’ exclusion
from public political speech and their reputation for economic prowess, the
advice is appropriate. Xouthos does acknowledge the problem of Kreousa’s
feelings and to this at least responds, “I’ll take you, as a sightseer, of course,
and not as my son. For in fact I do not want to cause pain to my wife, childless
as she is, while I am fortunate myself. But in time I shall grasp the right moment
and induce my wife to allow you to inherit my rule over the country” (655–60).
The proposal calls for the reconcealment of what Xouthos takes to be Ion’s
newly found biological identity. The implication is that Ion will act as someone
else, a tourist this time, not an immigrant looking to infiltrate Kreousa’s family/
polis. The interaction ironically anticipates Athena’s closing dictum to Ion that
he must reconceal his “real” autochthonous identity. That secret will fulfill a
similar purpose, but it will keep Xouthos, not Kreousa, unsuspecting.
Kasimis 237
and a successful, assimilated metic like Xouthos, but metics still experience
exclusions that laws cannot capture. Ion suggests the myth of autochthony
invests Athenians in a politics of belonging that extols proper parentage
rather than participation in its institutions. In Athens, good blood displaces
good character as the criterion for political inclusion.18 According to Ion,
there is no way to live in Athens without feeling the effects of this coupling
of blood and political identity. If he lived in Athens as a metic and a child
born out of wedlock, Ion explains, he would always be inferior if not invisi-
ble. Perhaps because he does not know he is fully autocthonous yet, Ion’s
reply to Xouthos offers a heartfelt account of the metic point of view:
No way of living with honor appears open to Ion in Athens. How could one
consent to inhabit the margins of political society when doing so would mean
leading no (political) life, not just a restricted one? If in Athens he does not
make himself invisible, he will engender the scorn of insiders who will.
Athenians will block Ion’s political ascent and effectively disenfranchise
him. And then there is Kreousa, whom the speech invokes in its most explicit
identification of a metic’s way of living with death. “Moving into a strange
house as an outsider to face a woman who is childless,” he will “incur
hatred” from her, just as he would from the demos, and put himself and
Xouthos at risk of murder (606–7, 611, 616–17).
Kasimis 239
For Xouthos, who adopts the conventional Periklean view in this interac-
tion, all the difficulties of living in a foreign city can be overcome by wealth,
which secures influence and safety in an adoptive city, as it would for Ion,
who would inherit his. This idea holds no sway for Ion, who argues that
money in the hands of a nonnative brings the same sorts of pains that politi-
cal superiority does (630–31). Besides, it is not wealth that makes life worth
living somewhere. In Delphi where Ion leads a life of “moderation,” things
are good, better than Athens even (632, 645). There is peace, leisure, and
happiness—not just for the few but for everyone. Why? Because everyone
in Delphi is a foreigner (640). There is no myth of exceptionalism at work,
no status to dole out.
Ion inhabits an outsider’s perspective more than once in this scene. He
puts forward criticisms of Athens through a projected metic-ness that display
a deep knowledge of the Athenian citizen’s view of outsiders. He criticizes
wealth for being inadequate (for metics) to trump law and custom. And when
he praises life in Delphi by contrast, he does not do so because he enjoys the
privileges of an insider there.
The answer Xouthos gives Ion to all this is dismissive—“Enough of this
talk! Learn to be happy!” (650). He begins planning Ion’s arrival despite the
concerns Ion has voiced. He effectively talks past his son. That may be his
new right as a father. But the incompatibility dramatized by their approaches
to the conversation begs a prior question about the argument Ion has just
given. Might Ion have talked past Xouthos, too?
Recall that it was the need for an heir that first motivated Xouthos’s invita-
tion to Ion. Ion “will be seen” in Athens as eugenēs (“well born”) on account of
his inheriting “life’s comforts.” Ion’s immigration is further justified for
Xouthos by the simple fact of familial restoration. “For your part you have
found what is most dear, though you did not know it earlier,” Xouthos says
when he first sees Ion (571). But Ion thinks about his immigration differently—
in terms of what it will mean for his everyday life above and beyond the mate-
rial comforts and power a family tie to a foreign resident can secure. He talks
past Xouthos not because he has not heard the blood reason Xouthos offers for
his immigration but because he does not yet share his father’s view that this
counts as a sufficient reason to act as he wants him to.
As a foreigner, Xouthos may never be a complete insider in Athens, but he
buys into the polis order and represents its wishful self-conception as hospi-
table, which may be true by comparison with some other poleis but not, as Ion
has pointed out, by comparison with Delphi. When the news of their kinship
relation opens lines of action and destiny as far as Xouthos is concerned, his
240 Political Theory 41(2)
the name of a father” (1539–53). Ion wishes to confront Apollo and hear it
directly from him, but Apollo never appears in the play to give Ion or the
audience a reason for his adoption by Xouthos. Instead, Athena arrives to
affirm everything Kreousa has already told him and close the tragedy with a
forecast (1574). Ion will go to Athens. His descendants will “settle in the
island cities of the Kyklades and the territory on the sea-coasts,” giving
“strength” to her land and settling parts of Asia and Europe (1584–88). The
Ionians “will win glory for her and the Athenians,” and Xouthos and Kreousa
will go on to have their own biological children, the progenitors of the Dorian
tribe (1589–90).
For all this to occur, Athena warns Kreousa, “Keep it a secret that this boy
is your son, so that Xouthos may happily retain his delusion and you too,
lady, may go on your way enjoying your blessings” (1601–3). Ion now
accepts the importance of blood to which he earlier objected and, as Xouthos’s
son, prepares to move, with Athena as his escort. He accedes as well to the
notion that he has a role to play in Athens’s imperialist destiny. Ion sets off for
Athens not knowing how long he will have to live as a noncitizen before his
descendants carry the banner of Athens to a new imperial outpost.19
In light of this reprisal of Ion’s immigration, I treat Ion’s earlier speech to
Xouthos and its elucidation of his anxieties about living in Athens not as a
typical dramatic obstacle en route to a happy ending but as a mirror and pre-
diction of this final scene. Does Ion’s ultimate compliance neutralize the con-
cerns he voiced earlier to Xouthos about being a metic when he did not know
autochthonous Kreousa was his mother? It may. Or that earlier speech may
yet ring in our ears. Ion never reconsiders his speech to Xouthos. Life as a
metic will be his and it will be what he feared unless he learns to take
Xouthos’s advice to love “talk” less and “be happy.” In other words, to give
up any hope of parrhesia, the speech of truth and justice that comes with
political freedom in Athens. If Xouthos is right, then Ion’s “true” blood and
the Athenian insider status to which it purportedly corresponds will not deter-
mine his experience of living in Athenian society.
Romanced by Blood
Xouthos’s view aside, life as a metic can hardly be called happy. Yet most
readings of the tragedy argue that the play ends on a surprisingly upbeat note,
even going so far as to call it a “happy” ending.20 Efforts to make sense of
the Ion’s treatment of autochthony tend to foreground, even celebrate, the
recognition scene between Ion and Kreousa.21 This interpretive move has
hitherto distracted from the political problems that are created by the same
242 Political Theory 41(2)
sanctuary into Athenian political society, the ending’s twist renders a (political)
restoration impossible with Athena’s introduction of a secrecy requirement.
The aversion of death, moreover, does not mean the aversion of political con-
flict.30 Readers for whom tragedy’s conflicts are legible only within an arc of
murderous plotting are misled by the play’s avoidance of death and neglect to
attend to the criticality that the play mobilizes both before and after the recogni-
tion scene.31 Failure to account for the de-cognition of kinship that occurs at the
end of the play enlists the Ion in a wholesale positive valuation of restoring
biological identity—the very belief that sustains Athenian hegemony.
When romance readers displace the politics of metoikia from this rewrit-
ing of autochthony, they reproduce Athens’s self-conception—an idealized
vision in which the demos, like the play, is invulnerable to contamination by
the metics that are otherwise everywhere. To see precisely how and from
what the metic’s erasure diverts readers, it is necessary to explicate the broad
lines of Nicole Loraux’s interpretation of the Ion. Loraux offers a bridge
between the romance reading, which sees the Ion’s central conflict as one of
violence averted through the recovery of biological identity, and the one
developed here, in which the play troubles the autochthonous claim that
blood settles questions of membership and belonging once and for all.
Loraux’s way out of the romance reading is to locate the play’s tragic
dimension not in the plot, where others seek it to no avail, but in its autoch-
thonous theme.32 The promising shift in register allows her to argue both
alongside and against the familiar view that the recognition scene may resolve
conflicts in the plot but that this in and of itself, she adds, does not alleviate
the play’s tragic tension. In fact, the way Euripides “resolves” Ion’s incorpo-
ration into Kreousa’s family, says Loraux, exposes the paradoxical, and
therefore, tragic nature of an autochthonous narrative.33
What gives autochthony and, by extension, the Ion a tragic quality for
Loraux is that it expresses a demand to repeat (over generations) what can
only happen once (the original birth).34 Loraux focuses on the play’s treatment
of gender, particularly its depiction of Kreousa, to illustrate this paradox.
Kreousa captures the impossibility as well as the attractiveness of autochtho-
nous birth because as a woman, she is both unnecessary to the original autoch-
thonous birth (from earth) and necessary to the biological reproduction whose
monitoring by Athenians will sustain the myth, and the Athenian people, in
and over time. Thus, when Loraux concludes that “woman is restored to the
shadows” by the end, with the “dilemma” of incorporating Ion into an Athenian
household “only in extremis . . . resolved,” she invites us to see that the final
scene functions as an instructive elaboration of the autochthony paradox.35
Indeed, Athena anchors the identity of the Athenians as a mythically pure and
244 Political Theory 41(2)
colonizing people in a concealment of the very blood tie that the city claims to
celebrate above all else. Kreousa’s so-called restoration to the private realm
plays out the conflicted reality that is always implied by a myth premised on
rejecting the women it depends on to perpetuate itself on (not from) the
ground. The paradox of Kreousa’s “return to the shadows” is that it occurs in
spite, if not because, of her importance to the public realm.
An open secret is not the same as a resolution. Yet Loraux does not consider
the disorderly effects of a restoration that relies on a lie. Her analysis assumes in
spite of the secret’s addition that the play simply mirrors the social meanings—
of woman, metic, autochthonous, Athenian—that the myth of autochthony
espouses in its core. Loraux’s fundamental claim that the Ion gains its tragic
dimension by representing the impossibility of autochthonous birth may be ser-
viced by a presumption of symmetry between text and myth. But such symme-
try also implies that Euripides’s Ion is importing existing social definitions of
woman rather than constituting them. This structuralist angle prevents Loraux
from asking how woman, metic, or any other category comes to bear its mean-
ings in the play. Kreousa may be emblematic of the paradoxical category of
woman that autochthony constructs, but even this category’s construction is
shown to be dependent on a secret, which, as the chorus demonstrated, may not
stay hidden. The categories that autochthony produces no longer appear as sta-
ble as Loraux’s restorative reading suggests.
My main quarrel with Loraux concerns this move away from her initial
willingness to seek the politics of tragedy at the discursive level, where I
insist new meanings are produced and not simply represented by the play.
Rather than treat the Ion as an autochthony story par excellence, I read it as
an active participant in the construction of new meanings. This involves ask-
ing how the secret reconceives and does not just reflect the city’s ideology.
Loraux provides the conceptual language to do so when she suggests that all
tragedy is mythopoetic. One may extend the claim that the Ion, like all mytho-
poesis, is engaged in reproducing an original (myth) anew: tragedy, whether
as text or performance, always marks a difference between an original
(autochthony) and its copy (the Ion).36 The central question is not, How does
the Ion mimic the paradoxical maneuvers demanded by autochthony? It is
rather, What does the Ion reimagine the Athenian politics of belonging to be?
If Loraux’s reading misses possibilities it licenses, it is because she focuses
on the category of woman to the exclusion of the metic. If the reconcealment
restores Kreousa to the private realm, as Loraux thinks it does, the ending of
the Ion fulfills (Loraux’s) Athenian expectations by bringing full circle the
inclusion-exclusion that makes Kreousa a woman and the Ion a tragedy. But
this is only half the story. What Athena demands of Kreousa, she also demands
Kasimis 245
of Ion. And in Ion’s case, the reconcealment makes a metic out of an Athenian
who should be a citizen. But an autochthonous son’s decline into metoikia is
hardly reassuring. Where gender did not but could have, Ion’s metic predica-
ment forces us to look again at how secrecy constitutes the political order in
a regime like Athens. That Ion admires Athens is made clear in the play, but
the question is why, in this rewriting of the autochthony myth, Athens needs
Ion as such. What does it mean that autochthonous blood must be hidden to
ensure that it will subsist as the supposedly reliable and universally sought-
after measure of eligibility for membership in the democracy?
The function of the autochthony myth within the city is largely to guard
against the kind of mingling and confusion of identities that blurs discrete
lines of demarcation in the social order. To prevent this chaos, Athenians
promote a civic ideology that insists social and political difference and the
categories that signify it have meanings that preexist their production and
figuration by the myth. Autochthony grounds difference in claims of nature—
specifically, in earth and blood—to give these categories the appearance of an
ontological status. The natural difference autochthony insists on between a
metic and a citizen is one particular version of the city’s secret. Woman is not
the only category to reveal the irreconcilable tensions that generate the polis’s
ideas of belonging, exclusion, and political membership. Metics also rese-
cure and reperform the value of autochthony as being at the expense of those
outsiders who are at once and always the product of but also the condition for
the democracy’s regeneration.
The metic perspective sheds light on something the play’s politics of gen-
der imply and are implied in but do not obviously illuminate: if a native
Athenian can pass as a metic, a metic can pass as an Athenian, for the so-
called facts of blood (or sex) do not speak for themselves—and, as Ion told
Xouthos, they do not determine a course of action either. This is a worrying
thought from an Athenian hegemon’s perspective. Yet it is precisely what the
marriage of imperialism and autochthony spawns while trying to suppress.37
When a polis colonizes but restricts full membership to natives on the basis
of blood, it cannot but produce the metic, a figure whose inclusion-exclu-
sion—whose ability to pass—bears the promise and the risk of this form of
citizenship. In asking Ion and Kreousa to keep his autochthonous identity
secret, Athena indicates that the polis’s seemingly inviolate identifications
are really vulnerable performances of naturalized identifications. From this
perspective, the Ion does not equivocate on or reproduce the claims of the
traditional autochthony story, as other readers have suggested. Nor does it
simply expose a tension between political membership as bloodright (status)
and political membership as a lived experience (practice). Rather, the tragedy
246 Political Theory 41(2)
exposes the Athenian practices that work to give an ontological status to the
city’s categories of standing. As the next section attests, Ion’s fate makes
manifest the violability of these categories and suggests it is foundational to
Athenian politics.
a marriage of imperial power. This is not just to reproduce biologically but for
the city to secure its capacity to maintain and innovate itself. It is a problem
Xouthos acknowledges early in the play when he hopes for Kreousa’s even-
tual and “painful” acquiescence to Ion’s incorporation into the family. Athena
invokes it, too, when she intimates that Kreousa will remain childless unless
she endures Ion’s inclusion as an apparent foreigner in the house of Erechtheus.
Only then will she and Xouthos go on to have a koinon genos, a “common
race” (1589), which the play outs, against convention, as a half-breed.
If Kreousa represents Athens here, as Loraux’s reading claims, what might
the secret be saying about the city? Kreousa was raped by a god, bore an
illegitimate child, and married a foreigner she needs to secure and define her
future. This feminized Athens should be autonomous. Kreousa, after all, has
an oikos of her own. But a female-headed household is apparently not ade-
quate, given Xouthos’s role. The patriarchal polis depends on violence, for-
eigners, trickery, and coercion to reproduce itself. There is no future for
Athens without cultural mixing.
One reason for this may be that the Athenian political order is inevitably
self-limiting. “The appeal to intergenerationality is always paradoxical,”
writes Jacqueline Stevens, because it rests “on the naturalized rules of kin-
ship that are produced by political societies,” the very same political societies
that turn to kinship as their natural ground.39 The secret at the very center of
the polis is that the blood ties it relies on are actually its own production.40
From a fifth-century perspective, it is likely that a woman in Kreousa’s situ-
ation could bequeath her family’s inheritance (ta prosfata) only to a son of a
legitimate union, which Ion is not. Only if Ion is thought to be the adopted
son of Kreousa and the non-autochthonous, natural, but illegitimate son of
Xouthos can he inherit and play a role in Athenian destiny. Through the secret
that transforms him into Xouthos’s metic son, he inherits wealth (and military
power) from Xouthos, though not full citizenship, and gains some status in
the polis as well as its legacy.41
Here Loraux issues a useful caution, which she may not quite follow, that
the play’s historical contexts cannot do the work of rendering the secret a
necessary or understandable solution to the tragedy. The tensions created by
the polis’s laws for membership are never actually solved, she reminds:
“Xouthos is and remains an intruder who cannot therefore really be the legiti-
mate father.” Echoing Ion’s worries, Loraux surmises that “in the eyes of the
Athenians, given the standing of Xouthos, Ion could at most be regarded as
an adopted son, unable to inherit the oikos of his adoptive father.”42 Loraux
may be right about this. But the absence of a neat solution to the play makes
the pursuit of the secret’s theoretical significance all the more appropriate.43
248 Political Theory 41(2)
In the context of the Ion’s production, inheritance laws serve as just one
instance of the range of institutional practices driving the insistence on and
attachment to familial identity and its knowability. The desire Xouthos feels
for his son’s return might also be an effect of the polis’s insistence on the
ontological priority of blood ties.
Zacharia may bring us closer to the secret’s meaning when she suggests
“the outsider must be allowed in if what lies within is to be rescued.”44 She
rightly shifts attention back to the necessary role the foreigner plays in secur-
ing autochthony’s perpetuity, but her language betrays the autochthonous
view that there is a stable inside to begin with. From Zacharia’s perspective,
the Ion’s criticism of autochthony on this issue amounts to little more than its
empirical debunking. In other words, one effect of the Ion’s retelling is that it
posits retroactively an Athenian founding in which foreigners were just
absorbed into the polis (maybe even the demos) and a native was left out.
Zacharia is not wrong, but her case and its dyadic structure may be driven by
her exclusive focus on Xouthos’s foreignness. The future of autochthony cer-
tainly needs Xouthos’s inclusion, but what of the performative foreignness
Ion expresses? In the play, Xouthos and Kreousa’s procreation hinges only in
part on Xouthos’s deceptive inclusion. It also requires Kreousa’s and Ion’s
silence about Ion’s nativity and Ion’s living in Athens as Xouthos’s metic son.
In Foucault’s reading of the Ion, the future of Athens depends on an
exclusion—of oracular pronouncements of truth—that then clears the way
for Athena to found the city in a political order of parrhesia, the speech-act
of political freedom.45 But this account depends, like other happy-ending
readings, on regarding Ion’s return not as a metoikia but as a homecoming.
Foucault sees “the truth of Ion’s birth and his right to exercise power now in
Athens” in Athena’s closing pronouncement in decidedly rosier hues than
Ion himself, who believed his life in Athens would lack parrhesia.46
Although Foucault is right to fasten on the generative power of Athena’s
“truth under the reign of a share of illusion,” his sanguine view of Ion’s
standing may imply the political order he takes it to generate is similarly
idealized. Seen in terms of Ion, the play’s closing does not found the field of
truth-telling, as Foucault insists, but rather grounds the autochthonous ideol-
ogy that is needed to keep the political order in place.
Drawing on the work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick may help us see pre-
cisely how the secret of Ion’s autochthonous birth does not mirror but rather
transforms Athens’s civic ideology. Sedgwick chronicles a historical shift in
perceptions of sexuality that provides a useful frame for thinking about the
competing conceptions of citizenship—status and practice—intertwined in
the Athenian model. No longer a “matter of acts” to which “anyone might be
Kasimis 249
Conclusion
Euripides’s Ion unsettles the forceful presumption that the right blood estab-
lishes citizenship in an unconventional way. It does not focus on a man with
the wrong blood who nevertheless infiltrates Athenian society undetected by
virtue of his active participation in the polis’s institutions. But there were
many cases of this, as classical court speeches attest, as well as a politics of
suspicion around such infiltration. In the Ion, practices of disclosure and
concealment are exposed as the daily work that enables the city to give its
self-serving and exclusionary guarantee that status, bestowed by blood,
grounds a practice of citizenship. The Ion teaches that there are practices,
like secret-keeping, that make political status look prior to and generative of
political practice.
This deconstruction of the binary relation of status and practice is not con-
fined to discussions of classical or blood-based citizenship. It applies to any
political field that insists a legible, verifiable identity precedes and determines
political visibility and citizenship activity. Undocumented activists engaging
in a strategy of disclosure today invert Ion’s predicament, but they risk making
the same point. Because Ion’s turn to the closet leads to a deprivileged status,
the play is an importantly disorienting lens through which to assess the dis-
avowed effects of any project that seeks emancipation through a logic of
secrecy. When immigrants “come out illegal” and fashion themselves as cur-
rently illegitimate but eligible for future recognition, they bring to mind Ion,
whose anticipated transition from a status-less temple servant—without facts
of birth, without even a name—to a political subject also moved through the
closet door. As status-less political subjects engaged in political acts of dem-
onstration, the undocumented do reveal the limits of a status-based citizen-
ship. But their strategy, as Ion showed, also utilizes a discourse that is always
already dyadically productive and stabilizing of a dominant identity.
Perhaps more significantly, coming out illegal generates new lines of divi-
sion between forms of illegitimacy. The Dream Act privileges a particular tra-
jectory to legal status when it emphasizes the lack of choice immigrants had as
children entering the United States illegally. If the initial criminal act of entry
is considered unintentional, it no longer appears decisive or indicative of the
Kasimis 251
model behavior that has since recommended inclusion. The difficulty with this
logic, however, is that it underlies the anti-immigration position as well. In
public discourse, the case for deportation often rests on the insinuation that
illegal immigration expresses something ontologically true about a person: the
act of illegal entry reveals one to be a lawbreaker as such. These seemingly
divergent accounts both treat practices of illegality not as behaviors but as
marks of character. In this they converge with the autochthonous insistence
that blood, like character, is the prior and natural ground of citizenship prac-
tice despite all evidence to the contrary.
Acknowledgments
For helpful suggestions and criticisms, I thank James Tully, Ross Carroll, and three
anonymous reviewers for Political Theory. I owe special gratitude to Bonnie Honig
for her generous comments on multiple drafts. Philip Baker, Ella Myers, Christopher
Skeaff, Simon Stow, Bryan Garsten, Karuna Mantena, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, Hélène
Landemore, Andrew F. March, Rachel Templer, Jay Elliott, Christopher Trinacty,
Emily Greenwood, and Larry George offered stimulating thoughts and encourage-
ment. Thanks to Sara Monoson and Mary Dietz for helpful discussions about an early
incarnation of the project.
Author’s Note
Versions of this paper were presented at Yale, the 2011 Western Political Science
Association meeting in San Antonio, and the University of South Carolina’s 2011
comparative literature conference on nostos.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article: This article was completed with the sup-
port of a Mellon Post-Doctoral Fellowship at the Whitney Humanities Center, Yale
University.
Notes
1. About twenty states are considering laws similar to Arizona’s 2010 controver-
sial SB1070. The Arizona law, partially blocked by the Ninth Circuit, makes it a
crime to not carry immigration papers and requires police “when practicable” to
252 Political Theory 41(2)
detain people they reasonably suspect are in the country illegally and to verify
their status with federal officials.
2. See Jose Antonio Vargas, “My Life as an Undocumented Immigrant,” New York
Times, June 22, 2011; and Maggie Jones, “Coming Out Illegal,” New York Times,
October 21, 2010. The federal dream act offers a conditional pathway to legal
residency for immigrants who entered the country illegally before the age of 16
and pursue higher education or military service.
3. In her analysis of immigrant participation in the 2006 demonstrations against
new anti-immigration legislation, Cristina Beltràn draws on Jacques Rancière’s
notion of dissensus to see their activity as an exercise of power that stages a
“dispute about the very frame within which we see something as given.” Beltràn
eventually criticizes a specific kind of immigrant self-fashioning that relies on a
discourse of labor to “gain political visibility,” but her discussion may take for
granted the unequivocally contestatory power of “acts of public disclosure”—
and even the language of visibility—that seem rather to assume, not dispute, the
frame in which undocumented immigrants are constituted as already invisible.
See Beltràn, The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 135, 139, 142.
4. For politically sensitive interpretations of the play, see Michel Foucault, The
Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France (London:
Palgrave, 2010), and Arlene Saxonhouse, “Myths and the Origins of Cities:
Reflections on the Autochthony Theme in Euripides’ Ion,” Greek Tragedy and
Political Theory, ed. J. Peter Euben (Berkeley: University of California, 1986),
257–60. See note 19.
5. For attention to the symbolic politics of metoikia, see the work of Pierre Vidal-
Naquet, “Oedipus between Two Cities: An Essay on Oedipus at Colonus,” in
Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, ed. Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-
Naquet (New York: Zone, 1990). Jacques Derrida models a way of reading clas-
sical theory through the stranger, not the metic in particular, in Of Hospitality
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). See also Nicole Loraux, Born of the
Earth: Myth and Politics in Athens, trans. Selina Stewart (Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 2000), 125–42.
6. Because politeia, often translated as citizenship, refers to both the juridical status
of membership and “active participation in public life,” it is difficult to distinguish
between the two meanings in the classical context, as Philip Brook Manville has
argued. “That is because the status of membership in the Athenian community
could not really be separated from the role the citizen played in it,” he explains.
Manville, The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1990), 5. However, this distinction is precisely what I take the Ion
to reveal. On the conflict between citizenship as a status and a practice in the
Kasimis 253
contemporary context, see Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of
Contemporary Membership (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 117.
7. The population estimates for metics living in Athens at any period are multiplied
from military figures, most of them Thucydides’s, whose numbers suggest metics
were around a third of the hoplites fighting. At the beginning of the Pelopon-
nesian War, there may have been 28,500 metics. A. W. Gomme, The Popula-
tion of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1933),
18–19.
8. Vincent Rosivach, “Autochthony and the Athenians,” The Classical Quarterly
37, no. 2 (1987): 294–306, 297.
9. Athenians are referred to as “the demos of Erechtheus” in Homer (Il. 2.19) but by
Sophocles’s time have become his descendants (Aj. 202). Rosivach sees this as
a shift in the Athenian self-conception. Erechtheus was eventually seen as Athe-
nians’ eponymous ancestor. Rosivach, “Autochthony and the Athenians,” 295.
10. Nicole Loraux, Born of the Earth, 10 and 33–34.
11. The Periklean laws of 451/0, re-enacted in 403/2, prescribed double endogamy.
That is, qualification for citizen status hinged on birth from two citizens. The
law may have relaxed during the Peloponnesian War, however. See Cynthia Pat-
terson, “Athenian Citizenship Law,” The Cambridge Companion to Greek Law,
ed. D. Cohen and M. Gagarin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
267–89.
12. Here I draw on and invert Bonnie Honig’s point about the myth of an immigrant
America. For Honig, the exceptionalist account “recuperates foreignness” for a
national project by “drawing on and shoring up the popular exceptionalist belief
that America is a distinctively consent-based regime, based on choice, not inheri-
tance.” Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001), 75.
13. There is no consensus on the Ion’s production date but assessments posit it some-
time between 415 and 412. I rely on Zacharia’s persuasive account that the play
was produced in March 412. Zacharia, Converging Truths, 1–3
14. There were also “fears of a general imperial secession,” which fits with the
“marked emphasis on Ionianism at the beginning and end of the play.” It is also
worth noting that in March 412 the Erechtheum, the shrine to Erechtheus, “stood
half-finished” and all parts of the Acropolis building project that “concerned
the inalienable mythical past of the city” were suspended for financial reasons.
Zacharia, Converging Truths, 1–3.
15. Like much Euripidean drama, the Ion is innovating because it engages in mytho-
poesis, the radical reworking of traditional myths. Such mythmaking is pedagogical
insofar as its departure from the traditional myth invites comparison that animates
reflection on the productivity of all myth. Because tragedy is characterized by
254 Political Theory 41(2)
claim to any directorial function” because “she only comes at the point when all the
serious conflicts have already been resolved (e.g., the prevention of the killing of
son by mother and mother by son).” Converging Truths, 146.
23. Susan Lape calls the Ion a “family romance of Athenian racialism.” Race and
Citizen Identity, 95, 98.
24. For a discussion of the play in the context of Athenian imperialism, see Zacharia,
Converging Truths.
25. Donald J. Mastronarde emphasizes that tragedy was an innovative and changing
genre in the classical period in The Art of Euripides: Dramatic Technique and
Social Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 44, 47, 51.
26. The costs to Ion’s citizenship in Athens do signal autochthony’s violent effects—
the structural exclusions and imperialism and its costs to human life.
27. Dougherty thus looks elsewhere to salvage the Ion’s tragic sensibility in spite of
its “happy ending” and finds it in its use of Delphi, which “functions in Greek
tragedy as a dramatic topos . . . where things work out . . . and contradictions
can be reconciled” (Dougherty, “Democratic Contradictions,” 263). Dougherty,
“Democratic Contradictions,” 264. For a view that opposes reading the play as a
“Delphic tragedy,” see Loraux, Children of Athena.
28. Zeitlin, 154. The discourse of happiness is also used by Saxonhouse, though she
rightly senses, but does not investigate, the “disquieting tone to the successful
and happy conclusion to the plot.” Saxonhouse, “Myths and the Origins of Cit-
ies,” 272, 257–60.
29. Ion’s repatriation signals his compliance with Athena’s instruction and her invo-
cation of Athenian destiny but little more as far as his own sentiments are con-
cerned. There is no textual evidence to suggest that Ion goes home happy or that
he will live a happy life there.
30. We could distinguish between visions of tragedy as conflict (political) and trag-
edy as suffering (ethical). See Bonnie Honig, “Antigone’s Two Laws: Greek
Tragedy and the Politics of Humanism,” New Literary Theory 41 (2010): 1–33.
31. Such an emphasis on violence leads Dougherty, for example, to argue that the
recognition scene not only “avoids murder” but “restores all participants in
timely fashion to their proper and productive identities.” The play, she and oth-
ers suggest, is restitutive not destructive, and for this reason quite unlike a trag-
edy. Dougherty, “Democratic Contradictions,” 264. Even Zacharia calls the end
“superficially” happy but tempers her assessment by seeing it as a means to an
end. For the play’s logic “is not just there to lead to the happy ending.” It “has a
thought-provoking function of its own.” Zacharia 148–49.
32. Loraux, Children of Athena, 184.
33. Ibid., 230.
34. Ibid., 195.
256 Political Theory 41(2)
Author Biography
Demetra Kasimis is an assistant professor of political science at California State
University, Long Beach. She is writing a book about the figure of the metic and
ancient Greek political thought, provisionally titled Imitating Citizens: Classical
Greek Theory and the Politics of Immigration.