ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen.

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen.
Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of
FACTS: the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic of the Philippines.
laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s
civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano is
void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is
governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and
upon his death, his widow.

In its September 13, 2005 Resolution, the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son she raised.
Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s
legitimate children with Zorayda filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged,
inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this ISSUE:
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in1993.
WON the marriage between Estreliita and the deceased Sen. Tamano was bigamous

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for an
extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995, and again, another 15
days or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted. RULING:

YES. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083 and therefore bigamous. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 20, 1995
void ab initio.
where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the
Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under
civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and
The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of
non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
nullity. Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the
exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized
denial of her Motion to Dismiss.
except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

The CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30, 1996. Estrellita
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way
then elevated the appellate court’s judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on
of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
certiorari
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the

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Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does the effect that the license number (9969967) on the presented marriage contract was of
not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
another marriage, to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.

GR # 183896
RTC RULING : RTC ruled that the marriage between the petitioner ad respondent is hereby annulled.
ABBAS v ABBAS
CA RULING: CA reversed the ruling, citing sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that
30-1-2013 there was compliance with all he requisites laid down by law.

FACTS ISSUE

• Syed, a Pakistani national, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino national, in Taiwan during 1991.

WON the absence of a valid marriage license renders a marriage invalid.

• They were married at a Taipei Mosque by 9-Aug-1992.

HELD

• He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992.

Yes; as a marriage license, a formal requisite for marriage is clearly absent, the abovementioned

• On 9-Jan-1993, his mother in law arrived with two men on her residence where petitioner was marriage is void ab initio.

also living. He was then told that he will undergo some ceremony, which is a requirement for his

stay in the country. There was no explanation provided, during which petitioner and Gloria RATIO

signed a document. It was only much later that he knew it was a marriage when Gloria told him.

• Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual or copy of the disputed marriage license, with the

• Petitioner further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, respondent relying primarily on the marriage contract and the testimonies of her witnesses to

nor had he ever resided there. prove the existence of the license.

• Petitioner went to the Office of the Civil Registrar or Carmona, Cavite, to check on their • In accordance with Articles 3,4,35(3) of the Family Code, the absence of a marriage license

marriage license and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract with a license which is a formal requisite renders the marriage void.

number.

• Despite the questionable motive of petitioner for the annulment petition to prosper, this cannot

• The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivina C. Encarnacion issued on 11-Jul-2003, a certification to make up for the respondent's failure to provide for a valid marriage license. It was Gloria who

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took the necessary steps to procure the license, hence it's lack cannot be attributed to him. marriage void." and not for purposes of remarriage which the petitiiner contends.

2. Not necessarily. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment
therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated
DOMINGO v. CA and AVERA February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.

FACTS:
Roberto Domingo and Delia Soledad Avera married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth JOSELITA SALITA vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS
Center Bldg.
G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994
Unknown to her, Domingo had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969
which marriage is valid and still existing. S
She came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them
for bigamy
FACTS:
From January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia
Since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila. A
support and subsistence year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment
on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity which incapacity existed at the time of the
Out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto; petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. Subsequently, in his Bill
of Particulars, Edwin specified that at the time of their marriage, Joselita was psychologically
Sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was
with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties
unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified
without her knowledge or consent
Doctor of Medicine — upon his time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of
She confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and
Still petitioner was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She insists that the allegations in the
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact.
Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of ultimate facts, and fail to point
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render
Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes
petitioner Roberto Domingo. that her insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding
circumstances of time, place and person does not call for information on evidentiary matters
ISSUES: because without these details she cannot adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the
WON a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether petition.
the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
WON the case (SP No. 1989-J) filed by private respondent is the proper remedy of private
ISSUE:
respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Whether or not the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of
RULING: particulars filed in amplification of the petition is sufficient.
Yes, there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before
contracting another. For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. HELD:

No. The word “solely” shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
3
Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly from the basis of the primary
right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omission of the defendant. It refers to
acts which the evidence on trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the
existence of those facts. The Supreme Court ruled that on the basis of the allegations, it is evident
that petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has
already alleged that petitioner was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his
profession. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts
— facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. The additional facts called for by petitioner
regarding her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is
not the function of a motion for bill of particulars.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the questioned
Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals
FACTS: Leouel Santos, a member of the army and Julia Bedia, a nurse got married in September 1986.
The couple lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to their son, Leouel Santos Jr. in 1987. As a
young
couple, Julia’s parents showed frequent interference with regards to their family affairs. They now
had arguments regarding this matter. Leouel thought that it’s about time that they should start living
independently from Julia’s parents.
In May 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later, she
and Leouel had the chance to talk over a long distance phone call. Which she promised him to return
home in 1989 but she never did. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military
training. He tried his best to find Julia in the US but he could not locate his wife.
Leouel asserted that due to Julia’s failure to return home or at least communicate with him leads to
filing a case in the RTC nullifying their marriage under Article 36 that constitutes psychological
incapacity. Julia filed an opposition; she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent and irresponsible.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is present in the case.
4
HELD: No. In this case, Leouel may stand aggrieved but his petition must be dismissed because the
alleged Psychological Incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented.
The
factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Psychological Incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. This psychological
condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that Psychological Incapacity
must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
REPUBLIC VS. CA & MOLINA
Facts:
Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina,
they were married on April 14, 1985 and son Andre O. Molina was born a year after their marriage.
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that
he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of
the family;
October 1986- the couple had a very intense quarrel that caused their relationship to be estranged
and resulted to Roridel quitting her job in March 1987. She then lived with her parents in Baguio
City.
Reynaldo’s filled Anwer stated that: he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and
wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2)
Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's
failure to run the household and handle their finances.
RTC- declared marriage null and void.
CA- denied petitioner’s appeal.
OSG- insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase
'psychological incapacity'. CA denied OSG’s appeal
CA’s anwer to OSG- "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added its own opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on
personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in
the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed
and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Petitioner- "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable
of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
Held: "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and
that (there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
"the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she
and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of
the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
5
1. Art 36- The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.
RTC ruling reversed. Marriage still subsists as valid
GR No 119190
Chi Ming Tsoi vs Court of Appeals and Gina Lao-Tsoi
Facts:
Gina Lao-Tsoi, the plaintiff, filed an annulment of marriage against Chi Ming Tsoi on the grounds of
psychological incapacity. She contended that her husband was psychologically incapacitated because
he refused to have sex with her. To further prove that there was no consummation of marriage, she
presented her physical results which state that she was still a virgin. She further contended that her
husband merely married her to hide his homosexuality and to maintain his residency in the country.
The defendant admitted that there was no sexual contact between them. But he rebutted the
plaintiff’s claims by stating she was the one who is psychologically incapacitated and not him. The
defendant submitted himself to a physical examination to prove his physical and psychological
capacity. Dr. Alteza said in her report that the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with
a woman. The defendant further attested that the petitioner was the one who refused to have sex
with him.
The Trial Court rendered their marriage to be void and the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.
Issue: Whether or not the refusal of both the petitioner and respondent to have sex with each other
constitute of psychological incapacity of both
Ruling: A marriage can be created when both parties are psychologically capacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. When one of the parties was proven to be psychologically
incapacitated even after the solemnization of the marriage, the marriage between the parties would
be declared as void. In the case at bar, the marriage between Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi was
void due on the grounds of psychological incapacity.
Application: One of the essential obligations of marriage is to procreate children through sexual
intercourse. Refusal to meet this obligation could be detrimental to one’s marriage. In the case at
bar,
the defendant was reluctant to make love to his wife because of her said refusal. The records show
that the defendant failed to find out what the problem with his wife could be Considering their 10
months of cohabitation as spouses, the defendant's reluctance to consummate their marriage
is more than stubborn refusal. This constitutes a sign of psychological incapacity.
Brenda Marcos vs Wilson Marcos
(G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000)
FACTS:
Wilson and Brenda Marcos were married twice, a civil wedding in Pasig on September 6, 1982 and a
church wedding in Manila on May 8, 1983. They have 5 children. When Wilson left the military
service in 1987, he engaged in several business ventures but did not however prosper and he has no
other gainful employment. As a consequence thereof and his inability to provide for his family, he
and Brenda would often quarrel and beat her and also hurt his children. Although they were already
living separately since 1992, they would still have bitter encounters which involve physical harm.
Due to Wilson’s violence, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage on the ground that the
latter was psychological incapacitated. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Article 36
which was however reversed by the Court of Appeals for failure to prove that the incapacity was
existing at the time of the celebration of marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable to be proven by experts.
6
Hence, the case was petitioned to the SC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a
requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.
HELD:
1. No. The personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. It may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
Also, the guidelines for the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to
Under Art. 36 of the Family Code were provided in the Republic v. CA and Molina Case but the 3
basic requirements mandated by the court that psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
b. Gravity
c. Juridical antecedence
d. Incurability
2. No. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his
acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception
of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
In addition, because Art. 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, the respondent should
have observed the procedural requirements for its invocation in the Molina case, but failed to do so.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HAMANO
FACTS:
On October 1986, Respondent, Loreta Hamano started a common law relationship with Toshio
Hamano. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. However, Toshia went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987.
On January 14,1988, the respondent and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor Cavite. Unknown to the
respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
became manifest only after their marriage.
Toshio went back to Japan and promised the respondent that he’ll return by Christmas to celebrate
the holidays with his family.
Toshio stopped giving financial support, but the respondent didn’t stop sending letters to him to
know his whereabouts,
Respondent learned that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their
child.
Hence, a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by the respondent to her Japanese
national husband, Toshio Hamano on the ground of psychological incapacity. She testified on how
she and their child were abandoned by Toshio.
RTC’s
Marriage of the respondent and Toshio declared null and void on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity. Whereas, he remained irresponsible and unconcerned
over the needs and welfare of his family.
CA’s
Denied the appeal made by the OSG. Affirming the decision rendered by the RTC.
Respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his
family and to ‘observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support’ pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code.
This case shouldn’t be equated with Molina and Santos cases because it involved mixed
marriages
ISSUE:
7
WON, Toshio is psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner (REPUBLIC OF THE PH).
Applying the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 enumerated in the
MOLINA CASE (Yung 8 guyssss)
This guidelines incorporate the basic requirements a. Gravity b. Juridical antecedence c. Incurability.
There’s no need for the medical examination in determining psychological incapacity.
Therefore, Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but IT WAS NEVER ALLEGED
NOR PROVEN TO BE DUE TO SOME KIND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ILLNESS.
Molina Case: it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person, it is essential that he must shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological not physical illness
ANTONIO v. REYES
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent
was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the
Gospel at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding at the Sta. Rosa de Lima
Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. Out of their union, a child was born
on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and
void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted
that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to
the present.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when
in fact, no such incident occurred.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told
some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the
Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy
letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the number one moneymaker
in the commercial industry worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was
the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.
He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when
he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. She spent lavishly on unnecessary
items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from
her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he
finally left her for good in November 1991.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by
attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that
she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband.
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent
from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the
Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she
had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson
& Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although
8
she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office
hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel
on 8 December 1979.
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof
were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States
while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked
the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to
monitor her husbands whereabouts.
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her
monthly budget of P7,000.00.
RTC RULING:
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents
propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe.
This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the
part of the parties. During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan
Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals.
CA RULING:
The appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have
been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of
the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:

WON. the totality of evidence presented sufficiently meets the standard set for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
SC RULING:
The Court find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on
his wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon
which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2)
expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of
respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
courts decision.
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of
and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark
about her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the
truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced
by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial
court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
RATIONALE:
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There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as
having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for
nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of
people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
REINSTATED.
Dino vs Dino
Facts:
On May 30, 2001, Alain M. Dino, the petitioner, filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
against his wife, Ma. Caridad L. Dino, under the grounds of psychological incapacity. This was proven
by Dr. Tayag’s psychological report of Ma. Caridad Dino. The report said that the respondent suffers
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a long-lasting and incurable disorder. The petitioner also
stated that his wife failed to comply with her marital obligation of giving him love and support. The
petitioner learned at a later date that the respondent had already acquired a divorce decree of their
marriage.
The trial court granted the petition but the decree would only be issued upon the compliance with
Article 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Upon the petitioner’s motion for partial consideration, the trial
court granted and modified its decision. The decision states that the decree of absolute marriage
shall be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Art 147 of
the Family Code.
The petitioner now contends that the annulment of his marriage does not apply to Art 147 of the
Family Code.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of an absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued after the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.
Held:
The petitioner’s contention was right. Article 147 of the Family Code is not applicable to the case at
bar. The marriage of Alain Dino and Ma Caridad Dino was declared void ab intio under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is therefore considered
as void from the start and doesn’t need to wait for the liquidation of properties for its declaration.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.
REPUBLIC V DE GRACIA
FACTS:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug,
Zamboanga del Norte.[6] They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2)
children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza).
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
(complaint) before the RTC, alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
her essential marital obligations.
RODOLFO: In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad
when they were students at the Barangay High School of Sindangan, and he was forced to marry her
barely three (3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. At the time of their
marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18 years of age. He had no stable job and merely
worked in the gambling cockpits as “kristo” and “bangkero sa hantak” When he decided to join
and train with the army,
Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, Natividad
moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child
named Julie Ann Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage on
January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the
latter in Cagayan de Oro City.
From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and
Ma.
Rizza and he exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of
Natividad’s psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.
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NATIVIDAD: For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during trial, despite
service of summons. Nonetheless, she informed the court that she submitted herself for psychiatric
examination to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfo's claims.
Rodolfo also underwent the same examination.
Dr. Zalsos: Stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from "utter emotional
immaturity which is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered as deviant from persons who
abide by established norms of conduct”.
OSG: Filed an opposition to the complaint, contending that the acts committed by Natividad did not
demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal
separation under the Family Code.
RTC: Declared the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
OSG: Averring that there was no showing that Natividad’s personality traits constituted
psychological incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that the testimony of
the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court.
CA: AFFIRMED RTC
SC: REVERSED AND SET ASIDE
In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by:
(a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which
does not, however, explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as
grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence.
Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which she administered on Natividad,
Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's condition and to show
that it existed at the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of
Natividad's behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations
sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos's report.
There is a precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a
particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat somekind of experience or
Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's condition remains
the lack of care
unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare
conclusion and even self- serving.

To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as 4. The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the
wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision
level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. Committee. He stated to wit,

G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

“Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been
manifested running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and being the
vs.
bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became an obsession and that
led to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had embraced”
FACTS:

1. Petitioner, Valerio E. Kalaw, presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses
were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
“ She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and associating
with friends. They were the priorities of her life. Her family is a mere secondary”
He, as well, identified the word “Narcissism” - It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to
make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that became
known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty
and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.

2. Respondent, Ma. Elena Fernandez, always presents a contrary evidence refuting these allegations
of the petitioner. Such as playing mahjong four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two
to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she
played mahjong in their relative’s home.
5. According, Dr. Dayan, respondent’s own witness, interpreted the result of the Millon Clinical
Multiaxial Inventory test conducted on the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high
scores on dependency(79), narcissism(78) and compulsivenes(84), to which the acceptable score is
72 and below, and when it scored 73 and above, it would mean that it is very significant.

ISSUE: WON the respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

3. Dr. Gates, petitioner’s expert presented, findings on arriving to the conclusion that the
respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder from the moment when she
partly assumed to be the breadwinner’s role in her family after the death of her father when she was RULING: YES.
still a teenager and the moment she indicated to Valerio Kalaw that he cannot blame her for being
negligent as a mother because she herself never experienced the care and affection of her own
mother herself.

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Psychological incapacity - refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the
celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be :

(a) medically or clinically identified,

(b) alleged in the complaint,

(c) sufficiently proven by experts and

(d) clearly explained in the decision.

 The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the
determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and
responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to
her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would
erode their moral fiber.

 Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children.

 The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not
only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them
to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every
occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their
needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the
observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained
that the current psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood
experience.

The court made a decision that the lack of personal examination and interview of the person
diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the
experts.

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