Professional Documents
Culture Documents
10.1177/0010414004272526
Thames / A HOUSE
POLITICAL
DIVIDEDSTUDIES / April 2005
A HOUSE DIVIDED
Party Strength and the Mandate Divide
in Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine
FRANK C. THAMES
Texas Tech University
Mixed-member electoral systems embrace two views of representation by electing some legisla-
tors in single-member district elections and others in a proportional representation election. This
can potentially create a “mandate divide” in legislatures, because single-member district legisla-
tors have an incentive to embrace parochial issues and proportional representation legislators
have an incentive to center on national issues. Previous studies of this question have only found
limited evidence of its existence. The author argues that the level of party system institution-
alization will fundamentally determine whether a mandate divide will exist in a mixed-member
legislature. Using roll-call voting data from the Hungarian National Assembly, the Russian
Duma, and the Ukrainian Rada, the author analyzes patterns of party discipline in each legisla-
ture. The empirical results show that a mandate divide only existed in the legislature with the
most weakly institutionalized party system, the Russian Duma.
I n recent years, scholars of electoral systems have had to contend with the
proliferation of mixed-member electoral systems across the globe.1 Gen-
erally, mixed-member systems elect one portion of the legislature through
single-member district elections and the other through some form of propor-
tional representation election.2 Since the postcommunist world began its
AUTHOR’S NOTE: This research was assisted by an award from the Eurasia Program of the
Social Science Research Council with funds provided by the State Department under the Pro-
gram for Research and Training on Eastern Europe and the Independent States of the Former
Soviet Union (Title VIII). I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments.
1. West Germany adopted the first mixed-member system in 1953. Italy, New Zealand, Mex-
ico, Israel, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Japan have all adopted mixed-member systems in the past
decade.
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 38 No. 3, April 2005 282-303
DOI: 10.1177/0010414004272526
© 2005 Sage Publications
282
awkward move to democracy in the early 1990s, it is not surprising that sev-
eral postcommunist states have adopted the electoral system de jour.3 Why
would such systems be so popular? Although there are important differences
among them, at their most basic level mixed-member systems offer the ad-
vantage of embracing two distinct notions of representation: one regional and
one national. Whereas proportional representation elections promote the cre-
ation of strong parties attentive to national issues, single-member district
elections promote local representation through the election of legislators
responsible to narrow constituencies.
Given their increasing popularity, a number of scholars have undertaken
extensive studies of mixed-member systems, primarily concentrating on how
they affect the party system or voting behavior (e.g., Gschwend, Johnston, &
Pattie, 2003; Moser, 2001; Shugart & Wattenberg, 2001). Although these
studies have been invaluable, few scholars have addressed the legislative
effects of mixed-member systems. This is a significant omission, because
mixed-member electoral systems combine legislators who have incentives to
embrace divergent forms of representation. Consequently, mixed-member
electoral systems could create a bifurcated legislature, as proportional repre-
sentation and single-member district legislators follow their incentives and
represent conflicting interests. Carried to an extreme, this mandate divide
could complicate policy making by adding a potentially fractious cleavage to
legislatures.
Although the logic of this mandate divide hypothesis is rather simple, cur-
rent empirical research has not universally substantiated its existence. In fact,
studies of mixed-member legislatures disagree on the existence of mandate
divides in several contexts (e.g., Herron, 2002; Lancaster & Patterson, 1990;
Scholl, 1986; Smith & Remington, 2001; Thames, 2001). What could
account for this variation? The existence of a mandate divide, I argue, de-
pends heavily upon the level of party system institutionalization. In institu-
tionalized systems where parties control valuable electoral resources, single-
member district legislators are more beholden to party leaders to secure
reelection, undermining their incentive to cast personal votes or reward con-
stituent interests. In such systems, proportional representation and single-
member district deputies will share a common incentive to support their par-
ties, preventing the development of a mandate divide. Conversely, in weakly
2. There are, however, exceptions. Taiwan, for example, pairs a proportional representation
tier with a single nontransferable vote (SNTV) tier.
3. Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Albania, Russia, Azerbai-
jan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan all adopted mixed-member systems. Bulgaria and
Croatia adopted mixed-member systems briefly before replacing them with proportional repre-
sentation systems.
of voters. Moreover, because party leaders control the formation of the party
lists, proportional representation legislators have a strong incentive to follow
their commands to secure a prized list position for future elections.
The conflicting sets of electoral incentives held by single-member district
and proportional representation legislators form the basis for the mandate
divide hypothesis. Single-member district legislators will have an electoral
incentive to give attention to parochial issues, whereas proportional repre-
sentation legislators will have an electoral incentive to cater to the party and
concentrate on nationwide concerns. The logic behind the divide is reason-
ably sound; however, empirical support for the existence of the divide in
mixed-member legislatures is inconsistent. Using survey data, Lancaster and
Patterson (1990) argue that single-member district legislators in the German
Bundestag valued pork barrel spending more highly for their reelection than
did the proportional representation deputies. Another survey-based study by
Scholl (1986) found that British members of the European Parliament,
elected in single-member district elections, were more interested in constitu-
ency service than were French members, who were elected in proportional
representation elections. In addition, Thames (2001) showed a difference in
party discipline between single-member district and proportional representa-
tion legislators in the Russian State Duma. Smith and Remington (2001),
however, found inconsistent support for the mandate divide in their study of
the Russian Duma. Through an analysis of discipline in the Ukrainian Rada,
Herron (2002) detected no significant discipline difference between single-
member district and proportional representation legislators. In addition,
Ishiyama (2000) found no evidence of a mandate divide among members
of the communist successor parties in either Hungary or Russia. Morlang
(1998) found a similar result among the deputies of the communist successor
party in Hungary as well.
To understand why there is such weak empirical evidence for the mandate
divide hypothesis, one must concentrate on the relationship between single-
member district deputies and political parties, because one key distinction
between single-member district and proportional representation deputies is
their relation to political parties. Whereas proportional representation legis-
lators in closed-list systems depend on parties, the need to win local elections
gives single-member district legislators an incentive to spurn parties at times
to vote with their constituents. Taken from this angle, the presence or absence
of a mandate divide will depend on the extent to which single-member dis-
trict legislators feel that support from political parties is essential for re-
election. If political parties are in a position to deny them a future nomination
and/or valuable electoral resources, then single-member district legislators
cannot simply ignore the party and consistently cast personal votes without
fear of jeopardizing their reelection chances. When parties have such strong
control over single-member district reelection, then the incentive structure of
single-member district legislators more closely resembles that of the pro-
portional representation legislators, because single-member district legis-
lators need to ensure party support for reelection. Party voting may anger
constituents; however, to not vote with the party would jeopardize party sup-
port in future elections. In this environment, the appearance of a mandate
divide is less likely, because both single-member district and proportional
representation legislators have similar incentives to vote with their party’s
position.
If this argument is correct, then the variation in empirical support for the
mandate divide is explained, in part, by the variation in party control of the
fates of single-member district candidates. What gives political parties influ-
ence over single-member district legislators? One of the primary factors that
can increase party control over single-member district candidates is the level
of party system institutionalization. As Mainwaring (1997, 1999) points out,
the degree of institutionalization is a critical factor that distinguishes dif-
ferent party systems beyond simply the number and ideological polarization
of parties. Weakly institutionalized party systems suffer from four specific
problems. First, in weakly institutionalized systems, patterns of party sup-
port tend to be unstable (Mainwaring 1997, 1999). Thus, in such systems
parties often appear and disappear with regularity. Even among established
parties, their level of support often changes significantly from election to
elections. Second, parties in weakly institutionalized systems maintain only
shallow roots within society (Mainwaring, 1997, 1999). Linkages between
parties and constituents are often weak and fragile. Parties have a difficult
time structuring and articulating popular preferences. Often, voters have dif-
ficulty identifying themselves with specific political parties. Third, the legiti-
macy of parties as political actors is often lower in comparison with more
institutionalized systems (Mainwaring 1997, 1999). Parties lack the wide-
spread popular support accorded to parties in more developed systems.
Finally, in weakly institutionalized systems parties often lack autonomous
and developed party organizations (Mainwaring 1997, 1999). This often
means that party organizations are simply the extension of individual leaders
or key elites. Such organizations do not have an autonomous apparatus that
allows them to develop strong ties with voters.
These features of weakly institutionalized parties hamper their ability to
control single-member district deputies, who maintain incentives to cast per-
sonal or constituency votes. In effect, such political parties lack strong orga-
nizations, campaign resources, identifiable party labels, and ties to social
groups. Parties in more institutionalized systems can use such resources to
5. This logic is often used to explain party voting by U.S. legislators (Aldrich, 1995; Cox &
McCubbins, 1993; Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991).
communist legislatures: the Russian State Duma, the Ukrainian Rada, and
the Hungarian National Assembly.
PARTY SYSTEMS IN
RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND HUNGARY
Russia, Ukraine, and Hungary were chosen as cases for several reasons.
First, they share broadly similar mixed-member electoral systems. In both
Russia and Ukraine, the mixed-member systems select 225 legislators in
single-member district plurality elections and 225 legislators in nationwide,
closed-list proportional representation elections. Both systems require par-
ties to reach a minimum percentage threshold of the proportional representa-
tion vote to obtain seats from this tier.6 The Hungarian mixed-member sys-
tem is a more complex, three-tiered scheme. First, 176 seats are distributed
according to the results of single-member district majoritarian elections held
across the country. Second, 152 seats are distributed according to the results
of proportional representation elections held in 20 territorial districts. The
number of proportional representation seats in a district varies from 4 to 28
seats. Last, the remaining 58 seats are distributed using a compensatory
scheme that allocates extra seats according to surplus votes from both the
single-member district and proportional representation tiers.
Most important, these systems are all “mixed-member majoritarian sys-
tems” (Shugart & Wattenberg, 2001). In mixed-member majoritarian sys-
tems, each type of election allocates seats independently to political parties.
Thus, in Russia, for example, a party’s seat total is the sum of its seats earned
in both the single-member district and proportional representation elections.
This differs from “mixed-member proportional systems” that link the results
of both elections to determine overall seat totals for parties (Shugart &
Wattenberg, 2001). In Germany, for example, the overall percentage of seats
a party may control in the Bundestag is proportional to the proportional rep-
resentation election results. Bawn and Thies (2003) argue that the relation-
ship between parties and single-member district legislators is fundamentally
different in each system. In mixed-member proportional systems, parties
maximize seats by increasing their proportional representation totals, not by
maximizing single-member district seats (Bawn & Thies, 2003). Thus, par-
ties in such systems are less beholden to popular, but ill-disciplined, single-
member district legislators. In mixed-member majoritarian systems, how-
6. In the 1993 Russian Duma election, the threshold was 5%. In the 1998 Ukrainian Rada
election, the threshold was 4%.
initial postcommunist legislative elections in 1994 did not alleviate the prob-
lem significantly. The single-member district majoritarian system used in
this election was replaced by the current mixed-member system due in part to
the inability of the old system to spur the development of political parties
(Birch, 2000; Bojcun, 1995; Craumer & Clem, 1999; Kubicek, 2000). As in
Russia, these limitations helped to prevent the development of political par-
ties with strong, well-funded party organizations or institutionalized ties to
social groups (Bilous & Wilson, 1993; Kubicek, 2000). Consequently, many
Ukrainian political parties relied not on strong social ties to stable social
cleavages but on personalities and links to government structures for their
influence.
Much of the literature on the Hungarian party system in the 1990s echoes
the Russian and Ukrainian literature. In both the 1990 and 1994 legislative
elections, Hungarian parties were thought to have weak organizational struc-
tures, loose ties to social groups, and only fluid electoral support (Ilonszki,
1998; Racz & Kukorelli, 1995). In fact, writing about the 1994 election, Racz
and Kurkorelli (1995) argue that “the organisational structures of parties,
with the exception of the socialists, were generally so deficient and transient
that they would defy systematic study” (p. 262). This would suggest that the
patterns of party politics in Hungary should have resembled those in Russia
and Ukraine during the 1990s.
Finally, although they each suffer from symptoms of weakly institutional-
ized party systems, there are significant differences between the relative
position of political parties in Hungary and in both Russia and Ukraine. Even
though the Hungarian system appeared to suffer from elements of weak party
institutionalization, political parties dominated the electoral process in both
the proportional representation and single-member district elections (Benoit,
2001; Ilonszki, 1998). Memberships and organizational structures remained
fluid; however, party labels became the essential electoral resources for suc-
cessful single-member district candidates (Hibbing & Patterson, 1992;
Ilonszki, 1998; Racz & Kukorelli, 1995). In fact, voters in both the first and
second rounds of the 1994 Hungarian parliamentary elections based their
voting decisions primarily upon the party identification of candidates (Racz
& Kukorelli, 1995). Thus, political parties have played a decisive role in the
Hungarian single-member district elections. This is a definite contrast from
the situation in Russia and Ukraine, where political parties had significantly
less impact on single-member district elections. In fact, in both Russia and
Ukraine, parties offered so little electoral resources to candidates that inde-
pendent candidates proliferated (Birch, 1998; Moser, 1999).
The relative strength of Hungarian parties vis-à-vis Russian and Ukrai-
nian parties can be further evidenced by the levels of partisanship among can-
Table 1
Percentage of Elected Independent Single-Member District
8. Parties that formed coalitions with new parties are not considered missing.
Table 2
Percentage Proportional Representation Vote of Missing Parties
tation vote went to parties that were missing in the next election. The situa-
tion in Russia and Ukraine was worse, 18.9% and 13.4%, respectively. Yet as
with the data on independent deputies, Ukraine appears to be slightly better
off than Russia.
Why would parties play such a stronger role in Hungary? Ishiyama (1997)
points out that political parties led the Hungarian democratic transition.
Unlike both Russia and Ukraine, where the transition was dominated by indi-
viduals without strong party ties, the Hungarian political parties negotiated
the end of communism. Thus when the election law was created for the 1990
parliamentary elections, it is no surprise that the party leaders created a law to
ensure that the major political parties would dominate parliamentary politics
(Racz & Kukorelli, 1995). In fact, the addition of national and territorial lists
served as insurance policies that allowed party leaders to obtain seats, even if
they lost single-member district contests. Moreover, the electoral rules were
designed to limit the ability of independent candidates to win seats in the
single-member district elections (Benoit, 2001). The fact that the main insti-
gators of the transition were political parties, coupled with the fact that these
parties created electoral laws to benefit their interests, certainly allowed them
to play a more dominant role in postcommunist politics. The point is not that
the Hungarian system does not show aspects of weak institutionalization in
comparison with Western party systems; instead, the point is that the Hungar-
ian party system is more institutionalized in comparison with post-Soviet
Russia and Ukraine.
Although all three countries have evidence of weakly institutionalized
party systems, it is clear that important differences existed between them. In
comparison with both Russia and Ukraine, Hungary clearly had the stron-
gest, most institutionalized party system. From the very beginning, Hungar-
ian political parties dominated the single-member district nominations, giv-
ing them a clear advantage over potential rivals, an advantage that neither
Ukrainian nor Russian political parties shared. If Hungary had the strongest
system, Russia had the weakest during this period. The Russian system had
the highest percentages of elected nonpartisan single-member district can-
didates and of vote for missing parties. Ukraine fell in the middle between
the two, though the data in Tables 1 and 2 clearly indicate that the Ukrainian
party system is much closer to the Russian than the Hungarian.
What does this mean for the mandate divide debate? If strong party
institutionalization changes single-member district legislators’ incentives to
prevent a mandate divide, then there should be no evidence of one in the Hun-
garian Parliament. If weak party institutionalization promotes a mandate
divide, then there is more likely to be evidence of one in Ukraine or Russia.
9. The Russian roll-call data were taken from the database created by the Center for Applied
Political Research, Moscow. The Ukrainian roll-call data can be found at http://www.rada.kiev.
ua/. The Hungarian roll-call data can be found at http://www.mkogy.hu/.
10. The appendix explains in more detail how iUNITY was calculated.
11. In Table 3, as in the regression models, legislators from all sessions in each legislature are
pooled. There were nine sessions of the Hungarian National Assembly between 1994 and 1998
and nine session of the Ukrainian Rada between 1998 and 1992. The Duma, which sat between
1994 and 1995, had only four sessions.
12. Both the territorial proportional representation and the compensatory legislators are
coded 0 in the Hungarian model.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for iUNITY by Legislature
Legislature N M SD
RESULTS
Table 4 presents the results of the Tobit regression models for each legisla-
ture.13 If one compares the results across all three models, one finds little evi-
dence of a mandate divide in all but the Duma. In the National Assembly
model, SMD is not statistically significant, indicating that a mandate divide
did not exist when controlling for other factors. SMD, perhaps surprisingly,
was also not statistically significant in the Rada model. In the Duma model,
however, SMD was statistically significant and negatively correlated with
iUNITY; therefore, not only did a mandate divide exist during this period, but
also single-member district deputies were less disciplined than their propor-
tional representation counterparts were.
What explains the absence of a divide in the Rada? This result mirrors pre-
vious studies of the Ukrainian Rada (Herron, 2002); however, it is surprising
given the weakness of both systems. The data presented earlier on the Ukrai-
nian system suggest that it is a more institutionalized party system in Ukraine
as compared to Russia. The Ukrainian party system was more institution-
alized in terms of the percentage of elected independent single-member dis-
trict deputies and vote for missing parties (see Tables 1 and 2), though only
slightly more, than the Russian was. Moreover, the Rada elected in 1998 was
the first mixed-member Rada; however, it was the second democratically
elected Rada. In Russia, however, the December 1993 elections for the Duma
were the first postcommunist ones. This greater experience with elections
may explain the slight advantage in institutionalization owned by Ukraine. In
addition, on average, Ukrainian parties between 1998 and 2002 were signifi-
cantly more disciplined than Russian parties were between 1994 and 1995
(see Table 3). This suggests a generally stronger level of discipline or coher-
ence amongst Rada members. One study that examined this divide found that
the cause of this difference appeared to be a strong, reinforcing ideological/
regional cleavage in Ukraine that structured Rada party politics and gave
electoral incentives for deputies from certain regions to back certain political
parties (Thames, 2003). Such a cleavage was absent from the Duma during
this period.
The impact of multiple candidacies varies among the different legisla-
tures. In the National Assembly model, neither TERRITORIAL nor NATION/
TERR is statistically significant. Thus, single-member district legislators
who were either on the territorial list or on both a national and territorial list
did not behave differently. Surprisingly, a single-member district deputy on
13. iUNITY can take any value between 1 and –1. Because it is censored at –1 and 1, I use a
Tobit regression model appropriate for a censored dependent variable.
Table 4
Tobit Models for National Assembly, Verkhovna Rada, and State Duma
(Dependent Variable = iUNITY)
(continued)
Table 4 (continued)
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX
To measure party discipline, I use a variation of Carey’s (2000, 2002) UNITY scores.
UNITY scores for political parties are calculated as follows:
UNITYij = |pctyes-pctno| for party i on vote j, where the percentages are calculated
as shares for all members of party/coalition (Carey, 2000, p. 4).
As CLOSE nears 1, the distribution of “for” and “against” votes approaches 0. Thus
votes that are closer weigh more heavily than those that are not. Because a close vote
would denote a contentious issue, party support on this issue is of more critical impor-
tance. UNITY can also be weighted by ATTEND, which simply measures the percent-
age of legislators participating in the vote (Carey, 2002). Poor attendance, like partici-
pation, is another indication of a vote’s significance. Weighted UNITY scores for
political parties are calculated as follows:
With these weighted UNITY scores, one can compare the party discipline of individ-
ual political parties without assuming that all votes are equally important.
I have adapted weighted party UNITY scores to create individual weighted scores
to measure an individual legislator’s party discipline, iUNITY. To do this, I coded each
legislator j’s vote k as either 1, if he or she voted with the party’s majority position, or
–1, if he or she voted against the party’s majority position. Then I calculated iUNITY
for each legislator as follows:
N
iUNITYj = ∑
j , k = 1…N
∗CLOSE k ∗ ATTENDk / Σ CLOSE jk ∗ ATTENDjk .
This creates the dependent variable iUNITY that measures individual legislator party
discipline, weighted for the closeness and participation of the vote.
REFERENCES
Agh, Attila. (1995). Partial consolidation of the east-central European parties: The case of the
Hungarian Socialist party. Party Politics, 1, 491-514.
Aldrich, John. (1995). Why parties? The origin and transformation of party politics in America.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bawn, Kathleen, and Thies, Michael. (2003). A comparative theory of electoral incentives: Rep-
resenting the unorganized under PR, plurality, and mixed-member electoral systems. Journal
of Theoretical Politics, 15, 5-32.
Bean, Clive. (1990). The personal vote in Australian federal elections. Political Studies, 38, 253-
268.
Bellin, Lauren, & Orttung, Robert (with Clem, Robert, & Craumer, Paul). (1997). The Russian
parliamentary elections of 1995: The battle for the Duma. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Benoit, Kenneth. (2001). Evaluating Hungary’s mixed-member electoral system. In M. S.
Shugart & M. P. Wattenberg (Eds.), Mixed-member electoral systems (pp. 477-494). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bilous, Andre, & Wilson, Andrew. (1993). Political parties in Ukraine. Europe-Asia Studies, 45,
693-703.
Birch, Sarah. (1998). Party system formation and voting behavior in the Ukrainian parliamentary
elections of 1994. In T. Kuzio (Ed.), Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of post-Soviet trans-
formation (pp. 139-160). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Birch, Sarah. (2000). Elections and democratization in Ukraine. New York: St. Martin’s.
Bojcun, Marko. (1995). The Ukrainian parliamentary elections in March-April 1994. Europe-
Asia Studies, 47, 229-249.
Carey, J. (2000). Party unity in legislative voting. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA.
Carey, J. (2002). Parties, coalitions, and the Chilean Congress in the 1990s. In S. Morgenstern &
B. Nacif (Eds.), Legislative politics in Latin America (pp. 222-253). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Cox, Gary, & McCubbins, Matthew. (1993). Legislative leviathan: Party government in the
house. Berkley: University of California Press.
Craumer, P., & Clem, J. (1999). Ukraine’s emerging electoral geography: A regional analysis of
the 1998 parliamentary elections. Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 40, 1-26.
D’Anieri, Paul, Kravchuk, Robert, & Kuzio, Taras. (1999). Politics and society in Ukraine. Boul-
der, CO: Westview.
Evans, Geoffrey, & Whitefield, Stephen. (1993). Identifying the bases of party competition in
Eastern Europe. British Journal of Political Science, 23, 521-548.
Fenno, Robert. (1978). Home style: House members in their districts. Boston: Little, Brown.
Fiorina, Morris. (1997). Congress: Keystone of the Washington establishment. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Fish, M. Steven. (1995). Democracy from scratch. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gschwend, Thomas, Johnston, Ron, & Pattie, Charles. (2003). Split-ticket voting in mixed-
member proportional election systems: Estimates and analyses of their spatial variation in
the German federal election, 1998. British Journal of Political Science, 33, 109-128.
Herron, Erik. (2002). Electoral influences on legislative behavior in mixed-member systems:
Evidence from the Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 27, 361-381.
Hibbing, Jonathan, & Patterson, Samuel. (1992). A democratic legislature in the making: The
historic Hungarian elections of 1990. Comparative Political Studies, 24, 430-454.
Ilonszki, Gabrielle. (1998). Representation deficient in a new democracy: Theoretical consider-
ations and the Hungarian case. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31, 157-170.
Ishiyama, John. (1997). Transitional electoral systems in post-communist Eastern Europe. Polit-
ical Science Quarterly, 112, 95-115.
Ishiyama, John. (1999). Political parties and candidate recruitment in post-Soviet Russian poli-
tics. Journal of Communist Studies and Transitions, 15, 41-69.
Ishiyama, John. (2000). Candidate recruitment, party organization and the communist successor
parties: The cases of the MSzP, the KPRF, and the LDDP. Europe-Asia Studies 52, 875-896.
Kiewiet, D. Roderick, & McCubbins, Matthew. (1991). The logic of delegation: Congressional
parties and the appropriations process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
King, Gary. (1990). Electoral responsiveness and partisan bias in multiparty democracies. Legis-
lative Studies Quarterly, 15, 159-181.
Kubicek, Paul. (2000). Unbroken ties: The state, interest associations, and corporatism in post-
Soviet Ukraine. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Lancaster, Thomas, & Patterson, William. (1990). Comparative pork barrel politics: Perceptions
from the West German Bundestag. Comparative Political Studies, 22, 458-477.
Mainwaring, Scott. (1997, August). Rethinking party systems theory in the third wave of democ-
ratization: The importance of party system institutionalization. Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.
Mainwaring, Scott. (1999). Rethinking party systems in the third wave of democratization. Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Mayhew, David. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Morlang, Diana. (1998, August). Socialists building capitalism: Electoral laws and party disci-
pline in Hungary. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Boston.
Moser, Robert. (1999). Electoral systems and the number of parties in post-communist states.
World Politics, 51, 359-384.
Moser, R. (2001). Unexpected outcomes: Electoral systems, political parties, and representation
in Russia. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press.
North, Philip. (1994). The growth of the constituency role of the MP. Parliamentary Affairs, 47,
705-720.
Norton, Philip, & Wood, David. (1990). Constituency service by members of Parliament: Does it
contribute to a personal vote? Parliamentary Affairs, 43, 196-208.
Oltay, Edith. (1994). Hungarian socialists prepare for comeback. RFE/RL Research Report, 3,
21-26.
Racz, Barnabas, & Kukorelli, Istvan. (1995). The “second generation” post-communist elections
in Hungary in 1994. Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 251-279.
Sakwa, Richard. (1993). Parties and the multiparty system in Russia. RFE/RL Research Report,
2, 12-16.
Scholl, Eric. (1986). The electoral system and constituency-oriented activity in the European
Parliament. International Studies Quarterly, 30, 315-332.
Shugart, Matthew, & Wattenberg, Martin. (2001). Mixed-member electoral systems: A defini-
tion and typology. In Matthew Shugart & Martin Wattenberg (Eds.), Mixed-member elec-
toral systems: The best of both worlds? (pp. 9-25). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Steven, & Remington, Thomas. (2001). The politics of institutional choice: The forma-
tion of the Russian State Duma. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Thames, Frank. (2001). Legislative voting behaviour in the Russian Duma: Understanding the
effect of mandate. Europe-Asia Studies, 53, 869-884.
Thames, Frank. (2003). Same system, different outcomes: Legislative behavior differences in
Ukraine and Russia. Studies in Public Policy, 373, 2-28.
Ward, Hugh, & John, Peter. (1999). Targeting benefits for electoral gain: Constituency marginal-
ity and the distribution of grants to English local authorities. Political Studies, 47, 32-52.
White, Stephen, Wyman, Matthew, & Kryshtanovskaya, Olga. (1995). Parties and politics in
post-communist Russia. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 25, 183-202.