Freedom of Association, 100 SCRA 100

The fundamental right of self-organization,108 SCRA 390

The right of self-organization of managerial employees,47 SCRA 434

In re: ATTY. EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554

Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.On November
29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governorsunanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay hismembership dues" to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of hisconstitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-
condition to maintaining hisstatus as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the correspondingdues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization towhich he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty andproperty guaranteed to him by the Co nstitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the
aboveprovisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.The
respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Courtbut is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
Issues: Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues?
Held: It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he ishereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Ratio Decidendi: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutionalfreedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he
isnot already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.
All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-definedb u t
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer
i s a r e a d y a m e m b e r . B a r integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or notattend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as hechooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual
dues. TheSupreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashionbe shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers. Moreover,there is
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional power and duty topromulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of thePhilippine Bar (Article
X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution), from requiring m embers of aprivileged class, such as lawyers
are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeedimposed as a regulatory measure, designed to
raise funds for carrying out the objectives andpurposes of integration. Also, it clear that under
the police power of the State, and under thenecessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should
be and is a matter subject to regulation andinquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize, then a penaltydesigned to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is notvo id as unreasonable or arbitrary.
NOTE: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is
an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its
objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not
infringethe constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to
perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon wasstricken out from the
rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.

Tarnate vs. Noriel, 100 SCRA 93

The crux of the matter in this proceeding for certiorari with preliminary injunction is whether or not probationary
employees are entitled to vote in the election of officers and board members of a labor union. Respondent
Director Carmelo C. Noriel 1 at first ruled that they could not, apparently relying on the applicable provision of
the Labor Code, which reads thus: "Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, with at least
one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee for
purposes of membership in any labor union., 2 When, however, a motion for reconsideration was filed, he
granted it and allowed the votes to be counted. Hence this suit for certiorari.
In the election of union officers on October 23, 1977, there were two strong contenders, petitioner Arthur
Ternate and respondent Lucerio Fajardo. Petitioner received 308 votes and respondent 285 votes. Forty (40)
ballots cast by employees who classified as second helpers were challenged. They were included in the list of
qualified voters upon the motion of the Fajardo faction and over the opposition of the Ternate group. It was
imposed as a condition that the challenged ballots would be segregated and would be counted only after
passing upon the question of membership of the such second helpers. The Ternate group finally agreed to
allow them to participate in the election. On October 27, 1977, after the decision, the Fajardo group moved to
have the challenged votes opened. The Med-Arbiter granted the prayer. Respondent Director Noriel in the
order now challenged in this petition, as noted earlier, decided otherwise in a motion for reconsideration.
The Solicitor General 3 when asked to comment, after stressing the constitutional right to form associations, a
corollary of which in the case of labor is the right to self-organization, pointed to Article 3 of the New Labor
Code in sustaining the power of respondent Director to issue the assailed order. Thus: "These constitutional
mandates are recognized in Article 3 of the New Labor Code. Further, Article 244 thereof is of the same tenor:
... — All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including religious, medical or
educational institutions operating for profit, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist
labor organizations for purposes of collective bargain. 4 Reference to the constitutional right to freedom of
association is not without relevance. The more decisive question, however, is the force and effect of the Labor
Code provision as to when a probationary employee could in the language thereof "be considered a regular
employee for purposes of membership in any labor union."
The answer arrived at by this Court after due consideration of all factors bearing on such issue, is that the
condition thus imposed in the Labor Code requiring "at least one year of service" calls for application.
Petitioner, therefore, must prevail.
1. The reliance of petitioner on the applicable Labor Code provision is not in vain. It is definite and clear. At
least one year of service is required for an employee to enjoy the benefits "of membership in any labor union."
There is no ambiguity. Its validity has not been challenged. It, therefore, calls for application in the precise
terms it was enacted. As was pointed out in Gonzaga Court of Appeals: 5 "It has been repeated time and time
again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply
it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently
been to that effect. 6 There is thus no statutory support for the challenged order of respondent Noriel.
2. In reaching such a conclusion, this Court is not unaware of the implication for freedom of
association. 7 There is plausibility on its face to the contention of the Solicitor General that to bar the
probationary employees from voting for union officials would run counter to such constitutional right. Nor
should it be forgotten that in U.E. Automotive Employees and Workers Union vs. Noriel, 8 it was stressed that
"freedom of association is explicitly ordained; it is not merely derivative, peripheral or penumbral, as is the case
in the United States. It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution. 9 A more realistic appraisal, however, of
the labor situation would serve to clarify matters. (The right to join a labor union remains undisputed. In the
meanwhile however, for purposes of electing the union officers, assuming it would be chosen as the sole
bargaining unit in the negotiation for a collective bargaining contract, the right of probationary employees could
be thus restricted as provided for in the Labor Code. The justification lies in the fact that management could, by
the simple device of appointing probationary employees in the labor union expected to prevail in the choice of
the sole collective bargaining agent, attain the result that would serve best its interests, not necessarily that of
labor). It must have been such a purpose that inspired a provision on this character. At any rate, there being no
attack on its validity, it must be given full force and effect.
3. The delay in the decision of this case is due to the fact that the required number of votes for this conclusion
could not be obtained until the last deliberation. Precisely to some of its members the argument based on
freedom of association weighed heavily. At any rate, before the next election takes place, matters hopefully
have been clarified by this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the election of petitioner Arthur Ternate is upheld. The
restraining order issued on November 27, 1978 is lifted

Samahan ng Manggagawa vs. Noriel, 108 SCRA 381

Villar vs. Inciong, April 20,l983

Facts:Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a duly registeredlabor
organization which, was the existing bargaining agent of the employees inprivate respondent
Amigo Manufacturing, Inc. (Company). The Company and theAmigo Employees Union -PAFLU
had a CBA governing their labor relations, which agreement was then about to expire on February 28,
1977. Within the last 60 daysof the CBA, upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees in the
company,including the petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR) filed a petition
forc e r t i f i c a t i o n e l e c t i o n w i t h M O L E . T h e p e t i t i o n w a s o p p o s e d b y t h e P h i l i p p i
n e Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) with whom the Amigo Employees Unionwas at
that time affiliated. The same employees who had signed the petition filedby FUR signed a joint
resolution disaffiliating from PAFLU. Petitioner Dolores Villar,representing herself to be the
authorized representative of the Amigo
EmployeesU n i o n , f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n e l e c t i o n i n t h e C o m p a n y . T h
e A m i g o Employees Union-PAFLU intervened and moved for the dismissal of the petition
forc e r t i f i c a t i o n e l e c t i o n f i l e d b y D o l o r e s V i l l a r , o n t h e g r o u n d , a m o n g o t h e r s t h a t D o l o
r e s V i l l a r h a d n o l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y t o s i g n t h e p e t i t i o n s i n c e s h e w a s n o t a n officer of the
union nor is there factual or legal basis for her claim that she was theauthorized representative of the local
union. Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition
filedb y V i l l a r , w h i c h d i s m i s s a l i s s t i l l p e n d i n g a p p e a l b e f o r e B L R . A m i g o E m p l o y e e s Uni
on-PAFLU called a special meeting of its general membership. A Resolution
wast h e r e b y u n a n i m o u s l y a p p r o v e d w h i c h c a l l e d f o r t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n b y t h e P A F L U n a
tional president, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, f
o r continuously maligning the union spreading false propaganda that the union officerswere merely
appointees of the management; and for causing divisivene ss in theu n i o n . P A F L U f o r m e d a
T r i a l C o m m i t t e e t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e l o c a l u n i o n ' s c h a r g e s against the petitioners for acts of
disloyalty. PAFLU and the Company concluded
an e w C B A w h i c h a l s o r e i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e s a m e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e e x i s t i n g C B
A , including the union security clause. PAFLU President rendered a decision finding thepetitioners guilty of
the charges. PAFLU demanded the Company to terminate the employment of the petitioners pursuant
to the security clause of the CBA. Acting
onP A F L U ' s d e m a n d , t h e C o m p a n y i n f o r m e d P A F L U t h a t i t w i l l f i r s t s e c
u r e t h e necessary clearances to terminate petitioners. PAFLU requested the Company
top u t p e t i t i o n e r s u n d e r p r e v e n t i v e s u s p e n s i o n p e n d i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r s a i d c l e a r a
n c e s t o t e r m i n a t e t h e p e t i t i o n e r s . T h e C o m p a n y f i l e d t h e r e q u e s t f o r clearanc
e t o t e r m i n a t e t h e p e t i t i o n e r s b e f o r e D O L E w h i c h w a s g r a n t e d . D O L E Secretary Inciong
denied the appeal, hence, this petition for review.Issue: WON DOLE Secretary erred in affirming the grant of
clearance of terminationof petitioners.Ruling:It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open
to legal objection. It isimplicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. But the
Courthas laid down the ruling that
a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision in a collective bargaining
agreement is not a restrictionof the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.
In the case at bench, the Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU enteredinto a CBA with a
union security clause which is a reiteration of the old CBA. The quoted stipulation for closed-shop is
clear and unequivocal.
Petitioners’ theory
thatt h e i r e x p u l s i o n w a s n o t v a l i d u p o n t h e g r o u n d s i s u n t e n a b l e . P A F L U h a d t
h e authority to investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-employees in thelocal union and after
finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of membership of the Amigo Employees
Union-PAFLU is clear under the constitution of t h e P A F L U t o w h i c h t h e l o c a l u n i o n w a s
affiliated. And pursuant to the securityclause of the new CBA, reiterating the same
c l a u s e i n t h e o l d C B A , P A F L U w a s justified in applying said security clause. Recognized
and salutary is the principlethat when a labor union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes
bound by thelaws and regulations of the parent organization. It is undisputable that
oppositorswere members of the Amigo Employees Union at the time that said union affiliatedw i t h P A F L U ;
h e n c e , o p p o s i t o r s a r e b o u n d b y t h e l a w s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s o f P A F L U . Inherent in every labor
union, or any organization for that matter, is the right of self -
p r e s e r v a t i o n . W h e n m e m b e r s o f a l a b o r u n i o n s e e k t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n a n d dest
ruction of the very union to which they belong; they thereby forfeit their rightst o r e m a i n a s m e m b e r s o f
t h e u n i o n w h i c h t h e y s e e k t o d e s t r o y . P r u d e n c e a n d equity, as well as the dictates of law and
justice, therefore, compelling mandate theadoption by the labor union of such corrective and remedial
measures, in keepingwith its laws and regulations, for its preservation and continued existence;
lest byits folly and inaction, the labor union crumble and fall.Decision appealed from is affirmed

People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382

People vs. Ferrer, 56 SCRA 793 (Read the dissenting opinion of Justice FERNANDO in both cases)
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive
Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.)
Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by
circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford
impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to
unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men,
Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge
2.)Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial
trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of
voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar
associations penalizing membershiptherein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being
although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and
violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present
danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts
of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary
of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false
evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death.
Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the
constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.
Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates
freedom of expression.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of
judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of
attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is
applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to
other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not
person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the
intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIPwith
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why
is membership punished.Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization.Membership makes
himself party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the
act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to
escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of
mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not
be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF
SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this
matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the
Congress were done. The court further stressesthat whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is
excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY
and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving
circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow
the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER.Membership is
willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose.Membership is willfully and knowingly
done by overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set
aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

The inherent power of eminent domain,93 SCRA 663

Barangay Matictic vs. Elbinias, 148 SCRA 83

BIGLANG-AWA VS. JUDGE BACALLA,354 SCRA 562

THE CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE LEGASPI, RTC 22, ILOILO CITY, 444 SCRA 269
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Iloilo on March 7, 2001 enacted regulation ordinance
granting umbrella authority to then Mayor Mansueto A. Malabor to institute expropriation proceedings on Lot No.
935, registered in the name of Manuela Yusay, located at barangay Sto. Niño Norte, Arevalo, Iloilo City.
On March 14, 2001, Mayor Malabor wrote Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del Rosario, administration of the estate, making
formal offer to purchase the property for the purpose of converting the same as an on-site relocation for the poor
and landless resident of the city. With apparent refusal to sell the property, the city represented by Mayor Jerry
P. Treñas filed an expropriation case based on the Power of State on Eminent Domain. Upon the strict
compliance to the governing rules on expropriation, the city of Iloilo argued that it is entitled to an immediate
issuance of a writ of possession.
ISSUES:1. When does a court order become final and executory? 2. What is the legal basis of the Local
Government Unit to exercise power of eminent domain? 3. What are the requisites in issuance of Writ of
Possession?
RULING:
A. Time-honored and of constant observance is the principle that noorder dictated in open court had no juridical
existence before it is set in writing, signed, promulgated and served on the parties. Since the order orally
pronounced in court had no juridical existence yet, the period within which to file a motion for reconsideration
cannot be reckoned therefrom, but from the time the same was received in writing. Petitioner had fifteen (15)
days from its receipt of the written order within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
B. Petitioner has the irrefutable right to exercise its power of eminent domain. It being a local government unit,
the basis for its exercise is granted under Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160, to wit:
Sec. 19 Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws.
C. For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and substance
of the complaint and the required provisional deposit. Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 provides that the local
government unit may take immediate possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on its
current tax declaration. As long as the expropriation proceedings have been commenced and the deposit has
been made, the local government unit cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ of possession.
Petition is hereby GRANTED
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE GINGOYON, 478 SCRA 474
Facts: In 2003, the Supreme Court held in AGAN VS. PIATCO, 402 SCRA 612 that the CONCESSION
AGREEMENT FOR THE BUILD OPERATE TRANSFER ARRANGEMENT OF THE NINOY AQUINO
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PASSENGER TERMINAL II between the Philippine Government and the
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) as well as the amendments thereto is void for being
contrary to law and public policy. On Motion for Reconsideration (420 SCRA 420), the Supreme Court held
that:
“This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are
almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take
over the said facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID
STRUCTURES. THE COMPENSATION MUST BE JUST AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND EQUITY
FOR THE GOVERNMENT CAN NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICH ITSELF AT THE EXPENSE OF PIATCO AND ITS
INVESTORS.”
On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Pasay City
seeking a writ of possession authorizing to take immediate possession and control over NAIA 3 facilities and
deposited the amount of P3.0B in cash with Land Bank of the Philippines representing the assessed value of
the terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes.
On the same day, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the
government to “take or enter upon the possession of the NAIA 3 facilities”. It held that it is the ministerial duty
of the government to issue writ of possession upon deposit of the assessed value of the property subject of
expropriation.
However, on January 4, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued another Order supplementing the December 21, 2004
Order. It pointed out that the earlier orders to the amount to be deposited by the government was based on
Section 2, Rule 67 when what should be applicable is RA 8974 and therefore ordered that the amount of
US$62,343,175.77 be released to PIATCO instead of the amount in the December 21, 2004 Order.
On January 7, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued another Order directing the appointment of three (3)
Commissioners to determine just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex.
Both Orders were questioned by the government as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUES: 1. What law is applicable in this expropriation case: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or RA 8974? 2. If
RA 8974 will be used, may the court used the provision of Rule 67 on the 3 commissioners to determine just
compensation.
HELD: 1. Application of Rule 67 would violate the AGAN Doctrine which provides that “for the government to
take over the said NAIA 3 facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE
SAID STRUCTURES”. If Section 2, Rule 67 will be applied, PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving the just
compensation even if the government takes over the NAIA 3 facility. It is sufficient that the government
deposits the amount equal to the assessed value of the facilities. It would violate the proscription in the AGAN
Decision that the government must pay first the just compensation before taking over the facilities.
So when shall Rule 67 be used in expropriation cases and when shall RA 8974 be used?
In all “National government projects” or “national infrastructure projects”, like those covered by the “Build-
Operate-Transfer”, RA 8974 shall be followed. The rest, Rule 67 shall apply.
Differences between the two laws on expropriation:
a. Under Rule 67, the government “merely deposits” the assessed value of the property subject of
expropriation and can have a writ of possession over the same while under RA 8974, the scheme of immediate
payment (100%) shall be followed.
b. Under Rule 67, there can be writ of possession even if the owner of the property has not received a single
centavo while under RA 8974, as in this case, Writ of Possession may not be issued in favor of the government
UNTIL ACTUAL RECEIPT by PIATCO of the preferred value of just compensation.
Upon issuance of the writ in favor of the government, however, it could already exercise acts of ownership over
the NAIA 3 facilities.
The just compensation to be paid by the government shall be determined within 60 days from the finality of the
decision based on Section 4, RA 8974.
2. Rule 67 on the appointment of three (3) commissioners to determine just compensation may be used since
RA 8974 does not provide for such procedure.
Just Compensation; Amount to be deposited in court before a Writ of Possession may be issued by the court in
favor of the government; When to
apply Rule 67 and when to apply RA No. 8974; Who owns the interest of the initial amount deposited for the
purpose of issuing writ of possession

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R.
No. 172410, April 14, 2008
THE FACTS: On 29 December 2000, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Toll Regulatory
Board (TRB), filed with the RTC a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners whose
properties would be affected by the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway.
The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 869-M-2000 and raffled to Branch 85, Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent
Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one of the affected landowners.
On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting
that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties,
in the total amount of P28,406,700.00, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor Branch (LBP-South
Harbor), an authorized government depository. TRB maintained that since it had already complied with the
provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the RTC.
The RTC issued, on 19 March 2002, an Order for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying that the respondent or its
duly authorized representative be allowed to withdraw the amount of P22,968,000.00, out of TRB’s advance
deposit of P28,406,700.00 with LBP-South Harbor, including the interest which accrued thereon.
Thereafter, the RTC allowed the release of the principal amount together with the interest to the respondent
but on Motion for Reconsideration of the TRB, it disallowed the withdrawal of the interest reasoning out that the
said issue will be included in the second stage of expropriation, that is, the determination of just compensation.
The private respondent elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals which ruled that the respondent is entitled to
the interest by way of accession.
Hence, this petition of the government before the Supreme Court.
I S S U E: Who has the right over the interest of the amount deposited representing the zonal value of the
property sought to be expropriated? The expropriator or the landowner?
HELD: The petition is without merit.
The TRB claims that there are two stages in expropriation proceedings, the determination of the authority to
exercise eminent domain and the determination of just compensation. The TRB argues that it is only during
the second stage when the court will appoint commissioners and determine claims for entitlement to interest,
citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco and National Power Corporation v. Angas.
The TRB further points out that the expropriation account with LBP-South Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC,
but of DPWH. Thus, the said expropriation account includes the compensation for the other landowners
named defendants in Civil Case No. 869-M-2000, and does not exclusively belong to respondent.
The said argument is without merit because it failed to distinguish between the expropriation procedures under
Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court speak of different procedures, with the former specifically governing expropriation proceedings for
national government infrastructure projects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon, we held:
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and
Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property
owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the
Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary.
Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial
compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements
and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
xxxx
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no
means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private
property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local
government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act
No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule
67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property “for national
government infrastructure projects.” Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for
purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode
prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.
There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the expropriation of properties intended for a
national government infrastructure project. Therefore, the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in
Republic Act No. 8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the
properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Republic.
The controversy, though, arises not from the amount of the deposit, but as to the ownership of the interest that
had since accrued on the deposited amount.
Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the interest earned by the deposited amount in the
expropriation account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue of accession, hinges on the determination of who
actually owns the deposited amount, since, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, the right of accession is
conferred by ownership of the principal property:
Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or
which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
The principal property in the case at bar is part of the deposited amount in the expropriation account of DPWH
which pertains particularly to HTRDC. Such amount, determined to be P22,968,000.00 of the P28,406,700.00
total deposit, was already ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or its authorized representative. The
Court of Appeals further recognized that the deposit of the amount was already deemed a constructive delivery
thereof to HTRDC:
When the [herein petitioner] TRB deposited the money as advance payment for the expropriated property with
an authorized government depositary bank for purposes of obtaining a writ of possession, it is deemed to be a
“constructive delivery” of the amount corresponding to the 100% zonal valuation of the expropriated property.
Since [HTRDC] is entitled thereto and indisputably the owner of the principal amount deposited by [herein
petitioner] TRB, conversely, the interest yield, as accession, in a bank deposit should likewise pertain to the
owner of the money deposited.
Since the Court of Appeals found that the HTRDC is the owner of the deposited amount, then the latter should
also be entitled to the interest which accrued thereon.
The deposit was made in order to comply with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, which requires nothing less
than the immediate payment of 100% of the value of the property, based on the current zonal valuation of the
BIR, to the property owner. Thus, going back to our ruling in Republic v. Gingoyon: It is the plain intent of
Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of “immediate payment”
in cases involving national government infrastructure projects.
The critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery which gives legal effect to the act is the actual
intention to deliver on the part of the party making such delivery. The intention of the TRB in depositing such
amount through DPWH was clearly to comply with the requirement of immediate payment in Republic Act No.
8974, so that it could already secure a writ of possession over the properties subject of the expropriation and
commence implementation of the project. In fact, TRB did not object to HTRDC’s Motion to Withdraw Deposit
with the RTC, for as long as HTRDC shows (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2)
that respondent is the absolute owner thereof.
A close scrutiny of TRB’s arguments would further reveal that it does not directly challenge the Court of
Appeals’ determinative pronouncement that the interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation
account accrues to HTRDC by virtue of accession. TRB only asserts that HTRDC is “entitled only to an
amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less.”
We agree in TRB’s statement since it is exactly how the amount of the immediate payment shall be determined
in accordance with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, i.e., an amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value
of the expropriated properties. However, TRB already complied therewith by depositing the required amount in
the expropriation account of DPWH with LBP-South Harbor. By depositing the said amount, TRB is already
considered to have paid the same to HTRDC, and HTRDC became the owner thereof. The amount earned
interest after the deposit; hence, the interest should pertain to the owner of the principal who is already
determined as HTRDC. The interest is paid by LBP-South Harbor on the deposit, and the TRB cannot claim
that it paid an amount more than what it is required to do so by law.
Since the respondent is the owner of P22,968,000.00, it is entitled by right of accession to the interest that
had accrued to the said amount only.
We are not persuaded by TRB’s citation of National Power Corporation v. Angas and Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Wycoco, in support of its argument that the issue on interest is merely part and parcel of the
determination of just compensation which should be determined in the second stage of the proceedings only.
We find that neither case is applicable herein.
The issue in Angas is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for
expropriated lands, the applicable law is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest
rate, or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal rate at 12% per annum. We ruled in Angas that
since the kind of interest involved therein is interest by way of damages for delay in the payment thereof, and
not as earnings from loans or forbearances of money, Article 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing the 6% interest
shall apply. In Wycoco, on the other hand, we clarified that interests in the form of damages cannot be applied
where there is prompt and valid payment of just compensation.
The case at bar, however, does not involve interest as damages for delay in payment of just compensation. It
concerns interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account.
Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency of the government pays just
compensation twice: (1) immediately upon the filing of the complaint, where the amount to be paid is 100% of
the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial payment); and (2)
when the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation becomes final and executory, where
the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just
compensation as determined by the court (final payment)
As a final note, TRB does not object to HTRDC’s withdrawal of the amount of P22,968,000.00 from the
expropriation account, provided that it is able to show (1) that the property is free from any lien or
encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner thereof. The said conditions do not put in abeyance the
constructive delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the latter’s compliance therewith. Article 1187 of
the Civil Code provides that the “effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been fulfilled,
shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation.” Hence, when HTRDC complied with the given
conditions, as determined by the RTC in its Orderdated 21 April 2003, the effects of the constructive delivery
retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount in the expropriation account of DPWH.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 441 SCRA 637
FACTS: Private respondents Eastern Plywood Corporation and Benigno Lim as officer of the corporation, had
an “AND/OR” joint account with Commercial Bank and Trust Co (CBTC), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner
Bank of the Philippine Islands. Lim withdraw funds from such account and used it to open a joint checking
account (an “AND” account) with Mariano Velasco. When Velasco died in 1977, said joint checking account had
P662,522.87. By virtue of an Indemnity Undertaking executed by Lim and as President and General Manager of
Eastern withdrew one half of this amount and deposited it to one of the accounts of Eastern with CBTC.
Eastern obtained a loan of P73,000.00 from CBTC which was not secured. However, Eastern and CBTC
executed a Holdout Agreement providing that the loan was secured by the “Holdout of the C/A No. 2310-001-
42” referring to the joint checking account of Velasco and Lim.
Meanwhile, a judicial settlement of the estate of Velasco ordered the withdrawal of the balance of the account of
Velasco and Lim.
Asserting that the Holdout Agreement provides for the security of the loan obtained by Eastern and that it is the
duty of CBTC to debit the account of respondents to set off the amount of P73,000 covered by the promissory
note, BPI filed the instant petition for recovery. Private respondents Eastern and Lim, however, assert that the
amount deposited in the joint account of Velasco and Lim came from Eastern and therefore rightfully belong to
Eastern and/or Lim. Since the Holdout Agreement covers the loan of P73,000, then petitioner can only hold that
amount against the joint checking account and must return the rest.
ISSUE: Whether BPI can demand the payment of the loan despite the existence of the Holdout Agreement and
whether BPI is still liable to the private respondents on the account subject of the withdrawal by the heirs of
Velasco.
RULING: Yes, for both issues. Regarding the first, the Holdout Agreement conferred on CBTC the power, not
the duty, to set off the loan from the account subject of the Agreement. When BPI demanded payment of the
loan from Eastern, it exercised its right to collect payment based on the promissory note, and disregarded its
option under the Holdout Agreement. Therefore, its demand was in the correct order.
Regarding the second issue, BPI was the debtor and Eastern was the creditor with respect to the joint checking
account. Therefore, BPI was obliged to return the amount of the said account only to the creditor. When it allowed
the withdrawal of the balance of the account by the heirs of Velasco, it made the payment to the wrong party.
The law provides that payment made by the debtor to the wrong party does not extinguish its obligation to the
creditor who is without fault or negligence. Therefore, BPI was still liable to the true creditor, Eastern.

GABATIN VS. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, 444 SCRA 176

What is the basis of the just compensation for expropriation proceedings in connection with the agrarian reform
program of the government.
Held: The taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program of the government partakes of the nature
of an expropriation proceedings. As such, in computing the just compensation, it is the value of the land at the
time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of the judgment, which should be taken into consideration.

Hacienda Luisita vs. Presidential Agrarrian Reform Council, GR no. 171101, April 24, 2012
I. THE FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY
the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock
Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative
facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the
revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original
6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders
or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately
schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or
practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their
choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed
names.”
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
II. THE ISSUES: (1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case? (2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657
unconstitutional? (3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation
(Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP? (4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes
of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999
(since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and
thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties,
whether they have fully paid for the lands or not? (6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5,
2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
III. THE RULIN: [The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et
al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to
remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its
earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI,
and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the
suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to
decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to
the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be
respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that
resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that
the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the
FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock
distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as
stockholders of HLI or not.]
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of
the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes
of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of
the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of
the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves
4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the
4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the
agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by
Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive –
considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-
owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded
per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that
may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper
distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving
strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of
the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita
that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-
hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC
resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare
converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when
PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the
agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage
through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such
approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the
minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is,
January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted
that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do
not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land
valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner
can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The
court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed
on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in
Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from
the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA).
Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-
year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA,
and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately
allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be
rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land
distribution under CARP.]
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the
present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock
is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders,
which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus
at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings,
the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares
divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC
substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

City of Iloilo vs. Judge Sesana, GR no. 168967, February 12, 2010

Napocor vs. Bernal, December 15, 2010

NPC vs. Jocson, February 25, 1992

Facts: The NPC filed for the acquisition of a right-of-way easementover portions of the parcels of land described in the complaints
forits Negros-Panay Interconnection Project, particularly the Bacolod- Tomonton Transmission Line. Provisional values
were fixed on thebasis of the market value and the daily opportunity profit petitionermay derive. Respondents sought a re-
evaluation. Judge increasedvalue without hearing and directing the defendants to manifestwithin twenty-four (24) hours whether or
not they are accepting and withdrawing the amounts, representing the provisional values,deposited by the plaintiff for each of them
as "final and fullsatisfaction of the value of their respective property (sic); " Judgedeclared the provisional values as the final values
and directing therelease of the amounts deposited, in full satisfaction thereof, to thedefendants even if not all of them made the
manifestation; andsuspended the issuance of the writ of possession until after thesuspending the amounts shall have been
released to and receivedby defendants.Issue: WON Judge Jocson committed grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack of
jurisdiction. YES.

Municipality of Biñan vs. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al: thereare two (2) stages in every action of expropriation: The firstis
concerned with the determination of the authority of theplaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and thepropriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involvedin the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of theaction, "of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has alawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint,upon the payment of just compensation to be determined asof the date of the filing of the
complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action
and leavesnothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too,would an order of condemnation be a final one,
forthereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedingsbefore the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of theright of
condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall befiled or heard." The second phase of the eminent domainaction is concerned with
the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not morethan three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the justcompensation on the basis of the evidence before,
andfindings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It wouldfinally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and
leavenothing more to be done by the Court regarding theissue. . . .
However, upon the filing of the complaint or at any timethereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or enter uponthe possession
of the property involved upon compliancewith P.D. No. 42 which requires the petitioner, after duenotice to the defendant, to deposit
with the PhilippineNational Bank in its main office or any of its branches oragencies, "an amount equivalent to the assessed value
of the property for purposes of taxation." This assessed valueis that indicated in the tax declaration.
P.D. No. 42 repealed the "provisions of Rule 67 of the Rulesof Court and of any other existing law contrary to orinconsistent" with
it. Accordingly, it repealed Section 2 of Rule 67 insofar as the determination of the provisionalvalue, the form of payment and the
agency with which thedeposit shall be made, are concerned. Said section reads infull as follows: Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon
depositingvalue with National or Provisional Treasurer. — Upon thefiling of the complaint or at any time thereafter the plaintiff shall
have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real or personal property involved if he deposits with theNational or
Provincial Treasurer its value, as provisionallyand promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the
proceedings, to be held by such treasurersubject to the orders and final disposition of the court. Suchdeposit shall be in money,
unless in lieu thereof the courtauthorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of adepository of the Republic of the Philippines
payable ondemand to the National or Provincial Treasurer, as the casemay be, in the amount directed by the court to bedeposited.
After such deposit is made the court shall orderthe sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place theplaintiff in possession of the
property involved.
It will be noted that under the aforequoted section, the courthas the discretion to determine the provisional value whichmust be
deposited by the plaintiff to enable it "to take orenter upon the possession of the property." Notice to theparties is not indispensable.
In interpreting a similarprovision of Act No. 1592, this Court, in the 1915 case of Manila Railroad Company, et al. vs.
Paredes, et al., 45 held: The statute directs that, at the very outset, "whencondemnation proceedings are brought by any
railwaycorporation" the amount of the deposit is to be"provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by thecourt." It is very clear
that it was not the intention of the legislator that before the order fixing the amount of thedeposit could lawfully be entered the court
should finallyand definitely determine who are the true owners of theland; and after doing so, give them a hearing as to its
value,and assess the true value of the land accordingly. In effect,that would amount to a denial of the right of possession
of the lands involved until the conclusion of the proceedings,when there would no need for the filing of the deposit. Of course, there
is nothing in the statute which denies the rightof the judge to hear all persons claiming an interest in theland, and courts should
ordinarily give all such persons anopportunity to be heard if that be practicable, and will causeno delay in the prompt and
provisional ascertainment of thevalue of the land. But the scope and extent of the inquiry isleft wholly in the discretion of the court,
and a failure tohear the owners and claimants of the land, who may or maynot be known at the time of the entry of the order, in
nowise effects the validity of the order. . . .
P.D. No. 42, however, effectively removes the discretion of the court in determining the provisional value. What is to
bedeposited is an amount equivalent to the assessed value fortaxation purpose. No hearing is required for that purpose.All that is
needed is notice to the owner of the propertysought to be condemned.
Clearly, therefore, respondent Judge either deliberatelydisregarded P.D. No. 42 or was totally unaware of itsexistence and the
cases applying the same.
In any event, petitioner deposited the provisional value fixedby the court. As a matter of right, it was entitled to beplaced in
possession of the property involved in thecomplaints at once, pursuant to both Section 2 of Rule 67and P.D. No. 42. Respondent
Court had the correspondingduty to order the sheriff or any other proper officer toforthwith place the petitioner in such possession.
Instead of complying with the clear mandate of the law, respondent Judge chose to ignore and overlook it. Moreover,
uponseparate motions for reconsideration filed by the defendantsin Civil Cases Nos. 5938 and 5939, he issued a new
Orderincreasing the provisional values of the properties involvedtherein. No hearing was held on the motions. As a matter of fact,
as the records show, the motion for reconsiderationfiled by defendants Jesus Gonzaga, et al. in Civil Case No.5938 is dated 11
July 1990 while the Order granting bothmotions was issued the next day, 12 July 1990. The motionfor reconsideration in Civil Case
No. 5938 does not evencontain a notice of hearing. It is then a mere scrap of paper;it presents no question which merits the
attention andconsideration of the court. It is not even a mere motion for itdoes not comply with the rules, more particularly Sections
4and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; the Clerk of Court thenhad no right to receive it. 50
There was, moreover, a much stronger reason why therespondent Court should not have issued the 12 July 1990Order
increasing the provisional values of the Gonzaga lotsin Civil Cases Nos. 5938 and 5939. After having fixed theseprovisional values,
albeit erroneously, and upon deposit bypetitioner of the said amounts, respondent Judge lost, aswas held in Manila Railroad
Company vs. Paredes, "plenarycontrol over the order fixing the amount of the deposit, andhas no power to annul, amend or
modify it in matters of substance pending the course of the condemnationproceedings." The reason for this is that a contrary
rulingwould defeat the very purpose of the law which is to providea speedy and summary procedure whereby the
peaceablepossession of the property subject of the expropriationproceedings "may be secured without the delays incident
toprolonged and vexatious litigation touching the ownershipand value of such lands, which should not be permitted todelay the
progress of the work."
Compounding the above error and the capriciousness withwhich it was committed is respondent Judge's refusal toplace the
petitioner in possession of the property or issuethe writ of possession despite the fact that the latter hadlikewise deposited the
additional amount called for by the12 July 1990 Order. Instead, respondent Judge issued the 16 July 1990 Order directing the
defendants to state in writingwithin twenty-four (24) hours whether or not they wouldaccept and withdraw the amounts deposited
by thepetitioner for each of them " as final and full satisfaction of the value of their respective property (sic) affected by
theexpropriation" and stating at the same time that the writ willbe issued after such manifestation and acceptance andreceipt of the
amounts. The above Order has absolutely nolegal basis even as it also unjustly, oppressively and capriciously compels the
petitioner to accept the respondent Judge's determination of the provisional value as the justcompensation after the defendants
shall have manifestedtheir conformity thereto. He thus subordinated his own judgment to that of the defendants' because he made
thelatter the final authority to determine such justcompensation. This Court ruled in Export Processing ZoneAuthority vs. Dulay, et
al. 52 that the determination of justcompensation in eminent domain cases is a judicialfunction; accordingly, We declared as
unconstitutional andvoid, for being, inter alia, impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives which tends to render the Court
inutilein a matter which, under the Constitution, is reserved to itfor final determination, the method of ascertaining justcompensation
prescribed in P.D. Nos. 76 464, 794 and 1533,to wit: the market value as declared by the owner oradministrator or such market
value as determined by theassessor, whichever is lower in the first three (3) decrees,and the value declared by the owner or
administrator oranyone having legal interest in the property or the value asdetermined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real
Property Tax Code, whichever is lower, prior to the recommendationor decision of the appropriate Government office to acquirethe
property, in the last mentioned decree. If the legislatureor the executive department cannot even impose upon thecourt how just
compensation should be determined, it wouldbe far more objectionable and impermissible for respondent Judge to grant the
defendants in an eminent domain casesuch power and authority.
Without perhaps intending it to be so, there is not only aclear case of abdication of judicial prerogative, but also acomplete
disregard by respondent Judge of the provisions of Rule 67 as to the procedure to be followed after thepetitioner has deposited the
provisional value of theproperty. It must be recalled that three (3) sets of defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Section
3,Rule 67 of the Rules of Court; Section 4 of the same ruleprovides that the court must rule on them and in the eventthat it
overrules the motions or, when any party fails topresent a defense as required in Section 3, it should enteran order of
condemnation declaring that the petitioner has alawful right to take the property sought to be condemned.
As may be gleaned from the 25 June 1990 Order, therespondent Judge found that the petitioner has that rightand that "there will
be a (sic) paramount public interest tobe served by the expropriation of the defendants'properties." Accordingly, considering that the
partiessubmitted neither a compromise agreement as to the justcompensation nor a stipulation to dispense with theappointment of
commissioners and to leave thedetermination of just compensation to the court on the basisof certain criteria, respondent Judge
was duty bound to setin motion Section 5 of Rule 67; said section directs the courtto appoint not more than three (3) competent
anddisinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain andreport to it regarding the just compensation for the propertysought to
be taken. Such commissioners shall perform theirduties in the manner provided for in Section 6; upon thefiling of their report,
the court may, after a period of ten (10)days which it must grant to the parties in order that thelatter may file their objections
to such report, and afterhearing pursuant to Section 8, accept and render judgmentin accordance therewith or, for cause shown,
recommit thesame to the commissioners for further report of facts. Thecourt may also set aside the report and appoint
newcommissioners, or it may accept the report in part andreject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as
shall secure to the petitioner the propertyessential to the exercise of its right of condemnation, and tothe defendant just
compensation for the property so taken.
Not satisfied with the foregoing violations of law andinsisting upon his own procedure, respondent Judgedeclared in his Order of
18 July 1990 that the provisionalamounts he fixed, later increased with respect to theproperties of the Gonzagas, shall be
considered as the fullpayment of the value of the properties after the defendantsin Civil Cases Nos. 5938, 5939, 5940, 5942 and
5943 shallhave filed their manifestations; he also ruled that the writ of possession will be issued only after the latter shall
havereceived the said amounts. This Order and the recordsbefore this Court do not disclose that the defendants in CivilCases
Nos. 5941 and 5944 filed any manifestation; yet, inthe Order, respondent Judge whimsically and arbitrarilyconsidered the so-called
provisional values fixed therein as the final values. By such Order, the case was in factterminated and the writ of execution then
became a mereincident of an execution of a judgment. The right of thepetitioner to take or enter into possession of the
propertyupon the filing of the complaint granted by Section 2 of Rule67 and P.D. No. 42 was totally negated despite
compliancewith the deposit requirement under the latter law.
City Government of Toledo City vs. Fernandos, et al: doesnot apply to the instant petition because at the pre-trialconference held
therein, the petitioner submitted to thediscretion of the court as to the correct valuation, privaterespondents stated that they have no
objections and are inconformity with the price of P30.00 per square meter asreasonable compensation for their land and the
CityAssessor informed the court of the current market andappraisal values of the properties in the area and the factorsto be
considered in the determination of such. The partiespresented their documentary exhibits. In effect, therefore,the parties
themselves agreed to submit to a judicialdetermination on the matter of just compensation and that judgment be rendered based
thereon. In the instant case,no pre-trial was conducted; the proceedings were still atthat state where the provisional value was yet
to bedetermined; and the parties made no agreement on justcompensation.

Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, Aug. 3, 1990

NATURE: Petition to review Commission on Audit decision
FACTS: - Petitioners, Spouses Ansaldo, owned two parcels of land which were taken by thegovernment and
used to widen what is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue in 1947.However, it was only in 1973 or
26 years later that the spouses claimed forcompensation. The Secretary of Justice in due course
rendered an opinion that justcompensation be paid in accordance with PD No. 76. This decree provided that
basisfor the payment should be the current and fair market value as declared by theowner or such
value as determined by the assessor, whichever was lower. (It shouldbe noted however that at the time the
decision was made by the SC, this provisionon payment was already declared unconstitutional in 1988 in the
Export Processingvs Dulay case where said mode was said to be an impermissible encroachment
onthe judicial prerogative to resolve the compensation issue
in an appropriateproceeding of eminent domain)- Pursuant to the opinion of the Justice Secretary, the
auditor of the Bureau of PublicHighways recommended to the auditor General that payment be made on the
basisof the current and fair market value and not on the fair market value at the time theproperty was in fact
expropriated. The Commission on Audit declined the saidrecommendation and instead ruled
that the amount of compensation should bed e t e r m i n e d a s o f t h e t i m e o f t a k i n g o f t h e
p a r c e l s o f l a n d . T h e m o t i o n f o r reconsideration filed by the spouses Arsaldo was denied.- Hence this
appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the fixing of compensation should be at the time of the taking of the property
HELD: Yes. Normally, of course, where the institution of an expropriation action precedesthe taking of the
property subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of thetime of the filing of the complaint. This is
so provided by the Rules of Court, theassumption of possession by the expropriator
ordinarily being conditioned on itsdeposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the
property asprovisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings. Thereare instances,
however, where the expropriating agency takes over the propertyprior to the expropriation suit, as in this case
although, to repeat, the case at bar isquite extraordinary in that possession was taken by the expropriator more
than 40y e a r s p r i o r t o s u i t . I n t h e s e i n s t a n c e s , t h i s C o u r t h a s r u l e d t h a t t h e
j u s t compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the
action of eminent domain.- The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara,16 is that"x x (W)here
property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings,the value thereof may be
enchanced by the public purpose for which it
istaken;the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated itsvalue thereby;or, there may have
been a natural increase in the value of theproperty from the time the complaint is filed, due to general
economicconditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what heactually loses; it
is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyondhisloss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual
value of his propertyat the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paidcan be truly just;
i.e., 'just not only to the individual whose property is taken,but to the public, which is to pay for it.'"-
Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos' property must be ascertained as of theyear 1947, when it was
actually taken, and not at the time of the filing of theexpropriation suit, which, by the way, still has to
be done. It is as of that time thatthe real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed,
shallearn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected, conformably with otherprinciples laid down by
case law.
Disposition:Petition DENIED

Mun. of Makati vs. CA, Oct. 1, 1990

Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral
Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land
which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced
payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment
of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through
a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon
execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation
required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such
motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed
this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution.
Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of
P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are
public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law.
There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to
levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses
and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that
the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds
deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders
petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's
blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The
State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.

Republic vs. IAC, 185 SCRA 572

Mun. of Talisay vs. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528

NPC vs. CA, 129 SCRA 665

Maddumba vs. GSIS, 182 SCRA 281

Meaning of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings, 29 SCRA 868

NHA vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245

BERKENKOTTER, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, December 14,
1992 Cruz, J.
Facts: 1. On June 18, 1982, Vicente Viray, then President of Apolinario Apacible School of Fisheries, a
government institution in Nasugbu, Batangas, sent the petitioner a written offer to buy the property of the latter
with an area of 10,640 square meters for its 5-year expansion program;
2. That the petitioner expressed willingness to sell at P50.00 per square meter in its reply;
3. Viray then requested the Office of the Provincial Assessor of the Province of Batangas to appraise the land
and the latter fixed its market value at P32.00 per square meter;
4. Viray then wrote the petitioner and expressed willingness to buy the latter's property at P32.00 per square
meter. The petitioner, however, stuck to its original valuation. Later on, it said that its property had in fact
appreciated to as much as P100.00 per square meter;
5. On October 28, 1983, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for the expropriation of the petitioner's
property and invoked the assessment made by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of the Provincial Assessor
of Batangas in the amount of P32.00. The government likewise sought immediate possession of the property
upon deposit of 10% of the total assessment in accordance with PD 48;
6. Berkenkotter originally questioned the purpose of the expropriation but later abandoned this objection and
concentrated only on what it called the "underappraisal" of the subject land;
7. The RTC then appointed a panel of commissioners in accordance with Rule 67, ection 5, of the Rules of
Court, to determine the just compensation to be paid for the land;
8. On September 23, 1985, the panel of commissioners submitted its report to the trial court and pegged the
market value at P85.00 per square meter;
9. The Republic of the Philippines objected and pointed to three (3) contracts of sale executed by the
petitioner in 1985 whereby it sold three (3) tracts of land similar in topography and adjacent to the property in
question for the unit price of only P19.18 per square meter;
10. The court directed the commissioners to convene anew and to receive additional evidence. However, in its
second report dated April 1, 1987, the panel reiterated its original recommendation of P85.00/sq. m. or a
total of P904,400.00 for the entire area sought to be expropriated. The trial court acting on this
recommendation rendered judgment requiring the Republic to pay the petitioner the amount of P904,400.00 for
the entire area sought to be expropriated;
11. The government appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered a
decision REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION and declaring that the fair market value which
should be the basis in computing the amount to be paid by the government to the petitioner shall be
P19.18, the market value according set by the petitioner if we follow the three (3) deeds of sale it
executed in favor of three (3) different individuals;
12. The petitioner was therefore constrained to file this instant petition claiming that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that P19.18 per square meter should be the basis of the computation for the just compensation of
its property because:
a. Viray even offered the amount of P32.00 per squaremeter as the fair market value;
b. that P32.00 per square meter was the appraised value made by the Office of the Provincial Assessor of
Batangas; and
c. the complaint itself prays that the market value be pegged at P32.00 per square meter.
Issue: WHAT SHOULD BE THE BASIS IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE JUST COMPENSATION:
P32.00/SQ. M. IN ACCORANCE WITH THE APPRAISAL OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR;
P100.00/SQ.M. AS CLAIMED BY THE OWNER; P85.00/SQ. M. AS RECOMMENDED BY THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY THE COURT TO EVALUATE THE SAME, OR P19.18 PER SQUARE
METER WHICH WAS THE SELLING PRICE IN AN ADJACENT LOT SOLD BY THE PETITIONER TO
THREE PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.
Held. The basis in the computation of just compensation shall be P19.18 per square meter or the price
which the petitioner sold its other lots to other individuals.
This is so because there is no showing that the petitioner had any special reason for granting each of the
individual vendees the extraordinary discount amounting to as much as 75% of its claimed real value of the
land. To all appearances, they were ordinary buyers who bought the land for their own private purposes
only and not for the public purpose invoked by the government.
The petitioner's claim that the value as appearing in the deeds of sale in the three other parcels is not a
reliable index of just compensation "because owners usually undervalue the selling price of the property to
lower the expenses they would have to pay for capital gains tax and documentary stamps tax" is practically an
admission that it did not indicate the actual consideration in the three transactions where it was made to
appear that the price per square meter was only P19.18. If this was the purpose of the petitioner when it
executed the 3 deeds of sale, then IT IS SURELY HOIST NOW BY ITS OWN PETARD. AND RIGHTLY SO,
FOR IT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM ITS OWN DECEPTION AND CLAIM THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY SHOULD BE ASSESSED AT THE HIGHER RATE IT CLANDESTINELY AGREED
UPON WITH THE BUYERS.
The Court is disappointed that the petitioner should demand a higher price from the republic, which needs the
land for a public purpose, when it was willing to accept less from the three individual buyers who had only their
private interests to serve.
The fact that the petitioner sold the 3 other parcels of land at P19.18 per square meter which are admittedly of
the same topography as that subject of this case, it impliedly admitted that the price for the latter should be the
same as the former. This rule of consistency is best expressed in the familiar saying, surely not unknown to the
petitioner, THAT WHAT IS SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE IS ALSO SAUCE FOR THE GANDER.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the proerty sought to be expropriated
(Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 378). The measure is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss. he compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the
taker.
To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the property, to which
should be added the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation.
The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by the parties willing but not
compelled to enter into a contract of sale.
Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value are: 1. cost of acquisition; 2.
the current value of like proerties; 3. its actual or potential uses; 4. particular case of lands; 5. their
size, shape, location; and 6. the tax declarations thereon.
Finally, note that as held in the case of Republic vs. Santos, 141 SCRA 30, the market value as
recommended by the board of commissioners appointed by the court were at best only ADVISORY AND
PERSUASIVE AND BY NO MEANS FINAL OR BINDING.

Manotok vs. CA, May 21,1987

EPZA vs. Dulay, April 29,l987

Lagunzad vs. CA, 154 SCRA 199 (When it is considered for "public use")

Sumulong vs. Guererro, 154 SCRA 461

Republic vs. CA, 154 SCRA 428

Cosculluela vs. CA, 164 SCRA 393

Rep. vs. Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336

Requisites of taking:
a.the expropriator must enter the property;
b.the entrance must not be for just a momentary period;
c.the entry must be under warrant of color or title;
d.the property must be devoted for public use; and
e.the owner must be ousted from beneficial use of his land.

Ignacio vs. Guererro, 150 SCRA 369

Garcia vs. CA, 102 SCRA 597

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349 ( A private property which is devoted to public use
may not be expropriated for another public purpose.)

De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
87335, February 12, 1989 Expropriation: Gancayco, J.
Facts: 1. On February 20, 1979, the Rep. of the Philippines initiated an expropriation proceedings against the
owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets, among them Cristina de Knecht together
with Concepcion Cabarrus, and some other fifteen defendants in Civil Case No. 7001-P;
2. In June, 1979, the Republic of the Philippines prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property
to be expropriated on the ground that it had already deposited with the PNB 10% of the amount of
compensation stated in the complaint; that on June 14, 1979, the Lower Court issued a writ of possession
authorizing the Republic to enter into the properties condemned and created a committee to determine just
compensation;
3. On July 16, 1979, De Knecht went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition directed
against the June 14, 1979 order of the lower court;
4. On October 30, 1980, the Supreme Court rendered its decision granting the petition for certiorari and
prohibition and directing that the Order of the respondent Judge dated June 14, 1979 be SET ASIDE and the
respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 7001-P;
5. On August 8, 1981, the defendants in Civil Case No. 7001- moved for the dismissal of said case since the
decision of the Supreme Court is already final;
6. On September 2, 1983, the Republic moved for the dismissal of the case due to the enactment of BP 340
expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. On the same date, the Court dismissed the case. The
defendants moved for a reconsideration which the Court denied;
7. De Knecht appealed the Order dismissing the case to the Court of Appeals who on December 28, 1988
issued its decision setting aside the Order appealed from and dismissing the expropriation proceedings before
the lower court on the ground that the choice of the above-mentioned streets as the line through which the
EDSA should be extended is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval;
8. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the legislature could still pass a law expropriating the lots of the private respondents
despite the existence of a final decision of the Supreme Court which held that choice of their lot to be used as
an extension of EDSA is arbitrary?
Held: It is true that there is already a final decision of the Supreme Court to the effect that the choice of the
Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. However, it is equally true
that the Constitution and our laws may expropriate private properties after the payment of just compensation.
When on February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the same properties for
the same purpose, IT APPEARS THAT THE SAME WAS BASED ON SUPERVENING EVENTS THAT
OCCURRED after the decision of the SC in De Knecht vs. Bautista in 1980. The social impact factor which
persuaded the Court to consider this extension has disappeared because of the fact that the residents of the
area have been relocated and duly compensated and only DE KNECHT now is left while her property is only
about 5% of the area to be expropriated. The Republic could continue it expropriation proceedings considering
the supervening events after the decision was rendered.
BP Bilang 340 THEREFORE EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDED THE AFORESAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT. X x x THE COURT AGREES IN THE WISDOM AND NECESSITY
OF ENACTING BP 340. THUS THE ANTERIOR DECISION OF THIS COURT MUST YIELD TO THIS
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE FIAT.
Cruz, J., concurring
Supervening events have changed the factual basis of the SC's decision to justify the subsequent enactment
of the statute. If we are sustaining the legislation, it is not because we concede that the lawmakers can nullify
the findings of the Court in the exercise of its discretion. It is simply because we ourselves have found that
under the changed situation, the present expropriation is no longer arbitrary.
I MUST ADD THAT THIS DECISION IS NOT A REVERSAL OF THE ORIGINAL DE KNECHT CASE, WHICH
WAS DECIDED UNDER A DIFFERENT SET OF FACTS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CRISTINA
DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 87335, February 12, 1989

Limitations of the power of expropriation, 3 SCRA 706

City of Baguio vs. NAWASA, 106 Phil. 144

Garcia vs. CA, 102 SCRA 620

Municipality of Daet vs. CA, 93 SCRA 503

Salas vs. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734

Arce vs. Genito, Feb. 27, 1976

Guido vs. RPA, 84 Phil. 847

Rep. vs. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461

Mataas na Lupa vs. Dimayuga, 130 SCRA 30

San Diego vs. Valdellon, 80 SCRA 305

Haguisan vs. Emilia, 131 SCRA 517

Heirs of Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220

Commissioner vs. Burgos, March 31,1980

Republic vs. Juan, 92 SCRA 29

Mactan-Cebu international Airport Authority vs. Lozada, Jr., GR No. 176625, February 25, 2010

De Oano vs. Republic, GR no. 168770, February 9, 2011

Kabiling, et al., vs. NHA, December 18,l987

Clements vs. Nolting, 42 Phil. 702

Co vs. PNB, 114 SCRA 842

Lozano vs. Martinez,146 SCRA 323

Rutter vs. Esteban,93 Phil. 68

Ilusorio vs. CAR, 17 SCRA 25

Ortigas vs. Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 533

Ganzon vs. Insierto, 123 SCRA 713

Del Rosario vs. De los Santos, March 21, 1968

Abella vs. NLRC, 152 SCRA 140

PVBEU vs. PVB, 189 SCRA 14

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAHINAY, G.R. No. 122485, February 1, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO LAUGA, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, the real name and the personal circumstances
of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, including those of her
immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision.
The Facts: In an Information dated 21 September 2000, the appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED
RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of
Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the
father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and criminally have carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.
On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution
and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical certificate
of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense
was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the appellant. On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the
prosecution, namely: victim AAA; her brother BBB; and one Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan” in the
barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following:
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home. AAA’s father, the appellant, was having a
drinking spree at the neighbor’s place. Her mother decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he
has the habit of mauling AAA’s mother. Her only brother BBB also went out in the company of some
neighbors.
At around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up; removed his pants, slid inside the blanket
covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear; warned her not to shout for help while threatening her
with his fist; and told her that he had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss
her repeatedly, and “inserted his penis inside her vagina.”
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out late. BBB
decided to take AAA with him. While on their way to their maternal grandmother’s house, AAA recounted her
harrowing experience with their father. Upon reaching their grandmother’s house, they told their grandmother
and uncle of the incident, after which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He invited appellant to the
police station, to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because
he was unable to control himself.
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination. Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal
Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:
hyperemic vulvae with 4 o’clock & 6 o’clock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody
discharges 2° to an alleged raping incident
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against him was ill-
motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated
argument, and beats the children as a disciplinary measure. He went further to narrate how his day was on
the date of the alleged rape.
The lone assignment of error in the appellant’s brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because: (1)
there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB; (2) his extrajudicial confession
before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right; and
(3) AAA’s accusation was ill-motivated.
HELD: Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a “bantay bayan” and the
credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a “Bantay Bayan”
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession
was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such
requirement.
The case of People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article
III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her
extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. This
Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed
as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the
Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001,
she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was,
therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should
have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman x x x
was made in response to the ‘interrogation’ made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing
accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the
confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her
bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at bar when
accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the private
complainant]. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a “bantay
bayan” may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a “bantay
bayan,” that is, “a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping
peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.”
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11
November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized “to serve
as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level.” The composition
of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least
three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non
Government Organization Representative well-known in his community.
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch
groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on
the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities
delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he
makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to
his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known
as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in
evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced
solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but “from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.”
Voluntary and spontaneous confession of a suspect who is already under custody of the police is
admissible in evidence even in the absence of counsel.

People vs. Felixminia, March 20, 2002

People vs. Figueroa, 335 SRA 349

People vs. Duenas, 426 SCRA 666

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE TING LAN UY, JR., et al., 475 SCRA 248
Facts: For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation intended for the
purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), the accused-appellants were charged
of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents as defined and penalized under Arts. 217 and
171 [8] in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. After trial, all accused were convicted by the
Sandiganbayan.
While the Information charged the accused of willful and intentional commission of the acts complained
of while the Decision found the accused guilty of inexcusable negligence.
Accused Ochoa interposed an appeal and claimed that his conviction was based on his alleged sworn
statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with an NPC personnel and the
report of the NBI. He maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined a the Philippine heart center
and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. He was not assisted by counsel nor he was
apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit. He likewise claimed that his constitutional
rights to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against and due process were violated.
Held: 1. Even if the information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence
may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense. (Diaz vs.
Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 118). This was the doctrine laid down in the case of Samson vs. Court of appeals,
103 Phil. 277.
2. The claim that his affidavit is inadmissible in evidence in accordance with section 12 [1] of the Bill of Rights
is not tenable. The “investigation” under said provision refers to “custodial investigation where a suspect has
already been taken into police custody and that the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit
information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to
the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
began to focus on a particular person as a suspect (People vs. Duenas, Jr., 426 SCRA 666). Clearly,
therefore, the rights enumerated by the accused are not available BEFORE GOVERNMENT
INVESTIGATORS ENTER THE PICTURE. The protective mantle of section 12, article III does not apply to
administrative investigations (People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216); confession to a private individual
(Kimpo vs. CA, 232 SCRA 53); verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not a part of the
investigation (People vs. Ordono, 334 SCRA 673); or even to a Mayor approached as a personal confidante
and not in his official capacity (People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589). In fact, even a videotaped interview where
the accused willingly admit his guilt in the presence of newsmen is not covered by the said provision though
the trial courts were warned by the supreme Court to take extreme caution in admitting similar confessions
because of the distinct possibility that the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may
attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having
an accused admit an offense on television (People vs. Endino, 353 SCRA 307).
Clearly, the confession of the accused was obtained during an administrative investigation by NPC and
therefore, the same was not covered by Section 12, Art. III of the Constitution.
(NOTE: In People vs. Andam, the confession made before a Municipal Mayor was held admissible as
evidence).

PEOPLE VS. SAMOLDE, G.R. NO. 128551, 336 SCRA 632, JUL. 31, 2000

People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216

Kimpo vs. CA, 232 SCRA 53

People vs. Ordono, 334 SCRA 673

People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589

People vs. Endino, 353 SCRA 307

PEOPLE VS. BARIQUIT, 341 SCRA 600

PEOPLE VS. DANO, G.R. NO. 117690, 339 SCRA 515, SEPT. 1, 2000

PEOPLE VS. MAYORGA, G.R. NO. 135405, 346 SCRA 458, NOVEMBER 29, 2000

PEOPLE VS. PATUNGAN, 354 SCRA 413

PEOPLE VS. PANFILO CABILES, 284 SCRA 199

Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 US 478

Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436

People vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379

People vs. Matos-Viduya, Sept. 11, 1990

People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289

People vs. Duhan, 142 SCRA 100

People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2

People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312