Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs. Abelardo T. Domondon, Jose A.

Gangan and Violeta

J. Josef, Respondents, G.R. No. 165036; 5 July 2010 Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs.
Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe, Respondent, G.R. No. 175705; 5 July 2010
Facts: Hazel Ma. C. Antolin (Petitioner) failed the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Licensure
Exam she took in October 1997. Convinced she deserved to pass the Exam, she wrote to the
Board of Accountancy (Board), requesting that her answer sheets be re-corrected. She was
shown her answer sheets but since these showed only shaded marks, she was unable to
determine why she failed the Exam. Consequently, she asked the Board for copies of the
questionnaire, her answer sheets, the answer keys and an explanation of the grading system
(collectively, the Examination Papers). Her request was denied on two grounds: (1) Section 36,
Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals,
as amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994,
only allowed access to her answer sheets, and reconsideration of the result of her examination
can be made only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of the answer sheets, or
malfeasance; and (2) the Board was precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other
than the answer sheets) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994.
The Board later informed her that her exam was investigated and no mechanical error was
found in the grading. Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages, with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction, against the Board and its members before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), praying that the Board provide her with all documents that would show whether
the Board fairly administered the exam and correctly graded her answers, and if warranted, to
issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA. She later amended her Petition to clarify that
she only wanted access to the documents requested, not recorrection of her exam, deleting in
the process her original prayer for issuance of a certificate of registration as CPA. Petitioner
passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Exam and took her oath as a CPA. Consequently, the
RTC denied her application for mandatory injunction for being moot. She amended her Petition
a second time to implead the PRC and to ask, in addition to access to the documents she had
requested, that if warranted, appropriate revisions in the October 1997 Exam results be made
by the Board and the PRC. The RTC considered the matter moot and dismissed the petition. On
her motion, however, the RTC reconsidered the dismissal, holding that her passing of the
subsequent CPA examination did not render the petition moot because the relief “and if
warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as Certified Public Accountant” was
deleted from the original petition. As regards whether she had the constitutional right to have
access to the documents she requested, the RTC resolved to let the parties first adduce
evidence, and to have PRC air its side of the case. The RTC also ordered the PRC to preserve
and safeguard the questionnaire, petitioner’s answer sheets, and the answer keys for the
October 1997 CPA Licensure Exam. When their motion for reconsideration was denied,
respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which set aside the RTC’s decision
and ordered the dismissal of the case because: (1) the petition was mooted when petitioner
passed the May 1998 CPA exam; (2) Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series
of 1994, constituted a valid limitation on her right to information and access to government
documents; (3) the Examination Documents were not of public concern, because she merely
sought review of her failing marks; (4) it was not the ministerial or mandatory function of the
respondents to review and reassess the answers to examination questions of a failing
examinee; and (5) she failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she did not elevate the
matter to the PRC before seeking judicial intervention. Petitioner, thus, brought the matter to the
Supreme Court. Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioner may seek judicial intervention to compel
the re-correction of her examination; (2) Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies; (3) Whether or not the case was mooted by petitioner’s passing the
May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination; and (4) Whether or not petitioner has the
constitutionalright to have access to the Examination Papers. Held: (1) Any claim for re-
correction or revision of petitioner’s 1997 examination cannot be compelled by mandamus. In
AgustinRamos vs. Sandoval[G.R. No. 84470, February 2, 1989 (Minute Resolution)], where
therespondent Judge was questioned for dismissing therein petitioners’ mandamus action to
compel the Medical Board of Examiners and the Professional Regulation Commission to re-
correct their ratings, the Supreme Court held that “(t)he function of reviewing and re-assessing
the petitioners’ answers to the examination questions, in the light of the facts and arguments
presented by them x x x is a discretionary function of the Medical Board, not a ministerial and
mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of thewrit of mandamus.” For a writ of mandamus to
issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing
demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be
equally clear. No such clarity exists here. And despite petitioner’s assertion that she did not
demand re-correction, the most cursory perusal of her Second Amended Petition and her prayer
that respondents “make the appropriate revisions on the results of her examination” belied this
claim. (2) Like the claimants in Agustin, petitioner’s remedy from the Board’srefusal to release
the Examination Papers should have been through an appeal to the PRC. Under Section 5(c) of
Presidential Decree No. 223, the PRC has the power to review and approve the policies,
resolutions, rules and regulations, orders and decisions of the various professional Boards,
including the results of their licensure examinations, and the decisions of the Boards on
administrative cases shall be final and executory unless appealed to the PRC within 30 days
from promulgation. Contrary’s to petitioner’s claim, this power is not limited to administrative
investigations but encompassesrequests for documents. And since the PRC itself issued the
resolution (PRC Resolution No. 338) questioned by petitioner, it was in the best position to
resolve questions addressed to its area of expertise. One of the reasons for exhaustion of
administrative remedies is thewell-entrenched doctrine on separation of powers, which enjoins
upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters falling primarily (albeit not
exclusively) within the competence of other departments. However, the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is subject to exceptions, among which is when only a question of law
is involved. Whether or not petitioner had a constitutional right to demand access to the
Examination Papers was one such question of law which cannot be resolved with finality by the
administrative officer. (3) An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.
In this jurisdiction, any citizen may challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his or her
right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen
possesses the inherent right to be informed by the mere fact of citizenship, petitioner’s belated
passing of the CPA Board Exams did not automatically mean that her interest in the
Examination Papers had become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly, the constitutional question
presented, in view of the likelihood that the issues in this case would be repeated, warranted
review. (4) Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute; it is
limited to “matters of public concern” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law” (Section 7, Article III, 1987 Constitution). Similarly, the State’s policy of full
disclosure is limited to “transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law” (Sec. 28, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). The Court has always
grappled with the meanings of “public interest” and “public concern” which “embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen,”
and which are, in the final analysis, up to the courts to determine on a case by case basis
[Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 535 (1987)]. National board examinations
such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the
examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent
administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the
accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not
merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and
learning of the art and science of accounting. The Court, nonetheless, realizes that there may
be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the
exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent
difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these
multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a
limited duration. The PRC, however, had not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons
behind their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the Examination Papers
confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of this case, which may impact on every
board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may be
ventilated, the Court deemed it best to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They
also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the
GRP from signing the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public
concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991)
HELD:
Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of
public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in
the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of
society.

AKBAYAN vs Aquino
FACTS:

This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with
Japan, concerning trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade
in services, investment, etc.

Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners – non-government

organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – sought via petition for mandamus
and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA, including the Philippine
and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and
annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry
into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until
the negotiation is completed.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the negotiation process are privileged
Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and
power to concur in treaties, from the negotiation process

RULING:

Standing

In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,
which is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part
of the general public which possesses the right. As the present petition is anchored on the right
to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens
including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally are suing in
their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in
jurisprudence.

JPEPA, A Matter of Public Concern

To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern xxx

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are
matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic
negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to
the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.

Privileged Character of Diplomatic Negotiations Recognized

The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In
discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
“information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.”

Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the
JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for
discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to
conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that
“historic confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability
of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be open to public scrutiny would
discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from
entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that
matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing
to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in
an area of greater national interest.

Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does
not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the
context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for
the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged
status.

Does the exception apply even though JPEPA is primarily economic and does not involve
national security?

While there are certainly privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security
such as those involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the
“informer’s privilege,” or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person
or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement
of that law. The suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national security
for this privilege to apply in any given instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in
all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-
standing practice. It would also be highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general.

Also illustrative is the privileged accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed
privileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and
those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is
essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.

In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the
case deliberated upon, so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve
matters of national security.

It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not
absolute, one significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than the other
branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and
employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal
wrongdoing.” This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a
judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.

Closely related to the “presidential communications” privilege is the deliberative process

privilege recognized in the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co, deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests,
not on the need to protect national security but, on the “obvious realization that officials will not
communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and
front page news,” the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions.

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and
presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the
confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential
communications is similar, if not identical.

The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus shows that the privilege for diplomatic
negotiations is meant to encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the
negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from public view. Similar to the privilege for
presidential communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through the same
means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in its
capacity as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations.” And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to
diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content of the information per se, but
because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public
interest, must be presumed confidential.

Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from
the privileged character of the deliberative process.

Does diplomatic privilege only apply to certain stages of the negotiation process?

In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that with regard to the duty to disclose
“definite propositions of the government,” such duty does not include recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.

Treaty-making power of the President

xxx they (petitioners) argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA
negotiations since whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international
trade agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section
28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No. 1464.

The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties
and international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and
other taxes xxx.

As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII
– the article on the Executive Department.
xxx

While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is
exercised by the President only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the
power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the
concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty.
In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations
provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already
inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives
accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.

This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for
the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still enure that all treaties will
substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution.

It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers,
may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for
Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to
the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a
while that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making
power of the President, but only the Senate.

Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-
members of the House of Representatives fail to present a “sufficient showing of need” that the
information sought is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do
not include treaty-negotiation.

Did the respondent’s alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege constitute waiver of such
privilege?

That respondent invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present
petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioner’s position
presupposes that an assertion of the privilege should have been made during the House
Committee investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to have waived it.

xxx (but) Respondent’s failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may
not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. xxx what respondents
received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for
information. And as priorly stated, the House Committee itself refrained from pursuing its earlier
resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecia’s
alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.

The privilege is an exemption to Congress’ power of inquiry. So long as Congress itself finds no
cause to enforce such power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light,
respondent’s failure to invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations did not
amount to waiver thereof.
“Showing of Need” Test

In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a “sufficient showing of
need” only means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure
sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages
in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional
adjudication involving fundamental rights.

xxx However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the privilege, and it has been
established that the subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a
party overcome the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter
of public concern, without any further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the
doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to
information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an information
is a matter of public concern.

Right to information vis-a-vis Executive Privilege

xxx the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to
information, a specific “showing of need” for such information is not a relevant consideration, but
only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has
claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the
same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that
information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively
and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.

RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND

NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE
JUDICIARY.
A. M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012.

Facts: Rowena Paraan, Research Director of the PCIJ, sought copies of the SALN of the
Justices of the Supreme Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal
Data Sheet of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information
on government officials.

Issue #1: Can the SALN of justices be accessed via the right to information?

Ruling: Yes. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full
public disclosure and honesty in the public service.
Issue #2: What are the limitations on the constitutional right to information?

Ruling: The right to information is not absolute. It is further subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law. Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to that right:
national security matters and intelligence information;
trade secrets and banking transactions;
criminal matters; and
(4)other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially known to
public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available to the public as
well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of
either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court

Sabio vs Gordon
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this,
on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting
him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he
invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s
unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly
ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that
“the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in
the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable
them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens
can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their
effective implementation.

VELMONTE VS BALMONTE170 SCRA 256

Facts:
Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with
the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to
secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be
furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et.al. Due to serious legal implications,
President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General
Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential
relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be;
that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be
proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June
1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance
System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that
for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action
necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte,Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome,
LeoObligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba,Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro,
and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke
their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the
list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP Laban
who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners
with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow
petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

Issue:
Whether Valmonte, et.al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on
behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46of PD 1146, as amended (the
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977),provide for annual appropriations to pay
the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as
employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or
guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its
resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and
regulations. Thus, one of the reasonsthat prompted the revision of the old GSIS law
(CA 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarialsolvency of the
funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD1146.] Consequently, as
Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is
therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly
with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government
employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be
the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that
all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the
GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a
matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship
exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts
the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting
the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the present
petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does
not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should
be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.

Legaspi vs CSC
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in
this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as
civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees
 HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does
not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers,
etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types
of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every
case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is,
therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is
first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as
already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case
of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is
not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the
operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly
observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments
against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every
denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the
proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the
legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are
occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even
as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny
the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which
would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take
judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there
is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is,
therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their
professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of
public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil
service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil
service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies

Aquino- Sarmiento vs Morato

FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the
board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a
review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either
banned, cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato
on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as
reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and
completely private and personal On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting
of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17)
members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which
rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter,
respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much
later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as
confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the
members.

ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid

HELD : The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person,
company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation,
state, or community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent
classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character. it is an office created
to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to
privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or
officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board and the
individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official
functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are,
therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental
law of the land.

Drilon vs Ermita

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as
the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate
the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before
the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department
heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention.
AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted
the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who
in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals
and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National
Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who
in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national
security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the
executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from
appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s
approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee
then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing
proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order
barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig.
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face
court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and
conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the
provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the
1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is
so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently
true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of
the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very
essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus
made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is
to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle
of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When
Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest
official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour,
is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department
head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either
by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of
the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation
of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21,
the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

Read full text

NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking
Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials
and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence,
including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia
legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if
the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires
act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or
cut unless the naked blade is drawn
Bantay vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007

FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside
certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have
manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal
Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees
of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has
yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s Law
Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al.,
was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the
nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request.
Comelec’s reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from
the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is
nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list
elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting
private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications
defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional
prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the
party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in
the elections.

ISSUE:

1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups
named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list
groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said
nominees.

HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents
named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007
elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,

1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make
a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action
for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case
must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address
issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal’s
evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the
qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization.
)

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7
of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives
on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such
vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the
House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in
any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in
interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the
right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The people’s right
to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided
by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees
of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing
the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their
respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

Baldoza vs. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14

FACTS: In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal,
Batangas,charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of
authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records
of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order
conditions of the said municipality. Respondent, in answer to the complaint,stated that there has never
been an intention to refuse access to official court records; that although court records are among public
documents open to inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by other persons who
have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to
who, when, where and how they may be inspected. court has unquestionably the power to prevent an
improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the
person requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy
or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal. Under the circumstances, to
allow an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free access, might do more harm than good
to the citizenry of Taal. Disorder and chaos might result defeating the very essence of their request.
The undersigned is just as interested as Mr. Baldoza in the welfare of the community and the preservation
of our democratic principles. The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for
investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and (cooperation among officers in the same
municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating Judge, but after formal investigation, he
recommended the exoneration of respondent.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the case against respondent is hereby dismissed.information which the records
contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the
contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called
upon to devise a remedy. The publication is made subject to the consequences of the law.Investigating
Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent certain
conditions and under his control and supervision. it has not been shown that the rules and conditions
imposed by the respondent were unreasonable.The access to public records predicated on the right of the
people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public
has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significancethe Court finds that the respondent
has not committed any abuse of authority. there is no showing of abuse of authority on the part of the
respondent.The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of the respondent
under certain conditions and under his control and supervision.Complainant admitted that he was aware
of the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent when he went to his office to view his docket
books for the purpose mentioned in his communication

A.M. No. 1037-CJ October 28, 1981

MARTIN LANTACO, SR., ESTEBAN DEL BARRIO, ROSALITO ALAMAG and BORROMEO
VITALIANO,complainants,
vs.
CITY JUDGE FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is a verified letter-complaint dated August 7, 1975 addressed to the President of the Philippines
(by lst Indorsement, dated August 25, 1975, this case was referred by the Office of the President to
this Court, pursuant to Section 7, Article X of the Constitution), by jeepney drivers Martin Lantaco,
Sr., Esteban del Barrio, Rosalito Alamag and Borromeo Vitaliano, all residents of Pasay City, against
City Judge Francisco R. Llamas of the Pasay City Court for "Backsliding and Grave Abuse of
Discretion."
On January 8, 1975, an investigating special counsel of the City Fiscal's Office of Pasay City, filed
Criminal Cases Nos. 95647, 95648, 95649 and 95650, all for estafa against Ricardo Paredes, an
officer of the PASCAMASCON, an association of jeepney operators, for "non-remittance of SSS
contribution premiums." These cases were assigned to respondent. After the prosecution had rested
its case, the defense moved to dismiss all the criminal cases on the ground that the evidence
presented by the prosecution is insufficient to convict the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution opposed the motion. According to the complainants, the respondent set the
promulgation of his decision on July 22, 1975, postponed to July 30, 1975 and again to July 31,
1975, when at about 9:45 in the morning, upon respondent's instruction, his clerk of court read the
dispositive portion thereof acquitting the accused of all four estafa cases on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

According to the herein complainants:

After the reading of (the) Decision a recess was made by Judge Llamas and we
requested Judge Llamas to furnish us a copy of said Decision. Judge Llamas told us
that there are no more copy and we told Judge Llamas if there is no more copy we
would like to xerox the original and Judge Llamas told us that xerox copy are not
permitted and Judge Llamas instructed one of the employees in his office – a- steno-
typist to type another copy for us and that the typist told us to come back on Monday,
August 4, which we did, but, the steno-typist failed to furnish us the copy as agreed
by us and told us again to come back next day, August 5. The next morning we went
back of the office of Judge Llamas, same we failed to get copy of the Decision.

On August 6, 1975 at 11:00 A.M. one of the complainants, Esteban del Barrio and
Ceferino F. Ginete, the President or our labor union went to Judge Llamas to secure
copy of said decision to (sic) the same person – the steno-typist. The steno-typist
went inside the room of Judge Llamas and a few minutes the typist went back to us
and informed us that he could not type the Decision because the folder is at the
house of Judge Llamas and when Mr. Ginete inquire why the said folder of the
complainants are at the house of Judge Llamas, the typist reply the Judge making
"CORRECTION." Mr. Ginete wonder why a correction is being made when the
decision has already been rendered anti why the delay in furnishing us copy, WHY?

This Court required the respondent to comment on the complaint by 2nd Indorsement dated
September 16, 1975. This Court also sent by registered mails a follow-up letter dated October 23,
1975 and a tracer letter dated November 25, 1975. The Bureau of Posts in a certification dated
November 26, 1975 certified that these follow-up letters were delivered to and received by the office
of the respondent.

Finally, on March 8, 1976 this Court received respondent's comment dated December 3, 1975. His
brief comment:

The four related criminal accusations against Mr. Ricardo Paredes, were validly and
properly decided by this Court. The motion to dismiss after the prosecution's case
was rested, was resolved and said resolution of acquittal is the very decision in this
case which was validly promulgated in the presence of the accused, the prosecuting
fiscal and Mr. Severino Ginete and all the complaining parties. The records of the
decision show that the accused assisted by counsel signed the same on said date
and copies thereafter furnished counsel for the accused and the prosecuting fiscal.

Respondent also averred:

 It is respectfully submitted that on the details of the proceedings and the evidence
presented, no better answer could be made by the undersigned except by submitting
a copy of said decision promulgated July 31, 1975 and marked as Annex "A" of this
comment. In the same breath, the matter of the advisability as suggested that this
finding by this Court be reviewed by the Military may best be answered by a thorough
reading of the decision.

After a careful examination of the records before this Court, We found that respondent committed
grave abuse of authority in refusing to give the complainants a copy of his decision in Criminal
Cases Nos. 95647-95650. The complainants were understandably interested in securing a copy of
the decision as they were the complaining witnesses in these four criminal cases. The request was
made during office hours. It was relayed personally to the respondent. The decision in question was
already promulgated. Copies were already furnished the counsel for the prosecution and the
defense. It was already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize. And if
there was "no more copy," the complainants were amenable to have a xerox copy of the original on
file, copies of which, as part of court records, are allowed to be given to interested parties upon
request, duly certified as a true copy of the original on file. What aggravates the situation, as seen
from the sequence of events narrated by the complainants which were never denied or rebutted by
the respondent, is that respondent, without just cause, denied complainants access to public records
and gave the complainants the run-around, which is oppressive as it is arbitrary. In Baldoza vs.
Honorable Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano (A.M. No. 112-MJ, May 5, 1976), WE emphasized the
importance of access to public records. predicated as it is on the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern in which the public has a legitimate interest. While the
public officers in custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in
which such records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion
does not carry with it the authority to prohibit such access, inspection, examination or copying.

Continuing, said this Court:

The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to
information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to
official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions,
subject to such limitations imposed by law (Article IV, Section 6, New Constitution).
The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental
role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic
perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic
decision- making if they are denied access to information of general interest.
Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies
of the times. As has been aptly observed: Maintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either
process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. (87 Harvard Law Review 1505)
[Baldoza vs. Hon. Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, A.M. No. 112-MJ, May 5, 1976].

The herein complainants prayed that respondent's decision be reviewed "to obviate any miscarriage
of justice considering the adverse effects to the thousands of jeepney drivers and to prevent the
other jeepney operators in using (sic) the Decision ... for their own benefits." The respondent
commented that "no better answer could be made ... except by submitting a copy of the decision"
and the complaint "may best be answered by a thorough reading of the decision."

OUR "review" in administrative cases of this nature as defined in Vda. de Zabala vs. Pamaran (A.C.
No. 200-J, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 430, 433), is limited to the text of the decision and respondent's
articulations on the law and the evidence submitted. WE do not review the decision to reverse it or to
set it aside as if it were brought to this Court on regular appeal; for this is beyond the objective of an
administrative proceedings to protect the public service, to secure the faithful and efficient
performance of official functions, and to rid the public service of incompetent, corrupt and unworthy
public servants.

WE have carefully read, examined and analyzed the decision submitted by the respondent. WE
found that in sustaining the motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence after the
prosecution rested its case, respondent committed several errors bordering on gross ignorance of
the law.

1. Respondent erred in concluding that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused, despite
repeated demands, refused and still refuses to remit the alleged collected premium contributions and
that "if no demand was ever made ... then a criminal prosecution for estafa ... could not prosper."

The uniform allegation in all the four informations for estafa that "the accused, despite repeated
demands, refused and still refuses to remit ...," need not anymore be proved by the prosecution;
because the Social Security Act of 1954 (R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 1792, No. 2658
and No. 3839, and further amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 24, 65 and 177), makes it the duty
of the employer to remit the contributions without need of any demand therefor by the employee.
Section 22(a), (b), (c) and (d) of said Act, governing "Remittance of Contributions" requires as a legal
obligation of every employer to remit within the first seven (7) days of the month the contributions of
the employee and the employer to the Social Security System, failing which invites the imposition of
a penalty of three percent (3%). With this mandate of the law, demand on the part of the employee
before the employer remits these contributions to the SSS is not a condition precedent for such
remittance. The Social Security System can collect such contributions in the same manner as taxes
are made collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code (Sec. 22[b], Social Security Act).
Thus:

SEC. 22. Remittance of contributions — The contributions imposed in the proceeding

sections shall be remitted to the SSS within the first seven days of each calendar
month following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the
Commission may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and to remit such
contributions shall be liable for their payment, and if any contribution is not paid to
the SSS, as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a penalty
thereon of three per cent per month from the date the contribution fans due until
paid. If deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission, the collection and
remittance of contributions shall be made quarterly or semi-annually in advance, the
contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their respective
employers: Provided, That upon separation of an employee, any contributions so
paid in advance but not due shall be credited or refunded to his employer.

(b) The contributions payable under this Act in cases where an employer refuses or
neglects to pay the same shall be collected by the System in the same manner as
taxes are made collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended
Failure or refusal of the employer to pay or remit the contributions herein prescribed
shall not prejudice the right of the covered employee to the benefits of the coverage.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) For purposes of this section, any employer who is delinquent or has not remitted
all the monthly contributions due and payable may within six (6) months from
approval of this amendatory act remit said contributions to the SSS and submit the
 corresponding collection lists therefor without incurring the prescribed three per cent
penalty. In case the employer fails to remit to the SSS the said contributions within
the six months grace period, the penalty of three per cent shall be imposed from the
time the contributions first became due as provided in paragraph (a) of this section.
Provided, however, That the Administrator, may in meritorious cases, allow
employers who have submitted a payment plan, on or before April 19 1973, to pay
their contributions due and payable up to December 31, 1973 without incurring the
prescribed three per cent penalty. As amended by Rep. Act No. 2658, and by Pres.
Decrees Nos. 24 and 177).

To prove remittance, the employer can submit his records thereon or a certification from the SSS as
to the fact of remittance of the contributions.

II. Respondent likewise erred in concluding that, in connection with the daily deductions of P 0.50 as
SSS premium contributions, "this Court is not convinced and could not reasonably believe that there
was a forced daily deductions or exaction of P0. 50."

Section 18 of the Social Security Act governing employees' contribution, provides that ...
the employer shall deduct and withhold from such employee's monthly salary, wage, compensation
or earnings the employee's contribution in an amount corresponding to his salary, wage,
compensation or earnings during the month in accordance with the following schedule effective on
January 1, 1973 ... ." With this legal obligation placed on the employer's shoulder, respondent's
reasonable belief that "there was or could be no forced daily deductions or exaction of P 0.50" would
have no legal basis and support.

III. Respondent again cried in finding "that from the existing relationship between the accused as
owner of the utility jeepneys and all the complainants, there is categorically demonstrated no
employer-employee relationship in contemplation of the Social Security Act of 1954, as amended by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 24, 65 and 177. In other words, if by law there exists no such relationship,
then the herein accused truly is not even obligated to collect such amounts; neither is he under
obligation to make remittance payments."

For, as early as March 23, 1956, in National Labor Union vs. Benedicto Dinglasan (L-7945), this
Court already ruled that there is employer-employee relation between jeepney owners/operators and
jeepney drivers under the boundary system arrangement, and enunciated:

The main question to determine is whether there exists a relationship of employer-

employee between the drivers of the jeeps and the owner thereof. The findings
contained in the first order are not disputed by both parties except the last to which
the respondent took exception. But in the resolution setting aside the order of 16
February 1954 the Court of Industrial Relations in banc did not state that such finding
is not supported by evidence. It merely declares that there is no employer-employee
relation between respondent, Benedicto Dinglasan, and the driver complainants in
this case. If the findings to which the respondent took exception is unsupported by
the evidence, a pronouncement to that effect would have been made by the Court in
banc. In the absence of such pronouncement we are not at liberty to ignore or
disregard said finding. The findings of the Court of Industrial Relations with respect to
question of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record shall be
conclusive. Taking into consideration the findings of fact made by the Court of
Industrial Relations we find it difficult to uphold the conclusion of the Court set forth in
its resolution of 23 June 1954. The drivers did not invest a single centavo in the
business and the respondent is the exclusive owner of the jeeps. The management
 of the business is in the respondent's hands. For even if the drivers of the jeeps take
material possession of the jeeps, still the respondent as owner thereof and holder of
a certificate of public convenience is entitled to exercise, as he does and under the
law he must, supervision over the drivers by seeing to it that they follow the route
prescribed by the Public Service Commission and the rules and regulations
promulgated by it as regards their operation. And when they pass by the gasoline
station of the respondent checking by his employees on the water tank, oil and tire
pressure is done. The only features that would make the relationship of lessor and
lessee between the respondent and the drivers, members of the union, as contended
by the respondent, are the fact that he does not pay them any fixed wage but their
compensation is the excess of the total amount of P7.50 which they agreed to pay to
the respondent, the owner of the jeeps, and the fact that the gasoline burned by the
jeeps is for the account of the drivers. These two features are not, however, sufficient
to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer-employee, because
the estimated earnings for fares must be over and above the amount they agreed to
pay to the respondent for a ten-hour shift or ten-hour a day operation of the jeeps.
Not having any interest in the business because they did not invest anything in the
acquisition of the jeeps and did not participate in the management thereof, their
service as drivers of the jeeps being their only contribution to the business, the
relationship of lessor and lessee cannot be sustained [In the matter of the Park Floral
Company, etc., 19 NLRB 403; Radley et al. vs. Commonwealth, 161 SW (2d) 417;
Jones vs. Goodson et al., 121 Fed. Rep. (2d) 176; Mitchel vs. Gibbson et al., 172
Fed. Rep. (2d) 970]. In the lease of chattels the lessor loses complete control over
the chattel leased although the lessee cannot make bad use thereof, for he would be
responsible for damages to the lessor should he do so. In this case there is a
supervision and a sort of control that the owner of the jeeps exercises over the
drivers. It is an attempt by ingenious scheme to withdraw the relationship between
the owner of the jeeps and the drivers thereof from the operation of the labor laws
enacted to promote industrial peace. (98 Phil. 650, 651-53).

On April 30, 1963, this Court reiterated this doctrine in Magboo, et al. vs. Bernardo (L-16790, 7
SCRA 952) and stated:

Appellant assails said decision, assigning three errors which boil down to the
question of whether or not an employer- employee relationship exists between a
jeepney-owner and a driver under a "boundary system" arrangement. Appellant
contends that the relationship is essentially that of lessor and lessee.

A similar contention has been rejected by this Court in several cases. In National
Labor Union v. Dinglasan, 52 O.B., No. 4, 1933, it was held that the features which
characterize the boundary – system namely, the fact that the driver does not receive
a fixed wage but gets only the excess of the receipt of fares collected by him over the
amount he pays to the jeep-owner and that the gasoline consumed by the jeep is for
the account of the driver – are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between
them from that of employer and employee. The ruling was subsequently cited and
applied inDoce v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-9417, December 22,
1958, which involved the liability of a bus owner for injury compensation to a
conductor working under the boundary system. (7 SCRA 953-54).

Indeed, considering that about nineteen (19) years before July 31, 1975, when respondent rendered
his decision in the four estafa cases, it was a settled doctrine that an employer-employee
relationship exists between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary
system arrangement, of which rule respondent was obviously ignorant (Section 1, Rule 129, Rules of
Court, and in line with Municipal Board of Manila vs. Agustin, 65 Phil. 144).

Respondent mistakenly relied on the cases of Social Security System vs. Court of Appeals and
Shriro (37 SCRA 579) and Social Security System vs. Court of Appeals and Manila Jockey Club (30
SCRA 210), which have no bearing on or relevance to the issue posed in the estafa cases filed by
the complainants and heard by him. The Shriro and the Manila Jockey Club cases did not involve or
resolve the relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers in any manner
whatsoever. The Shriro case concerned the relationship of "commission sales agents" and Shriro
(Philippines) Inc., the exclusive distributor of "Regal" sewing machine. The Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
case concerned jockeys who are connected with the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. and the Philippine
Racing Club, Inc.

Since an employer-employee relationship subsists between the jeepney owners/operators and

jeepney drivers under the boundary system arrangement, SSS coverage "shall be compulsory" (Sec.
9, Social Security Act), the SSS's deduction would follow as a matter of law (Sec. 18, supra), and the
accused in the four estafa cases, without previous demand by the jeepney drivers, is under legal
obligation to remit the driver's contribution to the SSS.

Decisions of the Supreme Court need not be proved as they are matters of judicial notice (Sec. 1,
Rule 129, Rev. Rules of Court; V Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 38-39). Ignorance of the law
excuses no one (Art. 3, New Civil Code) and judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the
Constitution are part of the legal system (Art. 8, New Civil Code).

In the light of the above discussion, respondent gravely erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss the
estafa cases by conveniently relying on the accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on the
weakness of the defense to gain conviction, for conviction can only rest upon the strength of the
prosecution evidence (Duran vs. Court of Appeals, L-39758, May 7, 1976, citing People vs. Barrera,
82 Phil. 391), and, as a consequence, material and moral damages had been inflicted on the
numerous complaining drivers whose rights to refile the criminal cases for estafa against the
accused are now foreclosed by the rule on double jeopardy.

In recapitulation, We find that respondent exhibited gross ignorance of the Social Security Act of
1954, as amended, particularly the sections governing SSS compulsory coverage, employer-
employee contributions, deduction of SSS's contributions, and remittance of SSS contributions; and
of the settled jurisprudence that the relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney
drivers under the boundary system arrangement is that of employer and employee. Or, if respondent
was aware of them, he deliberately refrained from applying them, which can never be excused
(Quizon, et al. vs. Judge Jose G. Baltazar, Jr., A.C. No. 532-MJ, July 25, 1975) and "is hardly to be
condoned" (Fernando, J., concurring opinion, Quizon, et al. vs. Judge Baltazar, Jr.,supra).

WE, moreover, find that respondent repeatedly ignored this Court's directive to file his comment on
the instant complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of our 2nd Indorsement of September 16,
1975, necessitating the sending of two tracer letters dated October 23, 1975 and November 25,
1975. His comment came only on March 8, 1976. His failure to submit the required comment within
the period fixed is disrespect to the Court as well as aggravated the delay in the speedy and orderly
disposition of this administrative complaint. (cf. Medina, etc., et al. vs. Hon. Valdellon; etc., et al., L-
38810, March 25, 1975; Atienza vs. Perez, etc., A.M. No. P- 216, July 9, 1974)

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS IS HEREBY DISMISSED AS CITY

JUDGE OF PASAY CITY WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT PRIVILEGES AND WITH
PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS,
AGENCIES OR INSTRUMENTALITIES.

SO ORDERED.

Subido vs Ozatea

This case, decided before the right to information was included in the Bill of Rights of the
Philippine Constitution, involved a request by the editor of the Manila Post, a morning daily, for
the Register of Deeds of Manila to furnish him a list of real estates sold to aliens and registered
with said Register of Deeds, but which request was denied. In resolving the petition for
mandamus, the Court based its ruling on its interpretation of a statutory regulation which
provides that "All records relating to registered lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall
be open to the public subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief
of the General Land Registration Office…" The Court said that the power to make regulations
does not carry with it the power to prohibit. The regulations which the Register of Deeds is
empowered to promulgate are confined to prescribing the manner and hours of examination to
the end that damage to, or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the
duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented,
that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured, and the like.

ISSUE:
What is the extent of the discretion of the Register of Deeds (RD) to regulate the accessibility of
records relating to registered lands in its office.

HELD:
What the law expects and requires from the RD is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial
judgment by which all persons resorting to the office, under the legal authority and conducting
themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the person seeking access to the records.
Except when it is clear that the purpose of the inspection is unlawful, it is not the duty of the
registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, purposes, and objects of the person
seeking to inspect the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records
contain is not flaunted before the public gaze.

GONZALES VS. NARVASA

G.R. No. 140835, August 14 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition
for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality
of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of
the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President
Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive OrderNo. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order
“to study and recommend proposed amendmentsand/or revisions to the 1987
Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner disputes the
constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only
the legislature can creat e by way of a law.

Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for information with respect to the names of
executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of their appointments, and a list of recipients of
luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to the Office of the
President. Petitioner filed this petition to compel the Executive Secretary to answer his letter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constituti onality
ofExecutive Order No. 43

HELD:

The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish
that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that
he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining anypersonal injury attributable to the
creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any
“injury” in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon
the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to
the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any
indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in
danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a
result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish
his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue

when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of
the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress
of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of
E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of
P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from
the funds of the Office of the President.” Being that case, petitioner must show that he
is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment
or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does
petitioner presume to make such a representation.

It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner. The letter deals with matters of public
concern, appointments to public offices and utilization of public property. The Executive Secretary is obliged to allow
the inspection and copying of appointment papers.