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RDS MMP Merger Proposal
RDS MMP Merger Proposal
▪ The Target owns and operates high capacity crude oil and natural gas terminals in the EBITDA Exit Multiple
Gordon Growth Model
62.32
74.30
Permian Basin, Delaware Basin, and Bakken formations, and additionally strategically Adj. EBITDA Exit Multiple 65.04
located marine storage terminals. Adj. Gordon Growth Model 71.18
▪ The Target’s operations are significantly less risky than typical upstream E&P P/FCF Expected Value
P/E Expected Value
47.76
66.94
projects where total loss of investment is common. Average Computed Value 64.59
Current Market Value 61.13
Valuation Conclusion
Given that Magellan Midstream has meandered around
its 52 Week Low over the last four months, we believe
an initial tender offer of $72.50 will appease
investors. The 52 Week High of $74.30 was achieved
during a bull run in crude oil and recent developments in
the industry lead us to believe that the 52-Week High is
at least 6-9 months away, conditional upon WTI crude oil
rebounding and stabilizing in the $60-70 range. The IEA
forecasts the U.S. will account for more than half of
global oil & gas production growth in 2025. Supply in the
Permian Basin is significantly bottlenecked until at least
late 2019 and is undersupplied through at least mid-late
2021. Midstream MLPs including Magellan Midstream
Partners will be among the primary beneficiaries of the
large production growth in the United States.
Analyst: Kevin Heymann, ASK Research 1 of 21
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The industry has grown rapidly since the first oil well was drilled 1846, at the Baku oilfields in present day Azerbaijan. Europe
and Asia presently meet ~30% of their energy needs using oil, while the Middle East uses oil to meet more than 50% of their
energy requirements. Last year, the United States consumed 19.96 million barrels of petroleum products per day, 20.5% of
total daily world consumption. According to the Energy Information Administration, transportation accounts for around 71%
of petroleum consumption, followed by industrial accounting for 21-24% of petroleum consumption. Commercial, residential,
and electrical applications draw on less than 5% of daily petroleum product consumption in the United States.
Royal Dutch Shell is composed of four fully integrated and incorporated commercial enterprises: Upstream, Integrated Gas &
New Engines, Downstream, and Projects & Technology.
▪ Upstream refers to the discovery of new reserves and the operation of
associated infrastructure. More specifically, it covers the exploration,
development, and production of oil and/or natural gas. Royal Dutch
Shell has significant interests, although the Company has divested of
several interests recently, in North Sea, Northern Africa, and the Gulf
of Mexico exploration.
▪ Integrated Gas & New Energies encompasses liquefied natural gas
(LNG), low or zero carbon emission fuel resources, and renewable
energy sources. Midstream activities are defined as the gathering
process, pipeline management, and processing of unrefined products
including previously listed sources. In February 2016, Royal Dutch Offshore drilling in the Groningen Gas Field in Norway.
The Dutch government is phasing out production by 2030.
Shell closed on the acquisition of BG Group. Subsequently, Royal
Dutch replaced Exxon as the leading LNG producer.
▪ Downstream operations involve the manufacturing, distribution, and
marketing of oil and related chemicals. Marketing counts usage by
commercial, residential, and industrial consumers in its scope. Royal
Dutch Shell operates in 70 countries worldwide, transporting and
producing oil and chemical products across the world non-stop.
▪ Projects & Technology is Royal Dutch Shell’s research and
development arm. The business line manages, acquires, and develops
technology that will be utilized in the Upstream and Downstream
operations.
Royal Dutch Shell is a textbook example of a vertically integrated oil company, Shell acquired BG Group in 2016 at a 54% premium for
nearly $70bn. The acquisition has been highly successful to date.
overseeing the entire value chain of the oil, gas, and diversified energy sector.
Given the nature of Royal Dutch Shell’s business model, there are significant
economies of scale and barriers to entry associated with the operation of business in the oil and diversified energy sector.
However, the company’s management attempts to see each of the four business lines turn a profit so that a more profitable
line will not be required to prop up a losing division. Royal Dutch Shell has not achieved this lofty goal in recent years.
It is imperative for Royal Dutch Shell to solidify upstream operations. Historically, upstream operations have acted as a profit
center for downstream operations. While downstream operations account for more than 80% of Royal Dutch Shell’s revenue,
downstream operations generate razor thin EBITDA margins. Moreover, upstream operations generated more than 50% of
profits in 2017 on a mere 20% of the Acquirer’s revenue. Thus, the concept of kaizen dictates Royal Dutch Shell maintain a
strong footing in the upstream business, while continuing to allocate capital efficiently and prudently to generate shareholder
returns.
Production of petroleum products and its derivatives is poised to skyrocket in the U.S. This trend was first theorized after the
2014-2015 oil crisis. The Permian Basin is particularly undersupplied today and this trend will continue into the foreseeable
future. Providers and facilitators of the various midstream operations like Magellan Midstream Partners will continue to take
advantage of the supply imbalance in the U.S. market.
Magellan Midstream is notably smaller than industry peers like Enterprise Products Partners. However, the Target is more
agile than larger firms and has enhanced ability to take advantage of high growth, low capital projects other companies would
pass on.
▪ Royal Dutch Shell continued with its $25bn share buyback program, launching a second tranche with maximum
aggregate consideration of $2.5bn in the period up to and including January 28, 2019.
▪ Royal Dutch Shell finalized an investment in a Canadian LNG project in early October 2018. The site is expected to
transport VLCC (Very Large Crude Carriers) tankers of supercooled natural gas to Asian importers by the mid-2020s.
▪ Royal Dutch Shell and Chevron were granted a 35-year-production sharing contract for the Saturno pre-salt block in
the Santos Basin in offshore Brazilian waters. Additionally, production began at the Lula Extreme South deep-water
development in the Santos Basin (25% pre-unitization interest).
▪ Royal Dutch Shell has divested of $30bn of assets since the 2014 oil price crash to reduce its debt gearing ratio to
20%. The Company’s debt gearing ratio declined to 23.1% from 23.6% in Q2 2018.
▪ Magellan Midstream has $2.5bn of new high growth projects in the pipeline.
One of these projects is the Permian Gulf Coast pipeline, announced in
September 2018. PGC pipeline is a joint venture with Energy Transfer, MPLX,
and Delek. It will deliver crude oil from the Permian Basin to Magellan’s East Map of Existing Permian Basin Pipelines.
Houston terminal. (Source: Dallas Morning News)
▪ Magellan Midstream leased crude oil capacity and throughput services from Seabrook Logistics in Q3 2018. These
services are then offered to the market and generate storage revenue and ancillary service fees.
▪ Average interest rate for Magellan Midstream is roughly 4.60% and gearing ratio was lower to come in around 2.30
times debt to EBITDA over the past quarter. Part of the reduction in the gearing ratio is resultant of the BridgeTex
sale, however Magellan Midstream has historically maintained a conservative balance sheet.
▪ Magellan Midstream shares are down 13% YTD, from the YTD high of $75.82. Shares fell dramatically to a reach a
nadir at $54.82 in late March 2018.
▪ OPEC is meeting in early December Earnings Drivers & Key Performance Indicators
Current as of 11/13/2018, Spot Prices in USD (Dollar/Barrel or Dollar/Million BTU) or Production Million Barrels Per Day
2018 and is widely expected to trim Brent Average WTI Average Imported Average Refiner Average AC Henry Hub Average Oil Production Gas Production
output. This should staunch the 2017 Actual
2018 Actual
54.15
73.12
50.79
66.79
48.98
62.88
50.68
65.87
2.99
3.01
9.35
10.90
3.78
4.37
dramatic drop in crude oil prices 2020 Estimate 71.92 64.85 61.30 63.88 2.98 12.06 4.86
▪ It should be noted that Magellan Midstream equity does not have statistically significant correlation with commodity
prices. The primary reason for this is resultant of Magellan Midstream’s contracted fee-based revenue generation.
However, global commodity prices have significant impact the firm’s business operations in the long run.
Analyst: Kevin Heymann, ASK Research 6 of 21
MOTIVES FOR POTENTIAL ACQUISITION
Royal Dutch Shell
▪ Expansion of power supply business such as
investments in EV charging networks and supply
infrastructure.
▪ Streamlining of portfolio to enhance efficiency
through reduction of costs.
▪ Continued investment in selective growth
opportunities for cash engines including
conventional oil and gas in upstream.
▪ Acquisition of Magellan Midstream fits Royal
Dutch Shell’s stated intent to invest in select Royal Dutch Shell Capital Expenditure Plan. Large Portion of Capital Expenditure Earmarked
existing and emerging opportunities such as Mid- for Investment in Conventional Oil & Gas and Shales. (Source: Acquirer Annual Report 2017)
Continent shale plays.
▪ The Acquirer gains exposure to Mid-Continent oil & gas plays including the booming Permian Basin, Delaware Basin,
and Bakken Formation.
▪ Enhances the Acquirer’s ability to compete with U.S. counterparts ExxonMobil and Chevron.
▪ Synergizes with the Acquirer’s presence in the Gulf of Mexico and Port of Louisiana & Houston.
Risk Mitigation
▪ The Acquirer obtains the human capital and U.S. domestic
midstream presence of the Target. U.S. Midstream MLPs are a
way to obtain exposure to the once again booming U.S. shale
market while eliminating E&P total loss risk.
▪ The Acquirer operates in over 70 countries globally; the U.S.
legal system is strong and therefore the Acquirer does not run
the risk of asset expropriation.
▪ Additionally, revenue earned internationally is a notable risk
factor for the Acquirer. Acquisition of the Target would reduce
Initial Construction of Marine Terminal along the Houston Ship Channel.
the risk of significant foreign currency fluctuations as revenue is Expected Delivery of Asset in Q1 2019.
generated in a liquid, globally desirable currency.
▪ Pipelines and terminals to and on the Gulf of Mexico coastline will likely reduce operating expenses for existing
Acquirer E&P assets in the Gulf of Mexico, primarily through the reduction of transport and refining costs.
▪ Acquisition of the Target will allow the Acquirer to have a much greater presence in the Mid-Continent oil province.
Next, the raw financial data of the six value drivers was placed on a separate spreadsheet. The six value drivers for each of the
15 firms were broken into separate rows and sorted smallest to largest. Constraints on the upper and lower bounds were
placed on the six value drivers to discover firms most comparable to Magellan Midstream Partners.
Constraint Matrix
Value Drivers NGL US NS US EEP US MMP US SMLP US ENBL US KMI US CQP US TCP US SHLX US EPD US ETP US PAA US DCP US CNXM US SEP US Value Driver Upper Bound 12%
Exp. Rev. Growth -11.2% 0.2% 2.2% 2.4% 2.9% 3.3% 3.4% 3.5% 4.9% 6.3% 7.5% 10.8% 13.7% 24.0% 31.2% 34.4% Exp. Rev. Growth Lower Bound 0%
Constraint Matrix
Value Drivers NGL US DCP US PAA US EPD US ETP US KMI US CQP US ENBL US NS US TCP US SHLX US MMP US SMLP US EEP US CNXM US SEP US Value Driver Upper Bound 70%
Gross Profit Margin 2.9% 5.7% 6.2% 12.8% 21.5% 30.6% 34.5% 42.3% 50.3% 53.2% 55.5% 56.6% 64.1% 67.5% 71.8% 72.5% Gross Profit Margin Lower Bound 20%
Constraint Matrix
Value Drivers NGL US PAA US DCP US EPD US KMI US ETP US ENBL US SMLP US CQP US NS US SHLX US MMP US CNXM US EEP US SEP US TCP US Value Driver Upper Bound 90%
EBITDA Margin -0.2% 5.4% 7.1% 9.1% 15.1% 15.1% 29.2% 40.0% 40.9% 43.6% 48.0% 51.0% 72.4% 77.1% 85.8% 112.6% EBITDA Margin Lower Bound 10%
Constraint Matrix
Value Drivers NS US NGL US DCP US EPD US ETP US PAA US KMI US ENBL US EEP US SMLP US CQP US MMP US CNXM US SHLX US SEP US TCP US Value Driver Upper Bound 50%
EBIT Margin -16.2% -2.2% 2.0% 4.5% 5.2% 5.8% 8.3% 13.5% 17.0% 19.3% 20.6% 37.9% 44.5% 49.0% 50.2% 63.2% EBIT Margin Lower Bound 5%
Constraint Matrix
Value Drivers NGL US PAA US DCP US ETP US EPD US NS US ENBL US CQP US KMI US MMP US EEP US SMLP US CNXM US SEP US SHLX US TCP US Value Driver Upper Bound 90%
OCF Margin 0.4% 5.7% 7.8% 12.8% 17.1% 24.1% 27.9% 28.6% 33.4% 44.7% 45.6% 45.8% 69.5% 82.0% 89.1% 90.0% OCF Margin Lower Bound 15%
Constraint Matrix
Value Drivers SEP US ETP US CQP US EEP US NGL US NS US EPD US PAA US DCP US KMI US ENBL US MMP US SMLP US CNXM US SHLX US TCP US Value Driver Upper Bound 50%
FCF Margin -13.2% -7.7% -5.2% -4.6% -0.1% 1.2% 4.2% 4.5% 5.4% 10.1% 12.7% 20.9% 22.8% 43.3% 62.3% 79.2% FCF Margin Lower Bound -5%
Prime comparables are firms ranked in the top eight. Prime comparables used for the final comparable analysis typically fell
within the constraints on at least 5 out of 6 value drives. Therefore, we define the top eight most comparable firms to
Magellan Midstream Partners:
▪ Summit Midstream Partners (U.S.: NYSE SMLP)
▪ Enable Midstream Partners (U.S.: NYSE ENBL)
▪ Enbridge Energy Partners (U.S.: NYSE EEP)
▪ Kinder Morgan (U.S.: NYSE KMI)
▪ Shell Midstream Partners (U.S.: NYSE SHLX)
▪ Cheniere Energy Partners (U.S.: AMEX CQP)
▪ NuStar Energy (U.S.: NYSE NS)
▪ Energy Transfer Partners (U.S.: NYSE ETP)
Value Drivers MMP US EPD US KMI US SEP US SHLX US CNXM US CQP US DCP US EEP US ENBL US ETP US NGL US NS US PAA US SMLP TCP US
Exp. Rev. Growth - 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
Gross Profit Margin - 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
EBITDA Margin - 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
EBIT Margin - 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
OCF Margin - 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
FCF Margin - 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
Total - 3 6 2 5 4 5 1 6 6 4 1 5 2 6 3
Company MMP US SMLP US ENBL US EEP US KMI US SHLX US CQP US NS US ETP US CNXM US EPD US PAA US TCP US SEP US DCP US NGL US
Ranking - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
For this analysis, P/FCF is the preferred multiple to use for valuation as it is Direct Valuation Estimate
shown to have the lowest difference between the mean and median. P/OCF
is a more comparable multiple than P/FCF because companies in the sector Trailing Twleve Months, as of 11/13/18
take on significant capital expenditures for new projects at different times. P/FCF P/E
However, MMP trades has substantially larger P/OCF than any other Median of Comps 16.47 12.17
comparable and thus is an outlier. Therefore, the P/FCF multiple allows for MMP Value Driver 2.90 5.50
a more comparable valuation across the eight prime comparables.
Additionally, the P/E ratio was used as it is the most widely quoted and used Estimated Value $ 47.76 $ 66.94
price multiple.
Indirect Valuation
The indirect valuation method using the same five firms was also performed. Three enterprise value multiples, EV/S,
EV/EBITDA, and EV/EBIT were collected and placed into the table below. EV/EBITDA is the preferred multiple among
valuation experts using the market approach to value firms in the oil, gas, & diversified energy industry. Summit Midstream
and Shell Midstream have EV/EBITDA multiples that are outliers. This has the effect of significantly distorting the difference
between the mean and median in our data set.
Indirect Valuation: Comparable Company Multiples
Trailing Twelve Months, as of 11/13/2018
MMP US SMLP US ENBL US EEP US KMI US SHLX US CQP US NS US ETP US MEAN MEDIAN DIFFERENCE
EV/S 6.95 5.16 3.19 7.17 5.45 10.44 5.44 3.77 1.81 5.30 5.30 0.07%
EV/EBITDA 13.70 39.20 10.98 11.35 13.09 25.52 13.63 11.35 10.70 16.98 12.22 38.93%
EV/EBIT 16.28 25.83 18.58 16.34 21.48 26.48 16.48 20.62 17.93 20.47 19.60 4.43%
Another comparison of multiples was performed after removing Summit Midstream and Shell Midstream. Below, we see that
the difference between the mean and median is much lower now. Taking the geometric average of the eight-company median
EV/EBITDA and the six-company mean EV/EBITDA yields us an expected exit multiple of roughly 12.00x. This
EV/EBITDA estimation is used as in exit multiple in the equity valuation step of our DCF forecasts.
Indirect Valuation: Comparable Company Multiples
Trailing Twelve Months, as of 11/13/2018
MMP US ENBL US EEP US KMI US CQP US NS US ETP US MEAN MEDIAN DIFFERENCE
EV/S 6.95 3.19 7.17 5.45 5.44 3.77 1.81 4.47 4.61 -2.90%
EV/EBITDA 13.70 10.98 11.35 13.09 13.63 11.35 10.70 11.85 11.35 4.41%
EV/EBIT 16.28 18.58 16.34 21.48 16.48 20.62 17.93 18.57 18.26 1.73%
EV/EBITDAX is the industry standard multiple; the "X" denotes Exploration & Production (E&P) costs. Midstream MLPs
such as Magellan Midstream include any incurred E&P costs in Depreciation & Depletion. Thus, EV/EBITDA is the multiple
we used. Firms in the sector typically have very large D&A and various tax structures, which is why valuation experts prefer to
use EBITDA(X) multiples for valuation. Other common valuation metrics industry experts employ include EV/Production or
EV/Proved Reserve Quantities. These valuation metrics are not applicable to the Target as Magellan Midstream solely
facilitates the gathering, transportation, and processing of petroleum products and their derivatives.
10 of 21
DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS & VALUATION
Comparison of Terminal Value and Price Per Share: Exit Multiple vs. Gordon Growth
Implied Equity Value: Exit Multiple Implied Equity Value: Gordon Growth
Estimated Present Enterprise Value $ 18,683 Estimated Present Enterprise Value $ 21,418
Plus: Cash and Cash Equivalents 217 Plus: Cash and Cash Equivalents 217
Less: Short Term Debt (251) Less: Short Term Debt (251)
Less: Long Term Debt (4,274) Less: Long Term Debt (4,274)
Less: Pension Liabilities (111) Less: Pension Liabilities (111)
Less: Other Long Term Liabilities (43) Less: Other Long Term Liabilities (43)
Less: Preferred Stock - Less: Preferred Stock -
Less: Non-Controlling Interest - Less: Non-Controlling Interest -
Implied Equity Value (Market Cap) $ 14,221 Implied Equity Value (Market Cap) $ 16,956
Fully Diluted Shares Outstanding 228.2 Fully Diluted Shares Outstanding 228.2
Implied Price Per Share $ 62.32 Implied Price Per Share $ 74.30
Items to Note
▪ As of 11/13/2018 Magellan Midstream Partner’s equity market value is $61.13.
▪ The industry standard EV/EBITDA multiple valuation method yields an intrinsic share price of $62.32.
▪ The Gordon Growth valuation method, even with a relatively conservative long-term growth rate, yields a higher
valuation of $74.30 per share. Magellan Midstream went public in 2001 and is a stable company. Thus, we do not
believe the H-Model to be as accurate a predictor of value as the Gordon Growth valuation method.
▪ Our EV/EBITDA valuation represents a 1.95% premium to the recently traded price. Reasons for the deviation
include normal market fluctuations, the recent downturn in global commodity prices, and an exit EV/EBITDA
multiple that is 1.70x lower than what shares recently traded for.
▪ Our Gordon Growth valuation represents a 21.54% premium to the recently traded price. Reasons for the deviation
include normal market fluctuations, the Target’s low WACC, and higher revenue growth expectations after 2019 than
analysts likely estimate.
Analyst: Kevin Heymann, ASK Research 11 of 21
ADJUSTED DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS & VALUATION
Magellan Midstream Partners LP 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Adjusted 5 Year Discounted Cash Flow Forecast FY 12/31 FY 12/31 FY 12/31 FY 12/31 FY 12/31 FY 12/31
Revenue[1] 2643.6 2713.0 2902.9 3106.1 3323.5 3489.7
% Revenue Growth 5.4% 2.6% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 5.0%
Less: Inc (Dec) in Net Working Capital (28.4) (27.1) (29.0) (31.1) (33.2) (34.9)
NWC/Sales -1.1% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0%
Unlevered Free Cash Flow to the Firm 1433.7 1098.8 1059.6 1133.7 1279.6 1483.1
Unlevered FCF to Firm/Sales 54.2% 40.5% 36.5% 36.5% 38.5% 42.5%
Present Value of Unlevered FCF to the Firm[3] 1047.6 918.4 893.4 916.6 965.9
Weighted Average Cost of Capital 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0%
[1] 2018 and 2019 revenue assumptions come from aggregate analyst estimates.
[2] Magellan Midstream Partners is an MLP, therefore it is not taxed at the partnership level. Rather, individual investors receive a K-1 and are
taxed at the personal level.
[3] Present value calculation assumes the mid-year convention.
Items to Note
▪ Adjustments were made to include the Acquirer’s WACC at 10.0%, up from the Target’s 8.3% WACC. This had the
effect of lowering the sum of the line titled Present Value of Unlevered FCF to the Firm. Further, Gordon Growth
valuation was affected negatively.
▪ As a result of enhanced operating synergies, thereby lowering operating costs, EBITDA margin is expected to be 3%
higher in 2019 and 2020. The value of this synergy increases to 5% after 2020 due to the competed integration of
Magellan Midstream into the Royal Dutch Shell portfolio.
▪ Further, the long-term growth rate used in the Gordon Growth valuation was increased to 4% from 3% for two
reasons.
▪ First, the addition of Royal Dutch Shell’s higher WACC increased the value of the denominator, having the
effect of reducing equity valuation.
▪ Second, expected revenue synergies stemming from Royal Dutch Shell ownership are greater than previously
forecasted over the long-term. However, we do not expect to see a significant deviance from our original
forecasted revenue growth in the short-medium term.
Adjusted Implied Equity Value: Exit Multiple Adjusted Implied Equity Value: Gordon Growth
Estimated Present Enterprise Value $ 19,303 Estimated Present Enterprise Value $ 20,704
Plus: Cash and Cash Equivalents 217 Plus: Cash and Cash Equivalents 217
Less: Short Term Debt (251) Less: Short Term Debt (251)
Less: Long Term Debt (4,274) Less: Long Term Debt (4,274)
Less: Pension Liabilities (111) Less: Pension Liabilities (111)
Less: Other Long Term Liabilities (43) Less: Other Long Term Liabilities (43)
Less: Preferred Stock - Less: Preferred Stock -
Less: Non-Controlling Interest - Less: Non-Controlling Interest -
Implied Equity Value (Market Cap) $ 14,841 Implied Equity Value (Market Cap) $ 16,242
Fully Diluted Shares Outstanding 228.2 Fully Diluted Shares Outstanding 228.2
Implied Price Per Share $ 65.04 Implied Price Per Share $ 71.18
Items to Note
▪ As of 11/13/2018 Magellan Midstream Partner’s equity market value is $61.13.
▪ The industry standard EV/EBITDA multiple valuation method yields an intrinsic share price of $65.04.
▪ The Gordon Growth valuation method, even with a more aggressive long-term growth rate, yields lower valuation of
$71.18 per share. Magellan Midstream went public in 2001 and is a stable company. Thus, we do not believe the H-
Model to be as accurate a predictor of value as the Gordon Growth valuation method.
▪ Our EV/EBITDA valuation represents a 6.40% premium to the recently traded price. Reasons for the deviation
include normal market fluctuations, the recent downturn in global commodity prices, and an exit EV/EBITDA
multiple that is 1.70x lower than what shares recently traded for.
▪ Our Gordon Growth valuation represents a 16.44% premium to the recently traded price. Reasons for the deviation
include normal market fluctuations, the Target’s low WACC, and higher revenue growth expectations after 2019 than
analysts likely estimate.
10.50% 47.93 50.52 53.12 55.72 58.32 60.92 63.52 66.12 68.72 71.32 73.92 76.52 79.11
11.00% 46.80 49.34 51.88 54.42 56.96 59.50 62.04 64.59 67.13 69.67 72.21 74.75 77.29
11.50% 45.70 48.18 50.67 53.15 55.64 58.12 60.61 63.09 65.58 68.06 70.55 73.03 75.52
12.00% 44.63 47.06 49.49 51.92 54.35 56.78 59.21 61.64 64.07 66.50 68.93 71.36 73.79
12.50% 43.59 45.97 48.34 50.72 53.10 55.47 57.85 60.22 62.60 64.98 67.35 69.73 72.10
13.00% 42.58 44.90 47.23 49.55 51.87 54.20 56.52 58.85 61.17 63.49 65.82 68.14 70.47
13.50% 41.59 43.86 46.14 48.41 50.68 52.96 55.23 57.50 59.78 62.05 64.32 66.60 68.87
14.00% 40.63 42.85 45.08 47.30 49.52 51.75 53.97 56.20 58.42 60.64 62.87 65.09 67.31
10.50% 40.68 42.96 45.50 48.34 51.53 55.14 59.28 64.04 69.61 76.18 84.07 93.72 105.77
11.00% 39.80 42.03 44.51 47.28 50.40 53.94 57.98 62.64 68.08 74.51 82.22 91.65 103.44
11.50% 38.94 41.12 43.55 46.26 49.31 52.77 56.72 61.28 66.60 72.88 80.42 89.64 101.17
12.00% 38.11 40.24 42.61 45.26 48.25 51.63 55.49 59.95 65.15 71.30 78.67 87.69 98.96
12.50% 37.29 39.38 41.70 44.29 47.21 50.52 54.30 58.66 63.74 69.75 76.97 85.78 96.80
13.00% 36.50 38.54 40.81 43.35 46.20 49.44 53.13 57.40 62.37 68.25 75.31 83.93 94.71
13.50% 35.73 37.73 39.95 42.43 45.22 48.38 52.00 56.17 61.04 66.79 73.69 82.12 92.67
14.00% 34.98 36.94 39.11 41.53 44.27 47.36 50.90 54.98 59.74 65.36 72.11 80.36 90.68
Items to Note
▪ The computed valuation share price for EV/EBITDA and Gordon Growth are circled based on the forecasted exit
multiple or long-term growth rate.
▪ For EV/EBITDA, the most positive scenario yields a share price of $91.17 at a WACC of 7.50% and an
EV/EBITDA exit multiple of 15.00x. The most negative scenario sees a share price of $40.63 at a WACC of 14.00%
and an EV/EBITDA exit multiple of 9.00x.
▪ On the flipside, the Gordon Growth sensitivity analysis yields a share price of $121.20 in the most favorable instance.
WACC would have to be 7.50% and the long-term growth rate would have to be a lofty 6.00%. The most unfavorable
instance sees a share price of $34.98 at a WACC of 14.00% and a long-term growth rate of 0.00%.
▪ The two variables in the above sensitivity analysis of our Gordon Growth valuation, WACC and long-term growth
rate, are shown with more latitude to increase due to various economic developments.
▪ Various economic developments include rising U.S. and global GDP, increasing inflation in the U.S., and the dual
headwinds of tapering of global quantitative easing and rising interbank interest rates. We expect firm WACC’s across
all U.S. business to increase resultant of rising interest rates and the reduced value of the interest tax shield.
The Acquirer has built up enough Cash, Cash Equivalents, & Short-Term Investments to fund the acquisition entirely through
equity. The Acquirer’s Cash Account is in the Selected Financial Data of the Acquirer section on page 16. One advantage of
this is keeping the Acquirer’s debt gearing ratio on track to reach its stated 20% target. A disadvantage of this strategy is the
deal structure would draw down on a liquid asset. The Acquirer would be wise to fund the purchase with at least 40% debt to
reduce the blow to the Cash Account and lower the effective opportunity cost of the acquisition. It is imperative the Acquirer
ensures the Target stays in compliance with all appropriate regulations that allow the Target to continue operations as an MLP.
Midstream MLPs that offer attractive dividend yields and exposure to the various shale rich regions in the Mid-Continent oil
province include Energy Transfer Partners LP (U.S.: NYSE ETP), Enbridge Energy Partners LP (U.S.: NYSE EEP), and
Summit Midstream Partners LP (U.S.: NYSE SMLP). Magellan Midstream Partners is the most attractive of the previous
three for reasons described herein, however the company is not the only attractive option in a field of competitive players.
Analyst: Kevin Heymann, ASK Research 15 of 21
SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA OF THE ACQUIRER
Royal Dutch Shell Plc 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Historical Operating Statement FY 12/31 FY 12/31 FY 12/31 FY 12/31 FY 12/31 FY 12/31 FY 12/31 TTM 9/30 Historical CAGR[2] Historical Average[2]
Revenue 470171 467153 451235 421105 264960 233591 305179 371573 7 Year 3 Year 7 Year 3 Year
Revenue Growth (%) - -0.6% -3.4% -6.7% -37.1% -11.8% 30.6% 29.0% -3.4% 13.1% 0.0% 2.7%
Depreciation & Amortization 9898 12005 11865 14535 22082 23395 26223 15707
D&A/Sales 2.1% 2.6% 2.6% 3.5% 8.3% 10.0% 8.6% 4.2% 7.1% -11.7% 5.2% 7.8%
Depreciation & Amortization 9898 12005 11865 14535 22082 23395 26223 15707
D&A/Sales 2.1% 2.6% 2.6% 3.5% 8.3% 10.0% 8.6% 4.2% 7.1% -11.7% 5.2% 7.8%
Capital Expenditures (19311) (26230) (38933) (21891) (21411) (20044) (12037) (16459)
CapEx/Sales -4.1% -5.6% -8.6% -5.2% -8.1% -8.6% -3.9% -4.4% -2.3% -9.1% -6.1% -6.3%
Less: Inc (Dec) in Net Working Capital (6471) 3391 2988 6405 5521 (6289) (3158) (6780)
NWC/Sales -1.4% 0.7% 0.7% 1.5% 2.1% -2.7% -1.0% -1.8% -0.7% 7.8% -0.2% -0.9%
Unlevered Free Cash Flow to the Firm 378 8621 -5030 11322 7175 954 26716 15183
Unlevered FCF to Firm/Sales 0.1% 1.8% -1.1% 2.7% 2.7% 0.4% 8.8% 4.1% 72.8% 31.3% 2.4% 4.0%
[1] Royal Dutch Shell operates internationally and is subject to varying degrees of taxation. After the 2014-2015 oil crisis firms in the industry were able to utilize NOL carryforwards,
distorting the average effective tax rate.
[2] 7 Year is defined as the period from 2011 to 2018. 3 Year is defined as the period from 2015 to 2018.
Depreciation & Amortization 121.2 128.0 142.3 161.7 166.8 178.1 196.6 212.2
D&A/Sales 6.9% 7.2% 7.5% 6.9% 7.6% 8.1% 7.8% 8.1% 8.7% 9.1% 7.5% 7.9%
Depreciation & Amortization 121.2 128.0 142.3 161.7 166.8 178.1 196.6 212.2
D&A/Sales 6.9% 7.2% 7.5% 6.9% 7.6% 8.1% 7.8% 8.1% 8.7% 9.1% 7.5% 7.9%
Capital Expenditures (193.4) (353.1) (380.1) (352.5) (617.8) (666.6) (514.3) 64.8
CapEx/Sales -11.1% -19.9% -20.0% -14.9% -28.2% -30.2% -20.5% 2.5% 15.0% 56.0% -17.8% -19.1%
Less: Inc (Dec) in Net Working Capital 14.5 42.7 (0.7) 77.7 37.9 (41.8) (0.2) (28.4)
NWC/Sales 0.8% 2.4% 0.0% 3.3% 1.7% -1.9% 0.0% -1.1% -10.5% -10.0% 0.7% -0.3%
Unlevered Free Cash Flow to the Firm 466.1 367.1 463.7 863.8 556.1 420.5 731.0 1373.9
Unlevered FCF to Firm/Sales 26.7% 20.7% 24.4% 36.6% 25.4% 19.1% 29.2% 52.2% 17.4% 38.9% 29.3% 31.4%
[1] Magellan Midstream Partners is an MLP, therefore it is not taxed at the partnership level. Rather, individual investors receive a K-1 and are taxed at the personal level.
[2] 7 Year is defined as the period from 2011 to 2018. 3 Year is defined as the period from 2015 to 2018.