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1. The contention of the plaintiff is of no merit. The Supreme Court held in

Valderrama vs. The Negros North Sugar Co. Inc., that the trial court erred in
finding that the appellant could not transport on its railroad passing through
the estates of the plaintiffs. The SC said that it is clear that the easement was
established for the benefit of all producers and of the corporation as it is the
intent of the milling contract. Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent,
continuous easement of way in favour of the corporation, it is contrary to the
nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced by the servient
state.

2. No, the respondents did not acquire an enforceable easement of light and view
through prescription by virtue of a verbal prohibition. Article 538 requires a
“formal act” and not just any verbal or written act. “Formal act” contemplated
in Article 538 in the Old Civil Code pertains to an instrument acknowledged
before a notary public. Prescription for a negative easement only begins when
there is a notarial prohibition by the dominant estate. Respondents could have
not acquired the easement by prescription because they have not fulfilled this
requirement. Even assuming they have acquired it, the easement no longer
exists because the properties were registered under the Torrens system
without any annotation or registration of the said easement.

3. The contention of the defendant is tenable. Section 40 of the Code of Civil

Procedure provides that the action to recover ownership or possession of real
property, or an interest therein, may only be exercised within ten years after
the cause of said action arises. Defendant Jabson’s answer is also meritorious,
the Supreme Court in held that the plaintiff is entitled to a right of way through
the shortest and least prejudicial portion of the servient estate, from plaintiff's
lot designated No. 3, in the plan Exhibit A, through defendant Timoteo Paez's
lot No. 12 according to said plan, to P. Rada Street, as provided in articles 564,
565 and concordant articles of the Civil Code.

4. The contention of the appellant is unmeritorious. The road which the appellant
seeks to have declared a right of way for the benefit of his hacienda has been
used for a great number of years by the members of the appellee’s church to
go to and from Ermita, and also by the appellant’s tenants, and by other
people. While it is true that the appellant’s tenants have use this road for carts
as above stated, yet it has not been shown that such use was absolutely
necessary in order to cultivate the dominant estate, but, on the contrary, it
clearly appears that said tenants crossed lot L merely on account of
convenience, as they could have reached the public highway by going in other
directions, especially south, only 198 meters. Therefore, the admitted and
established facts show that (1) the use of the road by the tenants of the
appellant in this matter and under these circumstances has not been such as
to create an easement by prescription or in any other manner; and that (2)
 the use of said road by all has been by permission or tolerance of the appellee.
The judgement appealed from denying the appellant’s claim to a right of way
across lot L is affirmed.

5. The Nanca-Victorias Road is not a public highway. The Supreme Court held
that Cuaycong et. al. did not acquire a right of private easement. Cuaycong et.
al. and their predecessors in interest had been using the said road since time
immemorial yet they only showed evidence that it was in use in 1885 but no
other evidence to show a further time of usage was ever shown to prove their
claim.

6. An injunction must not be issued to restrain the defendant from entering or

passing through the properties of the plaintiff, especially through the "mill site"
of plaintiff's sugar central. For injunction to be granted, it must establish the
right sought to be protected exists, but also that the acts against which the
injunction to be directed are violative of said right. In the case at bar, plaintiff
failed to establish his right and that the defendant has committed or attempts
to commit acts that endanger such right. The complaint does not state how
and why the mere passage of defendant over plaintiff’s estate conveying “tuba”
to his Hacienda has caused damage to plaintiff’s property rights. Thus,
injunction cannot be properly granted.

7. The finding of the trial court is not tenable. Under Article 631 and 624 of the
Civil Code, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage
was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501- A to Eduardo Tañedo, nor did
Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the
occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Thus, the
use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law. Hence, the spouses
Romeo and Pacita Sim, the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- B),
cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.

8. The license which the plaintiff, using her right of ownership, requested for the
construction of a terrace on the strip of 3 meters adjoining the canal of San
Jacinto or Sibacon, was erroneously denied. Considering that the easement
intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely
a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the
exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating it for a public use
which, be it what it may, cannot be accomplished unless the owner of the
property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified. The
question involved here is not the actual establishment of an easement which
might be objected to by an action in court, but a mere act of obstruction, a
refusal which is beyond the powers of the city of Manila, because it is not
simply a measure in connection with building regulations, but is an attempt to
suppress, without due process of law, real rights which are attached to the
right of ownership. Therefore, the license requested by the plaintiff for the
 construction of a terrace on the strip of 3 meters adjoining the canal of San
Jacinto or Sibacon shall be granted.

9. The judgment of the court is tenable. An owner of the lower lands cannot erect
works that will impede or prevent such an easement or charge, constituted
and imposed by the law upon his estate for the benefit of the higher lands
belonging to different owners, neither can the latter do anything to increase or
extend the easement. The defendant had no right to construct the works, nor
the dam which blocks the passage, through his lands and the outlet to the
Taliptip River, of the waters which flood the higher lands of the plaintiffs.
Hence, to the detriment of the easement charged on his estate, thus, violates
the law.

10.No, the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance
is not correct. The respondents are hardly in a position to avail of the
registration of Lot 433 in 1923 without the corresponding registration of the
easement on the title as an excuse to summarily terminate it thirty years
thereafter. The original registered owner allowed the easement to continue in
spite of such non-registration: the least that can be said is that he either
recognized its existence as a compulsory servitude on his estate or voluntarily
agreed to its establishment and continuance. And the respondent Guillermo
Gutierrez, as the successor-in-interest to the, said owner by inheritance, is not
an innocent third person who could plead the absence of annotation on the
title. Not only was he aware of the existence of the easement when he inherited
the property in 1927, but he likewise allowed it to continue for twenty-six years
after he acquired title. He is bound both by the act of his predecessor and by
his own.