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RULE 115: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

DOMONDON v. WHEN RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATED: The right to a speedy
SANDIGANBAYAN trial is deemed violated only when: 1) the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; 2) when
unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; 3) when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine

whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial,
or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed,
and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice
to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.

PEREZ v. PEOPLE TESTS TO DETERMINE VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL:

The first approach is the "fixed-time period" which holds the
view that "the Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be
offered a trial within a specified time period." 48 The second
approach is the "demand-waiver rule"which provides that "a
defendant waives any consideration of his right to speedy trial for
any period prior to which he has not demanded trial. Under this
rigid approach, a prior demand is a necessary condition to the
consideration of the speedy trial right."49

The fixed-time period was rejected because there is "no

constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial can be
quantified into a specific number of days or months."50 The
demand-waiver rule was likewise rejected because aside from the
fact that it is "inconsistent with this Court’s pronouncements on
waiver of constitutional rights,"51 "it is insensitive to a right which
we have deemed fundamental."52

The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the "balancing

test," in which "the conduct of both the prosecution and
defendant are weighed."53

BALANCING TEST, EXPLAINED: A balancing test necessarily

compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad
hoc basis.

The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism.

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Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there

is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the
balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to
speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an
inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar
circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the delay
that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably
less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.

Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government

assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should
be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay
the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted
heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as
negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less
heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the
government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid
reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify
appropriate delay.

We have already discussed the third factor, the defendant’s

responsibility to assert his right. Whether and how a defendant
asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have
mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be affected by the
length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay,
and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not
always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more
serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to
complain. The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right,
then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining
whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We
emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for
a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.

A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of

course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of
defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to
protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most
serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately
to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If

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witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is

obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to
recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory,
however, is not always reflected in the record because what has
been forgotten can rarely be shown.

OMBUDSMAN v. JURADO RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION NOT LIMITED TO CRIMINAL

PROSECUTIONS: The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition
of cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with
the administration of justice.

FOR RIGHT TO BE OPERATIVE THERE MUST BE A CASE INITIATED

AGAINST DEFENDANT: In the Tatad case, there was a hiatus in
the proceedings between the termination of the proceedings
before the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its
resolution on April 17, 1985. The Court found that "political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the
prosecutorial process" against then Secretary Francisco S. Tatad.
In the Angchangco case, the criminal complaints remained
pending in the Office of the Ombudsman for more than six years
despite the respondent’s numerous motions for early resolution
and the respondent, who had been retired, was being
unreasonably deprived of the fruits of his retirement because of
the still unresolved criminal complaints against him. In both
cases, we ruled that the period of time that elapsed for the
resolution of the cases against the petitioners therein was
deemed a violation of the accused’s right to a speedy disposition
of cases against them.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION EXTENDS TO PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATIONS: We find the long delay in the termination of
the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant
case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to
due process (Citing Tatad v Sandiganbayan)

CO v. NEW PROSPERITY NO VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL WHEN PROVISIONAL

PLASTIC PRODUCTS DISMISSAL WAS INVALID AND CASE SUBSEQUENTLY REVIVED: ht
to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to

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show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and

oppressive" delay in the trial was attended with malice or that
the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on
the part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that
"‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and necessarily a flexible
concept."26 In determining whether the accused's right to speedy
trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the
entirety of the proceedings.27 The factors to balance are the
following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c)
assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice
caused by such delay.28 Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of
the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday
life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do
not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 29 "While the
Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres
to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive
the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute
criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for
an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the
accused to speedy trial."

IBANEZ v PEOPLE RIGHT TO COUNSEL INDISPENSABLE: The right to be assisted by

counsel is an indispensable component of due process in criminal
prosecution.27 As such, right to counsel is one of the most
sacrosanct rights available to the accused.28 A deprivation of the
right to counsel strips the accused of an equality in arms resulting
in the denial of a level playing field. 29 Simply put, an accused
without counsel is essentially deprived of a fair hearing which is
tantamount to a grave denial of due process.

RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINE: Mere opportunity and not actual

cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-
examine.36 The case of Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng
Manggagawang Pilipino, et al. thoroughly explained the meaning
and substance of right to cross-examine as an integral component
of due process with a colatilla that the same right may be
expressly or impliedly waived, to quote:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing

witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or
in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial
powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process.

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However, the right is a personal one which may be waived

expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of
the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself
of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be
received or allowed to remain in the record.

TIN v. PEOPLE EQUIPOISE RULE: Faced with two conflicting versions, we are
guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule, where the evidence
on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side
the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of
proof loses.31 The equipoise rule finds application if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
suffice to produce a conviction.32Briefly stated, the needed
quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is
found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner must be declared
innocent and set free.

PEOPLE v. LUGNASIN RULES AND TEST, OUT OF COURT IDENTIFICATION: Out-of-court

identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is
done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to
face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies
the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose.
Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the
integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case,
courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.:
(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of
the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3)
the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification

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procedure.

SPOUSES TELAN v. CA RIGHT TO COUNSEL EXTENDS TO CIVIL CASES: The right to

counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal
cases, specially so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or
property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.

In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by

a member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a
grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had
become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the
accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and
counsel.

There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be

different from that in civil cases. The preeminent right to due
process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also to
property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in
danger of losing his house in which he and his family live and in
which he has established a modest means of livelihood, is given
the right to be heard by himself and counsel.

PEOPLE v. BALOLOY RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION NOT APPLICABLE TO

SPONATENOUS STATEMENTS: Constitutional provision on
custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits
having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or
confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime
before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution
bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state
as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

PEOPLE v. CACHUELA OUT OF COURT IDENTIFICATION: Out-of-court identification is

conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness
for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs
are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done
thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group
of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the

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admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of

suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test
where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length
of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION, WHEN ADMISSIBLE: The Court has

consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be
admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the
confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably
of the confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must
be in writing."

WHEN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION COMMENCES: "A custodial

investigation is understood x x x as x x x any questioning initiated
by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. x x x It begins when there is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has
started to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the
police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.

PEOPLE v. MORIAL RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION: A person under

custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights, which attach
upon the commencement thereof. These are the rights (1) to
remain silent, (2) to competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two
other rights.38 The prosecution must prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the accused was accorded said rights
before he extra-judicially admitted his guilt to the authorities.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS CONTINUOUS AND MUST BE PRESENT

DURING THE INQUIRY NOT JUST DURING SIGNING OF
CONFESSION: The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect
who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory

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statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed

extrajudicial confession. Thus inPeople v. de Jesus [213 SCRA 345
(1992)] we said that admissions obtained during custodial
interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later
reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still
flawed under the Constitution.

PEOPLE v. AYSON RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: It prescribes an "option of

refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party
or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory
question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to
incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at
any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness
receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the
stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular
question is addressed to him, the answer to which may
incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer
on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.

RIGHT NOT SELF EXECUTING: The right against self-incrimination

is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the
protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may
be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time.

RULES FOR RIGHT TO BE INVOKED: 1) to be exempt from being a

witness against himself, 31 and 2) to testify as witness in his own
behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-
examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to
be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against
him. 32

The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from

being a witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be
compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in
which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be
compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order
of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the

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prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In other

words — unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action)
who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the
right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at
the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can
refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness
stand, be sworn, answer any question. 34 And, as the law
categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall
not in any manner prejudice or be used against him." 35

If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do

so. This is his right. But if he does testify, then he "may be cross-
examined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as to
any matters stated in his direct examination, or connected
therewith . 36 He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer
any question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or
the evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to
incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged.

It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal

action be asked a question which might incriminate him, not for
the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime,
distinct from that of which he is accused, he may decline to
answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against
self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder,
the accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-
examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he
might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline
to answer any particular question which might implicate him for a
different and distinct offense, say, estafa.

RIGHT UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION NOT APPLICABLE TO

ADMINISTRATIVE CASES: There is no custodial investigation in an
administrative inquiry.

SUMMARY OF RIGHTS:

1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public

prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some
significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the
continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be

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informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat,

intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and
to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected;
and

2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT — 37

a) to refuse to be a witness;

b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to

him by such refusal;

c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-

examination by the prosecution;

d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a

specific question which tends to incriminate him
for some crime other than that for which he is
then prosecuted.

VILLAFLOR v. SUMMERS INSPECTION OF BODY DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT AGAINST SELF
INCRIMINATION: we lay down the rule that the constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the
proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the
accused is permissible.

PEOPLE v. NICANDRO RIGHT TO BE INFORMED, WHAT CONSTITUTES: When the

Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be
informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be
presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule,
therefor, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to
repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section
20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell
the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also
explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person
under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the
subject fairly understands.

In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be

informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the

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police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective

communication that results in understanding what is conveyed.
Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be
said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. Now, since
the right "to be informed" implies comprehension, the degree of
explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the
education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances
of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler
and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is
unlettered.

RIGHTS, WAIVABLE: Like other constitutional rights, the right

against self-incrimination, including the right of a person under
investigation to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver of
the right must not only be voluntary; it must be
made knowingly and intelligently (People vs. Caguioa, supra),
which presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is
being waived. It stands to reason that where the right has not
been adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to
whether the person interrogated knew and understood his
relevant constitutional rights when he answered the questions, it
is Idle to talk of waiver of rights.

BELTRAN v. SAMSON WRITING COVERED BY RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION:

writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or
the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the
case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a
means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is
more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of
producing documents or chattels in one's possession.

HERRERA v. ALBA OBTAINING DNA SAMPLE DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT AGAINST
SELF INCRIMINATION: Obtaining DNA samples from an accused
in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case,
contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate
the right against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to
evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress
(People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has
ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition
on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an

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exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be

material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test
to extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis, Supra);
the substance emitting from the body of the accused was
received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng,
23 Phil. 145); morphine forced out of the mouth was received as
proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by the judge
for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed
(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a
woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor
vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the
restriction on "testimonial compulsion."

LUMANLAW v. PERALTA MANDAMUS PROPER REMEDY TO ENFORCE RIGHT TO SPEEDY

TRIAL: It is established that a writ of mandamus may be issued to
control the exercise of discretion59 when, in the performance of
duty, there is undue delay that can be characterized as a grave
abuse of discretion resulting in manifest injustice. 60 In view of our
finding of unwarranted delays in the conduct of the arraignment
of petitioner, he has indeed the right to demand -- through a writ
of mandamus -- expeditious action from all officials tasked with
the administration of justice. Thus, he may not only demand that
his arraignment be held but, ultimately, that the information
against him be dismissed on the ground of the violation of his
right to speedy trial.

Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a

public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most
especially when the public right involved is mandated by the
Constitution.61 Besides, it has long been established in this
jurisdiction that the writ of mandamus is available to the accused
to compel a dismissal of the case.

ABADIA v. CA RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL APPLICABLE TO MILITARY TRIBUNALS:

These rights are clearly available to all citizens even in the
absence of statutory enactment. They cannot be denied to
certain individuals because of gaps in the law for which they are
not responsible. They cannot be taken away from certain
individuals because of the nature of their vocation. Members of
the military establishment do not waive individual rights on
taking up military uniform. That they become subject to uniquely
military rules and procedures does not imply that they agree to
exclusively fall under the jurisdiction of only those rules and
regulations, and opt to stand apart from those rules which govern

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all of the country's citizens.

PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH FREE PRESS: en
and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting
enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out,
"a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the
criminal field… The press does not simply publish information
about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism."

TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST: Pervasive publicity is

not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-
to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality… Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of
parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and
publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

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