1. ROWENA C. CARINGAL, petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R. No. 197086. February 12, 2014.]

On November 6, 2002 the Public Prosecutor filed against

petitioner Caringal and her co-accused, Rev. Efren P. Tan of the MHUFI, a
charge of illegal recruitment in Criminal Case 02-2060 and four counts of
estafa in Criminal Cases 02-2061 to 64.

Illegal recruitment is large scale if committed against three or more persons

individually or as a group. Here, however, the prosecution presented only the
cases of the Lugars. For this reason, on December 15, 2008 the RTC convicted
petitioner Caringal only of simple illegal recruitment and sentenced her to a
prison term of 6 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 12 years, as maximum, and
to pay a fine of P200,000.00. The prosecution proved the two essential
elements of illegal recruitment: one, that the offender had no valid license or
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers;
andtwo, that he had undertaken an act of "recruitment and placement" as
defined under Article 13 (b) 4 or any of the prohibited practices enumerated
in Article 34 5 of the Labor Code.

Rollo, pp. 18-19: Under Section 7 of R.A. 8042, any person found guilty of
illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12)
years and a fine of not less than two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00). As held in People v. Simon (234 SCRA 555 [1994]), the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law are applicable in the
following manner: "It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for
indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states
that, 'If the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same.' We hold that this quoted
portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law
wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to
the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such
that it may be said that the 'offense is punished' under that law."

1
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO LIAN y
VERANO, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 115988. March 29, 1996]

EN BANC, REGALADO, J.:

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, of Agoo, La Union convicted the accused
for the offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition punished by
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended.

The first paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended,

punishes the crime of simple illegal possession of firearm[11] with reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. In unquestioning
obedience, the trial court merely adopted that very same penalty which it just
quoted verbatim in its judgment in this case. In effect, therefore, it imposed an
indeterminate sentence the minimum and maximum extent of which are
legally indeterminable.

The maximum period of reclusion temporal consists of 17 years, 4 months and

1 day to 20 years. This is supposed to be the penalty which should serve as
the basis for fixing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence, but the court
below failed to specify the duration of that minimum. On the other
hand, reclusion perpetua, pursuant to a recent statutory amendment, now has
a duration of 40 years[12] but it is nevertheless an indivisible penalty.[13] Hence,
in order that it may be used as the maximum of the indeterminate sentence,
the only feasible way is to put the same at either 20 years and 1 day or 40
years, but which the court a quo likewise did not do.

In all events, it would have been pointless if it had just done so as such an
indeterminate sentence would, in the first place, be unauthorized and
invalid. There can be no indeterminate sentence if the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,[14] otherwise it will result in
commingling divisible and indivisible penalties in the same sentence to be
served by the convict. Hence, the indeterminate sentence imposed by the trial
court in this case is legally indefensible for lack of specification of the
minimum and maximum range thereof, aside from the proscription against
an indeterminate sentence if the penalty imposed, as the court below has
done, extends to reclusion perpetua.

This does not mean, however, that there is any legal obstacle to the
application and graduation of the penalty in the aforesaid Section 1 of the
decree involved nor, for that matter, to the imposition of an indeterminate
sentence properly taken therefrom. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its

2
maximum period to reclusion perpetua is not singular, unusual or prohibited
in the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code. That is the same penalty
for malversation of more than P22,000.00,[15] for attempted or frustrated
robbery with homicide,[16] and, before the subsequent amendments to the
Code, for destructive arson.[17]

In fact, such a penalty is contemplated in Article 61 of the Code which speaks

of a principal penalty composed of one indivisible penalty and the maximum
period of a divisible penalty, in which case the penalty next lower in degree
consists of the three succeeding periods taken from the penalties next lower in
degree, that is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its medium period. What is sought to be emphasized and clarified by this
illustration, and which appears to have been overlooked in previous
decisions, is that the aforesaid penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua is a complex and divisible penalty consisting of
three periods.

Now, the second paragraph of Article 77 of the Code, which deals with
complex penalties, provides that (w)henever the penalty prescribed does not
have one of the forms specially provided for in this Code, the periods shall be
distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed rules, that is, those in Articles
61 and 76. Hence, where as in this case, the penalty provided by Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua, the minimum period thereof is 17
years, 4 months and 1 day to 18 years and 8 months; the medium period is 18
years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years; and the maximum period is reclusion
perpetua.

In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been

alleged or proved. In accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws
explained in People vs. Simon,[18] although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a
special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code,
hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees[19] or determining the
proper period[20] should be applied. Consequently, the penalty for the offense
of simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period of the complex
penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.

This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with

the rules therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription under
the law, shall be the maximum of the range of the indeterminate
sentence.[21] The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any

3
period of the penalty next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED

and accused-appellant Leo Lian y Verano is hereby sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. In all other respects, said judgment is
AFFIRMED.

3. Lydia c. Gelig v. People GR 173150, July 28, 2010

The RTC Decision convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct
assault with unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty only of the
crime of slight physical injuries.

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused LYDIA GELIG, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion,
and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an Indeterminate Penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO
(2) MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL AS MAXIMUM. She is likewise
ordered to pay the offended party the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)
Pesos as actual damages and Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos for moral
damages.

SO ORDERED.

The CA modified the judgment and only convicted Gelig of slight physical
injuries.

SC Ruling

Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond

reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate
court must be consequently overruled in setting aside the trial courts
verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of direct
assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the
assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a private person by
fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her
tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a teacher. She
tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk

4
properly, but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal
invectives. When Lydia continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely
retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the
situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall
divider while she was going to the principals office. No fault could therefore
be attributed to Gemma.

The prosecutions success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct
assault does not necessarily mean that the same physical force she employed
on Gemma also resulted in the crime of unintentional abortion. There is no
evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma
by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the
abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemmas attending physician, Dr.
Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented to the court to prove that she suffered an
abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that her medical condition
was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident.[18] It was therefore vital
for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was competent to establish a
link, if any, between Lydias assault and Gemmas abortion. Without her
testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault on
Gemmas abortion.

It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for
incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17,
1981 incident.This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of
the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her
bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said incident were not
substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that
the abortion may have been the result of other factors.

The Proper Penalty

Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of direct assault, she must suffer the penalty imposed by law. The
penalty for this crime is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00, when the offender is a public
officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority.[19] Here, Lydia is a public officer or employee since she is a teacher
in a public school. By slapping and pushing Gemma, another teacher, she laid
her hands on a person in authority.

The penalty should be fixed in its medium period in the absence of mitigating
or aggravating circumstances.[20] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence

5
Law,[21] the petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate term, the
minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree, i.e., arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, and the maximum of which is that properly imposable
under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.

Thus, the proper and precise prison sentence that should be imposed must be
within the indeterminate term of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2)
years and four (4) months of arresto mayor, maximum to prision
correccional minimum to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21)
days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. A fine of not more
than P1,000.00 must also be imposed on Lydia in accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner Lydia

Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered finding Lydia
Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct assault and is
ordered to suffer an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day
to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional. She is also ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00.

4. Aloysius Dait Lumauig v. People, GR No. 1666680, July 7, 2014

Information:

That in or about August 1994 or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in

Alfonso Lista, Ifugao and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused then Municipal Mayorof Alfonso Lista, Ifugao, and as
such accountable public officer, and responsible for the amount of P101,736.00
which the accused received by way of cash advance for payment of the
insurance coverage of the twelve (12) motorcycle[s] purchased by the
Municipality, and, hence with the corresponding duty under the law to
account for the same, did then and there, willfully and feloniously fail to
liquidate and account for the same to the damage and prejudice of the
Government.5

From the same facts stemmed an Information for violation of Section 3 of

Republic Act (RA) No. 301911 docketed as CriminalCase No. 26527 against

6
petitioner for having allegedly utilized the cash advance for a purpose other
than for which it was obtained.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

1. In Criminal Case No. 26527, accused ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG is

hereby ACQUITTED. No civil liability shall be imposed there being no basis
for its award. The cash bond posted for his provisional liberty is ordered
returned to him, subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedure; and

2. In Criminal Case No. 26528, accused ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG is

hereby CONVICTED of the felony of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render
Accounts under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby
sentenced to a straight penalty of six months and one (1) day and a fine of
Php1,000.00.

SO ORDERED.13

Ruling of the SC

The acquittal of petitioner in the anti-

graft case is not a bar to his conviction
for failure to render an account in the
present case.

Petitioner stakes the present Petition on the assertion that since the cases for
which he was indicted involve the same subject cash advance in the amount
of P101,736.00, his exoneration in the anti-graft case should likewise exculpate
him from further liability in the present case.

We are not persuaded.

It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident.
"However, [we have] consistently held thatthe same act may give rise to two
or more separate and distinct charges."16 Further, because there is a variance
between the elements of the two offenses charged, petitioner cannot safely
assume that his innocence in one case will extend to the other case even if
both cases hinge on the same set of evidence.

The glaring differences between the elements of these two offenses necessarily
imply that the requisite evidence to establish the guilt or innocence of the
accused would certainly differ in each case. Hence, petitioner’s acquittal in the

7
anti-graft case provides no refuge for him inthe present case given the
differences between the elements ofthe two offenses.

The penalty imposed on petitioner should be modified.

Petitioner argues that assuming that he is liable for violation of Article 218, he
should be meted a lesser penalty considering that (1) he subsequently
liquidated the subject cash advance when he later discovered and was
confronted with his delinquency, and (2) the COA did not immediately
inform him of his unliquidated cash advance.

On this point, we partially agree with petitioner.

In sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six months and one day of

prisión correccionaland a fine of P1,000.00, the Sandiganbayan correctly
considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as borne by
the records,21 in favor of petitioner. However, it failed to consider the
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE of RETURN OR FULL RESTITUTION
OF THE FUNDS THAT WERE PREVIOUSLY UNLIQUIDATED.

In malversation of public funds, the payment, indemnification, or

reimbursement of the funds misappropriated may be considered a
mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary
surrender. Although this case does not involve malversation ofpublic funds
22

under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code but rather failure to render an
account under Article 218 (i.e., the succeeding Article found in the same
Chapter), the same reasoning may be applied to the return or full restitution
ofthe funds that were previously unliquidated in considering the same as a
mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner.

The prescribed penalty for violation of Article 218 is prisión correccionalin its
minimum period or six months and one day to two years and four months, or
by a fine ranging from 200to 6,000 pesos, orboth. Considering that there are
two mitigating circumstances and there are no aggravating circumstances,
under Article 64 (5)23 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is the
penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty which, in this case, is arresto
mayorin its maximum period or four months and one day to six
months.1âwphi1

The Indeterminate Sentence Law, under Section 2,24 is not applicable to,
among others, cases where the maximum term of imprisonment does not
exceed one year. In determining "whether an indeterminate sentence and not
a straight penalty is proper, what is considered is the penalty actually

8
imposed by the trial court, after considering the attendant circumstances, and
not the imposable penalty."25 In the case at bar, since the maximum of the
imposable penalty is six months, then the possible maximum term that can be
actually imposed is surely less than one year. Hence, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is not applicable to the present case. As a result, and in view of
the attendant circumstances in this case, we deem it proper to impose a
straight penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayorand delete the
imposition of fine.

5. People v. Beth Temporada, GR No. 173473, December 17, 2008

EN BANC, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us for review is the February 24, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), affirming with modification the May 14, 2004 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, convicting accused-
appellant Beth Temporada of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment, or
violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, and five (5) counts
of estafa under Article 315, par. (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Information for large scale illegal recruitment reads:

That in or about and during the period comprised between the months of
September 2001 and January 2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, representing themselves to have the power and
capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise
employment to REGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., DENNIS T. DIMAANO,
EVELEYN V. ESTACIO, SOLEDAD B. ATTE and LUZ MINKAY without first
having secured the required license from the Department of Labor and
Employment as required by law, and charge or accept directly or indirectly
from said complainant[s] the amount of PH57,600.00, PH66,520.00,
PH88,520.00, PH69,520.00, PH69,520.00, respectively, as placement fees in
consideration for their overseas employment, which amounts are in excess of
or greater than that specified in the scheduled of allowable fees prescribed of
the POEA and without reasons and without fault of the said complainants,
failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse them the expenses they
incurred in connection with the documentation and processing of their papers
for purposes of their deployment.

9
Except for the name of private complainant and the amount involved, the five
(5) Informations for estafa contain substantially identical averments as
follows:

That in or about and during the period comprised between November 23,
2001 and January 12, 2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud ROGELIO A.
LEGASPI, JR., in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to said
ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., prior to and even simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud, to the effect that they have the power and capacity
to recruit and employ ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., as technician in Singapore
and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the
necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, induced and succeeded
in inducing said ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., to give and deliver, as in fact he
gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P57,600.00 on the strength
of said manifestations and representations said accused well knowing that the
same were false and fraudulent and were made solely for the purpose of
obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the amount of P57,600.00, which amount,
once in their possession, with intend to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to their
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said ROGELIO
A. LEGASPI, JR. in the aforesaid amount of P57,000.00 Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law.

Only appellant was apprehended and brought to trial, the other accused
remained at large. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial
on the merits ensued. After joint trial, on May 14, 2004, the RTC rendered
judgment convicting appellant of all the charges:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the GUILT of accused

Beth Temporada BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, judgment is hereby
rendered CONVICTING the said accused, as principal of the offenses charged
and she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment;
and the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correctional as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum for the estafa committed against complainant Rogelio A.
Legaspi, Jr.; the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correctional as minimum to ten (10) years and one day of prision

10
mayor as maximum each for the estafas committed against complainants,
Dennis Dimaano, Soledad B. Atte and Luz T. Minkay; and the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as
minimum, to eleven (11) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum
for the estafa committed against Evelyn Estacio.

The accused is also ordered to pay jointly and severally the complainants
actual damages.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, with MODIFICATION to the effect that in Criminal Cases

Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, & 02-208376, appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as
maximum; and in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, she is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
medium, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal minimum, as maximum, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.[6]

SC Ruling

We affirm the Decision of the CA, except as to the indeterminate penalties

imposed for the five (5) counts of estafa.

The totality of the evidence, thus, established that appellant acted as an

indispensable participant and effective collaborator of her co-accused in the
illegal recruitment of complainants. As aptly found by the CA:

Without doubt, all the acts of appellant, consisting of introducing herself to

complainants as general manager of ATTC, interviewing and entertaining
them, briefing them on the requirements for deployment and assuring them
that they could leave immediately if they paid the required amounts,
unerringly show unity of purpose with those of her co-accused in their
scheme to defraud private complainants through false promises of jobs
abroad. There being conspiracy, appellant shall be equally liable for the acts of
her co-accused even if she herself did not personally reap the fruits of their
execution. We quote with approval the trial courts findings on the matter:

xxx It is clear that said accused conspired with her co-accused Rosemarie
Baby Robles, Bernadette M. Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, and Jojo Resco in
convincing complainants xxx to apply for overseas jobs and giving

11
complainants Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay and Dennis Dimaano guarantee that
they would be hired as factory workers in Hongkong, complainant Rogelio
Legaspi, as Technician in Singapore and Evelyn Estacio as quality controller
in a factory in Hongkong, despite the fact that the accused was not licensed to
do so.

It should be noted that all the accused were connected with the Alternative
Travel and Tours Corporation (ATTC). Accused Beth Temporada introduced
herself as ATTCs General Manager. Saod accused was also the one who
received the P10,000.00 given by complainant Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. and the
P10,000.00 given by complainant Evelyn Estacio as payment for their visa and
plane ticket, respectively.[10]

Consequently, the defense of appellant that she was not aware of the illegal
nature of the activities of her co-accused cannot be sustained. Besides, even
assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed unaware of the illegal nature
of said activities, the same is hardly a defense in the prosecution for illegal
recruitment. Under The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
a special law, the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is malum
prohibitum and not malum in se.[11] Thus, the criminal intent of the accused
is not necessary and the fact alone that the accused violated the law
warrants her conviction.[12]

Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042 prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 for the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale or by a syndicate. The trial court, therefore,
properly meted the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 on
the appellant.

Anent the conviction of appellant for five (5) counts of estafa, we, likewise,
affirm the same. Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code may, for the same acts, be separately
convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC.[14]

While we affirm the conviction for the five (5) counts of estafa, we find,
however, that the CA erroneously computed the indeterminate penalties
therefor. The CA deviated from the doctrine laid down in People v.
Gabres;[16] hence its decision should be reversed with respect to the
indeterminate penalties it imposed. The reversal of the appellate courts
Decision on this point does not, however, wholly reinstate the indeterminate
penalties imposed by the trial court because the maximum terms, as

12
determined by the latter, were erroneously computed and must necessarily be
rectified.

The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC,
when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. The minimum term is
taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prisin
correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months). Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for
the five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional since this is
within the range of prisin correccional minimum and medium.

On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty
of prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum in its maximum
period, adding 1 year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20
years. However, the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prisin
correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum is not prisin
mayor minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC. To compute the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional maximum
to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of
time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in
accordance with Article 65[17] of the RPC. Following this procedure, the
maximum period of prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum
is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.[18] The incremental penalty,
when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.[19]

In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be

subtracted by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00.
Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as was done starting with the case
of People v. Pabalan[20] in consonance with the settled rule that penal laws
shall be construed liberally in favor of the accused. The doctrine enunciated
in People v. Benemerito[21] insofar as the fraction of a year was utilized in
computing the total incremental penalty should, thus, be modified. In
accordance with the above procedure, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentences imposed by the RTC should be as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, where the amount defrauded was P57,600.00,
the RTC sentenced the accused to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prisin correccional as minimum, to 9 years and 1 day of prisin
mayor as maximum. Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by

13
P35,600.00, 3 years shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years,
at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum term, therefore, that can
be validly imposed is 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisin mayor, and not
9 years and 1 day of prisin mayor.

In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, where the

amounts defrauded were P66,520.00, P69,520.00, and P69,520.00, respectively,
the accused was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prisin correccional as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prisin
mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid three estafa cases. Since the
amounts defrauded exceed P22,000.00 by P44,520.00, P47,520.00, and
P47,520.00, respectively, 4 years shall be added to the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days
to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum term,
therefore, that can be validly imposed is 10 years, 8 months and 21 days
of prisin mayor, and not 10 years and 1 day of prisin mayor.

Finally, in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, where the amount defrauded was
P88,520.00, the accused was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years
and 2 months of prisin correccional as minimum, to 11 years and 1 day
of prisin mayor as maximum. Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00
by P66,520.00, 6 years shall be added to the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days
to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum term,
therefore, that can be validly imposed is 12 years, 8 months and 21 days
of reclusin temporal, and not 11 years and 1 day of prisin mayor.

Response to the dissent.

In the computation of the indeterminate sentence for estafa under Article 315,
par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the Court has consistently followed
the doctrine espoused in Pabalan and more fully explained in Gabres. The
dissent argues that Gabres should be reexamined and abandoned.

We sustain Gabres.

The formula proposed in the Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Ruben T.

Reyes, i.e., the maximum term shall first be computed by applying the
incremental penalty rule, and thereafter the minimum term shall be
determined by descending one degree down the scale of penalties from the
maximum term, is a novel but erroneous interpretation of the ISL in relation

14
to Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. Under this interpretation, it is not clear
how the maximum and minimum terms shall be computed. Moreover, the
legal justification therefor is not clear because the meaning of the terms
penalty, prescribed penalty, penalty actually imposed, minimum term,
maximum term, penalty next lower in degree, and one degree down the scale
of penalties are not properly set out and are, at times, used interchangeably,
loosely and erroneously.

For purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to first clarify the meaning of

certain terms in the sense that they will be used from here on. Later, these
terms shall be aligned to what the dissent appears to be proposing in order to
clearly address the points raised by the dissent.

The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the
felonies defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is
what is referred to as the prescribed penalty. For instance, under Article
249[22] of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusin
temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of
imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for attending or modifying
circumstances which when present in the commission of a felony affects the
computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus
modified, is referred to as the imposable penalty. In the case of homicide
which is committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the
court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is
the penalty actually imposed on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.

Concretely, in U.S. v. Saadlucap,[23] a pre-ISL case, the accused was found

guilty of homicide with a prescribed penalty of reclusin temporal. Since there
was one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances
in this case, the imposable penalty is reclusin temporal in its maximum
period, i.e., from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years. The court then had
the discretion to impose any prison term provided it is within said period, so
that the penalty actually imposed on the accused was set at 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusin temporal,[24] which is a single fixed penalty, with no
minimum or maximum term.

With the passage of the ISL, the law created a prison term which consists of
a minimum and maximum term called the indeterminate sentence.[25]

15
Thus, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the RPC. In other words,
the penalty actually imposed under the pre-ISL regime became the
MAXIMUM term under the ISL regime. Upon the other hand, the
MINIMUM term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to the
PRESCRIBED PENALTY. To illustrate, if the case of Saadlucap was decided
under the ISL regime, then the maximum term would be 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusin temporal and the minimum term could be anywhere
within the range of prisin mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) which is the
penalty next lower to reclusin temporal. Consequently, an indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prisin mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusin temporal as maximum could have possibly been imposed.

If we use the formula as proposed by the dissent, i.e., to compute the

minimum term based on the maximum term after the attending or modifying
circumstances are considered, the basis for computing the minimum term,
under this interpretation, is the imposable penalty[26] as hereinabove
defined. This interpretation is at odds with Section 1 of the ISL which clearly
states that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that PRESCRIBED by the Code for the
offense. Consequently, the basis for fixing the minimum term is
the prescribed penalty,[27] and NOT the imposable penalty.

In People v. Gonzales,[28] the Court held that the minimum term must be
based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense without regard to
circumstances modifying criminal liability.[29] The Gonzales ruling that the
minimum term must be based on the prescribed penalty without regard to
circumstances modifying criminal liability is only a restatement of Section 1 of
the ISL that the minimum term shall be taken from within the range of the
penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty (and from nowhere else).[30]

Further, the dissent proceeds from the erroneous premise that its so-called
regular formula has generally been followed in applying the ISL. To reiterate,
according to the dissent, the regular formula is accomplished by first
determining the maximum term after considering all the attending
circumstances; thereafter, the minimum term is arrived at by going one
degree down the scale from the maximum term. As previously discussed, this
essentially means, using the terms as earlier defined, that the minimum term
shall be taken from the penalty next lower to the imposable penalty (and not
the prescribed penalty.) In more concrete terms and using the previous
example of homicide with one ordinary aggravating circumstance, this would

16
mean that the minimum term for homicide will no longer be based
on reclusin temporal (i.e., the prescribed penalty for homicide) but reclusin
temporal in its maximum period (i.e., the imposable penalty for homicide
with one ordinary aggravating circumstance) so much so that the minimum
term shall be taken from reclusin temporal in its medium period (and no
longer from prisin mayor) because this is the penalty next lower to reclusin
temporal in its maximum period. The penalty from which the minimum term
is taken is, thus, significantly increased. From this example, it is not difficult
to discern why this interpretation radically departs from how the ISL has
generally been applied by this Court. The dissentsregular formula is,
therefore, anything but regular.

In fine, the regular formula espoused by the dissent deviates from the ISL and
established jurisprudence and is, thus, tantamount to judicial legislation.

There is no absurdity or injustice in fixing or stagnating the minimum term

within the range of prisin correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Preliminarily, it must be
emphasized that the minimum term taken from the aforementioned range of
penalty need not be the same for every case of estafa when the amount
defrauded exceeds P12,000.00. In People v. Ducosin,[31] the Court provided
some guidelines in imposing the minimum term from the range of the penalty
next lower to the prescribed penalty:

We come now to determine the minimum imprisonment period referred to in

Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act provides that this minimum which shall
not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by said Code for the offense.[32] We are here upon new
ground. It is in determining the minimum penalty that Act No. 4103 confers
upon the courts in the fixing of penalties the widest discretion that the courts
have ever had. The determination of the minimum penalty presents two
aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination of the extreme limits
of the minimum imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the
factors and circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in
fixing the minimum penalty within the ascertained limits.

We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum

penalty, namely, the considerations which should guide the court in fixing the
term or duration of the minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind
the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation
of personal liberty and economic usefulness (Message of the Governor-

17
General, Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to
consider the criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of
society. This opens up an almost limitless field of investigation and study
which it is the duty of the court to explore in each case as far as is humanly
possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not be standardized but
fitted as far as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative
necessity of protecting the social order.

Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should be

considered are: (1) His age, especially with reference to extreme youth or old
age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity
and personal habits; (4) his previous conduct, environment and mode of life
(and criminal record if any); (5) his previous education, both intellectual and
moral; (6) his proclivities and aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7)
his demeanor during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime
committed; (8) the manner and circumstances in which the crime was
committed; (9) the gravity of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103
excepts certain grave crimes this should be kept in mind in assessing the
minimum penalties for analogous crimes).

In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first,

toward his dependents, family and associates and their relationship with him,
and second, his relationship towards society at large and the State are
important factors. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity
of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and
other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to
individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not
heretofore known in these Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as
guides, the courts can give full effect to the beneficent intention of the
Legislature.[33]

Admittedly, it is possible that the court, upon application of the guidelines

in Ducosin, will impose the same minimum term to one who commits
an estafa involving P13,000.00 and another involving P130 million. In fact, to a
lesser degree, this is what happened in the instant case where the trial court
sentenced the accused to the same minimum term of 4 years and 2 months
of prisin correccional in Criminal Case Nos. 02-208372, 02-208373, 02-208375,
02-208376, and 02-208374 where the amounts defrauded were P57,600.00,
P66,520.00, P69,520.00, P69,520.00 and P88,520.00, respectively. However,
there is no absurdity and injustice for two reasons.

18
One, while it is possible that the minimum term imposed by a court would be
the same, the maximum term would be greater for the convict who
committed estafa involving P130 million (which would be 20 years
of reclusion temporal) than the convict who swindled P13,000.00 (which
could be anywhere from prisin correccional maximum to prisin
mayor minimum or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).[34] Assuming that both convicts qualify for parole after serving the
same minimum term, the convict sentenced to a higher maximum term would
carry a greater burden with respect to the length of parole surveillance which
he may be placed under, and the prison term to be served in case he violates
his parole as provided for in Sections 6[35] and 8[36] of the ISL. Under Section 6,
the convict shall be placed under a period of surveillance equivalent to the
remaining portion of the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final
release and discharge by the Board of Pardon and Paroles. Further, the
convict with the higher maximum term would have to serve a longer period
upon his re-commitment in prison in case he violates his parole because he
would have to serve the remaining portion of the maximum term, unless the
Board of Pardon and Paroles shall, in its discretion, grant a new parole to the
said convict as provided for in Section 8.

Although the differences in treatment are in the nature of potential liabilities,

to this limited extent, the ISL still preserves the greater degree of punishment
in the RPC for a convict who commits estafa involving a greater amount as
compared to one who commits estafa involving a lesser amount. Whether
these differences in treatment are sufficient in substance and gravity involves
a question of wisdom and expediency of the ISL that this Court cannot delve
into.

Two, the rule which provides that the minimum term is taken from the
range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty is, likewise,
applicable to other offenses punishable under the RPC. For instance, the
minimum term for an accused guilty of homicide with one generic mitigating
circumstance vis--vis an accused guilty of homicide with three ordinary
aggravating circumstances would both be taken from prisin mayor the
penalty next lower to eclusion temporal. Evidently, the convict guilty of
homicide with three ordinary aggravating circumstances committed a more
perverse form of the felony. Yet it is possible that the court, after applying the
guidelines in Ducosin, will impose upon the latter the same minimum term as
the accused guilty of homicide with one generic mitigating circumstance. This
reasoning can be applied mutatis mutandis to most of the other offenses

19
punishable under the RPC. Should we then conclude that the ISL creates
absurd results for these offenses as well?

In fine, what is perceived as absurd and unjust is actually the intent of the
legislature to be beneficial to the convict in order to uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation
of personal liberty and economic usefulness.[37] By the legislatures deliberate
design, the range of penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains
fixed and only the range of penalty from which the maximum term is taken
changes depending on the number and nature of the attending
circumstances. Again, the reason why the legislature elected this mode of
beneficence to a convict revolves on questions of wisdom and expediency
which this Court has no power to review. The balancing of the States interests
in deterrence and retributive justice vis--vis reformation and reintegration of
convicts to society through penal laws belongs to the exclusive domain of the
legislature.

III.

People v. Romero,[38] De Carlos v. Court of Appeals,[39] Salazar v.

People,[40] People v. Dinglasan[41] and, by analogy, People v. Dela Cruz[42] do
not support the formula being proposed by the dissent.

These cases involved a different penalty structure that does not make use of
the incremental penalty rule due to the amendatory law. Thus, the
comparison of these cases with Gabres is improper.

Meanwhile, in Dinglasan, the felony committed was estafa through bouncing

checks which is punishable under Article 315 par. 2(d) of the RPC as amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 4885[46]

Here, the prescribed penalty of prisin correccional maximum to prisin

mayor minimum was increased to reclusin temporal by the amendatory
law. Consequently, the penalty next lower to reclusin temporal is prisin
mayor from which the minimum term was taken. This is the reason for the
higher minimum term in this case as compared to Gabres. In fact, Dinglasan is
consistent with Gabres

As in Gabres, the penalty next lower (i.e., prisin mayor) was determined
without considering in the meantime the effect of the amount defrauded in
excess of P22,000.00 on the prescribed penalty (i.e., reclusin temporal).

20
Finally, Dela Cruz involved a case for qualified theft. The prescribed penalty
for qualified theft is two degrees higher than simple theft. Incidentally, the
penalty structure for simple theft[49] and estafa is similar in that both felonies
(1) requires that the prescribed penalty be imposed in its maximum period
when the value of the thing stolen or the amount defrauded, as the case may
be, exceeds P22,000.00, and (2) provides for an incremental penalty of 1 year
imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. It should be
pointed out, however, that the prescribed penalty for simple theft is prisin
mayor minimum and medium while in estafa it is lower at prisin
correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum.

Being two degrees higher, the prescribed penalty for qualified theft is,
thus, reclusin temporal medium and maximum, while the minimum term is
taken from the range of prisin mayor maximum to reclusin
temporal minimum, which is the penalty next lower to reclusin
temporal medium and maximum. The penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty is determined without first considering the amount stolen in excess of
P22,000.00 consistent with Gabres. In fact, Dela Cruz expressly cites Gabres

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate

penalty shall be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree to that prescribed for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. Since the
penalty prescribed by law is reclusin temporal medium and maximum, the
penalty next lower would be prisin mayor in its maximum period to reclusin
temporal in its minimum period. Thus, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence shall be anywhere within ten (10) years and one (1) day to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months.

The maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which, taking into

consideration the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the Revised Penal Code. Since the amount involved in the present case
exceeds P22,000.00, this should be taken as analogous to modifying
circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full
indeterminate sentence, not in the initial determination of the indeterminate
penalty. (citing Gabres) Thus, the maximum term of the indeterminate
penalty in this case is the maximum period of reclusin temporal medium and
maximum, which ranges from eighteen (18) years, two (2) months, and
twenty one (21) days to twenty (20) years, as computed pursuant to Article 65,
in relation to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.[50] (Emphasis supplied)

21
Clearly, none of these cases supports the Dissenting Opinions thesis that the
minimum term should be computed based on the maximum term. Quite the
contrary, Dinglasan and Dela Cruz are consistent with Gabres.

IV.

The argument that the incremental penalty rule should not be considered as
analogous to a modifying circumstance stems from the erroneous
interpretation that the attending circumstances mentioned in Section 1 of the
ISL are limited to those modifying circumstances falling within the scope of
Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC.Section 1 of the ISL is again quoted below

The plain terms of the ISL show that the legislature did not intend to limit
attending circumstances as referring to Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. If the
legislature intended that the attending circumstances under the ISL be limited
to Articles 13 and 14, then it could have simply so stated. The wording of the
law clearly permits other modifying circumstances outside of Articles 13 and
14 of the RPC to be treated as attending circumstances for purposes of the
application of the ISL, such as quasi-recidivism under Article 160[51] of the
RPC. Under this provision, any person who shall commit a felony after
having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such
sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. This circumstance
has been interpreted by the Court as a special aggravating circumstance
where the penalty actually imposed is taken from the prescribed penalty in its
maximum period without regard to any generic mitigating
circumstances.[52] Since quasi-recidivism is considered as merely a special
aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree is computed
based on the prescribed penalty without first considering said special
aggravating circumstance as exemplified in People v. Manalo[53] and People v.
Balictar.[54]

The question whether the incremental penalty rule is covered within the letter
and spirit of attending circumstances under the ISL was answered in the
affirmative by the Court in Gabres when it ruled therein that the incremental
penalty rule is analogous to a modifying circumstance.

Under Gabres, prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum is the

prescribed penalty[55] for estafa when the amount defrauded exceeds
P22,000.00. An amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00 is effectively
considered as a special aggravating circumstance in the sense that the penalty
actually imposed shall be taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum

22
period without regard to any generic mitigating circumstances. Consequently,
the penalty next lower in degree is still based on the prescribed penalty
without in the meantime considering the effect of the amount defrauded in
excess of P22,000.00.

What is unique, however, with the afore-quoted provision is that when the
amount defrauded is P32,000.00 or more, the prescribed penalty is not only
imposed in its maximum period but there is imposed an incremental penalty
of 1 year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided
that the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. This
incremental penalty rule is a special rule applicable to estafa and theft. In the
case of estafa, the incremental penalty is added to the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty (or to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years) at the discretion of the court, in order to arrive at the penalty actually
imposed (i.e., the maximum term, within the context of the ISL).

This unique characteristic of the incremental penalty rule does not pose any
obstacle to interpreting it as analogous to a modifying circumstance, and,
hence, falling within the letter and spirit of attending circumstances for
purposes of the application of the ISL. Under the wording of the ISL,
attending circumstances may be reasonably interpreted as referring to such
circumstances that are applied in conjunction with certain rules in the Code in
order to determine the penalty to be actually imposed based on the prescribed
penalty of the Code for the offense. The incremental penalty rule substantially
meets this standard. The circumstance is the amount defrauded in excess of
P22,0000.00 and the incremental penalty rule is utilized to fix the penalty
actually imposed. At its core, the incremental penalty rule is merely a
mathematical formula for computing the penalty to be actually imposed using
the prescribed penalty as starting point. Thus, it serves the same function of
determining the penalty actually imposed as the modifying circumstances
under Articles 13, 14, and 160 of the RPC, although the manner by which the
former accomplishes this function differs with the latter. For this reason, the
incremental penalty rule may be considered as merely analogous to
modifying circumstances. Besides, in case of doubt as to whether the
incremental penalty rule falls within the scope of attending circumstances
under the ISL, the doubt should be resolved in favor of inclusion because this
interpretation is more favorable to the accused following the time-honored
principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused.[56] Thus, even if the Dissenting Opinions
interpretation is gratuitously conceded as plausible, as between Gabres and

23
the dissents interpretation, Gabres should be sustained since it is the
interpretation more favorable to the accused.

V.

The claim that the maximum term should only be one degree away from the
minimum term does not make sense within the meaning of degrees under the
RPC because the minimum and maximum terms consist of single fixed
penalties. At any rate, the point seems to be that the penalty from which the
minimum term is taken should only be one degree away from the penalty
from which the maximum term is taken.

As a general rule, the application of modifying circumstances, the majority

being generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances, does not
result to a maximum term fixed beyond the prescribed penalty. At most, the
maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum
period. Since the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty and the
minimum term is taken from the next lower penalty, then, in this limited
sense, the difference would naturally be only one degree. Concretely, in the
case of homicide with one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the maximum
term is taken from reclusin temporal in its maximum period which is within
the prescribed penalty of reclusin temporal, while the minimum term is taken
from prisin mayor which is the penalty next lower to reclusin temporal;
hence, the one-degree difference observed by the dissent.

In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the maximum term can
exceed the prescribed penalty. Indeed, at its extreme, the maximum term can
be as high as 20 years of reclusin temporal while the prescribed penalty
remains at prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum, hence, the
penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty from which the minimum term is
taken remains at anywhere within prisin correccional minimum and medium,
or from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In this sense, the
incremental penalty rule deviates from the afore-stated general rule.[57]

However, it is one thing to say that, generally, the penalty from which the
minimum term is taken is only one degree away from the penalty from which
the maximum term is taken, and completely another thing to claim that the
penalty from which the minimum term is taken should only be one degree
away from the penalty from which the maximum term is taken.

The one-degree difference is merely the result of a general observation from

the application of generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances

24
in the RPC in relation to the ISL. Nowhere does the ISL refer to the one-degree
difference as an essential requisite of an attending circumstance. If the
application of the incremental penalty rule deviates from the one-degree
difference, this only means that the law itself has provided for an exception
thereto. Verily, the one-degree difference is a mere consequence of the generic
mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances created by the legislature.
The difficulty of the dissent with the deviation from its so-called one-degree
difference rule seems to lie with the inability to view these attending
circumstances as mere artifacts or creations of the legislature. It does not
make sense to argue that the legislature cannot formulate attending
circumstances that operate differently than these generic mitigating and
ordinary aggravating circumstances, and that, expectedly, leads to a different
result from the one-degree difference for it would be to say that the creator
can only create one specie of creatures. Further, it should be reasonably
assumed that the legislature was aware of these special circumstances, like the
incremental penalty rule or privileged mitigating circumstances, at the time it
enacted the ISL as well as the consequent effects of such special circumstances
on the application of said law. Thus, for as long as the incremental penalty
rule is consistent with the letter and spirit of attending circumstances under
the ISL, there is no obstacle to its treatment as such.

VII.

Mr. Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna proposes an interpretation of the incremental

penalty rule based on the phrases shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin
temporal, as the case may be and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code found in the last sentence of said rule.

While this interpretation is plausible, Gabres should still be sustained because

in construing penal statutes, as between two reasonable[60] but contradictory
constructions, the one more favorable to the accused should be upheld, which
in this case is Gabres. The reason for this rule is elucidated in an eminent
treatise on statutory construction.

But also, for a court to enforce a penalty where the legislature has not clearly
and unequivocally prescribed it could result in judicial usurpation of the
legislative function. One court has noted that the reason for the rule is to
guard against the creation, by judicial construction, of criminal offenses not
within the contemplation of the legislature. Thus the rule requires that before
a person can be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within
the statute sought to be applied. And, so, where a statute is open to more than
one interpretation, it is strictly construed against the state. Courts further

25
rationalize this application of the rule of strict construction on the ground that
it was not the defendant in the criminal action who caused ambiguity in the
statute. Along these same lines, courts also assert that since the state makes
the laws, they should be most strongly construed against it.[61] (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, in one case, where the statute was ambiguous and permitted two
reasonable interpretations, the construction which would impose a less severe
penalty was adopted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED with

respect to the indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the five (5)
counts of estafa, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused is sentenced to an

indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional as
minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisin mayor as maximum.

(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, the

accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months
of prisin correccional as minimum, to 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisin
mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid three estafa cases.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused is sentenced to an

indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional as
minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of reclusin temporal as
maximum.

In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

6. People v. Wilforiano Cesar @ Junior, G.R. No. L-26185, March 13, 1968

EN BANC BENGZON, J.P., J.

Accused was a student of St. Anthony's Academy in Carmen, Bohol. On

March 9, 1966, during the first period in the afternoon, he went out to buy a
notebook from the store of a certain Emil Andres and there he met his friend,
Vidal Torrefranca who offered him tuba. He drank two glasses and returned
to his classes. He was able to attend all his classes and could remember the
subjects he attended. After classes, he stood by the flagpole where he met and

26
stabbed with a knife1 Segundo Sarce Jr., Acting Principal Teacher of St.
Anthony's Academy. Accused fled after the stabbing. According to the
autopsy report,2 the victim died minutes after the wound was inflicted.

Charged of direct assault with murder in the Municipal Court of Carmen,

Bohol, accused waived his right to preliminary investigation and moved that
his case be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Bohol at Tagbilaran.
This was granted and the accused was charged with the same complex crime
in the latter court.

With leave of court, and in order to mitigate his liability, accused proved that
he was born in the Municipality of Carmen, province of Bohol, on May 27,
1948 (Exhibits 1 and 1-A), and therefore on the date of the commission of the
crime, he was only 17 years, 9 months and 12 days old.

The trial court convicted the accused of direct assault upon a person in
authority with homicide in its decision dated April 30, 1966, the dispositive
portion of which is as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, accused Wilforiano Cesar alias Junior is

found guilty of the complex crime of direct assault upon a person in authority
with homicide, as defined under Article 48 in relation with Articles 148 and
249 of the Revised Penal Code, with a special or privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority (Article 68, paragraph 2) and spontaneous plea of
guilty (Article 13, paragraph 7) and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from TWELVE (12) years and ONE (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) years, EIGHT (8) months and ONE (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, (Article 27 in relation to Articles 76 and
77 of the Revised Penal Code; People. vs. Pao, 58 Phil. 545; People vs.
Gayrama, 60 Phil. 796) with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and
to pay damages to the heirs of the deceased Segundo Sarce Jr. in the amount
of P7,500.00, including expenses for embalming, tomb, prayers, wick, but
without subsidiary personal liability in case of insolvency in view of the
nature of the penalty (Article 39, Revised Penal Code). The accused must pay
the costs of this proceeding. He is, however, credited one-half of his
preventive imprisonment from March 10, 1966, until this decision becomes
final (Article 29, Revised Penal Code).

In this appeal, the accused raises as sole issue the correct penalty under the
circumstances.

27
Accused-appellant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the crime of direct
assault upon a person in authority with homicide. This being a complex
crime, the penalty for the more serious crime should be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period.4 The more serious crime is homicide
punishable by reclusion temporal.

Accused has to his credit two mitigating circumstances: the special or

privileged mitigating circumstance of minority5 and the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty.6 Therefore, under Art. 64, par. 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty imposable is the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by law. Under Art. 71, Revised Penal Code, the penalty next lower
to reclusion temporal is prision mayor. Because of the complex nature of the
crime committed by accused-appellant, the penalty of prision mayor is to be
applied in its maximum period. However, having in his favor the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty without any offsetting aggravating
circumstance, applying Art. 64, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
of prision mayor maximum should be imposed in its minimum range.

Parenthetically, We must state that the lower court erred in the imposition of
the correct penalty — despite its proper appreciation of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority and the ordinary circumstance of plea of
guilty in favor of the appellant — because it applied first the imposable
penalty to its maximum degree, i.e., reclusion temporal maximum, and then
imposed the penalty immediately inferior to it, i.e., reclusion
temporal medium. This latter penalty it imposed as the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence, but applied in the minimum range because of the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. As the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence, it imposed the minimum of the penalty next lower,
i.e., reclusion temporal minimum.

The proper method7 is to start from the penalty imposed by the Revised
Penal Code, i.e., reclusion temporal; then apply the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority and determine the penalty immediately inferior
in degree, i.e., prision mayor; and finally apply the same in its maximum
degree but within the minimum range8 thereof because of the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. Prision mayor being the maximum
of the indeterminate sentence, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty is
within the range of the penalty next lower to it as prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code, i.e., prision correccional.

All told, and applying now the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-
appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of not less than six

28
(6) years of prision correccional, to not more than ten (10) years and eight (8)
months of prision mayor.9

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified as to the

personal penalty so as to sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty of
not less than six (6) years of prision correccional to not more than ten (10)
years and eight (8) months of prision mayor; in all other respects, the
judgment is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

7. Nicanor Napolis v. CA and People, G.R. No. L-28865 February 28, 1972.

EN BANC, CONCEPCION, C.J.

Appeal taken by Nicanor Napolis from a decision of the Court of Appeals

affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby finds

the accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in band and sentences
Bonifacio Malanaas an accessory after the fact to suffer imprisonment of from
six (6) months, arresto mayor, as minimum to six (6) years, prision
correccional, as maximum and to indemnify the offended party, Ignacio
Peñaflor in the sum of P80.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency but not to exceed one-third (1/3)of the principal penalty and the
accused Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre to suffer imprisonment of
from ten (10) years and one (1) day, prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, reclusion temporal, as maximum,
both to indemnify the spouses Ignacio Peñaflor and Casimira Lagman in the
sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Fifty-Seven Pesos (P2,557.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and all three to pay the
proportionate part of the costs.

A criminal complaint for robbery in band was filed:

That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, in the
Municipality of Hermosa, Province of Bataan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused Bonifacio Malana,
Nicanor Napolis, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, Alias Mori, Jose Escabel,
Alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe, Alias Sommy Casimiro,
Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso, Domingo Flores, Alias Eko and Paul

29
Doe, by conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with the intent to
gain and armed with a Grease Gun, Three (3) caliber .45 pistols and two (2)
revolvers, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, entered
the dwelling of the spouses IGNACIO PEÑAFLOR and CASIMIRA L.
PEÑAFLOR by boring a hole under the sidewall of the ground floor of the
house and once inside, attack, assault and hit Ignacio Peñaflor with the
handle of the Grease Gun causing him to fall on the ground and rendering
him unconscious, tied his hands and feet and then leave him; that the same
accused approached Casimira L. Peñaflor , threatened her at gun point and
demanded money; that the same accused while inside the said house
searched and ransacked the place and take and carry away the following cash
money and articles belonging to said spouses Ignacio Peñaflor and Casimira
L. Peñaflor , to wit: P2,000.00 in cash, Philippine Currency, One (1) ring
(Brillante) valued at P350.00, One (1) licensed Commando Colt Revolver,
Serial No. 532132 and One (1) Flashlight, valued at P7.00, to the damage and
prejudice of said spouses in the total sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN PESOS, (P2,557.00) Philippine Currency.".

The trial court convicted Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana and Apolinario
Satimbre, as above indicated. Said defendants appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, however, dismissed Malana's appeal, and affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance, insofar as Napolis and Satimbre are
concerned. Satimbre did not appeal from said decision of the Court of
Appeals, whereas Napolis alleges that said court has erred — .

The fourth assignment of error refers to the characterization of the crime

committed and the proper penalty therefor. It should be noted that the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting Napolis, Malana
and Satimbre of the crime of robbery committed by armed persons, in an
inhabited house, entry therein having been made by breaking a wall, as
provided in Article 299 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and, accordingly,
sentencing Napolis and Satimbre to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, which is in accordance with said legal provision.

In addition, however, to performing said acts, the malefactors had, also, used
violence against Ignacio Peñaflor , and intimidation against his wife, thereby
infringing Article 294 of the same Code, under conditions falling under sub-
paragraph (5) of said article, which prescribes the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period,

30
which is lighter than that prescribed in said Article 299, although, factually,
the crime committed is more serious than that covered by the latter provision.
This Court had PREVIOUSLY ruled — .

... that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is

characterized by intimidation, this factor "supplies the controlling
qualification," so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of the
Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that "robbery which is
characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently
graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because
where violence or intimidation against the person is present there is greater
disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual." (U.S.
vs. Turla, 38 Phil. 346; People vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89.) And this view is
followed even where, as in the present case, the penalty to be applied under
article 294 is LIGHTER than that which would result from the application
of article 299. ... . 3

Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing

view. Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an
inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence
against or intimidation upon persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the
Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. 4 Pursuant to the above view,
adhered to in previous decision, 5 if, aside from performing said acts, the thief
lays hand upon any person, without committing any of the crimes or
inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294
of the same Code, the imposable penalty -- under paragraph (5) thereof --
shall be much lighter. 6 To our mind, this result and the process of reasoning
that has brought it about, defy logic and reason.

The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a

person supplies the "controlling qualification," is far from sufficient to justify
said result. We agree with the proposition that robbery with "violence or
intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery
committed by force upon things," but, precisely, for this reason, We cannot
accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above cited —
reduction of the penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of
violence or intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to our mind,
more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with
violence against or intimidation of person takes place WITHOUT entering
an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised
Penal Code.

31
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements
of both provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for the
imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the penalty for the most
serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar,
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This penalty should, in turn,
be imposed in its maximum period -- from nineteen (19) years, one (1)
month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal —
owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime. In
short, the doctrine adopted in U.S. v. De los Santos 7 and applied in U.S. v.
Manansala,8 U.S. v. Turla, 9 People v. Baluyot, 10 Manahan v.
People, 11 and People v. Sebastian, 12 is HEREBY ABANDONED and
appellant herein should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from ten (10) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor to nineteen (19) years,
one (1) month and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal.

8. AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 197562, April 20, 2015

The complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons and

robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons was committed
when the accused, who held firearms, entered the residential house of the
victims and inflicted injury upon the victims in the process of committing the
robbery. Hence, the penalty is that imposed for the robbery in an inhabited
house, the more serious crime. All the accused are liable because the act of
one is the act of all.

Fransdilla and her co-accused were eventually charged with robbery under
the following information, to wit:

That on or about the 20th day of February, 1991, in Quezon City Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain,
and by means of violence and intimidation upon person rob the residence of
CYNTHIA YREVERRE Y PANGANIBAN located at No. 24-B Mabait St.,
Teacher's Village, Quezon City, this City, by pretending to be from
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AGENCY (POEA) and once inside
took, rob, and carried away the following items therefrom. belonging to
LALAINE YREVERRE Y Panganiban, all in the total amount of
PhP2,701,000.00, Philippines Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the

32
said offended party in the aforementioned sum and in such other amounts as
maybe awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

As stated, the RTC convicted Fransdilla and her co-accused of robbery,

decreeing in its decision of September 15, 1999, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused AURORA

ENGSON FRANSDILLA, EDGARDO CACAL Y SANCHEZ, DANILO
CUANANG Y VALDEZ, MANUEL SILAO Y YREVERRE and EDGARDO
SILAO Y YREVERRE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime
of Robbery punished under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and in the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to
imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY to FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusión temporal as minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to
TWENTY (20) YEARS oí reclusión temporal as maximum. Said accused are
likewise ordered to indemnify the herein private complainants the amount of
TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, the value of the
property taken less the amount recovered, and to pay the amount of
PhP200,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.6

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of all of the accused, but modified
the penalty imposed by the RTC, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 15, 1999 of the trial court is
affirmed subject to the modification that accused-appellants and accused are
sentenced to an imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusión
temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Rejecting the claim of insufficiency of the proof of conspiracy raised by

Fransdilla, the CA observed that the clear and categorical testimony of Lalaine
positively showed that Fransdilla's acts demonstrated her common design

33
with the other accused to commit the robbery,9 stressing that "it is a common
design which is the essence of conspiracy, though the conspirators may act
separately and on different manner but always leading to the same unlawful
result." It adverted to Fransdilla's various acts as evincing her role in the
concerted resolve to commit the robbery, such as introducing herself to
Lalaine as a representative of the POEA in order to gain access into the house;
trying to distract Lalaine by using the telephone, asking for a cigarette, going
to the bathroom, and pretending that she was then having her menstrual
period in order to have her cohorts enter the house; and peeping inside the
bedroom when her co-accused were tying Lalaine up to enable themselves to
search for and take away jewelry and other valuables inside the latter's
bedroom without hindrance.

Ruling of the SC

The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the CA.

Conspiracy of Fransdilla with

her co-accused was established
beyond reasonable doubt

It bears stressing that Fransdilla opted not to present evidence in her defense
during the trial. On appeal, the core of her contentions in the CA was that the
Prosecution did not establish her having conspired with the other accused in
committing the robbery. She reiterates such contentions here, stating that the
State's formal offer of evidence did not include any reference to any evidence
specifically incriminating her.

The Court rejects Fransdilla's contentions.

Our review of the records of the trial reveals that contrary to Fransdilla's
contentions, the State competently and credibly established her active
participation in the execution of the robbery through Lalaine's testimony
detailing her specific acts.

The State thus discharged its burden to produce before the trial court
sufficient evidence against all the accused, including Fransdilla, that would
warrant a judgment of conviction. Fransdilla's non-presentation of her
defense, despite her being directly incriminated by Lalaine, denied the Court
her explanation for her specific overt acts of complicity in the robbery and
thus rendered the incriminating evidence unrefuted. By this the Court simply
means that Fransdilla did not discharge her burden of evidence, which is "the

34
duty of a party to start and continue giving evidence at any stage of the trial
until he has established a prima facie case, or the like duty of the adverse
party to meet and overthrow that prima facie case thus established."12

As such, the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proof against

Fransdilla.

Correction of the Indeterminate Sentence

was necessary to conform to the letter and spirit
the Indeterminate Sentence Law

That the trial judge fixed the indeterminate sentence at "imprisonment of

TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and
EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of reclusion temporal as maximum" was a patent elementary error. Such
fixing contravened the letter and spirit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Section 1.

The CA justifiably deemed it necessary to correct the indeterminate sentence.

Under Section 1, supra, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is a
penalty "within the range of the penalty next lower to that PRESCRIBED by
the [Revised Penal] Code for the offense," and the maximum is "that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code." Considering that the clear objective of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to have the convict serve the minimum
penalty before becoming eligible for release on parole pursuant to
the Indeterminate Sentence Law,16both the minimum and the maximum
penalties must be definite, not ranging. This objective cannot be achieved
otherwise, for determining when the convict would be eligible for release on
parole would be nearly impossible if the minimum and the maximum were
as indefinite as the RTC fixed the indeterminate sentence. Indeed, that the
sentence is an indeterminate one relates only to the fact that such imposition
would leave the period between the minimum and the maximum
penalties indeterminate "in the sense that he may, under the conditions set out
in said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or in part."17

3.
Crime committed was the complex crime of
robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and

35
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code

Citing Napolis v. Court ofAppeals.,18 the CA ruled that all the accused,
including Fransdilla, were guilty of committing the complex crime of robbery
in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised Penal Code, and robbery
with intimidation or violence under Article 294, Revised Penal Code. Thus, it
held that the penalty for the complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code was that for the more serious offense, to be imposed in its
maximum period. Taking into consideration that no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances were present, it set the indeterminate sentence of 12 years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

We concur with the CA.

Napolis ruling:

We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements
of both provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for the
imposition — as provided in Art. 48 of said Code — of the penalty for the
most serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar,
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This penalty should, in turn, be
imposed in its maximum period - from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and
eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal - owing to the
presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime. xxx.20

Napolis v. Court of Appeals is controlling in this case. To start with, the

information fully alleged the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house
under Article 299, Revised Penal Code, and robbery with intimidation or
violence under Article 294, Revised Penal Code by averring that "the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to gain, and by means of violence and intimidation upon person
rob the residence x x x." And, secondly, the Prosecution competently proved
the commission of the complex crime by showing during the trial that the
accused, after entering the residential house of the complainants at No. 24-B
Mabait St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, took away valuables, including the
vault containing Cynthia's US dollar currencies, and in the process committed
acts of violence against and intimidation of persons during the robbery by
slapping and threatening Lalaine and tying her up, and herding the other
members of the household inside the bodega of the house.

36
Article 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice
devoted to worship. — Any armed person who shall commit robbery in an
inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to religious worship,
shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property taken
shall exceed 250 pesos, and if:

(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was
committed, by any of the following means:

1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress.

2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window.

3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.

4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.

Or if —

(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:

1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or

sealed furniture or receptacle;

2. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced open outside the

place of the robbery.

When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property taken
exceeds 250 pesos, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.

The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the value of
the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos.

When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken
does not exceed 250 pesos, they shall suffer the penalty prescribed in the two
next preceding paragraphs, in its minimum period.

If the robbery be committed in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house,

public building, or building dedicated to religious worship, the penalties next
lower in degree than those prescribed in this article shall be imposed.

37
Relevant are paragraph (a)4 (because Fransdilla pretended to be from the
POEA) and paragraph (b)2 (because the accused brought the vault down from
Cynthia's upstairs bedroom and forced it open outside the place where the
robbery was committed), supra. The penalty for the crime is reclusion
temporal.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the complex crime
is that for the more serious felony, which, in this case, was the robbery in an
inhabited house by armed men punishable by reclusion temporal, to be
imposed in the maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four months and one day to 20
years). Hence, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence of 12 years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion
temporal, must be corrected to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review

on certiorari and AFFIRMS in all respects the conviction of accused AURORA
ENGSON FRANSDILLA for the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited
house by armed men under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and
robbery with violence against and intimidation of persons under Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS,
namely: (1) she shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; (2) the award of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages is
deleted for lack of legal basis; and (3) and the actual damages of P2,250,000.00
shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the
information until full payment.

9. Saturnino C. Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, G.R. Nos. 176830, 185587,

185636, 190005, February 11, 2014

EN BANC, SERENO, CJ.

On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd

Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay
Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass grave contained skeletal remains of
individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation
VD) launched by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New

38
People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.

Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to require
consideration. Accordingly, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and
economy, this Court will pass primarily upon the following:

1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary

investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.

2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed under

the political offense doctrine.

From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured
and executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF20 pursuant to Operation
VD.

The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos,
Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando
(Judge Abando) on 28 February 2007, and docketed as Criminal Case No. H-
1581.

On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.

Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others
(including petitioners Echanis and Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-944 was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch
150 (RTC Makati).39 Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner
Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already
absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in
connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.40

On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil action

for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65

On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65

On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil action

for certiorari under Rule 65.

On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005 with

G.R. Nos. 176830, 185587 and 185636.73

39
OUR RULING

The political offense doctrine is not a

ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination
by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.

Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in

furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common"
offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they
are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from
the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of
a graver penalty.”

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion.122 Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the
killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political
complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and
punished as rebellion alone.

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial
court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing
was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the
act to be conclusively demonstrated.124

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have
been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon
the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would
not be placed in double jeopardy.

10. Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Hon. Justice Francis Garchitorena,

Sandiganbayan and the People, G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993

EN BANC, QUIASON, J.

On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly
committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien
Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).

40
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205
SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to
harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was
in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that
"(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13,
1992.

Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any
offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official
acts complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324
and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted
the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived
in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. she concludes that the
Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations
(Rollo, pp. 25-31).

The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under
Executive Order No. 324, that petitioner merely followed in good faith the
policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that the aliens were
spouses or unmarried minor children of persons qualified for legalization of
stay, are matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.

Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that
she had caused "undue injury to any party, including the Government," there
are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by
causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.

In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:

The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a
violation of Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving any private party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable
element of the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed
by petitioners although there may be instances where both elements concur.

RE: DELITO CONTINUADO

41
Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition
that the public prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner,
after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one
amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also noted that petitioner
questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended
Informations, the splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In
the furtherance of justice, we therefore proceed to inquire deeper into the
validity of said plant, which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in her
petition.

We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in
petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be file
against her.

The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or

"continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."

In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be

borne in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing
problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define and more difficult to
apply.

According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a

plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal
provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means
that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one
and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal
Code, 630, 1987 ed.).

According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several

crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator
(Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and
Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).

Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one
criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).

Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only

one offense the following cases:

42
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the
accused at the same time and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67
Phil. 320 [1939] ).

(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same
coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).

(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion
(People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ).

(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he
collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's
fees shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).
The collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of
collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made
under the same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).

On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:

(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from
January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956
(People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on
two different occasions.

(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and
falsifications to conceal said offenses committed in August and October 1936.
The malversations and falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose
or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil.
354 [1938] ).

(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of
the collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June
1964 involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People
v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).

(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections

from customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of
Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).

The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal

Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws,
e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services

43
rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10
SCRA 156 [1964] ).

Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be

supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.

The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates
a single offense or separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law
and perplexed American courts as shown by the several theories that have
evolved in theft cases.

The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that
is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or different
owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts
have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under which there is a
distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the
doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or
one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation,
37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).

The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the
commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act involving
the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson,
157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State
v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).

An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional
guarantee against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense
(Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed that the doctrine is a
humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused
may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28
ALR 2d 1179).

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with

performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application for
legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.

The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by
petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the

44
Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17,
1988.

The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the

original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original
information each amended information states the name of the individual
whose stay was legalized.

At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors
manifested that they would file only one amended information embodying
the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As stated in the Order dated
November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division).

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the
same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability
even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay
of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval
was embodied in the same document.

Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a
bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or injury. The
Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13, 1992 stated as follows:

. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and
prejudice to the government is concerned, the same is represented not only by
the very fact of the violation of the law itself but because of the adverse effect
on the stability and security of the country in granting citizenship to those not
qualified (Rollo, p. 59).

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No.

16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution
dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense
that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is
directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos.
18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the
original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued
by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the disqualification of
Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

45
11. People v. Wenceslao Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012

EN BANC, PEREZ, J.

The subject of this present appeal is the Decision1 dated 18 June 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246, affirming the Decision2 dated 30
September 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 21-910, finding herein appellants
Wenceslao Nelmida @ "Eslao" (Wenceslao) and Ricardo Ajok @ "Pordoy"
(Ricardo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder, thereby sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellants were likewise ordered to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of each of the deceased victims, i.e.,
Police Officer 3 Hernando P. Dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz) and

Information:

That on or about the 5th day of June 2001, at SAN MANUEL, Lala, Lanao del
Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named appellants and their co-accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, armed with assorted high-powered firearms
and hand-grenade, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with treachery, evident premidation (sic), taking advantage of their
superiority in strength and in numbers, and with intent to kill, ambush, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the persons of the following, namely:

XXX

by then and there firing and shooting them with said high-powered firearms
thereby inflicting upon the persons of PO3 De la Cruz, T/Sgt. Dacoco, PFC
Haron Angni, PFC Gapor Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo, Mosanip Ameril and
Macasuba Tandayao gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of the death of PO3 De la Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco and the serious
wounding of said PFC Haron Angni, PFC Gapor Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo,
Mosanip Ameril and Macasuba Tandayao that without the medical assistance
would have caused their deaths, while Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan and Jun
Palanas were not hit.8

Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most of whom were

victims of the ambush, to be credible, categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and consistent, coupled with their positive identification of the
appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime and their lack of ill-motive
to falsely testify against them, vis-à-vis the defense of denial and alibi
proffered by the latter, the trial court rendered its Decision on 30 September
2005 finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder

46
with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder and imposing
upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the
aforesaid trial court’s Decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered finding herein appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated
murder and double attempted murder, and the Court hereby sentences them
to suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the late PO3 Dela Cruz the amount of P 50,000.00 as
moral damages and another sum of P 50,000.00 for and by way of civil
indemnity ex delicto; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the late T/Sgt.
Dacoco the sum of P 50,000.00 as moral damages plus P 50,000.00 for and by
way of civil indemnity ex delicto; and to pay, jointly and severally, Ex-Mayor
Johnny Tawantawan the amount of P 50,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees, and
the costs of suit.

On 18 June 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision
affirming appellants’ conviction of the crime charged.

As to the crime committed. The trial court, as well as the appellate court,
convicted appellants of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and
double attempted murder. This Court believes, however, that appellants
should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two (2)
counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder as the killing and
wounding of the victims in this case were not the result of a single act but of
several acts of the appellants, thus, making Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code INAPPLICABLE.

Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the vehicle

boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group with bullets discharged from
their firearms when the said vehicle passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del
Norte, resulted in the death of two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan,
i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco.

Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the commission of

the crime. Time and again, this Court, in a plethora of cases, has consistently
held that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof,
which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. There
are two (2) conditions that must concur for treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the
employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution
was deliberately and consciously adopted. "The essence of treachery is that
the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected

47
manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance
to resist or escape."74

The deadly successive shots of the appellants and their co-accused did not
allow the hapless victims, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, any
opportunity to put up a decent defense. The attack was executed by
appellants and their-co-accused in such a vicious manner as to make the
defense virtually impossible. Under the circumstances, it is very apparent that
appellants had murder in their hearts when they waylaid their unwary
victims.75 Thus, as to the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco,
appellants should be held liable for murder.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however,

CANNOT be appreciated as it is deemed absorbed in treachery.76

Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident

premeditation, the circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated. To prove this
aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the
time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time,
between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof,
sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.77 None of these elements could be gathered from the evidence on record.

As regards the victims Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and
Juanito, although they were injured during the ambush and were all
hospitalized, except for Macasuba, it was not mentioned that their injuries
and wounds were mortal or fatal such that without the timely medical
assistance accorded to them, they would have died.78 However, it does not
necessarily follow that the crimes committed against the aforenamed victims
were simply less serious physical injuries. Also, even though Mayor Tawan-
tawan and Jun did not sustain any injury during the ambush, it does not
mean that no crime has been committed against them. The latter were just
fortunate enough not to have sustained any injury on the occasion thereof.
Since appellants were motivated by the same intent to kill, thus, as to
Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito, Mayor Tawan-tawan
and Jun, appellants should be held guilty of attempted murder.

What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability of Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code. Its resolution would determine whether the
conviction of appellants must be for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of
murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder or of the complex crime of
double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted
murder.

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in

the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only

48
one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex
crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as complex
crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in
the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate
and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that
when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate
and distinct crimes.80

Evidently, there is in this case NO complex crime proper. And the

circumstances present in this case do not fit exactly the description of a
compound crime.

From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and
wounding of the victims were not the result of a single discharge of firearms
by the appellants and their co-accused. To note, appellants and their co-
accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two security escorts died while five
(5) of them were wounded and injured. The victims sustained gunshot
wounds in different parts of their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid
that more than one bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more than one
gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims. As held in People v. Valdez, 81 each
act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming
each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual
acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime.82

Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act
but several individual and distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not apply for it speaks only of a
"single act."

There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code despite the fact that several acts were performed by several
accused in the commission of the crime resulting to the death and/or injuries
to their victims.

In People v. Lawas,83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of their
leader, Lawas, simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. As a
result, 50 persons died. It was there held that the killing was the result of a
single impulse as there was no intent on the part of the accused to fire at each
and every victim separately and distinctly from each other.

If the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it

constitutes a single offense. However, "single criminal impulse" was not the
only consideration in applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in the
said case because there was therein no evidence at all showing the identity or

49
number of persons killed by each accused. There was also no conspiracy to
perpetuate the killing, thus, collective criminal responsibility could not be
imputed upon the accused. Since it was impossible to ascertain the number
of persons killed by each of them, this Court was "forced" to find all the
accused guilty of only one offense of multiple homicide instead of holding
each of them responsible for 50 deaths.84

Significantly, there was no conspiracy in People v. Lawas. However, as this

Court held in People v. Remollino,85the Lawas doctrine is more of an
EXCEPTION than the general rule.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises
on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the
felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every
one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually
committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the
agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of
the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it
does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs
the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all.86

The Information filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged

conspiracy, among others. Although the trial court did not directly state that a
conspiracy existed, such may be inferred from the concerted actions of the
appellants and their co-accused, to wit: (1) appellants and their co-accused
brought Samuel to a waiting shed located on the left side of the road where
the yellow pick-up service vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group would pass; (2) appellants and their co-accused, thereafter, assembled
themselves on both sides of the road and surreptitiously waited for the
aforesaid yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the moment the yellow pick-up
service vehicle passed by the waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused
opened fire and rained bullets thereon resulting in the killing and wounding
of the victims; (4) immediately, appellants and their co-accused ran towards
the house of Samuel’s aunt to get their bags and other stuff; (5) Samuel
followed appellants and their co-accused; and (6) appellants and their co-
accused fled.

Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of the

appellants and their co-accused. Clearly, their acts were coordinated. They
were synchronized in their approach to riddle with bullets the vehicle
boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. They were motivated by a
single criminal impulse ─ to kill the victims. Indubitably, conspiracy is
implied when the accused persons had a common purpose and were united
in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all

50
perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to
create joint criminal responsibility.87

With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their co-
accused had assumed joint criminal responsibility ─ the act of one is the act of
all. The ascertainment of who among them actually hit, killed and/or caused
injury to the victims already becomes immaterial. Collective responsibility
replaced individual responsibility. The Lawas doctrine, premised on the
impossibility of determining who killed whom, cannot, to repeat, be applied.

Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos,88 People v. Abella,89 People v.

Garcia90 and People v. Pincalin,91 this Court also applied Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code even though several acts were performed by the accused
and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.

In People v. De los Santos,92 a prison riot occurred for two consecutive days
inside the national penitentiary between the members of two gangs, i.e.,
Sigue-Sigue Sputnik and Oxo. As a result, nine (9) inmates were killed.
Fourteen (14) inmates were then convicted for the crime of multiple murder.
The existence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime was duly proven.
There was, however, no discussion why the accused were convicted of a
complex crime instead of separate crimes.

In a similar case of People v. Abella,93 involving the massacre of certain

prisoners in the Davao Penal Colony and a reprise of a similar riot that
occurred in the national penitentiary on 16 February 1958 (subject of De los
Santos), all the accused were also convicted for the complex crime of multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Conspiracy likewise attended the
commission of the crime. This Court applied the ruling in De los Santos and
elucidated that the ruling in the said case is predicated on the theory that
"when for the attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an offense,
various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one
offense," a complex one. The Lawas doctrine was equally applied although
conspiracy had been duly proven. This Court then stated that where a
conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose "their individual
acts in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act – the act of
execution – giving rise to a complex offense. The felonious agreement
produces a sole and solidary liability: each confederate forms but a part of a
single being."94

People v. Garcia95 and People v. Pincalin96 have the same factual background
as De los Santos and Abella. They were the third and fourth cases,
respectively, of prison riots resulting to the killing of convicts by fellow
convicts while inside the national penitentiary. In Garcia, the accused were
convicted for the complex crime of multiple murder and double attempted
murder, while in Pincalin the accused were convicted for the complex crime

51
of double murder and frustrated murder. In both cases, this Court found
conspiracy to have attended the commission of the crime.

In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in Garcia and Pincalin, this
Court, gave the same justification as in Abella: that both cases were covered
by the rule that "when for the attainment of a single purpose, which
constitutes an offense various acts are executed, such acts must be considered
as only one offense, a complex one." Correspondingly, "where a conspiracy
animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution,
giving rise to a complex offense. Various acts committed under one criminal
impulse may constitute a single complex offense.97

We however found no intention by this Court to establish as doctrine,

contrary to Lawas, that Article 48 is applicable even in cases where several
acts were performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the commission
of the crime. In Pincalin, this Court has already clarified that: nonetheless, this
Court further held that "in other cases where several killings on the same
occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may
be applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses, as
opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in some decided cases."98

De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were EXCEPTIONS to

the general rule stated in Article 48 which exceptions were drawn by the
peculiar circumstance of the cases.

It may be mentioned that in People v. Sanidad,99 this Court, once again,

applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code although the circumstances of
the case were not the same as in Lawas, De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and
Pincalin, where this Court departed from the general rule.

In Sanidad, suddenly and without a warning, several accused unleashed a

volley of shots at the jeepney boarded by the victims. Miraculously, all
passengers, except Rolando Tugadi (Rolando), survived the ambush and
suffered only minor injuries. Conspiracy attended the commission of the
crime. Accused were convicted for the complex crime of murder and multiple
attempted murder. We there held that the case comes within the purview of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Citing Lawas and Abella, it was
pronounced that although several independent acts were performed by the
accused, it was not possible to determine who among them actually killed
Rolando; and that there was no evidence that the accused intended to fire at
each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other.
On the premise that the evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to
kill Marlon Tugadi’s group as a whole, we repeated that where a conspiracy
animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution,
giving rise to a single complex offense.100

52
The reliance in Sanidad, on Lawas and Abella is INCORRECT.

The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin,
thus: where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not
involving prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings
would be treated as separate offenses. Since in Sanidad, the killings did not
involve prisoners or it was not a case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners. As
such, Abella would not apply.

To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code because of the impossibility of ascertaining the number of
persons killed by each accused. Since conspiracy was not proven therein, joint
criminal responsibility could not be attributed to the accused. Each accused
could not be held liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence
showing the number of persons actually killed by each of them.

Proven conspiracy could have overcome the difficulty.

Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as
though each one performed the act of each one of the conspirators. Each one
is criminally responsible for each one of the deaths and injuries of the several
victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48. The
applicability of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the
definitional phrase "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies." This is not an original reading of the law. In People v. Hon.
Pineda,101 the Court already recognized the "deeply rooted x x x doctrine that
when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate
and distinct crimes." As we observed in People v. Tabaco,102 clarifying the
applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, this Court further stated
in Hon. Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, x x x there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into
the law."103

With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the separate
crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted
murder.

As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed
upon appellants is reclusion perpetua for each count, pursuant to paragraph 2,
Article 63104 of the Revised Penal Code.105

Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. The
penalty prescribed by law for murder, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death,
should be reduced by two degrees, conformably to Article 51106 of the Revised
Penal Code. Under paragraph 2, Article 61,107 in relation to Article 71 of the

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Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is prision mayor. There being neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the same should be imposed in its
medium period pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 64108 of the Revised Penal
Code.109 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the case of attempted
murder, the maximum shall be taken from the medium period of prision
mayor, which is 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, while the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any
of its periods, the range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. This Court,
therefore, imposed upon the appellants the indeterminate penalty of 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision
mayor, as maximum, for each count of attempted murder.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. HC No. 00246 dated 18 June 2008 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
(1) appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
murder thereby imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count; (2) appellants are also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
seven (7) counts of attempted murder thereby imposing upon them the
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count; (3) other
than the civil indemnity and moral damages already awarded by the trial
court and the appellate court, appellants are further ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, exemplary and temperate damages in the amount
of P 30,000.00 and P 25,000.00, respectively, to the heirs of each deceased
victims; and (4) appellants are also directed to pay, jointly and severally,
Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito the amount
of P 40,000.00 each as moral damages, P 25,000.00 each as temperate damages
and P 30,000.00 each as exemplary damages.

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